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How Important for Philosophers is the History of Philosophy?Author(s): Roy MashReviewed work(s):Source: History and Theory, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Oct., 1987), pp. 287-299

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HOW IMPORTANT FOR PHILOSOPHERS IS THEHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY?

ROY MASH

Two questions motivate this paper: what is the relation between philosophy andthe history of philosophy? and: what is the value of studying the history of phi-losophy for those pursuing philosophy? Widely divergent answers are possible.Quine, for instance, writing about science but thinking of philosophy, says:Scienceandthehistoryof scienceappeal o verydifferentempers.Anadvancenscienceresolvesan obscurity, tangle,a complexity, n inelegance, hat the scientist hen grate-fully dismissesand forgets.Thehistorianof science riesto recapturehe verytangles,confusions,and obscurities rom which the scientist s so eagerto free himself.'If Quine is right, then to the extent that philosophy and science bear the samerelation to their histories, the historian of philosophy must be an inadvertentobscurantist, reconfusing that which is now clear. Opposed to Quine is an out-look of a far different sort, which we may in general associate with the doctrineof historicism, and which I shall refer to as "the historical point of view."2Thisposition is expressed by the Spanish historian of philosophy, Julian Marias:Philosophy's elationship o its history s unlike hat of science, or example, o its ownhistory. n the lattercase,the two thingsaredistinct; cience,on the one hand, and onthe other,what sciencewas,thatis, its history.The two are ndependent f one another,and sciencecanexistand be understood nd cultivated eparateromthehistoryof whatit has been ... In philosophy he problem s philosophy tself; . . . The entirepast isincluded n everyactof philosophizing.... [Alllphilosophy ncludes he entirehistoryof philosophy;f it didnot, it wouldnot be intelligible, nd,what is more, t could notexist.... There s, then,an inseparable onnectionbetweenphilosophyandthehistoryof philosophy.Philosophy s historical,and its history s an essentialpartof it.3I must say at the outset that my sympathies are with Quine. Though I grant thehistory of philosophy more relevance than he perhaps does, I believe that theimportance of doing the history of philosophy for doing philosophy has beenexaggerated. On my view the value of the history of philosophy for philosophy

1. The Timeof My Life: An AutobiographyCambridge,Mass., 1985), 194.2. This phrase s lifted from John Passmore'sxcellent rticle,"The dea of a Historyof Philos-ophy,"HistoryandTheory,Beiheft5, TheHistoriographyf theHistoryof Philosophy1965),1-32.3. History of Philosophy, ransl.StanleyAppelbaum nd ClarenceC. StrowbridgeNew York,1967),4-5.

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288 ROY MASHis, or should be, conceived as more or less like that of logic. Each hasgreat heuristicvalue for every branch of philosophy, but neither is indispensable.

Nevertheless, t is evidentthat the history of philosophy has enjoyed a peculiarlycentral place with respect to philosophy as a whole, at least as the discipline ispracticed today in the West. In university curricula, from introductory coursesto Ph.D. exams, the ubiquity of the history of philosophy is characteristic ofno other branch of philosophy.Other areas such as logic, epistemology,and ethics,though stressed, are not so nearly omnipresent, and with the exception of logic,are frequently themselves approached in an historical vein. In this way theirtraining insures that few philosophers are without at least a generous smatteringof the history of their subject. And since most academic philosophers are ex-pected, at least some of the time, to teach historically oriented courses, the tradi-tion perpetuates itself. The trend is carried beyond academia, where the maininstitutions for philosophical expression, journals and books, are ones in whichprefatorynods to one's predecessors arede rigueur,and in which "placing"one'sviews in historical perspective is commonplace, if not downright required.

But does the history of philosophy rate this treatment? Just how basic is itto philosophy? Wherein does its value consist and wherein does it not? It is withthese normative issues that the following discussion will be concerned.4 I beginby trying to pin down the historicist claim that philosophy is "inherentlyhistor-ical." This is followed by a positive account of the relation and value of the his-tory of philosophy to philosophy. I shall, in particular, distinguish three sortsof reasons for studying the history of philosophy: the pragmatic, the homely,and the far-fetched, and argue that only the second sort stands up.

I

The historical point of view accommodates many arguments leading to the sameconclusion, namely that philosophy is (in some way or other) inherently or in-trinsically historical.5 But it is not easy to reduce this thought to a thesis thatis neither vague, nor innocuous, nor obviously false. In section III I shall comeback to some of the arguments associated with this conclusion. For now, how-ever, I want to turn attention to the thesis itself.

