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Global Journal of HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE Political Science Volume 13 Issue 4 Version 1.0 Year 2013 Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA) Online ISSN: 2249-460x & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Rethinking Pre-Colonial State Formation and Ethno-Religious Identity Transformation in Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate

By Lenshie, Nsemba Edward & Ayokhai, F.E.F. Federal University, Lafia, Nigeria

Abstract - State formation in Hausaland was on course in precolonial Nigeria in the context of geographical proximity, biosocial relations and cultural contiguities before the development was impeded by the Fulani overlords in the Usman Danfodio led jihad (1804-1817). During the jihad, the populations of the Hausa (Habe) states were spontaneously disaggregated and later, re-aggregated to establish a new state, the Sokoto Caliphate. This paper examines the nexus between pre-colonial state formation and social identity transformation along ethno-religious lines in Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate. It finds that a major outcome of precolonial state formation in Hausaland is the transformation of social identities along ethno-religious lines. The paper argues that the jihad was not only motivated by the need for religious purification but also as much by the quest for ‘power to make binding decisions and authoritative allocation of values in the society’ and to also ‘determine who gets what, when and how’. This paper contends that the jihadists’ interception of the evolution of the Hausa States had two significant implications. Firstly, it ended the possibility of the transformation of the Hausa States under the Habe rulers into an empire and aborted the Habe dynasties while enthroning the rule of the Fulani over states in Hausaland. Secondly, the Hausa states founded on the cosmopolitanism ideology were transformed to adopt a new ethno-religious identity, the Hausa-Fulani. These implications were to significantly influence the trajectories of social identity formation in Hausaland under the Caliphate.

Keywords : hausaland, hausa pre-colonial states, jihad, ethno-religious transformation, sokoto caliphate.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 160699


Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:

Rethinking Pre-Colonial State Formation and Ethno-Religious Identity Transformation in

Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate Lenshie, Nsemba Edward α & Ayokhai, F.E.F.σ

Abstract - State formation in Hausaland was on course in pre-colonial Nigeria in the context of geographical proximity, bio-social relations and cultural contiguities before the development was impeded by the Fulani overlords in the Usman Danfodio led jihad (1804-1817). During the jihad, the populations of the Hausa (Habe) states were spontaneously disaggregated and later, re-aggregated to establish a new state, the Sokoto Caliphate. This paper examines the nexus between pre-colonial state formation and social identity transformation along ethno-religious lines in Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate. It finds that a major outcome of pre-colonial state formation in Hausaland is the transformation of social identities along ethno-religious lines. The paper argues that the jihad was not only motivated by the need for religious purification but also as much by the quest for ‘power to make binding decisions and authoritative allocation of values in the society’ and to also ‘determine who gets what, when and how’. This paper contends that the jihadists’ interception of the evolution of the Hausa States had two significant implications. Firstly, it ended the possibility of the transformation of the Hausa States under the Habe rulers into an empire and aborted the Habe dynasties while enthroning the rule of the Fulani over states in Hausaland. Secondly, the Hausa states founded on the cosmopolitanism ideology were transformed to adopt a new ethno-religious identity, the Hausa-Fulani. These implications were to significantly influence the trajectories of social identity formation in Hausaland under the Caliphate. Keywords : hausaland, hausa pre-colonial states, jihad, ethno-religious transformation, sokoto caliphate.

I. Introduction here is a consensus among scholars that human habitation in the Nigeria area dates back to circa 300 B.C. In the central Sudan area, which Northern

Nigeria constituted part, there existed several states at different levels of social formation. They were so numerous that it was impossible to enumerate them (Kurfi, 1983, Barkindo et.al., 1989). Of all the states, the Hausa state formations were outstanding. In the century before colonisation, the Nigerian area witnessed the transformation of several pre-colonial state formations. Author : Department of Political Science and International Relations Taraba State University, Jalingo.

E-mail : [email protected]

Department of History Federal University, Lafia, Nigeria.. E-mail : [email protected]

These states were widely spread culturally and different in sizes and forms of organizational sophistications, which evolved within the context of their respective socio-cultural and religious traditions (Oyovbaire, 1985; Odofin, 2003; Aper, 2008).

The Hausa states in central Sudan date before the advent of Bayyajida, the acclaimed legend and founder of the ‘federation’. The Habe within this period had evolved administrative and organisational structures to govern their people. In each of the states, bio-social relations and ethno-religious belief system had developed. Within their socio-cultural and traditional belief systems and widely spread mutually intelligible language enhanced by geographical proximities, the tendencies of an emerging Habe ruled mega state was becoming high in the century before they were conquered and brought under Sokoto Caliphate.

