revised state legislative policymaking in an age of ... · 3 national conference of state...

Center for Legislative Strengthening

| FEB 2018

State Legislative Policymaking in an Age of Political Polarization

REVISED

iii NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2

The 10 Case-Study States ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 3

Three Separate Concepts ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 4

Evidence of Polarization................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5

Settlements (Policymaking) ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

States with Divided Government ............................................................................................................................................................................ 7

StateswithUnifiedGovernment ............................................................................................................................................................................ 9

Stalemates.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10

Factors that Mitigate the Effects of Polarization ....................................................................................................................................................... 11

ConstitutionsandRules ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 11

GovernorsandLegislativeLeaders ....................................................................................................................................................................... 12

CommitteeSystems ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 14

PersonalRelationships,CultureandTraditions ................................................................................................................................................... 17

SpecialRoles:Women,NonpartisanStaffandNarrowMajorities ..................................................................................................................... 19

AttitudesTowardCompromiseandCoalitionBuilding ....................................................................................................................................... 20

Factors that Exacerbate the Effects of Polarization ................................................................................................................................................... 23

Perspectives of Members of Congress who are Former State Legislators .............................................................................................................. 25

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 26

Notes ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 27

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28

Appendix I Case-Study State Party Status ........................................................................................................................................................... A1

Appendix II AverageStateLegislativePolarization,1993-2015 ...........................................................................................................................A2

Appendix III American Legislator Survey ............................................................................................................................................................... A3

TablesTable 1. Case Study States and Analysts .................................................................................................................................................................. 3

Table 2. Legislator Responses:“Howmuchinfluencedominoritypartymembershaveon[yourmostvalued]committee’sdecision?” ..... 16

Table 3. Legislators’ Attitudes Toward Compromise Compared to the Public ................................................................................................... 20

Table 4. Legislator Responses:“Doyouthinkcompromiseisanessentialpartofthelegislativeprocessorisitsellingout?” ....................... 21

Table 5. 50-State Legislator Responses:“Howmuchtimedoyouspendoneachofthefollowingactivities?” ............................................... 22

Table 6. 50-State Legislator Responses:“Pleaseindicatehowmuchattentionyouthinkyourlegislativepartyleadershouldgiveto:” ........ 22

Table 7. Independent Variables for Multiple Regression Analyses .....................................................................................................................A3

Table 8. Minority Party Influence on Committee Decisions: Doyouthinkcompromiseisanessentialpartofthelegislativeprocessorisitsellingout? .................................................................A4

Table 9. Multiple regression:“Howmuchinfluencedominoritypartymembershaveon[yourmostvalued]committee’sdecision?” .......A4

Table 10. Compromise:Doyouthinkcompromiseisanessentialpartofthelegislativeprocessorisitsellingout? .........................................A5

Table 11. Multiple regression:“Howmuchinfluencedominoritypartymembershaveon[yourmostvalued]committee’sdecision?” .......A5

1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

Executive SummaryThisreportsummarizestheresultsofastudyofpoliticalpolarizationinstatelegislaturesanditseffectsonpolicymaking.AteamofNCSLstaffandacademicpoliticalscientistsconductedmorethan250interviewsoflegislators,staffandotherparticipantsin10statelegislaturesduring2015-16legislativesessions.Wefoundevidenceofsignificant—andincreasing—polarizationinmostofthese10statelegislaturescompa-rabletothatexperiencedbyCongress.However,weconcludedthatmostofthelegislaturesinoursamplewereabletonegotiatedifferencesandreachsettlementsonmajorpolicyissueslikebudgets,transporta-tionandhighereducationunderconditionsofpoliticalpolarizationanddividedgovernment.

Factorsthatlegislatorsbelievemitigatetheeffectsofpolarizationonpolicymaking,especiallywhencom-paringthemselvestoCongress,include:

• Stateconstitutionsandrulessuchassinglesubjectrequirementsforbills,limitedsessionswitheffec-tivedeadlines,requirementsforbalancedbudgets,andthefairandconsistentapplicationofrules.

• Governorsandlegislativeleaderswhoareabletoseethebigpicture,communicateandworkto-gethereffectively,andmakeeffortstotreattheminoritypartyfairlyandvaluetheirinput.

• Empoweredcommitteesthatdeliberateeffectivelyandmakeeffortstoincorporateminoritypartyideas.

• Personalrelations,culturesandtraditionsamonglegislatorsthatpromoteinterpartycommunicationandcooperationandengendertrustandrespect.

• Nonpartisanstaff.

• Adeterminationtogetthingsdone,oftenexpressedas“We’renotD.C.”

Wealsoidentifiedfactorsthatexacerbatetheeffectsofpoliticalpolarizationonpolicymaking.Theyincludeleaderswhotakeideological,uncompromisingpositions,the24-hournewscycleandsocialmediathatimpededeliberationandtheopenexchangeofideas,andadeclineincross-partyfriendships,social-izingandcollaboration.

OurresearchproducedanumberofusefulideasforstatelegislatorsandmembersofCongressonhowtofunctionaseffectivepolicymakersunderconditionsofpoliticalpolarization.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 2

IntroductionDuringthesixyearsoftheObamaAdministrationwhencontrolofthefederalgovernmentwasdividedbetweenRepublicansandDemocratstheCongresscameinforconsiderablecriticism.Thepublic,themediaandevenscholarsregardeditashighlypolarized,withmembersofeachpartyimplacablyopposedtotheother,andunabletonegotiateandresolvedifficultpublicpolicyproblemswithapresidentoftheopposite party.

ButCongressisoneofonly51legislaturesintheAmericansystemofrepresentativedemocracy.Havethe50statelegislaturesbeensimilarlygridlockedbypolarization,unwaveringcompetitionandintenseideology?Howmanyofthemareperformingwellatcraftingsolutionstodifficultpolicyproblemsinaclimatethatisanti-political,anti-politicianandpolarized?Whyhavesomestatesexperiencedproblemswithreachingsettlementsonpolicyissues,likeCongress,whileothershavenot?TotheextentthatstateshavebeeninfectedwiththesameproblemsasCongress,whatcanbedoneaboutit?WhatlessonscanCongresslearnfromstatelegislaturesaboutmitigatingorreversingpoliticalpolarization?

Inordertounderstandpolicymakinginatimeofpoliticalpolarization,theNationalConferenceofStateLegislatures(NCSL),togetherwithateamofpoliticalscientists,studiedthepolicymakingprocessin10statelegislaturesduringthe2015and2016legislativesessions.Theteamconductedin-depthinterviewswithhundredsoflegislatorsandotherparticipantsinthelegislativeprocess.Thisreportsummarizesthefindingsfromthose10statestudies.

Thegoalsoftheresearchwereto:

• Expandknowledgeabouttheinstitutionalfeaturesandpoliticalforcesthatdeterminepartypolariza-tionandaffectlegislativeperformance.

• Provideideasandtoolstohelplegislativepractitionersmitigatetheeffectsofextremepartisanship.

• DetermineiftherearelessonsfromstatesthatmighthelpreducetheimpactofpolarizationonpolicymakinginCongress.

TheWilliamandFloraHewlettFoundationprovidedsupportforthecasestudiesof10states.Theprinci-pleinvestigatorontheprojectandauthorofthisreportwasNCSL-emeritusstaffmemberKarlKurtz,nowaconsultantwithLegisMatters,andtheprojectmanagerwasBrianWebergofNCSL.TheyassembledateamofeminentpoliticalscientistsconsistingofprofessorsGaryMoncrief(BoiseStateUniversity),LyndaPowell(UniversityofRochester)andPeverillSquire(UniversityofMissouri)tohelpdesigntheprojectandconduct the research.

Inadditiontothestudiesofpolicymakingin10states,NCSLalsoconductedtheAmericanLegislatorSurveyin2014(AppendixIII).Thesurvey,whichwassenttoallstatelegislators,wasdesignedtouncoverlawmakers’attitudestowardpartisanship,theinstitutionofthelegislatureandthepolicymakingprocess.Findingsfromthis50-statesurveythatbearonpolarizationandpolicymakinghavebeenincorporatedintothisamendedversionofareportthatwasoriginallypublishedonlineinApril2017.


The 10 Case-Study StatesThelegislatureschosenforin-depthinterviewsincludeafewstateswithunifiedgovernment—gover-norandbothhousesofthelegislatureunderthesameparty’scontrol—butthemajorityinthesampleoperate under divided government in order to strengthen the comparison to divided government at the federallevelatthetimeweconductedthestudyin2015-16.

Wechosesevenstateswithdividedgovernment—Colorado,Iowa,Maine,Massachusetts,Minnesota,VirginiaandWashington—andthreestateswithunifiedpartycontrol—ConnecticutunderDemocraticcontrolandTennesseeandWisconsinwithRepublicansinchargeofthelegislativeandexecutivebranch-es.All10stateshaveexperienceddividedgovernmentatsomepointduringtheperiodsince2000(seeAppendixI).

Eachofthefiveprincipalprojectanalysts(plusTimStorey,aseniormanageratNCSL)waspairedwithanNCSLstaffpractitionertoconductthestudiesofthe10statelegislatures.

Table 1. Case Study States and AnalystsState Lead Analyst NCSL Liaison No. of InterviewsColorado Tim Storey StacyHouseholder 24Connecticut GaryMoncrief LauraRose 29Iowa PeverillSquire KatieZeigler 24Maine Lynda Powell MaryFairchild 20Massachusetts KarlKurtz BrianWeberg 30Minnesota GaryMoncrief JulieBell 39Tennessee BrianWeberg PamGreenberg 19Virginia KarlKurtz Angela Andrews 30Washington PeverillSquire LarryMorandi 22Wisconsin KarlKurtz JonathanGriffin 21Total 258

Theseresearchteamsspentaweekineachofthecapitalsandconductedatotalof258interviewswithcurrentandformerlegislators(includingformerlegislatorsnowservinginCongress),staff,andotherpar-ticipants(lobbyists,academicsandreporters)inthelegislativeprocess.WeconductedinterviewsintheMassachusettsandWisconsinlegislaturesandwithmembersofCongresswhoareformerstatelegisla-torsin2016.Theinterviewsintheothereightstatesalltookplacein2015.

Weassuredallintervieweesthattheircommentswereconfidentialinthesensethattheywouldnotbedirectlyidentifiedwithanyquotations.

Otherfactorsbesidesthepartisanmakeupweretakenintoaccountintheselectionofstudystates.Theseincludethepresenceorabsenceoftermlimits,regionaldiversity,arangeofdifferentlevelsoflegislativeprofessionalismandthewillingnessoflegislativeleaderstohavetheirlegislatureincludedinthestudy.

Termlimitsforstatelegislatorsareanimportantinstitutionalvariable,settingthe15stateswithlimitsapartfromtheother35legislaturesandtheCongress.Inoursampleofstates,ColoradoandMainehavetermlimits.WeachievedregionaldiversityinoursamplewiththreestateseachfromtheNortheastandMidwest,andtwostateseachfromtheSouthandWest.

Amongthecase-studystates,MassachusettsandWisconsinfallinthemoreprofessionalizedcatego-ry—i.e.,year-roundlegislativesessions,largestaffsandhigherpayformembers.Inmanywaysleg-islaturesinthiscategoryaremorelikeCongressinstyleandoperationsthantheyarelikeotherstatelegis-


latures.MaineandVirginiaareintheclassiccitizenlegislaturecategory(shortsessions,lowpayandsmallstaff).Colorado,Connecticut,Iowa,Minnesota,TennesseeandWashingtonareinthehybridcategoryinbetweenthetwoextremes.

Usingacombinationofroll-callvotinganalysisandanationalcandidatesurveyknownastheNationalPoliticalAwarenessTest,orNPAT,politicalscientistsBorisShorandNolanMcCartyhavepublishedameasureoftheideologicaldifferencesbetweenthetwoparties(i.e.,levelsofpolarization)ineachofthe99chambersofthestatelegislatures.Theyshowthat,infact,moststatelegislaturesaremorepolarizedthantheCongress.Amongour10states,theColorado,Washington,Wisconsin,MinnesotaandVirginialegislatures(inorderfrommoretolesspolarized)aresubstantiallymorepolarizedthantheCongressontheShor/McCartymeasure.Maine,Iowa,ConnecticutandTennesseeareslightlymorepolarizedthanCongress,andMassachusettsissubstantiallylesspolarized(seeAppendixII).

TheShorandMcCartyscaleofstatelegislativepolarizationisausefulbackdroptoouranalysisofpolar-izationin10statelegislatures,butitisonlyastartingpoint.Wewillpresentdifferingperspectivesontheextentofpolarizationinour10states.Moreimportantly,themaininvestigativetaskofthisNCSLprojectistodeterminetheconditionsunderwhichlegislativeinstitutionsoperatereasonablywellevenwhenthepartiesarepolarized.

Three Separate ConceptsAtthecongressionallevel,thethreeconceptsofpolarization,policymaking(oritsconverse,gridlock)andcivility(orincivility)havebecomedeeplyintertwined:Tothegeneralpublicandmanyobserversitappearsthatincivility,obstructionandgridlockaretheinevitableproductsofpolarization.Itis,however,possibletobeideologicallypolarizedyetstillnegotiateagreementsonpolicy,justasitispossibletobepolarizedyetrespectfulandcivil.Similarly,effectivepolicymakingcanoccurunderconditionsofeithercivilityorincivility.Therefore,itisimportantattheoutsettodefinewhatwemeanbytheconceptsofpolarization,policymakingandcivility.

Wedefine“polarization”aspartiesthatareideologicallydistantfromoneanother,butsubstantiallyuni-fiedinternally.Inoneofourinterviews,aWisconsinDemocrat(minorityparty)said,“Thetwopartiesareideologicallysplit—there’snotmuchdisagreementwithinthem.Bothpartieshavepurgedtheirmoder-atesandbecomemoreextreme.”That’stheessenceofpolarization.

Policymakingistheprocessofmakinglaws.Inthelegislativesetting,lawmakingisusuallyincremental.Theprocessischaracterizedbycompetinginterestsreachingagreements,oftentemporary,throughdeliberation,negotiationandcompromise.Weoftenusetheterm“settlements”interchangeablywithpolicymakingtoemphasizetheshort-termnatureoflegislativesolutionsandtheimplicitnotionthatthisyear’spolicymayhavetoberevisitedandadjustednextyear.Theconverseofpolicymakingisgridlock:theinabilityoflegislatorsandexecutivestoreachanagreementorpassalaw,withtheresultbeingstale-mateorinaction.

Civilityreferstonormsofcourtesy,politeness,comityandrespect.Whilemanybelievethatcivilityfacili-tatespolicymaking,inourviewitisnotaprerequisiteforpolicymakingtotakeplace.Becausethemediafocusonpublicname-callingandblamegames,incivilitymaymaskbehind-the-scenesnegotiationsandpolicyresolution.

Becauseofourparticularinterestindividedgovernment,ourfocusisoncompromise,ordeal-making,betweenpoliticalparties.Underdividedgovernmenttheminoritypartyinonechambermaybethemajorityintheother,orthegovernormaybuttresstheminorityinbothchambers.Asaresult,compro-miseisanecessarypartoftheprocess.AMinnesotaminorityleadersaid,“Thepublicviewofcompro-miseismeetinginthemiddle.Butinthelegislature,compromiseisaboutwhattheminoritycanextractusingtheirlimitedresources,whichinvolvetime,[theoccasionalability]toembarrassthemajority,andtradingvotesonsomekeyissues.”Or,asaVirginiaminorityleaderputit,“[Incompromise,]thegoaloftheminorityistoprovideinputintheprocess,togetone-quarterofaloaf,orevenhalf,andtoputourfingerprintsonthelegislation.”

