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October 2011 Final
Final evaluation report
Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with Stakeholder Participation in Management - GCP/SRL/057/CAN
Office of Evaluation
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations
2
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
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___________________________________________________________________________ The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or of its Member States and partners.
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Acknowledgements
The evaluator would like to express his gratitude to everyone in Sri Lanka who assisted him
in his work. Particular thanks is due to the project staff who, despite the demands being made
on them in the last days of the project, were always helpful and willing to assist and made the
task both interesting and informative.
Composition of the Evaluation team
Evaluation team
Prof. Roderick L. Stirrat, social development and small scale fisheries expert
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Table of contents
List of Acronyms 5 Executive Summary 6
1 Introduction 10 1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation 10 1.2 Methodology of the evaluation 10 2 Context of the project 11 3 Project concept and relevance 12
3.1 Project Design 12 3.2 Relevance 15 4 Project Implementation 16 4.1 Key events in the project‟s life 16
4.2 Budget and expenditure 17 4.3 Project management 18 4.4 Technical backstopping 19
4.5 Government support 19 5 Results and contributions to stated objectives 21
5.1 Outputs and outcomes 21 5.1.1 Output 1: Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site
rehabilitation and management 21 5.1.2 Output 2: Fisheries landing centres rehabilitated in 15 districts 23 5.1.3 Output 3: Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour
management developed and implemented (and livelihoods improved) 26 5.1.4 Project Outcome: Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-
sustaining as a result of stakeholder participation in management. 27 5.2 Gender issues 28
5.3 Impact and sustainability 29 5.3.1 Infrastructure 29
5.3.2 Frameworks for community participation 29 6 Conclusions 30 7 Recommendations 32
8 Lessons Learned 33 Annex 1. Terms of reference 34
Annex 2. Brief profile of the evaluation team 39 Annex 3. Documents consulted 39 Annex 4. Itinerary and list of persons met 41
Annex 5. Original Project Logical Framework 43 Annex 6. Revised Project Logical Framework 46
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List of Acronyms
AD Assistant Director (DFAR)
ADB Asian Development Bank
CBO Community Based Organization
CCD Coast Conservation Department
CFHC Ceylon Fisheries Harbours Corporation
DFAR Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CTA Chief Technical Advisor
FCICSL Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka
FCS Fisheries Cooperative Society
FI Fisheries Inspector
FLC Fish Landing Centres/Sites
GoSL Government of Sri Lanka
ICEIDA Icelandic International Development Cooperation Agency
IFAD International Fund for Agriculture
LTO FAO Lead Technical Officer
MFARD Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Development
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NARA National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency
NSC National Steering Committee
OED FAO Office of Evaluation
PMU Project Management Unit
RFLP Regional Fisheries Livelihood Project
RTE Real Time Evaluation
SANDS Shoreline and Near Shore Data Systems
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Executive Summary
Information about the evaluation
ES1. The project, „Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with
Stakeholder Participation‟ (GCP/SRL/057/CAN) was a post-Tsunami project in Sri Lanka
funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with a total amount of
USD 4.9 million. It started in April 2008 and was completed on 30 September 2011.
ES2. The Project Document included provisions for a final evaluation and the parties
involved – the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), CIDA, FAO Sri Lanka, the FAO Lead
Technical Officer (LTO) and the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) agreed that a final
evaluation would be useful „to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be
useful for future projects‟.
ES3. The Evaluation was carried out in late August-early September 2011 and included a
presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions at the final project workshop. It
followed the methodological guidance provided in the ToR: this included a review of a range
of available documents and interviews with project staff, with staff of government
departments with which the project interacted, and with relevant others. In addition, field
visits were made to 15 project sites. During these visits the physical results of project
activities were viewed, meetings between project staff and members of the fishing
communities observed, and a range of individuals interviewed.
ES4. Owing to unforeseen problems, the evaluation team was reduced to one member, the
identified national consultant, a fishery expert, withdrawing at the last moment from the
assignment. This seriously restricted the overall expertise of the team, especially in the
context of assessing the economic and financial aspects of the project. In addition, this
evaluation lacks the insights which are developed by a multi-disciplinary team.
Key findings and conclusions
ES5. The project was formulated in 2007 as part of the broader FAO‟s support to the
Government in the aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami that caused widespread
destruction along much of the coast of Sri Lanka affecting not only fishing craft and gear but
also fisheries-related infrastructure such as buildings and roads.
ES6. Project design was finalised in 2007 and focused on three key areas of activity:
i. Strengthening the capacity of the Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation (CFHC)
to manage and coordinate the rehabilitation of fish landing sites,
ii. Carry out the rehabilitation of fish landing sites in 15 (later reduced to 13)
districts,
iii. Develop and implement frameworks for community participation in fish landing
site management.
ES7. Through these activities it was argued that the „livelihoods of fishers and fishing
communities in tsunami affected areas [will] be improved.
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ES8. In the context of building capacity in the CFHC, the project envisaged an ambitious
training scheme for CFHC staff, the establishment of a unit in the CFHC to design and
manage harbours and fish landing sites, and major improvements in data and information
management systems. As far as fish landing sites were concerned, the project planned to
carry out infrastructure activities in 80 sites whilst establishing forms of „community
management‟ to ensure the sustainability of these infrastructural developments.
ES9. The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR) was designated as the
implementing agency but the project was situated in the CFHC where a Project Management
Unit (PMU) and a Design Unit were to be established. The Department of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (DFAR) was to be involved in the establishment and management of fish
landing sites with the help of NGOs.
ES10. In terms of relevance, the project‟s strategy and objectives were broadly in line with
GoSL policies. In terms of FAO‟s current strategic objectives, the project does relate to two
of the organisational results in the 2010-2011 Plan of Work. However, design in terms of the
logical relationship between capacity building in the CFHC, building infrastructure and
establishing community management of assets on the one hand, and improvements in the
livelihoods of fishing families and communities on the other is not made clear. Whilst the
objective was couched in terms of livelihoods, project activities focused on physical assets
and their management, not livelihoods.
ES11. Overall, general project management was good given the shortcomings in project
design and the difficulties of the institutional environment in which the project was operating.
Project management took decisions quickly, and adopted a flexible attitude to changing
situations.
ES12. There were, however, problems. Delays in starting the project coupled with delays in
implementing construction works (partly due to bad weather) made it difficult for the project
to achieve its outputs within the project timeframe. It quickly became apparent that the CFHC
had only a marginal interest in fish landing sites and the project found itself taking on roles
which had been seen as those of the CFHC. During project implementation the role of the
DFAR became increasingly important.
ES13. As far as training was concerned, 856 people attended courses supported by the
project, almost 50% from the DFAR and the balance from CFHC (around 30%) and the
MFARD. Around 33% of all staff in MFARD, DFAR and CFHC received some sort of
training supported by the project. Topics covered included planning, monitoring and
evaluation, Harbour engineering and contract management and management of community
organisations. In addition, there were courses on livelihoods and on social mobilisation and
study tours to India and the Philippines were organised by the project. The CFHC, the DFAR,
the MFARD and the National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency
(NARA) also received assistance in terms of equipment and software. Overall, the training
and other assistance supplied by the project did enhance the knowledge of members of these
organisations. However, the lack of an integrated and inclusive approach to capacity building
and problematic relations between the project and GoSL affected the full potential of the
project in terms of training and capacity building were not realised and the long term
sustainability of project outputs was jeopardised.
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ES14. The original target of working in 80 fish landing sites was always over-optimistic
given logistical and financial constraints. The project was active in 42 sites of which 23 were
open and in use by the end of the project. The infrastructure rehabilitated or constructed
ranged from road construction through to small complexes of buildings and in one case an
office for the Fisheries Assistant Director. There were delays in the construction process but
the CTA estimated that 95% of construction work was completed by the end of the project. In
some cases there were issues as to the siting of infrastructure, for instance fish sales points.
ES15. One of the central issues the project was how to address the long term maintenance
and management of the infrastructure established by the project at the FLCs. The project
sought to realise this output through local level CBOs, in most cases cooperative societies,
and through establishing business plans which would ensure long term sustainable
management of the sites. The project worked closely with DFAR staff to establish these
management groups and agree business plans with them. In some cases this initiative
promises well. In others there are issues as to how far the business plans are fully understood
and there are questions as to whether sufficient training in their use has been given.
ES16. Gender was not a central issue in this project and although the needs assessment paid
attention to the numbers of women involved in various activities, there was no gender
analysis. However, given the major role that women play in post-harvest activities in much of
Sri Lanka, women were involved in the organisations which it is planned will manage the fish
landing sites and were involved in meetings convened by the project. The project itself
estimates that „more than 10%‟ of project beneficiaries were women.
ES17. The project received good support from the Lead Technical Officer (LTO) although
it would have benefitted from inputs on participatory management and capacity building. The
Chief Technical Advisor would also have benefitted from greater training in FAO
procurement procedures. As far as FAOR is concerned, a more proactive stance especially in
encouraging and nurturing contacts between the various FAO fisheries projects active in Sri
Lanka would have been helpful to all whilst delays in the payment of invoices created
problems for the project.
ES18. Given that the project came to an end at the time of this evaluation, the following
recommendations are all addressed to FAO at corporate level.
ES19. It emerged in the analysis of this project that failures in planning were key to many
of the problems the project faced. Hence, Recommendation 1 focuses on project formulation
aspects.
Recommendation 1 To FAO on project formulation
FAO should ensure that in future projects:
a) More attention is paid to the logical relations between activities, outputs and
objectives,
b) When FAO and other agencies have worked in the same sector, a systematic
review of their experience should be made to guide planning,
c) Livelihoods projects must involve effective stakeholder and gender analysis at the
planning stage,
d) Realistic targets and time frames must be set.
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ES20. In project implementation FAO must address three issues arising from the
experience of this project, related to i) the fact that in the project, relations with the GoSL
were often strained; ii) training was a major component but there are doubts as to its
effectiveness in increasing capacity; and iii) project staff experienced problems in handling
FAO regulations and processes.
Recommendation 2 To FAO on project implementation
FAO should ensure that in future projects:
a) At project inception (or earlier) a clear division of labour should be agreed between
FAO and partner organisations, there must be regular meetings of coordinating
bodies, and the FAOR must take a proactive role in facilitating good relations;
b) FAO should ensure that training only takes place in terms of a wider training
strategy;
c) Staff should receive adequate training in FAO procedures. This is especially
important in projects which involve infrastructural components.
ES21. This project highlights some of the issues concerning the ways in which future
sustainability might be strengthened.
Recommendation 3 To FAO on sustainability
It is recommended that FAO ensures that problems concerning sustainability are identified at
an early stage in project implementation and that the time frame of projects is such that the
results of interventions can be assessed and issues addressed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation
1. The project Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with Stakeholder
Participation in Management (GCP/SRL/057/CAN) was funded as a post-tsunami project in
Sri Lanka, by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with a total budget of
USD 4.9 million. It started in April 2008 and was completed on 30 September 2011.
2. The Project Document included provisions for a final evaluation, and parties
involved – the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), CIDA, FAO Sri Lanka, the FAO Lead
Technical Officer (LTO) and FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) – agreed that a final
evaluation would be useful 'to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be
useful for future projects'. In particular, the Terms of Reference of the Evaluation1 identified
three focal questions:
i. What have been the project's achievements in comparison to expected outputs and
outcomes?
ii. What are the potential and/or actual impacts of the project – positive, negative,
intended, unintended?
iii. What lessons can be drawn that may inform approaches to small scale fisheries
infrastructure development?
3. The Evaluation was carried out in late August-early September 2011, and included a
restitution of preliminary findings and conclusions at the final project workshop. This draft is
circulated to FAO stakeholders for their comments and suggestions, before finalization by the
Team Leader.2
1.2 Methodology of the evaluation
4. The evaluation followed the methodological guidance provided in the ToR. It was
based on a review of a range of available documents,3 and interviews with project staff and
with staff from government institutions with which the project interacted.4
5. In addition, field visits were made to 15 project sites in the following districts:
Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota, Chilaw, Mannar and Mullaitivu. During
these visits the physical results of project activities were viewed, meetings between project
staff and members of the fishing communities were observed, and a range of individuals was
interviewed.
