rosenkrantz haecceity an ontological essay

GARY S. ROSENKRANTZUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

HAECCEITYAn Ontological Essay

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GARY S. ROSENKRANTZUniversity of North Carolina at Greensboro

HAECCEITYAn Ontological Essay

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERSDORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ix

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINAIRES 1I Haecceity: An Initial Account 1

II Qualitative and Nonqualitative Abstracta 6III Controversies About Haecceities 11IV Modal Concepts 16V Cognitive and Linguistic Concepts 22

VI Haecceities and Individual Essences 42VII Varieties of Realism and Anti-Realism 53

VIII The Concrete/Abstract Distinction 56IX Qualitative and Nonqualitative Properties 69

CHAPTER 2 - THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 72I Metaphysical Explanations 72

II Qualitatively Indistinguishable Concreta 77III Proposed Criteria of Individuation 82IV Principles of Evaluation for the Proposed Criteria 93V Evaluations of the Proposed Criteria 97

VI The Haecceity Criterion: Neither Trivial Nor Circular 106VII Responses To A Priori Objections to Haecceity 124

VIII Haecceity: A Metaphysical Explanation of Diversity 130

CHAPTER 3 - HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 140I The Individuation of NEPs 140

II The Individuation of Disjoint Objects 146III Objections To Unexemplified Haecceities: A Reply 150IV The Unity of Metaphysical Modalities 166

CHAPTER 4 - SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES 168I Mereological Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities 168

II Causal Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities 179

viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5 - ACQUAINTANCE 184I Haecceities and Acquaintance 184

II Haecceities and Re-identification 191III An Argument for Premise 1 of R 196IV An Argument for Premise 2 of R 198V Synchronic Versions of R 204

VI Objections to R and its Analogs: A Rebuttal 214VII Divine Cognition and Haecceities 220

VIII The Objects of Acquaintance 225IX Objections to Russellian Objects of Acquaintance: A Response 236X Cognitively Inaccessible Haecceities 241

INDEX OF NAMES 245

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 247

PREFACE

Philosophical discussions of haecceity or "thisness" give rise to a number ofcontroversies. One of these controversies concerns whether or not there arehaecceities or "thisnesses". This controversy over the existence of suchattributes is pertinent to a body of contemporary research in metaphysics,epistemology, and the philosophy of language, including analytic investiga-tions of Identity and Individuation, Modality and Possible Worlds, Proposi-tional Attitudes, De Re Belief, and Names. For example, philosophers whoaccept the existence of haecceities have advanced the following claims. (1)Haecceities provide a criterion of identity across possible worlds forparticulars.' (2) De re necessity can be understood in terms of de dictonecessity because individuals have haecceities. 2 (3) De re belief can beanalyzed in terms of de dicto belief because individuals have haecceities.3

(4) A person, S, grasps his own haecceity when he has a piece of self-knowledge expressible in first-person language, and S cannot identify anexternal thing, x, unless S uniquely relates x to himself in such a way thatS grasps his own haecceity. 4 (5) In some contexts, haecceities of particularsare intensions of indexical expressions or proper names.'

Of course, philosophers who deny that particulars have haecceities reject(1)-(5). Typically, these philosophers argue either that the notion of such ahaecceity is obscure, or that haecceities of this kind are peculiar entities, or

See Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal ofPhilosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 5-26.

2 See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974).

3See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle: Open Court,1976), Chapter 1, and Appendix C.

4Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1, and Appendix C.

5See M. Lockwood "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation(New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating ProperNames," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Also see Roderick Chisholm,Person and Object, Chapter 1; and Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1981), pp. 21-22.

ix

that it is metaphysically extravagant to think that particulars have haeccei-ties.'

This book has three goals. First, to vindicate the thesis that particularshave haecceities. Second, to solve certain metaphysical, epistemological, andlinguistic problems about haecceities. Third, to use premises abouthaecceities to justify a rare and very special variety of Extreme Realismabout abstract entities.

Chapter 1 is introductory in nature, and provides the groundwork foraccomplishing the three aforementioned goals. Preliminary discussions ofmajor topics are coupled with elucidations of key metaphysical, epistemo-logical, and linguistic concepts, including the concept of haecceity.Philosophical analyses of two distinctions which are central to this projectare provided, the first being the distinction between concreta and abstracta,and the second being the distinction between qualitative abstracta and

nonqualitative abstracta.Chapter 2 examines the metaphysical problem of explaining the diversity

of individuals at a time, or of providing a criterion of individuation forparticulars, given the possibility of two qualitatively indistinguishableindividuals. It is argued that the solution to this problem implies thatparticulars have haecceities.

Chapter 3 provides justification for the controversial claim that there areunexemplified haecceities which have necessary existence and which couldbe exemplified by particulars.

Chapter 4 argues for a somewhat surprising thesis: that we can pick outor identify some of the aforementioned unexemplified haecceities, and usedefinite descriptions of a certain kind to denote or make singular referenceto them.

Chapter 5 advances an epistemological argument which has three

6See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer

Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The First Person (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1981), and "Possibility without Haecceity," in Peter A. French, Theodore E.Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, II, Studies in

Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164. Also see ErnestSosa, "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes" in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological

and Semiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.

interesting implications. (1) There are some haecceities which no one iscapable of grasping or expressing linguistically, for instance, haecceities ofobjects which are incapable of consciousness. (2) In some cases a haecceitycan be grasped or expressed linguistically by one and only one person, forexample, your haecceity can only be grasped or expressed linguistically byyou. (3) There are some haecceities which can be grasped or expressedlinguistically by many persons, for instance, the haecceity of a sharablecharacteristic such as Squareness.

Some prefatory remarks about my approach to ontology and the relation-ship of this approach to the ontological problems dealt with in this essay willperhaps be helpful to the reader. Although I will defend a form of platonicrealism, my conception of ontology is fundamentally aristotelian in nature.According to such a conception, ontology is a "first science" which studiesfundamental categories of being or existence, otherwise known as ontologicalcategories. There are two main branches of ontology: speculative ontology,and analytic ontology.' Speculative ontology attempts to ascertain whatkinds of entities exist. It asks, for example, whether or not there areinstances of ontological categories such as Substance, Event, Place, Time,Collection, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number. Analytic ontology,on the other hand, attempts to give an account of what features various kindsof entities must have: it seeks to provide conceptual or philosophicalanalyses of ontological categories, without commitment as to whether or notthere are instances of those categories.

Accordingly, analytic ontology concerns itself with the nature of the morefundamental categories of concreta, for example, Substance, Event, Place,and Time, the nature of the more fundamental categories of abstracta, forinstance, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number, and the nature of anynecessary interrelationships which hold among any of these categories.Speculative ontology, however, is concerned with whether or not there existconcreta or abstracta belonging to such categories.

'This distinction was drawn by D. C. Williams in his Principles of Empirical Realism(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966), p. 74. In a similar vein, Brian Carrhas recently distinguished between categorial description and categorial realism. See Carr'sMetaphysics: An Introduction (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987),Chapter 1.

PREFACE xiX PREFACE

xii PREFACE

Problems belonging to each of these branches of ontology shall beinvestigated in this essay. I will argue that the notions of Concrete Entityand Abstract Entity can be analyzed in terms of a hierarchy of ontologicalcategories related to one another as species and genus. Such an argumentis an instance of analytic ontology. I shall also argue that there are abstract

properties, including both universals and haecceities of concreta. Here we

have a piece of speculative ontology.Standard arguments given in support of Abstract Property-Realism include

the following. First, sharable properties have been posited on the groundthat they are part of the best explanation of one or more of the following sixphenomena. (1) There being a number of concrete items which are of thesame kind, for instance, numerous particulars which are white. (2) Aperson's having the ability to perceive that a number of concrete items areof the same kind. (3) A predicate's denoting numerous concrete items whichare of the same kind. (4) The existence of a necessary truth such as if

something is red, then it is colored. (5) The fact that there are nonactual

possibilities like there being a purple horse. (6) The existence of logical andmathematical truths, for example, that all men being mortal is validly

inferable from all men being animals and all animals being mortal, and that

7+5=12, respectively. Second, sharable properties have been postulated onthe ground that there are truths about such properties, for instance, some

shapes are never exemplified, or Honesty is a virtue, whose import cannot

be adequately captured by any nominalistic translation.For most philosophers, the question of the existence of haecceities arises,

if at all, only after the existence of sharable properties or universals likeTriangularity, Catness, and Redness has been accepted. When confronted bythis question, many philosophers decline to postulate haecceities of concreta,whether they be "thisnesses" of inanimate entities or ego-centric propertiessuch as being identical with me. Such a posttilation is often viewed withdeep suspicion because it appears to be unparsimonious, and indeed thecharge of ontological profligacy is one that has been leveled againstProperty-Realism of any sort. My own argument is an attempt to show that,on the contrary, it is necessary to posit haecceities of concrete entities inorder to explicate the state of affairs of two concreta's being diverse at a

time.

PREFACE, xiii

The argument I present entails a radical or "giraffe" realism of properties.This radical realism not only implies that there are universals or sharableattributes, but implies that for any concrete entity, a, a has a haecceity, anirreducibly nonqualitative property or "thisness" of being identical with a.Haecceities of concrete entities are postulated on the ground that they arepart of the best explanation of two concrete entities' being diverse at a time.Utilizing the premise that concrete entities have haecceities, I proceed toargue that there are unexemplified haecceities. According to my argument,some of these unexemplified haecceities are not equivalent to a conjunctionof exemplified properties, and others of them are equivalent to such aconjunction. These conclusions are accepted on the ground that they are partof the best explanation of the fact that the number of individuals whichcould exist is greater than the number of individuals which do exist. Finally,I argue that many nonqualitative haecceities cannot be grasped by any of us,but that some of these haecceities can be picked out by us. This lastargument has four noteworthy implications. First, a haecceity of an essen-tially nonconscious being is necessarily ungraspable. Second, an unexempli-fied haecceity cannot be grasped by us. Third, some unexemplifiedhaecceities which are equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified propertiescan be picked out by us. Fourth, an unexemplified haecceity which is notequivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties cannot be picked outby us.

My overall argument implies an extreme realism of properties via aninference to the best explanation of the diversity of concrete entities. As faras I am aware, this is a hitherto untraveled route to Property-Realism.

A number of acknowledgements are in order. I am indebted to mycolleague (and erstwhile collaborator on other projects) Joshua Hoffman. Hehas helped me in writing this book in a myriad of ways, not least of whichin providing difficult objections for me to attempt to surmount. I would alsolike to thank my teacher Roderick Chisholm, who is the source of myinterest in the topic of Haecceity. Many of the leading ideas in this book arepresent in an earlier form in my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences,Brown University, 1976, written under the direction of Roderick Chisholm,Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. In addition, I would like to express mygratitude to Arnold Cusmariu for his encouragement and helpful observa-

xiv PREFACE

tions. I benefitted significantly, as well, from the criticisms and suggestionsfor improvements proposed by an anonymous referee who reviewed anearlier draft of this book for Kluwer academic publishers. Thanks are alsodue to an anonymous referee who reviewed a manuscript containing somerelated material for Cambridge University Press, namely, my and Joshua

Hoffman' s Substance Among Other Categories: A Conceptual Investigation.

Finally, I wish to thank the Research Council of the University of NorthCarolina at Greensboro for supporting my work on this project -during a

leave in the spring of 1987.I have incorporated parts of the following articles of mine: "Acquain-

tance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23; "Nonexistent Possibles

and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-

147; "Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische

Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107-119; "On Objects Totally Out Of This World,"Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986), pp. 197-208; with JoshuaHoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance," Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835-853; also with JoshuaHoffman "J. Rudner Boscovich" and "Mereology" in Robert Audi, ed., The

Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, forthcoming); "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa,

eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993); and

"Critical Notice: The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by

Edward Wierenga," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991),

pp. 725-728. I would like to thank the editors of Philosophia, Grazer

Philosophische Studien, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Basil

Blackwell, and Cambridge University Press for kindly allowing me to

include this material.

Greensboro, North Carolina1993

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

"There is a certaine singularitie, interest, and proprietiein euerie thing."

[1583 Stubbes The Anatomie of Abuses II. 11 (1882)]

That singularity which seemeth so close girt to everyindividual creature."

[Beaumont Psyche, or love's mystery XXI. lii (1684)]

I - HAECCEITY: AN INITIAL ACCOUNT

"There was nothing like it in the philosophy of Plato."

(1782 Priestly An History of the Corruptions of Chris-tianity I. I. 93)

What is a haecceity or "thisness"?' Informally speaking, we can say that aparticular haecceity is the property of being identical with a certain entity.For example, if there are such properties as being identical with me, beingidentical with Socrates, and being identical with Gorbachev, then theseproperties are haecceities.