AsecondMinnesotaminorityleadersaid,“Relationships,trustandbargainingchipsarethekey.”Asaresult,intheanalysisthatfollows,afterdescribingtheconditionsofpoliticalpolarizationinstatelegis-latures,wewillfocusonhowlegislatorsandgovernorsbuildrelationships,establishtrustandgetdealsdone.Howthemajoritytreatstheminoritywillbeamajorthemeofourdiscussion.


Evidence of PolarizationInalmostallofour10case-studystates,ourintervieweestoldusthatthepartiesinthelegislaturehavebecomemoredistantfromeachotherovertimeandthatthereislessdiversitywithineachoftheparties.

AmongtheranksofRepublicanlegislators,wewereoftentoldthatthefearofaprimarychallengefromtherightwasdrivingtheirlegislativecaucustowardamoreconservative,lessaccommodatingposition.ManystateshadtheirownstatelegislativeversionofthetaleoftheprimarydefeatofU.S.HousemajorityleaderEricCantorinVirginiathatsentshockwavesthroughtheU.S.Capitolin2014.Forexample,inTennessee,RepresentativeDennis“Coach”Roach,apopular,long-servingconservativeRepublicanhighschoolteacherandwrestlingcoach,wasdefeatedin2014byacandidatewhodescribedhimselfas“Morepro-lifethanyourpastor,morefortheSecondAmendmentthanDavyCrockett,andmorefortraditionalmarriagethanAdamandEve.”

IntheVirginiaSenate,whichhashadnarrow,changingmajoritiesformorethanadecade,itwaswidelyperceivedthattwomoderateRepublicanswhohadbeenatthecenterofdeal-makingbetweentheparties,WalterStoschandJohnWatkins,chosenottorunforre-elec-tionin2015becausetheyknewtheywouldfaceaprimarychallenge.AnotherVirginiaRepublicansenatorwhowasknownforawillingnesstocompromise,EmmettHanger,narrowlysurvivedaprimary.TheconservativespeakeroftheHouse,BillHowell,whohadnotbeenchal-lengedinanelectionforyears,defeatedaneven-more-conservativeprimary opponent more handily.

InWisconsin,moderateRepublicanSenatorsDaleSchulzandMikeEllis,whohadvotedagainstthelandmarkcollectivebargainingbillpromotedbyGovernorScottWalker,similarlychosenottorunin2014afterbeingthreatenedbyprimaryopposition.

TheeffectoftheserealorthreatenedchallengestoRepublicanmemberswastomovethesurvivorstotherightandreducetheirwillingnesstonegotiateandcompromisewithDemocrats.ARepub-licanleaderinVirginia,whohimselffearedaprimarychallenge,saidthatheregardedhisroleasprotectinghismembersfromvotesthatwouldopenthemuptochallenges.ARepublicanleaderinWisconsintalkedabouttheconstantneedtobalancetheinterestsoftwogroupsofAssemblymembers:thosewholiveinfearofprimarychallengesfromtherightandthosefrommarginaldistrictswhoarepotentiallyvulnerabletodefeatbyDemocrats.

Inmoststates,thethreatofprimarychallengeswasascribedtothegrowinginfluenceoftheTeaParty.ButthenumberoflegislatorswhoidentifyasTeaPartymembersisrelativelysmall.AWisconsinRe-publicanleaderarguedthatitismoreaccuratetodescribethemostconservativemembersofhiscaucusas“thosewholiveinfearofaprimarychallenge”thantocallthemTeaPartymembers.

Democratsalsopointedtothelossofmoderatemembersandamovementoftheircaucustotheleft,butintheircaseitislessduetoprimaryactivismfromtheleftthanitisattrition.InstateswhereDemocraticnumbersinthelegislaturehavedeclinedsharplyinthelast15years(Tennessee,Virginia,Wisconsinand,toalesserextent,Minnesota),thememberswhoremaintendtocomefrominnercitiesorotherwiseur-bandistricts.Therearefew,ifany,ruralDemocratsleftintheselegislatures.TheresultisthesameaswiththeRepublicans—amorehomogeneouscaucusthatislesswillingtonegotiateorcompromisewiththeotherside.Along-servingWisconsinDemocratsaid,“Moderatesarethecatalystsofcompromise—buttherearen’tmanymoderatesleft.”

OneofthequestionsintheAmericanLegislatorSurveyasked,“Whenyouconsidertheiropinions,howdothefollowinggroupsaffectyourlikelihoodtocompromiseinyourpolicydecisions?”(Scaleof1=Less

Among the ranks of

Republican legislators, fear

of a primary challenge from

the right was driving their

legislative caucus toward

a more conservative, less

accommodating position.

Democrats also pointed to the

loss of moderate members

and a movement of their

caucus to the left, but in their

case it is less due to primary

activism from the left than it

is attrition.


Likelyto5=MoreLikely)Ofthefourgroupsthatrespondentswereaskedtorate,GeneralElectionVotersonaveragescored3.5,PrimaryElectionVoters3.3,LegislativeLeaders3.2andContributors2.5.Forthemostpart,theseare“middling”responses,indicatingthatnoneofthegroupshasamajorimpactonlegislators’likelihoodofcompromising.Surprisingly,PrimaryElectionVotersscoredslightlyabovethemid-pointofthescale—moretoward“MoreLikely”tocompromise.TherewerenostatisticallysignificantdifferencesbetweenDemocratandRepublicanlegislatorsonthisquestion.Thesenationalresponsestothesurveyservetomoderatetheconclusionsdrawnfrominterviewsinthe10statesregardingthepolar-izingeffectofprimaryelectionthreats.

Instateafterstate,legislatorstoldusthattheincreasingpolarizationinthelegislatureiscausedbypolar-izationofvotersandthatmembersaremerelyrepresentingtheirdistricts.AveteranliberalmemberinWashingtonsaidthatheunderstoodwhythenewconservativemembersarethewaytheyare:“They’revotingtheirdistrictandyoucan’tgetmadatthemforthat;I’vedoneitmyself.”

Asevidenceofthepublic’sincreasingpolarization,legislatorspointedtoadeclineinsplitticketvoting.AWisconsinlegislatorcalledattentiontoaJournalSentinelandMarquetteUniversityLawSchoolstudyshowingthattheproportionofvoterswhosplittheirballotsinstatewideelectionshaddeclinedfromarangeof23-36percentinthe1980sand‘90stooneof6-7percentinthe2010and2012elections.

Politicalscientistsdisagreeaboutwhetheritisthepublicorthepoliticalelitesthataremorepolarized.However,a2014PewResearchCentersurveysupportstheviewsofthelegislatorsweinterviewedthatthepublicismorepolarizedthanitusedtobe.PewreportsthattheideologicalgapbetweenthemedianDemocratandthemedianRepublicanhasgrownconsiderablysince1994,andespeciallysince2004.Tobesure,amajorityofrespondentsstillidentifythemselvesasmoderates.Buttheproportionofconsis-tentlyliberalidentifiersandconsistentlyconservativeidentifiershasclearlyincreased.Andthesegroupsholdincreasinglynegativeviewsofeachother.Moreover,thesearethegroupsthataremostactivepolitically,andmostlikelytocontributetoacandidate.

Anotherexternalfactorthatshowsorcontributestopolarizationwithlegislaturesistheescalationincampaigncosts,oftenfueledbythegrowingroleofindependentcampaignexpenditures.InColorado,Tennessee,VirginiaandWisconsin,legislatorsnotedthatoutsidegroupsweremajorinstigatorsof,oratleastcontributorsto,within-partychallengesortoeffortstorecalllegislators.

InMaine,wherelegislativecampaignsusuallycostamodest$30,000,independentexpendituresareplayinganincreasingroleincampaigns.One2012Senateracehadindependentexpendituresof$500,000.ARepublicansaidthathehad$200,000spentagainsthimandwasoutspentfourtoone.Thepossibilitythatacandidatewillbetargetedbylargeindependentexpenditureshasdeterredsomecandi-datesfromtakingpartinMaine’svoluntary“cleanelection”lawthatprovidespublicfundinginexchangeforacommitmentnottoraiselargeprivatefunds.AMainesenatorsaid,“Ifa$25,000to$30,000Senateracenowbecomes$300,000withindependentexpendituresthrowninagainstyou,itisverypersonal.Itishardtoletthatmemorygoonceyouareelected.”

BasedonourinterviewsandobservationsoftheinteractionsbetweenDemocratsandRepublicanduringthe2015-16legislativesessionsinour10states,wewouldhaveaslightlydifferentrankingoftheirdegreeofpolarizationcomparedtotheShorandMcCartystudythatisbasedonroll-callvoting.WewouldmoveColorado,Minnesota,VirginiaandWashingtonfromthemostpolarizedgroupingtomoderatelypolar-ized,leavingonlyWisconsininthehighlypolarizedcategory.WewouldalsomoveConnecticuttothelesspolarizedcategory,alongwithMassachusetts.(OneMassachusettsHousemembersaidofpartisanshipinhisstate,“Bynationalstandards,thisisaprettytameplace.”)

Regardlessofwhereeachstateranksonapolarizationscale,ourinterviewsconfirmthatstatelegislaturesoperatewithpoliticalpartiesthatareincreasinglyideologicallydistantfromeachother.Anddespitecon-tinuingdisagreementswithinthepartiesinsomestates,thereisincreasingpressuretoconformtopartyorthodoxyinmostofthem.Inotherwords,moststatelegislaturesoperateundersubstantiallythesameconditionsastheCongress.


Settlements (Policymaking)Instateafterstateweweretoldthat90percentormoreofallbillsarenotpartisanandarepassedunanimouslyorwithsubstantialbipartisanmajorities.InWisconsin,leadershadcalculatedanexactnumber—93percent.Thepointofthesecommentsisusuallythatthemedia’sfocusonconflictexagger-atestheextentofpartisanshipinlegislatures.AWashingtonlegislator,withsomehyperbole,said,“Whilethemediafocusesondiscordanddoesn’treportconsensus,98percentofthebillspasswithbipartisansupport.”“There’sfarmorecollaborationthanwhatthepublicsees,”addedaWisconsinlegislator.

Whileacceptingtheimportanceofthelargenumberofbillsthatpasswithlittleornoopposition,it’salsotruethattheremaining10percentorsoofissuesareusuallythemostdifficultandcontentiousandareoftenhighlypartisananddivisive.Theperformanceoflegislaturesonthecontentiousissuesisoftenameasuringstickforsuccessorfailureinpolicymaking.

Therefore,wewilldevotethissectionofthereporttooutliningafewofthekeysettlementsreachedinoursampleof10legislaturesinrecentyears.Becausepolicymakingisoftensignificantlydifferentbetweenstateswithdividedgovernmentandthosewithunifiedgovernment,wewillseparatethedis-cussionofstatesaccordingly.Wewillalsonotesomeinstancesofsignificantstalemateorgridlockinthestates.

States with Divided GovernmentBudgetsarethesinglemostimportantlegislativestatementofprioritiesforastate.Theynotonlydeter-minespendinglevelsbutalsooftencontainpolicy.Forthisreason,wepaidparticularlycloseattentiontonegotiationsonbudgetsinoursampleof10states.

Withafewnotableexceptionsthatwewilldiscussunderstalematesbelow,budgetstypicallypassmostofour10case-studystateswithbipartisanmajorities.Thereasonsgivenforthisincludethebalancedbudgetrequirementscontainedin49ofthestateconstitutions,astrongtraditionofbipartisanbudgetingandthe“grease”providedbytheuseofearmarks(ormemberitems)tobringalongrecalcitrantmembers.

Thebalancedbudgetrequirement,usuallycombinedwithalimitonthelengthoflegislativesessions,loomslargeineveryone’sassessmentofthebudgetingprocess.“It’stheonebillthatMUSTpass,”wasatypicalcomment.Theconstitutionalrequirementtoreachasettle-mentonthebudgetforcesfactions(sometimeswithinthesameparty)toworktogether.Tothebalancedbudgetrequirement,Virginiaaddsadeep-seatedcommitmenttomaintainingthestate’sAAAbondrating.“TheAAAbondratingisacompellingforcethattranscendsparty,”saidaveteranstaffer,addingthatitprovidesthe“cometoJesus”momentattheendofbudgetnegotiations.

InMaine,billsintroducedafteracertaindateinthelegislativesessiontakeon“emergency”statusandthereforerequireatwo-thirdsmajor-ity.Thisincludesthebudgetbillbecauseitistypicallynotintroduceduntillateinthesession.Thenegotiationandcompromisenecessarytoobtainthetwo-thirdsmajorityhasmeantthattheLegislaturehasbeenabletowithstandandoverturnthefrequentvetoesofthebudgetbymaverickconservativeGovernorPaulLePage.

Washingtonstate’stwistonthebalancedbudgetrequirementhasbeentoaddaruleunderitstwo-yearbudgetprocessthatbudgetsmustbalanceoverfouryears.Thisisdesignedtopreventpostponingactionsorusingbudgetgimmicksthatpassdeficitsontofutureyears.Washingtonlegislatorsviewedthisprovisionasalsohavingpromotedbipartisanshiponthebudget.

Inmostlegislaturesthemoneycommitteesplaykeyrolesinbringingmemberstogether.Servingonappropriationsorbudgetcommitteesusuallyrequiresagreatercommitmentoftime.Weweretoldin

In most legislatures the

money committees play key

roles in bringing members

together. Members in

several states talked of the

collegiality that develops on

budget committees as a

result of the responsibility

and the increased time

working together.


severalstatesthatthebestandbrightestlegislatorsareappointedtothesecommittees.“Beingonthemoneycommitteemakesyougrowup,”saidaVirginiaHousemember.Membersinseveralstatestalkedofthecollegialitythatdevelopsonbudgetcommitteesasaresultoftheresponsibilityandtheincreasedtimeworkingtogether.

Colorado’spowerfulsix-memberJointBudgetCommittee(JBC),madeupoftwomajorityandoneminoritymemberfromeachchamber,maintainsapracticeofnotrecommendingabudgettotheHouseandSenateunlessthevoteisunanimousincommittee.AllmembersoftheJBCcommittosupportingthebudgetwiththeircaucuses,andtheresultisthatbudgetsoftenpassbothchamberswithrelativelyfewno votes.

Legislatorsinotherstatesalsoreportedthatminoritypartymemberswhoserveonbudgetcommitteeshavemoreinfluenceonthebudgetthanthepublicsees.InMassachusettsandVirginia,bothofwhichhavelargemajoritiesforonepartyinbothchambers,moneycommitteechairsmeetwitheverymemberoftheircommitteeindividuallyearlyinthesessiontofindoutwhattheirprioritiesare.The2016budgetpassedtheMassachusettsGeneralCourtunanimouslyinpartbecauseeverymembergotsomethinginthebudget.Areporterdubbedthispractice“gazebosintownsquares.”

InaspecialsessioncausedbyaninabilitytoagreeonabudgetduringtheregularsessioninWashingtonstateafewyearsago,theHouseminorityleadertooktheinitiativeandbrokeredadeal.HedevelopedaproposalthathetooktotheDemocraticspeakeroftheHouseandaskedhimifhewouldagreetoitiftheRepublicanSenatemajorityleaderwouldagreetoit.Thespeakersaid,“Yes,buttheSenateleaderwillneveragreetoit.”HewenttotheSenateleaderwiththesamequestionandgotasimilarresponsethathewouldagreetoitbutpredictedthatthespeakerwouldnot.Theminorityleaderthenfleshedouthisproposalinprivatewithkeyplayersinbothchambers,andtheyultimatelyreachedasettlement.AnanonymouspersonpostedaSwissflagontheminorityleader’sdoor.