6. Owing to unforeseen problems at the moment of starting the field work, the
evaluation team consisted of only one member, as the identified national consultant, a fishery
_________________ 1 See Annex 1, Terms of Reference
2 See Annex 2, Profile of team members
3 See Annex 3, List of documents reviewed
4 See Annex 4, List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process
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expert, withdrew at the last minute from the assignment. This seriously restricted the overall
expertise of the team, especially in the context of assessing the economic and financial
aspects of the project. In addition, this evaluation lacks the insights which come from a multi-
disciplinary team.
2 Context of the project
7. On December 26th 2004 a tsunami hit the eastern, southern and south-western coasts
of Sri Lanka causing major loss of live as well as widespread damage to physical structures
and fishing craft. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami a major international relief effort
was mounted by a range of agencies from Sri Lanka and the international community. These
included FAO.
8. Despite the official aim of 'building back better', in many cases the resources
supplied by the various relief agencies were sub-standard or inappropriate to local conditions.
In part as a response to this situation, the GoSL began to take a greater role in coordinating
relief and rehabilitation activities. In the context of the fisheries sector, various arms of the
Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR, later MFARD – the Ministry of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Development)5 including the Ceylon Fisheries Harbours
Corporation (CFHC) and the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DFAR)
became the channel through which rehabilitation activities were directed.
9. FAO was actively involved in assisting the GoSL in managing and coordinating the
process of relief and rehabilitation in the fisheries sector. This included FAO assistance to the
Sri Lankan Government in the production of a long term strategy for the marine fisheries
sector in November 2005, and an analysis of fisheries institutions and capacity assessment in
2007. FAO also assisted in the production of a 'Master Plan' for the reconstruction and
development of anchorages and fish landing sites. In addition, FAO also supported a number
of other projects in the fisheries sector.
10. Much of the immediate relief focused on the replacement or rehabilitation of fishing
boats and gears but longer term issues concerning land-based infrastructure were also
addressed by the various agencies active immediately after the tsunami. This included the
restoration of harbours and anchorages as well as assets associated with smaller-scale landing
sites spread along the affected coasts. The situation was in part intensified by the removal in
some cases of fishing households and other buildings from the immediate vicinity of the
beach. This was seen by some as putting fishing gear at risk of being stolen.
11. Whilst most post-tsunami efforts went into boats, gear and supporting income-
generating activities, a smaller fraction went (and is still going) into the rehabilitation and
construction of fishing harbours. There has also been work which focuses more directly on
Fish Landing Centres (FLCs).6 Indeed, the project document refers to 220 previous
interventions in landing sites and anchorages in the post-tsunami period. Perhaps the most
relevant are the Icelandic International Development Cooperation Agency (ICEIDA)
supported project to develop infrastructure at 25 FLCs in seven districts between 2006 and
_________________ 5 The name of the Ministry changed in 2010. Throughout this report it will be referred to as the MFARD. 6 The literature seems to use 'fish landing sites' and 'fish landing centres' interchangeably. So will this report.
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2008, and the IFAD supported rehabilitation of FLCs at 18 sites on the south and east coasts.
In addition, various NGOs, both Sri Lankan and international, carried out a range of activities
as did international donor agencies such as GTZ, ADB and JICA.7
12. According to the Tripartite Review Report,8 “The development and/or improvement
of facilities at landing sites became quite an attractive activity for the actors in the tsunami
rehabilitation programme. As a result, FLCs proliferated. However... these facilities have
generally fallen into rack and ruin as a result of mismanagement or the absence of any
management.”
13. As the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) noted in 2010, there is no certainty as to how
many fish landing sites there are in Sri Lanka, the figure of 700 frequently being quoted.
What constitutes a landing site is often unclear, many being temporary or only being used by
four or five craft. There is also uncertainty as to which ones have received assistance since
the tsunami, and what is the state of the assets established at these sites.
14. Leaving aside this major gap in the available knowledge on FLCs, by the time this
project was planned FAO had already gained considerable experience and knowledge of Sri
Lankan conditions. FAO had been involved in a series of projects in the fisheries sector and
had given general assistance to the GoSL, benefitted from the presence of an active FAO
Representative. By the time the project was being planned, the 'Real Time Evaluation of the
FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake
and Tsunami'9 was also available. In addition the Fisheries Institutional Analysis and
Capacity Development was available by November 2007.10 As far as FLCs were concerned, it
was also in a position to gain from the experience of IFAD and ICEIDA as well as other
agencies.
3 Project concept and relevance
3.1 Project Design
15. Project design was finalised in 2007 and focused on three key areas of activity:
a. Strengthening the capacity of the CFHC to manage and coordinate the rehabilitation
of fish landing sites,
b. Carry out the rehabilitation of fish landing sites in 15 (later 13) districts, and
c. Develop and implement frameworks for community participation in fish landing site
management.
_________________ 7 GTZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit; ADB: Asian Development Bank; JICA:
Japan International Cooperation Agency. 8 The Tripartite Review of the project took place in September 2010, primarily at the behest of CIDA
9 The RTE was launched in 2005 and completed, after three international missions, in the second half of 2006.
The report was issued in 2007 and is available at http://www.fao.org/evaluation/oed-documents-and-
reports/en/ 10
This report is available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai532e/ai523e00.htm
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16. Through these activities it was argued that the 'livelihoods of fishers and fishing
communities in tsunami affected areas [will] be improved'.11
17. As far as capacity was concerned, the initial design focused on an ambitious training
scheme for CFHC staff, major improvements in data and information management systems,
and the establishment of a unit within the CFHC capable of designing harbours and managing
FLCs. By strengthening its capacity it was envisaged that the CFHC would be able to have
inputs into the other two areas of project activity.
18. The project envisaged adopting a participatory approach to the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of FLCs. Here, it was proposed that 80 sites from a list of 100 prepared by the
MFARD would be the foci of activity and that project and CFHC staff would be involved in
selecting sites, identifying needs, and reviewing the capacities of relevant construction
companies and local NGOs.
19. The final component, the management of the rehabilitated or newly built FLCs, was
seen as a form of 'community empowerment'. Thus not only were local communities to be
fully involved in the selection, design and construction of the new facilities: they were also to
be involved in the management of these FLCs. Here, the plans for the project envisaged
DFAR staff playing a key role, with assistance from the MFARD and from NGOs.
20. In the project design, the MFAR was designated as the implementation agency, but
the project was to be situated in the CFHC where a Project Management Unit (PMU) and a
design unit were to be established. The project was to be managed by an FAO international
Chief Technical Advisor working alongside a National Project Coordinator, both of whom
would be overseen by a steering committee which would include representatives from the
MFAR, the CFHC and FAO. It was originally proposed that there should also be two other
international experts to work on community participation and engineering aspects of the
project. However, these posts were rejected by GoSL.
21. An Inception Mission was mounted in 2008 and culminated in a National Inception
Workshop in November 2008. The complexity of the project in terms of the number and scale
of activities involved was considered to necessitate a workshop on training in monitoring and
evaluation. This was held in December 2009, after the CTA had been in post for 8 months,
and a monitoring and evaluation manual was produced in March 2010. The workshop led to a
complex and comprehensive monitoring system as well as a critical analysis of the existing
logframe and the formulation of a revised logframe for the project. However, the project
objective remained unchanged.
22. These changes focused more on detail than on overall strategy. Changes in wording
removed some of the ambiguities in the earlier project document particularly by affirming the
distinction between FLCs on the one hand, and harbours and anchorages on the other.
Decisions were taken as to which sites should be focused on and these became the basis for
Phase 1 of the project which concentrated its efforts in 11 districts. The original logframe
(2007) and the revised logframe (2009) are attached in Annex 5 and Annex 6.
_________________ 11
Project Document, p. 10
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23. One of the points made in the 2010 critical analysis of the original logframe and
associated project document was a lack of clarity in what the project would be doing and the
relationship between activities, outputs and objectives. Even after revision this lack of clarity
remained, especially in terms of how the project's objective – “the livelihoods of fishers and
fishing communities in tsunami affected areas improved” – is logically related to the three
activities and outputs strands in the project. Thus capacity building in the CFHC, the
construction or rehabilitation of FLCs and the encouragement of local Community Based
Organizations (CBOs) to manage these landing sites are all laudable in themselves, but how
they relate to the income or income security of fishing households is not immediately clear.
24. Arguably some components (e.g. the provision of lockable storage facilities for
engines and other gear) may reduce the dangers of theft but no evidence was presented in the
planning documents that theft was a problem. Similarly, the establishment of ice storage
facilities could have an effect on fish prices and thus fisher incomes. Other structures, for
instance the provision of meeting halls, of offices for cooperative society officers and at times
Fisheries Inspectors may well be laudable but again do not directly relate to income
generation. Also, there was some mention of training in post-harvest techniques which could
be related to improved livelihoods but this was envisaged as a minor component of the
project.
25. What was lacking was a clear theory of change which linked outputs (improved
landing sites and training) to outcomes (self-managed landing sites) which would contribute
directly or indirectly to project objectives (improved livelihoods).12 It could be argued that
this project was in effect a sub-component of the wider set of projects supported by FAO in
the Sri Lankan fisheries sector, and thus contributed to wider objectives. But this is not
supported by the low level of coordination FAO activities in the sector.
26. More generally, it appears that the project was primarily driven by a perceived need
for physical infrastructure at fish landing sites. As the Internal Evaluation puts it, 'The project
was not based on a livelihood need assessment but on a tsunami damage assessment'.13
Whether or not there was such a need is difficult to ascertain, but what is clear is that in small
landing sites (as distinct from larger harbours and anchorages which were outside the purlieu
of the project) there was little in the way of infrastructure prior to the tsunami and thus little
to rehabilitate.
27. Thus the project was to a certain extent working in a situation where it was not clear
that there was a need for infrastructure development at FLCs and had to work to create a
demand for what the project had to offer. Put crudely, local communities appear to have been
presented with a shopping list of inputs from which they chose. The purported link between
various constructions at these sites and the livelihoods of fishing households was simply a
means of justifying a project where the primary objective was completed infrastructure and
the means to manage it.
28. To a certain extent the lack of linkages between the activities and outputs of the
project with its objectives was recognised during the lifetime of the project. Thus as will be
discussed later, there were attempts to move beyond a simple focus on the management of
_________________ 12
The nature of log frame planning is made clear in the Project Cycle Management Guide produced by
SEAGA available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf 13
Internal Evaluation, p. 13
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FLC infrastructure to a consideration of wider ways in which the CBOs involved in
management could be involved in a wider range of activities which might have a more direct
relationship to livelihoods.
29. If the underlying logic of the project was flawed, there are also questions to be asked
as to how the project was seen as fitting into government structures. The project was designed
to work with the CFHC with a secondary linkage to the DFAR. Yet it was always
problematic as to how involved the CFHC was in small scale fish landing sites rather than
fishery harbours and major anchorages. As will be elaborated on later in this report, the
CFHC lacked both the capacity and the will to take an active role in developing FLCs.
Failure to appreciate these factors at the planning stage led to problems in project
implementation.
30. What is perhaps surprising is that more note of FAO's experience in Sri Lanka was
not taken into account in the project planning process. No mention is made of, for instance
the problems reported in the tsunami evaluation concerning procurement. Although
representatives from other FLC-orientated projects participated in the Inception workshop
this seems to have had little impact on the design of the project. This, coupled with the lack
of any livelihoods analysis and the absence of any detailed consideration of the interest in and
commitment of the CFHC to FLCs were to cause major problems in project implementation.
3.2 Relevance
31. The project's strategy and objectives were broadly in line with GoSL strategies
concerning the revitalisation of the fishing industry in tsunami affected parts of the country.
