rethinking the freetown crowd: the moral economy of the 1919 strikes and riot in sierra leone

Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riot in SierraLeoneAuthor(s): Ibrahim AbdullahSource: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol.28, No. 2 (1994), pp. 197-218Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian Association of African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/485715 .

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Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riot in Sierra Leone

Ibrahim Abdullah

Resume

Cet article se repose sur les decouvertes de l'histoire sociale de l'Europe pour expliquer les graves et I'meute de 1919 qui se sont diroulkes a Freetown, en Sierra Leone. L'article se concentre sur une catigorie negligde de l'histoire sociale africaine - la foule-en-action - pour affirmer que les greves et l'meute qui a suivi etaient des modes de negociations adoptis par les ouvriers et les pauvres des villes pour mettre fin au declin des salaires, 'a l'augmentation du coi^t de la vie, au chomcge general et ' la famine qui s'etait installke apres la Premiere guerre mondiale. L'article explique la maniare dont le contexte urbain a offert un milieu propice t l'achange d'idees entre les nouveaux immigrants sans emploi et les travailleurs sta- bles dans la ville, mais aussi la maniere dont le ch6mage et la famine, plus particulierement les pinuries alimentaires et les prix eleves ont fait des marchands, en majorite Syriens, une cible evidente. Le consensus general dans la communaute en ce qui concerne un juste prix du riz, denrie de base, et la notion tres rdpandue d'injustice conomique ont procure c" la foule le droit moral d'exprimer sa colkre contre l'exploitation et les profits realises par les Syriens. L' conomie morale de la foule de Freetown souligne la Igi- timite de la foule-en-action - comme forme de protestation de la part d'individus 14sis conscients de leurs actions et des options qui leur 4taient offertes.

Rarely do historians agree about which specific or general questions to pose when studying large groups of people. Until recently, the field of what can

generally be termed crowd history was dominated by sociologists more interested in the psychological aspect of "mob" action and behavior than in "mob" composition and motivation. Several British historians have not only made possible the identification of faces in the crowds, but they have also

An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual conference of the Cana- dian Association of African Studies, Montreal, Canada, May, 1992. My thanks to Mar- tin Klein, Jacquelyn Solway, and Ann Malone for an encouraging reading of an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the Editor for his comments and suggestions.

197



198 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

reconceptualized the crowd as a legitimate and rational form of protest in a particular historical period (Hobsbawm I959; Rude

198I; Thompson 1971; Holton 1978; Harrison 1988). Such pioneering efforts have been successfully applied beyond the European setting (Feldberg 1974; Abrahamian 1968).

In the African context, a convincing case can be made for applying the tools of European social history (Fortescue 199o; Furedi 1973). Certainly, the

phenomenon of the crowd as a form of protest by aggrieved individuals or groups existed in certain precolonial African states (Attanda 1973, 1974). And most important, unlike in Europe after 1830, when the "pre-industrial" form gave way to new types of organization, the crowd phenomenon remained the dominant means of protest in post-colonial Africa. The concept of moral economy captures the crucial relationship between precapital- ist cultural values and community perceptions of legitimate/illegitimate action.

Africanists seeking to unlock the important relationship between precap- italist organizational norms and collective forms of resistance have applied the concept of moral economy to the study of labor protests and slave resistance (Moodie 1986; Mason 199o). Dunbar T. Moodie's account of the 1946 miner's strike in South Africa, for instance, considers collective moral outrage and the violation of what was considered mutually "acceptable" to both workers and mine compound Indunas (Moodie 1986, 2). It does not, however, treat society as a whole, nor does it address the moral economy issue at the level of the relationship between state and worker. Similarly, John Mason's "moral economy of the lash" captures the experiences of one particular slave; however, it is not typical of slave consciousness or rebellion in general.

This article employs the concept of moral economy to reconsider the Freetown strikes and riot of I9i9. Moral economy refers to the social and economic rights or traditions enjoyed by a subaltern class or group. Arising for the most part from group experiences, these customary rights and practices are a set of expectations and obligations that both rulers and ruled accept. A violation of this consensus - such as an increase in the price of basic necessities or unfair wages - constitutes a breach of the moral economy. By examining the composition, motives, and organization of the crowd in action, this article demonstrates that the striking workers and rioters were acting to defend the moral economy - their right to a decent wage to keep up with inflation and to a just price for rice, an essential commodity. I

The strikes and riot were closely related. Both were direct consequences of World War I, the rising cost of living, and the scarcity and high prices of foodstuffs such as rice (Abdullah 199oa; Cox-George 1961). While the partic- ipants in the strikes were mainly workers, the riot involved the urban poor and unemployed (especially those discharged following the war) as well. The



199 Abdullah: The 1919 Strikes and Riot in Sierra Leone

actions of both state and community underscored the popular nature of this whole upheaval. While the former had to concede to the workers' demands, the latter expressed solidarity with the striking workers and rioters. Also, the superb organization and conduct of both workers and rioters baffled officialdom.

Almost two months before the strike began, management began receiving indications of its likelihood. A majority of both artisans and laborers sup- ported Freetown's daily wage workers. They were reacting to discrimination in the granting of bonuses that were supposed to cushion the effects of the

hardships created by the war. According to the substantive Governor's

account,2 the Executive Council had approved certain advances of the "war

bonus," as the increase was termed, to specific state employees, mostly Europeans and West Indians. As a result of protest and petition, by 28 April the executive had extended the bonus to clerical officers, all officials "on annual salaries," and a "number of classes of daily wage" workers;3 these included policemen, warders, office and court messengers, and men of the West African frontier forces. After incessant petitions and complaints from artisans and laborers, mostly daily waged men, a committee was established to inquire into the possibility of extending the war bonus.