If there are haecceities, then I exemplibi the property of being identicalwith me, and lack the property of being identical with Socrates. The relation

'The anglicized term haecceity derives from haecceitas, a term coined by Duns Scotus(1266-1308). Haecceitas is from Latin haecce, haece, fem. of hic this. Thus, the literalmeaning of haecceity is thisness. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the firstappearance of the anglicized form in a text is in 1647: "Here club-fisted Logick with all herQuiddities...nor Scotus with his haeccities was able to dastardize or cow his spirits, but he madeher who first appeard like a Gorgons head, to prove a meer Bugbeare." (Robert Baron, TheCyprian Academy, Lib. I., p. 6)

2 CHAPTER 1

of lacking is the contradictory of the exemplification relation. When it issaid that an entity, x, exemplifies a property what is meant is that x has thatproperty; and when it is said that x lacks a property what is meant is that x

does not have that property. For instance, when it is said that an object, o,

exemplifies Sphericity, what is meant is that o has the property of being

spherical; and when it is said that o lacks Greenness, what is meant is that

o does not have the property of being green. It seems that we intuitively

grasp what it is for something to have a property, just as it appears that we

intuitively grasp what it is for something to have a part, though in either one

of these two cases we would be hard pressed to provide a conceptual

analysis of what it is that we intuitively grasp.Certain paradigm or core instances of Propertyhood are sharable qualities,

properties which can be exemplified by a number of things at once, forexample, qualities such as Redness, Squareness, and Catness. So, if at time

t there are three cats Morris, Felix, and Garfield, then at t each of them

exemplifies Catness or has the property of being a cat. On the other hand,a haecceity is not a sharable quality. For example, it is evident that theproperty of being identical with me cannot be exemplified by two things at

once.It might be suggested that a formal account of haecceity can be provided

in linguistic terms: a haecceity is a property designated by an expression ofthe form 'the property of being identical with N', where 'N' is a proper

name or indexical indicator. However, since properties are not linguisticentities, it seems reasonable to ask for a nonlinguistic account of haecceity.Notice that my earlier informal characterization of haecceity is nonlinguistic.This informal characterization suggests that a nonlinguistic account of theconcept of haecceity can be provided by employing existential quantification.As we shall see, the exact nature of such a nonlinguistic account depends onwhether or not there could be an unexemplified haecceity. 2 According to

some philosophers, an unexemplified haecceity is an impossibility. 3 If these

philosophers are correct, then the concept of haecceity can be defined as

follows.

2By unexemplified I mean never-exemplified.

3 See Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 3

(Dl) F is a haecceity =df. (3x)(F is the property of being identical withx.)4

Unlike the linguistic account of haecceity given earlier, (Dl) is notformulated in terms of a relationship which a haecceity bears to a linguisticexpression of a certain kind. In this sense, (Dl) provides a nonlinguisticaccount of haecceity.

Since a haecceity is a property, and since a property has content, ahaecceity has content. The content of a haecceity is an entity's individualityor identity, and (Dl) makes it clear in what sense a haecceity has, such acontent.' Because nothing can be identical with more than one thing, therecould not be an entity which exemplifies more than one haecceity.

Plainly, a haecceity cannot be identified with a property such as:

(i) being identical with something, or(ii) being an x such that (3y)(x=y), or

(iii) being self-identical, or(iv) being an x such that x is identical with x.

(i)-(iv) are necessarily coinstantiated, but a haecceity is not necessarilycoinstantiated with (i)-(iv). For instance, although whatever exemplifies

4In (D1), existential quantification is utilized to define the concept of haecceity. Existential

quantification can be used in this way because a variable bound by an existential quantifierrefers generally to an item without the variable expressing any attribute whatsoever. A variableof this kind does not express a haecceity of an item, since it makes no reference to anything inparticular. Such a variable cannot be said to express an attribute of existence, since existenceis what is expressed by the quantifier which binds the variable, Nor is there any other attributewhich a variable of this sort could reasonably be thought to express.

(DI) has the following implicit logical structure: necessarily, for any property y, y is ahaecceity if and only if there exists an x such that Ryx, where R is the dyadic relation, _beingthe property of being identical with.

5Compare Johannes Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The

Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis:Hackett, 1973), p. 588. Scotus characterizes a haecceity as a "positive entity intrinsicallydetermining a nature to singularity." For a discussion of Scotus's conception of haecceity seeJohn Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism, A Study of Peirce's Relation to John DunsScotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963).

4 CHAPTER 1

being identical with me exemplifies being identical with something, a thing

other than me exemplifies only the second of these properties.As I understand the notion of haecceity, a haecceity is an abstract entity.

The distinction between abstracta and concreta seems to be indispensable in

ontology: the debate between realists and anti-realists over the existence of

universals presupposes this distinction.One traditional position in this debate is that of platonic or extreme

realism. It maintains that attributes such as Triangularity, Horseness, andRedness exist apart from the mind, and can exist unexemplified: they belongto a transcendent realm of abstract entities, distinct from spatio-temporalreality. Less extreme in this respect is aristotelian or moderate realism.While moderate realism entails that the aforementioned abstracta exist apart

from the mind, it is an immanent realism which holds that such an

abstractum cannot exist unless it is exemplified by a concretum. On the

other hand, anti-realism implies that there are no abstracta. For instance,

nominalism maintains that only concreta or particulars exist, and hence that

there are no abstract attributes. Conceptualism is a form of anti-realismwhich holds that entities like Triangularity, Horseness, and Redness aremental constructs, concrete mental entities which cannot exist apart from the

mind.I assume (plausibly, I think) that this very general division between

concreta and abstracta is exhaustive and exclusive: necessarily, every entityeither belongs to the ontological category of the concrete or belongs to theontological category of the abstract, and there could not be an entitybelonging to both of these categories. To illustrate the concrete/abstractdistinction, I will give examples of ontological categories which are species

of abstracta and concreta, respectively, together with putative instances of

these ontological categories.' Species of abstracta include Property (for

example, Redness, Squareness, et cetera), Relation (for instance, Between-

ness, Identity, and so on), Proposition (for example, that some animals are

horses, that some animals are unicorns, and so forth), Set (for instance, the

null set, the set of Plato and Aristotle, et cetera), and Number (for example,

6The intuitive notion of an ontological category will be discussed further in section VIII

of this chapter.


the number 8, the number 9, et cetera) Species of concreta includeSubstance (for instance, material objects and spirits), Event (for example,utterances and thoughts), Time (for instance, instants and durations), Place(for example, points and extended regions of space), Limit (for instance,corners and surfaces), Privation (for example, shadows and holes), Trope(for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, that particular squareness,et cetera),' and Collection (for example, the mereological sum of Mars andSaturn, the mereological sum of Mars, Saturn, and Neptune, and so on.) 8The intuitive distinction between concreta and abstracta may be difficult toanalyze, but it is serviceable nonetheless. A philosophical analysis of theconcrete/abstract distinction will be offered in section VIII of this chapter.

7The term 'trope' as a name for such concrete "properties" is due to D. C. Williams, The

Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966). Atrope such as Aristotle's wisdom would not, of course, itself be wise: it is Aristotle who is wise.Moreover, Aristotle's wisdom could only be possessed by Aristotle, though other wiseindividuals, for example, Socrates, possess a particular wisdom of their own which could notbe possessed by anyone else. Likewise, the particular squareness of a certain object could onlybe possessed by that object, and each square object possesses its own particular squarenesswhich no other square object could possess. Furthermore, the particular squareness of a certainobject shares the spatial location of that object. In addition, it appears that the particularsquareness of a certain object is square, and hence possesses spatial parts. Many modern tropetheorists do not postulate both tropes and universals, and many identify either everyday things,or substances, with collections of tropes. Examples of trope theorists include D. C. Williams,G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular," symposiumin Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122, and KeithCampbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

8The term, `mereological', derives from the Greek liapoc, meaning part. Accordingly,

mereology is the theory of parts, or more specifically, S. Lesniewski's formal theory of parts.Typically, a mereological theory employs terms such as the following: proper part, improper

part, overlapping (having a part in common), disjoint (not overlapping), mereological product(the "intersection" of overlapping objects), mereological sum (a collection of parts), mereologicaldifference, the universal sum, mereological complement, and atom (that which has no properparts). Formal mereologies are axiomatic systems. Lesniewski's Mereology and NelsonGoodman's formal mereology (which he calls the "Calculus of Individuals") are compatible withNominalism, i.e., no reference is made to sets, properties, or other abstract entities. Lesniewskihoped that his Mereology, with its many parallels to set theory, would provide an alternativeto set theory as a foundation for mathematics. Mereological theories of this kind arecollectivistic: they imply that any individuals, no matter how scattered, have a mereological sumor comprise an object. For an authoritative discussion of the principles of formal mereologicalsystems see Peter Simons Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

6 CHAPTER 1

II - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVEAB STRACTA

"Reason..descendeth from generalles to specialles, & from themto particulars."

(1594 trans. T. B. La Primaudaye's French Academie II. 162)

There is an intuitive distinction between general and nongeneral abstracta,for instance, general and nongeneral properties and propositions. The class

of nongeneral properties includes haecceities of concreta, for example, beingidentical with Socrates, being identical with Gorbachev, being identical withme, and so on. It is plausible that there are haecceities of concreta if andonly if there are nongeneral properties which are not haecceities, for

instance, being next to me, being the successor of Gorbachev, and being aman in that room who is taller than any other man in that room. Incontrast, the following are examples of general properties: being square,being a property, being self-identical, being identical with something, beingnext to someone, being next to a square, and being a square which is larger

than any other square.To say that an abstract entity is nongeneral is to say that it pertains to a

specific concretum in a certain intimate way, for example, being identical

with Socrates and being next to me pertain to Socrates and me, respectively.On the other hand, to say that an abstract entity is general is to say that it

does not pertain to a specific concretum in this intimate way, for instance,

being identical with someone and being next to someone do not pertain to a

particular concretum.Since a haecceity of a general abstract entity does not pertain to a specific

concretum in the relevant sense, such a haecceity is a general property. Forexample, the haecceity of Squareness is being identical with Squareness - a

general property. In contrast, some haecceities of abstracta resemble

haecceities of concreta in being nongeneral. A case of a nongeneral

haecceity of an abstractum is a haecceity of a (nongeneral) haecceity of a

concretum, for instance, the property of being identical with the property ofbeing identical with me. This last case is also a property which pertains to


me.The distinction between general and nongeneral propositions parallels the

distinction between general and nongeneral properties. The former distinc-tion is illustrated by the following examples.

General Propositions Nongeneral PropositionsSomeone is white

Jones is whiteThe tallest man is wise

That man is wiseAll men are men

I am a manFor every metal, The tallest womanthere is a solvent on Earth is black

Notice that a nongeneral proposition pertains to a specific concretum in acertain intimate way, for instance, I am a man pertains in this way to me.On the other hand, a general proposition, for example, all men are men, doesnot pertain to a specific concretum in this way.

It is not easy to analyze the intuitive distinction between general andnongeneral abstracta. But even in the absence of an analysis, this distinctionremains useful. An analysis of the distinction between general andnongeneral properties or propositions will be provided in section IX of thischapter.

Standardly, a general property is called qualitative, and a nongeneralproperty is called nonqualitative. However, this practice is somewhatmisleading. Inasmuch as 'quality' and 'property' are synonyms, a "nonquali-tative property" appears to be a contradiction in terms. However, it seemsthat 'qualitative' and `nonqualitative' are meant to be understood in thetechnical senses of general and nongeneral, respectively. In that case, thenotion of a nonqualitative property appears to be perfectly coherent. So asto conform with the customary practice of calling a nongeneral propertynonqualitative, ' qualitative' and `nonqualitative' will henceforth be employedin the aforementioned technical senses.

It is plausible that there are nonqualitative properties just in case there arenonqualitative propositions. It is no less plausible that there are qualitativeproperties if and only if there are qualitative propositions. Finally, it isplausible that there are qualitative properties just provided that there are

8 CHAPTER 1

relations which are general or qualitative in character, for instance,Betweenness, Love, Identity, and Diversity.

Philosophers customarily distinguish relations from relational properties,for example, properties such as being identical with Squareness, beingidentical with Gorbachev, and being next to Gorbachev. However, thiscustomary practice is somewhat confusing, since properties and relationsdiffer in their structure. In particular, the exemplification of a relation, R,consists of an entity's bearing R to one or more entities, whereas theexemplification of a property, P, by an entity, x, that is, x's having P, does

not consist of x's bearing P to one or more entities. In other words, arelation's exemplification, unlike a property's, involves more than one term.This is compatible with the fact that a thing can only bear a reflexiverelation (such as Identity) to itself, since a relation of this kind is 2-termed. 9

The linguistic manifestation of this structural difference between propertiesand relations is that the former are expressed by one place predicates, andthe latter are expressed by multi-place predicates. It follows that necessarily,Property and Relation are mutually exclusive categories. (Thus, a haecceityis one thing, and the reflexive relation of Identity is quite another.)Therefore, literally speaking, a relational property is a contradiction in terms.In this sense, there cannot be a relational property.

