risks of conflict recurrence and conditions for prevention: the paradox of peacebuilding
TRANSCRIPT
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 1/7
4 AUGUST 2015
It is not easy to establish peace in a region
that has experienced conict. It has been argued
that a post-conflict region has, within the first
five years, a high risk of recurrence of conflict
(Zürcher 2007; Collier et al. 2008). In fact, 36
per cent of cases studied resumed conict during
a period from 1945 to 1996 (Walter 2004). Thus,
a major issue in a post-conict region is methods
by which it may be transformed from an unstable
to a stable society.
It is essential to generate knowledge of such
risks for peacebuilding in a post-conict region.
It is absolutely critical to understand the mecha-
nisms leading to the resumption of civil war, in
order to prevent recurrence of conflicts, and to
establish peace.
With this view in mind, this essay explains the
risks and mechanisms for the recurrence of civil
war in post-conict regions, and considers con-
ditions for preventing this. We show that cur-
rent peacebuilding efforts by the international
community are significant, and necessary for
preventing the resumption of conict. However,
if the international community is not involved,
we demonstrate that there is an “ironic option”
for post-conict regions in order to build a stable
society.
Thus, a rat ional method for seeking stabi lity
is one based on the knowledge of conicts avail-able to a post-conict region; this comprises the
contradictory policy of a “tyranny for peace.”
A dominant moral value implies that there is a
necessity for involvement in conflict zones by
the international community. However, in real-ity, there are numerous cases where Western
countries intentionally do not intervene, or are
unable to do so. Here we suggest that there is
the paradox of peacebuilding in such cases. To
be specic, available policies for preventing the
resumption of civil war r in such cases do not in-
volve a reconcil iation and coexistence of parties,
but rather oppression and exclusion of one party
against another.
The following sect ions rst explain the mech-
anisms for the transformation of a conict into
peace or into a new war. Second, we examine
the risk of civil war recurrence, which is based
on quantitative research, and focus on the role
of political leaders, and structures in the conict
region. Finally, the essay considers desirable poli-
cies for preventing resumption of conict.
01
Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention:The Paradox of PeacebuildingKosuke Togashi
Introduction
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 2/7
There are signicant questions on how conict
affected regions move towards either peace or re-
turn to war. Ramsbotham et al. (2011) addressed
this question in the field of conflict resolutionstudies, and pointed out the need to understand
“Conict Transformation” as a process.
The concept of “Conict Transformation” that
they introduced was employed to grasp the pro-
cess of armed conict as an occurrence, end, and
resumption (see Table 1). These changes include
major ones including change of the structure of
the conict, as well as minor ones such as chang -
es to various components of the conflict struc-
ture. These mutually inuence each other.
Table 1: Types of Conict Transformation
“Contextual transformation” means changesin social, regional, and international contexts, in
which conf lict is embedded, and provides most
dramatic effects on conict. Ramsbotham et al.,
state that the end of the Cold War was a prime
example of context transformation that unlocked
protracted conflicts in Southern Africa, Central
America, and elsewhere.
“Structural transformation” is what arises
from a change in the conflict structure, which
is a set of parties in conflict, their incompatibleobjectives, and their power relationships. These
changes can take many forms. If the root causes
of the conict lie in the structure of relationships
within which parties operate, then a transforma-
tion of this structure is necessary to resolve the
conict. In asymmetric conicts, structural trans-
formation entails a change in the relationship
between the dominant and weaker parties. It will
then produce a change in the conict party’s at-titude regarding continuation of the conict.
“Actor transformation” comes about through a
change of actors, leadership, constituency of the
leader, or adoption of new goals, values, or be -
liefs. As result of these changes, one of the con-
ict parties decides to seek peace by abandoning
violence or by refusing negotiation, and aggres-
sive military operations by adopting new hardline
objectives or means.
“Issue transformation” may be explained as
follows. Conflicts are defined by the conflicting
positions parties take on issues. The conflict is
transformed when conflict parties change their
positions, or when issues lose salience or new
ones arises. Changes of position are closely re-
lated to changes of interest, and changes of goals,
and hence to actor transformation, and also to
the context and structure of the conict.