Part of this strategy was the 'Masterplan for Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages
and Fishing Centres' (2006), which FAO had been involved in preparing and which consisted
of a list of fishing centres which the MFARD used to identify suitable sites for project
activities. The project was also in line with the 'Building Back Better' principle which
underlay post-tsunami recovery. And finally, it was said to be in line with the President's
'Mahinda Chintana' vision of the future of Sri Lanka (his manifesto for the 2010 presidential
election) and the 'Ten Year Development Policy Framework of the Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources Sector' announced in 2007, although the linkages between the project and
government policy are not direct. MFARD has also published an extremely ambitious set of
objectives for the sector envisaging almost doubling fish landings between 2009 and 2012.
This project has only a marginal relationship with these objectives.
32. As far as FAO is concerned, the project document claimed that the project related to
four of the MDGs: MDG 1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger); MDG 2 (Achieve
universal primary education); MDG 3 (Promote gender equality and empower women) and
MDG 7 (Ensure environmental stability).
33. It is difficult to sustain these claims. The sorts of activities the project engaged in
and supported did not address extreme poverty or hunger nor were they designed to do so.
There was no component in the project concerned with education. Although the project did
involve women it was not designed to enhance the capabilities of women or enhance their
economic and social standing. And finally the project was not concerned with environmental
issues except in passing.
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16
34. The project was formulated within the context of the first FAO Strategic
Framework,14 wherein the project appears as correctly contributing to a programme titled
“2JA03: Capacity Building for Aquaculture and Small-scale Fisheries Development.” In the
current framework, links were made to both food security and sustainable management of
fisheries resources. More importantly, however, for the work of the Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department, this project is relevant to Article 8.9 of the Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries on Harbours and landing places for fishing vessels.
4 Project Implementation
4.1 Key events in the project’s life
35. Given the complexities and delays in project implementation, it appears useful to
outline some key dates and events in the life of the project. These are listed in Box 1 below.
Box 1. Project milestones
Date Event, step
December 2004 The Asian tsunami
2006 Masterplan for Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages prepared by FAO
for GoSL
August 2007 Project document completed
October 2007 Fisheries Institutional Analysis and Capacity Assessment to the MFAR, Sri Lanka
March 2008 Agreement signed between FAO and CIDA
15 April 2008 Official start of project
August 2008 Inception mission visits Sri Lanka; Needs assessment of proposed sites started
September 2008 Official agreement signed between FAO and GoSL
February 2009 Draft Profile and Needs Assessment completed
March 2009 Chief Technical Advisor appointed
CIDA and FAO agree a six month extension to project
April 2009 Inception Phase Report and Project Implementation Plan
First Budget revision
May 2009 Violent conflict in north and east ends
July 2009 PMU fully staffed
August 2009 Project becomes fully operational
Six month extension to project agreed
September 2009 Training needs assessment completed
First needs assessment in ex-conflict areas
November 2009 M&E Training and Implementation Workshop
Revision of log-frame
Training component becomes active
March 2010 First construction contracts signed
Mid-2010 Presidential and National elections in Sri Lanka
June 2010 Second needs assessment in ex-conflict areas
August 2010 Phase 2 (work in Mannar and Mullaitivu districts) approved
September 2010 Tripartite Mission reviews project
November 2010 Second budget revision
August 2011 Internal evaluation (review) of project
August-September 2011 Independent evaluation
September 2011 End of project operations Source: Evaluation team
_________________ 14 FAO first Strategic Framework 2000-2015 was replaced by the current SF 2010-2019.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
17
36. The project got under way in August 2008 with the visit of the Inception Mission.
At that point it was under the management the FAO office and, from late January 2009, of a
temporary CTA. Under him a two person team carried out an ambitious Needs Assessment
using a list of possible sites supplied by the CFHC.
37. The CTA finally arrived in March 2009 and an Inception Phase Report and Project
Implementation Plan were produced in April 2009. Project staff was then hired and included
the two consultants who had produced the Needs Assessment (a Community Participation in
Fisheries Expert and an Expert in Fish landing Site/Harbour Management and Institution
Building), a Human Resources Management and Training Specialist and a Monitoring and
Evaluation/IT Officer. In addition there was a Project Assistant, a Finance and Administrative
Assistant, a Project Secretary, an Office Assistant and three drivers.
38. Thus in all project staff consisted of five professional specialists which, given the
geographical scale and ambition of the project necessarily implied the use of consultancies,
23 Sri Lankan and 12 International.
4.2 Budget and expenditure
39. The costs of infrastructure totalled more than 50% of the overall budget. However,
as a result of delays in project implementation and the over-optimistic view of what could be
achieved in the three year life of the project, much of the construction work was still in
progress in the last weeks of the project and final payments would not be due until some
months after structures will be handed over by the contractors.
40. This resulted in a situation where still major items of expenditure were to be paid by
the time of the official closing date of the project, on 30 September 2011. At the date of
finalizing this report (14 October 2011) FAO financial statement indicated a positive balance
of 25% of the budget, after deducting expenditures and hard commitments. Thus it was
difficult to come to any general conclusion about the financial performance of the project and
this report wishes to flag this as an important issue for FAO to tackle adequately.
41. Project management made strenuous and generally successful efforts to control and
monitor its budget in a difficult situation. The process of producing bills of quantities and
cost estimates for construction work involved a series of checks and balances with three
levels of accountability: the supervising consultants, the project harbours specialist, and the
CTA all reviewing costs on a regular basis. Systems to impose penalties for late or sub-
standard delivery were also in place and were enforced. All the contractors involved in
construction work were major Sri Lankan companies, although in some cases their
performance was less efficient and the quality of their work lower than might have been
expected. The decision to group the works in to a series of packages rather than deal with
individual contractors at each site was almost certainly cost-effective.
42. It is difficult to compare the costs of infrastructure works at project-supported sites
with the costs incurred in other FLC-oriented projects. The package of inputs supplied by the
project varied from site to site which makes it difficult to compare the operations of this
project with – say – the operations of the ICEIDA project. It was claimed that where
comparisons could be made the costs of buildings supplied by this project, by IFAD and by
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18
ICEIDA in parallel FLC projects were comparable and the Internal Evaluation concluded that
FLCs constructed by UNOPS were more expensive than those established by the project.
43. Most training was sourced from Sri Lankan organisations. In most cases these bids
went through a tendering process and appear to have been managed in an efficient fashion.
44. There were two revisions to the project budget. The first in April 2009 followed on
from the Inception Mission. The main thrust of the revision was to reallocate expenditure
from consultancy fees to salaries of project staff and to make allowance for the purchase of
project vehicles (unaccountably missing from the original budget). The second in November
2010 made some minor revisions in line with the non-involvement of NGOs in project
activities. Both these revisions appear to be sensible and practical and overall involved very
little change to the original budget. But as was noted, given that the project has still to meet
many of its bills, whether the project runs over budget, is on budget or under-spends was not
clear at the time of closing the evaluation mission.
4.3 Project management
45. Overall, general project management was good given the shortcomings in project
design and the difficulties of the institutional environment in which the project was operating.
Project management took decisions quickly, there was a degree of flexibility, for instance
adjusting its operational base to fit the institutional structure in Sri Lanka and reacting
speedily to the opening up of two northern districts to project activities (Phase 2 of the
project). The project was also notable for its use of relatively innovative approaches, for
instance the 'traffic lights' system of identifying the suitability and readiness of proposed sites
for project interventions, the 'business plans' approach to FLC management, and the
involvement of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka
(FCCISL). There was also close monitoring of project activities in line with the strong lead
set by the M&E Training workshop in November 2009.
46. Where there was much less success was in adjusting the original focus on site
construction and management to the more livelihoods focus hinted at in the project document.
Thus although the needs assessment and subsequent activities did mention social factors this
was in terms of the management of FLCs, not on livelihoods of fishermen or fishing families.
Nor did it include any social analysis. There were also delays in project implementation. The
work of the project started 6 months later than planned (which led to a six month project
extension) and there were also delays in the implementation of construction works, partly due
to adverse weather conditions but also due to issues concerning permissions from the Coast
Conservation Department (CCD), the need to comply with FAO procurement rules and the
decision of the National Steering Committee (NSC) not to involve UNOPS. Even if there had
not been these delays, it would have been difficult for the project to achieve its outputs within
the overall time frame. The project also lost focus. There was a shift away from FLC-
associated capacity building in the CFHC to a more general focus on training in the fisheries
sector.
47. An original objective of the project was to enhance the capacity of the CFHC to
design and manage FLCs. This was to be achieved through the creation of a FLC unit within
the CFHC and training of CFHC personnel. It quickly became apparent that there was little
interest in this line of activity from the Sri Lankan side, despite continuing attempts
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
19
throughout the life of the project to get the CFHC more involved in FLCs. This appears to be
the result of a number of factors. First, CFHC has traditionally focused on harbours and, to a
lesser extent, anchorages. FLCs were simply outside its ambit. Secondly, as harbours are the
main source of income for the CFHC, there was an unwillingness to use scarce resources by a
corporation which had already suffered from a major reduction in central government
subventions. Thirdly, as a government sector organisation, the CFHC was unable to meet the
costs of suitably qualified engineers which an effective FLC unit would require.
48. What this meant in practice was that the PMU took on the functions which had been
envisaged as the responsibility of the FLC unit in the CFHC. As far as the project's work on
FLCs was concerned, the DFAR with its network or ADs and FIs, the importance of which
had to a certain extent been recognised in the original plans for the project, became
increasingly significant. How far they were involved in needs assessment and site selection is
unclear.
4.4 Technical backstopping
49. The project received five visits from the Rome based Lead Technical Officer (LTO).
These were supportive to the project, especially in its dealings with the Sri Lankan
authorities. The LTO was also instrumental in arranging the study tours to General Santos
Fish Port Complex in the Philippines. There is no evidence that more technical support on the
physical aspects of harbours and FLCs was required given the nature of the project and the
competence of project management. However, the project would have benefited from more
technical inputs and support on participatory management and capacity building.
50. One area where the project did face difficulties was in dealing with procurement
issues. As a new member of FAO staff, the CTA (and project staff) would have benefitted
greatly from procurement training at the beginning of (rather than half way through) the
project Delays in decision making within FAO also led to problems, for instance delays
caused by the slow response to the proposal that UNOPS should handle the infrastructural
aspects of the project.
51. The project might also have benefited from greater involvement from the FAO
Representative especially in advising on the nuances of the Sri Lankan context and mediating
in a timely fashion at those points where minor issues threatened relations between the
project and GoSL. The FAO Representative might also have been more proactive in creating
a forum where the various FAO projects at work in the fisheries sector could exchange
information and experience. This is particularly significant in that in some quarters at least
this project was seen as part of a wider programme of activities in the Sri Lankan fisheries
sector. But given time pressures on the FAOR this is perhaps unrealistic. Finally, there were
continuing problems over the timely payment of project invoices, a situation which worsened
towards the end of the project.
4.5 Government support
52. Although this project was requested by the GoSL, several problems affected the
relationship between the project and various governmental institutions. Some of these have
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
20
been alluded to above, including the new regulations introduced by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that led to a protracted period of negotiations and to the late arrival of the CTA.
53. The original concept of the project envisaged a major role for Sri Lankan NGOs,
many of whom have had extensive experience in social mobilisation, in participatory
management and in training. Indeed, some had previous experience in establishing FLCs.
However, the changing political climate in Sri Lanka led to NGOs being less and less
acceptable to Government. In particular, MFARD refused to countenance the involvement of
NGOs (Sri Lankan or otherwise) in the project and thus the project was forced to have
recourse to consultants. This probably led to less effective social mobilisation and a weaker
understanding of the dynamics of village life.
54. Almost from its inception, the project was put under great pressure by MFARD to
construct a harbour at Kalametiya on the southern coast of Sri Lanka. This would have been a
major construction event, outside the focus of the project which was on small scale beach
landing sites, and would have required a considerable proportion of the overall budget of the
project. The project supported a consultancy to produce an investment plan but refused
further involvement in this site owing to the cost of the works which was estimated at USD
3.1 million.