Charles Taylor writes, "Philosophy and the history of philosophy are one. Youcannot do the first without also doing the second."6But it is not clear whether

4. The converse uestion-what is the valueof philosophy or the historyof philosophy?is onethat, though ascinatingnitsownright, s beyond he scopeof my concern,and so willbeignored.5. A convenientocus for recentexpressions f the historicalpoint of view maybe found n thevolume,Philosophy n History,ed. RichardRorty,J. B. Schneewind, nd QuentinSkinner Cam-bridge,Eng., 1984).The presentpaper s in parta reaction o a numberof articlescollected here.6. "Philosophy nd Its History,"n Philosophy n History,17.Taylor mmediately oes on to saythat "it is essential o an adequateunderstandingf certainproblems,questions, ssues,that oneunderstandhemgenetically"emphasis dded).This seems o commithimonlyto theweaker nd,I think,uncontroversialhesisthat some areasof philosophymustbe pursuedhistorically.See myremarks n criticalphilosophy n section II.) But if this is his point,Taylorgivesus no clue as towhichareasescapethe historicalapproach,nor as to how and why they escape t.



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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY? 289the proposition s that philosophyand the historyof philosophyareidentical(as the first sentencesuggests);or whether he latter s merelyessentialfor theformer as the second sentence uggests.)Thestrongerdentity hesisseemspa-tently falseif it implies hat one cannot tell the two apart.Not all philosophersarehistorians f philosophy,nor does allphilosophizingakehistoricalmaterialfor its subjectmatter.It takes no subtle exerciseof the fancyto determineoftwo books such as Kripke'sNaming andNecessityand Popkin's The Historyof Scepticism:From Erasmus o Spinoza,whichis moreproperlycategorizedas philosophyand whichas historyof philosophy.The alternative laim s a bit (but only abit)moremodest.Taking he businessof philosophy o be thepromulgation f "creative edescriptions"f the world,of our awareness f it, andplacewithin t, Taylorholds that, in order o achievesuch reformulations,t is indispensablehatone approach he problemsof phi-losophy genetically.7This theme is echoedby LorenzKruger:[Mlyattempt tconnectinghe historicity f philosophy rimarily ith he naturalcienceswilllook misdirected. think, however,hata moreconventional ndmoreplausibleap-proachcould not succeed n demonstrating, s I wish to, thatphilosophy s essentiallyof an historicalnature."Kruger's mphasis.)The gist is essentialist,but what sort of essentialismmight be intended hat isnot obviously alse?If the idea is that one cannot do philosophyat all withoutdelvingntoorigins, everalkindsof counterexampleomeimmediatelyo mind.The earliestphilosophers imply hadno historyof philosophy o appealto, ornone to speak of. Then again, what of children?WhenI was nine yearsold itoccurred o me(independentlyo farasIknow) hatImighthavebeendreamingall the whileI thoughtI was awake.If Taylor s to be credited,either(on theessentialist hesis)I was not philosophizingat all, or (on the identitythesis)Iwas doing the historyof philosophy.Neitherchoice seemsplausible.Yetagain,theworld s full of "sidewalk"hilosopherswhospendno small imeprofoundlykibitzingaboutthemeaningof life, thebasisformorality,hepossibilityof cer-tainty,and so on, yet without he least historicalbackgroundntheseproblems.Their untutoredspeculationmay suffer from an ignoranceof the historyofthought,but it is hardly he less to be consideredas philosophybecause of it.Another houghthas to do with thealleged llusion hatphilosophys "time-less."Thusit is sometimesurgedthat philosopherswho neglectthe historyofphilosophyareguiltyof a Platonichubrisby supposing hattheycouldphiloso-phizeahistorically, out of time"as it were, reating heirproblemsas thoughtheyhadno history.Hence, t maybe said, philosophy'sbeing intrinsically is-toricalmerelymeans hatphilosophical roblems avehistories,hatphilosophersof whatevertripe ancient,adolescent, idewalk,professional imbibe hishis-tory withthe restof theirculture,and that theycould not pose the questionsthey do, or in the way they do, if the questionshad no history.