Wereceivedmanyreportsofcross-partynegotiationandcompromiseinareasotherthanthebudget.Severalofthesewereinthedomainoftransportation.AmajortransportationinfrastructurebillinVirgin-iain2013illustratesthetransitorynatureofmuchlegislativedeal-making.Playinganunusualroleforananti-taxRepublican(“NixongoestoChina,”asonelegislativeleaderputit),GovernorRobertMcDonnellsaidthatthestatewasoutofmoneyfortransportationandurgentlyneededtoacttobuildmoreroads.TheHouseofDelegateswastheprinciplebattlegroundonthebillasthereisamajorsplitinitsRepubli-cancaucusbetweensuburbanlegislatorswhostoodtobenefitfromroad-buildingandrurallegislatorswhodidnot.Thiswasfurthercomplicatedwhenthecaucusadopteda“Hastertrule”requiringthatamajorityofthemajoritypartysupportthebillbeforetakingittothefloor.Thespeakerandkeycommit-teechairssoonhijackedthegovernor’srevenue-neutralproposalandeventuallycraftedacompromisetaxproposalthatreducedthegastaxbutincreasedthesalestax.Thedealalsoallowedurbanareasthatwereinmostneedoftheimprovements,especiallyNorthernVirginia,totaxthemselvesmore.Noonewassatisfiedwiththefinaloutcome,butitwassettledforatime,withmostmembersrecognizingthattheywouldlikelyhavetoreturntotheissuebeforelong.

IowaandWashingtonenactedfueltaxincreasestosupporttransportationinfrastructureinverysimilarfashionin2015.TakingonanissuethatanIowalegislatorsaidwas“aboutaspopularasthelegislatureraisingitsownsalaries,”thelegislaturesinbothstatesembarkedonmulti-yearpubliceducationeffortsabouttheneedforhighwayimprovements.Andbothcraftedastrategyofinvolvingallfourcaucusesinthedecision-making.Lotsofcompromisesweremade,andleadersinbothstatescarefullycalculatedthenumberofvotesneededtopassthebillsandgavetheirmembersfreedomtovotenoiftheyneededto.

ThelargeDemocraticmajorityintheMassachusettslegislaturemeansthatcross-partynegotiationisnotoftenrequired.However,ahistoryofRepublicangovernorsandatraditionofthetwopartiesworkingtogethermeansthattherearemanystoriesofeffectivenegotiationanddeal-making.OneexampleisarestructuringoftheboardofBoston’smasstransitauthority,theMBTA,inthe2015session.AfterabadwinterinwhichtheMBTAhadoftenshutdownduetoweather,therewaswidespreadpublicandmediademandforachangeinthemanagementofthetransitauthorityboard.Democratswerereluctanttotakethisissueon,butunderpublicpressureallowedRepublicanstoadvancearestructuringproposal.ThebillwaslargelywrittenintheSenateRepublicanminorityleader’soffice,andeventuallypassedwithbipartisansupport.

A2016billintheMassachusettslegislatureillustratestheimportanceofconferencecommitteesinthe


endgameofpolicymaking.Everymemberofthelegislaturehadhadexperiencewithopioiddeath,eitherintheirownfamilyortheirdistricts,sotherewasabroadcommitmenttodosomethingabouttheissue.TheSenatecameoutwithabillfirst.RepublicanGovernorCharlieBakermadeaverydifferentproposaltwomonthslater.TheHousethencrafteditsownbill,incorporatingpartsofthetwoearlierproposals.Thedifferenceswereworkedoutinasix-memberclosedconferencecommitteeconsistingofthetwowaysandmeans(appropriations)committeechairs,thesubstantivecommitteechairswithjurisdictionofthesubjectandtwominoritypartymembers.

Wecollectedmanyotherstoriesofnegotiationsandsettlementsinstateswithdividedgovernmentonissuessuchasmentalhealth,drugaddiction,highereducationandcriminaljusticereform.Ingeneral,themorelocaltheissue,themorelikelytherewastobeeffectivedeal-making.Butlegislatorsinseveralstatesreportedthatitwasmoredifficulttoenactpolicyonissuesthatdividethepartiesnationally,suchastheCommonCoreeducationstandards,healthcareorenvironmentalpolicy.

States with Unified GovernmentThethreestatesinoursamplewithunifiedgovernmentin2015-16—Connecticut,TennesseeandWis-consin—operatedifferentlyfromtheoneswithdividedgovernment.Forthemostpart,themajoritydoesnotneedminoritypartyvotestopassbills.Buteachonehasitsowntraditionsandmanagesconflictindifferentways.

TheConnecticutlegislaturehashadlargeDemocraticmajoritiesinbothchambersformorethan20yearsandaDemocraticgovernorsince2010.Thepowerofunifiedgovernmentisdemonstratedbya2015legislativescorecardthatcountedpassageof31of45majorissues,inadditiontothepassagein2013ofguncontrollegislation(inthewakeoftheNewtownmassacre)andamajorjobspackage.FromtimetotimetheDemocraticmajoritydrawsonRepublicanminoritysupporttopasslaws,astheydidinacriminaljusticereformpackageadvocatedbythegovernorin2015.

UnderlyingthelegislativeprocessinConnecticutisaculturedescribedasa“NewEnglandsenseofcivility.”Itismanifestedbyapracticeofnever“callingthepreviousquestion”—shuttingoffdebate.Suchamo-tionwouldbeviewedasa“nuclearoption”inConnecticut.Itisaverystrongnormthattheminorityhastherighttoextendeddebate,anditappearstoworkbecausetheminoritydoesnotabusetheprivilegebyusingitasafilibuster.

RepublicansheldasupermajorityintheTennesseeGeneralAssemblyalong with the governorship. The Tennessee leaders and governor in 2015-16weremoderateRepublicanswhowerewillingtocompromisetoaccomplishtheirgoals.However,therewasasignificantTeaPartyfactionintheRepublicancaucusthatcouldblockaction.Democratsforthemostparthadlittlenegotiatingpower.

TheresultisthatthelegislaturehasenactedseveralofGovernorBillHaslam’sinitiativesinrecentyears,suchasareductioninthestate’sincometaxoninterestanddividendsandaproposaltoprovidefreecommunitycollegeforeveryhighschoolgraduate.However,oppositionfrombusiness,medicalprovidersandconservativelegislatorsblockedenactmentofthegovernor’sproposaltoprovidefederallysubsidizedhealthcarecoveragetolow-incomeTennesseans.Inoneinstance,an“oddcouple”coalitionofTeaPartyRepublicanswithDemocratsformedtopassatemporarytwo-yearcontinuationofthestate’sCommonCoreeducationstandardsandestablishedagovernor’scommissiontodraftnewstandards.

SimilartoConnecticut’sNewEnglandcivility,theTennesseelegislaturehasastrongcultureofrespectamongmembersandadeferencetosenioritythathasallowedtheminoritypartyatleastsomelevelofparticipationandinfluenceintheprocess.However,thethirdunifiedstateinourstudy,Wisconsin,hasadifferenthistorythatisanimportantpartofourstudyofpolicymakingunderconditionsofpolarizationanddeserves more detailed discussion.

Underlying the legislative process in Connecticut is a culture described as a “New England sense of civility.” It is a very strong norm that the minority has the right to extended debate, and it appears to work because the minority does not abuse the privilege by using it as

a filibuster.


Afterlivingunderdividedgovernmentfor12years,DemocratswonamajorityofbothchambersoftheWisconsinLegislaturein2008and,withholdoverDemocraticGovernorJimDoyle,pushedthroughasignificanttaxincreaseoverRepublicanobjections.Inthe2010election,Republicansaccomplishedareversal,sweepingtheAssemblyandtheSenateandelectingScottWalkerasgovernor.Inanationallywatchedspectacle,thenewRepublicanmajority,atGovernorWalker’sbehest,enactedalandmarkbudgetadjustmentbillknownasAct10.Itsignificantlyrestrictedcollectivebargainingbypublicemploy-eesandreducedtheirbenefits,amongotherprovisions.DemocratswereinitiallyabletoblockthisactionbyleavingthestateanddenyingaquorumintheSenatebutintheendwerepowerlesstopreventthemajority’sactions.

Intheaftermath,bothpartiesinitiatedrecallelectionsagainstkeysenatorsandthegovernorin2011-12.AfewRepublicanslosttheirrecallelections,butGovernorWalkerprevailed,andbythestartofthe2015session,RepublicanshadactuallyincreasedtheirmajorityintheAssemblyandmaintainedcontroloftheSenate.

InthefiveyearsaftertakingcontrolofWisconsinstategovernment,theRepublicanmajorityhascontin-uedtomakeeffectiveuseoftheirunifiedmajorityposition.Bythecountofonereporter,Republicansenacted25majorreformsbetweenthe2010electionandthemiddleofthe2015session,includingaredistrictingbillthatmostsaidislikelytoensureRepublicancontroloftheLegislaturethroughoutthede-cade.BothDemocratsandRepublicansreportedthatDemocratshavenoinfluenceonstatefiscalpolicyormajorlegislation.Themajoritynevernegotiateswiththeminority.

Butthefactthatthereisnocross-partynegotiationdoesnotmeanthattherearenocompromisesorsettlements.TheAssemblyRepublicansaredividedintothreefactions:agroupofconservativememberswhoareconstantlyguardingagainstprimarychallengesintheirdistrictsfromtheright,acollectionofmoremoderatememberswhocomefrommarginaldistrictsthatDemocratsoftenwin,andeveryoneelseinbetween.Bothofthemoreextremefactionshavethepowertoblockaction.TheSenateiscloselyenoughdividedthatafewsenatorscanstallbills.SincetheRepublicancaucusesinbothchambersusearulethatnobillgoestothefloorwithoutthesupportofthemajorityofthemajorityparty(“Hastertrule”),negotiationandcompromiseareoftennecessarywithintheparty.

Inmanyways,Wisconsin’sAct10wastheequivalentofCongress’enactmentoftheAffordableCareActunderaunifiedDemocraticgovernmentin2009.Itwasahighlydivisiveissuethatwaspassedbythema-joritywithlittleornominorityinputandhascontinuedtodefinecleavagesandaffectrelationshipswithintheLegislatureeversince.TheanalogybetweentheWisconsinLegislatureandCongressbreaksdowninthatthefederalsystemswitchedtodividedpartycontrolinthenextelectionafteradoptingalandmarklawandexperiencedsignificantgridlockasneithersidewaswillingtonegotiatewiththeother.InWiscon-sin,ontheotherhand,RepublicansheldontotheirmarginsinthewakeofAct10andcontinuedtobenefitfromtheirmajoritytoenactsignificantchangesinstategovernment.

Assessmentsofthelastingimpactofthe2011Act10inWisconsindifferedin2015.Manyparticipantsintheprocessusedtheterm“Act10hangover”todescribecontinuedacrimonyanddistrustbetweenRsandDs.AparticularlyembitteredDemocraticsenatorarguedthattheWisconsinLegislatureisnolongerfunctional,saying,“TheessenceofCongresshastrickleddowntoWisconsin.”Others,however,saythatthetacticsoftheRepublicanmajorityonAct10werenotsignificantlydifferentfromtheDemocrats’whentheyhadunifiedcontrol.TheyarguethatthelevelsoftrustbetweenthetwopartiesarenotanyworseinWisconsinthaninanyotherstatewithunifiedpartycontrol.Act10isathingofthepastintheirview.

StalematesForallofthestoriesofsuccessfuldeal-making,wealsoheardtalesofsignificantstalematesorgridlock.Itisimportanttorecognizethatlegislativestalemateisineffectadecisionnottoact,tomaintainthestatusquo.Intalkingaboutadecisionbyalegislaturenottoact,onemustbecarefulnottobebiasedinfavorofgovernmentactionbecauseoneperson’s(orparty’s)frustrationaboutnotpassingalawisanotherperson’swisedecisionnottoenactanew,flawedorunnecessarylaw.“Doingnothingisitselfapolicydecision,”saidaVirginiastaffer.

Forourpurposeswedefinestalemateorgridlockasafailuretoactonacriticalornecessaryissue,suchasabudget,inatimelyfashion,oftenrequiringshort-termstopgapmeasuresoragovernmentshutdown.


Forexample,inVirginiain2014thenewDemocraticgovernor,TerryMcAuliffe,proposedaspartofthebudgetthatthestateexpanditsMedicaidprograminlinewiththeAffordableCareActprovisionsinwhichthefederalgovernmentpaysfortheexpansion.InthestateSenate,itappearedthatafewRepub-licanswerewillingtojointheDemocratsandgoalongwiththeidea.TheHouse,however,wasdividedontheissue.Outofconcernsoveranancillaryissueaboutthegovernor’spowertoappointstatejudgeswhenthelegislatureisnotinsession,theRepublicanleadershipoftheHousedecidedtostayinsessionaslongaspossible.StallingonthebudgetandtheMedicaidexpansionproposalbecamethevehiclefordoingthis,andthemoretimewenton,themorehardenedtheRepublicanHousepositionagainstMedic-aidexpansionbecame.

Intheend,abudgetthatdidnotincludeMedicaidexpansionwasadoptedinSeptember,fourmonthsaftertheconstitutionallysetadjournmentdateandthreemonthsintothenewfiscalyear.Howeverlate,itwasasettlementofsorts,oneinwhichtheHousesuccessfullyfaceddownboththegovernorandtheSenate.Interestingly,thespecterofthe2014stalematecontributedtolargelypeacefulbudgetnegotia-tionsin2015.

Minnesotaexperiencedathree-weekgovernmentshutdownandthefurloughof19,000stateemployeesin2011inDemocraticGovernorMarkDayton’sfirstyearinofficefacingaRepublican-controlledLegisla-ture.Bothsidestookahardlineonthemultiplebillsthatmakeupthestatebudgetandrefusedtobudge.Underpublicpressureasroadconstructionprojectswereshutdownandstateparkswereclosed(overtheJuly4holiday),thegovernoreventuallybackeddownonmostofhisdemandsandaccededtotheLegislatureonmostitems.Thegovernor,however,mayhavewonthewarasthepublicgenerallyblamedRepublicansfortheshutdown,andtheylosttheirmajorityinthenextelection.

TherewasaprospectofasimilarshutdowninMinnesotainthe2015legislativesessionasGovernorDay-ton,thistimewithaRepublicanHouseandDemocraticSenate,vetoedthreeomnibusbudgetbillsaftertheLegislatureadjourned.Followingastaterequirement,10,000employeesreceivedadvancenoticethattheywouldbefurloughedeffectiveJuly1.ButinJunethegovernorandRepublicanSpeakerKurtDaudtnegotiatedadeal,calledaspecialsessiontoenactitandavertedtheshutdown.AsinVirginia,thememoryoftheblackeyesufferedbystategovernmentin2011helpedtoresolvethebudgetin2015.

Factors that Mitigate the Effects of PolarizationWeaskedallofourintervieweeswhatfactorshelpthemtoovercometheeffectsofpolarizationandcontinuetoenactpolicy.

Constitutions and RulesManylegislatorscitedtheimportanceofsinglesubjectrulesforbillsandstrictinterpretationsofgerma-neness.ATennesseeSenateleadersaidthatattentiontogermanenessguardsagainstdiversionsintheprocessthatmightotherwiseunderminesettlementsonkeyissues.InColoradothereisbipartisanprideinthelegislature’ssinglesubjectrule,andthememberspoliceeachotheronit.InIowa,oneleadercom-mented,“Thespeakerisveryconsistentaboutwhetheranamendmentisgermane.Hisinterpretationisnarrowandwell-known.”TheIowaspeakerhimselfsaid,“IgiveareasonaboutwhyIruleanamendmentgermaneornotgermaneeverytime,”asamatterofcourtesyandtohelpmembersfeelthattheygetafairshake.