The distinction between salaried officials and daily wage workers was at the centre of the dispute. The Acting Governor, in a despatch to the Secre-

tary of State, noted that the "distinction created a considerable amount of

dissatisfaction" 4 among the daily wage workers. A later committee, formed

by the Acting Governor, reported several anomalies in the granting of the award:

A messenger whose pay is calculated at I/3 d a day receives no war bonus while another messenger in receipt of ?i a month is granted a war bonus on the ground that the former is a daily wage man and the latter is not, although both are paid monthly, the difference being that in the case of the former his wages are com-

puted by the day and so fluctuates [sic] according to the number of days in a month. 5

The workers, led by the artisans, argued in their petition that although their

pay was calculated on a daily basis, ranging, in the case of the technical

branches, from i/- to 5/- and, in the case of laborers, from I/- to 3/-, they received their actual pay on a monthly basis. They were, moreover, perma- nently employed by the railway, and their aggregate salary was

"ecual to that

of some of the clerical grades who were in receipt of a war bonus" (Abdullah 199ob). Furthermore, they pointed out that they belonged for the most part to the same "social class as that from which the clerical staff is recruited," 7 and lastly, that they had already petitioned and been promised a definite answer by mid-July. Similarly, in an interview in the Weekly News, some



200 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

workers revealed that although they had worked for the railway for seven- teen years, they were still unfairly considered to be daily wage workers. Those interviewed, mostly artisans, complained about job security and "felt

they had committed some crime by becoming mechanics after they had

completed their courses" (Sierra Leone Weekly News 25 July 1919, 8). They also wondered rhetorically, "what would be the condition of the colony if

they were all clerks, and none mechanics" (Sierra Leone Weekly News 25

July 1919). In the interim between the submission of the petition and the granting of

the war bonus, the deteriorating economic conditions proved intolerable.

First, the price control committee was unable to prevent increases on basic foodstuffs. By the end of May the Weekly News was calling upon officials to take some positive action:

These are grave matters and the Government of the land should not suffer itself to sleep over it. [sic] The matter of cornering of foodstuffs by Syrians and others had been put forward by sufferers over and over again for consideration by the

Government, but what has been done has satisfied nobody; so far as the food committee is concerned we consider it chargeable not before man only but before God for criminal negligence on its part in the whole matter of prohibitive prices at which poor people must buy food or starve to death (Sierra Leone

Weekly News 31 May 1919, 8).

Rice, when it was available, had increased in price from id a cup in 1914 to

5d in 1919, very expensive for workers receiving pre-war wages. "At the

present rate of buying," according to the Weekly News, "twenty shillings is

certainly not worth more than five shillings in normal times" (Sierra Leone

Weekly News 31 May 1919, 9). Two days before the strike erupted, on 12

July, the paper exhorted officials to import rice, corn, and yams to sell to

"people at reasonable prices. This will at once break the back of the present trouble, and introduce a bearable condition of the food scarcity" (Sierra Leone Weekly News 12 July 1919, 8). This call came, however, too late.

On the evening of Tuesday 14 July, daily wage workers of the "native" technical staff, the "native" subordinate staff, and the laborers in the Rail-

way Department went on strike. The following day, "native" technical staff and laborers at the Public Works Department joined their colleagues;8 the crisis had begun. Striking railway workers received most of the attention, because of both their prominent role in negotiations before the strike and the railway network's importance in the economy.

The Acting General Manager reported that daily wage workers had "threatened to strike" three weeks earlier. At about two-thirty on 15 July they made good on their earlier threats: workers refused to work and "were




stopping the trains from running," prompting the Acting General Manager to summon the Commissioner of Police to "send a number of constables to

keep order and to prevent damage being done." 9 The Weekly News noted the involvement of all workers, including guards, porters, laborers, linesmen, pointsmen, watchmen, and messengers, so that, "it was not possible for any of the heads to interfere. The strikers took possession of the trains at every point, put out the fires, turned the brakes and kept them in the position found" (Sierra Leone Weekly News 19 July i919, 8).

Despite some incidences of sabotage, such as "disconnecting the car-

riages" 1o and derailing a truck, the strikers were, for the most part, orderly and superbly organized, according even to official reports. The Governor, displaying the contempt for popular action typical of government officials, remarked:

It was obviously well organised with despatch runners on bicycles, picketing, procession and other details that are familiar to England but not Sierra Leone. The railway officials express considerable doubts on the ability of their men to

organize in this way and suggest the existence of influences outside the rail- II

way.

The Acting Locomotive Superintendent also mentioned:

The strike was well organized. There was signalling with flags, and my movements were watched and reported. I saw white pieces of cloth hung up at vari- ous places but I do not know what they mean. ... The men seemed to be

co-operating with the railway men in the Protectorate, the organization seemed

perfect. I heard nothing about men being given strike pay. I saw men on bicycles also, they had flags also. I recognized none of them. There are not many railway, men who have bicycles. I do not think my men are capable of organizing any- thing in the way that strike was organized. 12

Neither the Superintendent nor state officials, however, could prove their

suspicions regarding outside influence and organizational input in the strikes.

The Acting Governor also described the strikers at a meeting attended by the Mayor as, "perfectly orderly and respectful." 3 Their elected spokes- man, a "native" senior fitter, made a speech detailing how fitters were treated in comparison to clerks, reiterating that even though some of them had been with the railway for more than a decade, they were still regarded as daily wage men. The Acting Governor promised to expedite action. The workers, meanwhile, indicated that they would not return to work, "until the question of the war bonus had been directly settled." 14

The striking workers were apparently divided, and those who met the



202 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

Acting Governor and Mayor were not representative of the whole group. Evi- dence suggests that those who attended the meeting did not all agree with Schlenker, the senior fitter, who spoke on their behalf. Schlenker was against the strike, blaming it on the men at the traffic division and identify- ing a particular man whom he alleged was not only a West Indian, but also an "old convict." This man, according to Schlenker, kept urging the men to strike, and, "he had the knowledge of the organization of strikes. The young apprentices listened to him; they were against the deputation, not the older men," like him. •5 Schlenker did not explain how a single man could have organized such a strike, but his charge does support the possibility that the strike was organized by younger men and apprentices.