7. Taylor,18-19.8. "WhyDo We Studythe Historyof Philosophy?"n Philosophy n History,78-79.



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290 ROYMASHBut this is a red herring.For even granting hese points, nothing of deepsignificances intimated boutthestudyof thehistoryof philosophy.Asis oftennoted, the term"history"maybe used to refer o actions, deas,and so on, that

actuallyoccurredn the past;or itmayusedto refer o thebodyof writings boutthose occurrences.But the objection before us confuses these two senses.Philosophy's istory in thefirst ense)maybe essentialo philosophynthe samefamiliarwaythat the historyof any discipline s necessary or thinkingabouttheproblems f the disciplinen theway heyare houghtabout.Butso farnothingextraordinaryasbeensaid.Nothinghas been offered o convinceus thatpur-suing he history inthe secondsense)of philosophys, oroughtto be, anymoreessential o philosophy hanpursuing hehistoryof medicine s to the practiceof medicine,or than pursuing he historyof education s to teaching.It is thepursuitof, not just the immersion n, historythat is at stakehere.Considernext a modifiedessentialist hesisto the effect hatdoing the historyof philosophy s necessary or doinggood philosophy- not to be confusedwiththe claimthat doingthe historyof philosophys necessary or doing philosophy"asit ought to be done,"namelyhistoricallyEventhis weakened ssentialism,however,stoo strong.Wittgenstein,n particular,tandsas somewhat f an em-barrassmento it. Thehistoryof philosophyhad only minimaldirect nfluenceon his work;he seemed,for the most part,determinedo dealwithproblemsdirectly,withoutresearching eeply nto whatthegreatphilosophers f the pasthad to say aboutthem. Advocatesof the historicalpoint of view, acedwith thisdiscrepancy,averesponded n variousways.J. H. Randallbitesthe bullet par-ticularlyhard:Thereare classiccriticismsof certainassumptionsand certainarguments,with whichanythinker odaymustcome to terms;he can disregardhemonly at his peril. It washis almosttotal lack of interest n andignoranceof his "field,"n this sense,that madethe insightsof Wittgensteino much ess fruitful han they might otherwisehavebeen.9As wellas any,this remarkdemonstrateshe lengthsto whichsomehistoriansarewillingto go to enshrine heirdiscipline.Surelyon anyreasonableaccountWittgenstein'swork(earlyand/orlate) has beena paradigm f fruitfulness. n-deed, consideringhecourseof philosophy ince hisdeath,it is hard o seehowhis insightscould havebeen morefruitful hanthey havebeen.It is equallyhardto seehowRandallmightsupport uch a dubiouscounterfactual sheproposes,or whatmighthavemotivatedt otherthana doggedallegianceo thecentralityof thehistoryof philosophy. f theconjecturingmoodis uponone,one might,with at least as fine a plausibility, upposethat a greaternoticeof the historyof philosophywouldhavestifledWittgenstein'smagination,atherhanenrichedit.Yetanotherwayto interprethehistoricalpointof viewis to seethequestionnot as, "why tudy hehistoryof philosophy?" ut "howmuchhistoryof philos-ophy oughtphilosophers o study?"-the historicist's nswernow being,"the

9. How Philosophy Uses Its Past (New York, 1963), 79.



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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY? 291morethe better."But again, thinkingof philosophersike Quine and Wittgen-stein, this is surelytoo strong.Thereareno data that I knowof that supportthe generalizationhat the best philosophersare(let alone must be) those whoknow he most history.And intrapersonalvaluations f how muchbettera givenphilosophermighthavebeen hadsheonly studiedmorehistoryareof a notori-ously unverifiableort, beg all the importantquestionsat issue,and reduce helevel of argument o petulant assertion.But the more-is-betterhesisneed not be thoughtto apply only, or primarily,to individuals.For perhaps t will be argued hat the benefitsconveyedby thestudyof the historyof philosophycanbe contracted econdhand. Wittgensteinmaynot havestudiedLeibniz,butherubbedelbowswith those who did. Hencethe questionnow becomes,"howmuchcommunity nvestmentn the historyofphilosophysdesirable?"Givena divisionof intellectual abor,whatproportionof historiansf philosophyo philosophers,r of historical apers o philosophicalpapers, s optimal?But whatever he rightanswermay be, hereagainthe wronganswers "themore the better."Between1790and 1810Europewas inundatedwith historiesof philosophy;but it is far from clear that the generalcaliberofwork duringthis period was greatly mprovedoverthat of previousrelativelyahistorical ras.