Fortystateconstitutionshave a provision1 thatrequiresabilltoaddressorcontainasinglesubject.Three-quartersofthemhaverulesaboutthegermanenessofamendmentsandmotions,althoughnotallareinterpretedasstrictlyastheexamplesfromourcasestudies.

Twenty-twoofthe99statelegislativechambershavearequirement2 thatallbillsbeheardincommittee.LegislatorsinColorado,MaineandTennesseeparticularlymentionedthisprovisionasamatteroffairnesstominoritypartymembersandawaytomakesurethatlegislatorscantelltheirconstituentsthattheirconcernshavebeenheard.

http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/germaneness-requirements.aspx

http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/04Tab4Pt5.pdf


Allbuttwo(MassachusettsandWisconsin)ofour10stateshaveconstitutionallyrequiredannualsessionadjournmentdates. WhencomparingthemselvestoCongress,statelegislatorsoftencitedthisrequire-mentasanadvantagethatforcestimelyaction.

Closelyrelatedtolimitstothelengthoflegislativesessionsisthenotionofthepart-time,citizenlegisla-tureinwhichlegislatorsgotothecapitalfora(short)timetodothepublic’sbusinessandthenreturntoliveandworkintheircommunities.Lawmakerstakegreatprideintheircitizenlegislaturesandthinkthatitmakesadifferenceintheirabilitytogetthingsdoneinatimelyfashion.InstateslikeMaine,VirginiaandTennessee,theycitethe“supermarketeffect”—citizenlegislatorsconstantlyrunningintoconstitu-entsonvisitstothestore—andtheneedtomakealivingoutsidethelegislatureaspromotingrelation-shipsandconnectionsthattranscendpolitics.

InMassachusetts—themostfull-timelegislatureamongourcase-studystates—legislatorssayjusttheop-posite.TheybelievethefactthattheyareinsessionmostoftheyearandintheStatehousetogethergivestimetoworkonbillsandresolvetheirdifferences.“We’reheretogetthingsdone,”saidonelegislator.

Becauseoursampleofstatescontainsonlytwoofthefull-timelegislatures,wecan’tresolvethisdiffer-enceofopinionsaboutfull-timevs.part-timelegislatures.

Three-quartersofthestatelegislativechambersalsoemploy deadlines3 forprocessingbills.Thesepro-visionstypicallyincludedeadlinesforbillintroduction,committeeaction,actionbythehouseoforigin,actionbythesecondhouseandconferencecommitteeactions.Minnesotalegislatorsparticularlymen-tionedtheirdeadlinesystemasaninstitutionalmechanismthatkeepstheprocessflowing.InTennessee,theSenatehasadeadlinesystembuttheHousedoesnot.ATennesseeSenateleadercommentedthattheirsystemputspressureontheHousetoworktowardcompromise.

Inourdiscussionofbudgetsettlements,wediscussedlegislators’beliefsintheimportanceofstatebal-ancedbudgetrequirements.Tennesseelegislatorsnotonlytalkedaboutthebalancedbudgetrequire-ment’simportanceforbringingopposingsidestogetheronthebudget,butalsothatitsetsaprecedentandprovidesanexampleonotherissues.

Similarly,wementionedtheimportanceofrulesthatallowearmarks(sometimesknownas“memberitems”)asalubricantinreachingagreementonstatebudgets.WepreviouslydiscussedMassachusetts’“gazebosintownsquares.”Virginiausedtoplaceearmarksformembers’favoredprojectsinthenon-state-agencyportionofthebudget,butin2009thestateattorneygeneralruledthatthispracticewasaviolationofthestateconstitution.Artfulandwell-placedlegislatorsarestillabletoplacetheirpetprojectsdirectlyintostateagencybudgets,butlegislatorsandstaffcomplainthatit’smoredifficulttodothan in the past.

Regardlessoftherulesspecifictoparticularstates,legislatorstalkedabouttheimportanceoffairandconsistentapplicationofrulesinbuildingtrust.Incongressionallingo,thisistheequivalentofthe“regularorder”—anassurance,especiallyasamatteroffairnesstowardtheminority,thatrulesandprocedureswillbefollowedconsistently.And,aswithCongress,inthefewinstancesthatweobservedit,thepracticeoflegislativeleaderstakingadvantageofthepowerofthemajoritytochangeorignorerulesengendersdistrustbetweenmajorityandminoritypartiesandexacerbatestheeffectsofpolarization.

Governors and Legislative LeadersManylegislatorstoldusthattheroleofleaders—whetherintheexecutiveorlegislativebranches—wascrucialtothepolicymakingprocess.Speakingofleadership,long-timeformerMinnesotaSenatemajorityleaderRogerMoesaid,“Thelegislativesessionislikeagiantjigsawpuzzle.What’sthefirstthingyoudowithajigsawpuzzle?Youlookatthepictureonthefrontoftheboxtoseehowitissupposedtofittogeth-er.Goodleadershelppeopleseehowthepiecesfittogether.”

Therelationshipsbetweengovernorsandthelegislature,particularlythelegislativeleaders,oftensetthetoneforpolicymakinginthestates.Inmoststates,governorsarethesinglemostpowerfulactorsinthelegislaturebecausetheysettheagenda,submitabudgetasastartingpointfordeliberation,andusethemediaattentiontheyreceiveandtheirbullypulpittoinfluencepublicopinion.

Theformalpowersofgovernorsinour10statesvarywidelyfromrelativelyweakVirginiagovernors,whoareuniqueinbeinglimitedtoonlyonefour-yearterm,topowerfulTennesseegovernors,whosebudgets

http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/96tab3pt1.pdf


receiveonlylimitedchangesbytheGeneralAssembly.Wisconsin’spowerfulgovernorshipisknownforits“Frankensteinveto”—thepowertodeleteindividualwordsfrombillsandtherebycompletelychangetheirmeaning.GovernorJimDoylefamouslyusedhisvetopowertoreducea272-wordsectionofabillto20wordsandintheprocesstransferredseveralhundredmilliondollarsfromtransportationtopublicschools.

Beyondtheformalpowersofchiefexecutives,therelationshipsbetweengovernorsandlegislaturesseemtobehighlyidiosyncratictothepersonalcharacteristicsandskillsofindividualgovernors.Forexample,veteranlegislativeleadersinVirginiadescribetheirrelationshipswithgovernorsinhighlypersonalterms,sayingthatthepersonalityofthegovernormakesthebiggestdifference.LeadersofbothpartiesgenerallydescribedhavinghadverypositiverelationshipswithDemocraticgovernorsGeraldBaliles,MarkWarnerandTimKaineandRepublicanRobertMcDonnell.Theyreportedthattheyhadrelativelypoorcommunica-tionwithDemocraticgovernorsDougWilderandTerryMcAuliffeandRepublicanJimGilmore.Along-timeRepublicanleadersaidthathehadmetonlytwicewithGovernorMcAuliffeinthefirsttwomonthsof2015,comparedtotwoorthreetimesaweekwithDemocraticpredecessorsWarnerandKaineandalmostdailywithRepublicanMcDonnell.GovernorMcAuliffemeetsweeklywithDemocraticleadersinthelegislaturebutnotwiththemajoritypartyRepublicans.

LegislatorsinWashingtonstatedescribedformerGovernorChristineGregoireassomeonewhowasskillfulinfacilitatingagreementbetweenDemocratsandRepublicans,butmanyviewedGovernorJayInsleeasasingle-issuechiefexecutivewhodoesn’ttakethetimetoworkwiththeLegislature.AformerIowaRepublicanleadersaid,“IusedtohaveregularweeklymeetingswithDemocraticGovernorTomVilsack.GovernorVilsackbroughtpeopletogether.”Incontrast,RepublicanGovernorTerryBranstadmeetsonlywiththelegislatorsfromhisownparty.“Hehasn’tworkedtofosterbipartisanrelationships,”concludedthisformerleader.

InTennessee,legislatorsregardedbillionaireRepublicanGovernorBillHaslamasanoutsiderwhoisnotheavilyengagedinthelegislativeprocess.However,heheldweeklybreakfastmeetingsduringsessionswiththetopleadersofbothparties,andheandthetwoRepublicanpresidingofficersmetforlunchatarestaurantnearthecapitoleveryThursdayasapublicsymbolofexecutive-legislativecooperation.

Inhisbook,“TheBestJobinPolitics:ExploringhowGovernorsSucceedasPolicyLeaders,”politicalscientistAlanRosenthalpointedtotheimportanceofgovernors’desirestoleavealegacy.Hesaidthisdesiretogetthingsdoneandtotakecreditforlegislativeaccomplishmentsleadsthemtomoderatetheirpositionsandnegotiatedealswithlegislatures.Buthealsonotedthatthenewgenerationofgovernorsfacesadifferentsetofcircumstancesthantheirpredecessors,andthisislargelyduetoincreasedpartisanshipandpolar-ization.Underthesecircumstances,Rosenthalargued,thenatureofpolicymakingismuchdifferentunderunifiedgovernmentthanunderdividedgovernment.Whenthegovernor’spartycontrolsbothlegislativechambers,theyarelessinclinedtonegotiatewiththeminorityparty.

Legislativeleadersplaymajorrolesindeterminingthesuccessorfailureoflegislativepolicymaking.Ten-nesseehasahistoryofstrongtopleaders(withthetitle“speaker”inbothHouseandSenate).Theyarethegluethatholdsthelegislaturetogether.Theyappointallcommitteechairsandmembersandsettheagendaforthelegislativesession.Thecharacteroftheleadersisimportanttothecooperativetonethatpervadestheinstitution.Bothspeakersin2015-16delegatedauthoritytotheircommitteechairsandonlybecomein-volvedinnegotiationsonthemostintractableissues.Bothwerepoliticalconservativesbutalsopragmatistswhoareinclinedtoseeksettlementswheneverpossibleratherthanadheretostrictideologicalpositions.

Massachusetts’twotopleaderswerecompletelyoppositeinstyleandapproach.SpeakerRobertDeLeoranatightship,relyingonhischiefofstaff,themajorityleaderandthewaysandmeanscommitteechairforadviceandguidance.Thespeakerviewedhimselfasaninclusiveleaderthatbendsoverbackwardtoaccommodatediverseopinions.ButHousecommitteechairswereveryrespectfulofthespeakeranddidnotrunbillsthathedidnotsupport.TheHousefunctionedefficientlyunderhisleadershipandgotthingsdone.Hiscriticssaidthatpowerwasconcentratedintoofewhands,hedictatedprioritiestothemembers,andtherewaslittleornomeaningfuldebate.

MassachusettsSenatePresidentStanleyRosenberg,ontheotherhand,believedinasharedleadershipstylethatencompassesbothmajorityandminoritysenators(theminorityholdsonlyfiveof40seats).HisgoalwastomaketheSenatemoreparticipatoryandtoempowercommitteesandcommitteechairs.“We’retryingtoundothecentralizedpowerofthepresident’soffice;it’shardandithastobegradu-al,”saidPresidentRosenberg.“It’saculturalshiftthatrequiressenatorstorealizethatwithadditional


authoritycomesresponsibility.”Asanillustrationofhisstyle,SenatorRosenbergtookacharterschoolsbilltotheflooroftheSenatewithonly12ofthe21votesheneededtopassit—somethingthatSpeakerDeLeowouldneverdo.Inthecourseofthedebate,SenatorRosenbergmetwitheverysenatorindividu-allytofindoutwhateachwantedinthebill.“Wekeptaddingamendmentsuntilwegotamajority,”saidthe president.

SenatorRosenberg’scriticssaidhewouldgetmoredoneifheprovidedmoredirectiontothemem-bers.Thecriticismsofthetwoleadersweremirrorimagesofeachother.“Ourleadersneedtofindahappymediumbetweenleadershipcontrolandmembers’freedomofaction,”saidaveteranHousecommitteechair.

AWashingtonstafferdescribedthespeakerinherlegislatureas“aconductorofanorchestra,”whereastheSenatemajorityleaderresembled“apianoplayerinabar,hopingthecustomerssingalong.”Thisdistinctionbetweendifferentstylesdemandedbylargerhousesofrepresentativescomparedtosmaller,more collegial senates was common in our 10 states.

Washingtonstateleadersusedavarietyofapproachestoensurecivility,consensusbuildingandteam-workbetweentheparties.DuringaperiodwhentheHousewastiedintheearly2000s,theHouseadoptedaformal“nosurprise”rule.Itrequiredtransparencywiththemembersregardingrulesofprocedureandthatleadersbeopenabouttheirplans.Membersregardedtheruleassosuccessfulthattheyhavecontinuediteversince,evenwithouthavingtheincentiveofatiedhouse.Itprovidesassurancetotheminoritypartythattheywillbetreatedfairly.

Long-timeWashingtonHouseSpeakerFrankChoppwaswell-regardedforhisbehind-the-sceneswork,collaborativestyleandwillingnesstoletotherstakethecredit.TheWashingtonSenatehasapracticeofen-suringthateachminoritypartymembergotatleastonebillpassedasawayofpromotingbipartisanship.TheHousemajorityleadershipalsomadesurethatthechamberpassedasubstantialnumberofminorityparty-sponsoredbills.

WepreviouslyreportedonConnecticut’spracticeofnevercallingthepreviousquestion.Similarly,anIowaSenateleadercommented,“Werespecttheminorityparty’sabilitytovoicetheirconcerns,especiallyaboutthebudget.Wedon’tusethetoolofcallingthequestion.Or,whenwedo,weconsultwiththeminorityleader.Wedon’tuseparlia-mentarysurprises.”

Incommentingonthequalitiesofeffectiveleaders,anIowaleadersaid,“Youhavetounderstandtheprocess,therulesandhavetheexperiencenottoreacttoeverylittlething.”ExperienceforlegislativeleadersisinshortsupplyinColoradoandMaine,bothofwhichhaveeight-yearlimitsonserviceineachofthetwolegislativechambers.Leadersinthoselegislaturesneverhavemorethansixyearsofexperi-enceandseldomserveasleaderformorethanonetwo-yearterm.

Committee SystemsParaphrasingWoodrowWilson,aVirginialegislatorsaid,“TheGeneralAssemblyincommitteeistheGeneralAssemblyatwork.”Inawell-functioningcommitteesystem,committeesgiveafairhearingtoallsidesonproposedlegislation,deliberateonthemeritsofeachproposalwithactiveparticipationbymi-noritypartymembersandscreenlegislationintheirareaofpolicyfortherestofthehouse.Committeesareparticularlyeffectivewhenleadersgivethemthefreedomtonegotiateandact.

SeveralMinnesotalegislatorssaidthatcommitteesdomostofthesubstantiveworkoftheLegislature.Committeechairsareempoweredtomakekeydecisions,andtheyhaveimportantresponsibilitytosetthetoneofcooperationorpartisanshipontheircommittees.AnIowacommitteechairsaid,“Wehavealotoffreedomandautonomywithourcommittees.Idon’thavetoaskforpermission.Ourroleisto

A Washington staffer

described the speaker in her

legislature as “a conductor

of an orchestra,” whereas

the Senate majority leader

resembled “a piano player in

a bar, hoping the customers

sing along.” This distinction

between different styles

demanded by larger houses

of representatives compared

to smaller, more collegial

senates was common in

our 10 states.


funnelthebillsandmaketheleadersresponsiblefornegotiatingfewerbills…[andserve]asaconduitofinformationtotheleadership.”