However, it seems that if the notion of a "relational property" isunderstood in terms of the sort of linguistic expression which designates sucha property, then this notion can be understood in a relevant nonliteral sense.On a linguistic understanding of this sort, a property, P, is relational if P'scanonical name has the form 'the property of being Fa', where Fxy'expresses a relation and 'a' is a name of something. Such a linguisticcriterion for a property's being relational does not have the absurd implica-tion that a relational property is a relation, and the notion of a relationalproperty it introduces is coherent. Thus, the preceding linguistic criterionappears to be serviceable. According to that criterion, properties such asbeing identical with Gorbachev, being next to Gorbachev, and being

9Some philosophers employ the term 'attribute' to cover both properties and relations. Inthe system of classification adopted by these philosophers, my distinction between properties andrelations reappears as the distinction between singulary attributes and nonsingulary attributes.


9

identical with Squareness count as relational.My arguments imply that the existence of abstracta of any one of the

three categories, Property, Relation, and Proposition, entails the existence ofabstracta of the other two categories. It is plausible that these entailmentshold because properties, relations, and propositions comprise a family ofabstracta whose members differ from one another in the number of termsthey possess: properties being one-termed, relations being multi-termed, andpropositions being zero-termed. However, there is an objection to my claimthat properties, relations and propositions form such a family.

To begin with, it seems that not only propositions are termless. Forexample, it appears that tables are termless. Nevertheless, it would clearlybe erroneous to say that a table is zero-termed. Accordingly, it might becharged that saying a proposition is zero-termed is equally erroneous. If thischarge is correct, then it undermines my claim that properties, relations, andpropositions form a family of abstracta of the aforementioned sort. In whatfollows, I answer this objection by clarifying this claim of mine.

First of all, for each of the three species of abstracta under discussion,there is a corresponding kind of truth. Corresponding to properties, there issingular de re truth. Necessarily, if there is such a truth, then it exists invirtue of an individual's exemplifying a property. For example, it is a truthabout Socrates that he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of Socrates'sexemplifying the property of being wise, a 1-term abstract object. Corre-sponding to relations, there is relational de re truth. Necessarily, if there isa truth of this kind, then it exists in virtue of an individual's (or a numberof individuals') entering into a relation. For instance, it is a truth aboutSocrates and Plato that the former teaches the latter. This truth exists invirtue of Socrates's bearing the teaching relation to Plato, a two-termabstract object. The existence of other relational de re truths entails theexistence of a three-term abstract object, a four-term abstract object, a five-term abstract object, and so on. Corresponding to propositions, there is dedicto truth. Necessarily, if such a truth exists, then it exists in virtue of aproposition's being true. For example, it is a truth that if a man is wise,then he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of a proposition's being true,namely, the proposition that if a man is wise, then he is wise.

Generalizing from singular and relational de re truths, we may infer that

1 0 CHAPTER 1

there being a truth of a certain kind entails that there is an n-term abstractobject appropriate to such a truth. A proposition is the appropriate sort ofabstract object for a de dicto truth. Because the existence of a de dicto truthentails the existence of a proposition, and because every proposition is atermless abstract object, there being a de dicto truth entails the existence ofa termless abstract object. Since there being a truth of a certain kind entailsthat there is an n-term abstract object appropriate to a truth of that kind, itfollows that a proposition is a zero-term abstract object. The fact thatpropositions are zero-termed, properties are 1-termed, and relations are multi-termed implies that necessarily, Property, Relation, and Proposition aremutually exclusive categories.


11

III - CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HAECCEITIES

"Which Infatuation has proceeded from Scholasticks who

have been so intemperate in the use of their words, thatthey could not make a rational discourse of anything,though never so small, but that they must stuff itwith their Quiddities, Entities, Essences, Haecceities,and the like."(1678 Cudworth The True Intellectual System of the Uni-verse I. ii. 8. 67)

"Haecceitys, Ecceitys, Petreitys, Quidditys, Identitys...andwhole Cart-loads of Qualitys."(1711 trans. Werenfels's Discourse of Logomachys, orcontroversys, about words vi. 101)

The existence of nonqualitative haecceities is especially controversial. Thereare three parties to the controversy, whose positions are as follows. (1)Nominalism. The existence of haecceities is denied by a nominalist, sincea nominalist denies the existence of properties, whether qualitative ornonqualitative. (2) Qualitative Realism. A qualitative realist accepts theexistence of properties, but maintains that all properties are qualitative.Hence, a qualitative realist rejects the existence of haecceities of concreteentities.' According to such a realist: (i) haecceities of particulars arepeculiar entities, and (ii) if an ontology is rich enough to include particulars,qualitative properties, qualitative relations, and qualitative propositions, thenit is unnecessary to posit haecceities of particulars within that ontology. (3)Nonqualitative Realism. According to a nonqualitative realist, there arehaecceities of particulars. Thus, a nonqualitative realist accepts the existence

10For a defense of Qualitative Realism see Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons:

Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The FirstPerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), "Possibility without Haecceity," inP. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11, Studies inEssentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164, and Ernest Sosa,"Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological andSemiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 1312 CHAPTER 1

of nonqualitative properties. Moreover, it seems that if there are nonqualita-tive haecceities, then there are qualitative properties, since qualitativeproperties are paradigmatic or core instances of Propertyhood. For example,it appears that if there exists a nonqualitative property such as being identicalwith me, then there exist qualitative properties such as being identical with

something, being an entity, being concrete, being a person, being identicalwith Personhood, and so forth. Thus, a nonqualitative realist should acceptthe existence of both nonqualitative and qualitative properties.

Since the existence of nonqualitative haecceities is rejected by nominalistsand qualitative realists alike, and since the existence of qualitative propertiesis rejected only by nominalists, the existence of nonqualitative haecceities ismore controversial than the existence of qualitative properties. And becausethe usual attempts to justify Realism only seek to establish QualitativeRealism, my attempt to justify Nonqualitative Realism is more ambitiousthan those attempts.

Qualitative realists often support their rejection of nonqualitative propertiesby arguing that a nonqualitative property is odd or peculiar in a way inwhich a qualitative property is not. Their argument is based on twopremises. Firstly, a nonqualitative property (unlike a qualitative one) is akind of hybrid of an abstractum and a concretum. Secondly, such a hybridis strange or unnatural. Therefore, nonqualitative properties are dubiousentities.

But the following considerations counter-balance such an argument.Suppose that there are qualitative properties, relations, and propositions. Inthat case, there is the qualitative proposition that something is red.However, it is prima facie plausible that this proposition exists if and onlyif there is the proposition that there is something identical with Redness. Inother words, it seems that there is the proposition

that (3x)(x is red),

just in case there is the proposition

that (3x)(x=Redness).

Observe that the latter proposition is qualitative and says that something isidentical with Redness. It is plausible that there is such a qualitativeproposition if and only if there is the qualitative property of being identicalwith Redness. (Likewise, it is plausible that there is the proposition that(3x)(x=me), namely, the nonqualitative proposition that there existssomething identical with me, just in case there is the nonqualitative propertyof being identical with me - a point which a qualitative realist accepts.)Inasmuch as an argument of the foregoing sort applies to any qualitativeproperty, it follows that every qualitative property has a qualitativehaecceity." Furthermore, the following metaphysical principle of parity isintuitively plausible.

Necessarily, if something has a haecceity, then everything has a haecceity.

It might be objected to this principle of parity that the following pictureof reality is acceptable: there are atoms of being, as well , as complexes ofthese atoms, but only the former have haecceities.

To set up my reply to this objection, I shall suppose that c is a complexof atoms, that a is an atom, and that every atom has a haecceity. Since ahas a haecceity, it appears that there is the following true singular existentialproposition about the atom a:

(3x)(x=a).

Because parallel considerations apply to every other atom, I conclude that foreach atom, there is a corresponding true proposition of this kind whichasserts the existence of that atom. Moreover, it is intuitively plausible thatif there are such true singular existential propositions about atoms, and thereexist complexes of atoms, then there are also , true singular existentialpropositions about these complexes. This intuition is backed up by thefollowing argument. Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning thatpropositions have truth-values, possesses modal characteristics, serve as

I 1 See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies". On pages 319and 349 Chisholm concedes that abstracta have haecceities even if concreta do not have them.

14 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 15

relata of logical relations, and either have other propositions as logical partsor are themselves logical parts of other propositions. This being the case,it is plausible that for propositions of certain sorts, there must be a logicallycomprehensive variety of propositions of those sorts. And in particular, itseems that if for every atom, there is a true singular proposition whichasserts the existence of that atom, and if there exist complexes of atoms, thenthere must be a logically comprehensive class of propositions which bothincludes the former propositions about atoms, and includes, for everycomplex of atoms, a true singular proposition which asserts the existence ofthat complex of atoms. It follows that there is the following propositionabout the complex of atoms c:

(3x)(x=c).

Furthermore, it appears that if there is the singular proposition that (3x)(x=c),then there must be the property of being identical with c - the haecceity ofa certain complex of atoms. Since a parallel argument applies to any othercomplex of atoms, I conclude that every complex of atoms has a haecceity.Therefore, it seems that if atoms have haecceities, then complexes of atomsmust also have haecceities. Consequently, it is not acceptable to picturereality as containing atoms which have haecceities and complexes of theseatoms which do not have haecceities. I conclude that the foregoing objectionto my principle of parity does not succeed.

More generally, the need for a logically comprehensive range ofpropositions makes it natural to suppose that if there is a true singularproposition asserting the existence of an item in one case, then there is a truesingular proposition asserting the existence of an item in every case. But inthe light of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there is such a singularproposition, then there exists the haecceity of the item whose existence isasserted by the singular proposition in question. Thus, it seems that ifsomething has a haecceity, then everything does. Since qualitative propertieshave haecceities, and since there are concreta, it follows that concreta havehaecceities. Therefore, if there are qualitative properties, then there arenonqualitative properties. Hence, Qualitative Realism is false. Because theargument for this conclusion has considerable merit, it appears that a

qualitative realist's rejection of nonqualitative properties is no less in needof justification than a nonqualitative realist's acceptance of such properties.

16

CHAPTER 1


IV - MODAL CONCEPTS

"There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning andthose of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary,and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, how-ever, are contingent, and their opposite is possible."

(1714 Leibniz Monadology 33)

As noted earlier, the controversy over the existence of haecceities is relevantto much current research on Modalities and Possible Worlds. Moreover, theconcept of haecceity cannot be explored without making use of metaphysicalmodalities. Throughout this essay, the modalities employed are metaphysi-cal, unless explicitly stated otherwise. A brief discussion of de re and dedicto metaphysical modalities is in order.

For the purposes of this discussion, let us suppose that there are a fullrange of properties, relations, and propos .ons, including properties andrelations which are unexemplified. In that case, we can characterize de re

and de dicto modalities in terms of abstracta of these kinds. Let us beginby providing a characterization of de re possibility.

De re possibility is an entity's possibly having some property or anentity's possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). For example, acertain quantity of liquid water possibly has the property of being frozen,and possibly bears the betweenness relation to two other particular materialobjects. De re possibility can be used to characterize the notion of anaccidental property.

F-ness is an accidental (contingent) property of x <:=> x exemplifies F-ness,and x possibly lacks F-ness.

To illustrate, Liquidity is an accidental property of a certain quantity ofwater.

De re necessity is an entity's necessarily having some property or anentity's necessarily bearing some relation to some thing(s). For instance, aparticular quantity of water necessarily has Extension. In other words,Extension is an essential property of that quantity of water. Similarly, the

quantity of water in question necessarily bears the relation of identity toitself.

The concept of a de re necessary (essential) property can be characterizedin terms of de re possibility as follows.

x necessarily (essentially) exemplifies F-ness t=> (i) x exemplifies F-ness,and (ii) —(x possibly lacks F-ness).

De re impossibility is an entity's not possibly having some property or anentity's not possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). By way ofillustration, a certain quantity of water does not possibly exemplifySphericity and Rectangularity at the same time, and does not possibly bearthe relation of diversity to itself.

De re modalities are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. Forexample, these modalities might be understood in the following way. xpossibly exemplifies F-ness just in case (3y)(y--=x & in some possible worldy exemplifies F-ness). F-ness is an accidental property of x just providedthat x exemplifies F-ness & in some possible world x lacks F-ness. xnecessarily exemplifies F-ness if and only if (3y)( --x & y exemplifies F-nessin every possible world in which y exists). x does not possibly have F-nessjust when (Jy)(y=x & there is no possible world in which y exemplifies F-ness).

It should be noted that for each of the foregoing characterizations andunderstandings of de re modalities for properties, there is a parallelcharacterization and understanding of a corresponding de re modality forrelations. For instance, x necessarily bears a relation R to y <=> (i) x bearsR to y, and (ii) —(x possibly fails to bear R to y); and a necessarily bears arelation R to b if and only if (ay)(Bz)(y=a & z=--b & y bears R to z in everypossible world in which y exists).

A de re modality is a relation that holds between an item and someproperty, or among a number of items and some relation. On the otherhand, the de dicto modalities of metaphysical possibility, necessity,impossibility, and contingency are properties of propositions. Intuitivelyspeaking, a possible proposition is one which could be true, a necessaryproposition is one which must be true, an impossible proposition is one

18

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 19

which could not be true, and a contingent proposition is one which could betrue and could be false. For example, the proposition that all ravens areblack is possible, the proposition that whatever is red is colored is necessary,the proposition that a spherical cube exists is impossible, the proposition thata cat exists is a contingent truth, and the proposition that no cat exists is acontingent falsehood.