The arrival of the Muslim Fulani clerics into Hausaland, their revolutionary teachings and eventually, the Usman Danfodio led Jihad in the 19th century halted the course of development of the Hausa States. It ended the Hausa dynasties and transformed the people ethno-religiously, such that they are perceived in post-colonial Nigeria as Hausa-Fulani. This paper attempts an examination of how the states and societies in Hausaland came to acquire the Hausa-Fulani identity. This paper examines the conditions necessitating the evolution of the Hausa state formations before the interception by the Fulani jihadists, the dynamics of the jihad and the ethno-religious transformation of the Hausa States into the Sokoto Caliphate.

II. Political Geography of Hausaland: An Overview of the Past in the

Present

The Hausa people etymologically have been referred as Hausawa, Haoussa, Ausa, Habe, and Mgbakpa. They constitute one of the single largest ethnic groups in the West African region. They are located on a large scale in the Sahelian areas of northern Nigeria and the south-eastern Niger, and spread across other African countries (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2012). Hausaland was better referred to as the Sudan Kingdom. In this part of the world where

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the Hausa settled, there were clusters of ethnic groups, who in centuries later were joined by them.

Describing geopolitically the Hausaland, Sulaiman (n/d) corroborates that Hausaland is located in the central Bilad al-Sudan, bordering Kanem Borno in the east and Songhai in the west. The Hausa people were neither an ethnic group nor the only inhabitants of the land. They were believed to have migrated into the region sometime before the 10th century from the central Sahara, perhaps due to desiccation or some such natural phenomenon. On arrival the Hausa people settled in the central savanna and mixed with the indigenous people. The result was a multi-ethnic society sharing a common language called ‘Hausa’.

This expanded the territoriality of the Habe beyond the northern plains of Jos-Plateau. In these areas they evolved various formations of centralized statehoods which were by definition city states. They included Daura, Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Gobir, and later Kebbi and Zamfara. Each of the states was walled to grant protection against perceived enemies. Notwithstanding, the polities were governed under the monarchical system; this was organized as a necessity to direct the affairs of governance. There were also powerful market centers in all the states, which were not only restricted within their respective territories but also attracted merchants from far and near to do businesses (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/414840/Nigeria/55311/Hausaland). Despite this territorial occupation and spread the Habe enjoyed in the Sudan region, they often contended against one another. Some of the emergent powerful rulers consistently wanted to annex other Hausa States to expand their spheres of control. The internal wrangling among these states rendered them unable to withstand external attacks. It is evident that the Hausa States in the century before the jihad were attacked and brought under the control of the Kenem Borno Empire. The territory was later brought under the Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1904). The Usman Danfodio led jihad expanded the Hausaland beyond its natural borders by bringing others into the Commonwealth of the Caliphate.

The Caliphate was later subjected to British colonial rule. Historical evidence demonstrates that the Fulani aristocrat, Sultan Attahiru of Sokoto struggled assiduously against colonial domination but eventually was overpowered in 1904. During this period, the deposed Sultan and Emirs were replaced with new ones and were made to take an oath of total loyalty to Her Majesty, the Queen and accept to do in accordance to the instructions of the Queen’s representatives – Governors and Resident Officers – in their respective localities (Sa’ad, 1980). This signalized the lost of authority to determine the socio-economic and political future of their societies, implying that they were nominal rulers designated with the position of becoming British

colonial surrogates (Soyinka, 2009). At independence, the Hausanization of the most parts of northern Nigeria have expanded the territorial boundaries of the Hausaland from the southwest to the northeast and north-central (Benue valley and the belt of River Niger) bordering the southern Nigeria (see figure 1).

Fig. 1 : Map showing major cities of Hausaland in modern borders of Nigeria

In post-colonial Nigeria the definition of

Hausaland came to be identified as the area where Hausa is the lingua franca, or alternatively, it is the area where Hausa is the first language of most or all of the population. This definition of the Hausaland incorporates the non-Hausa aborigines into the classification. This makes Hausaland enormously extensive attributed to widespread Hausanization of the region. With expansion of Hausa language as a lingua franca in this part of the country, it provided the ability not just to communicate but also, some sense of political and cultural identity. Accordingly, this identity can be traced to the beginning of the present millennium (Sutton, 1979). Pre-Caliphate States in Hausaland and Ethno-Religious Identity Formation

