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  • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIllUIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlUllIIIItIIIIIItllIIIIIIIIIIItillIIIIUSFC2007-7152-02

    {BC4E2C6D-DOE2-4782-A6E7-3269367F11A2}

    {83258}{63-070620 110514}{061207}

    RESPONDENT'SBRIEF

  • BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

    2007-7152

    MICHAEL R. BAXENDALE,

    e%_,5%_ __% Claimant-Appellant,

    _n-- R. JAMES NICHOLSON,

    _cretary of Veterans Affairs,

    _ _ Respondent-Appellee.

    ON APPEAL FROM

    THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS IN

    04-2492, JUDGE MARY J. SCHOELEN

    PETER D. KEISLER

    Assistant Attorney General

    OF COUNSEL:

    MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI

    Deputy Assistant

    General Counsel

    MARTIE ADELMAN

    Attorney

    Department of Veterans

    Affairs

    810 Vermont Ave., N.W.

    Washington, D.C. 20420

    JEANNE E. DAVIDSON

    Director

    MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.

    Assistant Director

    ROBERT E. CHANDLER

    Trial Attorney

    Commercial Litigation Branch

    Civil Division

    Department of Justice

    Attn: Classification Unit

    ii00 L Street, N.W.

    Washington, D.C. 20530

    Tale: (202) 514-4678

    Attorneys for Respondent-

    Appellee

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS

    TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i

    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... ii

    STATEMENT OF COUNSEL ......................................... iv

    STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ....................................... 1

    STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................... 2

    I. Nature Of The Case .................................. 2

    II. Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

    Below ............................................... 2

    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................... 6

    ARGUMENT ...................................................... 7

    I. Standard And Scope Of Review ........................ 7

    II. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider Mr.

    Baxendale's Argument ................................ 9

    III. VA Does Not Have A Duty To Obtain A Medical Opinion To

    Determine Whether A Claimant Is Entitled To An Earlier

    Effective Date When The Existing Evidence Of Record

    Provides A Sufficient Basis To Assign An Effective

    Date ............................................... I0

    A. The Veterans Court's Decision Is Consistent With

    38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) .......................... I0

    B. The Veterans Court's Decision Is Consistent With

    38 U.S.C. § 5103A ............................. 13

    IV. Mr. Baxendale's Argument Regarding Section 5110 And Its

    Implementing Regulation Is Without Merit ........... 16

    CONCLUSION ................................................... 20

  • TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

    CASES

    Baxendale v. Principi,

    18 Vet. App. 419 (2003) .................................. 4

    Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

    441 U.S. 281 (1979) ..................................... 12

    Dalton v. Nicholson,

    21 Vet. App. 23 (2007) .............................. 16, 18

    Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

    791 F.2d 846 (llth Cir. 1986) ........................... 19

    Dinqess v. Nicholson,

    19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd, Nos. 06-7247 & 7312 (Fed.

    Cir. June 5, 2007) ....................................... 5

    Dixon v. United States,

    381 U.S. 68 (1965) ...................................... 14

    Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,

    425 U.S. 185 (1976) ..................................... 14

    Gobber v. Derwinski,

    2 Vet. App. 470 (1992) .............................. ii, 16

    Hilkert v. West,

    12 Vet. App. 145 (1999) ................................. II

    In re Watts,

    354 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................... 19

    Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

    297 U.S. 129 (1936) ..................................... 14

    Michael R. Baxendale v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of

    Veterans Affairs,

    No. 99-159, 2001 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1,048 (Vet.

    App. Aug. 9, 2001) ....................................... 3

    ii

  • Michael R. Baxendale v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary of Veterans

    Affairs,

    No. 04-2492 (Vet. App. Dec. 13, 2006) .................... 2

    Prenzler v. Derwinski,

    928 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ............................ 8

    Quarles v. Derwinski,

    3 Vet. App. 129 (1992) .................................. 18

    Scott v. Brown,

    7 Vet. App. 184 (1994) .................................. 18

    United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,

    455 U.S. 16 (1981) ...................................... 14

    STATUTES

    38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) ..................................... passim

    38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) .......................................... 6

    38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2),Section 3.400(0) (2) ............ 3, 4, 17

    38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) ........................................... 6

    38 U.S.C. § 5103A ........................................ passim

    38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) .......................................... 16

    38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (2) ........................... 17, 18, 19, 20

    38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) .................................... 8, 9, ii

    38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (i) . Section 7292(d) (2) .................... 9

    38 U.S.C. § 7292 (e) (i) ...................................... 9

    38 U.S.C. § 7929(d)(2) ....................................... 10

    Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 ........................... 3

    iii

  • STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

    Pursuant to Rule 47.5, respondent-appellee's counsel states

    that this action was previously before this Court as Michael R.