A proposition, p, is necessary just provided that the negation of p is notpossible. In formal terms, Op 74--- —0—p. In addition, Op ss —0—p.Furthermore, p is impossible if and only if —Op. Finally, p is contingent just

when Op & 0—p.De ditto modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds. A

possible proposition is one which is true in some possible world. Anecessary proposition is one which is true in all possible worlds. Animpossible proposition is one which fails to be true in any possible world.A contingent proposition is one which is true in some, but not every,possible world.

Next, let us consider certain existential modal concepts. To begin, a

contingent being is an existent which could fail to exist. Such a being hascontingent existence. On the other hand, a necessary being is an entitywhich must exist. A being of this kind has necessary existence. Thus, x isa contingent being just when x is an existent which is not a necessary being,and x is a necessary being just provided that x is an existent which is not acontingent being. In other words: x is a contingent being (or has contingentexistence) if and only if (3y)(y=x & y is not a necessary being (or does nothave necessary existence)); and x is a necessary being (or has necessary exis-tence) when and only when (3y) (r-x & y is not a contingent being (or doesnot have contingent existence)). It might be said, following customarypractice, that (i) something has necessary existence just in case it exists inall possible worlds, and (ii) something has contingent existence just when itexists in the actual world, but fails to exist in some other possible world.Typical concreta are contingent beings. Indeed, since the thesis that everyconcretum is a contingent being is not implausible, a treatment of modalconcepts should not explicitly contradict this thesis. On the other hand, mytreatment of modal notions in Chapter 3 generates an argument that abstractasuch as properties and propositions are necessary beings.

(D1) is an adequate definition of the concept of haecceity only if everyhaecceity is exemplified. However, there might, exist an unexemplifiedhaecceity which could be exemplified by a concretum. After all, it seemsthat there are cases in which the existence of a concretum is possible eventhough the concretum in question never exists. Let us call a possibleconcretum that never exists a nonexistent possible (a NEP).

It might be said that x is NEP if and only if x is a concrete individualwhich exists only in possible worlds other than the actual world. In whatfollows, I describe various kinds of NEPs, and construct a definition of theconcept of haecceity that is compatible with the existence of unexemplifiedhaecceities.

There are three kinds of NEP: a NEP is either a mereological product, acausal product, or else is mereologically and causally disjoint.' (1) Amereological product is a nonexistent possible material object which wouldbe created by the assembly or arrangement of some bits of matter, forexample, , a material object which would be created if certain material objectswere , attached to one another in a particular way, when such attachmentnever occurs. (2) A causal product is a NEP which would be produced bysome particular(s) under a nomologically possible circumstance, for instance,an organism which would result from a certain sperm fertilizing a certainegg under specified conditions, when such an episode of fertilization nevertranspires. (3) A NEP which is neither a mereological product nor a causalproduct is mereologically and causally disjoint. For example, it appears thata merely possible spirit or soul is a disjoint object. A spirit is an individualsubstance which is spatially unlocated or unextended and capable of con-sciousness: perhaps no spirit ever exists, but it seems that possibly, there arespirits. Another example of a disjoint object is provided by the followingcase. It seems that possibly, there exists an electron, e, in addition to all of

12I employ the term 'disjoint' in this connection for two reasons. Firstly, in formalmereological theories, to say that x and y are disjoint is to say that x and y have no part incommon. Similarly, a disjoint object (in my sense), existing in some other possible world,either has no part in common with any actual material object, or else has a proper part whichhas no part in common with any actual material object. Secondly, in an another (archaic) sense,`disjoint' means disconnected. However, a disjoint possible (in my sense) is causallydisconnected from actual entities: it cannot be produced by such entities.

(D2) F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that: (ax)(F is the propertyof being identical with x.)

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 2120 CHAPTER 1

the electrons that ever actually exist. In other words, there exists a set, S,which has every electron as a member, and it is plausible that S couldcoexist with an electron, e, which is not a member of S. It appears that sucha merely possible electron, e, is a disjoint object.

The foregoing remarks presuppose that electrons are necessarily indivisiblefundamental particles. If this presupposition is mistaken, then we canreplace the foregoing occurrences of 'electron' with another term whichsignifies a kind of possible essentially indivisible fundamental particle, forinstance, Toscovichian point-particle having no proper parts'."

Let us return to the matter of the definition of haecceity. Although somephilosophers are skeptical of the existence of unexemplified haecceitieswhich could be exemplified by concreta, I have noted that there might besuch haecceities. On the other hand, it seems that there could not be anecessarily unexemplified haecceity: there couldn't be the property of beingidentical with a certain thing when this property is not possibly had byanything. Since there could not be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity,every unexemplified haecceity is possibly exemplified. The followingrevised version of (D1) allows for the existence of unexemplified haecceities.

13Rudjer Josip Boskovic (1711-1787), or Roger Boscovich, is best known for his A Theoryof Natural Philosophy Reduced to a Single Law of the Actions Existing in Nature. This workattempts to explain all physical phenomena in terms of the attractions and repulsions of point-particles (puncta) which are indistinguishable in their intrinsic qualitative properties. Accordingto Boscovich's single law, puncta at a certain distance attract, until upon approaching oneanother they reach a point at which they repel, and eventually reach equilibrium. Thus,Boscovich defends a form of dynamism, or the theory that nature is to be understood in termsof force and not mass (where forces are functions of time and distance). By dispensing withextended substance, Boscovich avoided epistemological difficulties facing Locke's naturalphilosophy and anticipated developments in modern physics. Among those influenced byBoscovich were Kant (who defended a version of dynamism), Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell,and Lord Kelvin.

Boscovich's theory has proved to be empirically inadequate to account for phenomena suchas light. A philosophical difficulty for Boscovich's puncta, which are physical substances, arisesout of their zero-dimensionality. It is plausible that any power must have a basis in an object'sintrinsic properties, and puncta appear to lack such support for their powers. However, it isextensional properties which puncta lack, and Boscovich could argue that the categorial propertyof being an unextended spatial substance provides the needed basis.

It should be noted that (D2) characterizes the concept of haecceity in termsof de re metaphysical possibility.

Three controversial claims about modality and haecceity are defended inChapter 3. The first of these claims is that for any x, if x is a possibleworld, then x can be identified with an abstract entity which has necessaryexistence and which involves haecceities of concreta. The second claim isthat there are unexemplified haecceities which correspond to NEPs, even inthe case of NEPs which are mereologically and causally disjoint: 4 Thethird claim is that metaphysical modalities exhibit a kind of unity orinterdependence explicable in terms of haecceities. This sort of unity orinterdependence among metaphysical modalities has three components. (i)For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dicto modalconcept. (ii) For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de remodal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingentexistence can be understood in terms of either de re or de dicto metaphysicalmodal concepts.

Finally, in Chapter 4 it is argued that we can pick out certain unexempli-fled haecceities which correspond to mereological or causal products, and usedefinite descriptions to denote these unexemplified haecceities.

14An unexemplified haecceity, H, corresponds to a nonexistent possible, i, if and only ifH r is necessarily such that it is exemplified if and only if i exemplifies it.

22

CHAPTER 1

V - COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS

"As the hand is apt to take hold of all instruments; so is thispower or facultie apt to apprehend the formes of all things,from whence grow the vniuersals."

(1606 Bryskett A Discourse of Civill Life 124)

"As these qualities or modes are only identified with the thingby a mental attribution, they are called attributes."

[1838 Sir W. Hamilton Logic v. 1. 77 (1866)]

If there are properties, relations, and propositions, then people intellectuallygrasp or comprehend the content of some of them, and can use linguisticterms to express some of them. Some basic cognitive and linguistic issuesabout haecceity concern our grasping and linguistically expressing haeccei-ties. In order to facilitate discussion of these issues I shall characterize therelevant concepts of grasping and linguistic expression, and describe theirinterrelationship.

A person's (S's) grasping a property, relation, or proposition, P, is a direct

cognitive relation which S bears to P: necessarily, if at time t S grasps P,

then S does not do so by virtue of his grasping anything else at t, forexample, a property, relation, or proposition other than P." It seems thatif we grasp some properties, relations, and propositions, then we can graspwhat it is for a conscious being to grasp a property, relation, or proposition,even if we are unable to provide a conceptual analysis of what it is for aperson to grasp something.. An individual may come to grasp a property or relation through a processof abstraction. Such a process of abstraction can be partly understood interms of the following moderate empiricist principle. I6

t5This is compatible with the moderate empiricist view that a person's grasping P at a time

tl may result in his grasping Q at a later time t2 if P and Q are diverse but similar properties.

16My understanding of this process of abstraction is patterned after Roderick Chisholm'sunderstanding of "intuitive induction" in The Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, 1966), Chapter 5. Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "The Nature of Geometry," American

Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1981), pp. 101-110, and "Some Reflections on Perception and A


(P1) If P is a qualitative experiential or perceptual property which is pos-sibly exemplified, then P may be grasped by a person, S, as a resultof either (i) S's having one or more experiences or perceptions ofsome instance(s) of P, or (ii) S's having one or more experiences orperceptions of some instance(s) of another qualitative experiential orperceptual property, Q, such that: Q is possibly exemplified, and nec-essarily, (Vx)(Vy)(if x has P & y has Q, then x and y are similar withrespect to x's having P and y's having Q).

According to clause (i) of this principle, S may abstract P from hisexperiences of particulars which exemplify P. For example, as a result ofperceiving a square thing, or a number of square things, a person, S, maycome to know what it is for a thing to be square, and thus, S may be said tograsp the property of being square. However, according to clause (ii) of(P1), for S to grasp a property, P, as a result of having perceived a numberof particulars, the particulars need not exemplify P. These particulars needonly provide a semblance or an appearance of an actual or possible instanceof P. Such a semblance or appearance, X, does not exemplify P, but issimilar to an actual or possible instance of P. For this reason, it may seemto S that X is an instance of P or X may suggest an instance of P to S. Forexample, if a thing which appears square is examined under a microscope,then it is revealed that the sides of the object are not straight, but aresomewhat jagged. However, S may come to grasp the property of beingsquare as a result of perceiving such an object with the naked eye because,so perceived, an object of this kind provides a good semblance or likenessof a square. For similar reasons, S may come to grasp the property of beingsquare as a result of perceiving an inexactly constructed figure which closelyresembles a square, but does not literally appear square to S. It is plausiblethat if there are properties, then people can grasp some of them in the waysdescribed above. If we can grasp properties in these ways, then we haveinnate capacities to form concepts in response to certain similarity classes of

Priori Knowledge," Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 355-362.

24

CHAPTER 1

experiential stimuli. It is extremely plausible that we possess suchcapacities."

A second way in which a person, S, may come to grasp a property is this.

(P2) If S grasps a property, P, and S grasps another property Q, and there

is the conjunctive property (P &Q), the disjunctive property (PvQ),

or the negative property —P, then S may come to grasp (P&Q),

(PvQ), or —P as a result of S's conjoining, disjoining, or negating

his concepts of P or Q.

For instance, if S grasps the property of being a horse, and S grasps the

property of being horned, and there is such a property as being a horned

horse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of S'sconjoining his concepts of being a horse and being horned. Similarly, if S

grasps the property of being a horse, and there is such a property as being

a nonhorse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of his

negating his concept of a horse." Conversely, if S grasps a conjunctive,

disjunctive, or negative property, then this entails that S grasps each of the

conjuncts or disjuncts of that property, or its negand.There is another role which grasping plays within a theory of properties.

Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there are properties. In that

"Radical Empiricism rejects (P1) in favor of a principle such as the following one. If P

is an experiential property which is possibly exemplified by a mental state of person, S, then S

may come to grasp P as a result of S's introspectively experiencing one or more of S's mental

states which are instances of P. Rationalism employs the distinction between a person'sgrasping a property in an occurrent sense, e.g., a person's attributing or contemplating aproperty, and a person's grasping a property in a dispositional sense, e.g., a person's having theability to attribute or contemplate a property. According to Rationalism, a person has innate

ideas: in some cases a person is born with a dispositional , grasp of a property, and this

disposition is not a result of his experiences. If, as a moderate empiricist believes, a person hasan innate capacity to-grasp-a-property-in-response-to-his-having-experiences-of-certaM-sorts, thenit does not follow that he is born with a dispositional grasp of a property. This is because onecan have a capacity to do something without having the ability to do that thing, if experienceis needed in order to cultivate that capacity. For example, I have the capacity to play the violin,

but not the ability.

18Note that the principle illustrated by these examples, i.e., (P2), is endorsed by radicalempiricists, moderate empiricists, as well as rationalists.


case, we can grasp many of them. Moreover, grasping a property is a directcognitive relation between the grasper and what he grasps. Thus, it seemsthat we can discern properties via our intuitions about what properties wegrasp. Although such a process of property-discernment is not infallible, itis highly reliable. Moreover, one's graspings, as well as one's intuitionsabout them, are directly accessible to one by means of introspection. Thus,the discernment of properties can be understood along internalist lines asfollows. If there are attributes, and if a person attentively thinks that hegrasps some attribute, then that person is prima facie justified in thinkingthat there is such an attribute. For instance, if there are properties, and if Iattentively think that I grasp being square, or being a horned horse, or beinga cat, or being stretchable, or being red, then I am justified in believing thatthere is such a property. To defeat a justification of this kind, evidence thatI do not grasp what I think I grasp is required.