III. Pre-Caliphate States in Hausaland and Ethno-Religious Identity

Formation Inquiry into the Hausa ethnic group is

complicating and could be misleading. Jibrin Ibrahim (2003) cited in Kazah-Toure (2004:45) stated that there is an agreement among historians over the difficulties of tracing the origin of the Hausa. Accordingly, the ancestors of the Hausa people were, however, mainly autochthons to the territory that came to be known as Hausaland, possessing an ethnic identity belonging to Afro-Asiantic language of the Chadic group (Kazah-Toure, 2003). Coleman (1985) succinctly stated that the original Hausa people moved into what is now the Northern Region of Nigeria at least some centuries

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13Rethinking Pre-Colonial State Formation and Ethno-Religious Identity Transformation in Hausaland

under the Sokoto Caliphate

Source: Hausa Kingdoms, Wikipedia free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hausa_Kingdoms

before the spread of Islam into the area. However, the Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia (2012) avers that

Between 500 CE and 700 CE Hausa people had been slowly moving west from Nubia and mixing in with the local Northern and Central Nigerian population established a number of strong states in what is now Northern and Central Nigeria and Eastern Niger.

Situating the Hausaland and their neighbours, Kurfi (1983) avers that Hausa States had evolved alongside other state formations before Islam spread and later, Western colonization into the area at the turn of 20th century.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw the rise of the Hausa city states of Katsina, Kano, Gobir, Zaria, etc., in the North as well as Nupe and Kwararafa kingdoms in the Middle Belt area of Nigeria (Kurfi, 1983).

The state formations in the Hausaland were not

monolithic; they were separate and independent entities. The independence enjoyed by the people also reflected in their pre-Caliphate identity formations. Each Hausa group preferred to be associated with their specific areas of habitation either as Gobirawa, Katsinawa, Daurawa, Kanawa, and so on (Jega, 1999; Barkindo, et.al. 1989). Pre-Caliphate Hausa States in the present day Northern Nigeria were construed by histories of migration and other social variables such as language, culture, tradition and geographical contiguity. These were identity structures that were necessary for the evolution of a federation in the centuries ahead.

One of the major factors that were indeed

important and necessitating in this regard was their ability to evolve a culture and tradition, built around the legend – Bayyajida, as the acclaimed founder of the Hausa States. Even though there were recorded histories of warfare among Hausa States, the myth, nonetheless, was developed to generate internal harmony and cohesion among the Hausa speaking peoples. Indicating how the Hausa speaking peoples were united by conscience, Coleman (1985) asserted that these characteristics of the peoples led to an intense cultural consciousness such that no matter where they travelled abroad, or how long they remained there, they retained a profound pride in Hausa language and the culture it denoted. This cohesion was not developed overnight but by centuries of cultural and traditional practices across generations. Ethno-cultural or religious

belief system among them made provision for that development.

Within this period, Hausa pre-colonial State

formations experienced concurrently the socio-economic, political and religious developments which were preconditions for evolving a stable government and to direct the process of administration. The systemic development provided the forum for creating

rulers and their subjects in their respective states. This relationship extended beyond each other’s borders. Their boundaries even though were arbitrary were however identifiable. Each knew and understood the limit of state boundaries and hence, limited their operations.

In the same way the political systems evolved –

identified as the Sarauta (Kingship) system. The political systems were active agents of social, economic and political transformations. They were capable of responding to the crises of nation building as were obtainable among the political systems of other nations across the world. The Sarauta systems were based on hereditary monarchy developed in the context of centralised system. Under the Sarauta system, the monarchs acted based on cultural and traditional provisions guiding the society. Sometimes, they might overstep their boundaries, but when that happens, they were often reminded for adjustment. This was not only applicable to the rulers but also subjects of the states. The working of the state in this direction implied that there were systems of formal rules or informal understandings that coordinated the actions of individuals.

There were arrays of powerful states in the

Hausaland. Most notable and significant among them were the Daura and Gobir as far as politics and governance was

concerned. Other Hausa States, for example, Kano and Katsina were eminent in trade, technological innovations and tourism respectively. Historically, it is documented that Daura was governed by a queen named Durama (Awu 2008) for several decades before the mythological appearance of Bayajida in the scene, to whom is accredited the founder of the Hausa Bakwoi (Seven legitimate Hausa) States, and to whose offspring and concubines are attributed the founders of Hausa Banza Bakwoi (Seven illegitimate Hausa states). Some of these States included Nupe, Gwari, Yauri and Kwararafa among others (Buah 1974).

However, the claim by the Hausa over these

states in the pre-colonial era is contradictory and mythical. There are no evidences to prove this claim. Suffice it to note that, the Jukun even though had encounter with the Hausaland during their migratory period, they evolved systematically, firstly, intelligible integrative spoken languages which were quite different from the Hausa language, and secondly, a belief system woven into their culture and traditions that marked them out from other ethnic groups. These ethno-traditional characteristics were developed in rituals and cultural symbolism of the people and were passed down from generation to generation. In fact,

it is on record that the Junkun constituted serious challenge to the survival of the Hausa States in the 18th century (Coleman, 1985).