    Baxendale v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

    No. 02-7148, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 12,749 (Fed. Cir. June 9,

    2004), in which this Court granted appellant's unopposed motion

    to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Respondent-appellee's

    counsel states that he is unaware of any case pending before

    this Court which will directly affect or be directly affected by

    this Court's decision in this appeal.

    iv

  • BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURTOF APPEALSFOR THE FEDERALCIRCUIT

    2007-7152

    MICHAEL R.

    v.

    BAXENDALEClaimant -Appellant,

    R. JAMES NICHOLSON,

    Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

    Respondent-Appellee.

    STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

    i. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider

    Mr. Baxendale's contention that the Department of Veterans

    Affairs ("VA") did not comply with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a).

    2. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans

    Claims ("Veterans Court") properly determined that VA did not

    have a duty to obtain a medical opinion to determine whether

    Mr. Baxendale's service-connected disability worsened in the

    year prior to the date VA received his claim for an increased

    rating.

  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE

    I. Nature Of The Case

    The appellant, Michael R. Baxendale, appeals the

    December 13, 2006, decision of the Veterans Court in Michael R.

    Baxendale v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

    No. 04-2492 (Vet. App. Dec. 13, 2006), which affirmed an

    October 29, 2004, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals

    (the "board") denying entitlement for an effective date earlier

    than August 17, 1992, for a i00 percent disability rating for

    his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").

    II. Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings Below

    Mr. Baxendale had active.duty service in the United States

    Marine Corps from February 1969 to August 1970. JA i. 1 In

    August 1991, the VA regional office ("RO") awarded Mr. Baxendale

    an increased disability rating of 50 percent for his service-

    connected PTSD. JA i. On January 4, 1993, VA received a letter

    from Mr. Baxendale's attorney, requesting that the RO accept his

    letter as a request for an increased rating. JA 1-2. In a

    December 1995 decision, the RO increased the disability rating

    to 100 percent, effective January 4, 1993. JA 2.

    On February 5, 1996, the RO received a notice of

    disagreement ("NOD") from Mr. Baxendale's attorney regarding the

    1 "JA" refers to the joint appendix filed in this case.

  • RO's December 1995 decision. JA 2. In an October 1998

    decision, the board awarded an effective date of August 17,

    1992, for the i00 percent rating for PTSD because that "was 'the

    earliest date on which it was factually ascertainable'" that

    Mr. Baxendale's disability had increased. JA 2. A VA

    psychiatrist's memorandum dated August 17, 1992, stated that

    Mr. Baxendale "should not work because any change in his stress

    level would seriously harm his tenuous emotional state." JA 2.

    Because the psychiatrist's memorandum was dated within one year

    prior to Mr. Baxendale's January 4, 1993 increased-rating claim,

    the board assigned an effective date of August 17, 1992, as

    provided in 38 C.F.R. _ 3.400(0) (2) .2 JA 2.

    Mr. Baxendale twice appealed to the Veterans Court, which

    remanded each time for the board to consider VA's compliance

    with the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 ("VCAA"), Pub.

    L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096. Michael R. Baxendale v. Anthony

    J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, No. 99-159, 2001

    r

    U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1,048 (Vet. App. Aug. 9, 2001);

    Baxendale v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 419 (2003) (table); JA 2.

    2 Section 3.400(o)(2) of title 38,'Code of Federal

    Regulations, states that the effective date of an increase

    in disability compensation is "[e]arliest date as of which

    it is factually ascertainable that an increase in

    disability had occurred if claim is received within 1 year

    from such date otherwise, date of receipt of claim."