“Personal and group transformation” comes
through a change of attitudes toward armed con-
ict by the main leaders. In the best-case scenario,
a former guerrilla leader, committed to victory
through any means, becomes a unifying national
leader offering reconciliation, or the leader of an
02
Conflict Transformation as a Process
"Structural transformation"
Changes in conflict structure, that is, the
parties in confl ict , their incompatible
objectives, and their power relationships.
"Issue transformation"
Changes of attitudes toward armed conict by
the main leaders.
"Contextual transformation"
Changes in social, regional, and international
contexts in which conicts are embedded.
"Actor transformation"
Changes of goals, values or beliefs, anddirections within conict parties or between
their leaders.
"Personal and group transformation"
Changes of attitudes toward armed conict by
the main leaders.
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 3/7
oppressive government decides to include his op-
ponents in the government. However, in the worst
case, the moderate intelligentsia, who were not
committed to violence, become radical national-
ists, mobilizing people by using propaganda.
What k inds of factors cause these changes andtransformations in conflicts? We attempt to un-
derstand this from two viewpoints: the role of a
political leader, and structural factors in a post-
conict region.
The resumption of conf lict is strongly tied to
the decisions of political leaders. Whether a po-
litical leader accepts the post-conict situation or
not is considered vital for establishing peace in a
post-conict region. Their judgment is dependent
on the post-conflict environment. It is thought
that political leaders would pursue peace to a
greater extent than a continuation or resumption
of conflict when the following conditions are
in place; 1) decreased possibility of winning the
conflict; 2) reduced rewards obtainable through
victor y; 3) increased costs for sta rt ing the con-
ict; 4) the length of the previous conict; and 5)
increased rewards for maintaining status quo.
Walter (2004, p.373) states that the cost of a
previous conict determines whether combatants
are likely return to the battlefield again. Fur-
thermore, she states that a post-conflict region
is under high risk for recurring conflicts if the
following conditions prevail: there is the desire
for retribution, combat weariness, and increased
information on combatant capabilities. She points
out that countries with high levels of individual
hardship and restricted outlets for nonviolent
change would be more likely to provide individu-
als with an incentive for joining rebel groups. For
a civil war to occur, intergroup antagonisms and
grievances must exist, and resources and supplies
must be available to support the movement over
time. Furthermore, leaders must emerge to coor-dinate and manage recruitment. Thus, the role of
leaders is also important.
Mason et al. (2011, p.172-173) argued that
there is high possibility for civil war recurrence if
there is “multiple sovereignty” in a post-conict
region, and rebel commanders have an incentive
to resume conict rather than to maintain peace.
“Multiple sovereignty” exists when one or more
organized armed challengers emerge and com-
mand a signicant degree of popular support.
Al l theorists state that the post-conict situa-
tion formed by the last conict has a great inu-
ence on choices of political leaders. In the follow -
ing section, we focus on the question as to what
characteristics of the post-civil war environment
enable a region to be more or less likely to experi-
ence a recurrence of conict.
Structural Factors of Conflict Recurrence, whichrelate to the forms of the end of the previous conflict
First, there are arguments that conflict dura-
tion, casualty, and type are related to a recurrence
of conflict. A society that has experienced pro-
longed conict is unlikely to have an incentive for
restarting conict, because they understand that
this comes at a high cost (Quinn et al. 2007, p.185).
This is why conict parties recognize the possi-
bility of victory in the next war, and the requisite
time to win it (Mason et al. 2011, p.178, 185). Fur-
thermore, for each additional year that the previ-ous war lasted, the probability for the failure of
peace declines by about 10 per cent. Conict du-
ration can be an indicator of the relative strength
03
The Roles of Political Leaders
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 4/7
of the government and rebel groups, as it shows
us how they were able to endure armed conicts.