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and maintaining bio-social relations and religious intercourse among the people; between rulers, and

Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, in his autobiography ‘My life’ affirms this fact thus: ‘curiously

enough, the Jukuns of Wukari… in a period of extra-ordinary activity, three times raided the far north and once captured the massive fortress of Kano itself and swept on and nearly took Katsina before their attack lost impetus’ in the century (Miapyen 2013).

According to Coleman (1985) Gobir was the

seat of power and the centre of intellectual formation. He pointed that throughout Hausaland; the Hausa pagan king of Gobir in mid-18th century had serious influence on other Hausa states and threatened to bring them under his control. The influence was forceful and incremental. Internally, the ruler was considered not to be responsive to the yearnings and aspirations of the people. The desire to annex other Hausa States lends credence to the internal contradictions that led to the jihad of the 19th century. Although, the ruler in Gobir had embraced Islam within the century the Fulani entered Hausaland, syncretism was still largely the practice.

Describing the repressive nature of the rulers of

Hausaland, particularly the Gobir ruler, Hunwick (1965) noted: a) the ruler, by his action, had shown himself not to be a Muslim, and the land is to be considered a land of Islam or a land of unbelief, according to the religion of its ruler; b) the unbelief of the Sarki of Gobir was shown by the way in which he followed certain non-Islamic practices such as the veneration of rocks and trees, consultation with magicians and soothsayers, the imposition of illegal taxes, the banning of the wearing of the veil for women etc., and c) by the way he attacked and persecuted other Muslims. Given this situation, Usman Danfodio took advantage of the political misnomers and began to preach Islam and mobilising the people against the state. The objective was to overthrow the status quo and to reconstruct a system from the deficits of the existing state system with the hope of founding an Islamic state that provide for effective justice delivery.

Nevertheless, before this period, the Hausa

States generally were marked out. They were centres of scholarship and intellectualism, and such development was rapid and the people could appreciate. The form of knowledge passed down was pragmatic and practical. It was geared towards building a society for self-propelling development and self-sufficiency in terms of production and consumption capacities. To ensure this prospect, the younger ones were given opportunities to choose between trades to learn and the experts in their endeavour of choice were always willing to teach. The devotion of the trainees to the trainers was great. In the process of learning, emphasis was placed on character and learning. Excellence was celebrated and encouraged by the people. The reason was to ensure that they become profitable for themselves and for their

The visibility and outrageous economies of

scale of the Hausa was informed by the foregoing commitments. Mainly, agriculture provided readily the trade for internal development.

Various species were domesticated ranging from millet, rice, cotton, groundnuts, and several other food crops and plants. The capacity for exchange of capital was developed; this enabled them to trade beyond their respective states boundaries. Their exchanges never stopped at the production and distribution of goods and services, but also to include clothing and textiles, minerals and other material artefacts (Rodney, 1972; Oliver and Atmore, 1994:12-14). Technologically, the Hausa had indigenously developed and directed them to meet bio-social requirements of the society. For instance, blacksmithing for the construction of hoes to serve the purpose of farming, the development of shoemaking technology, building and architectural technology, and tie and dye technology among others were domesticated. It is relevant to state that the Hausa had mastery of trades and were exporting beyond their borders to generate foreign earning. Note that it was the surpluses that were exported to attract the import of other resources that were not readily developed in their respective societies. This informed why several trades and exchanges flourished in the Hausa States (Oliver and Atmore, 1994).

Equally important is the fact that the Hausaland

had developed the concept of ‘God’ in which a psycho-cosmic drama was performed often in reverence to the deity. The people had the belief that He was the most powerful on earth and in heavens. He was capable of protecting and ensuring their well being. The worship was performed through efficacious tenuous process. They were given to the worship of Iskoki (spirits). The peoples’ belief in Iskoki approximated similar practices in Christianity and Islam, where Allah (God) is spirit not physically seen, but exists everywhere and all knowing (omnipresent and omnipotent), and as such should be worshiped in the same context. The basic difference was the mode of the worship associated with them and directed to the deities (Quick, 1995; Andersson, 2002; Sulaiman, n.d; Lesnhie and Johnson, 2012).