  • On October 29, 2004, the board issued a decision finding

    that Mr. Baxendale filed his claim for an increased rating on

    January 4, 1993. JA 2, 60. The board also found that VA

    provided notice as required by the VCAA. JA 54-57. The board

    found that it was not necessary for VA to obtain a medical

    opinion to determine whether an increase in disability was

    factually ascertainable in the one year prior to the date on

    which Mr. Baxendale's increased-rating claim was filed because

    "the evidence of record was 'sufficient to establish the

    necessary factual basis' for [its] conclusions" and any opinion

    rendered 14 years after the claim was filed would be "purely

    speculative." JA 3 (quoting JA 57). The board found that

    August 17, 1992, the date of the VA psychiatrist's report, was

    the earliest date on which the record indicated that a

    disability rating in excess of 50 percent was warranted for

    Mr. Baxendale's PTSD. JA 3, 60-61. The board therefore

    concluded that, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o) (2), the effective

    date for Mr. Baxendale's i00 percent disability rating was

    August 17, 1992. JA 3, 53, 63.

    In a December 1!, 2006 decision, the Veterans Court

    rejected Mr. Baxendafe's argument that VA had a duty to assist

    by obtaining a "'retrospective' medical opinion" to determine

    whether his PTSD increased in severity in the one year prior to

    his January 4, 1993 increased-rating claim. JA 3, 4-5. The

    4

  • Veterans Court affirmed the board's conclusion that there was

    sufficient medical evidence in the record to declde

    Mr. Baxendale's contention that he was entitled to an earlier

    effective date for the i00 percent rating without obtaining a

    new medical opinion. JA 5. The Veterans Court stated that

    "[t]he board reviewed the extensive records of treatment in 1991

    and 1992 before finding that the August 17, 1992 VA

    psychiatrist's report was the earliest evidence of record

    indicating an increase in disability." JA 5. The Veterans

    Court found that, in light of this evidence and Mr. Baxendale's

    failure to discuss why the evidence of record was insufficient,

    the board's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to

    decide the claim is not clearly erroneous. JA 5.

    The Veterans Court next found that Mr. Baxendale's claim

    for an increased rating was substantiated in December 1995,

    prior to enactment of the VCAA, when the RO awarded a

    I00 percent rating with an effective date. JA 6. The Veterans

    Court therefore found that 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) is not applicable

    to Mr. Baxendale's claim. JA 6; see Din@ess v. Nicholson, 19

    Vet. App. 473, 490 (2006), aff'd, Nos. 06-7247 & 7312 (Fed. Cir.

    June 5, 2007).

    The Veterans Court also rejected Mr. Baxendale's argument

    that the board misapplied 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) by not finding

    that May 8, 1992, was the date on which he filed an informal

    5

  • claim for an increased rating. JA 7. The Veterans Court found

    no error in the board's application of the presumption of

    regularity because Mr. Baxendale did not point to any clear

    evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity. JA 7. The

    Veterans Court therefore affirmed the board's decision. JA I,

    9.

    The Veterans Court issued its judgment on January 5, 2007,

    and Mr. Baxendale filed his notice of appeal to this Court on

    February 20, 2007. JA 10, II.

    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

    This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider

    Mr. Baxendale's argument that the Veterans Court erred in

    affirming the board's finding that VA fulfilled its duty to

    assist him in developing the facts pertinent to his request for

    an earlier effective date under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), because it

    involves factual determinations and the Veterans Court's

    application of section 3.103(a) to the facts of his case.

    Assuming for purposes of argument that this Court has

    jurisdiction to consider Mr. Baxendale's argument, the general

    statement in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) that VA is obligated to

    "assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the

    claim," does not support his argument that VA was required to

    obtain a medical opinion to determine whether his disability

    became totally disabling prior to August 17, 1992, the effective

    6

  • date assigned by the board for his increased rating. 3 The

    Veterans Court properly affirmed the board's finding that it was

    not necessary to obtain such an opinion because the evidence of

    record was sufficient to establish the necessary basis for its

    effective-date finding and such an opinion would be speculative.

    The Veterans Court's conclusion that VA does not have a

    duty to obtain a medical opinion to determine whether

    Mr. Baxendale's disability increased in the year before he filed

    his increased rating claim is consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 5103A.