55. Overall, the project received relatively little support from either the MFARD or the
CFHC. The main thrust of the project was not of direct interest to the CFHC whilst the
MFARD did little to support it or take an interest in its activities. Minor issues could lead to
problems, for instance when Sri Lankan civil service regulations and FAO regulations failed
to match up. One example of the lack of a close involvement of government in the project
was the failure of the Steering Committee to meet between November 2009 and August 2010.
Another was the failure of the CFHC to comment on any of the reports prepared by the
project.
56. The DFAR had the closest relationship with the project and received the most
benefits from the project in terms of training. In effect the project moved its focus of
activities from the CFHC to the DFAR and perhaps this should have been recognised in the
formal arrangements for the project. The MFARD and the CFHC did receive some benefits
but much less than was originally envisaged, and most of it only tangentially related to the
project's primary interest in fish landing sites.
57. Overall, poor relations with some national stakeholders led to the project becoming
something of an enclave. Many of the activities carried out by the project in the FLCs should
have involved either the CFHC or the DFAR or both but became the sole responsibility of the
project. This threatened both the capacity building aspects of the project and also its long
term sustainability.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
21
5 Results and contributions to stated objectives
5.1 Outputs and outcomes
58. Ideally, it would be useful to be able to compare the actual outputs and outcomes of
this project with those listed in the revised logframe. In this case this is not possible for a
number of reasons. First, the change in focus from the CFHC to the DFAR meant that many
of the indicators listed in the logframe became irrelevant. Second, many activities were still
in progress at the time of project closing date and had not yet led to identifiable outcomes.
Thirdly, in many cases the information did not as yet exist.. Thus the approach adopted here
follows the broad framework of the logframe but is not as comprehensive as one would like.
5.1.1 Output 1: Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site rehabilitation
and management
59. The original remit of the project had been to help increase capacity in the CFHC to
manage and coordinate rehabilitation of fish landing sites. Given the lack of interest in
CFHC, the project shifted its focus to the broader task of increasing the general capacity
across the fisheries sector as a whole. Key to this was training.
60. A Training Needs Assessment was carried out in September 2009 covering 345
responders not only in the CFHC but also in the MFARD and the DFAR. The result was an
ambitious training programme with five main components:
i. Planning, monitoring and evaluation. This group of courses was primarily aimed at
staff from the MFARD and covered such topics as co-management, M&E systems
and data analysis.
ii. Management of community organisations. This group of courses covered such topics
as participatory management, social mobilisation and livelihoods issues, and was
primarily aimed at staff from the DFAR
iii. Harbour engineering and contract management. Primarily aimed at CFHC
management staff
iv. General courses. These included courses in English, Tamil, basic IT and financial
management, and were aimed at a broad cross-section of staff in the fisheries sector.
v. Special courses. These were aimed at senior staff and included specialist software
training and overseas study tours.
61. In total 856 people attended these courses, DFAR (413) and CHFC (272) making up
the bulk of attendees. Strikingly, 94 people attended four or more courses. Around 33% of all
staff in MFARD, DFAR and CFHC received some form of training supported by the project.
The training was delivered by a mix of Sri Lankan and international consultants.
62. One important element in the training programme consisted of two courses on the
Sustainable Livelihoods approach and one on Sustainable Livelihoods Enhancement and
Diversification, all held in mid 2010. The existence of these courses, oriented towards DFAR
staff, indicate that the project was trying to make an effort to put more emphasis on
livelihoods issues, an emphasis lacking in the project design. The project also mounted three
social mobilisation courses in the first half of 2010.
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22
63. The training programme was broadly dependent on the profile of demands elicited
by the questionnaire. Despite the efforts of the project, attempts to establish a Training
Working Group to coordinate training needs across the fisheries sector were unsuccessful and
there does not seem to have been a training strategy.
64. As has been outlined previously, the lack of interest in FLCs on the part of the
CFHC led to the project developing its relationship with the DFAR. Plans to develop a FLC
unit in the CFHC came to nothing as did the attempt to prepare a corporate plan for the
CFHC. Even so, as also mentioned previously, there was a considerable amount of training
made available to CFHC staff including study tours to the Philippines and to India, plus some
computer equipment and courses in using software.
65. Clearly these inputs into the CFHC did not strengthen its capacity to 'coordinate
landing site rehabilitation and management', but they perhaps had some impact on the long
term capacity of the CFHC to manage fisheries harbours. Thus the visit to the General Santos
Fish Port Complex was seen as showing what is possible for a middle income country such as
Sri Lanka and has opened up the discussion of new ways (for Sri Lanka) of managing such
harbours and increasing standards of operation. In terms of knowledge, individual members
of staff in the CFHC have clearly benefited, but there is no overall structure within which
these individual benefits can be fully utilised to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
the organisation as a whole. As many evaluations and studies have made clear, training by
itself does not lead to capacity building.
66. In DFAR, out of the 413 attendees, again over 50% attended three or more courses.
Most of these courses were more directly attuned to the direct interests of the project in FLC
management, all were very well received by the participants, and again it is clear that
individuals gained a considerable amount of knowledge through their exposure to new ideas
and ways of approaching the management of fishery assets. But again the major issue is the
degree to which training in itself can increase capacity.
67. Other inputs in support of capacity building in the sector consisted of the
rehabilitation of an auditorium for the CFHC (which proved useful as a venue for project
training activities) and the supply of motorbikes and computers to the DFAR for use by ADs
and FIs. The project also supported three students taking MSc courses. Mention should also
be made of the project's support to a new office for the AD in Mullaitivu. The project did
attempt to support the preparation of a corporate plan for the CFHC but this was terminated at
the request of the MFARD.
68. The study tours to the Philippines and to India appear to have had an impact on
decision makers and may well lead to positive results in terms of new thinking and
innovations in fisheries harbour management. Similarly, the training supplied in project
management and general training may also have longer running effects. But the impact and
sustainability of the training supplied depends on the wider institutional setting in which
trainees are situated, and here there are serious doubts. The most obvious is the training in the
use of MIKE21 – in the absence of the software itself in CFHC. In contrast, SANDS software
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
23
which had been offered to the CFHC, found a home in NARA and it is planned that it will be
used to collate data from across the fisheries sector.15
69. The lack of overall training strategies and capacity building strategies in general
means that the potential of the individual gains cannot be realised at the broader institutional
level. The project did begin work on a corporate plan for the CFHC but was prevented by the
MFARD from completing the work. The project did succeed in preparing detailed job
descriptions including training aspects or junior and middle management in the CFHC.
70. The lack of suitable institutional frameworks also threatens the long term
sustainability of certain aspects of capacity building in other ways. For long term benefits to
derive from the support given for the use of the SANDS programme by the project depends
upon continuing cooperation between relevant bodies, not just within the overview of the
MFARD. There is no guarantee that this will be forthcoming. Nor are there plans for support
to trainees in the future, and it would not be surprising if lessons learnt or skills gained will
soon be forgotten. Further, the project could not achieve many of its training objectives as it
ran out of time.
71. As far as equipment is concerned, the MFARD has been advised that it will be
responsible for supporting the maintenance of equipment supplied by the project. As far as
the materials made available to the FLCs are concerned, it is hoped that the business planning
approach to FLC management will enable this equipment to be maintained.
72. In sum, the project has had a definite impact in terms of knowledge within the
organisations with which it has worked, but it is not clear that this has increased the
organisations' capacity in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This would have required a
much more integrated and inclusive approach to capacity building with probably less
emphasis on training large numbers of participants and more emphasis on both developing
corporate plans and ensuring that project staff work in conjunction with counterparts in the
host organisations.16
5.1.2 Output 2: Fisheries landing centres rehabilitated in 15 districts
73. Between August 2008 and February 2009 an ambitious 'Profile and Needs
Assessment' of 50 fish landing sites was carried out based on the list of sites identified by the
Masterplan. This generated a wealth of data which finally appeared in report form in June
2009, although the document was in use from February 2009. The report identified the types
of intervention needed at the various sites and the issues which would have to be addressed
such as availability of land. In certain cases it deemed sites to be unsuitable for project
intervention.
74. One feature of this needs assessment was its insistence that the needs of different
communities were different, and that a 'one size fits all' approach was unworkable. Here there
was an attempt to involve the local community in a dialogue as to what was needed and what
_________________ 15
MIKE 21 is an extremely expensive set of programmes of use in harbour planning and management.
SANDS is a relatively cheap programme much more useful to the needs of managing small scale landing
sites. 16
It should also be mentioned that the project also supplied training to 55 members of MFARD, and that in
addition to training the project supplied computer equipment and some vehicles to the DFAR.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
24
was possible. This was in part the result of the experience of two other projects which had
worked on FLCs in Sri Lanka funded by ICEIDA and IFAD. The former had adopted a
system using a small number of standard models which was judged as less successful than the
IFAD approach which stressed the different needs of different sites.
75. Thus, the project supported a range of interventions – for instance net mending halls,
engine store rooms, fish auction sheds – each particular activity depending on negotiations
between local fishers and project staff. These negotiations were facilitated by DFAR staff
members. Not all requests were granted, partly because many were for infrastructure outwith
the remit of the project (e.g. major marine works) or were difficult or challenging for local
communities to manage. So for instance the frequent requests for fuel storage facilities were
generally ruled out as requiring management skills which were unlikely to be realised. The
needs assessment also addressed a range of social and economic issues, but primarily in terms
of what the likely impact of these factors would be on the management of landing site assets.
76. The Needs Assessment was followed up by further consultations in potential project
sites between project staff and local residents, a very demanding process for project staff.
The project developed what it called a 'traffic light' system to indicate the degree to which
sites were suitable for interventions. This was based on data being generated by the project's
M&E system and provided a simple visual means of indicating potential for the project.
Factors which would give rise to an amber or red status included the existence of FLC inputs
by another agency, problems in obtaining the requisite permissions from CCD and a lack of
local commitment.
77. Given the size of the PMU and the geographical spread of the project, it would have
been difficult if not impossible for the PMU to manage the physical activities in the project
sites spread around the coast of Sri Lanka. The project proposed that the design and
management of infrastructural works should be handled by UNOPS but this was rejected by
the NSC in July 2009, the NSC agreeing to follow a tender process to select suitable service
providers.
78. Thus in October 2009 the design and supervision contract was awarded to a Sri
Lankan consultancy company, PROTEK, which worked in close collaboration with the
project engineer. As for the construction work, the project followed the route outlined in the
project document and grouped the various sites into four geographical clusters, awarding
contracts to contractors following FAO and GoSL guidelines.
79. One of the points made in the evaluation of FAO post-tsunami activities was that
FAO should avoid becoming involved in construction activities and concentrate its activities
in areas in which it had a clear comparative advantage. Unsurprisingly the project faced
major problems in managing the activities associated with infrastructure renovation and
improvement. In part these derived from a mismatch between FAO procurement rules and the
local situation. Thus FAO insistence on accepting the lowest tender led to the project being
forced to appoint a contract despite misgivings over whether or not the contractor could
deliver on time. In Sri Lanka the normal procedure is for contractors to receive an advance
payment (20% of costs), a practice not accepted by FAO.
80. The original target of working in 80 FLCs in all 15 coastal districts of Sri Lanka was
always over-optimistic. At the time the project started certain districts were out of bounds
owing to the armed conflict in northern Sri Lanka. Furthermore, in cost terms (not to mention
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25
the administrative and logistical issues involved and inflationary pressures), working in 80
sites was unrealistic. And finally, it might be worth noting that not all districts had been
affected by the tsunami. This issue had arisen at the Inception Workshop where there was a
strong recommendation from participants that the project should work in all districts and not
only those affected by the tsunami.
81. The project succeeded in working in 13 coastal districts (Jaffna and Killinochchi
were excluded), eleven in Phase 1; two in Phase 2. Rather than attempt to renovate existing
infrastructure or construct new infrastructure in 80 sites the project succeeded in being active
in 42 sites, although at one site no construction work took place but only support to the local
FCS, and another consisted of the construction of a new office for the DFAR AD in
Mullaitivu. Of the balance, it was claimed during the evaluation mission that 23 out of 40
FLCs were open and in use. At four of these project inputs consisted of roads, at one a new
toilet block was constructed, at another an existing building was refurbished, and new
buildings were constructed at seventeen sites.