Manylegislativeleadersholdweeklymeetingswithcommitteechairstostrengthencommunicationandcoordinatecommitteeactivities.AVirginiacommitteechairsaidofSundaynightmeetingsbetweencommitteechairsandleaders,“Thecommunicationfromcaucusleadersisimportant.Theydon’toftenaskusformuch,butwhentheydo,youneedtofollowthecaucuslead.”AnIowaleaderreportedthatcommitteechairshavealotofautonomybutthatattheleaders’weeklymeetingswithcommitteechairs,“Weencouragethechairstobringcontroversialbillstothecaucusfirst,beforethecommittee.Wedon’twantthemtofeellikeleadershippullsallthestrings.”

Somecommitteechairsreportedthattheymadeconcertedeffortstoovercomepoliticalpolarization.AWashingtonchairsaidthatheheldweeklymeetingswiththerankingminoritymemberandmadesurethateverymemberofthecommittee,RepublicanorDemocrat,gotabillfavorablyreportedoutofcommittee.Otherchairsinstateswithsplitlegislativecontroltalkedabouttheimportanceofbuildingpersonalrelationshipswithcounterpartchairsoftheoppositepartyintheotherhouse.

Theperceptionofawell-functioningcommitteesystemandthethemeofempoweredcommitteechairswasechoedinmostofourcase-studystates.However,legislatorsintheMassachusettsHouseandWis-consinAssemblysaidthattheleadersmaintainrelativelytightcontrolovercommitteeactions.WisconsinDemocratsfeelasifthemajorityrunsroughshodoverthemincommittee.AndinVirginia,foralltheconfidencelegislatorsexpressedintheircommitteesystem,onemembersaid,“Whenabillhasnotoriety,thecommitteesdon’tmatterasmuch,”meaningthathigh-stakesbillsbeartheimprintoftheleaders,themajoritycaucusesandthegovernormorethanthecommittees.

Legislaturesthatoperateprimarilywithjointcommitteesareaspecialcase.Asithappens,theonlythreesuchlegislaturesinthecountryareinoursampleof10states:Connecticut,MaineandMassachusetts.Inallthreestates,thejointcommitteeshadco-chairsfromthetwochambers,hadmoreHousemem-bersthansenatorsbymarginsofthreeorfourtoone,heldjointhearings,andreportedonbillstobothchamberswithacombinedmajorityvote.ManyintervieweesinMainethoughttheirstate’sjointcommit-teesfacilitatednegotiationandbipartisancompromisesandreducedtheneedforseparatenegotiationbetweenthechambers.Maine’sjointcommitteesystemhasworkedunderbothunifiedandsplitpartycontrolwithintheLegislature.Oneconservativemember,though,complainedthatthejointcommitteesystemreducesinternallegislativechecksandbalancesandmakesittooeasytopasslegislation.

Connecticutlegislatorsweresimilarlysatisfiedwithitsjointcommitteesystem,inpartbecausebothchambershavebeenunderthecontrolofthesamepartyforsolong.Somelegislatorsexpressedskep-ticismastowhetherthejointcommitteesystemwouldsurviveafuturechangeinpartycontrolinonechamber.EventhoughtheyhadaDemocraticmajorityinbothchambers,MassachusettsSenateleaderswerefrustratedwiththejointcommitteesystembecausetheyfeltasifitwasunderthecontroloftheHouse,whosememberscouldalwaysoutvotethemoncommittees.TheSenatepresidentattemptedtochangetheGeneralCourt’sjointrulesandsplitcommitteesbetweenthechambersattheoutsetofthe2015session.TheHousedidnotgoalongwiththisproposal.Asaresult,jointruleswereneveradoptedforthe2015-16biennium,andthelegislaturecontinuedtooperatewiththeoldrulesthatremainineffectuntilnewonesareadopted.

Althoughmostoftherestoftheircommitteesoperatebychamber,bothColoradoandWisconsinhaveverypowerfuljointbudgetcommittees.TheColoradoHouseandSenatebothelectthreememberstotheJointBudgetCommittee.Thechairmanshiprotatesannuallybetweenthetwochambers.WehavealreadymentionedthattheJBCoperatesunderarulethattheydonotrecommendabudgetbillunlessthereisunanimoussupportamongitssixmembers.Thismeansthatminoritypartymembersonthecommitteehaveconsiderableinfluenceoverthebudget,andthecommitteemustdevelopa“longbill”thatwillpassbothchambersandobtainthegovernor’sapproval.TheJBCneveradjourns,asithaspoweroverfundingdecisionsincaseofemergenciesbetweenlegislativesessions,andserviceonthecommitteeisafull-timecommitment.JBCmembersofbothpartiesviewthemselvesasateamandfunctionasabuilt-inconsensusbuildingcommitteeforthelegislature.

Wisconsin’sJointFinanceCommittee(JFC)isequallyaspowerfulasColorado’sJBC,althoughinrecentyearsithasexperiencedmorepartisanconflict.Legislativeleadersineachchamberhandpickeightmem-berstoserveonJFCfromamongmemberstheyexpecttobeleadersinthefuture.(Allbutonetopleader


inrecentmemoryhaspreviouslyservedonJFC.)Thecommitteemeetsforeightto10hoursadayfortwomonthstodevelopthestatebudget,sothemembersgettoknoweachotherwell.Historicallythecom-mitteehasoperatedincollegialfashion.SincetheRepublicantakeoveroftheLegislatureafterthe2010election,theAssemblyRepublicanmembersofJFChavecaucusedtogetherbeforeeachmeeting,usuallyformanyhours,totalkabouttheissuesontheagendaanddevelopaposition.Theythenvotetogetherintheformalmeeting,evenifsomeofthemembersdisagreewiththepositiontaken.ThisgivesmajoritypartyAssemblymembersmorepowerintheJFCandleavestheminoritypartyoutaltogether.DemocratsandRepublicansalikesaythattheminoritypartyhasnoimpactonstatebudgetoutcomes.

Legislatorsoftencitedtheimportanceforthepolicymakingprocessoftheabilityofminoritypartymem-berstohaveinfluenceoncommitteedecisions.Thishelpstobuildsupportforlegislationandgivestheminoritypartyasenseofbuy-in.IntheAmericanLegislatorSurvey,weaskedaquestionabouthowmuchinfluenceminoritypartymembershaveontherespondent’smostvaluedcommittee’sdecisionmaking(Table2).Notethattwoofthethreestateswithjointcommitteesystemsareatthetopofthelistbutthatthethird,Massachusetts,isbelowaverage.Therearetoofewresponsesfromthejointcommitteestatestoreachdefinitiveconclusionsabouttheeffectofthisvariableontheinfluenceofminoritypartymembersoncommitteedecisions.

Table 2. Legislator Responses“How much influence do minority party members have on [your most valued] committee’s decision?” (Scale of 1=None to 7=Considerable)

States N AverageMaine 65 5.2Connecticut 36 4.3Washington 35 4.150 States 1,620 3.6Colorado 25 3.5Massachusetts 32 3.4Minnesota 52 3.3Virginia 24 3.1Iowa 42 3.0Tennessee 34 3.0Wisconsin 38 2.7

Inamultipleregressionanalysis(AppendixIII)oftheeffectsofvariousinstitutionalorindividualcharac-teristicsofall50statesontheperceivedinfluenceofminoritypartymembersincommittee,thefollowingindependentvariableswerestatisticallysignificant.

• Party | 99.9 percent confidence level:DemocratsperceiveminoritypartymembersasmoreinfluentialthandoRepublicans.

• Professionalism | 99.9 percent confidence level:Lawmakersfromstateswithpart-timelegislatorsandrelativelylowresourcesforthelegislatureperceiveminoritypartymembersasmoreinfluentialthandothoseinmorefull-time,high-resourcelegislatures.

• Money Committees | 99 percent confidence level:Legislatorswhoseprimarycommitteeassign-mentisnotanappropriations,budgetortaxcommitteeperceiveminoritypartymembersasmoreinfluentialthandothosewhoserveonmoneycommittees.ThisiscontrarytotheinterviewfindingsinthediscussionofthecollegialityofbudgetcommitteesinColoradoandWisconsinabove,butconsistentwithanotionthatmoneycommitteesmayenforcemorepartydisciplinethandosub-stantivepolicycommittees.


• Majority Status | 99 percent confidence level: Legislators who are in the minority party perceive them-selvesasmoreinfluentialincommitteethandomajoritypartymembers.

• Term Limits | 99 percent confidence level:Legislatorsinstateswithtermlimitsviewminoritypartymembersasmoreinfluentialthandothoseinnon-term-limitedstates.Thissuggeststhatlegislatureswithlessexperiencedmembersmaynotplaceasmuchemphasisonpartydisciplineincommittees.

• Divided Government | 95 percent confidence level:Legislatorsinstateswithdividedgovernmentviewminoritypartymembersasmoreinfluentialthandothoseinstateswithunifiedgovernment.

Theviewsofwomenlegislatorsregardingtheinfluenceofminoritypartymembersincommitteedidnotdiffersignificantlyfromthoseofmen.

LegislatorsinMassachusetts,MinnesotaandVirginiatalkedabouttheimportanceofconferencecommit-tees,especiallyiftheyareclosedtothepublic,forfinalnegotiationsonbills.“Everythingendsupgoingtoconference,”saidaMassachusettssenator.Theconferencecommitteesdonotmeetinpublic,andtheirreportscannotbeamendedonthefloor.AnotherveteranBayStatemembersaid,“Whenyou’repartofaconferencecommittee,youcangetthingsdone.”

ConferencecommitteeswerealsoparticularlyimportantinMinnesota,inpartbecausetheyuseacon-currentbillintroductionsysteminwhichabillisintroducedinonechamberandacompanionbillintheother.Committeesandthechamberasawholeworkontheirownbillswithoutwaitingforthehouseoforigintoact,anddifferencesarenegotiatedinconferencecommittees.Leadersineachchamberappointtheconferencecommitteemembersandareundernoobligationtoappointmemberswhodidnotvoteforthebill.Asaresult,MinnesotaconferencecommitteessometimesconsistonlyofmajoritypartymemberswhentheLegislaturehasunifiedcontrol.

InVirginia,conferencecommittees,usuallyconsistingofthebillpatronandtwomemberseachofthema-jorityandminorityparties,donotoftenmeetinpublic.Infact,theymaynotmeetatall.Differencesareof-tenworkedoutbetweenkeymembersinprivate,andtheothermembersthensignontotheagreement.

InWisconsin,conferencecommitteeshavenotbeenusedtoresolvedifferencesbetweenthetwopartiessincethepassageofAct10,inlargepartbecausethestateconstitutionrequiresopenconferencecom-mittees.Instead,agreementsareworkedout(ornot)inleaders’offices.“Conferencecommitteesarenotusefulbecausetheyarepublic,”saidasympatheticlobbyist.“It’sbettertoresolvethingsinprivateintheleaders’offices.”

Personal Relationships, Culture and Traditions Besidestheformalrulesandstructures,legislatorsemphasizedlessformalandperhapslesstangiblefactorsthatencouragecompromiseandproblemsolving.Theseincludeinterpersonalrelationships,espe-ciallyacrossparties,andcultures,attitudesandnormsofbehavior.

Coloradolegislatorsinparticularmadeapointabouttheimportanceoftalkingtomembersoftheotherpartyandbuildingpersonalrelationships.Onemajoritypartysenatorwenttoeverymemberontheothersideoftheaisleandaskedeachtotellhimabouttheirinterests,theirhobbiesandtheirfamilies.Anothermembersaid,“Youneverknowwhocouldbeyourpartneronabill.Therearenewrelationshipsandissueseveryyear,soyoucan’tdiscountanyone.”Amajoritypartyleaderandhisminoritycounterpartmadeapactearlyintheircareerstocosponsoratleastonebilleachyear.Theycontinuedthistraditionwhenmajoritypartycontrolflipped.TheirpracticeisfacilitatedinColoradobyachangeinrulesallowing“jointco-primesponsors”ofbillsratherthanrequiringonlysingleprimesponsors.Somecreditthisrulewithencouragingmorebipartisanship.

AnIowalegislatorsaid,“Ifindthetimetotalktocolleaguesfromtheotherpartyatthelargesocialreceptions.Iplayracquetballandbasketballwithcolleagues.Itgivesustheopportunitytotalkaboutourfamiliesandinterests.”Whilelegislatorsinanumberofstatesnotedadeclineinlegislativesocializingeitherduetoethicslawsorgeneralsocietalchange,aWashingtonleadernotedthatmembersofthetwopartiesstillhavedinnertogetherandmakeconnectionswitheachother.

AnotherIowamemberemphasizedtheneedtorecognizethattherearetwosidestoeveryissueandtheimportanceoftryingtounderstandtheotherside’sperspective.AWashingtonlegislatortalkedaboutthe


importanceofgettingtoknowtherangeofissuesthatmembersholdonanyissue,emphasizingthatit’snotalwaysfarleftvs.farright.“Onceyouunderstandhowfaryoucanmaneuvertoreachaccommoda-tion,thepartylabelsfalloff,”hesaid.

Severalstateshaveunusualseatingarrangementsonthefloorofthechamberthatmembersregardaspromotingpersonalrelationshipsandbipartisanship.IntheMassachusettsandConnecticutsen-ates,seatingisintheround,soallmemberscanseeeachother.AConnecticutsenatordescribedhischamber’spracticeofseatingmembersbydistrictnumber,notbyparty,withthecomment,“Itmaynotchangethewaywevote,butitprobablyhelpstoincreasecivilityandmayhelpdeflectpartisanshipabit.”Tennesseelegislators,whoalsohaveaformof“blended”seatingonthefloor,believethatthispromotesrelationshipsandcollaborationbetweentheparties.SeatingintheIowaGeneralAssemblyischosenbyseniorityandcausesmembersofthetwopartiestobeinterspersed.AknowledgeableIowaobserversaid,“Whenmembersaresittingkneetokneeonthefloorwithnowheretohide,itmakesadifference.Youhavetositeyetoeyeandtalktoeachother,evenafterdisagreements.Ithumanizestheprocess.”

Sharingcommonspacesandtravelingtogetherwerealsomentionedaswaysofbuildingrelationshipsacrossparties.MostmembersoftheIowalegislaturedonothavetheirownoffices,sotheyhavetoworkattheirdesksontheflooralongsidemembersoftheotherpartywhennotinsession.Manystatestakecommitteesontourstostatefacilitiesoutsidethecapitalcity,andthis,too,promotespersonalrelation-ships.InColorado,interestgroupssponsortripsaroundthestate.Oneparticipantinabipartisangroupof10freshmanmembersonsuchatripreportedthattheygottoknoweachotherandtheirdistrictsandleanedontherelationshipstheydevelopedinthenextlegislativesession.

Coloradohasagrowingnumberofinformal,issue-orientedcaucusessuchassportsmen,animalprotec-tion,orfamiliesandchildren.Allarebipartisanandhelptobuildrelationships.ThetwotoppartyleadersintheMassachusettsSenatetakeprideinhavingfrequent“jointcaucuses,”whichareineffectstudysessionsforthemembersofbothpartiesonmajorlegislation.

WehavepreviouslymentionedanumberofnormsofbehaviorsuchasTennessee’scultureofrespectforseniormembers,ConnecticutandIowa’sreluctancetoshutoffdebate,andWashington’spracticeofmakingsurethatminoritypartybillspass.

WeheardaboutotherindividualstateattitudesortraditionslikeConnecticut’ssenseofcivility.Formanydecades,Virginianshavetakenpridein“theVirginiaway,”whichmeansrisingabovepartisanshiptodowhatisrightforthestate.ManyworrythattheVirginiawayis slipping away as the willingness to reach across the aisle to solve problemsisdisappearing(onesomewhatcynicalstafferdescribeditas“gone”).ButitisstillanimportantenoughtraditioninRichmondthatmemberstalkaboutitandbelievethatitinfluencestheirbehavior.