The Haradu (god of thunder) phenomenon was

also prominent among the people. The phenomenon was considered to be one of the most supreme deities which helped to condition their existence both vertically and horizontally. Their belief in the deity was orchestrated through festive dance referred to as bori as marked features of respect to the deity (Nzemwe, 1985). Till this day, some of these practices are still visible among the Hausa maguzawa, who have not intermixed their culture with any form of religious practices. This system was factorial to the internal solidarity and cohesion enjoyed among the Hausa because it

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respective societies (Rodney, 1972; Nzemwe, 1985; Barkindo et.al., 1985; Ubah, 1985; Bako, 1999). provided the moral codes for their existence as a

collective whole. Religion was therefore primus in this development. The Haradu was invoked to assert justice where injustice was manifested and nobody wanted to accept responsibility for an offence.

Among the Hausa, justice delivery through the invocation of the spirit was carried out instantaneously on the offender when no one accepted responsibility for an offense. Theirs was not like those obtained in other religions such as Islam and Christianity, where retributions are believed to be in the ‘life-here-after’. Ubah (1985) asserts ‘the pre-colonial period, from the mythical to historical times, was dominated by a religious world view. Thus, all activities and instruments of governance and survival were clothed in religion, ritual, language and symbolism’. Religion constructively shaped the lives and thought pattern of the peoples in Hausaland and directed their mindsets towards production of good governance to meet the challenges that came with the varied demands of social formation.

This development was transformed to meet new ends, following the migration of the Fulani into Hausaland during the pre-jihad era. In this connection, Hunwick (1965:269) stated that in the century before the jihad, in the north-western Hausaland were settled by large Fulani who migrated over the centuries from the Futa-Toro of Senegal. Many of them, mainly Muslims settled in towns and villages and intermarried with the Hausa population. With this development the tendency for ethno-religious transformation was therefore eminent. In every society, Kazah-Toure (2004) argues that ‘migration provided the tendencies of creating new ethnic identity’, informed by ethno-biosocial relations of hitherto non-coexisting groups.

IV.

Islam, Jihad and the Establishment

of Sokoto Caliphate

Before Islam entered the Hausaland, traditional religions were the mainstay. The Hausas were not irreligious; their religiosity reached a level where it began to be viewed as contradictory to the belief of Islam. Islam was introduced into Hausaland in the 14th century, even though it has been religion in Borno Empire since the 11th century. The reason was that between these periods, Hausaland was yet to enter into the trans-Saharan trade with their neighbours in northern Africa (Barkindo et.al., 1985). However, the arrival of the Fulani expanded the religion through teaching of the tenets of the faith. Within this period, Arabic was introduced. This development provided the people with a medium of writing and communication. This was considered the era of modern scholarship and intellectualism in Hausaland.

Bako (1999) argues that the development provided the ease for building an ideological base through teaching and preaching against the state order

contemporary civil society mobilisation. To buttress how Usman Danfodio started the mobilisation, according to Sulaiman (n/d)

…he had to mould men and women who would subscribe to his ideas and share his aspirations to bring an umma dedicated to Islam in order to transform society. [This he did by establishing] his own school, trained his own students and created his own community of scholars, teachers and saints. It was through these students the Talaba that he spread his massage; it was from these students that he formed the inner core of the movement; and it is they who spearheaded the prosecution of the jihad….

The Jama’a (community) was formed in Degel,

the Gobir state and was transformed into a militant group in the subsequent years to execute the jihad (Bako, 1999:79-89). The people who joined the Jama’a were motivated by varied objectives. These motives were presented by Bello’s classification of the community into ten categories depending on their involvement. Sulaiman (n/d) cited Bello thus:

The first nine include those who had joined the Jama’a for purely political reasons, because it offered a refuge for the oppressed; those who, being Fulani, had joined it on tribal considerations and had cause to ‘despise the non-Fulani, even if they are learned, pious or mujahidun’; those whose reason for their membership was no more than ‘fashion’; scholars whose fortunes had been drained by the revolutionary momentum unleashed by the Jama’a, and who had no alternative but to join in order to survive; and those who were in the Jama’a because it offered material benefits. There were still others who rode on the prestigious crest of the Jama’a, even though they had since been attracted by the world and the devil,’ and had abandoned its goals; those who were born within the Jama’a and remained in it, not by absolute conviction, but by accident of birth, who were not keen to learn the values and objectives which the movement stood for. And then there were others swept by currents into the body of the Jama’a: they did not know why they were there, nor did they belong there, either by orientation or conviction; hence, depression became their lot. The genuine members of the Jama’a, who comprised one out of the ten categories, were those ‘guided not by the world but by Allah, giving up property, power and family for the life to come’.