D. M. Armstrong has advocated an externalist account of property-detection which differs from my picture of property-discernment, and whichmight be thought to threaten it. His account entails the moderate realistthesis that all properties are exemplified. In Armstrong's view, questionsabout which properties exist are to be settled by "total science," whichincludes philosophy as a minor component, but which is mainly empiricalscientific research. 19 He argues that unexemplified properties are transcen-dent platonic entities which cannot be objects of empirical scientific research.It appears that if there are unexemplified attributes, then we can investigatesome of them only through either a priori or philosophical research.However, my argument for Extreme Realism will be based on considerationswhich are independent of any claims about property-discernment or thegrasping of properties. Rather, these considerations depend upon claimsabout the best account of particulars' being diverse at a time, and the bestaccount of the possibility of particulars which never exist in fact. Thus, mydefense of Extreme Realism does not beg any questions about property-detection which might be at issue between an Armstrongian and myself. So,if my philosophical argument for Extreme Realism succeeds, then the

19See D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1980).

26 CHAPTER 1

existence of unexemplified properties is justified and all forms of ModerateRealism are undermined. Since an Armstrongian account of property-detection implies Moderate Realism, if my argument in this book is justified,then an Armstrongian account of property-detection is unwarranted, and doesnot threaten my contention that we can identify attributes via our intuitions

about what attributes we grasp.Under what conditions are we justified in believing that an individual

grasps a property? The following epistemic principle concerning a person'sgrasping a property is acceptable.

(PG) If at time t it is plausible for Si that F-ness exists, and at t it is plau-sible for Si that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si

can infer that it is prima facie plausible (for SI) that S2 grasps F-

ness at t.2°

For example, it is plausible for me that Sheree believes that something issquare. (I suppress temporal indices for ease of exposition.) Hence, if it is

also plausible for me that Squareness exists, then I can infer that it is prima

facie plausible for me that Sheree grasps Squareness. By the same token, ifit is plausible for me that there is the property of being identical withGorbachev, then I am able to infer that it is prima facie plausible for me that

Raisa grasps this haecceity, since it is also plausible for me that Raisabelieves that someone is identical with Gorbachev. However, prima facieplausibility does not entail truth, and such plausibility might be defeated bycontrary evidence. Hence, the foregoing premises do not entail that Raisa

grasps Gorbachev's haecceity.The following two examples illustrate the defeasibility of the justification

(PG) provides for the claim that S grasps F-ness. Suppose at time tl it is

plausible for us both that Redness exists, and that at tl Jones believes that

something is red. In that case, (PG) enables us to infer that at tl it is prima

facie plausible for us that Jones grasps Redness at tl. Still, even if Redness

exists, it doesn't necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps Redness. After

20 • . . , iIn this principle F' is a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriate

predicate.


all, it is possible that at t it seems to us that Jones has the belief in question,when he does not. For example, consider the following scenario. First, attl we observe that Jones is facing a red apple with his eyes open, and isuttering the sentence 'The apple is red'. Second, at tl we have a justifiedfalse belief that Jones is sighted. Third, we subsequently discover at t2 thatJones is congenitally blind. Surely, in some possible cases of this kind, attl it is plausible for us that at tl Jones believes that something is red, but att2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not grasp (phenomenal) Rednessat tl. Hence, the prima facie plausibility which (PG) confers upon the claimthat Jones grasps Redness at tl has been defeated.

Alternatively, suppose at tl it is plausible for us both that the property ofbeing non-self-exemplifying exists, and that at tl Jones (truly) believes thatRedness is non-self-exemplifying. Then (PG) enables us to infer that at tlit is prima facie plausible for us that Jones grasps being non-self-exempling at tl. Nevertheless, even if at tl Jones has this belief, it doesnot necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps the property of being non-self-exemplifying. For although at tl it is plausible for us that the property ofbeing non-self-exemplifying exists, there could not be such a property. 21

Hence, at tl Jones does not grasp the property of being non-self-exemplifying, despite the fact that at tl Jones believes that something is non-self-exemplifying. Thus, possibly, at tl it is plausible for us that at tl Joneshas this belief, but at t2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not graspthe property of being non-self-exemplifying at tl. Therefore, the prima facieplausibility which (PG) confers upon the claim that Jones grasps being non-self-exempliing at tl has been defeated.

Consider the following principle concerning a person's coming to graspa haecceity.

21The proof parallels Russell's demonstration that there is no such set as the set of all sets

which are not members of themselves. The property of being non-self-exemplifying must eitherexemplify itself or not exemplify itself. The former entails that this property is non-self-exemplifying; and the latter entails that this property is self-exemplifying. It follows that theproperty in question must both exemplify itself and not exemplify itself. Therefore, it isimpossible that there be such a property. Nevertheless, given the intemalist principle ofproperty-detection defended earlier, it seems possible that there be individuals who are ignorantof this proof, and who are justified in thinking that there is a property of this kind.

28 CHAPTER 1

(P3) A person, S, may grasp a haecceity, 11, as a result of S's having oneor more experiences or perceptions of an instance of H.

(P3) is a moderate empiricist principle. It suggests that numerous individualsgrasp Gorbachev's haecceity as a result of their abstracting it from theirperceptions of Gorbachev. (P3) is not an unattractive principle. After all,(P3) is analogous to (P1), and (P1) is highly plausible. Nonetheless, inChapter 5 an argument will be provided which implies the falsity of (P3).

The notions of a person's grasping a property and a person's making useof a linguistic term to express a property are connected. When I say that a

person, S, makes use of a linguistic term, T, to express a property, P, what

I mean is that a particular usage of T at a certain time expresses P in S's

idiolect. A person, S, uses a linguistic term to express a property, P, only

if S grasps P; and in typical cases, if S grasps P, then S can use a linguistic

term to express P. For instance, S uses a linguistic term to express

Squareness only if S grasps Squareness; and typically, if S grasps Square-

ness, then S can use a linguistic term to express Squareness, for example, the

linguistic term 'square'. Likewise, S uses a linguistic term to express

Gorbachev's haecceity only if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity; and in typical

cases, if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity, then S can use a linguistic term toexpress this haecceity, for instance, the linguistic term 'Gorbachev' or

`identical with Gorbachev'.Some further distinctions can now be drawn. First of all, there is a

distinction between a person's grasping a property and a person's identifyinga property by description. This distinction is reminiscent of Russell'sdistinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descrip-tion." The following case shows how a person can identify a property by

description without grasping that property.Case (1): Due to a genetic defect, Jones's visual cortex is dysfunctional.

Such a defect always produces congenital blindness. As a result, Jones isnever capable of having a visual experience. Because of these circum-

22 See Bertrand Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic

and Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174, and The Problems of

Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Chap. 5.


stances, Jones is never capable of grasping (phenomenal) Redness.Nevertheless, Jones has a sighted acquaintance Smith with whom he hasfrequent conversations. Such conversations can occur because Jones has afull range of nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mentalstates which enable Jones to both grasp a wide range of nonvisual properties,and adequately justify a wide range of true nonvisual beliefs. In particular,Jones knows that

(3x)(x is the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs bySmith in his conversations with Jones).

Jones grasps the requisite properties and relations for his having this pieceof propositional knowledge, for example, the properties of being an apple,being a stop sign, and being a property, the relation, x being said of y, andso forth. After all, a person can grasp these properties and relations basedupon his nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mental states.In addition, as a matter of fact

Redness=the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs bySmith in his conversations with Jones.

Hence, although Jones is incapable of grasping Redness, he manages toidentify Redness by description - as the property most frequently said ofapples and stop signs by Smith in his conversations with Jones.

A person's (S's) identifying a property, P, by description is an indirectcognitive relation which S bears to P. If S indirectly cognizes P, then Sidentifies P by virtue of his grasping some attribute, Q, other than P, suchthat P exemplifies Q.

Furthermore, S's using a linguistic term to express a property, P, must bedistinguished from S's using a linguistic term to designate or make singularreference to P, since S can refer to P by using a name or a definitedescription which designates or denotes P without S's using a linguistic termwhich expresses, P. For instance, possibly, in Case (1) Jones uses thedefinite description 'the perceptual property most frequently attributed toapples by my friends' to denote Redness, and Jones fixes the reference of the

30 CHAPTER 1

name 'Redness' by using this definite description. In that event, Jones uses`Redness' to designate Redness. Still, since Jones is never capable of

grasping Redness, and since S uses a linguistic term to express P only if S

grasps P, Jones is never capable of using a linguistic term to express

Redness.Thus, the distinction between a person's using a linguistic term to express

a property and a person's using a linguistic term to designate or makesingular reference to a property parallels the distinction between a person'sgrasping a property and a person's identifying a property by description.

Both of these distinctions apply to haecceities. Generally speaking, if an

entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S, can designate x by using an

indexical name or a proper name, then S can designate H by using a name

of the form 'being identical with N', where 'N' is either an indexical name

of x, for instance, 'me', 'this', or 'that', or a proper name of x, for example,`Gorbachev', 'Socrates', or 'Squareness'. By way of illustration, suppose

that you, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness have haecceities. Further

suppose that you use the names 'I', , 'Gorbachev', and 'Squareness' to

designate yourself, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness, respectively. Inthat case, we may assume that you can designate these haecceities by using

the names 'being identical with T, 'being identical with this', 'beingidentical with Gorbachev', and 'being identical with Squareness', respec-

tively."

23 It also seems that one can refer to a haecceity by means of using a definite description.For example, it can be said that the haecceity of the man in front of me is the property of beingidentical with the man in front of me, provided that the definite description 'the man in front

of me' is used referentially rather than attributively. For an account of the distinction betweenreferential and attributive uses of definite descriptions see Keith Donnellan, "Reference and

Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 281-304, and "Proper Names and

Identifying Descriptions," Synthese, 21 (1970), pp. 335-358.It should also be noted that some philosophers employ an alternative mode of expression

in which haecceities are designated by expressions such as 'being me', 'being I', 'being this',

`being Socrates', `Socrateity', and so forth. See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity

(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), and Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle:

Open Court, 1976). Also note the following passage from Boethius: "For were it permitted tofabricate a name. I would call that certain quality, singular and incommunicable to any othersubsistent, by its fabricated name, so that the form of what is proposed would become clearer.For let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality


However, even if an entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S,designates H by using a name of the form 'being identical with N', where`N' is either an indexical indicator or proper name of x, this does not entailthat S is capable of either grasping H or using a linguistic term to expressH. After all, if x has a haecceity, then in some possible situations Sdescriptively identifies x's haecceity in much the same way as Jonesdescriptively identifies a color in Case (1). For instance, suppose that Inever have the capability to grasp this table's haecceity. Still, I mightidentify this table's haecceity by description. For example, on the assump-tion that this table is the only table within a yard of me, I might identify thistable's haecceity by my knowing that . (3x)(x is the haecceity of the tablewithin a yard of me). Similarly, suppose that I never have the capabilityto use a linguistic term to express Gorbachev's haecceity because I am nevercapable of grasping that haecceity. Nonetheless, I might name Gorbachev'shaecceity with a linguistic term of the form 'being identical with N', where`N' is a proper or indexical name of Gorbachev. To illustrate, on theassumption that Gorbachev is the current president of the U.S.S.R., I mightname Gorbachev's haecceity by my fixing the reference of the name 'beingidentical with Gorbachev' with the description 'the haecceity of the currentpresident of the U.S.S.R.'

The distinction I have drawn between grasping a property and descrip-tively identifying it parallels two other distinctions: (i) the de dicto belief/de

`Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'.Therefore, this Platonity is one man's alone, and this not just anyone's but Plato's. For 'Plato'points out a one and definite substance, and property, that cannot come together in another."(Librium de Interpretation edito secunda, PL 64, 462d - 464c) Quoted in Alvin Plantinga,"The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 129-138, andHector-Neri Castafieda, "Individuation and non -Identity: A New Look," American PhilosophicalQuarterly, 12 (1975), pp. 135-136.

Finally, observe that depending on the context, tokens of a single name-type can designatediverse entities of different kinds, e.g., one Morris is a human and another Morris is a cat.Hence, a token of a name-type which designates a haecceity in one context might fail todesignate a haecceity in another context. If Felicia Ackermann's theory of names is correct,then in some contexts tokens of the name-types 'being identical with Socrates' and 'beingidentical with this' designate unanalyzable nondescriptive properties which are not haecceities.See her "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophi-cal Studies, 35 (1979), pp. 55-69.

32 CHAPTER 1

re belief distinction, and (ii) the direct de re belief/indirect de re belief

distinction. Given the existence of a strongly realistic or platonistic domainof propositions, relations, and properties, it appears that (i) and (ii) can becharacterized in terms of psychological relationships a person bears toproperties, relations, or propositions. For instance, take a typical case of de

re belief:

Socrates is believed by Plato to be wise.