WhenhebecamespeakeroftheWisconsinAssemblyin2013intheaftermathofthepartisanblowupofAct10twoyearsearlier,RobinVosnegotiatedamemorandumofagreementwiththeminorityre-gardingallocationoftimeonthefloor.Accordingtothetermsoftheagreement,thetopleadersfrombothpartiesmeetprivatelybeforeeverylegislativesessiondaytoagreeontimelimitsfordebate.Mem-

bersandleadersbothsaytheagreementhasworkedwell:TheAssemblyworksonatighterschedule,sessionsendearlier,andmembersgettogohomeatareasonablehour.Thisstepreducedtensionswiththeminorityandsmoothedlegislativeoperations—withoutchangingthefactthattheRepublicanshadanunassailablemajorityanddidn’tneedDemocraticvotestogetthingsdone.

Therewasoneattitudethatpervadedeverystatecapitolwevisited.Itwasusuallyexpressedas,“WearenotD.C.”ThespecterofcongressionalgridlockissuchthatitspursstatestoattempttoactdifferentlyfromCongress.“We’reheretogetthingsdone,”saidaMaineleaderinspecificcomparisontoCongress.AnIowasenatortookprideinhischamberbysaying,“TheSenatehasadesiretodothingsdifferentlyfromD.C.In2013and2014therewaslotsofcooperation.In2013wepassedapropertytaxreform,healthreform—thereweremanygrandbargainsmade.Onesuccessledtothenextsuccess.WeallfeltgoodaboutnotbeinglikeD.C.”

There was one attitude

that pervaded every state

capitol we visited. It was

usually expressed as,

“We are not D.C.” The specter

of congressional gridlock is

such that it spurs states to

attempt to act differently

from Congress.


Special Roles: Women, Nonpartisan Staff and Narrow MajoritiesTheproportionofwomenlegislatorsinour10statesrangedfromhighsof41percentinColoradoand33percentinMinnesotaandWashington,tolowsof17percentinVirginiaand18percentinTennessee.Theotherfivestatesclusteredwithinafewpointsofthenationalaverageof24percent.

Whenweaskedabouttherolesofwomenlegislatorswegottwodifferentpointsofview—fromlegisla-torsofbothgendersandparties.Oneisthatgendermakesadifference.Advocatesofthisperspectivesaythatwomenlistenbetter,aremoredeliberativeandcollaborative,andarebetteratdevelopingrelation-ships.“Wedon’tgetascaughtupinposturingasthemen,”saidaMassachusettsDemocraticwomancommitteechair.AWisconsinRepublicancommitteechairsaysthatshethinkswomenaremorecommit-tedtoprocessandmorerationalandhavelonger-termperspectivesthanmen.

Theopposingviewisthatgenderdoesn’tmakeadifference.“They’renodifferentfrommen,”saidaMassachusettsleader.“Someareaggressiveandtoughandsomearecollaborativeandcooperative,”hecontinued.“Idon’tthinkit’spossibletogeneralizeaboutwomenlegislators,”saidaWisconsinfemaleleader.AliberalMassachusettscommitteechaircommented,“Thereappearstobeasisterhoodamongwomenlegislators,butIdon’tviewgenderasasignificantissueinlegislativeperformance.”WewillreturntodifferencesbetweenmaleandfemalelegislatorsintheanalysisofresponsestotheAmericanLegislatorSurveybelow.

Legislatorsinseveralstatesmentionedthatnonpartisanstaffareimportantinconstrainingpartisanshipandmitigatingtheeffectsofpolarization.ATennesseepartisanstaffersaidthatnonpartisanstaffkeeptheinstitutionontrackandcontributetoasenseoftrustarounddata,analysisandkeydecisionpoints.ConnecticutandMinnesotalegislatorsalsocommentedonthehighregardinwhichnonpartisanstaffareheld.Intheterm-limitedColoradolegislature,legislatorssaythenonpartisanstaffprovidecontinuityandhelpthemunderstandthebigpictureandthehistoryofissues.

Inarecentbook,“InsecureMajorities:CongressandthePerpetualCampaign,”politicalscientistFrancesLeearguesthatatthenationallevel,theclosenessofthetwopartiesandshiftingcontroloftheWhiteHouseandCongressarewhatdrivepartisanconflict,impedecooperationandleadtostalemate.Thestatelegislatorsinour10statesamplehadjusttheoppositepointofview:Theysayclosemajoritiesmeanmorecooperationandcollaboration.

ADemocraticleaderinColoradosaidthatthestate’s“purple”pro-clivitiesandthenarrowmarginsintheHouseandSenatemeanthatmembersofherpartyhavetobemoremoderateandcentrist.InWashington,wherecontroloftheSenatehasswitchedoftenover30years,aleadersaid,“It’seasiertoreachagreementwhenthemajori-tiesareslim,becauseyoucan’talwayscontroleveryoneinyourowncaucusandyoumightneedtheotherparty’ssupport.”Elaboratingonthispoint,aWashingtonstatestaffersaidthatthecompetitivenessofsuburbandistrictsmeansthattheDemocraticspeakerinaHousewitha51-47marginsometimeshastolethismembersvoteagainsthiscaucusandthereforeneedsvotesfromtheotherparty.

AnIowastaffmemberobservedthattheslimmerthemajority,themoreyouhavetoplaynice.AWashingtonstafferthoughtthatshiftingmajoritieshaveamoderatingeffectbecause“You’regoingtobeintheminorityatsomepoint,sohowdoyouwanttobetreatedwhenthathappens?”InaVirginiaSenatewithanarrowRepublicanmajority,aDemocratsaidthattheminorityhassignificantinputonbills“becauseweonlyhavetopickofftwoorthreeRepublicans.”

Underlyingallofthesevariousfactorsthatmitigatetheeffectsofpoliticalpolarizationistheideaoftrust.Itwaseitherexplicitorimplicitinthediscussionofrulesandtheirfairandconsistentapplication;there-lationshipsbetweenleadersandgovernors;theinternalworkofcommittees;thecoordinationbetweencommitteesandleaders;traditionslikethe“nosurprise”ruleornotarbitrarilyshuttingoffdebate;andtheroleofnonpartisanstaff.

“It’s easier to reach

agreement when the

majorities are slim, because

you can’t always control

everyone in your own caucus

and you might need the other

party’s support.”


Onemorestorythatillustratestheimportanceoftrust:AnurbanblacklegislatorinWashingtonsaidthatheaskedtobeputontheagriculturecommitteetolearnaboutruralissuesandworkwithmembersoftheotherparty.Thisdidnotcosthimanythinginhisdistrictbecausetheissueswerenotprioritiesforhisconstituents.Butbyworkingwithcolleaguesintheotherpartyontheirbills,hefeltasifheearnedtrustandtherighttoaskthemforsupportonhisbills.

Attitudes Toward Compromise and Coalition BuildingInourinterviews,legislatorsoftentoldusthatawillingnesstocompromisewaskeytogettingthingsdone,tomakingpublicpolicy.IntheAmericanLegislatorSurvey,weasked,“Doyouthinkcompromiseisanessentialpartofthelegislativeprocessorisitsellingout?”(Scaleof1=Essentialto7=SellingOut)Onaveragelegislatorsscored2.4onthisscale,muchcloserto“essential”thanto“sellingout.”AndlegislatorsweremuchmorefavorabletocompromisethantheAmericanpeople(Table3).Becausethequestionswerenotexactlythesame,extremecautionisnecessaryininterpretingtheresultsfromthesethreesur-veys,butthedifferencesbetweentheattitudesofthegeneralpublicandthoseoflegislatorsaresogreatasstilltobenoteworthy.Legislativelifeapparentlyteachesthevalueofcompromise.

Table 3. Legislators’ Attitudes Toward Compromise Compared to the Public

Gallup# Prolific Academic+ State Legislators‡Favorableto Compromise

50% 62% 79%

Neutral 26% 11%Unfavorableto Compromise

23% 38% 10%

#GallupPoll2014:“Wherewouldyourateyourselfonascaleof1to5,where1meansitismoreimportantforpoliticalleaderstocompromiseinordertogetthingsdoneand5meansitismoreimportanttosticktotheirbeliefseveniflittlegetsdone.”

+ProlificAcademicSurvey(2015)ofAmericancitizensbyJohnR.HibbingandElizabethThe-iss-Moore:“Doyouagreeordisagreewith,‘Whatpeoplecallcompromiseisreallyjustsellingoutonone’sprinciples.’”

‡NCSLAmericanLegislatorSurvey2014:“Doyouthinkcompromiseisanessentialpartofthelegislativeprocessorisitsellingout?”(Scaleof1=Essentialto7=Sellingout)

TheresponsestothisquestionIntheAmericanLegislatorSurveyfromthe10statesinthisstudy(Table4)areforthemostpartaswewouldexpect,withMassachusetts,MinnesotaandVirginiathemostfavor-abletocompromiseandtwooftheunifiedgovernmentstates,TennesseeandConnecticut,theleast.TheonlysurpriseisWisconsininthemiddleofthepack,perhapsreflectingtherealitythatcompromiseisstillnecessarywithinadividedmajorityparty,evenwhenithasanoverwhelmingmarginofcontrol.


Table 4. Legislator Responses“Do you think compromise is an essential part of the legislative process or is it selling out?” (Scale of 1=Essential to 7=Selling out)

States N AverageMassachusetts 38 1.9Minnesota 56 2.1Virginia 33 2.1Maine 68 2.2Wisconsin 42 2.350 States 1,812 2.3Colorado 29 2.3Iowa 43 2.4Washington 39 2.5Connecticut 40 2.6Tennessee 35 2.6

Amultipleregressionanalysisofthecompromisequestionshowsthatthefollowingfactorsarestatistical-lysignificantinexplaininglegislators’attitudestowardcompromise:

• Party | 99.9 percent confidence level:TheaveragescoreforDemocratswas1.9andforRepublicans2.9.WhiletheRepublicans’averagescoreissignificantlylessfavorabletowardcompromise,itisstillmuchcloserto“Essential”thanitisto“SellingOut”onthe7-pointscale.

• Polarization | 99 percent confidence level:LegislatorsinlesspolarizedstatesontheShor-McCartyscaleviewcompromisemorefavorablythandothoseinmorepolarizedstates.

• Professionalism| 95 percent confidence level:Lawmakersfromstateswithmorefull-time,high-re-sourcelegislaturesviewcompromiseasmoreessentialthandothoseinpart-timelegislatureswithrelativelylowresources.

FactorssuchasDividedGovernment,MajorityPartyStatus,TermLimitsandserviceonaMoneyCommit-teewerenotstatisticallysignificant.InaninitialbivariateanalysisoftheeffectofGenderoncompromise,womenlegislatorsappearedtobemuchmorefavorabletocompromisethanmen,butaftercontrollingforpoliticalparty(60percentofwomenlegislatorsareDemocrats),therelationshipwashedout.Thisresultsupportstheviewsofsomeofourintervieweesthatwomenlegislatorsdonotbehavesignificantlydifferentlyfrommen.


Anothersurveyquestionaskedhowmuchtimelegislatorsspendoneachofsevenactivities(Table5).Inadditiontospotlightinglegislators’focusonconstituentsandcommitteework,thistableshowsthatleg-islatorsallocatemoretimetobuildingcoalitionswithinpartythanacrossparty.Thisisparticularlytrueformajoritypartymembers.Notsurprisingly,though,minoritypartymembersdevotemoretimetobuildingcoalitionsacrosspartiesthanwithintheirown.Thisrelationshipholdsaftercontrollingforparty.

Table 5. 50-State Legislator Responses“How much time do you spend on each of the following activities?” (Scale of 1=Hardly any to 5=A great deal)

Legislators’ Activities ScoreKeepingintouchwith constituents

4.1

Committeework 4.1Helpingconstituents withproblems

4.0

Buildingcoalitionswithin party

3.5

Makingsuredistrictgets money/projects

3.2

Buildingcoalitionsacrossparties

3.1

Campaigning/fundraising 2.6

Wealsoaskedlegislatorshowmuchattentiontheythinktheirpartyleadershouldgivetoaseriesofac-tivities,usingthesamefive-pointscale(Table6).FocusingontheKeepingtheCaucusUnitedandBuildingCoalitionsAcrossPartiesresponses,thesamedynamicbetweenmajorityandminoritypartiesasinthepreviousquestionholdstrue:Minoritypartymemberswanttheirleaderstofocusattentiononworkingacrossparty(3.9)significantlymorethanmajoritypartymembersdo(3.4).

Table 6. 50-State Legislator Responses“Please indicate how much attention you think your legislative party leader should give to:” (Scale of 1=Hardly any to 5=A great deal)

Leaders’ Priorities ScoreFloor management 4.1Supportinganddefendingtheinstitution

4.0

Assistingmemberswithlegis-lativeproblems

3.9

Keepingthecaucusunitedonfloorvotes

3.8

Buildinglegislativecoalitionsacrossparties

3.6

Fundraising 3.4


Factors that Exacerbate the Effects of PolarizationJustasleaderscanplayacrucialroleinorganizingandmanagingconflictanddisagreementintheleg-islativeprocess,theycanalsogumuptheworksbytakingconfrontational,ideologicalpositions.Afewgovernorshavebeenparticularlyvisibleintaking“mywayorthehighway”roles.Inthelatterpartofthelastcentury,Minnesota’smaverickindependentGovernorJesseVenturawasfamousforhisdisrespectfortheLegislatureandhisunwillingnesstodealwithit.MorerecentlyinthefirstyearofMinnesotaDemocraticGovernorMarkDayton’stermin2011,therewasagovernmentshutdownwhenheandtheRepublican-ledLegislaturetookabsolutistpositionsandwereunabletoreachaccommodationonthestatebudget.

MaineTeaPartyconservativeGovernorPaulLePagepridedhimselfonhisaggressiveposturetowardtheMaineLegislatureandhisuseofeverytoolavailabletocombatit.Amemberofhisadministrationsaid,“GovernorLePagehasapointofviewregardingtheLegislaturethatisnotpartisan.Heviewshimselfasachangeagent.TheLegislatureistheestablishment.”ThegovernordisagreedwithDemocratsintheHouseandRepublicanswhocon-trolledtheSenate.Inhisfirsttermheissuedanunprecedentednumberofvetoes.ButbecausetheLegislaturehadalreadyassembledatwo-thirdsmajoritytopassthebudget(aspreviouslydescribed),theLegislaturehadthevotestooverridethebudgetvetoesandothersaswell.AsplitLegislaturemadeitsowndealsandfunctionedwithoutthegovernor.

Inhisfirstyearinoffice,WisconsinGovernorScottWalkertookaveryaggressive,nocompromisepositioninfavorofmajorcutsingovernmentspending,restrictinggovernmentemployees’collectivebargainingrightsandreducingtheirbenefits.Inhiscase,thisabsolutistpositionenabledmajorchangesinstategovernmentbecausehehadaunifiedRepublicanmajoritythatsupportedhimintheLegislature.HealienatedDemocrats,buttherewasn’tmuchtheycoulddoaboutit.

Ineverystateweheardcomplaintsaboutthenegativeeffectsofthemodernworldofelectroniccommunicationonlegislativepolicymak-ing.AVirginialeadersummeditupas“themediaintrudesintoeveryorificeofthepublicbody.”Inthiscase,themediareferstothe24-hournewscyclefueledbynon-traditionalbloggersandreporters,socialmediaandtalkradio.