    ARGUMENT

    I. Standard and Scope of Review.

    Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), this Court has

    jurisdiction to review a Veterans Court decision with respect to

    the validity or interpretation of any statute or regulation

    relied upon by that court in making that decision or with

    respect to the validity of the decision on a rule of law. In

    3 Mr. Baxendale's brief is inconsist#nt in its assertion of

    the date that should_be the starting point for the one-year

    period for retroactive determination' of his disability

    increase. He argues fat various points that VA was

    obligated to provide a medical opinion as to whether his

    disability increased 'in the one year!prior to the date of

    his increased-rating Iclaim, which was January 4, 1993.

    Appellant's Brief ("Abp. Br.") at 1, 4-5, 17. At other

    points in his brief, however, Mr. Baxendale contends that

    he was entitled to a retrospective opinion concerning

    whether his disability increased in the one year prior to

    August 17, 1992, the date of the VA opinion upon which the

    board relied to assign the effective date of the increased

    rating. App. Br. at 15, 18.

  • reviewing a Veterans Court decision, the Court must decide "all

    relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional

    and statutory provisions" and must set aside any regulation or

    interpretation thereof "other than a determination as to a

    factual matter" relied upon by the Veterans Court that it finds

    to be "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

    otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to

    constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in

    excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or

    in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of

    procedure required by law." 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (i).

    Section 7292(d) (2) of title 38, United States Code, provides

    that, except to the extent that an appeal from a Veterans Court

    decision presents a constitutional issue, this Court "may not

    review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a

    challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a

    particular case."

    This Court may review legal determinations of the Veterans

    Court under a de novo standard. Prenzler v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d

    392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Upon such review, the Court may

    "affirm or, if the decision of the [Veterans Court] is not in

    accordance with law, modify or reverse the decision of the

    [Veterans Court] or remand the matter, as appropriate."

    38 U.S.C. § 7292(e)(i).

  • II. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To ConsiderMr. Baxendale's Argument

    Mr. Baxendale contends that the Veterans Court

    "misinterpreted" 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) by finding that VA was not

    required to assist in the development of his claim, for an

    earlier effective date for his i00 percent disability rating, by

    obtaining a medical opinion regarding whether his disability

    increased in the year prior to the date on which his claim for

    an increased rating was filed. App. Br. at 5-6, 15-16. Under

    section 3.103(a), VA is required to "assist a claimant in

    developing facts pertinent to the claim." Mr. Baxendale argues

    that one of the ways in which VA could have developed facts

    pertinent to his claim was to obtain a "retrospective" medical

    opinion concerning whether his disability increased prior to

    August 17, 1992. App. Br. at 15.

    This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider

    Mr. Baxendale's argument because the question of whether VA

    complied with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) is a matter involving factual

    determinations and application of law to the facts ofI

    Mr. Baxendale's case. 38 U.S.C. § 7929(d) (2). The board found

    that the RO obtained !"all relevant evidence necessary for an

    equitable disposition of the veteran's claim for an earlier

    effective date for" the I00 percent disability rating. JA 52.

    In addition, the board found that "the evidence of record

  • is sufficient to establish the necessary factual basis for its

    conclusions" and that any opinion rendered 14 years after the

    increased-rating claim was filed "would be speculative." JA 57.

    The Veterans Court held that the board's findings are

    "supported by substantial evidence of record." JA 5. The

    Veterans Court further found:

    The Board reviewed the extensive records of treatment

    in 1991 and 1992 before finding that the August 17,

    1992, VA psychiatrist's report was the earliest

    evidence of record indicating an increase in

    disability. [Citations omitted] In light of this

    evidence and the appellant's failure to discuss why it

    was insufficient, the Board's conclusion that there

    was sufficient medical evidence of record to decide

    the claim is not clearly erroneous and, therefore,

    remand for a new VA medical opinion is not warranted.

    JA 5. It is clear that Mr. Baxendale's appeal involves a

    challenge to these factual findings and to the Veterans

    Court's application of law to the facts of his case. This

    Court does not have jurisdiction to consider such matters,

    as provided in 38 U.S°C. § 7292(d), and should therefore

    decline to consider Mr. Baxendale's appeal.