82. Thus almost all the physical work done by the project involved the construction of
new buildings in addition to the upgrading of public facilities such as roads, and it is probably
incorrect to see this project as concerned with rehabilitation of existing assets but rather with
the introduction of a new range of facilities for the fishing population in selected villages.17
The range of facilities provided is impressive including net mending halls, engine store
rooms, ice storage facilities and meeting halls.
83. Yet whilst the overall figures are impressive, there are problems. None of the
contracts have been completed on time. The result is that 'liquidated damages' have had to be
imposed on three of the four contracts. At the time of this evaluation, construction work in
cluster 3 (South Coast) where the contract was awarded in May 2010 and which should have
been completed in April 2011 was still in progress – with little indication that it would be
completed before the end of the project in September 2011. In one case the works were
estimated to be only 25% complete at the end of August 2011. The supervising consultants
were aware of these issues. In Phase 2 sites, handled by a different contractor, it was clear
that a major effort was being made to complete work before the end of the project. Despite
these delays, the CTA reports that 95% of construction works were completed by the end of
the project.
84. In a few cases it was not clear that the completed facilities were correctly sited
despite the efforts that had gone into involving local people in decisions over infrastructure.
Thus at Taldekka (in Chilaw district) a recently completed fish sales point was not being
used, fish sellers continuing to congregate along the road 25 meters away where fish buyers
were found. At Kadawatha South (also in Chilaw district), the same problem may arise. More
generally, during the evaluation it appeared that many of the structures were not being used,
the exception being covered areas which, no matter what their design objective, were being
used for net mending. However, it should be remembered that only around 50% of sites had
been officially opened at the time of the evaluation.
_________________ 17
This raises the interesting question as to why there was so little rehabilitation. One possible answer is that
other factors, particularly the absence of an effective FCS, ruled these sites out of the project. Another is
that sites suitable for rehabilitation had already been dealt with by other agencies. A third is that perhaps
there was nothing to be rehabilitated.
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26
5.1.3 Output 3: Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour
management developed and implemented (and livelihoods improved)
85. One of the central issues the project was attempting to address was the long term
maintenance and management of the infrastructure established by the project at the FLCs. It
is only too evident that this has been one of the major failings in past interventions in this
area, the coast of Sri Lanka being littered with abandoned or dilapidated buildings and
equipment, by no means all post-tsunami assets. The solution to this problem was seen as
'asset co-management‟, management being shared between the DFAR (which retained the
ultimate ownership of the assets) and local organisations. The Project Document envisaged
that a wide range of stakeholders would be involved in managing the FLCs. However, the
project decided that this was unworkable and focused its activities on pre-existing Fisheries
Cooperative Societies (FCS).18 Indeed, the existence of a functioning FCS was one of the
major factors in determining whether a site should be classed as 'green, 'amber' or 'red'.
86. A major component of the project's approach to the co-management of FLC
infrastructure was the concept of the 'business plan'. At each FLC it was envisaged that a
CBO (an FCS or a combination of two or more FCS) would manage the FLC in accordance
with a business plan agreed to by the CBO and the DFAR. Again, the scale of the enterprise
(over 10,000 households in phase 1) was such that the PMU had to seek outside assistance.
Originally the Project Document had envisaged NGOs as playing a key role in group
formation and drawing up business plans but the involvement of NGOs was blocked by
MFARD. A team of four consultants was appointed in April 2010 to assist in drawing up
business plans in collaboration with CBOs in project sites. In June 2010 the FCCISL
(Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka) was brought in to support
the work of the CBO business plan consultants.
87. The objective of these business plans was to ensure that the FLCs became viable
sources of income sufficient to support the management and maintenance of the infrastructure
and use this as the basis for more ambitious income generating activities in the future. To this
end various income streams and costs were identified. The existence of these business plans
would, it was hoped, enhance the capacity of CBOs to raise loans from commercial banks to
expand their activities.
88. This approach to the management of the FLCs and the involvement of the FCCISL
in their establishment were certainly innovative ideas and an imaginative approach to avoid
the problems of asset management in the past. The first two of these plans were finalised in
September 2010 and in an attempt to speed up the process it was hoped that the CBOs could
produce their own plans. This proved over-ambitious and greater involvement of the
consultants and the FCCISL proved essential. In all, 33 business plans were either completed
or nearing completion by the time of the evaluation. Business plans were not produced where
the interventions took the form of highly „public‟ goods (e.g. roads) and in one case a
business plan was produced to assist an FCS in a situation where no infrastructure was
provided.
_________________ 18
An added complication was the establishment of 'Rural Fisheries Organizations (RFOs) by MFARD in mid
2010. The potential implications of this will be addressed below.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
27
89. Many business plans were still being discussed during the Evaluator's visit. They are
drafted in English and many CBOs who are to manage the FLCs had still not seen a Sinhala
(or Tamil) version of the business plan. There were also reportedly problems in some of the
translations, the translators failing to spot differences between the plans produced for
different sites.
90. How far the business plans are understood by the CBOs managing the FLCs is not
clear, although it must be said that in at least three cases CBO officers had a very clear idea
of what was involved and the utility of them in managing the FLC assets. What appears to be
the case is that these were already very well run societies before the intervention of the
project and in these cases the office holders in the societies had a basic understanding of the
business plan concept. As yet there has been little training to the CBOs charged with
managing the FLCs. Whether this training is sufficient or effective in inculcating the
necessary ways of approaching asset management is an open question.
91. As stated earlier, ownership of the infrastructure at the FLCs is vested in the DFAR
and the relationship between the CBO managing the FLC and the DFAR is governed by a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which delineates the rights and duties of the two
parties. As yet these do not have legal status although this is expected. These MoUs are
drawn up in such a way that the DFAR has ultimate control over the use of the assets. They
also make fairly heavy demands on the CBO managing the resource, e.g. an attendance of
60% of members at monthly meetings before any decisions can be taken.
92. Officers of the DFAR including FIs and ADs have received training in participatory
approaches to asset management and a livelihoods approach to rural development. But they
have little if any experience in facilitating group formation or encouraging participatory
approaches to asset management although they were reportedly involved in facilitating
discussions over the business plans. During the evaluation, staff of the DFAR appeared as
spectators rather than as participants in discussion involving the local CBO and project staff.
93. Finally mention should be made of cross-visits between members of CBOs where
members of weaker organisations could benefit from the experience of more experienced
organisations. One interesting aspect of this programme were visits to the water supply sector
where there are a number of successful community asset management schemes.
5.1.4 Project Outcome: Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-sustaining
as a result of stakeholder participation in management.
94. It is too early to make any comments on the outcome of the project. As indicated
above, one of the criteria used to determine whether or not a site was suitable for a project
intervention was 'the strength of community organisations' which counted for 30% of the
ranking score. This would appear to imply that the sample of communities in which the
project worked was somewhat atypical of Sri Lankan fishing villages in general and that one
might expect a relatively high degree of success. But this is to speculate, an activity better left
to a discussion of 'sustainability'.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
28
5.2 Gender issues
95. Gender was not a central issue in this project. However, the ProDoc does make the
claim that, “The project will prioritise working with women” and that, “Women will benefit
directly through participation in management. They will also benefit considerably by being
able to organise activities such as fish processing using the new facilities which will become
available at the centre and improved access to other markets.”
96. In practice, however, there was no attempt at any gender analysis (nor indeed, a real
attempt at stakeholder analysis). This is not to say that women were ignored. The 'Needs
Assessment' makes mention of women's groups and the gender composition of FSCs. But this
does not constitute a gender analysis and there was no discussion of the nature of the gender
division of labour, how this related to economic and power differentials, nor what the
potential differential impact of the project would be on men and women.
97. The Needs Assessment noted that in some cases women made up the majority of
members of FSCs. During project implementation, women were often the most vocal group.
It was reported that in some cases women made up 90% of the attendees at meetings
concerning business plans, and some of the more influential office holders in the FSCs are
women. This is not surprising given the central role that women play in small scale fish
marketing in Sri Lanka. During the evaluation the central role of women in some FSCs was
witnessed by the evaluator, but what was also striking was the absence of women in other
FSCs.
98. One of the reasons given for the predominance of women in some of the meetings
was that the men were asleep after a night's fishing – which raises the issue of whether the
timing of meetings was such that both men and women could attend. There are also other
indicators which would seem to imply that women were perhaps not as centrally involved in
the process of deciding on inputs from the project as might appear to be the case. Thus the
poor positioning of sales points at two sites visited in Chilaw district may indicate the lack of
involvement of women who in this area dominate fish selling. Similarly, the reported requests
that FSC facilities be used as venues for Montessori schools has come after they have been
erected, perhaps indicating again that women's needs were marginal during the site selection
process. On the other hand, the project did attempt to ensure that the buildings constructed
were suitable for a range of uses and in one case (not visited by the evaluator) it is reported
that a building was redesigned to accommodate a school.
99. Turning to the training elements of the project, overall figures indicate that 133 out
of the 856 trainees were women – about 15%. In CFHC the proportion of women was
relatively high – 34%, but in the DFAR it is only 11%. Admittedly, we do not have figures
for the gender composition of staff as a whole, but it is rather worrying that only 11% of
DFAR trainees, the department which will have the most contact with the organisations
managing the FLCs, consists of women. Presumably the courses on Sustainable Livelihoods
did contain components on gender, but there is no evidence of a wider interest in gender in
the range of training offered by the project.
100. In a sense this is not surprising for although the project was billed as being
concerned with livelihoods it was orientated around an interest in infrastructure and
infrastructure management. Thus gender became invisible and was only of any real interest to
the project when gender issues impinged on the infrastructure rather than vice versa. Perhaps
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
29
the approach to gender adopted by this project is summed up by the formulation of one of the
indicators for output 3 – the output concerning community participation - which refers to
'women, poor and marginalised groups', not the most illuminating categorisation.
101. The project itself claims that there are around 20,000 beneficiaries of the project. Of
these, it estimates that 'more than 10% 'are women.. How many beneficiaries are 'poor' or
from 'marginalised groups' is unknown.
5.3 Impact and sustainability
102. Given that the project is only just finishing and that few of its outputs are completed,
it has been decided to deal with impact and sustainability together as both involve predictions
based on limited evidence.
5.3.1 Infrastructure
103. There is no evidence that the supply of net mending halls, meeting rooms or other
infrastructural items has had any impact on livelihoods. This is not to say that they are not
being used but rather that their impact on peoples' lives is marginal and that there is no
evidence that they are contributing to higher incomes or more sustainable incomes. This is
not surprising given that the original planning of the project asserted rather than demonstrated
a relationship between these investments and livelihoods and that there was no real evidence
of need.
104. However, there are possibilities that the work of the Regional Fisheries Livelihood
programme (RFLP) in some parts of Sri Lanka may have a positive effect on how the
infrastructure is used. One element of the RFLP is to improve fish handling at the landing
sites, and this in conjunction with some elements of this project (ice stores; fish selling
points; fish auction halls) may have a beneficial impact.
105. In the long run however, the viability of the infrastructure depends on whether the
organisations charged with managing the structures supplied by the project are viable. If they
are, and if there proves to be positive benefits accruing to these organisations, then there is a
sustainable future for the infrastructure supplied by the project.