Railway artisans were quite possibly in touch with their colleagues in the Public Works Department; their simultaneous actions point to some form of coordination and organization. The strikers' picketing and discipline evinced some general knowledge of strikes and industrial disputes. For example, an Assistant District Commissioner "got the impression that the strike was well organized in advance and not arranged on the spur of the moment." 16 The Commissioner of Police also reported that strikers were warned not to touch "government property" by men who "looked like strike-leaders." 17 Moreover, men who were under instructions could have effected the closure of the offices of departmental heads, including that of the General Manager of the railway. A substantial number of artisans and laborers thus acted concertedly, and the railway network eased communica- tion between strikers in the city and those in the hinterland (see Best

1949).I8 The strike, which lasted more than eight days, "covered the period of the

more violent stage of the anti-Syrian riots," 19 and was effective enough to stop train service from i6 to 22 July.20 On 18 July, the Acting Governor sent a "serious and urgent"2' telegram to the Secretary of State, reporting the strikes in the city and the refusal of workers to resume work until the bonus was paid. In response, the Governor and the Executive Council recom- mended that artisans, starting i January 1917, be paid a war bonus on the same scale as that approved for clerks, and laborers, starting i January 1919, an increase of 3d per day. These increased expenditures of ?3 I ooo were to be raised from custom duties and railway rates. But by the time these recom- mendations had been evaluated, the situation was already out of control.23

After sending the telegram, the Acting Governor and other senior officials relaxed over a game of bridge, no doubt chatting optimistically about the Peace Day celebrations currently being organized by the Native Commercial Employees' League, amidst rantings of "Rule Britannia Rule." That same night, the riot broke out, and this popular bonus song became the refrain of the rioters: 23




Bonus Bona Bonum, Boni Bone Bona; We want we small, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

The official delay in granting a raise to cope with post-war inflation degen- erated into a sense of collective moral outrage involving not only workers, but also the urban poor - the unemployed. Both these groups viewed the high price of rice and the unfair wages as breaches of the moral economy.

The rioters' main concern was obtaining rice; rice merchants were their

principal targets. On the first night of the riot many Syrian shops were "com-

pletely gutted," 24 with the noticeable exception of a large stocked empo- rium owned by a Syrian called Bamin, who had nothing to do with rice.25

Looting continued all night and on the following day with "redoubled vio-

lence,"26even though the military was called in and the Riot Act pro- claimed. The crowd forced open shops owned by Syrians who were suspected to be hoarding rice and helped themselves to whatever they could carry away. According to eyewitness accounts, these attacks on Syrians occurred

simultaneously in the western, central, and eastern wards of the city.27 Within a week the riot had spread to the hinterland. Of five districts, only Koinadugu, where there were no Syrian shops, escaped rioting. By the time the police force was able to restore order with the help of the military, three

Syrians were reported dead: one woman died from complications arising from premature delivery during the riots; another succumbed from injuries sustained during the riot; and the third was believed to have been shot by one of his compatriots "in their excitements," 28 presumably as they attempted to defend their property.

The Freetown riot assumed a pattern paralleling the classical mob. Hobsbawm has argued that the classical mob did not merely riot as a form of

protest, but did so because it expected to achieve something by rioting (Hobsbawm 1959, 11).29 These riots were also always directed against the "rich and powerful." Finally, and perhaps most important in regard to Free-

town, mobs often exhibited a "hostility to foreigners." The classical mob, Hobsbawm notes:

... often rioted ... against unemployment and for a cheap cost of living - famine

prices and unemployment normally tending to coincide.. . and consequently market dealers . . were in all countries its obvious and most invariable targets (Hobsbawm 19 5 9, III).

All the circumstances associated with Hobsbawm's classical mob were

reproduced in Freetown. The Freetown riots were, without exception, directed against property rather than persons. The rioters were well organized and attacked only Syrians suspected of hoarding or profiteering in rice.



204 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

Even the Acting Governor wrote that, "in no single instance were the premises of Europeans and Creole merchants interfered with." 30 The battle cry of the Freetown crowd - strikers and rioters - was for bonus and rice. This economic rallying call became the peg upon which the strikes and riot were anchored. The bonus song - the refrain of the crowd - expressed the demands thus:

Maria mammy cry for Bonus, Ner Bonus kill am; We berh am Ten o'clock

Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Strike don cam for Bonus, We Unite for Bonus; Creole Boy ner danger Boy, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Kaiser 31 make Bonus, When he take Bonum; Peace Terms wan Bonam up, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Milner 32 say pay Bonus, Barker 33 say bite first; Maud34 say make Red-belleh shoot, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

White man all get Bonus, Dem get past Ten pounds; We want we small Bonus, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Coral35 too get Bonus, Dem deh go for Bonum; Malay coral Bonus, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Bonus Bona Bonum, Boni Bone Bona; We want we small Bonus, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!

Bonus nar Noun oh, Bonus nar Verb oh, Bonus nar any tin, Bonus, Bo-Bonus!




Last year we say ner Flu, This year we call am Strike; When all dem Coral go, Bonus, Bo-Bonus! (see Spitzer 1975, i6i). 36

Almost all the senior officials, including the Acting Governor (and later the substantive Governor), attributed the riot to the scarcity and high prices of rice. Summing up the causes of the riot, Governor Wilkinson thus identified three causes: the shortage of foodstuffs and the Syrians' hoarding; the strike and the peace celebrations, which provided an excellent opportunity for the

looting of shops; and lastly, an organized conspiracy to loot the Syrian shops. 37 Similarly, the citizens of Freetown in their petition blamed the riots on the Syrians' "throttling of the native trader," "arrogant demeanor," and "improper sexual" behavior.38 The crucial factor recurring in all accounts was the rice question and the Syrians' trading policies.