    III. VA Does Not Have A Duty To Obtain A Medical Opinion To

    Determine Whether A Claimant Is Entitled To An Earlier

    Effective Date When The Existing Evidence Of Record

    Provides A Sufficient Basis To Assign An Effective Date

    I

    A. The Veterans Court's Decision Is Consistent

    With 38 C°F.R. 3.103

    Assuming for purposes of argument that this Court has

    jurisdiction to consider Mr. Baxendale's argument that VA was

    I0

  • obligated under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) to obtain a medical opinion

    to determine whether his disability increased prior to August

    17, 1992, Mr. Baxendale's claim is without merit. App. Br. at

    15, 18. Section 3.103(a) of title 38, Code of Federal

    Regulations, states generally that "it is the obligation of VA

    to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the

    claim and to render a decision which grants every benefit that

    can be supported in law while protecting the interests of the

    Government." Nothing in this general statement suggests that VA

    was required to obtain a medical opinion regarding whether

    Mr. Baxendale's PTSD became totally disabling prior to

    August 17, 1992, in the absence of any suggestion by

    Mr. Baxendale that such evidence existed. 4

    The duty to assist requires VA to assist claimants, rather

    than to unilaterally seek out and develop all possible sources

    of evidence. See Hilkert v. West, 12 Vet. App. 145, 151 (1999 ;

    Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992) (VA's duty to

    assist does not encompass "a duty to prove a claim with the

    claimant only in a passive role"). If the evidence of record in

    4 The board found that "_[t]here is no indication that any

    pertinent evidence was not received, which is obtainable,"

    and that Mr. Baxendale's representative "has not identified

    any specific evidence' to;be obtained." JA 54. The board

    found that VA had obtained "extensive VA outpatient recordsI ,

    and VA examinations reports' covering the relevant period,

    as well as Mr. Baxendale's records from the Social Security

    Administration. JA 54.

    Ii

  • a particular case provides a sufficient basis to assign an

    effective date or if a claimant does not point to evidence

    indicating that he or she was disabled in the year prior to the

    date of the claim, the duty to assist does not require VA to

    request a wholly speculative medical opinion regarding the

    issue.

    The statement in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), that it is VA's

    obligation "to assist a claimant in developing the facts

    pertinent to the claim," is identified in the heading of

    section 3.103(a) as a "[s]tatement of policy" and does not

    purport to define the scope or application of VA's duty to

    assist. See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,

    302 n.31 (1979) (suggesting that general statements of policy do

    not have force and effect of law and are issued by agency to

    advise public prospectively of manner in which agency proposes

    to exercise discretionary power). In stating its policy to

    provide assistance to claimants, VA did not indicate that it was

    unconditionally required to assist claimants without regard to

    whether a particular assertion by a claimant was plausible or

    r

    reasonably capable of substantfation _ The general policy stated

    in section 3.103(a), therefore, is most reasonably viewed in

    harmony with the corresponding statutory provision governing the

    VA's duty to assist, as explained, below.

    12

  • B. The Veterans Court's Decision Is Consistent With38 U.S.C. § 5103A

    Mr. Baxendale concedes that the Veterans Court rejected his

    argument that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d), VA was required to

    provide a medical opinion to determine whether he became totally

    disabled prior to August 17, 1992. App. Br. at 5 n.2; JA 23,

    32-34. Mr. Baxendale states in his opening brief filed with

    this Court that the Veterans Court's "statutory interpretation

    is correct and not challenged by this appeal. ''5 App. Br. at 5.

    He instead argues before this Court that the Veterans Court

    failed to take into consideration 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), which he

    states is "apparently inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (1)

    and (2)." App. Br. at 15. He contends that 38 C.F.R.

    § 3.103(a) required VA to obtain a medical opinion to determine

    whether he was entitled to an effective date prior to the date

    established by the evidence of record. App. Br. at 6, 15-16.

    Mr. Baxendale's argument is without merit.

    s Mr. Baxendale errs in describing the Veterans Court's

    holding with regard to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A. He states that

    the Veterans Court "concluded that § 5103A(a) is limited to

    existing records and that medical examinations under

    § 5103(d) [sic] are not available to claimants who seek anJ

    increased rating." App. Br. at 5. In fact, the Veterans

    Court rejected Mr. Baxendale's argument that VA has a duty

    "to obtain records that he failed to identify to VA, [and]

    that he cannot now identify to the Court." JA 4; see 38

    U.S.C. § 5103A(b) (i). Th# Veterans Court affirmed the

    board's finding that the_ record contained sufficient

    medical evidence to decide Mr. Baxendale's request for an

    earlier effective date. JA 5.