A higher casualty hardens the hostilit y and
distrust between former protagonists, making
them more likely to resume conict at a later date
(Quinn et al. 2007, p.185; Mason et al. 2011, p.186).It indicates the difculty to coexist with the pre -
vious enemy in a post-conf lict society. Walter
(2004, p.379-380), however, has different view,
that the longer and presumably more costly the
civil wars reduced the likelihood that a country
wou ld face another one. Furthermore, she be-
lieves that costs incurred during the previous war
have no real effect on the likelihood that another
war would occur.
Many researchers see no statistically signicantcausal relationships between civil war recurrence
and types of conflict. Quinn et al. (2007, p.185)
found that secessionist conflicts and ethnically
based revolutions are as likely to occur as ideo-
logical revolutions followed by renewed conict.1
There are arguments that the likelihood of re-
suming conflict depends on whether it will end
in a negotiated settlement or in a military victory.
In general, power sharing and ensuring autonomy
(devolution) 2 are greatly recommended policies
for resolving conict. However, such agreements
form less than 30 per cent of the total (Wal -lensteen et al. 2011, p.151). Thus, there are two
different views on causal relationships between
power sharing and establishment of peace.
Collier et al. (2008, p.471) showed that the
effect of granted autonomy is very large. With-
out autonomy, the decade-risk is 46.2 per cent,
whereas with autonomy, the risk fal ls to 12.2 per
cent. However, they added that there are only a
few cases of autonomy, and that the variables are
not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Walter (2004) has a different understanding. She
found that governments that agreed to partition
their country (territorial power sharing) as a result
of one war were significantly more likely to face
additional wars. According to this analysis, if the
government readily grants autonomy as a means for
settling a conict, it becomes more vulnerable, and
this could turn into the seeds of a new conict.
However, why does it appear that—in some
cases—power sharing has contributed to main-
tain peace in a post-conflict region? Mukherjee
(2006) tried to answer this question. He argues
that political power sharing must be suggested af -ter either the government army or the rebel group
emerges victorious, rather than a state of military
stalemate. Furthermore, Call (2012, p.184-196)
has stated that a key problem is in the character -istics of power sharing and in the implementation
of agreements. He concluded that political and
military power sharing contributes to the estab -
lishment of peace; however, territorial power
sharing raises the likelihood of resumption of
conict. He added that in more than 80 per cent
of cases where agreements were not withdrawn,
armed conicts did not recur. Yet, there are many
cases of conflicts resuming after violations of
agreements, so it would seem that the problem is
whether part ies have incent ives to implement apower-sharing agreement or not.
Further, many researchers focus on the rela-
tionship between conflict outcome and recur-
rence. For instance, there are many statistical stud-
ies, which indicate that decisive military victory
of either the government or rebel group is more
likely to ensure peace than a negotiated settle-
ment (Walter 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; DeRouen
and Bercovitch 2008; Mason et al. 2011; Obayashi
2013). In a negotiated settlement, both govern-
ment and rebel groups are able to conserve their
energy and maintain military powers. In contrast,
in a decisive mil itary victory, the defeated side will
understand the costs of restarting the conict, and
the winning side will try to control all of the state
power. Therefore, the defeated side loses militarypower and incentives for starting the next war.
Meanwhile, there are studies that the pos -
sibility of the failure of negotiated settlements
(renewed civil war) reduces every year. This is
especially so if international peacekeeping forces
are deployed in a conflict region after a negoti-
ated settlement, therefore reducing the possibility
of recurrence. Thus, many researchers believe
that international peacekeeping forces and peace
agreements contribute to keeping peace.
In addition to this, in the case of a decisive
military victory, the key point is whether the win-
ner is the government or a rebel group. A rebel
victory is less likely to be followed by the recur-rence of a civil war, than either a government vic-
tory or a negotiated settlement (Quinn et al. 2007,
p.174). However, in the rst year following a rebel
04
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 5/7
victory, the risk of fai lure of peace is almost 200
per cent higher than it is for a government vic-
tory (Mason et al. 2011, p.184). According to this
analysis, the probability of the failure of peace
following a rebel victory is substantially higher
than that following government victory within
a period of three to four years after a victory.However, after three years, the risk of failure of
peace is lower than it is for a government victory.