The Syrians who had arrived in Sierra Leone in the 189os were, by 1914, the dominant foreign group in the distributive trades, which covered almost all the colony's important produce and merchandise (Van der Laan 1975;

Anthony I980). Although not wholly responsible for the scarcity and increased prices, they (like non-Syrians) did hike prices to make more profit during the war, and some hoarded rice for the same reason. Even so, the rice

question was present before Syrians became dominant in the trade. Also, they were not the only group in the business. The expatriate firms, PZ, CFAO, and SCOA, were, in fact, the biggest importers and distributors of

imported rice. Syrian traders dealt primarily in the marketing of locally produced rice. To understand the evolution of the rice crisis, involving both

scarcity and increased prices, it is necessary to consider the production of local rice and the yield of the crop over time.

As early as November 19Io, the Governor, on the advice of the Collector of Customs, abolished the import duty on rice because of the failure of that

year's harvest. The shortage was attributed to both the prolonged dry season and the insufficiency of the supply of seed rice. In fact, people were even

compelled to harvest the rice before it was properly ripe. To avert recurring shortages, the Governor pledged to increase the supply of foodstuffs the fol-

lowing year by obtaining yam and corn seed from Ghana and groundnut from the Gambia. These would then be given as gifts to chiefs, but the greater pro- portion would go to those areas of the hinterland, "from which labor will be requisitioned in connection with the extension of the railway system to Rowalla." 39 In retrospect, however, such actions failed to resolve the rice problem (see Macmillan 1920, 249).40 With the outbreak of war and the increased population in Freetown, the food shortage resurfaced, but this time in the form of a crisis.



206 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 I994

By 1914 officials were conscious of a potential food deficit, especially at a time when labor was being diverted from agriculture. To forestall such a shortage, the government prohibited the export of rice in 1916. Henceforth, more rice was also imported to supplement local production, which had decreased as a result of bad weather and the war effort. But in 1918 rice production fell below the targeted average because of "unusual rains," which had prevented the bush from being burnt and reduced the area in cultivation. Local production of rice was further hampered by the 1918 influenza epi- demic, which incapacitated many harvesters. The shortfall of rice in i919 was therefore anticipated - according to official sources, it was "common knowledge that there would be a rice famine in i919." 41

When the Acting Colonial Secretary, Captain Stanley, asked the district commissioners in February 1919, "if there is likely to be a serious shortage of foodstuffs," and whether the "Government should endeavor to secure ship- ments of cereals," their replies were "unanimously of the nature of a strong affirmative." 42 If officials had been aware for five years that more rice would probably be needed to avert famine, and in fact took some early steps to procure more rice, why did the shortage occur? What role did state officials, Syrian rice merchants, and expatriate firms play in aiding or averting food scarcity in the city? Why did the shortage reach a crisis?

First, the growing urban population consumed more rice than required before the outbreak of war. The problem was not, however, only that of an increased population - prices for rice were also artificially high, and it was scarce. Merchants controlled the price of local rice in the city. This price fix- ing discouraged peasants from producing directly for the market, and, as will be shown, most were producing for Syrian traders who had forwarded loans to them in advance. Moreover, the expatriate firms that distributed imported rice were also unwilling to sell below the controlled price and incur a low profit margin or an outright loss (Van der Laan 1975, 88). Instead, as the shortages increased and pressure rose for merchants to sell rice below the controlled price to a hungry urban populace, the expatriate firms began to transport their stock of rice by rail to the hinterland. From i June to the outbreak of the riots on i8 July, 249 tons of rice left Freetown for the hinterland. Whereas more rice was imported, none was distributed in Freetown because of stringent price control. In the hinterland, where prices were uncontrolled, large profits could be realized. For example, Paterson Zochonis (PZ) was selling a bushel of rice for 64/-, as against the controlled price of 28/-.43

The continued scarcity amidst plenty forced the government to import an additional ?5 ooo worth of rice at the end of June. Following the steps taken by expatriate firms, rice dealers, mostly Syrians, also transported their stock to the hinterland where they could make greater profit. Others refused to sell



207 Abdullah: The i919 Strikes and Riot in Sierra Leone

at controlled prices in the city and hoarded their stocks in the hope that

prices might rise. The tension over the scarcity of rice in Sierra Leone was

heightened by the prevalent belief that the Syrian dealers were hoarding rice. As if to lend credence to this accusation, three Syrians were prosecuted in

June for selling rice above the controlled price.44 Moreover, when the riots broke out on 18 July, the price of locally produced rice - the preserve of Syri- ans - was as low as 2d a cup - a sixty percent drop from the profiteering rate of

5d a cup.45 The riot revealed the extent of the Syrian dealers' control over the mar-

keting of locally produced rice. On the second day of rioting, the military discovered a large quantity of locally-produced rice at a house on Rawdon Street occupied by a Syrian.46 After the riot, "hundreds of bushels were ... rescued,",47 from the house of a Syrian trader, Mr. Chabli. This same trader had reportedly refused to sell "even one bushel of local rice for urgent per- sonal need." 48 Another Syrian trader, Madam Sassin, had also refused to sell

rice, although she had ample stores.49 After the riot a Mrs. Brown, whose house was rented by a Syrian, told the Mayor that, "as many as three hun- dred bags of rice belonging to her tenant were found in one of the stores on her premises." So These reports of such huge quantities of rice being withheld from the market encouraged the popular belief that Syrian traders were responsible for the scarcity and provoked the subsequent riot.

A few days after the riot, the European Chamber of Commerce sent a reso- lution to the Governor, affirming the general belief that Syrians were responsible for the scarcity:

The chamber recognizes the fact that the riot and plunder were due to the great scarcity of rice caused by the hoarding of this commodity, the staple food of the colony, by certain persons, particularly the Syrians. 5 I

This was only partially correct and was part of an attempt to obscure the actions of expatriate firms. If Syrians were hoarding and profiteering from

locally produced rice, the expatriate firms were guilty of doing the same with

imported rice. These companies first prevented the city's inhabitants from

purchasing rice at the controlled price by railing their stock to the hinterland in order to make greater profits. Yet they were not as easily identified by the

populace, because they were less visible, engaged in wholesale tradinj rather than in retail business. In fact, state officials were also guilty of handi;ng a potentially explosive issue in a cavalier manner, for although they were aware of a growing problem, they did little from 9 Io to 1919 to resolve it. In July 1919, when there was virtually no rice available in the city, thirty-two tons of state-imported rice was "lying idly" 52 in a government warehouse. Nevertheless, the Acting Governor claimed he knew nothing about this

supply!