    13

  • Every agency action must fit reasonably within the

    statutory framework established by Congress. "The rulemaking

    power granted to an administrative agency charged with the

    administration of a federal statute is not the power to make

    law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry

    into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.'"

    Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976)

    (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), and

    Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

    297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)). Moreover, an agency's regulation

    must also be consistent with a governing statute's purpose and

    design. Se___eeUnited States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16,

    26 (1981).

    Congress has specifically provided in 38 U.S.C.

    § 5103A(d) (I) that, "[i]n the case of a claim for disability

    compensation," VA must provide a medical examination or obtain a

    medical opinion when "necessary to make a decision on the

    claim." The board found that there was sufficient competent

    medical evidence in the record to decide whether Mr. Baxendale

    was entitled to an earlier effective date for the i00 percent

    disability rating, and the Veterans Court found that the board's

    finding was not clearly erroneous. JA 5. Therefore, the

    Veterans Court properly found that it was not "necessary" for VA

    to obtain a medical opinion under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) to

    14

  • determine whether Mr. Baxendale's disability increased prior to

    August 17, 1992.

    Moreover, VA's duty to assist does not relieve Mr.

    Baxendale from his "responsibility to present and support a

    claim for benefits. ''6 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a). Congress has

    provided in 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) (3) that VA may defer assistance

    "pending the submission by the claimant of essential information

    missing from the claimant's application," and Congress has

    directed in 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b) (I) that VA's obligation to

    obtain "relevant records" extends only to records that "the

    claimant adequately identifies." As the Veterans Court pointed

    out, Mr. Baxendale "argues that it was VA's obligation to find

    evidence indicating that his PTSD increased in severity prior to

    August 17, 1992." JA 4. Mr. Baxendale did not point to any

    evidence in existence showing an increase in disability prior to

    that date, and in fact contended that "it is not his burden to

    point out such records." JA 4, 54. Mr. Baxendale's argument

    that 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) requires VA to undertake a fishing

    expedition to determine whether any medical evidence can be

    obtained to potentially support an effective date earlier than

    6 Section 5107(a) of title 38, United States Code, states:

    "Claimant responsibility. Except as otherwise provided by

    law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and

    support a claim for benefits under laws administered by the

    Secretary."

    15

  • that established by the existing evidence is at odds with title

    38, United States Code. See Gobber, 2 Vet. App. at 472.

    Therefore, 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) cannot be read in the manner

    proposed by Mr. Baxendale.

    IV. Mr. Baxendale's Argument Regarding Section 5110 And Its

    Implementing Regulation Is Without Merit

    Mr. Baxendale next contends that the Veterans Court

    misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (2) and its implementing

    regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(0)(2), by impermissibly shifting

    the duty to develop evidence to support an earlier effective

    date to him. App. Br. at 17. The statute and regulation

    provide that the effective date of an award of increased

    disability compensation is "the earliest date as of which it is

    ascertainable that an increase in disability had occurred," if

    the application for an increased rating is received within one

    year from such date. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (2); 38 C.F.R.

    § 3.400(o) (2). 7 Mr. Baxendale contends that the statute and

    regulation required VA to develop facts pertinent to whether it

    Lwas "ascertainable" that he was totally disabled prior to

    August 17, 1992. App. Br. at 17-18. Mr. Baxendale argues that,r

    Lin Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 34 (2007), the Veterans

    I

    Thus, the earliest!possible effective date for7

    Mr. Baxendale's increased! rating is January 4, 1992, which

    is one year from January 4, 1993, the date on which he

    filed the claim.

    16

  • Court recognized that a veteran is entitled to consideration of

    an effective date under section 5110(b) (2) when a claimant is

    awarded an increased rating for a service-connected disability

    and that "[t]he relationship between the VA's duty to assist

    under . 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) is evident and required by the

    plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (b) (2) . " App. Br. at 18.

    We do not dispute that 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) is the

    appropriate statutory provision for determining the effective

    date of an increase in disability compensation. However, we

    fail to see how the statute and its implementing regulation

    require VA to obtain a medical opinion regarding whether

    Mr. Baxendale is entitled to an effective date earlier than the

    date found by the RO based on the evidence of record.