Hence, the conclusive key point is whether the
victorious rebels can surv ive with state power,
gained after war, for about four years or not.
Structural Factors of Conflict Recurrence, whichrelate to the post-conflict environment
Here, we summarize the risks in a post-conict
region from the viewpoint of political, economic,
and social environments.
There are debates su rround ing the sy stem
of governance and the resumption of conflict.
There is a general understanding that democracy
prevents conict and its recurrence, but there is
no obvious causal relation between a democratic
system and the establishment of peace in a post-
conict society. For instance, Quinn et al. (2007,
p.185) found no signicant relationship between
the levels of democracy two years after the con-
ict ended and the likelihood of a civil war recur -
ring. Furthermore, with regards to elections as
one of key elements of democracy, Collier et al.
(2008, p.470) found that the risk of conflict re-
currence declined in the year of the election, but
increased in the following year.
There are st at ist ical resu lts that show that
true democracies are less likely to experience a
renewed civil war than semi-democracies (Wal-
ter 2004, p.384). However, Collier, et al (2008,
p.470) also observed that, unfortunately, severe
autocracy was highly successful in maintaining
post-conflict peace. Mason et al. (2011, p.184)
found that both democratic and autocratic states
are more capable of preserving peace after a con-
flict, but weak authoritarian regimes and partial
democracies are most likely to fail to sustain the
peace in the aftermath of conict.
Many researchers argue about the relationship
between socio-economic development levels and
a failure of peace consolidation. There are ana-
lytical studies that indicate a low probability of
resumption of a conict if socio-economic devel-
opment levels in a post-conict region are high
(Walter 2004, p.380; Quinn et al. 2007, p.186;
Collier et al. 2008, p.469; Mason et al. 2011,
p.186). Collier et al. (2008, p.469) states that the
decade-risk falls to 26.9 per cent if the economygrows at 10 per cent per year, whereas the de-
cade-risk is 42.1 per cent if the economy remains
stagnant throughout the decade. As it is difcultto achieve these results by the post-conflict re-
gions themselves, Quinn and Mason suggest that
international investment is a crucial factor. Simi-larly, it is argued that social indicators, like infant
mortality rates and average life expectancies, in
a post-conict region also have a certain causal
relationship with conict resumption.
Furthermore, there are arguments that if the
government army has a large military capac -
ity, the rebel group will not have an incentive
to resume armed conflict, because the cost of
war is large and the benef its small . In addition,
Obayashi (2013) focuses on the military ability
of rebel groups rather than that of governments,
and demonstrates the following: peace is likely to
be sustained if the rebel army has a great military
strength, but if rebel groups control only partial
territory or hold safe lands outside the conflict
area, the probability of resuming armed conict
will be high.
According to the understanding of conict re-
search discussed above, if the parties in conict
conduct policies as per the table given below,
after conict, there is a high likelihood that they
will reduce the risk of renewed conict and will
be able to secure their interests.
05
Conclusion: Response to Conflict by
the International Community and
the “Ironical Option”
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 6/7
The irony of employing a policy, which is based
on the results of analysis in conflict research, is
as follows. If both government and rebel groups
attempt to secure their own interests and seek
post-conict stability without demanding foreign
intervention, they inevitably arrive at the forma-
tion of an extremely authoritarian system.
In the table, policy options to be taken by the
international community indicate the signicance
and importance of peacebuilding. However, this
does not alter the fact that in conicts where the
international community is not involved, poli-
cies adopted by the warring parties are inevitably
pessimistic ones. If the conflict parties in “ter-
ritorial conict” cannot resolve the possession of
and legal status of a specic territory and conict
region, thus becoming “Unrecognised Quasi-
States”(or “De Facto States”), this problem will
be especial ly serious (Togashi 2011).