How muchhistoryof philosophy s desirable or an individualphilosopheror for a communityof philosophers?Put in this fashion, there is almost cer-tainlyno straightanswer: he amount s boundto varyfrom philosopher o phi-losopher.The only generalanswerI wish to urge s: less than is presently up-posed. Clearly some historyof philosophyis helpful and useful for doingphilosophy.Some philosophersbenefit romit morethanothers,somegenera-tions morethan others. Otherthan these banal generalities,nothingmuchofa positive nature can be said. Certainly he inflatedclaims of the historicist(whether heybe couchedin termsof identification,necessity,more-is-better,and so on) do little to helpus understand he relationand value of the historyof philosophyorphilosophy, or how this relation ndvaluearebroughto bear.

IIDoing philosophy nd doingthe historyof philosophy redistinctactivitieswithdistinctgoals (which s not to denythattheyare often carriedon alternately revensimultaneously). achof theseactivities anbethoughtof ashavinga reac-tive and a creativemode.In the reactivemode the historyof philosophy s ex-egetic,whilephilosophys critical; n the creativemode,the historianof philos-ophyconstructsnarratives,whilethe philosopherconstructsdirecttheories.Historiansare reactivewhen they areconcernedprimarilyo exposethe con-tent of a philosopher's hought. On the standardandI thinkcorrect)account,the historianof philosophy n this aspect of herwork is concernedwithideasonlyas artifacts.Herownassessment f thecorrectness f aphilosopher's laimsis besidethe point. Her problemsarethose of the interpreter; ertaskis thatof understanding.Of course nterpretations often a preliminaryo evaluation.



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292 ROY MASHThe abundant iterature n the "Cartesianircle," or example, s of morethanmerehistoricalsignificance. f Descartesdoes play off clear and distinct deasagainstGod'sveracityn a circular ashion,then his foundation or knowledgeis put in serious eopardy.But to makethis shift to evaluation s to move overto philosophy.Philosophy, n its reactivephase,takesup whereexegesis eavesoff. Having ascertained what another philosophersaid (and meant), thephilosopher's imas critic s to decidewhether,and to whatextent, t is correctorjustified.Hencephilosophy, ike thehistoryof philosophy, ncorporates xe-gesis,butunlike hehistoryof philosophy,nevercounts nterpretationsan endin itself.Therole of criticismsinphilosophys especiallypredominantelative, or ex-ample,to its rolein art. Evaluatingpoetryis not the samethingas writing t;criticizingpainting s not painting; udgingmusic is not playingor composingit. Philosophy,on the otherhand,drawsno strongdistinctionbetweendoingphilosophyand criticizing t. Hencethedearthof philosophical reativewritingcourses.In writingcriticalpapersstudentsarealreadyphilosophizing.1ICriticalphilosophymaybesubdivided ntohistoricalandcontemporary riti-cism,dependinguponthe immediacyof the object of criticism.Thereneed beno precise inedrawnbetween hecontemporary nd thehistorical.Whendoesa philosopher'sworkbecomehistory?Whensheis dead?Whenher work s outof vogue? Shall we drawthe line at Frege, he logicalpositivists,the ordinarylanguage heorists?Presumably omecombinationof temporalproximity, ele-vance, and availability s at work here.Bradleyand Greenareclearlyhistory;Russell ess so; Fodor,at the time of this writing, not at all.The point to be emphasized s that the morehistoricalone'sexplicitobjectof criticism s, the more one will needto dependon the historyof philosophy.This is nearly rivial.If one fanciesoneself a Cartesian, r if one sees it as one'sduty to set Descartesright,one is well-advisedo havereadDescartes.But totheextent hata philosopher oncentrates n flesh-and-bloodivals,rivalswhocan answerof their own accord,to that extent she will have less directuse forthe historyof philosophy.This fact is importantwith respect o another redherring:call it the "her-meneuticherring." his hasto do with thepossibilityof objectivephilosophicalinterpretation,he degree o whichinterpretationnd assessmentareindepen-dentof one anotherandthe associatedmethodologicaldilemmaof antiquari-anismversusanachronism.Muchhasbeenwrittenonthese matters.2 Neverthe-

10. "Criticism,"s I am usingthe term, cancut two ways.It mayattackanother'sposition,ordefend t. Somephilosophers realmostexclusively ounter-punchers,ndsome almostexclusivelydisciples.Both areprimarily eactive, aking heircues fromthe workof others.A simple, houghnot infallible,ndication f critical hilosophy anbe found nthenumber f referencesn authoruses.11. Insofaras literary riticismmay itself be takenas a form of literature, nd madethe objectof furthercriticism, t begins to take on the self-obsessive spect of philosophical riticism.12. E.g.,fullyhalfthe articlesnPhilosophynHistorywrestlewith heseproblems. eealso MichaelAyers,"AnalyticPhilosophy nd the Historyof Philosophy,"n PhilosophyandIts Past,ed. Jona-than RWe,MichaelAyers,andAdam WestobyBrighton,1978);JohnDunn, "TheIdentityof the