Such a de re belief seems to be a triadic relation holding among a person(the attributor), a property (the property attributed), and a thing (theattributee). Thus, Socrates's being believed by Plato to be wise appears tobe identifiable with Plato's attribution of Wisdom to Socrates. A de re

belief appears (generally speaking) to be a person's attributing a property (ora relation) to some item(s). Observe that if a person, S, attributes a property

(or relation) to some item(s), then S grasps that property or relation.

Compare a case of de dicto belief:

Pythagoras believes that all equilateral triangles are equiangular.

In this case, what Pythagoras believes is the proposition that all equilateral

triangles are equiangular. In general, a de dicto belief seems to be a dyadic

cognitive relationship holding between a person (the believer) and aproposition (the thing believed). Notice that if a person believes aproposition, then he grasps that proposition.

Let us apply the notions of de re and de dicto belief to Case (1). In Case

(1), Jones identifies Redness by description. It can be argued plausibly thatJones's making this identification implies that Redness is believed by Jonesto be a property, that is, (3x)(x-Redness & x is believed by Jones to be aproperty). Nonetheless, because Jones does not grasp Redness, Jones doesnot grasp the proposition which a sighted person believes when a sightedperson believes that Redness is a property. Therefore, Jones does not believethis proposition, or equivalently, —(Jones believes that (3x)(x----Redness & x

is a property)). Compare this situation and the following possible

case.


Case (2): Based on trustworthy testimony, Jones knows that the man in hiskitchen is a philosopher. In addition, it is true that

the man in Jones's kitchen=the redhead in Jones's kitchen.

Yet, due to Jones's blindness,

—'(Jones believes (3x)(x--the redhead in his kitchen & x is a philosopher)).

Still, it can be plausibly argued that in these circumstances

(ax)(x=the redhead in Jones's kitchen & x is believed by Jones to be aphilosopher). 24

Jones's cognitive relationship to a concrete entity in Case (2) is analogousto Jones's cognitive relationship to an abstract entity in Case (1): in eachcase the cognitive relationship is indirect.

If entities have haecceities, then a propositional conception of direct de rebelief or strict de re belief can be defined in terms of de dicto belief asfollows.2 5

24Most writers on the topic of de re belief concur on this point. In other words, most of

these writers agree that one's descriptively identifying an individual is sufficient for one'shaving a de re belief with respect to that individual. For example, see David Kaplan,"Quantifying In," Synthese, 27 (1968), pp. 178-214, Ernest Sosa, "Propositional Attitudes DeDicta and De Re," The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 883-896, and Roderick Chisholm,"Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re'," Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976), pp. 1-20.Like these writers, I am unaware of any compelling reason to limit the objects of de re beliefto either objects of perceptual acquaintance or objects of Russellian direct acquaintance such asoneself, one's own mental states, and universals.

25Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person, and Ernest Sosa, "Propositions and

Indexical Attitudes". They develop qualitative realist positions on the nature of cognitiveattitudes de dicto and de re. Chisholm and Sosa argue that we can understand these cognitiveattitudes in terms of a person's standing in cognitive relationships to qualitative attributes orqualitative propositions, and they specifically tailor their views to avoid the implication thatthere are nonqualitative properties and propositions. However, aside from these similarities,Chisholm's and Sosa's positions are quite different.

34 CHAPTER 1

S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,

being identical with N, & (ii) S believes that something which is N is F,

and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and F-

ness.26

For example, suppose that a sighted person, S, has a true de ditto belief that

(3x)(x=Redness & x is a property). In believing this, S grasps the conjunc-

tion of the haecceity of Redness and Propertyhood. It follows that S directlyattributes Propertyhood to Redness. On the other hand, a propositional belief

which S has about x is an indirect attribution of F-ness to x by S if and only

if S's propositional belief about x is an attribution of F-ness to x by S, but

in making this attribution S does not grasp the conjunction of x's haecceity

and F-ness. For instance, suppose that (ax)(x=Redness & x is believed by

Jones to be a property) as in Case (1). In a situation of this kind, Jones'sattribution of Propertyhood to Redness is a propositional belief, but Jonesdoes not grasp the haecceity of Redness. Thus, Jones indirectly attributesPropertyhood to Redness. Similarly, suppose that the redhead in Jones'skitchen is believed by Jones to be a philosopher as in Case (2). In such asituation Jones indirectly attributes the property of being a philosopher tothat redhead, since in making this propositional attribution, Jones does notgrasp the haecceity of the redhead in his kitchen.

There are obvious differences between direct de re belief and Russellian

knowledge by acquaintance, although in some sense both are direct de re

cognitive attitudes. According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is

logically independent of knowledge of truths, and a person is acquaintedwith numerous multiply exemplifiable attributes, his own states of mind, and(probably) himself. A different conception of "knowledge by acquaintance"is advocated in Chapter 5. I argue that a person, S, is acquainted with an

item, x, just in case S has a certain kind of direct de re knowledge about x,

26 'N' and 'F" are schematic letters which should be replaced with appropriate linguisticexpressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the

second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Note that substitution of a name 'N'for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'

is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's

haecceity.


where the definition of the notion of direct de re knowledge parallels that ofthe concept of direct de re belief. Thus, I understand "acquaintance" as akind of propositional knowledge. Hence, unlike acquaintance in Russell'ssense, acquaintance in my sense is logically dependent upon knowledge oftruths.

A person cannot have a direct de re belief about an entity, x, unless hegrasps a conjunctive property one of whose conjuncts is x's haecceity. Sincea person cannot grasp a conjunctive property without grasping each of itsconjuncts, and since direct de re knowledge requires direct de re belief, aperson cannot have direct de re belief about x, or direct de re knowledgeabout x, unless he grasps x's haecceity. Accordingly, in order to ascertainthe objects of direct de re knowledge and belief, we need to determine whichhaecceities can be grasped by, a person.

An answer to this question is defended in Chapter 5. This answer has twoparts. (i) For any person S, S is incapable of grasping a haecceity of aphysical object or person other than S (nor is S capable of grasping thehaecceity of any other particular outside of the circle of his own ideas).Since some particulars located in the external world relative to S areinanimate, and therefore incapable of grasping a property, a corollary of (i)is that some haecceities of particulars are such that no one is capable ofgrasping them. (ii) Each of us can grasp his own haecceity, haecceities ofsome of his own mental states, and haecceities of some abstract entities. (i)and (ii) imply that the entities whose haecceities a person can grasp andRussellian objects of direct acquaintance are substantially one and thesame.27

Because a person, S, cannot have a direct de re belief about an item, x,unless S grasps x's haecceity, (i) and (ii) together entail that a person, S, isincapable of directly attributing a property to a particular in the externalworld relative to S, and that each of us can directly attribute properties tohimself, some of his own mental states, and some abstract entities. Inaddition, (i) and (ii) have certain linguistic implications. Inasmuch as S usesa linguistic term to express a property only if S grasps that property, (i)

27See Bertrand Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," and The Problems of Philosophy,

Chapter 5.

36

CHAPTER 1


implies that S is incapable of using an indexical name or a proper name, N,

to express the haecceity of a physical object or person other than S (nor is

S capable of using N to express the haecceity of a particular located in the

external world relative to S). 28 Since if S grasps a property, then in typical

cases S can use a linguistic term to express that property, (ii) implies that if

S uses N to designate himself, some of his mental states, or certain abstractentities, then typically S can use N to express the haecceity of such an entity.

A related application of the haecceity notion in the cognitive fieldconcerns psychological attitudes expressible in terms of first-person language,for example, my belief that I am alive. Consider a possible scenario of the

following sort. 29

Upon awakening on the battlefield amidst a tangle of bodies, I glimpse ascratched leg extending from underneath a tarpaulin. Because there aremany similar looking legs sticking out from underneath the tarpaulin, I amunaware of the fact that it is my leg which I see. I have a perceptual belief

that this person's leg is scratched, but I do not believe that my leg is

scratched, even though that person is identical with me."In the case described above, (3x)(x=me & x is perceptually believed by x

to have a scratched leg). Hence, where being F is an attribute, my being

believed by myself to be F is not a logically sufficient condition for my

believing that I am F, even when the former de re belief is perceptual. Nor

28Compare M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference," in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and

Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating

Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Lockwood is committedto the view that people use proper names of material objects or persons other than themselvesto express haecceities of such material objects or persons.

29As far as I know, cases of this kind were first proposed by Hector-Neri Castafteda. See

his " 'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio, VII (1966), pp. 130-157, and

his "The Phenomeno-logic of the I," Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses fur Philosophie,

Vol. III (University of Vienna, 1969), pp. 260-266.

30This example is an adaptation of one used by Roderick Chisholm. See his Person and

Object, p. 37. In variations upon this case, I see myself in a mirror, but fail to recognizemyself, either because I glimpse myself from an odd angle, or because unbeknownst to me myappearance has totally changed, or because I am suffering from amnesia and I do not recall what

I look like.

is my having some de re perceptual belief a logically necessary condition formy believing that I am F. After all, I could believe that I am , thinking evenwhen I am in a state of complete sensory deprivation, lacking any visual,tactual, auditory, gustatory, or olfactory experiences, and therefore nothaving any de re perceptual belief. What is it, then, for an individual tohave a self-attributional belief which is expressible in first-person language?In other words, what is it for a person to self-ascribe a feature?

An argument presented in Chapter 5 leads to what seems to be a plausibleanswer to this question. In Chapter 5, I shall argue both that (a) each of uscan introspectively grasp his own haecceity, and (b) sensory perception doesnot enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of an object that he perceives.Given (a) and (b), haecceities can be used to explain how a person couldhave a perceptual belief about himself without his making a correspondingself-ascription. In that case, the idea that a self-ascription is a belief whereinthe believer grasps his own haecceity is an extremely attractive one. Inparticular, an analysis of the concept of self-ascription along the followinglines looks plausible.

First, we formulate an analysis of what it is for me to believe that I am F.

I believe that I am F =ff. (i) I exemplify the haecceity, being identicalwith N, and (ii) I believe that something which is N is F, and in believingthis I grasp the conjunction of my haecceity and the property ofbeing F.'

A parallel analysis applies to each of us, and a corresponding account ofwhat it is for any person to have such a belief about himself can be statedas follows.

31,N and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to be replaced with suitable linguistic

expressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and thesecond occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Observe that substituting a name 'N'for the schematic letter 'IV' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates S'shaecceity.

38 CHAPTER I

S believes that he himself is F =df. (i) S exemplifies the haecceity, being

identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which is N is F, and

in believing this S grasps the conjunction of S's haecceity and the property

of being F. 32

The phenomenon of self-ascription suggests that the concept of haecceity

has an important role to play in elucidating the nature of our belief andknowledge of external things. To see this, consider the following thesis of

the indispensability of first-person reference, a thesis which is suggested by

Descartes's closing argument in the Second Meditation. 33 According to this

thesis, a person cannot have a piece of knowledge, K1, about an external

thing unless he has another piece of knowledge, K2, about himself which can

be expressed in first-person language. This thesis seems to be true. Itappears that a person, S, cannot have knowledge about an external thing, x,

unless there is a cognitive, psychological, or referential way of being related

to an item, such that S knows that he is related to something in that way,where S's knowledge can be expressed in first-person language. Forinstance, it seems that I cannot have perceptual knowledge that this is red,

unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I see something

red,34 I cannot have knowledge by description that the first president of the

32 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with suitable linguisticexpressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the

second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Notice that replacing the schematic

letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'

is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates S's

haecceity.

33Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. This thesis is also suggested by the

following remarks about demonstrative reference made by Stuart Hampshire. "The pronoun 'I',and the first person singular form in general is more than just one more demonstrative devicein language, parallel and on the same level with 'this' and 'that', and with the other personalpronouns. The first person singular is the nucleus on which the other referential devicesdepend...The final point of reference, by which a statement is attached to reality, is the speaker'sreference to himself, as one thing, and one person, among others." Thought and Action (London:

Chatto & Windus, 1959), p. 87.

34It might be objected that there could be a young child who has visual knowledge about

an external object, x, e.g., knowledge that this is red, where x=this, but who does not know that

he sees something red. But what reason is there for thinking that there could be such a child?


United States of America was a great general, unless I have some suchknowledge about myself as that I think that someone was the first presidentof the United States of America, and I cannot know that Bill Clinton camefrom Arkansas, unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that Irefer to somebody as 'Bill Clinton', respectively.

Given the indispensability of first-person reference, it can be arguedplausibly that there is a sense in which our knowledge of ourselves is morebasic than our knowledge of external things. To set up this argument,consider the following possible case.