Notwithstanding, these circumstances which

motivated the people, the objective of Usman Danfodio was to mobilise the people towards embracing and joining the Jama’a to fulfil the task of jihad against the


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in the century before the Jihad was executed. Suffice to note that, the call for Jihad took the pattern of

Habe rulers in the Hausaland became critical. This provided the impetus for Gobir, particularly Gudu, to

become intellectual centre for the mobilisation of the people against the state. Even though this was more pronounced there, Katsina, for instance, also provided the environment for the intellectual development geared towards developing a learned and administrative class for the Fulani, who later incited the subjects against their rulers (Ajayi, 1965).

In other non-Hausa settlements, the

revolutionary teaching aggravated the impetus for the devotees and reformers to exploit social, political and economic grievances in their societies to overthrow the government of their respective states. This did not result to the purification of the religion, but further extended borders of Islamic dominance (Ubah, 1985). Okafor (1989) also noted:

Islam started as a religion of the ruling classes with the king as the first convert. The chiefs and the civil administrators followed the king in accepting Islam probably for the ease of winning his confidence and favours. Subsequently it was implemented as state religion in the kingdom.

Mohammed (1989) reiterated Ubah’s statement

while citing Balogun as stating that:

Islam began as a religion of aliens then became the religion of influential or ruling elites before it finally got accepted by the masses and became popular and later a militant religion.

It is important to chronicle that Hausaland,

starting from the 14th century, had opened up trade relations with the Tureg, Barber and Arab in northern Africa. Through the Trans-Sahara trade in the middle of 14th century, the Hausaland began experiencing widespread immigration by the Fulani and their animals in search for pasture. It was within this period that Islam found its ways into Hausaland and laid the foundation for the jihad, which was to bring the Hausa and their neighbours under subjugation. In few places, the Fulani overlords were not involved directly but got the blessings of Usman Danfodio to execute the jihad. The success of the jihad led to the formation of the Sokoto Caliphate with Usman Danfodio as the leader of the newly founded state. Those who executed the jihad successfully in their respective territorial enclaves were blessed to be Emirs but subordinated to the Caliphate authorities.

It

can be inferred that elite class struggles was central to the war as the masses were manipulated to provide fertile grounds for the jihad. Implicitly or explicitly, the essence of the jihad was to enhance the competitiveness and presence of the Fulani and

to build Islamic Empires throughout the Central Sudan and beyond (Ubah, 1985; Al-Masih 1991). Ubah (1985) recounted that:

[Borno Empire] early because the Chad region had commercial links with Northern Africa; it came to Hausaland late because until the fifteenth century this people did not participate in the trans-Saharan commerce, and it would appear that communication networks between Kenem [Borno Empire] and Hausa land were late developing. From Kano and Katsina the new religion spread to other Hausa States, and it was further extended during the early nineteenth century revolution inspired largely by Fulani clerics led by Usman Danfodio.

Historians have espoused reasons for the jihad that later enthroned Fulani oligarchy. There is the view that the Hausa States accepted the religion before the jihad but the practice was intermixed with traditional belief systems. This gave credence for the jihad. The other view generates from the political economy standpoint that the quest for political and economic control was central to the jihad. There was the fear that the influence of the pagan king of Gobir was becoming enormous and could lead to the decline of Islam that was increasingly gaining grounds in Hausaland (Coleman 1985).

According to Bako (1999), by a way of trying to sustain the status quo of the Sarauta system, the Hausa kings nurtured and developed scholarship that was meant to aggrandize their self glorifying status and material possessions as against the mass citizens’ interests. These despotic and unjust attitudes exhibited by the Hausa kings in governance were factors that ignited the jihad. Ajayi (1965) stated that the Hausa States were not decadent as the Fulani reformers often implied. They were mistaken when they thought the decline of Islam also meant the decline in justice, fair taxation and good governance, true morality and the vitality of society generally. The war was simply directed at the Habe rulers, particularly the Gobir ruler, who had exhibited strong military might against the other Hausa States.

The jihad actually started as a movement protesting against the repressive regime. The most important point to note is that political power was the major concern. This was because power provided the capacity for inciting obedience among subjects and allowed rulers to monopolise the use of force and the authoritative allocation of values in the society. For the Fulani, state power was a necessity. They believed, if state power was captured, it was going to guarantee them hegemony over the land and people of Hausaland. It was also going to give them the rights to allocate resources and determine ‘who

gets what, when and how’ and ‘who does what and to whom’ (Barkindo, et-al.1989).