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HOW IMPORTANT S THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY? 293less, I have not much to say about them. If meaningand truth are twinhalvesof a benigncircle,andif the task of evaluation equiresheir simultaneouspur-suit, thenthose who are concerned o criticizehistorical igureswill have thatmuchmore use for the historyof philosophy. Equally, hose who are not soconcernedwill have hat much ess use forit.)Butsince,as I havenoted, criticalphilosophyaimedathistorical ubjectsobviouslydependsonthe historyof phi-losophy, his emphasison the interdependence f truthand meaningdoes notaddmuchof importanceo the discussionat hand. It certainlygivesus no clueas to whatvaluethehistoryof philosophyhas forthosephilosopherswho criti-cize theircontemporaries, r who offer their ownpositive theories.In its creative,as opposed to its reactive,mode the historyof philosophyat-temptsto weavevariousthinkersand theirideas into a coherentsequence, oexplainwhy and howthe sequenceoccurredas it did, leading up to our mostrecent orebears, ndfinally o ourselves.But constructive istoryof philosophyis not merelyexegesisaimed at a large chunk of time.Though it is no doubtpossibleto be a mere doxographer, o go from one age to anotherreadingoffwhat various philosophers hought about varioussubjects, the constructivehistorianwants o do more.She wants o tella story:"TheStoryof Philosophy."But storiesneedstructure nd plot to bringan otherwisehaphazard umble ofeventsandideas nto a meaningful eries.As narrators istorians ttempt o cap-turethe flow of ideasin a net of explanation.The explanationsmay waver ntheiremphasis n internalphilosophical)ersus xternalsociopolitical) actors,but the endpoint s always he same.Likeongoingmemoirs, he finalchangingchapter s always he present.Justas thehistoryof philosophys notsolelyexegetic, o of coursephilosophyis not entirely ritical,not wholly consisting n defensesandrebuttals f others'work. Positive heory s occasionallyattempted.Thismarksphilosophy's rea-tive or constructivephase.It may rangefromgrandKantian-sized rojects, oones morenarrowly onceived for example,Russell's heoryof descriptions).Nor need it always ryto produceanswers.Discovering newpuzzlecan be asinstructiveas solvingan old one.Tobe sure,constructive hilosophys almostalways etagainsta backgroundof dissatisfactionwith priortheories. Hencethe commonpracticeof "stage-setting": unning hroughpreviousattempts o addressa problemwithan eyeto displaying heirdeficienciesbefore proceeding o one'sown answer.But al-though he motivation orconstructive hilosophysoftena dissatisfactionwithearlierwork,the relevance f the historyof philosophy s at its low ebb as faras makingone'sown peacewith a problem s concerned.Whatmattersmostfortheconstructive hilosophers the problem tself.What othershavehad tosayabout it is of secondary mportance.Problemswill of coursealmostalwayshave a history,but the importanceof that history s subordinateo the impor-tanceof the problem.History of Ideas,"Philosophy 43 (1968), 85-104; and E. D. Hirsch Jr., The Aims of Interpretation(Chicago, 1976).