    Also, Mr. Baxendale's reliance on Dalton is misplaced. In

    Dalton, the Veterans Court held that a grant of a rating for

    total disability based upon individual unemployability based

    upon the worsening of a previously service-connected condition

    that renders the veteran unable to secure or follow a

    J

    substantially gainfulloccupation is an award of increased

    compensation for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (2). 21 Vet.

    App. at 34. The Veterans Court, in describing the board's

    obligation to assist the claimant on remand, instructed thei

    board "to search the record to determine whether it is factually

    ascertainable that in the one year prior to application there

    17

  • was an increase in disability." Id. (emphasis added). In

    support of this statement, the Veterans Court cited Scott v.

    Brown, 7 Vet. App. 184, 189 (1994), in which the court approved

    the board's consideration of "'all the evidence of record'" for

    the year preceding the claim to determine whether the veteran's

    disability increased in severity. Id. (emphasis added).

    There is no indication in Dalton or Scott that VA is

    required under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (2) or 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(0) (2)

    to obtain a medical opinion to determine whether the onset of an

    increase in disability occurred prior to the date established by

    the evidence of record. Rather, these cases support the

    Veterans Court's conclusion in Mr. Baxendale's case that VA was

    not required to develop new evidence to determine whether he was

    entitled to an earlier effective date. As the Veterans Court

    held in this case, the board properly reviewed the extensive

    record before concluding that the evidence did not support an

    earlier effective date. JA5. In fact, the Veterans Court

    stated in Quarles v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 129, 135 (1992),

    that "evidence in a claimant's file which demonstrates that an

    increase in disability was 'ascertainable' up to one year prior

    to the claimant's submissionl of a 'claim' for VA compensation

    should be dispositive on thelquestion of an effective date forI

    any award that ensues." (Emphasls added). Thus, this Court

    should affirm the Veterans Court's finding that VA had no duty

    18

  • to develop evidence pertinent to an effective-date determination

    under section 5110(b) (2) in Mr. Baxendale's case.

    Finally, Mr. Baxendale argues that the Veterans Court's

    decision relieving VA of its obligation to obtain a medical

    opinion was prejudicial. App. Br. at 19-20. Mr. Baxendale has

    failed to identify any existing evidence of entitlement to an

    earlier effective date that VA failed to obtain. JA 4. In

    addition, he fails to allege that he is in fact entitled to an

    earlier effective date. Rather, as the Veterans Court pointed

    out, Mr. Baxendale argues that it is "VA's obligation to find

    evidence indicating that his PTSD increased in severity prior to

    August 17, 1992." JA 4. As this Court has stated, "[t]he

    purpose of the rule [of prejudicial error] is to avoid wasteful

    proceedings on remand where there is no reason to believe a

    different result would have been obtained had the error not

    occurred." In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

    Mr. Baxendale's assertion that VA was required to develop

    evidence "'pertinent' to whether it was 'factually

    ascertainable'" that his disability increased prior to

    August 17, 1992, does not demonstrate that any VA error in fact

    affected the effective date assigned by the RO. App. Br. at 18;

    Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 846, 850 n.6 (Ii th- Cir.

    1986) (plaintiff "never asserted . that any additional

    19

  • information existed that he could submit should he receive .

    full notice").

    CONCLUSION

    For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss

    Mr. Baxendale's appeal or alternatively affirm the decision of

    the Veterans Court.

    Respectfully submitted,

    PETER D. KEISLER

    Assistant Attorney General

    OF COUNSEL:

    MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI

    Deputy Assistant

    General Counsel

    MARTIE ADELMAN

    Attorney

    Department of Veterans

    Affairs

    810 Vermont Ave., N.W.

    Washington, D.C. 20420

    JEANNE E. DAVIDSON

    Director

    O reo or

    ROBERT E. CHANDLER

    Trial Attorney

    Commercial Litigation

    Branch

    Civil Division

    Department of Justice

    Attn: Classification Unit

    ii00 L Street, N.W.

    Washington, D.C. 20530

    Tele: (202) 514-4678

    Attorneys for Respondent-

    Appellee

    June 12, 2007

    2O

  • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

    I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on this/_day of June, 2007, I

    caused to be placed in the United States mail (first-class, postage prepaid) copies

    of"BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, R. JAMES NICHOLSON" addressed as follows:

    Kenneth M. Carpenter

    1525 Southwest Topeka Blvd.

    Topeka, KS 66601