Intheworldoftheinstantnewscycle,everyquestionaskedinacommitteehearing,votecastonanamendmentoroffhandcommentoverheardinthehallwaymaybebloggedortweeted.ATennesseelegislatorsaidthatthisinstantexposurequashesthemembers’willing-nesstobecandid,takerisksorexplorenewideas.AVirginiasenatorarguedthattheinstantnewscyclemakeslegislatorsthinkthattheyhavetoreacttoissuesandproblemsquickly,whichhardenspoliticalpositions.

“TheInternetleadstothespreadofmisinformation,”saidaVirginialegislator.AnotherVirginiansaid,“Wackosareallthetimecontactinglegislatorselectronicallywithallkindsofcrazyshitandmakingthem-selvesfamousbycomplainingonlinewhenthelegislaturedoesn’tdowhattheywant.”

AWisconsinleadercomplainedthattheconstantattentiontonewsandsocialmediabythemembersreducesthequalityofdeliberation:“Everyoneisontheircellphonesorcomputers.Theymaketheirownspeechesorarguments,thengobacktocheckingtheirsmartphones.Theydon’tevenlistentotheirownside’sarguments,muchlesstheothers’.”AWisconsinAssemblymemberaddedthattheproblemisthatlegislatorstendtobelievethattheirfriendsonFacebookandTwitterarerepresentativeofthepublicandtherebyloseperspectiveontheextentofdisagreementamongthepublic.

In the world of the instant

news cycle, every question

asked in a committee hearing,

vote cast on an amendment

or offhand comment

overheard in the hallway

may be blogged or tweeted. A

Tennessee legislator said that

this instant exposure quashes

the members’ willingness

to be candid, take risks or

explore new ideas.


HighlypartisanandopinionatedtalkradioissoinfluentialinthesoutheasterncornerofWisconsin,homeofmanyofthemostconservativemembers,thatsomerefertotheareaas“radio-land.”Inthe2016legislativesession,abilltoaddone-halfcenttothestatesalestaxtofundbadlyneededtransportationinfrastructuresailedthroughanAssemblycommitteewithaunanimousvote.Butthentalkradiogotholdoftheissueandattackeditasanunacceptabletaxincrease.Asaresultoftheradiohueandcry,conser-vativeanti-taxlegislatorsbackeddownfromsupportingthebillincaucusandblockeditfromgoingtothefloor.Thebillwasdead.“Thingswouldbebetteraroundhereifradioswereremovedfromlegislators’cars,”quippedaDemocrat.

Manylegislatorsconsideradeclineinsocializingamonglegislatorsofdifferentpartiesascontributingtopolarization.Someadmitthatthismaybearesponsetosocietalchangesinwhichpeoplespendlesstimehangingouttogether(“bowlingalone”).InColorado,Minnesota,TennesseeandWisconsin,theyblameethicsrestrictionsforcuttingdownoneveningreceptionsanddinnershostedbylobbyists.AWisconsinlegislatorsaidthatinsteadoffourorfivereceptionsanightasinthepast,therearenowonlyfiveorsoayear.ButaColoradolawmakercommented,“Youcanstillforgeagoodrelationshipifyoupayforyourowndrink.”

AWisconsinleadersaidthatanunintendedconsequenceofthememorandumofunderstandingthatledtomorepredictablesessionscheduleswasthatfewerlegislatorsstayedinMadisonatnight.Heestimatesthatonlyaboutone-thirdofthemembersstayedovernightinthecapital.“Insteadofpullingall-nightersandstayingintown,theygohometotheirfamilies.”

Inourlimitedsampleoftwoterm-limitedlegislatures(ColoradoandMaine)weheardthattermlimitsinhibitmembersgettingtoknoweachother.“Whybothertoreachacrosstheaislewhenyouortheywillbegoneinafewyears?”askedaColoradolegislator.Beyondthiseffectoftermlimitsonpersonalrelations,legislatorsinbothstatestalkedaboutthedifficultyofmanagingtheprocesswithinexperiencedleadersandtheadvantageoftheexecutivebranchingettingitswaywithinexperiencedlegislators.Wedidnotuncoveranyconsistenteffectsoftermlimitsonpolicymakingduetopolarization.

Twopracticesinchamberswithlargemajorities,useofthe“Hastertrule”andcaucusingincommittees,comeinforcriticismfromtheminority.TheVirginiaHouseofDelegatesandtheWisconsinAssemblyinrecentyearshavebothimposedarulethatnothingmovestothefloorunlessamajorityofthemajoritycaucussupportsthebill.Dissentingmemberswithinthecaucusarethenboundtothepartyposition,thusensuringitspassagewithoutminorityinput.Whilethereisnodoubtthatthispracticeimpedesinter-partynegotiationandcompromiseandfrustratestheminority,itensuresthatthemajoritygetsitsway.Italsomeansthatnegotiationoccursprimarilywithinthemajorityparty.

ThehousesinIowaandWisconsinhavemadeincreasinguseofcaucuseswithincommitteesinadvanceofvotes.AnIowastaffmembersaid,“About15yearsagoaHouseappropriationscommitteechairstart-edthepracticeofcaucusingwithincommittees.Itendedtheairingoutofeverythingpublicly.Thesamepracticespreadtoothercommittees.Thereissomuchtimespentincommitteecaucus.Itdoesn’tseemtobeanopenanddeliberativeprocess.”AnotherIowaobserversaidthatthepreferenceforclosed-doorcaucusdiscussionandthelackofpublicdebateareduetoafearof“gotcha”politics.“Membersknowthatwhatevertheysayinpubliccanbecapturedandtweeted.”

LiketheHastertrule,caucusingincommitteeisausefultoolforthemajority.However,totheextentthatcommitteesareaplacewhereminoritypartymemberscaninfluenceoutcomes,evenwhentheothersidehasalargemajority,itisafurtherrestrictiononminoritypartypower.


Perspectives of Members of Congress who are Former State LegislatorsWealsointerviewed12membersofCongresswhoareformerstatelegislators—plusacongressionalstafferwhohadalsoworkedinherstatecapitol—fromour10case-studystates.Theintervieweesinclud-edsevenRepublicansandsixDemocrats.Manyoftheirperspectivesontheirstatelegislativeexperienceareincludedinourpreviouscommentsaboutlegislativepolicymaking,butwewanttocalloutsomeofthem here.

MostofthemembersofCongresssaidtheybelievethattheirstatelegislatureperformsbetterthanCongress.Butnotall.OnememberofCongresswhohadbeenintheminorityinherstatelegislaturebutinthemajorityinCongressthoughtthatCongressworkedbetter.Thesamewastrueofamemberfromastatethathadexperiencedsignificantstalematesandonewhohadhadtodealwithideological,uncom-promisinggovernors.SeveralofthempointedoutthatmostbillsinCongresspasswithoverwhelmingsupport,justasstatelegislatorsreported.

Whenaskedtocomparetheirstatelegislativeandcongressionalexperiences,afewthemesemergedfromtheircomments.ComparedtoCongress,statelegislaturesortheirmembers:

• Operateonasubstantiallysmallerscaleandwithamorehomogeneouspolity.“Thereare201legislatorsinMinnesotacomparedto535inCongress;5millionpeoplecompareto300million,”saidone.“There’sawholedifferenceinmagnitudebetweenVirginiaGeneralAssemblyandCongress,”said another.

• Aremorecollegialandlesspartisan.MembersofCongresswhohadservedbothintheminorityandmajorityintheirstatelegislaturessaidthatminoritymembersweremoreeffectivetherethaninCongress.“InTennesseeIwasfriendswithmembersfrombothparties.It’shardtomakefriendsacrosspartiesinCongressexceptwhenwegooninternationaltripstogether,”wasoneofseveralcommentsabouthow“congressionaldelegations”(alsoknownasCODELS)areoneoftheonlywaystogettoknowmembersofCongressfromtheotherparty.Membersalsosaidthattheleadersintheirstatelegislaturesweremorecollegialacrosspartyandchamberthancongressionalleaders.

• Havemoregenuinedebateonthefloorandincommittee.“TheartofdebatematteredinmyLegis-lature,”saidaformerMaineleader.SpeakingofhisexperienceinColorado,anothermemberofCon-gresscommented,“Wewereonthefloortogetherandhadrealdebates,notone-minutespeeches.”AVirginiansaid,“OurdebatesinCongressarenotreal.It’saloss.”.

• HavegovernorswhoaremoreinvolvedinthestatelegislativeprocessthanthepresidentisinCon-gress.

• Useearmarksasatooltogetcompromiseandbridgegapsonthebudget.

• Arelowerprofileandfacefewerdemands,especiallyforcampaignfundraising.“There’smuchmoredemandformytimeandattentioninCongress,”saidafreshmanmemberfromWashington.“Ididn’thavetositonthephoneallthetimetoraisemoneyinSt.Paul,”saidacongressionalveteran.

WealsoaskedthemembersofCongresswhatpracticesfromtheirstatelegislativeexperiencetheywouldliketoseeadoptedbyCongress.Followingaresomenoteworthyresponses:

• OnememberofCongresssaidthathewouldliketoseeCongressgiveeverybillahearingandavote.Anotherversionofthisfromadifferentrepresentativewastogiveeverymembertherighttogetavoteonabillwithouthavingaformalrequirementofavote.

• AformerstatehousemajorityleadersaidhethoughtthatCongressshouldactpromptly,bothincommitteeandonthefloor,onbillsbeforethem.HeaddedthatmembersofCongressshouldbeexpectedtostayontheflooruntiltheirbusinessisdone.“Forcingmemberstostayinsessionisabetterwayofcontrollingamendmentsthanhavingtherulescommitteeblockthem,”hesaid.

• SeveralsaidthatCongressshouldconductopendebatesonissues.“Whatwouldbetheharm?”askedaformerstatesenatemajorityleader.


• ARepublicanHousemembersaidthatshethoughttherewouldbegreatertrustinCongressifitdevotedinstitutionalresourcestobuildingpersonalrelationshipsacrossparties.Afreshmanrepre-sentativesaidthathisclasshasheldperiodicbipartisanmeetingsandthatthispracticeneedstobeadoptedandexpandedbyothersubgroupsintheCongress.

• Regardingbudgetsandappropriations,almostallmembersofCongresssuggestedreinstatingearmarksasatoolofnegotiationandcompromise.Republicanmembers,thoughnotDemocrats,saidthattheythoughtafederalbalancedbudgetrequirementwouldforceCongresstoactinamoretimelyandeffectivemanneronthebudget.OnememberalsosuggestedthatCongressgetridofitsseparatebudgetandappropriationsprocesses.

Oursmallsamplesizeof12membersofCongressdidnotallowustodrawhardconclusionsaboutpracticesthatmighthelpthatinstitutionimprovepolicymakinginthefaceofpolarization.However,thecommentsofferedbycongressmenwhohaveservedinstatelegislaturessuggestedthattheyarearichsourceofideasforstrengtheningtheinstitution.Theirperspectivesalsoreinforcekeythemeswegleanedfromourtencasestudystates.

ConclusionTheresultsofourresearchshowthatunderconditionsofsignificant—andincreasing—politicalpolariza-tion,statepolicymakerscontinuetobeabletonegotiatedifferencesandreachsettlementsonmajorpoli-cyissueslikebudgets,transportationandhighereducation.Ourconversationswithlegislatorsandotherparticipantsinthelawmakingprocesshaveproducedamenuofrules,procedures,normsandpracticesthathelptoovercomethenegativeeffectsofpolarization.Theseideasinclude:

• Stateconstitutionsandrules,suchassinglesubjectrequirementsforbills,limitedsessionswithef-fectivedeadlines,requirementsforbalancedbudgets,andthefairandconsistentapplicationofrules

• Governorsandlegislativeleaderswhoareabletoseethebigpicture,communicateandworkto-gethereffectively,andmakeeffortstotreattheminoritypartyfairlyandvaluetheirinput

• Empoweredcommitteesthatdeliberateeffectivelyandmakeeffortstoincorporateminoritypartyideas

• Personalrelations,culturesandtraditionsamonglegislatorsthatpromoteinterpartycommunicationandcooperationandengendertrustandrespect

• Nonpartisanstaff

• Adeterminationtogetthingsdone,oftenexpressedas“We’renotD.C.”

MembersofCongressandstatelegislatorswillhavetodetermineforthemselveswhichoftheseideasmightstrengthentheabilityoftheirowninstitutionstomakelawsunderconditionsofpoliticalpolariza-tion.SomeofthemobviouslyworkbetteronthesmallerscaleofstatelegislaturesthanCongress.Othersaretheresultofmanyyearsoftraditionandpracticethatcannotbeadoptedinanothersettingbyruleordecree.Butallareworthyofthoughtandconsiderationbypolicymakerswhowishtoworkeffectivelyunderconditionsofpoliticalpolarization.


Notes1 NCSL,stateswithsinglesubjectrequirements,http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-

legislatures/germaneness-requirements.aspx

2 NCSL,statelegislativechamberswithrequirementsthatallbillsbeheardincommittee, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/04Tab4Pt5.pdf

3 NCSL,statesthatemploydeadlinesforprocessingbills, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/96tab3pt1.pdf



http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/04Tab4Pt5.pdf

http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/96tab3pt1.pdf


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A1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

Appendix ICase-Study State Party Status Partisan Control in Partisanship, Polarization and Policy Making Case Study States

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Tot Div SessionsCO Legislature Split Rep Dem Dem Dem Split Dem SplitCO Governor Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem DemCO State Control Div Rep Div Dem Dem Div Dem Div 4CT Legislature Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem DemCT Governor Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem DemCT State Control Div Div Div Div Div Dem Dem Dem 5IA Legislature Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem Split Split SplitIA Governor Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem Rep Rep RepIA State Control Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem Div Div Div 3MA Legislature Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem DemMA Governor Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem RepMA State Control Div Div Div Dem Dem Dem Dem Div 4ME Legislature Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Dem SplitME Governor Indep Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep RepME State Control Div Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Div Div 3MN Legislature Split Split Split Dem Dem Split Dem SplitMN Governor Indep Rep Rep Rep Rep Dem Dem DemMN State Control Div Div Div Div Div Div Dem Div 7TN Legislature Dem Dem Split Split Rep Rep Rep RepTN Governor Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep RepTN State Control Div Dem Div Div Div Rep Rep Rep 4VA Legislature# Rep Rep Rep Rep Split Split Rep RepVA Governor Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep DemVA State Control Rep Div Div Div Div Div Div Div 7WA Legislature** Split Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Split SplitWA Governor Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem DemWA State Control Div Div Dem Dem Dem Dem Div Div 4WI Legislature Split Rep Rep Split Dem Rep Rep RepWI Governor Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep RepWI State Control Div Div Div Div Dem Rep Rep Rep 4*Election years for Virginia are one year earlier. For example, the 2014 election denotes 2013 for Virginia.

Election Years*

**Washington House was tied after the 2000 election. Senate was controlled by Democrats, so status was split. After the 2012 election, the Senate had a nominal Democrat majority, but a coalition of Republicans and Democrats controlled resulting in split status.

Case Study State Party Control, 2000-2015

#The Virginia Senate was tied after the 2011 election (listed as 2012 in this table), but a Republican lieutenant governor provided effective control to the GOP. The Senate was also tied at the outset of the 2014 session with a Democratic lieutenant governor, but switched to Republican control in the middle of the 2014 session, which continued in the 2015 session.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES A2

Appendix IIAverage State Legislative Polarization, 1993-2015Thehigherthescore,thegreaterthedistancebetweenthetwopoliticalpartiesineachlegislature.