5.3.2 Frameworks for community participation
106. As has already been mentioned, there was no analysis in project documents of why
so many local-level organisations in the fishery sector in Sri Lanka have been seen as
failures, and thus no identification of what factors are crucial in underlying the long term
viability or not of such organisations. The inception report did propose a study to examine
some aspects of these issues but this was not supported by the MFARD. Clearly there are
some organisations which thrive and appear to be viable in the long term but these are
relatively few and the project is perhaps lucky that the selection process favoured sites with
such organisations. Thus in terms of community participation and supporting local
management of assets, the project appears to have had an impact in sites such as
Kurusgahapaduwa and Godawaya. Similarly, at Pullimunai the long established and well run
FCS will probably benefit greatly from the infrastructure and assistance in business planning
supplied by the project.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
30
107. These however are exceptions, and in most places there is not a history of long
running well run organisations which can manage assets and can benefit from the business
plan approach adopted by the project. There are already indications in some sites of disputes
as to who should control the assets and how they should be run. The situation is complicated
by the establishment in 2010 by the MFARD of a 'National Fisheries Federation (NFF) which
will have village-level units known as 'Rural Fisheries Organisations' (RFO), although they
are also referred to as 'Village Level Fisheries Organisations‟ or „Fisheries Community
Organisations'. The precise role of these new RFOs is unclear, and how they will relate to
pre-existing FCSs is also not clear. But this has raised worries at the village level as to what
structures will be responsible for managing the infrastructure supplied by the project or the
implementation of associated business plans. It also raises the obvious issue of how these
organisations will relate to political structures. The situation is thus very fragile – and very
unpredictable.
108. The sustainability of the management structures created for the infrastructure is very
reliant on two factors: the continuing involvement of the FCCISL and the abilities and
commitment of staff from the DFAR. Members of the FCCISL have been involved in
assisting in the formulation of business plans and in assisting in their implementation. There
are no arrangements for them to have a continuing involvement in the future. FIs and ADs
from the DFAR have been involved in assisting in the management of groups and have had
some training in participatory approaches to management. However, this training is
incomplete and as yet they have little experience of what in practice their role as mentors of
the management groups will be. Furthermore, given their existing workloads and their other
obligations as government servants, including enforcement, it is questionable whether they
will have the time to carry out this role, and there may be conflicts of interests between this
and their other duties.
109. In sum, the results of this project appear unlikely to be sustainable. Because the issue
was presented in physical terms, i.e. the need for infrastructure, insufficient attention was
paid to another, perhaps more crucial issue: why have forms of collective management both
of resources and assets, tended to fail in fishing communities in Sri Lanka.
6 Conclusions
110. This was a poorly formulated project, and many of the problems which project
management had to deal with were the result of failures at the planning and inception stages
of the project cycle:
a. The project was unclear as to its objectives. Whilst notionally concerned with
improving livelihoods, it was focused on the establishment of infrastructure at fish
landing sites and the means to manage this infrastructure in a sustainable fashion.
This is clear in the logframe which fails to develop a clear set of causal relationships
between activities, outputs and objectives;
b. The project was established over two and a half years after the tsunami. By this stage
much remedial work had been done in coastal areas of Sri Lanka and the project was
simply too late to have much impact. In addition, project formulation did not take
advantage of the experience of FAO and others in the post-tsunami fisheries sector;
c. At the planning stage, there was no social or gender analysis, and thus no
understanding of the dynamics of fishing communities in Sri Lanka. The failure to
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
31
address these issues led to a failure to understand the conditions under which
participatory forms of management might flourish or fail. It was also unclear as to
who the beneficiaries were likely to be and why, and issues such as gender were
ignored;
d. There was a failure to understand the context in which the project would work.
There was no analysis of the institutional setting of organisations such as the CFHC,
the MFARD or the MFAR, their capacities or interests. It was also not clear
whether or not there was a need for the sorts of interventions being proposed by the
project;
e. The time frame set for the project was too short given the scale of its aims and
ambitions. The project should have been more focused both in terms of geographical
area covered and in terms of capacity building.
111. As far as implementation is concerned, the picture is mixed. Some aspects of the
implementation process are to be admired and learnt from; others were less successful:
f. Given the constraints of project design and the context which the project found itself
in, project management was relatively good in terms of timely decision making,
introduction of novel ideas and controlling expenditure. Sensibly the project revised
down the number of FLCs at which it could operate;
g. Project staff were hard working and given the scale of the project remarkably
successful in producing the outputs required;
h. The project successfully repositioned itself by shifting its major links with Sri
Lankan organisations from the CFHC to the DFAR. However, this was at the cost of
spreading itself too thinly across a number of state bodies;
i. The FAOR could have been more proactive in facilitating good relations between
the project and GoSL institutions;
j. The project introduced novel ideas into the management of FLCs. At the level of
particular FLCs this involved the establishment of business plans as a means of
directing future participatory management of FLCs. In terms of the project's direct
work it introduced a 'traffic lights' system to provide an easily understood
visualisation of project activities;
k. The project was run efficiently in terms of its use of resources. It established an
ambitious monitoring system which allowed it to track activities, expenditures and
outputs in a timely way;
l. However, a series of factors (delays in mobilising the project; weather conditions;
bureaucratic delays) coupled with the ambition of the project led to a failure to
complete project activities within the allotted time-scale;
m. In terms of outputs, the project was successful both in terms of physical
infrastructure created and numbers of people trained;
n. There were continuing problems throughout the project concerning its relations with
Sri Lankan organisations. These were in part due to a mismatch between FAO
operating rules and those of the Sri Lankan agencies, coupled with a similar
mismatch between Sri Lankan expectations and FAO regulations;
o. The project also had problems in dealing with FAO over such issues as procurement;
p. During implementation there was no attempt at any rigorous social or gender
analysis. And relatively few inputs into training and capacity building amongst the
local organisations charged with managing the FLCs.
112. Given that the project's activities have not ended and that none of them have been
established for any period of time, comments on impact and sustainability are few.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
32
q. The project successfully ran a number of well received training courses. But whether
this will have any lasting impact on the CFHC, the DFAR or the MFARD is
doubtful. There was little success in creating the wider structures within which the
benefits of training can be realised at an organisational level;
r. A considerable number of roads, buildings and covered areas have been constructed
by the project. In the short run some at least are being used, although not always for
the purpose they were designed for. And some of the structures are poorly sited;
s. Key to the sustainability of the infrastructure supplied by the project are the FLC
management units. Some will survive and probably make good use of the project's
legacy. The majority are likely to fail because of the lack of any clear understanding
of social context of the FLCs or the organisations charged with their management,
and limitations on the capacity of the DFAR to support these organisations.
7 Recommendations
113. Given that the project is now at an end, the following recommendations are all
addressed to FAO at corporate level.
114. It emerged in the analysis of this project that failures in planning were key to many
of the problems the project faced. Hence, Recommendation 1 focuses on project formulation
aspects.
Recommendation 1. To FAO on project formulation
FAO should ensure that in future projects:
e) More attention is paid to the logical relations between activities, outputs and
objectives,
f) When FAO and other agencies have worked in the same sector, a systematic
review of their experience should be made to guide planning,
g) Livelihoods projects must involve effective stakeholder and gender analysis at the
planning stage,
h) Realistic targets and time frames must be set.
115. In Project implementation FAO must address three issues arising from the
experience of this project, related to i) the fact that in the project, relations with the GoSL
were often strained; ii) training was a major component but there are doubts as to its
effectiveness in increasing capacity; and iii) project staff experienced problems in handling
FAO regulations and processes.
Recommendation 2. To FAO on project implementation
FAO should ensure that in future projects:
i) At project inception (or earlier) a clear division of labour should be agreed
between FAO and partner organisations, there must be regular meetings of
coordinating bodies, and the FAOR must take a proactive role in facilitating good
relations;
j) FAO should ensure that training only takes place in terms of a wider training
strategy;
k) Staff should receive adequate training in FAO procedures. This is especially
important in projects which involve infrastructural components.
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33
116. This project highlights some of the issues concerning the ways in which future
sustainability might be strengthened.
Recommendation 3. To FAO on sustainability
It is recommended that FAO ensures that problems concerning sustainability are identified at
an early stage in project implementation and that the time frame of projects is such that the
results of interventions can be assessed and issues addressed.
8 Lessons Learned
Lesson Learned 1. On project planning
Although good planning may not guarantee success, bad planning ensures a problematic
project. No matter how energetic and committed the project team, it is difficult if not
impossible to work with a poor and unrealistic planning document.
Lesson Learned 2. On project planning
Planning involves an appreciation of a range of factors including the social and the political.
It is unrealistic to expect livelihoods objectives to be achieved without good social and
political analysis.
Lesson Learned 3. On ownership
It is essential for partner organisations to feel a sense of ownership of a project. The lack of
this leads to problems in implementation and a tendency towards an 'enclave' project.
Lesson Learned 4. On roles and responsibilities
For a project to run smoothly there must be long term agreement between the project
management and the host government on the ground rules concerning the running of the
project (e.g. use of NGOs; use of foreign staff; division of labour and responsibilities).
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report, Annexes
Annex 1. Terms of reference
1. Background
1.1 Background and purposes of the evaluation
1. This is a post-tsunami project in Sri Lanka funded by the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) with a total amount of USD 4.9 million. The project
started in April 2008 and will be completed on 30 September 2011. The project directly
supports priorities as set out in the “Mahinda Chintana – A Ten Year Horizon
Development Framework 2006 –2016” as well as the fisheries Master Plan. The
expected impact of the project is: livelihoods of fishers and fishing communities in
tsunami-affected areas improved. The expected project outcome is: rehabilitated
landing sites functioning and managed self-sustaining through active stakeholder
participation.
2. The specific outputs of the project are:
Capacity of Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation (CFHC) strengthened to
coordinate landing site rehabilitation and management;
Fisheries landing sites rehabilitated in 15 districts; and
Institutional frameworks for community participation in fisheries landing site
management developed and implemented.
3. A project office has been set up within the premises of CFHC. The project is being
managed by an international chief technical adviser supported by a team of local staff
that includes a harbour engineer and a community participation and fisheries
management specialist. The project implementation is guided by a National Steering
Committee chaired by the Secretary of Fisheries and comprised of representatives from
FAO, CIDA, and government agencies such as the Ceylon Fishery Harbours
Corporation, Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development, and Coast
Conservation Department.
4. There are a total of 41 project sites grouped into four clusters: northwestern area (12),
eastern area (9), Colombo and southern area (11), and northern area (9). Some sites
were recommended by CFHC based on a master plan for the reconstruction and
development of anchorages and fish landing centres prepared with the assistance of
FAO. Other sites have since been identified by the project and/or Ministry. The
infrastructure for each site varies and is based on the needs expressed by the fisheries
cooperative society (FCS). The Assistant Directors, fisheries inspectors and district
fisheries officers took an active role during the needs identification process. Capacity
building was undertaken for CFHC harbour managers, assistant directors of fisheries,
and district fisheries inspectors. Training needs assessment was carried out during the
first year which became the basis for a training plan. Organizational strengthening of
the FCS is an important component and was carried out through the participatory
formulation of business plans for each fish landing site and cross-visits between FCS.
5. The project has a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place. In August
2010, a project review was conducted and facilitated by a national consultant to assess
the project progress, ascertain what was/what was not achievable within the remaining
project timeframe and to assess if any changes needed to be effected to the project
outputs. A timeline of major activities was presented during the review to ensure that
the project outputs could be completed by NTE September 30, 2011. In April 2011, an
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35
internal stock-taking exercise was started with the assistance of local consultants to
consolidate experiences and lessons from the project, the findings of which will be used
for the preparation of the terminal report and a fisheries technical paper.
2. Purpose of the Evaluation
6. A final evaluation of the project will be carried out before the completion date of 30
September 2011 to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be useful
for future projects. The evaluation will focus on the following questions:
i. What have been the project‟s achievements in comparison to expected outputs and
outcomes?
ii. What are the potential and/or actual impacts of the project – positive, negative,
intended, unintended?
iii. What lessons can be drawn that may inform approaches to small-scale fisheries
infrastructure development?
3. Scope of the Evaluation
7. The evaluation will build on the recommendations of the project review and the
findings of the internal stock-taking exercise. It will assess the project against the
standard international criteria of evaluation:
relevance;
efficiency;
effectiveness;
sustainability;
impact; and
gender mainstreaming as a means to achieve gender equality.