208 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

Syrians were therefore not the only group responsible for the scarcity and consequent profiteering in the rice trade. Other than their greater visibility, what made them so much more vulnerable to vociferous attack than others? By 1918, Syrians had established a virtual monopoly over the supply of locally produced rice, in part because of their exploitation of local customary practices and advancing of loans to peasants against future harvests. They thus achieved control over prices, albeit a tenuous one, particularly if imported rice or local substitutes were selling for less. From 1914 to 1919,

however, the prices of both substitutes for rice had risen. Their increased economic power therefore threatened the livelihood of Freetown merchants.

Syrian traders were also targeted as villains, since other Freetown merchants were jealous and resentful of them. These merchants, who controlled the press in the city, painted the Syrians in a very unpalatable light - as profi- teers, exploiters, and rogues, who were in the colony

To sell and buy and fatten On the blood of the land (Sierra Leone Weekly News 13 September 1919).

Finally, the Syrian traders themselves did not help matters. They sometimes resorted to "marrying" indigenous women in order to employ them as traders retailing local foodstuffs. In the end, the increasing concentration and centralization of raw materials in Syrian hands drove out other local non-Syrian traders. 53

Thus, apart from trade rivalry, Syrian economic strength was allegedly translated into arrogance. Not only did they win the hearts of Krio women, but they also reportedly boasted of their conquests. In a society with a super- ficial Christian, middle-class morality, this was an added insult (Wyse 1981). Many accused Syrians of calling Africans "niggers." But as Governor Wilkin- son rightly pointed out, such accusations were due "more to trade rivalry than to race feeling." 54

In a petition forwarded by the Mayor of Freetown to the Secretary of State, the signers, many of them merchants and landlords, argued that the mer- chant class, although blamed as ring leaders of the riot, were "as much taken aback at the riots as anyone else." 55 They pointed out that those arrested were not members of this class and that non-Syrian merchants suspected of profiteering in rice were also attacked. Denying the claim that they were responsible for organizing the riot, the petitioners showed how this was con- trary to their interests as landlords, and they informed the Secretary of State of the threats they had received concerning the continued occupancy of their properties by Syrians. Finally, they called on the Secretary of State to reconsider seriously the continued stay of Syrians in the colony and affirmed the general belief:




...the disturbances were due wholly and solely to the excessively high prices demanded for food which goaded the classes most severely affected past endur-

ance; and the plot was sedulously concealed because those who conceived it would not obtain general approbation. 56

Does this acceptance of grounds for rioting by some leading members of the

community imply that a conspiracy existed? Available evidence is too slim to warrant such a conclusion. The allegation that the riots were organized by Freetown's leading community members is consistent with officialdom's

contempt for popular action by the "rude" and "unlettered masses." Such a belief is informed by the unstated premise that the workers and urban poor are incapable of taking actions on their own behalf and that they always have to be fed with ideas emanating from outside their ranks. And since they have no intrinsic ideas, they are thus prone to rioting and looting in order to sat-

isfy "some lurking criminal instinct" (Rude 198I, 78). Freetown merchants were, in fact, affected by the rise and dominance of

Syrians in commerce. In addition, the Freetown press largely trumpeted anti-

Syrian sentiments. Popular folklore in Sierra Leone has it that Krio cunning and diplomacy always work to their favour; they are always behind major upheavals, but manage to remain in the background and escape being caught. Blaming the Krio ignores the strong motivations of a starving populace, many of whom were reduced to consuming "young cassada" (see Grace

1977).57 It seems unlikely that they would need outside direction, when

they were generally aware of the fact that-rice was being hoarded by a particular group.58 A Krio might have composed the popular bonus song of the strikes and riot, but the mob's consciousness and understanding of the situa-

tion, as expressed in the song, extended far beyond the composer's imagina- tion. 59

The citizens' petition rightly showed that their own interests were at

stake, but these petitioners were landlords and thus the "better classes," 60 who never participated in rabble-rousing activities. They obviously sympa- thized with the strikers and rioters; their leadership in organizing the riot is, however, highly unlikely. Their role, even when their interests were

involved, neatly typifies that of the middle classes in similar situations. As Rude observed of riots in general,

...normally, merchants, capitalists or the more prosperous households did not demonstrate, riot or shoulder muskets to besiege a Bastille or capture royal pal- aces by force of arms ... even where the sympathies of a substantial part of the propertied classes were evidently enlisted on the side of those taking part, such activities were generally left to the common herd (Rude 198I, 205).



2 10 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

Who, then, did participate in the riot? What were their motives and beliefs? In other words, who were the faces in the Freetown crowd?

Although their class and racial prejudices caused them to assume that the

people in the crowd-in-action were mere puppets, the official sources, with some slight variations, agree on the identity of the "faces in the crowd." The Governor, for example, was convinced that the "rioters were drawn mostly from the ranks of people - protectorate aborigines now living in Freetown - whose numbers increased largely during the war by the demand for well-paid casual labour in coaling and working on ships." He was of the view that the "motives of the actual rioters most of whom were aboriginal natives of the labouring class," had nothing to do with "trade jealousy,62 which could have influenced the supposed conspirators. Similarly, Captain Schweder of the West African Regiment opined that the "crowd was made up entirely of country boys." 63 Colonel Faunce reported as well that "out of several hun- dred arrests only two were Creoles." According to him, the riot was

"planned by educated natives with the intention of seizing and selling chea- ply hoarded stocks of rice by the agency of aboriginal residents in Freetown and that the mobs at once increased so rapidly that those responsible lost control." 64 The police report for 1919 attributed the riot to a "section of the Creole population " who "were ably assisted by the native element who were out to loot." W' In the opinion of Major Dawes, the "organisers appear to have made use of certain of the daily employees on the railway and loafers who congregate round railway towns and trading centres, and to have relied on the natural impulse of the natives to join in."