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294 ROY MASHIII

Why then shouldphilosophers tudy the historyof philosophy?"3 f the manyreasonsavailable should iketo distinguish nd discuss hreegeneral orts: hepragmatic, he homely, and the far-fetched.The main pragmatic easonfor studying he historyof philosophy s simplythat most otherseriousphilosophers ne comes ncontactwithwillhavestudiedit. The store of common knowledgebindsprofessionalphilosophers ogetherina community.Acceptancento thecommunity acitlyrequires amiliaritywithits own history,much as acceptance ntoa civilcommunity nvolvesknowledgeof thecommunity's istory,tsfounding athers,tswars, tsmyths,anditsjokes,its ideals and long-standingpreoccupations.n this sense, one needs to knowthe historyof philosophy n orderto belong.But this sort of reason s not inherent n the natureof the historyof philos-ophy.It leavesopenthe possibility hat the current nstitutional ituationmaychange f its demandsare found unreasonable. he infatuationwith the histor-ical mightagain wane,as it did in the seventeenth entury;historymight againdriftawayfrom the centertoward he peripheryof the discipline. ndeed,onepurpose of this paper is to agitatefor just such a change.Outsideof the pragmatic purs, hereareplentyof sound and homelyreasonsfor philosopherso studythe historyof philosophy.At a minimum, he greatthinkersof the past mayserve as role models exemplifyingivesgivenover tothought.Their worksand lives can be sourcesof inspiration.Philosophy, ikepoetry,has its muse, and by way of payinghomage,may gain immensely romstudying"monuments f its own magnificence,"he chief gain being hat philos-ophy earns rom he past. Whatsets professional hilosophers part romcock-tail speculators ndchildren,what makesthem especiallyworth istening o, isin large part their knowledgeof whatother great thinkers hroughouthistoryhave had to say about a varietyof topics. The primaryvalue of the historyofphilosophy or philosophy s thereforeheuristic.Wehavemuch to learnfromthe past, both from its successesand its failures.A numberof imagesaresuggestive f this heuristic elation.The morephilos-ophyis conceivedof as a science,the moreappealingwe mayfindthe pictureof ourselvesookingout from the shouldersof giants.As an edifice,old philos-ophy constitutesa foundationon whichweraisenewstructures.Or wemayre-storean earlier acade,keeping t moreorlessintact,updatingandrefurbishingit, paringaway ts weakeraspects,but reformulatingts strengthsn a morecon-temporarydiom.Thinkingof the historyof philosophyas an endowment,progressive nd cu-mulative,wemay magineourselves s its beneficiaries, njoying he accruedn-

13. Elsewherenthispaper hequestionhas beenput more ersely:"why tudy he historyof phi-losophy?" ather han "whyshouldphilosophers tudy... .?" But in all cases the formershouldbereadas anabbreviationorthelatter,morespecificquery, ince t is really he valueof the historyof philosophyorphilosophershat s at issuehere. certainly aveno wishto deny hat the historyof philosophy s a worthwhile ursuit or its own sake, no less so than is philosophy.



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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY? 295terest of thousands of years of thought. And among the heirlooms there willcertainlybe hidden jewels: the forgotten, the overlooked, the out of the way.Ob-scure passages from Montaigne, Epictetus, Reid, or Aquinas may kindle an as-sociation, and indirectly (and occasionally directly) find relevance for some cur-rent concern.

Against the "shoulders of giants" story we may oppose that of the "shadowsof giants." Taken to its extreme, this perspective can lead to despair: What ifit has all been said? Or at least everything of consequence? If "nothing can besaid which has not been said already,"then is history of philosophy all that isleft to us? Are we to be footnoters and nothing more? Does progress in philos-ophy consist merely in finding new and interesting ways to cross-index the past?Or is the number of original philosophical ideas and systems infinite? (Is thenumber of tunes infinite?)

An antidote to such despair lies in regarding the giants on whose shoulderswe perch as object lessons. On this view, we progress not from learning of thesuccesses of the past but by taking its failures to heart. We might imagine therange of philosophical topics as defining a minefield through which we must nav-igate, and the past giants as minesweepers of a sort. Locke's epistemology is im-portant if only to show us in detail why that road leads to destruction. If he hadn'ttrod it, someone else would have had to. (But to be accurate we must complicatethis picture by conceiving of the mines as retriggerable. It is not as though thegiants have opened up paths previously closed, rather their moribund corpusesflag the still present peril.)

But these familiar answers only show that studying the history of philosophyhas heuristic value for the philosopher, not that it is inescapable. In this we mightcompare the history of philosophy with logic. While the study of logic has en-riched all the other branches of philosophy, yet philosophers can, and sometimeshave, gone about their business largely ignorant of it. The benefits to be reapedfrom either activity are a powerful encouragement for studying them. But nei-ther is indispensable, and the value of each may vary from philosopher to philos-opher. The historian who holds that philosophy and the history of philosophyare inseparable ought no more to be credited than the logician who claims thatall philosophy is fundamentally logic.

The desire to see the history of philosophy as special and grand has encour-aged many to look for rather more far-fetched reasons for studying it than thosewe have been considering, and in the process often to inflate its importance.14The short answer that philosophy is inherently historical - we have found

14. As ajustificationor ookingbeyondhehomelyanswers,tmaybesuggestedhat hese ruismsneglectcertainkey differences etween he historyof philosophyand the historyof science.Thephysicistoo standson the shoulders f her llustrious redecessors,ut she feels no needto go andreadthemin the original.She workswithina model, and neither tudiesoutmodedones northeoriginsof herown. Thismove,however, egsthequestion oncerningheimportance f thehistoryof philosophy.Somephilosophers uch as Quinewouldbe happy o viewphilosophy's astas thescientistviewshers; ndeed, would welcomeanyrelease rom the burdenof rehashing ld news.