I fall victim to an extreme form of amnesia in which I forget, irretriev-ably, everything I knew about particular things, while retaining mastery ofa wide range of general concepts. In addition, at the onset of my amnesiaI am in a state of total sensory deprivation, and remain so for an hour. IfI were in circumstances of this kind, then for an hour I would not have anyknowledge about an external thing. But during this hour I could haveknowledge about myself, because I could be in such circumstances and haveintrospective knowledge that I am thinking. 35

It follows that a person can have knowledge expressible in first-personlanguage about himself without his having knowledge about an externalthing Since a person cannot have knowledge of an external thing unless hehas knowledge expressible in first-person language about himself, we canconclude that an individual's knowledge of an external thing is asymmetri-cally dependent upon his having knowledge about himself expressible infirst-person language. That is, a person can have such knowledge abouthimself without his having knowledge of an external thing, but a personcannot have knowledge of an external thing without his having knowledgeof this kind about himself. Hence, there is a sense in which self-knowledgeis more basic than knowledge of an external thing, and a sense in which

the case that S's inability to articulate this sentence is due to linguistic incompetence, and thatS does know that he sees something red.

for concluding that S would be ignorant of the fact that he sees something red. It may well be

The rationale might be that possibly, a child, S, possesses the visual knowledge in question, butcannot articulate the sentence 'I see something red'. But this hardly provides a decisive reason

35Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "Cognition and Identifying Reference," Auslegung, 6 (1978), pp.

51-64.

40

CHAPTER 1

first-person reference is prior to reference to an external thing. Thus, if theobject of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language is a proposi-tion which involves the believer's haecceity, then it follows that a person, S,

cannot have knowledge of an external thing, x, unless S knows a propositionwhich involves his own haecceity. If a person cannot have knowledge of anexternal thing unless he knows such a proposition, then haecceities ofthinking subjects play a fundamental role in epistemology and the philosophyof mind.

At any rate, a large portion of a person's belief and knowledge aboutexternal things can be expressed in terms of first-person language. Forexample, in virtue of my knowing that the thing appearing at the center of

my field of vision is purple, where x=the thing appearing at the center of myfield of vision, x is known by me to be purple; and in virtue of my knowingthat the first president of the country in which I reside was a great general,where George Washington=the first president of the country in which Ireside, George Washington is known by me to have been a great general.Hence, if the notion of a belief expressible in terms of first-person languagecan be understood in terms of the concept of haecceity, then a person, S,

often picks out or identifies an external thing, x, by uniquely relating x to

himself in such a way that S grasps his own haecceity. Therefore, if theconcept of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language can beunderstood in terms of the notion of haecceity, then the notion of haecceityhas a large role to play in the elucidation of the nature of our thought aboutexternal things.

Influenced by Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance anddescription, Roderick Chisholm has given the concept of haecceity an evenlarger role in explicating the nature of our thought about external things.'Chisholm's theory implies that necessarily, a person's knowledge about anexternal thing, x, is knowledge by description about x. His theory alsoentails that necessarily, in having knowledge by description about x, a

person, S, uniquely relates x to himself in such a way that S grasps his own

haecceity. According to the account Chisholm has developed, S may identify

a first external thing, x, by uniquely relating it to himself, S may identify a


second external thing, y, by uniquely relating it to x, S may identify a thirdexternal thing, z, by uniquely relating it to y, and so on. For instance, I canidentify the United States of America as the country a portion of whose landI see beneath my feet, Abraham Lincoln as the president who freed thoseenslaved in this country, and Mary Todd Lincoln as the wife of AbrahamLincoln, and so forth. In addition, Chisholm argued that a person's body ofknowledge about external things is a network of such sequences ofidentifications, where each sequence in the network is noncircular and suchthat it has the person's identification of himself as its first member. If thisargument is sound, then a person's body of knowledge about external thingsis ultimately anchored by his identification of a nonexternal thing, namely,himself. Furthermore, based upon his analysis of de re belief in terms of deditto belief (an analysis which presupposes that concreta have haecceities)Chisholm has held that necessarily, if S has a belief about an external thingx, then S has knowledge about x. 37 If all of these Chisholmian positions arecorrect, then a person's self, as known to that person through his haecceity,is an archimedean point of reference upon which all of that person's thoughtabout external things depends.

36Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object. 37

See Roderick Chisholm, "Knowledge and Belief: `De Otero' and `De Re''.

42 CHAPTER 1


VI - HAECCEITIES AND INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES

"This is why, Monsieur, it seems to me, that I ought toregard as involved in my individual concept only what is ofsuch a nature that I would no longer be myself if it were

not in me, while on the other hand, everything which is ofsuch a nature that it might either happen to me or not hap-pen to me without my ceasing to be myself, should not beconsidered as involved in my individual concept..."

(Arnauld to Leibniz, May 13, 1686)

The concepts of haecceity and individual essence are closely related, an

individual essence of an entity, e, being an essential property of e which

could not be had by anything other than e As noted earlier, it has been

maintained that there couldn't be an unexemplified haecceity. In a similarvein, some philosophers hold that an unexemplified individual essence is animpossibility. Provided that these philosophers are correct, the concept ofan individual essence can be formally defined in the following manner,

(D3) E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x necessarily exemplifies E, and

E is necessarily such that —(3y) (y-Ax & y exemplifies E.))

If de re modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds along thelines indicated earlier, then (D3) can be reformulated in terms of possible

worlds. In particular:

E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x exemplifies E in every possible

world in which x exists, and in no possible world is E exemplified by

something other than x.)

But it is not obvious that every individual essence is exemplified. Afterall, there might be an unexemplified individual essence which could beexemplified by a particular. However, just as it appears that there could notbe a necessarily unexemplified haecceity, it appears that there could not bea necessarily unexemplified individual essence. Thus, I shall assume thatevery individual essence is possibly exemplified. The following amended

version of (D3) allows for (but doesn't logically entail) the existence ofunexemplified individual essences, inasmuch as it only requires that anindividual essence be possibly essential to an entity and necessarily repugnantto any other entity.

(D4) E is an individual essence =df. E is possibly such that: (3x)(x nec-essarily exemplifies E, and E is necessarily such that —(3y)(y#x &y exemplifies E)).

For example, suppose that Socrates has a haecceity, namely, being identicalwith Socrates. Call this haecceity H. Clearly, H satisfies (D4), since H ispossibly such that: (3x)(x—Socrates and x necessarily exemplifies H, and His necessarily such that —(3y)(y#x & y exemplifies H)). 38 Thus, H is anindividual essence. Inasmuch as an argument of this kind applies to everyhaecceity, every haecceity is an individual essence.' However, I arguebelow that some individual essences are not haecceities.

To begin, consider a property which everything has necessarily, forinstance, being such that whatever is red is colored. A characteristic of thissort is a universal essential property. A conjunction of a haecceity and auniversal essential property is an individual essence, for example, beingidentical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12 (PI), being identical withAristotle and such that 7+6=13 (P2), being identical with Aristotle and such

38A nominalist or a qualitative realist rejects the existence of H. Nevertheless, bothNominalism and Qualitative Realism are least formally consistent with the following thesis:Socrates is essentially identical with Socrates, and Socrates is necessarily diverse from any entityother than Socrates. That is: (3x)(x=Socrates & x is necessarily identical with x & y)(y#x —>x is necessarily not identical with y) ).

39Compare the following passage from Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On the Four

Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages,p. 589. "And if you ask, 'What is this individual being from which individual difference istaken? Is it not matter, or form, or the composite?' I reply that every quidditative entity,whether partial or total of any kind, is of itself indifferent, as quidditative entity, to this entityand that one...just as being "this" does not belong to it, so the opposite is not repugnant to itfrom its own character. And just as the composite insofar as it is a nature does not include thebeing by which it is "this", so neither does matter insofar as it is a nature, nor form. Therefore,this being is not matter, nor form, nor the composite, insofar as any of these is a nature..."From this passage, it seems that Scotus would regard a haecceity as an individual essence.

44 CHAPTER 1

that 7+7=14 (P3), and so on. Assuming a conjunctive property's conjunctsare proper parts of that conjunctive property, it follows that Aristotle's

haecceity is a proper part of P1, P2, P3, et cetera. Because it is impossible

for something to be a proper part of itself, Aristotle's haecceity and P1, P2,

P3, and so forth, are diverse. Hence, there are conjunctive individual

essences which are not haecceities. Since a parallel argument applies toevery haecceity, on the assumption that every entity has a haecceity, everyentity has a conjunctive individual essence other than its haecceity.Although this argument is not implausible, it depends on the assumption thatthe conjuncts of a conjunctive property are proper parts of that property.

A second argument which is plausible and which does not rely on this

assumption goes as follows. For any properties P and Q, if P is possibly

such that P has an attribute, A, or bears a relation, R, to something, z, (at a

time) when Q does not have A or bear R to z, then P#Q.4° Given that

Aristotle has a haecceity, it seems possible that Aristotle grasps thishaecceity by being aware of himself. Since it is possible that at some timeAristotle is aware of himself and mathematically unsophisticated, it appearspossible that at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp

either PI (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that

7+5=12), P2 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that

7+6=13), or P3 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that7+7=14), and so on. Hence, Aristotle's haecceity is diverse from P1, P2,

P3, and so forth. Parallel arguments imply that P1, P2, P3, et cetera, are

diverse from one another. Consequently, Aristotle has indefinitely manyindividual essences, only one of which is a haecceity. An argument of thiskind applies to any haecceity exemplified by a person. Such an argumentalso applies to any haecceity of an abstract entity which could be grasped.Therefore, a person or an abstract entity of this kind has innumerableindividual essences, only one of which is a haecceity.

40This principle follows assuming the appropriate versions of the principles of TheDiversity of The Dissimilar and The Necessity of Identity. According to the first principle,necessarily, for any x & y, and any time t, if at t x has an attribute A, or stands in a relation R

to something z, and at t y lacks A, or y is such that it does not bear R to z, then x^y. According

to the second principle, for any x & y, if x is identical with y, then x is necessarily identical with

y.


There are variants upon my first two arguments for saying that someindividual essences of concrete things are not haecceities. These variantsparallel the original arguments, and are at least as plausible as them, but areformulated in terms of different.universal essential properties. For example,instead of constructing individual essences by conjoining Aristotle'shaecceity with properties like being such that 7+5=12, being such that7+6=13, and being such that 7+7=14, individual essences can be constructedby conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with logically complex conditionalproperties such as (a) being colored if red, (b) being shaped if octagonal, and(c) being an animal if a cat. Like my second argument, these variantsmaintain that it is possible for Aristotle to grasp his haecceity without hisgrasping the conjunction of that haecceity and some universal essentialproperty. It is just as plausible that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity,and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with either (a), (b), or (c),as it was that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity, and fails to graspeither P1, P2, or P3 (as defined above).

Alternatively, an individual essence which is not a haecceity can beconstructed by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with a universal essentialproperty such as being self-identical. Such a variant upon my secondargument relies upon the following sub-argument in order to justify thepremise that possibly, at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and failsto grasp the conjunction of that haecceity with being self-identical. First,Aristotle's haecceity pertains to a specific concretum, namely, Aristotle. Incontrast, being self-identical is a wholly general property of which Aristotleis a particular instance. But, surely, in most cases an individual could graspa property which pertains to a specific concretum before he grasps a whollygeneral property of which that concretum is an instance. After all, one'sawareness of what is specific and concrete generally precedes, and causallycontributes to, one's awareness of what is general. Furthermore, being self-identical has a reflexive character which Aristotle's haecceity lacks. Hence,given that Aristotle could grasp his own haecceity, it seems possible that atsome time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp being self-identical. Moreover, Aristotle cannot grasp the conjunction of his haecceitywith being self-identical, unless he grasps both conjuncts of such aconjunction. Thus, it appears possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his

46 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 47

haecceity and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with being self-

identical.Another cogent reason for drawing such a conclusion here (as well as in

the previous parallel cases) is that possibly, Aristotle suffers from apsychological disability which allows him to grasp each of the relevantconjuncts, but not their conjunction.

Additionally, it seems that Concreteness and Personhood are nonuniversalessential characteristics of Aristotle, and hence that the conjunction of eitherof these two characteristics and Aristotle's haecceity is an individual essenceof Aristotle. It can be argued plausibly along lines parallel to those above(except that this parallel argument has nothing in it corresponding to thepoint about reflexivity in the earlier argument) that Aristotle could grasp hishaecceity without grasping either of the two conjunctions in question, andthat such conjunctions are individual essences which are not haecceities.

A further argument is also worth considering. If it can be assumed thatnumbers exist, then it can be argued plausibly that a number has indefinitelymany qualitative individual essences other than its haecceity. For example,if 2 exists, then 2's haecceity is the property of being identical with 2. Butconsider a qualitative individual essence of 2 such as being the even prime

(Al), being the square root of 4 (A2), being the cube root of 8 (A3), and so

on ad infinitum. Notice that possibly, 2's haecceity is grasped by a person

at a time at which Al, A2, A3, et cetera, are not grasped by that person.Thus, an argument of the sort used in the preceding case implies that thequalitative individual essences, Al, A2, A3, and so forth, and 2's haecceity

are diverse. In addition, parallel arguments imply that Al, A2, A3, and so

on, are diverse from one another. Hence, 2 has indefinitely many qualitativeindividual essences other than its haecceity. For any number n, a parallelargument implies that n has indefinitely many qualitative individual essences

other than its haecceity.Interestingly, haecceities and individual essences seem to diverge not only

when logical or mathematical properties are involved, but also in the case ofphenomenal qualities. For example, it can be argued plausibly that certaincolors have individual essences which are not haecceities. Consider the colorOrange. The haecceity of this color is the property of being identical withOrange. However, Orange has the following individual essence:

(El) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red andYellow, x is other than these colors, x is similar to Red, equallysimilar to Yellow, and more similar to Red or Yellow than is anyfourth color.