During the first night of the riot, however, only shops containing rice were attacked. Moreover, the organized nature of these initial attacks certainly points to some element of order in the selection of targets. 67 Given the prevailing circumstances in Freetown, it is not impossible that the "conditions of social commotion" provided a favorable opportunity for the lum- pen proletariat, mostly migrants from the hinterland, to join in the fray under the cover of a riot (Rude 1981, 199).

The increase in Freetown's population - from 75 572 in 1911 to 85 163 in

1921 - which was largely due to migration, included people who were perma- nently unemployed, and therefore susceptible to any looting opportunity. Furthermore, the increase in the ranks of those without employment - from 7 509 in 1911 to 8 620 in 1921 (which included 3 035 males) - was also rele- vant. 68 It is therefore not surprising that whereas in 1911, I 639 persons or

23.1 per thousand of the population were convicted of crime, in I920, 2 499 persons were so convicted, the rate per thousand rising to 29.3.69

The urban context was, however, crucial. Different categories of workers were not geographically separated; instead they lived together, along with the unemployed, in the crowded east end. The prominence of railway men in




the city's social life did not amount to exclusiveness. Also, the distinction between daily wage and clerical workers did not necessarily translate into different interests. Workers and the unemployed shared a social setting and cultural milieu, interacted freely with each other, and discussed prevailing economic conditions. The strikes and subsequent riot - "collective bargaining by riots" (Hobsbawm 1959, 7) - were products of this interaction between workers and the unemployed, most of whom were discharged car- rier corps members, migrants from the hinterland, as well as another group of Sierra Leoneans who had been deported from England as a result of race riots.70

Although it is not clear whether railway workers and their counterparts in the Public Works Department took part, it is worth considering why the riot erupted at the same time as the Native Commercial Employees' League, a union of mercantile clerks, was celebrating the end of the war. The issue of whether the migrants from the hinterland were responsible for the riot, or just out to loot, raises the additional question of whether a worker ceased to be a worker after being laid off. Furthermore, it relates to people's experiences as workers - soldiers (combatants), carriers, and laborers - and whether these experiences lost their meaning after the war. 7 If, as according to officialdom, the strike was well organized with despatch riders, "something familiar to Britain not Sierra Leone," why should the same workers or former workers not organize a mode of bargaining by other means? If the strike took place independently of the merchants, why not the riot? Is it not possible that people's experiences as soldiers and workers could have been uti- lized when it became apparent that the machinery of state was weak? 72

This article does not provide a definite answer to the larger question of who was responsible for the riot; it does, however, suggest that a more per- suasive and convincing answer is possible. Such an explanation would extend beyond the limited view of officialdom and the state/management claim that workers and the urban poor are incapable of taking actions in defence of their interests. None of those caught or convicted ever disclosed the existence of any plot emanating from the merchants.73 In fact, the popular nature of the riot undermines the belief that it was organized by the Free- town merchants. After all, workers and the urban poor were both consumers of rice and historical actors in their own right.

It is highly probable that migrant workers from the hinterland (former peasants), the major actors in the riot, were venting their anger against Syrian exploitation. The community generally believed that Syrian merchants had gained control of the rice trade by exploiting indigenous cultural forms. One such practice was known as Sama, whereby local chiefs, landlords, or other notables would provide advances to peasants during the "hunger season," for which the latter would have to pay in the form of produce



212 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

after the harvest.74 Following the harvest, peasants often lived on little and were compelled to feed their families from their stock of rice seed. Therefore, most ended the harvest season with little or nothing to begin the new plant- ing season; they were, in fact, already in debt from previous advances. Often unable to secure sufficient credit from either traditional sources or financial institutions and expatriate firms to help them to carry on until the next season, peasants turned to ubiquitous Syrian traders for credit advances. To stop this recurring debt cycle, the state prohibited the practice by an ordinance in 1918; it nevertheless appears that such practices continued.

Syrians were thus increasingly able to gain control of locally produced rice through this customary medium; by 1919 they were "the principal source of agricultural credit in rural Sierra Leone" (Leighton 1979, 90). Madam Sassin, a Syrian trader who was allegedly the close friend of a chief, reportedly bought all of the 192o rice harvest for Mambolo, a major rice producing area.75 Thus the rioters, most of whom were from the hinterland, acted not only from hunger (the immediate cause), but also because of the

percieved injustices they had endured from Syrian traders. The moral economy of the urban crowd was threatened; the popular belief

prevailing in the community (especially among the working class and the unemployed) was one of injustice occasioned by the high price of rice (Illife 1987, 179). The "consensus of the community" with regards to a just price for rice was "endorsed by some measure of license afforded by the authori- ties" (Thompson 1971, 78). In particular, the Acting Governor was hesitant to declare martial law or take stern action. 76 In fact, the pervasive belief of the crowd was that "the government did not agree for the Syrians to be here."77 Even the Commissioner of Police stated that "the Syrians had brought the trouble on their own head." 78 The Weekly News interpreted the whole episode as "a universal lesson to the present day money makers - whether bankers, merchants or what not ... on 'How not to make money,'" (Sierra Leone Weekly News 26 July 1919, 8) implying that moral limits existed on how people should make money. "The raid was not an offensive but a defensive act," declared the Weekly News the following month (Sierra Leone Weekly News 2 August 1919).

Officials thus understood that the increased cost of living was a burden; a raise was consequently granted to certain categories of workers. By challeng- ing this official gesture, railway artisans and laborers were utilizing a familiar, but unwritten, aspect of what was acceptable to society. State officials similarly considered the rice scarcity and price increase to be unacceptable, especially in times of acute scarcity. The actions of the Freetown crowd to force down the price of rice were thus acceptable to society and seen as part of the social contract.