8. The evaluation will assess the project as follows:
a. Its relevance to: national development priorities, needs and programmes; FAO
Global Goals and Strategic Objectives/Core Functions; other aid programmes in the
sector;
b. Robustness and realism of the theory of change underpinning the
project/programme, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities,
expected outputs, outcomes and impacts (specific and development objectives) and
validity of indicators, assumptions and risks;
c. Quality and realism of the project/programme design, including:
Project duration;
Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.
Institutional set-up and management arrangements;
Approach and methodology;
Process and adequacy of consultation with the Government of Sri Lanka
authorities;
d. Financial resources management, including:
Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs;
Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions- if any - in matching necessary
adjustments to requirements of project implementation;
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
36
Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.
e. Management and implementation, including:
Effectiveness of strategic management, including quality and realism of Work
Plans;
Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;
Implementation gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs,
the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial
measures taken;
Implementation, efficiency and effectiveness of internal monitoring and
review processes;
Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies (if any);
Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and
Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and
resource partner.
f. Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and
timeliness.19
g. Extent to which the expected outcomes have been achieved. In particular, the
Evaluation will assess:
How adequately the project addressed stakeholder participation and how such
participation could make a difference in achieving the expected outcome;
Catalytic role of the project interventions in potentially increasing livelihoods
opportunities;
Potential contribution of training activities to institutional strengthening
h. Use made by the initiative of FAO‟s normative products and actual and potential
contribution of the initiative to the normative work of the Organization.
i. Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the initiative. This will cover:
Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in project objectives, design,
identification of beneficiaries and implementation;
Analysis of how gender relations, gender equality and processes of women‟s
inclusion were and are likely to be affected by the initiative, including in
relation to access to resources and benefits and to empowerment aspects;
Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project management.
j. The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the initiative's results by the
beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the initiative. The
assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate:
Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed
technologies, innovations and/or processes;
Environmental sustainability: the initiative‟s contribution to sustainable natural
resource management, in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the
natural resource base.
_________________ 19
The Project Manager should list the key outputs that he/she suggests for the evaluation team to assess
directly. The evaluation team may add to the list as appropriate.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
37
k. Overall performance of the project/programme: extent to which the initiative has
attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives and FAO
Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and
Core Functions; this will also include the identification of actual and potential
positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly,
intended or unintended. Further, in the project sites in the north that were formerly
under conflict, the Evaluation will assess the potential impact of the project
interventions on promoting social stability.
9. Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and
formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO
and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-
up action.
10. The evaluation will draw attention to specific lessons of interest to other similar
activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major
objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.
4. Evaluation methodology
11. The evaluation will adopt a participatory approach and involve the widest possible
representation of stakeholders from each of the three project outputs and geographical
clusters (northwestern area, eastern area, Colombo and southern area, and northern
area).
12. It will start with a desk review of project documents, reports and monitoring and
evaluation system, among others. The evaluation team will decide on the selection of
the project sites to visit in consultation with the project management. The evaluation
team will use a combination of methods as appropriate, such as semi-structured
interviews, focus group discussions, and observation. It will triangulate the findings
from these methods.
13. The evaluation team will interview representatives from the following:
FAO Representation;
Donor agency;
Project management and staff;
Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation including those who participated in the study
tour to the General Santos Fish Port Complex in the Philippines;
Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development;
Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources including district fisheries
inspectors and assistant directors who participated in the training courses;
National steering committee;
Fisheries cooperative societies and rural fisheries organizations, including a
selection of those who participated in the cross-visits.
14. In so far as possible, interaction will also take place with non-participants to canvass
their opinions. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that women and other
under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner. The Sustainable
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38
Livelihoods Framework20 will be used as the reference for assessing contributions to
poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental
sustainability, etc. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
framework will be one major analytical tool for assessment of the projects‟ results.21
5. Evaluation report
15. The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation
issues, questions and criteria listed in the ToR. The report will be as clear and concise
as possible and will be a self-standing document. Adequate balance will be given to its
different parts, with focus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. It will
include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the
report when considered important to complement the main report and for future
reference.
16. The structure of the report should facilitate in so far as possible the links between body
of evidence, analysis and formulation of recommendations. These will be addressed to
the different stakeholders: they may be strategic and/or operational and will have to be
evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.
17. The evaluation team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation
process. The report will be prepared in English with numbered paragraphs.
18. The preliminary findings of the evaluation mission will be presented during the end-of-
the-project workshop on 8-9 September 2011 in Colombo. The evaluation team will
consider the comments, clarifications and suggestions from the workshop for
integration into the final draft report. The team leader bears responsibility for
submitting the final draft report to FAO and in finalizing the report based on the
comments received.
6. Composition of the evaluation team
19. The evaluation team will be comprised of an international community development
expert and a national fisheries expert with an institutional and policy perspective. The
team members will have had no previous direct involvement in the formulation,
implementation or backstopping of the project. The international expert must have an
in-depth knowledge and experience of community and capacity development in the
fisheries sector with direct knowledge of the Sri Lankan context. The national fisheries
expert would provide insights on the relevance of the work done, coherence with
national processes and perspectives of sustainability and uptake of the lessons learned.
_________________ 20
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial,
and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in
particular of the poor. For more information, among others:
http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf 21
SWOT is a widely used strategic planning tool, useful also in the assessment of development interventions,
to canvass their strengths and weaknesses, as well as future perspectives. It is particularly used in focus
groups, but it can be adapted to individual interviews as well
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
39
7. Evaluation timetable
20. The evaluation will be organized following this timetable:
August 22 Briefing by OED and FI of the evaluation team
through tele-conference
August 23 or 24 Fielding of the mission
August 25 Latest arrival by the mission in Sri Lanka
August 26 – 8 September Desk review, interviews, field visits
9 September Presentation of preliminary findings to the end-of-the
project workshop
10 September International consultant departs Sri Lanka
17 September Submission of final draft report to FAO and CIDA
24 September Comments received from FAO and CIDA
30 September Final report submitted
Annex 2. Brief profile of the evaluation team
Professor Roderick Stirrat, UK national, is a Professor of Anthropology at the University
of Sussex and a social development consultant with over 30 years experience in the
developing world. Much of his work has been concerned with the natural resources sector,
and particularly with forestry and fisheries management issues in South and Southeast Asia.
Annex 3. Documents consulted
Project Documents
1. September 2007. Project Document.
2. April 2009. Inception Phase Report and Project Implementation Plan
3. June 2009. Profile and Needs Assessment, Vols 1 and 2
4. November 2009. Training Needs Assessment and Training Plan
5. March 2010. Monitoring and Evaluation Manual
6. August 2011. Draft Terminal Report
7. 2009-2011. Project Strategy Papers Nos. 1-11
Business Plans
8. Kurusagahapaduwa Fisheries Cooperative Society Limited, Chilaw
9. Annai Wellakkani Fisheries Cooperative Society, St, Antony Rural Fisheries
Organization and St. Joseph Vas Rural Fisheries Organisation, Ambakandawila,
Chilaw.
Project Progress Reports
10. December 2008-May 2009
11. May2009-April 2009;
12. June 2009 –December 2009
13. December 2009-May 10;
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
40
14. May 2010-October 2010
15. November 2010-April 2011
Consultants’ Reports
16. September 2010. Report of the Tripartite Review Mission. Claude Fernando.
17. August 2011. Green Tech Consultants . Restoration and Improvement of Fish
Landing Centers with Stakeholder Participation in Management Project.: Internal
Evaluation.
Back to Office Reports (LTO)
18. November 2008
19. September 2009
20. August 2010
Other FAO papers
21. 2001. Project Cycle Management Technical Guide, SEAGA. Available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf
22. 2005. Fisheries Sector Damage and Needs Assessment and Programme for
Recovery and Rehabilitation. Available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/tsunamis_05/sri_lanka/needs_assessments/SriLank
a_needs_assess_20-01-05.pdf
23. 2005. Master Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages and Fish
Landing Centres along the Coast of Sri Lanka. Available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/tsunamis_05/sri_lanka/cons_miss_rep/Sigurdarson
_FinalDec05.pdf
24. 2007. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Livelihoods in the Fisheries and
Aquaculture Sector in Countries Affected by the Tsunami in 2004. Available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/011/j8998e.pdf
25. 2007. Fisheries Institutional Analysis and Capacity Development . Available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai532e/ai532e00.htm
26. 2007. The FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian
Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. Evaluation Report. Available at
http://typo3.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/Indian%20Ocean%20Earthquak
e%20and%20Tsunami_2007_ER.pdf
27. 2008. Integrated programme for the rehabilitation of the fishery sector in the
tsunami affected districts of Hambantota, Ampara and Batticaloa. Final Report.
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
41
Annex 4. Itinerary and list of persons met
Date Location Main activity People met
Monday 22nd
August
Leave UK at 14:35 Travel
Tuesday 23rd
Arrive SL 0900 Review documents
Wednesday 24th
Project office Meeting project
staff
Mr Simon Diffey, Chief Technical
Advisor, Fisheries;
Mr Kumarasinghe Bandara;
Mr Kusal Dharmartne, Monitoring and
Evaluation/IT Officer
Mr Palitha Muthukade, Community
Participation in Fisheries expert
Mr Lalith Wijeratne
Thursday 25th
FAO
Representation
Meeting FAO staff Mr Patrick Evans FAO Rep;
DFAR Workshop on
sustainable
management of FLC
facilities
Mr Nimal Hettiarachchi, DG DFAR
Friday 26th
MFARD Interviews Dr Dhamita de Zoysa, Secretary;
Dr S Subasinghe, Advisor to the
Minister
CIDA Interviews Dr Nihal Atapattu, Senior
Development Officer
Saturday 27th
Reviewing
documents
Sunday 28th
Reviewing
documents
Monday 29th
Fairline Road,
Telwatta,
Kottawanagala,
Pelana, Idiwara
Field trip to project
sites
Project participants
Tuesday 30th
Unakuruwa Field trip to project
sites
Project participants
Wednesday 31st Taldekka,
Kadawatha South,
Ambakandawila
Field trip to project
sites
Mr Nihal Padukka, AD, Chilaw
Thursday 1st
September
MFARD Interviews Mr Indra Ranasinghe, DG (Technical)
CFHC Interviews Mr Amal Senalankadhikara, Chairman
Friday 2nd
September
NARA Interviews Ms Manusha Wijesundera;
Ms Amali Wijedeva
Project premises Interviews Mr Michael Stickley, Halcrows;
Mr Steve Creech, Independent
Consultant
FCCISL Interviews Mr Krisantha Wisenthige
Saturday 3rd
September
Documents
reviewed and notes
collated
Sunday 4th
September
Mannar, Venkalai,
Pesalai and
Pullimunai
Field trip to project
sites
Project participants
Monday 5th
September
Mullaitivu town,
Seealwathai and
Kalapadpadu North
Field trip to project
sites
Project participants
Tuesday 6th
CFHC Interviews Mr Percy Samarasinghe, Manager,
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
42
September Harbours Operations
Wednesday 7th
September
Preparing
preliminary
presentation
Thursday 8th
September
Terminal workshop
Friday 9th
September
Terminal workshop
Saturday 10th
September
Leave Sri Lanka, h
10:00 am
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report, Annexes
Design Summary
Indicators / Targets (by End of Project unless otherwise
stated)
Data Sources
Assumptions
Impact: The livelihoods of fishers
and fishing communities
in tsunami affected areas
improved
1. Fishers and community attribute
livelihood improvement to
restored landing centres
2. Increased income for fishers
3. Reduced livelihood vulnerability
for fishers
• District level
household surveys
• Fisher surveys-
landing centres
• no deterioration of
macro-economic
conditions
• abatement of
conflict/improvemen
ts in security
• resources managed
sustainably Outcome: Rehabilitated landing
centres functioning well
and self-sustaining as a
result of stakeholder
participation in
management
1. 80 landing centres rehabilitated
2. Management groups established
for 80 landing site
3. Community participation in
management of 80 landing centres
4. Improved capacity of government
to rehabilitate and support
management of landing centres
5. Reduction on post harvest losses
and improvement in fish quality
6. Increased income for fishers(over
baseline
• technical surveys
of completed
landing centres
• management committee
•
meeting reports
project
stakeholders/ben eficiaries
evaluations of
project activity
• no further
environmental
disaster
• abatement of
conflict/improvemen
ts in security (at
landing sites)
• community cohesion
allows consensus
and participation of
key stakeholders
Outputs: 1. Capacity of CFHC
strengthened to
coordinate landing site
rehabilitation and
management
1.1 National masterplan for harbour
rehabilitation updated and
National database for FLC
construction/rehabilitation
created
1.2 Harbour rehabilitation design
unit in CFHC operational and
staffed
1.3 Priority landing centres for
project rehabilitation identified
and clustered for implementation
1.4 Training in participatory landing
site management and landing site
design provided to CFHC staff
1.5 Cross visits completed
1.6 Government guidelines, design
standards and best practices for
landing site rehabilitation and
management agreed and
harmonised
1.7 Project operating procedures in
15 districts established and
training provided to District
engineers and stakeholders
• government
and community
management
plans
• CFHC reports
• project reports
(including
inception/progr
ess)
• training and
capacity
building reports
• guidelines
published
• timely establishment
of CFHC unit
• timely
implementation of
project activities
• counterpart staff
resources made
available
2. Fisheries landing
centres rehabilitated in
15 districts.