US

ReprintedbypermissionfromBorisShorandNolanMcCarty,“TheIdeologicalMappingofAmericanLegislatures.” American Political Science Review105(2011):530-542,updatedathttps://americanlegislatures.com/blog/.

States studied in this report

Congress


Appendix IIIAmerican Legislator SurveyNCSL,incollaborationwithRochesterUniversityProf.LyndaPowell,sentasurveyto7,383statelegisla-torsinMay2014.Theinitialsolicitationwasaninvitationtorespondtoawebsurvey.Inthefollowingmonths,twomailsurveysweresenttonon-respondentstotheelectronicsurvey.Subsequently,emailinvitationsweresenttolawmakersintargetedlegislativechamberswithlowresponserates.Wereceived1,814responsestothesurvey—a24.6percentresponserate.Allresponseswerereceivedin2014exceptforsevenin2015andtwoin2016.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO SELECTED QUESTIONS

Inthebodyofthetextweprovidedataonresponsesfromthe10statesinourstudytoquestionsdealingwithminoritypartyinfluenceoncommitteedecisionsandlegislators’attitudestowardcompromiseandsummariesofmultipleregressionanalysestothesamequestions.Hereweprovide50-statedataanddetailsofthemultipleregressions.

Table 7. Independent Variables for Multiple Regression AnalysesIndependent Variable CodeParty Republican=0;Democrat=1,basedonself-identificationinthesur-

vey.AllrespondentsfromNebraska,whichisnominallynonpartisan,identifiedthemselveseitherasDemocratsorRepublicans.Theonlyrespondentthatself-identifiedasindependentwaseliminatedfromtheanalysis.

Term Limits Non-term-limited=0;Term-limited=1Professionalism Indexfor2014onascaleof0to1,basedonacompositeofestimated

legislatortaxablecompensation,legislators’estimatesoftimespentonthejob,andnumberoffull-timestaff,expressedasapercentageofthesamemeasuresforCongress

Divided Government Divided(partyofatleastonelegislativechamberoppositefrompartyofgovernor)=0;Unified=1;NebraskacodedasunifiedRepublican

Majority Party Status Majority=0;Minority=1;referstorespondent’sstatusasamemberofthemajorityorminoritypartyinthechamber

Gender Female=0;Male=1Polarization Shor-McCartystatelegislativepolarizationbychamber,2014Money Committee Respondent’smostvaluedcommittee—Money(appropriationsorbud-

getcommittee)=0;Non-moneyorblank=1


Table 9. Multiple regression on, “How much influence do minority party members have on [your most valued] committee’s decision?”(Scale of 1=None to 7=Considerable) *, **, *** indicates significance at the 95 percent, 99 percent and 99.9 percent confidence levels, respectively.

Coefficient (Standard error)

Constant 3.885*** (.241)

Party 0.352*** (0.080)

Term Limits 0.261** (0.089)

Professionalism -3.060*** (0.390)

Divided Government -0.194* (.081)


Majority Status 0.247** (.080)

Gender -0.043 (.088)

Polarization 0.150 (.092)

Money Committee 0.303** (0.117)

Number of observations 1,634Adjusted R Squared .068

Table 8. Minority Party Influence on Committee DecisionsDo you think compromise is an essential part of the legislative process or is it selling out? (Scale of 1=Essential to 7=Selling out)

State N Avg. ScoreAlabama 26 3.0Alaska 18 3.2Arizona 15 3.0Arkansas 28 4.7California 12 2.8Colorado 25 3.5Connecticut 36 4.3Delaware 14 3.2Florida 20 3.4Georgia 43 3.6Hawaii 24 2.3Idaho 32 2.9Illinois 23 3.3Indiana 39 3.2Iowa 42 3.0Kansas 48 3.8Kentucky 33 3.1Louisiana 25 3.8Maine 65 5.2Maryland 44 3.8Massachusetts 32 3.4Michigan 32 3.8Minnesota 52 3.3Mississippi 33 3.8Missouri 36 3.4

State N Avg. ScoreMontana 51 3.4Nevada 16 3.7New Hampshire 110 4.5New Jersey 14 3.0New Mexico 28 4.1New York 28 2.1North Carolina 41 3.0North Dakota 55 3.1Ohio 18 2.6Oklahoma 16 3.0Oregon 23 4.7Pennsylvania 23 3.3Rhode Island 30 2.6South Carolina 26 4.3South Dakota 37 3.2Tennessee 34 3.0Texas 18 3.7Utah 32 3.1Vermont 61 4.4Virginia 24 3.1Washington 35 4.1West Virginia 27 3.9Wisconsin 38 2.7Wyoming 38 3.349 States* 1,620 3.6

*Nebraska’snonpartisanUnicameralexcludedbecausecommitteesnotorganizedonpartisanbasis.


Table 11. Multiple regression on, “How much influence do minority party members have on [your most valued] committee’s decision?”(Scale of 1=None to 7=Considerable) *, **, *** indicates significance at the 95 percent, 99 percent and 99.9 percent confidence levels, respectively.


Constant 2.718*** (0.214)

Party -0.944*** (0.070)

Term Limits 0.025 (0.079)

Professionalism -0.740* (0.343)

Divided Government -0.003 (0.071)


Majority Status -0.057 (0.071

Gender 0.087 (0.078)

Polarization 0.221** (0.080)

Money Committee -0.027 (0.106)

Number of observations 1,692Adjusted R Squared 0.118

Table 10. CompromiseDo you think compromise is an essential part of the legislative process or is it selling out? (Scale of 1=Essential to 7=Selling out)

State N Avg. ScoreAlabama 29 2.9Alaska 19 2.5Arizona 16 3.1Arkansas 29 2.1California 12 2.1Colorado 29 2.3Connecticut 40 2.6Delaware 16 2.1Florida 23 2.8Georgia 49 2.3Hawaii 27 1.7Idaho 38 2.9Illinois 26 2.0Indiana 39 2.3Iowa 43 2.4Kansas 54 2.7Kentucky 34 2.3Louisiana 26 2.6Maine 68 2.2Maryland 51 2.1Massachusetts 38 1.9Michigan 35 2.5Minnesota 56 2.1Mississippi 37 2.9Missouri 41 2.6Montana 61 3.2

State N Avg. ScoreNebraska 23 1.7Nevada 16 2.0New Hampshire 122 2.1New Jersey 17 2.3New Mexico 29 2.8New York 36 2.2North Carolina 42 2.8North Dakota 59 2.4Ohio 20 1.9Oklahoma 18 2.3Oregon 29 2.2Pennsylvania 26 1.8Rhode Island 31 2.2South Carolina 27 1.6South Dakota 40 2.6Tennessee 35 2.6Texas 20 3.2Utah 39 2.5Vermont 64 2.1Virginia 33 2.1Washington 39 2.5West Virginia 29 2.8Wisconsin 42 2.3Wyoming 40 2.350 States 1,812 2.4


AMERICAN LEGISLATOR SURVEY

1. WERE YOU OPPOSED IN YOUR LAST CAMPAIGN?

Primary Election □ No □ Yes General Election □ No □ Yes

2. IF OPPOSED, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBE THE 2ND PLACE CANDIDATE? [CHECK ALL THAT APPLY]

Incumbent Had Held Other Elected Public Office

Had Held Appointed Public Office Had Held Party Office

Primary □ □ □ □

General □ □ □ □

3. IF OPPOSED, HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK WAS SPENT IN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (THAT IS, NOT BY CANDIDATE COMMITTEES OR PARTIES) TO ELECT:

YOU THE 2ND PLACE CANDIDATE NO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES

Primary: $ ____________________ $ ____________________ □ General: $ ____________________ $ ____________________ □

4. IN YOUR LAST ELECTION, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS AND THOSE OF OTHERS? [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW] IF YOU ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT A POLITICAL VIEW, PLEASE LEAVE THAT ROW BLANK. IF UNOPPOSED IN AN ELECTION, LEAVE THAT SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE ROW BLANK.

Extremely Liberal Liberal Slightly

Liberal

Moderate/Middle of the Road

Slightly Conservative Conservative Extremely

Conservative

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Yourself □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Primary Election 2nd Place Candidate □ □ □ □ □ □ □ General Election 2nd Place Candidate □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Voters in Your District: Average General Election Voter □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Average Democratic Primary Voter □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Average Republican Primary Voter □ □ □ □ □ □ □

5. AS YOU CONSIDER THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AS A LEGISLATOR, HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING? [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW]

Not Important at All Very

Important 1 2 3 4 5 Your legislative party leaders □ □ □ □ □ Other members of your caucus □ □ □ □ □ Members from the other party □ □ □ □ □ Committee recommendations □ □ □ □ □ Lobbyists □ □ □ □ □ Non-partisan staff □ □ □ □ □ Partisan staff □ □ □ □ □


6. DO YOU SPECIALIZE IN A SINGLE POLICY AREA OR ARE YOU EQUALLY ACTIVE IN MANY AREAS? Specialize in

Single Policy Area Equally Active in Many

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

7. SHOULD YOUR STATE DECREASE, MAINTAIN, OR INCREASE SPENDING ON: [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW] Greatly Decrease Slightly Decrease Maintain Slightly Increase Greatly Increase 1 2 3 4 5 Welfare □ □ □ □ □ Healthcare □ □ □ □ □ The Environment □ □ □ □ □ Law Enforcement □ □ □ □ □ Transportation/Infrastructure □ □ □ □ □

8. IF YOU WERE REQUIRED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RAISING TAXES OR CUTTING SPENDING TO SOLVE A BUDGET DEFICIT, WOULD YOU CHOOSE:

9. WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS IN DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES IN YOUR CHAMBER? [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW] IF YOU SERVE IN A TIED CHAMBER, ANSWER ABOUT THE PERIOD JUST BEFORE THE TIE.

No Influence Dictates

Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Majority leadership □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Minority leadership □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Committee chairs □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Other chamber □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Interest groups □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Non-partisan staff □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Partisan staff □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Governor □ □ □ □ □ □ □

10. WERE YOU THE PRIMARY AUTHOR OF ANY BILLS THAT BECAME LAW IN 2013 OR 2014?

□ No □ Yes If yes, how many? ____________________________

11. WHEN YOU CONSIDER THEIR OPINIONS, HOW DO THE FOLLOWING GROUPS AFFECT YOUR LIKELIHOOD TO COMPROMISE IN YOUR POLICY DECISIONS? [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW]

12. DO YOU THINK COMPROMISE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OR IS IT SELLING OUT? Compromise is

Essential Compromise is Selling Out

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

All from Tax Increases All from

Spending Cuts 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □

Makes Me Much Less Likely Neither More

nor Less Likely Makes Me Much More Likely

1 2 3 4 5 Primary voters □ □ □ □ □ General election voters □ □ □ □ □ Legislative party leaders □ □ □ □ □ Contributors □ □ □ □ □


13. HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU SPEND ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES? [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW]

14. OF YOUR STANDING COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, WHICH ONE DO YOU VALUE THE MOST?

COMMITTEE NAME: __________________________________________________________ □ NO ASSIGNMENT [SKIP TO Q20]

15. HOW IMPORTANT IS YOUR MEMBERSHIP ON THIS COMMITTEE TO YOUR: [CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW]

16. CONTINUING WITH THE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT YOU VALUE THE MOST: HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU SERVED ON THIS COMMITTEE? ______________________________

DID YOU REQUEST THIS COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT? □ No □ Yes

17. HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DO MINORITY PARTY MEMBERS HAVE ON THIS COMMITTEE’S DECISIONS? None Considerable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

18. REGARDING THE BILLS REFERRED TO THIS COMMITTEE:

HOW OFTEN DOES A BILL SUPPORTED BY THIS COMMITTEE PASS ON THE FLOOR INTACT (OR WITH ONLY FRIENDLY AMENDMENTS)?

Never Always 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □ HOW OFTEN DOES A BILL OPPOSED BY THIS COMMITTEE PASS ON THE FLOOR?

Never Always 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

19. IF YOU COULD SERVE ON ANY ONE COMMITTEE, WOULD THIS BE YOUR FIRST CHOICE? □ No □ Yes

Hardly Any A Great Deal

1 2 3 4 5 Committee work □ □ □ □ □ Building coalitions within own party to pass legislation □ □ □ □ □ Building coalitions across parties to pass legislation □ □ □ □ □ Keeping in touch with constituents □ □ □ □ □ Helping constituents with problems with government □ □ □ □ □ Making sure your district gets a fair share of government money and projects □ □ □ □ □ Campaigning/Fundraising □ □ □ □ □ Could you further distinguish between: Fundraising for yourself □ □ □ □ □ Fundraising for your caucus □ □ □ □ □

Not Important Very Important

1 2 3 4 5 Reelection □ □ □ □ □ Ability to make public policy □ □ □ □ □ Influence in your chamber □ □ □ □ □ Fundraising □ □ □ □ □ Opportunity to run for other office □ □ □ □ □


20. WHAT PERCENT OF VOTERS IN YOUR DISTRICT WOULD YOU SAY:

_____________________ % _____________________ % _____________________ % Feel Closer to the Republican Party Feel Closer to the Democratic Party Are Truly Independent

21. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE CONTENT AND PASSAGE OF BILLS IN YOUR CHAMBER INFLUENCED BY THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS TO CANDIDATES AND PARTIES?

Not at All Influenced Completely

Determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

22. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE CONTENT AND PASSAGE OF BILLS IN YOUR CHAMBER INFLUENCED BY INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (THAT IS, SPENDING IN THE ELECTION NOT MADE BY PARTIES OR CANDIDATE COMMITTEES)?

Not at All Influenced Completely

Determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

23. WHICH HAS MORE INFLUENCE OVER THE CONTENT AND PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION IN YOUR CHAMBER?

24. PLEASE INDICATE HOW MUCH ATTENTION YOU THINK YOUR LEGISLATIVE PARTY LEADER SHOULD GIVE TO:

[CHECK ONE BOX IN EACH ROW] Hardly Any A Great Deal 1 2 3 4 5 Assisting members with legislative problems □ □ □ □ □ Floor management □ □ □ □ □ Building legislative coalitions across parties □ □ □ □ □ Fundraising □ □ □ □ □ Keeping the caucus united on floor votes □ □ □ □ □ Supporting and defending the institution □ □ □ □ □

25. AVERAGED OVER THE FULL YEAR, INCLUDING SESSION TIME, INTERIM WORK, CONSTITUENT SERVICE, AND CAMPAIGNING, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF A FULL-TIME JOB IS YOUR LEGISLATIVE WORK?

26. AFTER SERVICE IN THE PRESENT CHAMBER, WHAT ARE YOU LIKELY TO DO? [CHECK ALL THAT APPLY]

□ Run for other chamber in my legislature □ Run for other elective office □ Seek appointive office □ Return to prior non-political career □ Lobbying/Consulting □ Retire

27. PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

YEAR OF BIRTH: 19 . RACE/ETHNICITY: [CHECK ALL THAT APPLY]

FAMILY INCOME:

□ Below $25,000 □ $50,000 - $74,999 □ $100,000 - $249,999 □ Prefer Not to Answer □ $25,000 - $49,999 □ $75,000 - $99,999 □ $250,000 or Above

<caseid>

Chamber and Party Leaders Both Equal

Influence Committees and Chairs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

0% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%

□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □

□ Asian □ Black □ Hispanic □ Native American □ Pacific Islander □ White

William T. Pound, Executive Director

7700EastFirstPlace,Denver,Colorado80230,303-364-7700|444NorthCapitolStreet,N.W.,Suite515,Washington,D.C.20001,202-624-5400

www.ncsl.org

NCSLContact:

Brian Weberg Director, NCSL Center for Legislative Strengthening

[email protected]

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