Nowadays, when the international commu-
nity intervenes in conflicts, people support the
intervention as a necessity from the perspective
of universal values or norms, and even in some
cases assert that intervention is the duty of the
international community. In reality, however,
there are considerable conflict cases in which
Western countries have not act ively intervened or
have been unable to intervene due to constraints.
In these cases, the author believes that we must
understand that the most rational and effective
policy for stabilization of a post-conict region is
the paradoxical option of a “tyranny for peace.”
Kosuke Togashi
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science
The University of Tokyo
References
Call, Charles (2012) Why Peace Fails: The Causes
and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, Wash-
ington DC, Georgetown University Press.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefer, Mans Söderbom
(2008) “Post-conict risks,” Journal of Peace Re-
search, 45:4, pp.461-78
DeRouen, Karl and Jocob Bercovitch (2008)
“Ensuring internal rivalries: A new framework
for study of civil war,” Journal of Peace Research,
45:1, pp.55-74
Fearon, James (2004) “Why do some civil war last
so much longer than others,” Journal of Peace
Research, 41:3, pp.275-301
Mason, David and Mehmet Gurses, Patrick
Brandt, Jason Quinn (2011) “When civil warsrecur,” International Studies Perspectives, 12,
pp.171-89
Mukherjee, Bumba (2006) “Why political power-
sharing agreements lead to enduring peaceful
resolution of some civil wars, but not others,” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly, 50, pp.479-504
Obayashi, Kazuhiro (2013) “Rebel Organization
and Postwar Peace Duration,” Kokusai Seiji (In-
ternational Politics), 174, pp.139-152
06
For Actors
Government
Rebel Group
International
Community
Table 2: RATIONAL policy to prevent conict recurrence
Policy
To REMOVE the rebel group completely, to REFUSE political agreements like
power sharing, to STRENGTHEN their own military power, and to BUILD an
authoritarian regime.
1)To BUILD a true democratic system and to DEVELOP a stable economy by
inviting international investment after winning the conict.
2)To BUILD an authoritarian regime that controls all violence and to DEVELOP an
economy by getting support from external actors like the diaspora after winning the
conict.
To involve actively with the conict during stages of negotiation, to support conicting
parties to reach a peace agreement, and to dispatch Peacekeeping Organization
After the conict, to assist in the democratic system and state monopoly on violence,
to ensure a stable economic development by international investment or OfficialDevelopment Assistance
8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/risks-of-conflict-recurrence-and-conditions-for-prevention-the-paradox-of 7/7
Quinn, Michael, David Mason and Mehmet
Gurses (2007) “Sustaining the Peace: Determi-
nants of Civil War Recurrence,” International
Interactions, 33:2, pp.167-193
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh
Mial l (2011) Contemporary conict resolution 3rd
ed., Cambridge, Polity Togashi, Kosu ke (2 011) “He iwa Ko ch iku ni
Okeru ‘Mi (Hi) Shonin Kokka’ Mondai” (The
Problem of ‘Un(non)recognized States’ in Peace-
building), Kokusai Seiji (International Politics),
165, pp.141-155
Wallensteen , Pete r and Lot ta Ha rbom, St ina
Högbladh (2011) “Armed conflict and peace
agreements,” Peace Research, London, Routledge
Walter, Ba rbara (2004) “Does Conf l ict Beget
Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, 41:3,
pp.371-388Zürcher, Christoph (2007), The Post-Soviet Wars:Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in
the Caucasus, New York, New York University
Press
Notes:
1 However, the type of conict is likely to affect
conict duration. Fearon (2004) stated that eth-
nic conict is more difcult to end than conict
that has its origin in a coup d’etat and revolution.2 Both power sharing and devolution is the same
where governments permit the opposition group
access to political, economic, and military author-
ity. The difference is that power sharing means
that the government permits the opposition
group access to authority within an existing ter-
ritorial framework, but devolution means that the
government grants a new territorial framework
and authority to the opposition group. However,
there is also an assertion that devolution is one
type of power sharing. See Call (2012, pp.39-
41, 186-195) for definition and classifications of
power-sharing denitions.
07