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296 ROY MASHdifficult to spell out in a plausible fashion. Let us now look instead to some ofthe arguments that surround and support it.

Philosophy, it is sometimes maintained, is essentially a reflexive activity. Toquote Mariasagain, "Inphilosophy, the problem is philosophy itself.""The chiefcontribution history can bring to philosophic understanding," says Randall, "isthe light it can shed on the characterof philosophy itself."15From these remarkswe might reason as follows. A common goal of philosophy is to understand thenature of intellectual activity, asking questions such as "what is science?""mathematics?""art?""law?""how do these activities work?" "what norms dothey employ?"In order to understand these activities the philosopher must studytheir histories. Just so, in understanding the natureof her own activity she muststudy its history.It is not true, however, that in order to do good work on the problem of thenature of philosophy one must have any more than a passing acquaintance withits history. Wittgenstein, who certainly did a lot of original work in this area,again stands as a counterexample. For Wittgenstein his own experience inphilosophizing was a far more relevant source of inspiration and informationthan the study of the philosophizing of others. And even if it is granted thatin order to understand philosophy one must study its history, it nevertheless issimply false that every philosopher, in order to be a philosopher (and a goodone) need address the question "what is philosophy?" any more than every phi-losopher worth her salt must address the question "what is religion?"or "whatis mathematics?"These are relatively narrow questions that demand study onlyfrom people especially interested n those fields.The fact that a philosopher neces-sarily practices philosophy brings upon her no obligation to be a philosopherof philosophy.

Consider then the "FreudianDefense." Studying the history of philosophy is,on this view, like recapturing a lost memory. Richard Rorty remarks, "Just asthe patient needs to relive his past to answer his questions, so philosophy needsto relive its past in order to understand its questions."16 Taylor doesn't invokeFreud in so many words, but his idea is similar. He describes the submergenceof philosophical theory in social practice as a kind of forgetting.17 Philosophersare stymied by problems because they belong to a society whose institutions andpractices embody the effects, but hide the origins, of these problems. (Here itis the culture rather than the individual that has repressed the memory.) Andas Freudian blocks are neutralized by calling to consciousness a lost memory,so the prescription for philosophical blocks involves retrieving the past.

Now as a rhetorical device the Freudian Defense is an effectivecollar-grabber,but since it is far from clear that Freudian analysis lives up to its billing in psy-chology, we should be all the more suspicious in extending its pronouncementsto philosophy.And as with the Freudianpsychologist so with the historicist: while

15. Randall, 99.16. Philosophyand the Mirrorof Nature(Princeton,1979),33.17. Taylor, 24.



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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY? 297the speculation may seem enticing, we are entitled to inquire into the rationale.Are any generalizable data in the offing? Are historically oriented philosophersmore whole, or "realized,"or philosophically "healthy"than those less steepedin history, or than they themselves would have been had they reallocated moreof their time to contemporary studies? And who sets the criterion for aphilosophical cure anyway?What kinds of mechanisms account for such cures?Can afalse memory (saya misinterpretationof Pyrrhonian skepticism)neverthe-less have salutary, placebo-like effects?

Suppose we connect Freud with Socrates. If philosophy has as an essentialgoal self-understanding,then philosophers will be driven to understandtheir ownphilosophical activity. The self-awareness that comes of seeing ourselves fromthe historical point of view is, on this line, incumbent on all who philosophize.Studying the history of philosophy, particularly in its narrativemoments, is es-sential for seeing how we got where we are; and seeing how we got where weare is a necessary condition for understanding where we are. And who wouldargue with such an admirable goal as self-understanding? Peter Hylton makesit particularly appetizing:Whatonecan hopetogainfromphilosophysnot, primarily, ositivedoctrinebutrathera clearermind and a deeper nsight nto one'spositionin the world. If these Socraticideas appeal o us at all, then it willseemunsurprisinghatthe philosophical nterpriseshould tself be subject o philosophical xamination nd criticism. f, indeed,we acceptthat philosophyhas to do peculiarlywithself-knowledge,we might wellfindit obviousthat the historyof philosophy s a partof philosophy tself.18But what are the mechanisms by which such self-awareness might be broughtabout? A thorough knowledge of the history of philosophy might be supposedto induce self-awarenessin any of several ways. By familiarizing ourselves withan age in which our ideas were nascent, we become aware of assumptions thatunderlie them. These assumptions, which are now taken for granted but whichwere once far from obvious, may once more call for argument. By seeing thatour own ideas have a history, are extensions of earlier themes, parts of a progres-sion of ideas, we see that if history had taken a different tack our ideas mighthave been differentthan they are; hence the "contingency of contemporary be-lief." By coming to an appreciation of the limitations of another age, by recog-nizing, for example, that there are ideas which it was historically impossible forLocke to have entertained, we realize that we are in the same boat with respectto the future. Although we cannot say precisely what it is that we are incapableof thinking - only posterity will be able to say that,19- we do know that thereare, or will be, such things.