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…Hausa knew no Muslims until the second half of the fourteenth century when Islam was introduced by the refugees from Mali. It had reached Kenem

V. End of Habe Dynasties and Ethno-Religious Transformation

The jihad ended the Hausa dynasties and established in their place Fulani overlords. Accordingly, Buah (1974) noted that the defeat of the Hausa States brought the end of Hausa dynasties. In their place emerged a powerful, united empire or Caliphate, with its headquarters in Sokoto. It led to ethno-religious transformation of the social identities in Hausaland; following the adoption of Islam as state religion and Holy Qur’an as central for making laws and instituting orders. In this connection, Bagadar (1994) states that ‘…Islam does not separate or distinguish between the spheres of the secular and the sacred, but retain both within its controls’. Bukhsh, (n/d: 12) noted in this regard that the reason for this was because ‘religion influence the nature of human existence and imparts more or less uniform character to people’s daily life’.

The victory of the Usman Danfodio led jihad spanned from the northwest to northeast and to the south of Borno Empire. The capture of the Hausa States particularly, was informed by their disunity in the face of Fulani cohesion. Noteworthy is the fact that their enthusiasm was generated among a large number of Hausa subjects, Turegs and other people within the Hausaland (Ajayi, 1965:264). However, other places in the Benue valley were also brought under control by the Jihadist, except for the Tiv and the Jukun speaking people and some ethnic nationalities in the Plateau province in the century. Gwandu, Ilorin, Gombe, Bauchi and Adamawa, Muri for instance, were conquered at different times and were established as emirates by Fulani clerics and crusaders (Barkindo, et.al., 1989). The process was carried out through disaggregation of ethnic groups and after successful conquest was recorded, these ethnic groups were re-aggregated into a state formation, the Sokoto Caliphate. What happened in these areas looks like the replication of experience

s from the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa. Al-Masih (1991) noted that the situation in the

Arabian Peninsula was the same as some other places in Northern Africa where obnoxious policies were directed at the heathens, animists, idol worshippers and adherents of primal religions – those who refused to surrender to Islam. Okwori (2003) concurred that “the people were raided and compelled to become Moslems apart from being decimated by the Jihadist for slaves.” The choice for decimating those who refused to accept Islam into slavery was the consideration that exterminating thousands of them was going to amount to a bloody and useless enterprise. They also strengthened the base of Islamic state formations under the Sokoto Caliphate.

…One result of this revolution was that the Frontiers of Islamic lands were vastly expanded as parts of present Sokoto, Bauchi, Kwara, Niger and Gongola [now Adamawa and Taraba] states were brought into the community of believers through wars of conquest as well as through the influence of traders and missionaries.

Fulani quest for territorial expansion led the Islamic frontiers to attempt a revolution into the Borno Empire. Al-Kanemi Mohammed considered the jihad unjustifiable since Islam had already been the religion in the empire before spreading into the Hausaland. He contended by asking whether where Abdullahi Bin-Fodio worshipped was a fire temple or a Church (Kukah, 1993) and as such the objective of the jihad in the Borno Empire was defeated. However, later the Fulani infiltrated the Borno Empire and influenced the process of governance toward the Sokoto Caliphate-like system of government.

With the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, the already existing political system

in Hausaland were

fused into or carried over by the Fulani led administration, although with some modifications (Ajayi, 1965:264). Usman Danfodio became both the spiritual and secular leader with the entire emirates under his control. This marked the period of the consolidation of the Islamic state. The era also marked the peak of the Islamists struggle and the expansion of the Jihad beyond the Hausa pre-colonial state boundaries (Bako, 1999:82). The Caliphate system was modelled after the Caliphate system

in the Arabian Peninsula. It is arguable

that the political system introduced into Hausaland was entirely foreign; externally negotiated into these societies and imposed on the indigenous populations with Islam as state religion.

To buttress how foreign the system was, Lapidus (2002) stated that “the early Caliphate was politically based on the Muslim community of Arabia and upon the Arab tribal forces who conquered its Middle Eastern empire.” The establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate was necessitated by historical dialectics where the old system goes out of being and the new one comes into being, carrying with it some elements of the old system. Such process of change in the political system brought dramatic transformations in Hausaland. Okafor (1989) identified some of the socio-economic and political transformation brought with establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate thus:

•

The introduction of Arabic culture and tradition into Hausaland;

•

The consolidation of Islam and the change in ethno-religious attitude of the Hausa;

•

The teaching of Arabic language to the converts and the citations of verses from the Qur’an;

•

The introduction of new social codes that were


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In the same vein, Ubah (1985) reiterated that

•

The integration of Hausa economic system into the economic system of the Arab world through the introduction of jizya against those recalcitrant to the religion.

•

Nevertheless, it created the impetus for more expanded commercial opportunities in the western Sudan itself and a new drive for commercial links with the south which gradually replaced the declining trans-Saharan trade (Ajayi, 1965:265).