Even the police force appears to have had some sympathy with the rioters'




frustrations, if not their means. It was reported that policemen on duty "were not over-zealous in making arrests when the booty consisted of only rice."79 All the firing on the rioters, except for one incident, was done by non-Africans. In Port Lokko, troops of the West African Frontier Police actu-

ally joined the crowd to loot. And in Sumbuya, three soldiers were among the

forty arrested, and they "appeared to have led the looting" (Kaniki 1973,

io8). Popular support is also evidenced by the fact that in some areas of the hinterland the local chiefs did nothing to restrain the crowd or help in recov-

ering the loot. 80 It appears, then, that the riot was not simply the result of a failed harvest, a shortage of stocks, and rising prices, but it was also a protest against widely perceived injustices arising from the colonial economy.

Actions such as the removal of rails, popular food riots, and collective bar-

gaining by riot were typical of early labor movements in Europe and North

America; preunionized workers experimented to find the best ways to pro- tect their trade and fight for wage increases to cope with rising prices. These

"pre-industrial" forms of labor protest, which appeared in Europe between

1750 and 1830, were reproduced in Sierra Leone in a vaguely similar context - the relative backwardness of productive forces and the gradual development of a commodity-based society. As elsewhere, the pre-industrial culture of Sierra Leone continued to mediate popular reaction to the rapid changes taking place. The period from 19oo to 1919 was one of rapid transformation, within which migrant workers were caught in a whirlwind of change. That whirlwind threatened their world of yesterday, but did not provide them with a corresponding understanding of and adaptation to the world to come - a world of industrialization and capitalist production relations.

The crowd-in-action, by defending a moral economy, did not seek to return to an ideal past; it rather demanded that such injustices as the high price of rice and the low wage be rectified. The actions of both strikers and rioters were therefore attempts to renegotiate the conditions under which

they could subsist. These were indeed people "who have found, or only begun to find, a specific language in which to express their aspirations about the world" (Hobsbawm 1959, 2). It is therefore not surprising that a year after the strikes and riot, railway artisans decided "that the time had come when

they should form . . . a Union ... for the protection of their interests" (Best 1949, 48). Eight days after the formation of the Railway Skilled Artisans'

Union, a strike, not authorized by the union, broke out.

Notes i. I have used "Krio" as opposed to the old spelling "creole" to refer to the inhabitants of

Freetown who were mostly descendants of freed slaves. I have, however, retained the old spelling whenever it appears in the sources. See the following accounts of the strikes and riot: Wyse (1981), Kaniki (1973), Spitzer (i975), Best (1949), Langley (1973),



214 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

and Conway (1968). Apart from Langley and Conway, these accounts present the strikes as a backdrop to the riots.

2. There are two official accounts of the strikes and riot: one by the Acting Governor (PRO/CO 267/582) and the other by the substantive Governor (CO 267/5 85) following his resumption of duty. In the opening paragraph of his report, the latter wrote, "I believe it to be as near the truth as any history can be."

3. CO 267/585, Governor's Report. 4. CO 267/582, Acting Governor to Milner, 22 July 1919, 4. 5. CO 267/582, 5. 6. CO 267/582, Acting Governor to Milner, 22 July 1919, 4. 7. CO 267/582. 8. CO 267/582, Acting Governor to Colonial Office (telegram), 18 July I919; Acting

Governor to Secretary of State, 22 July 1919. 9. CO 267/585, Statement by Mr. E.G. Barker, Acting General Manager of the Railway.

Sir E. Merewether, a former Governor, had ruled that in the event of a strike, the police were to take care of things.

io. CO 267/585, Statement of Commissioner of Police. ii. CO 267/5 85, Wilkinson to Milner, 29 January 1920. 12. CO 267/585, Statement of Mr. W. L. King, Acting Locomotive Superintendent. 13. CO 267/585, Acting Governor to Milner. 14. CO 267/585. 15. CO 267/585, Statement of Mr. W. C. Schlenker, Senior Native Fitter, Railway Depart-

ment. 16. CO 267/585, Statement of Mr. G. A. Boddam-Whetam. I7. CO 267/585, Statement of Commissioner of Police. 18. Another remote possibility is that workers received strike knowledge from European

artisans who had gone on strike in 1915 demanding better conditions. 19. CO 267/585, Wilkinson to Milner. 20. CO 267/585, Railway Annual Report, 1919, 4. 21. CO 267/582, Acting Governor to Secretary of State (telegram), 15 July 1919. 22. CO 267/582. 23. CO 267/582, The Humble Memorial of ... Citizens of Freetown in the Colony of Sierra

Leone to the Right Honorable Viscount Milner, 4 September 1919. 24. CO 267/585, Governor's Report, 29 January I92o. 25. CO 267/585, Evidence of Captain P. G. Schweder, West African Regiment. 26. CO 267/582, The Humble Memorial of ..., 2. 27. CO 267/582; CO 267/585, Governor's Report. 28. CO 267/582; CO 267/592, Wilkinson to Milner. 29. For a reconceptualization of this category, see Rude (1981), and for a perceptive piece

on the problems of importing the Hobsbawmian models to Africa as they relate to bandits, see Austen (1986). Austen writes: "The root difficulty in utilizing Hobsbawm derived models for Africa is the centrality to them of the concepts of a territorially defined state and the market defined private property" (o102). This is well taken, although we disagree with his suggestion that witchcraft was the central motif for an African model of resistance.

30. CO 267/582, Acting Governor to Milner, 31 July 1919. This must be qualified. Evi- dence suggests that the shops of some Freetown merchants suspected of hoarding rice were also threatened, though no damage was done. See Sierra Leone Archives Despatch No. 357, Acting Governor to Milner, 31 July 1919.

3 1. Kaiser refers to Kaiser Wilhelm of Imperial Germany.