The message is clear. In recovering origins we also recovera sense of contin-gency.It is not so much a substantive doctrine one wantsto dredge up, as a feeling

18. "The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt Against Idealism,"in Philosophy in History,395-396.19. And maybe not even posterity. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel's The View rom Nowhere (Oxford,1986), chap. 6.



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298 ROY MASHfor the precariousness of one's own doctrines, of their being but a few out ofa vast field of competitors each of which, if not true, is at least conceivable. Ahealthy self-awareness hakesour complacency.A soberappreciationof the foiblesof the past is at once humbling and enriching. By encouraging an attitude ofopen-mindedness, by overcoming provincial common sense, a study of the his-tory of philosophy enlarges our imaginative scope.

But self-awareness s not an unconditional blessing. History is as liable to stul-tify as to liberate. Knowledge of our most fundamental, undefended premisescan servemerelyto induce timidity or, in the extremecase, paralysis.An appreci-ation of the shakiness of one's foundations is just as apt to dampen strong con-viction, to inhibit the advance of bold hypotheses, as it is to stimulate new dis-covery. Inveterate open-mindedness is not a featureto be touted if it perpetuallydeprives one of firmly believing that one is right; that, on occasion, other doc-trines are incoherent. For the mere fact that such alternatives were once consid-ered viable does not in itself show that they are,or were,in fact viable. Practicallyspeaking, though this may sound like heresy,some degree of self-ignorance mayprove fruitful for philosophy.20

Moreover, the theme of self-awarenesstends to undercut our homely reasonsfor studying the history of philosophy. For on this view we do not learn anythingfrom the giants other than that we are on a par with them insofar as we are allprisoners of one Weltanschauungor another. According to it we derive from thepast not knowledge (as the homely answerswould haveit) but a lesson. The lessonis: never trust a premise. And the deeper the premise, the more fundamental itis to everything you hold dear, the more unquestionable it seems-the more itis to be questioned.

Only then, it is thought, will one be free of the premise's grip, as the Freudianpatient is free of her neurosis. But of course this freedom is illusory. Because -and here is another moral to be gleaned from this way of looking at the historyof philosophy-we will never be without unsubstantiated, and indeed unsub-stantiatable, premises. There is no throwing off of chains; there is only an ex-change, an awareness (for what that is worth) that one was in chains, and ofwhat those chains were like.

I have explored this theme not because I believe self-awareness is never abyproduct of studying the history of philosophy, but to show how difficult it isto adduce it as the basis for an answer to the question, "why study the historyof philosophy?" and at the same time retain those good, solid, wholesome, (dareI say "Midwestern"?)answers which are all that should be required.

IVThe burden of this paper has been to show that (1) the history of philosophy

20. Evengranting he categorical esirability f combattingntellectual omplacency, hyshouldthe appealto historybe an indispensablemethod for countering he insidiouseffectsof culturalmyopia?Mightn't ravel,or a vigorousstudy of anthropology, roduce he requisite timulation,the wideningof horizonsfor which these pursuitsare justly vaunted?



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HOW IMPORTANT S THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY? 299is, in no revealing sense, intrinsic to philosophy, and (2) what I have called "thehomely reasons" alone justify studying the history of philosophy. How widelythese propositions are held it is hard to say. It may be that they have the disad-vantage of seeming less radical or exciting than the historical point of view theyoppose. But a thirdpoint, I suspect, will do for provocation: (3) The significanceof doing the history of philosophy for doing philosophy has been, and continuesto be, exaggerated. This is not to belittle the historian's work. The history ofphilosophy is not unimportant for philosophy, just overemphasized. But if thisis right, the implications for the way philosophy is practiced and taught in aca-demic institutions will not be slight. It is here that we may expect pedestrianideasto have powerful consequences.San Francisco State University

r.mash, how important for philosophers is the history of philosophy

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