2.1 Community based management
meetings and stakeholder
consultations completed.
2.2 Design and Bathymetric surveys
complete
• project and
CFHC reports
• community
meeting reports
• availability of state
land
• availability of
manpower and
materials;
Annex 5. Original Project Logical Framework
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
44
Design Summary
Indicators / Targets (by End of Project unless otherwise
stated)
Data Sources
Assumptions
2.3 Outline plans completed
2.4 Community discussions on outline
plans completed and revisions
made
2.5 Final design, detailed plans BOQ
and specifications completed
2.6 Tendering and national
procurement for construction
services.
2.7 Monitoring of quantities/quality
of constructions
2.8 Completion of construction and
handover to community
management groups
• standard of
construction quality;
and,
• post construction
maintenance of
facilities
3 Institutional
frameworks for
community participation
in harbour management
developed and
implemented (and
livelihoods improved)
3.1 Management groups operating in
participating landing centres by
NTE.
3.2 Participatory management plans
for participating landings sites
developed
3.3 Regular meetings of landing site
management groups and
implementation of decisions
3.4 Stakeholder identification process
completed and awareness of the
harbour management committees
raised in participating
communities
3.5 Stakeholder representation on
management groups includes
broad representation including
women, poor and marginalized
groups.
3.6 Capacity building of key
stakeholders in management
completed
3.7 Improved maintenance of all
rehabilitated harbour infrastructure
3.8 Capacity building for fishers
carried out
3.9 Increased market price for fish
from rehabilitated landing centres
3.10Increased income for fishers
landing fish at rehabilitated
landing centres
3.11Reduced waste by 20% for
commercially important species
(and discards) landed by fishermen
operating from rehabilitated
landing centres
3.12Improved quality of processed
fish and fish products from
communities around rehabilitated
landing centres
3.13Improved quality of environment
at rehabilitated landing centres
• government
and community
management
plans
• CFHC reports
• project reports
(including
inception/progr
ess)
• training and
capacity
building reports
• stakholder
analysis reports
• training
programmes
completed
• houselhold
surveys
• participation of
communities in
process
• supportive legal
frameworks exist
• training providers
can be identified
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
45
Indicative Activities:
Design Summary Indicators / Targets
(by End of Project unless otherwise
stated)
Data Sources
Assumptions
1.1 Update national
masterplan for
harbours and create
database
1.2 Establish and train
CFHC team within
ministry and
operational
procedures in
Districts
1.3 Identify priority
landing centres for
rehabilitation
1.4 Develop design
standards and best
practices
2.1 Complete design
surveys for landing
centres and prioritise
2.2 Prepare outline plans,
discuss and agree
final plans with
community groups
2.3 Tender for
construction
2.4 Rehabilitate all
prioritised landing
centres (under 3
phases)
2.5 Monitor construction
(quality)
2.6 Handover of landing
centres to community
management groups
3.1 Establish and build
capacity of
community
management groups
3.2 Establish landing site
maintenance regime
3.3 Train management
groups in financial
management
3.4 Carry out training
needs assessment of
fishers
3.5 Carry out training of
fishers and key
stakeholders in post
harvest activities
3.6 monitor quality of
landed fish
3.7 Establish project
steering committee
3.8 Conduct baseline
studies
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report, Annexes
Annex 6. Revised Project Logical Framework
Revised version by International M&E Consultant, December 2009
Design Summary Indicators Data Sources Assumptions22
Goal:
The livelihoods of fishers and fishing communities in tsunami affected areas improved
1. Number and percentage of fishers and communities that attribute, livelihood
improvement to project activities carried out in their communities23
2. Reduction on post harvest losses for commercially important species landed by fishermen operating from rehabilitated landing centres and improvement in fish quality.
3. Increased market price for fish from rehabilitated landing centres 4. Increased income for fishers landing fish at rehabilitated landing centres 5. Improved quality of environment at rehabilitated landing centres
Beneficiary assessment towards the end of the Project
Baseline and evaluation study covering Project sites where infrastructure, co-mgmt. regime and/or training will be (has been) (re-)built/ practiced/ conducted that can have an impact on fish quality, reduction of post-harvest losses and other positive effects
Positive effects caused by project interventions are relevant & meaningful for fish folks’ improvement of livelihoods
no deterioration of macro-economic conditions
abatement of conflict /improvements in security in conflict zone
sustainable mgmt. of resources
Outcome:
Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-sustaining as a result of stakeholder participation in management
1. No of FLC where rehabilitated infrastructure is being used by targeted groups
2. Degree (expressed in percentages) to which new/ rehabilitated infrastructure is being used by the target group as expected.
3. No and % of rehabilitated/constructed FLCs where fees are collected by users as recommended by the Project
4. No of FLC management/user groups in each maturity category, and % distribution across categories
5. No of Project FLCs where post-construction maintenance of infra-structure is practiced according to recommendations made by DSC.
6. Degree to which government capacity to (i)organize rehabilitation and
(ii)support participatory management of landing centres, is applied24
7. Evidence that the DFAR and/or CFHC have/has considered the project’s recommendations related to participatory management regimes.
quarterly reports by FIs and/or co- management committee meeting reports
periodic surveys of project stakeholders/beneficiaries conducted by Project’s Community Participation Expert and M&E/IT Officer
tri-partite evaluation report
workplans by FLC development unit in CFHC
study by all prof. project staff (organized by CTA and M&E/IT Officer) on the application of newly
all barriers that could prevent the expected beneficiaries from using the new infrastructure have been anticipated and dealt with by the project
GoSL decision makers remain committed to transfer responsibilities related to infrastructure to user groups
community cohesion allows consensus and participation of key stakeholders
trainers trained by the Project conduct effective training for FLC co-mgmt.& user groups
25
_________________ 22
There are two additional assumptions related to this component not visible in our logframe which are critical to the success of the project: (“attempts to use project
funds for purposes other than those stated in the Prodoc will be resisted by each of the three parties” and “decisions taken by the NSC reflect strong commitment to the
Project’s goal”). 23
This will be based on several indicators specifically related to individual types of project intervention. 24
This would include indicators of showing application of different aspects of capacity 25
This is a critical assumption that needs monitoring if the training at field level, i.e. the training provided by trainers trained under the project, is not financed by the
Project
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
47
Design Summary Indicators Data Sources Assumptions22
8. DFAR and/or CFHC have/has taken decisions based on the project recommendations on participatory management regimes.
9. Degree to which CFHC and DFAR district staff prepare reports covering Project related questions and issues
created capacities of CFHC, MFAR and DFAR staff (incl. results of post-training surveys) and decisions taken on Project recommendations
environment is conducive to the application of what has been imparted through training
Outputs:
1. Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site rehabilitation and management
1.1 FLC development unit in CFHC operational and staffed by people trained under the Project
1.2 Job descriptions of staff of the new FLC unit drafted and submitted to CFHC management for consideration and approval
1.3 CFHC staff has the capability to update and use the master-plan for harbour rehabilitation.
1.4 CFHC staff can use the National GIS-database as a management tool. 1.5 CFHC staff able to prioritise FLC rehabilitation according the established
criteria. 1.6 CFHC staff can design and manage FLCs in participatory way. 1.7 CFHC staff in a position to follow the guidelines, design standards and best
practices drafted by the project in collaboration with key stakeholders. 1.8 The degree to which district staff can follow project operating procedures.
CFHC capacity needs assessment (as baseline report)
(study) report by all professional project staff (organized by CTA, M&E/IT Officer and HRD Training Coordinator) on (proposed) institutional changes and the newly created capacities of CFHC, MFAR and DFAR staff
government and community management plans and reports
individual training reports
summary reports by training provider
timely establishment of CFHC unit responsible for FLC development
counterpart staff is made available by CFHC management and collaborates intensively with project experts
CFHC management encourages the development of ‘soft’ skills of CFHC staff related to the promo-tion of participatory co-mgmt. - regimes and staff is willing to become involved in such efforts
2. Fisheries landing centers rehabilitated in 15 districts.
2 % of completed infrastructure works of different types in each FLC/district/project phase as of total number planned (green traffic light).
3 No of different types of completed infrastructure in each FLC/district/project phase.
4 Total cost of each type of infrastructure per FLC/ District/project phase as compared to TCE and FTCE
5 % of (expected) users satisfied with the facilities/infrastructure provided (rehabilitated) by the project.
6 % of work completion certificates issued by the DS consultant according to schedule as of total no of certificates to be issued.
7 % of constructed infrastructure rated by the DFAR/CFHC district officers as satisfactory/ unsatisfactory.
Design and Supervision Consultant’s progress reports
entries in FLC profiles originating from DSC and BTO-reports by Harbour Engineering Specialist
(back-to-office) reports on beneficiary assessments organized by project staff
quarterly reports by FIs or co- mgmt.committee meeting reports
community meeting reports
reports by CFHC district staff
abatement of conflict / improvements in security (at landing sites) in all 15 districts
sufficient availability of state land for FLC infrastructure development
availability of manpower and materials for construction
project staff is in the position to crosscheck that standards of construction quality are kept and deficits are effectively dealt with
3 Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour management developed and implemented (and livelihoods
3.1 No and type of different participatory co-management regimes developed for landings sites.
3.2 Guidelines, rules and regulations for FLC co-management regime(s) and CBOs’ participation drafted and submitted for approval
3.3 Type and no of project supported co-management groups/committees established in FLCs.
3.4 No of fish landing sites where required capacity building of key stakeholders (incl. user groups) in management has been completed
3.5 No of co-management groups/committees which include broad
Project’s strategy paper on participatory co-management regimes covering legal aspects
entries in FLC profiles originating BTO-reports
reports prepared by Project’s Community Participation Expert
quarterly reports by FIs and/or co-
1. willingness of users to participate in co-management regimes and take responsibility for adequate operation and maintenance
2. supportive legal frameworks exist
3. suitable training providers can be identified
GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report
48
Design Summary Indicators Data Sources Assumptions22
improved26)
representation including women, poor and marginalized groups. 3.6 No of Project FLCs where co-management groups/committees have been
exposed to the infrastructure maintenance procedures (recommended in DSC Manual)
3.7 No of hand-overs of rehabilitated FLCs to co-management groups/committees
3.8 Recommendations submitted to GoSL on the promotion of successful and promising regimes identified through in-depth evaluation of different participatory co-management regimes implemented under the Project and by other projects (e.g. IFAD)
management committee meeting reports
government and community management plans and reports
individual training reports
summary reports by training provider
in-depth evaluation of different participatory co-mgmt. regimes
_________________ 26
The phrase in brackets should rather be eliminated as it is not a project output but a desired impact.