32. Milner refers to the Secretary of State for the colony. 33. Barker was the Acting General Manager of the Sierra Leone Railway. 34. Maude was the Attorney General. 35. Coral was the perjorative name used to describe Syrians because of the cheap coral

beads they used to hawk in the city when they first entered the colony. 36. Co 267/585, "Maria mammy" in the first stanza, which Spitzer translated literally to

mean "Maria mammy cries for the bonus," actually symbolises the complex relation- ships and networks in the community. The "mother" signifies the community's dependence on the wages of workers and how the increased cost of living made things difficult - hence the death of "Maria Mammy," who was buried at ten o'clock.

37. CO 267/583, Wilkinson to Milner, 9 October i919; CO 267/585, Commissioner of Pol- ice.

38. CO 267/582, Humble Memorial, 3-4. 39. Sierra Leone Archives, CSO from Governor to Secretary of State Despatches Nos.

527-646, io November I9Io. 40. By 191o, when the crisis began, the colony was still an exporter of rice. In 191o, the col-

ony exported 35 I14 bushels of rice; 22620 in 1911; 30715 in i912; 21 546 in 1913;

i8 705 in 1914; and 21 600 in 1915. 41. CO 267/583, The Food Shortage, 9 October 1919. 42. CO 267/583. 43. CO 267/582, Governor to Secretary of State, 12 January I192o. 44. CO 267/582, Governor to Secretary of State, 31 July 1919. 45. CO 267/582, Humble Memorial. 46. CO 267/582. 47. CO 267/582. 48. CO 267/582. 49. CO 267/585, Statement of P. H. H. George, Senior Outdoor Officer Customs Depart-

ment. 50. CO 267/582, Humble Memorial. 51. CO 267/583, Wilkinson to Milner, 9 October 1919. 52. CO 267/585, Governor to Secretary of State, 12 January 192o. 53. CO 267/582, Humble Petition. 54. CO 267/583, Wilkinson to Milner, 9 October 1919. 55. CO 267/582, Humble Petition. The petitioners were mostly merchants, clerks, arti-

sans, and the unemployed. Out of 657, 189 described themselves as artisans, 146 as merchants and traders, i 19 as clerks, 24 as teachers, lawyers, and clergymen; the rest were laborers, pensioners, and unemployed.

56. CO 267/582. 57. CO 267/5 82, Extracts from a letter to O.C. Detachment, West African Regiment, Port

Lokko, 25 July I919. "Young cassada" refers to the young tuber of the cassava plant. The consumption of this tuber carries with it a stigma of slavery. "Of course, rice is the chosen food; cassada is the food of the poor and slave. The freeborn will scarcely eat cassada if they can get rice, and to like cassada is taken as a sign of ill-breeding, it being regarded as a choice sneer for an enemy to tell him 'he eats cassada like a slave.' "

58. Spitzer's account lays too much emphasis on the "anti-Syrian" crusade at the expense of the struggle of workers, the urban poor, and the community at large. He saw the riots as "a vehement and seemingly organized attack against the most vulnerable group in Sierra Leone" (Spitzer 1975, 156). According to him, unemployed Krios participated as "organizers" and were "ably assisted, and even displaced, by the large number of up-country men who wandered about Freetown . . . ready to hold Syrians



216 CJAS / RCEA 28:2 1994

accountable for their part in the scarcity and high price of goods" (Spitzer i975, 162-163).

59. In one account, children even spoke of the loot they received as their own bonus. CO 267/585, Governor's Report.

60o. CO 267/582, Humble Petition. 61. CO 267/585, Governor's Report. 62. CO 267/585, Governor's Report. 63. CO 267/585, Evidence of Captain Schweder, West African Regiment. 64. CO 267/582, Colonel Faunce, 6 August 1919. 65. CO 267/585, Police Report, 1919. 66. Sierra Leone Archives, Intelligence Return for Quarter ending 20 September 1919,

Major Dawes. 67. CO 267/585, Major Heslip, the Commissioner of Police wrote: "I think on the second

night it was sheer love of loot; on the first night it was organised." 68. Sierra Leone Census Report 1921, 12.

69. Sierra Leone Census Report, 5. 70. Prior to the strike and riot, Sierra Leonean immigrants, "Sea-boys," were repatriated as

a result of racial disturbances in Liverpool and Cardiff, and it was generally believed that they "would instigate reprisals in Sierra Leone against the white residents" (Humble Petition, i). CO 267/585 Statement of the Commissioner of Police, 28 July 1919. The Governor, however, refused to consider the above as a probable factor.

71. Some of the carriers and combatants who were slaves took advantage of purchasing their freedom with the money they had earned during their period of service. Those who did went back to the hinterland. See Correspondence Relating to Domestic Slav- ery in the Sierra Leone Protectorate (London: HMSO, 1928).

72. CO 267/5 85, E.G. Barker of the Railway Department noted the involvement of railway porters and women shouting "Bonus, Bonus."

73. Most of those arrested were found with loot, but without evidence of their participa- tion in the riot. CO 267/585, Acting Governor to Milner, 19 August 1919.

74. For the Sama Ordinance of 1919, see Appendix "B" in Humble Petition. 75. CO 267/5 82, Humble Petition. 76. Conway argues that the Acting Governor "assumed an equivocal position," and "sens-

ing a legitimate basis for the resentment" against the Syrians, "adopted a tolerant atti- tude" (Conway 1968, 53). Most District Commissioners were convinced that the Act- ing Governor was incapable of dealing with the riot. The substantive Governor wrote: "He was dilatory in the matter of the war bonus, inert in the famine, unwilling to face responsibility when the strike broke out, timid in the face of the strikers, half hearted in his precautions and hesitating when the need for military help had to be faced." CO 267/585, 29 January 1920.

77. CO 267/5 85, Extracts from a letter from DC Detachment, West Africa Regiment. 78. CO 267/5 85, Commissioner of Police. 79. CO 267/5 82, Humble Petition. 8o. This is similar to the reluctance of English magistrates to take action against crowds,

"when popular disturbances swept through the areas under their jurisdiction" (Thompson 1971, 95).



217 Abdullah: The I919 Strikes and Riot in Sierra Leone

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rethinking the freetown crowd: the moral economy of the 1919 strikes and riot in sierra leone

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