However, some of the characteristics of Hausa ethno-cultural identities, such as language and other traditions that were considered not to be in conflict with Islamic traditions were maintained. For instance, the Hausa language was retained, although, not without some linguistic alterations. The essence was that the language already had profound influence throughout the Northern Nigeria, given that it was

easy to learn and it

was also considered to be rich in vocabularies (Okafor, 1989). At this juncture, the Hausa language was considered as the language of Islamic missionary activities in the region. There is no gainsaying that the use of the language expanded the feelers of

Islam in

Northern Nigeria in the post-colonial era. The Fulani in the Hausaland gave up their mother tongue – fulbe, to adopt the Hausa language, but retained their paternal blood line in traditional governance (Coleman, 1985).

The pre-colonial Hausa States super-structures with their attendant political positional hierarchies were also retained, only that an entirely new political class emerged to assume political positions. The new political elites became invariably the critical deciders and determiners of what was justice with reference to the Qur’an and the Hadith. They assumed the centre stage of power to determine 'who gets what, when and how', 'who does what and to whom', and 'authoritatively make binding decisions and allocate values in the society'. In contemporary Nigeria, the success of the Fulani led jihad provided them with the opportunity of influencing most decisions as they affect Northern Nigeria.

During this period the non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims who executed the jihad in their respective

communities were reward with positions of authorities in the Caliphate. Recalcitrant ones were placed under a special poll tax system called jizya for not accepting Islam. This marked the beginning of what Okwori (2003) referred to as the ‘economic jihad’. According to Ajayi (1965), the religious fervour of the Islamic revolutions did not last longer and the ideals of justice and good administration were not always achieved. The successors of the reformers, who assumed power positions after struggled with the basic problems of administration, dynastic rivalries, good and bad officials and so on.

This goes to buttress that even though there was no need to doubt Usman Danfodio’s sincere commitment and enthusiasm to revive Islam and to set-

up Islamic system of government, there was the doubt that many who joined in executing the jihad were not actually sincere. What subsequently followed as described by Ajayi (1965) clearly indicates that there were mixed motives by others during the jihad campaign. This defeated the actualisation of Usman Danfodio’s dreams of establishing a full blown Islamic state called the ‘Sokoto Caliphate’ even before western colonialists entered the hinterland.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to rethink history in the light of Hausa pre-colonial states formations and their development before they were interrupted by the Usman Danfodio led jihad. The paper revealed that Hausa States had already developed strong ethno-religious and cultural traditions which directed the behavioural pattern, collective solidarity and cohesion toward constructing a formidable federation. Some of the characteristics underpinning this were geographical proximities, cultural affinities, and common myth and language characters. But their annexation, subjugation and conquest which brought them under Sokoto Caliphate ended that expectation and enhanced the future of Fulani’s dominance in the socio-economic and political processes in Hausaland. The Fulani and their Hausaland subjects evolved an entirely new ethno-cultural identity. With the transformation of Hausaland into the Sokoto Caliphate achieved, the social basis of state and political power also changed, with allegiance to Islam and its exponents assuming the prime determinant of one’s place in society. Equally important are the population reconfiguration of the erstwhile Hausa States and the reversal of role and place between the erstwhile Habe rulers and the Fulani conquerors and inheritors of the newly emergent Sokoto Caliphate. The role of Islam in forging a new identity cannot be over stressed. Under the Caliphate, the acceptance of Islam was elevated to, and equated with, “citizenship” status. Being a member of the community of the Islamic faithful in the Sokoto Caliphate came to supersede and replace both the notion of allegiance to, and the substantive membership of, a territorial and political sovereign. To become a citizen, one required only to accept Islam and demonstrate this in one’s allegiance to the spiritual leader in whom incidentally political power was also vested. This was demonstrated in Shehu Uthman Danfodio as the Amir al-Muminim (Commander of the faithful) and the political head of the Caliphate. This pattern was also replicated in the emirs, who deputized for him in the over thirty emirates that constituted the Caliphate. Equally, marital alliances and language came to play prime roles in one’s mobility on the social ladder, particularly in gaining access to positions of authority.

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hitherto unknown to the Hausa people; and

The interplay of these variables did not only create a society in which the minority Fulani elite became the dominant socio-political actors, but also a complex society in which a majority of people, and their rich and resilient culture could not be totally neglected on account of military defeat. The net outcome of this complex historical process is the emergence of what came to be known as the Hausa-Fulani identity. While the Sokoto Caliphate created and sowed the seeds of this identity, it would appear that colonial and post-colonial Nigerian politics merely nourished it to maturity. In contemporary Nigerian politics, the Hausa-Fulani identity has become such a reality that it is very difficult to separate the two from each other. This ethno-cultural assimilation has remained valid in contemporary times and would appear to have a long future ahead.

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