The fact that (El) and the following individual essence are necessarilycoinstantiated helps clarify the sense in which these colors are similar.

(E2) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red andYellow, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily such that:at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similar incolor to an instance of Red, equally similar in color to an instance ofYellow, and more similar in color to an instance of Red or Yellowthan is an instance of any fourth color.

The notion of a color being at the level of generality of Red and Yellow isexplicated below. Firstly, a color, Cl, is a variety of a color, C2, justprovided that (i) O (Vx)(x has Cl —> x has C2), and (ii) 0 (3x)(x has C2 &x lacks C1). For instance, if something has Crimson, then it has Red, butpossibly something has Red and lacks Crimson. Secondly, a color C is atthe level of generality of Red and Yellow if and only if C is a color whichis not a variety of another color. For example, Scarlet and Crimson arevarieties of Red, but Red is not a variety of another color. A color whichis not a variety of another color may be said to be a highest species of color.

We can now see why it is plausible that (E2) is an individual essence ofOrange which is other than Orange's haecceity. Notice that possibly, aperson has visual experiences of red and yellow, but never has a visualexperience of orange. It seems possible that such a person grasps (E2)without grasping Orange. Thus, it appears that possibly, a person grasps(E2) without grasping the haecceity of Orange. Inasmuch as (E2) is anindividual essence of Orange, it seems possible that a person grasps anindividual essence of Orange without grasping Orange's haecceity.Moreover, it is possible that a person grasps the haecceity of Orange withoutgrasping (E2), since (E2) is much more complex than this haecceity.Employing a pattern of argument introduced above, we can see that these

48

CHAPTER 1


49

possibilities make it plausible that (E2) is an individual essence of Orangewhich is other than Orange's haecceity.

Parallel reasoning leads to the conclusion that Red has the followingindividual essence other than its haecceity.

(E3)being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Yellowand Orange, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily suchthat: at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similarin color to an instance of Orange, equally similar in color to aninstance of Orange as is an instance of Yellow, and more similar incolor to an instance of Orange than is an instance of any color other

than x with the exception of Yellow.

Next, consider the nonchromatic colors Blackness and Whiteness. The

haecceity of Whiteness is being identical with Whiteness. In addition,

Whiteness seems to have the following individual essence:

(E4) being the opposite of Blackness.

If there are negative properties, then some pairs of properties are formal

contradictories, for example, being white and being nonwhite, being

triangular and being nontriangular, and so on. Other pairs of properties are

contraries, for instance, being white and being green. Contraries are not

coinstantiable, but are not formally contradictory. Finally, some contraries

are opposites, for example, Whiteness and Blackness, Hotness and Coldness,Smoothness and Roughness, et cetera. All opposites are contraries, but notall contraries are opposites. For instance, being triangular has no opposite,

though it has contraries, for example, being square, being circular, being

hexagonal, and so forth.We are now in a position to see why it is plausible that (E4) is an

individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness's haecceity.Observe that possibly, a person has visual experiences of white, but lacks avisual experience of black. It seems possible that such a person graspsWhiteness without grasping Blackness. Consequently, it appears possiblethat a person grasps the haecceity of Whiteness without grasping (E4). In

addition, it is possible that a person has visual experiences of black, lacks avisual experience of white, and has tactual experiences of hot and cold. Itseems that possibly, a person of this sort grasps Blackness and Oppositionwithout grasping Whiteness. Hence, it appears possible that a person grasps(E4) without grasping Whiteness's haecceity. Utilizing a by now familiarpattern of argument, we can see that these possibilities make it plausible that(E4) is an individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness'shaecceity.

A parallel argument shows that

(E5) being the opposite of Whiteness,

an individual essence of Blackness, is other than the haecceity of Blackness(being identical with Blackness).

Ernest Sosa has argued forcefully that if property A is the philosophicalanalysis of property B, then A=B, although it may (misleadingly) appear thatpossibly, somebody grasps B without grasping A.`" However, I will showthat for each of the earlier sorts of cases in which it seems that possibly,someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences, there isa case of that sort in which neither one of two coinstantiated individualessences can be plausibly regarded as an analysis of the other. If I am right,then Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim that possibly, someonegrasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences.

In the case of individual essences such as being identical with Aristotle,being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12, being identical withAristotle and colored i f red, being identical with Aristotle and self-identical,and so on, it is clear that none of these properties is an analysis of any of theothers: none of these properties explicates or explains any of the others inthe way required by a philosophical analysis. Parallel remarks apply to apair of individual essences such as being identical with 2 and being thesquare root of 4.

Turning to our pairs of individual essences of colors, I shall argue thateither being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2), or being

41 See Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710.

50 CHAPTER 1

identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3), and either being identical with

Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4), or being identical with Blackness is not

analyzable as (E5). To begin with, suppose for the sake of a reductio that

being identical with Whiteness is analyzable as (E4), and being identical with

Blackness is analyzable as (E5). In that case, being white is analyzable as

being the opposite of black, and being black is analyzable as being the

opposite of white. But any attempt to analyze Whiteness in terms ofBlackness while analyzing Blackness in terms of Whiteness is viciouslycircular. Hence, each of these pairs of supposed analyses contains at leastone member which is not a genuine analysis.

Likewise, assume for the purposes of a reductio that being identical with

Orange is analyzable as (E2), and being identical with Red is analyzable as

(E3). Surely, then, being orange is analyzable in terms of being yellow and

being red, and being red is analyzable in terms of being yellow and being

orange. However, any effort to analyze being orange in terms of being red

while analyzing being red in terms of being orange is viciously circular.

Therefore, at least one member of each of these pairs of supposed analyses

is not a bona fide analysis.Moreover, in what follows I will argue that (E2), (E3), (E4), and (E5) are

not analyzable as being identical with Orange, being identical with Red,

being identical with Whiteness, and being identical with Blackness,

respectively.Suppose for the sake of a reductio that either (E4) is analyzable as being

identical with Whiteness or (E5) is analyzable as being identical with

Blackness. In that event, either being the opposite of white is analyzable as

being black or being the opposite of black is analyzable as being white. In

either case,' we have a philosophical analysis whose analysans is less

complex, logically speaking, than its analysandum. However, according to

Sosa's conception of philosophical analysis, the analysans must be of greater

logical complexity than the analysandum.42 Moreover, this is a plausible

420n Sosa's view, an analysis resolves a complex attribute, A, into more basic components,

viz., A's logical parts. His view implies that in an analysis the analysans must involve a logicalcomplex, e.g., a conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc. This requirement does not seem to besatisfied if one either seeks to analyze (E4) as being identical with Whiteness or seeks to analyze

(E5) as being identical with Blackness.


51

requirement for a philosophical analysis.' I conclude that none of theseexamples is an authentic analysis.

Similarly, it is evident that if (E2) is analyzable as being identical withOrange or (E3) is analyzable as being identical with Red, then a philosophi-cal analysis can have an analysandum of greater logical complexity than itsanalysans. Since we have ruled out the possibility of such a philosophicalanalysis, neither of these cases is a genuine analysis.

In sum, either being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2) andvice-versa, or being identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3) and vice-versa; and either being identical with Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4) andvice-versa, or being identical with Blackness is not analyzable as (E5) andvice-versa. We have seen that for each of the earlier sorts of cases in whichit seems that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiatedindividual essences, there is a case of that sort in which neither one of twocoinstantiated individual essences can be plausibly regarded as an analysisof the other. Hence, Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim thatpossibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences.

Let us take stock for a moment. In the light of the foregoing arguments,two things are plausible. First, if there are haecceities, then some entitieshave a plurality of individual essences. Second, if there are haecceities, thensome individual essences are not haecceities. 44 Of course, if an entity has

43Note that this requirement implies that being identical with Aristotle and such that7+5=12 cannot be analyzed as being identical with Aristotle and being the square root of 4cannot be analyzed as being identical with 2. This confirms some of the conclusions reachedearlier about these and other similar examples.

44Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object; and Alvin Piantinga, "World andEssence," Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), pp. 380-386. According to their definitions of theterm `haecceity', 'haecceity' means individual essence. Thus, given their definitions, thesentence 'All individual essences are haecceities' is trivially true. The truth of this sentenceappears to be incompatible with my contention that some individual essences are not haecceities.However, I am not convinced that this appearance of incompatibility is more than a mereappearance, since I suspect that Chisholm and Plantinga introduce 'haecceity' as a technicalterm. If my suspicions are correct, then Chisholm's and Plantinga's definitions of 'haecceity'are stipulative, and do not reflect a substantive thesis about haecceities and individual essences.In any case, since my sense of haecceity is legitimate, and since it seems that some individualessences are not haecceities in that sense, it is a significant drawback of Chisholm's andPlantinga's definitions of 'haecceity' that on these definitions the sentence 'Some individual

52 CHAPTER 1


53

a plurality of individual essences, then these essences are necessarilycoexemplified.' Hence, it seems (as has oft been argued) that necessarycoexemplification is not sufficient for property identity.

If for any property A and any property B the necessary coexemplification

of A and B is sufficient for A's being identical with B, then property identity

is coarse grained. Otherwise, property identity is fine grained. In the light

of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there are haecceities, thenproperty identity is fine grained.

Finally, note that no more than one of any plurality of coexemplifiedindividual essences is a haecceity: the coexemplification of individualessences does not imply the coexemplification of haecceities.

essences are not haecceities' is trivially false.

45A property PI and a property P2 are necessarily coexemplified =df. P1 is necessarily

such that for any x, x has P1 if and only if x has P2.

VII - VARIETIES OF REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM

"In some shape or other, Nominalism and Realismstill divide between them the empire of thought."

(1864 Burton The Scot Abroad II. i. 16)

Since haecceities are properties, the existence, of haecceities entails Realism,the doctrine that properties exist. Of course, if there are properties, then aproperty cannot be eliminated in favor of an entity of another kind orontological category, for instance, a concept, a linguistic expression, anevent, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, or a set. 46

However, Realism may be either Robust or Anemic. According to AnemicRealism, properties exist, but a property is reducible to or identifiable witha concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, a set,or the like." For example, one variety of Anemic Realism maintains thatproperties can be identified with concepts, a kind of mind-dependentconcrete entity, for instance, the property of Horseness=the concept ofHorseness, the property of Unicornicity= the concept of Unicornicity, and soforth. On the other hand, Robust Realism says that properties exist, andPropertyhood is a fundamental ontological category. Propertyhood is afundamental ontological category just in case a property is not reducible toor identifiable with a concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, acollection, a relation, a set, or the like. Note that on my understanding ofwhat it is for Propertyhood to be a fundamental ontological category,Propertyhood's having this status is consistent with the nonexistence ofproperties or with a property's being eliminable in favor of an entity ofanother kind or ontological category.

Such eliminability of properties entails Anti-Realism, the doctrine thatproperties do not exist. Traditionally, Anti-Realism takes one of two forms.Nominalism denies that there are properties, maintaining that a property is

461f an entity, e, is eliminated in favor of e*, then e fails to exist.

471f an entity, e, is reduced to or identified with an entity, e*, then necessarily, e exists ifand only if e* exists.

54 CHAPTER 1

a nonconcrete entity and only concrete entities exist. Thus, Nominalismimplies that neither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornic-ity exists. Conceptualism adds to Nominalism the claim that there areconcepts, and that a putative reference to a property can be replaced with areference to a concept. In other words, Conceptualism is the thesis thatproperties can be eliminated in favor of concepts. For instance, althoughneither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornicity exists,

concepts of Horseness and Unicornicity exist.Let us now return to a consideration of Robust Realism. A standard

defense of Robust Realism is based on an argument in favor of the existence

of qualitative properties. In Chapter 2, I will provide a nonstandard defenseof Robust Realism, one which is based on an argument in favor of the

existence of nonqualitative properties.There are two traditional varieties of Robust Realism: Extreme Realism

and Moderate Realism. According to Moderate Realism, every property isexemplified, for example, Horseness exists, but not Unicornicity. On theother hand, Extreme Realism maintains that some properties are exemplifiedand some are not, for instance, Horseness and Unicornicity, respectively.

Two opposing forms of Extreme Realism may be distinguished.

According to Weak Extreme Realism, every unexemplified property can beidentified with a logical complex of exemplified properties. For example,the unexemplified property of being a horned horse is a conjunction of twoexemplified properties, namely, being horned and being a horse. WeakExtreme Realism would seem to be a cross between Extreme Realism and

Moderate Realism. In contrast, Strong Extreme Realism maintains that someunexemplified properties cannot be identified with logical complexes of

exemplified properties.In Chapter 3 I argue that (i) Strong Extreme Realism is true on the

grounds that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities whichcorrespond to mereologically and causally disjoint NEPs and which cannot

be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties. Furthermore,I argue in Chapter 5 that (ii) it is impossible that anyone grasps or picks outan unexemplified haecceity of this kind, and (iii) some of these unexempli-fied haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. (i)-(iii) entails Radical Realism,a form of Extreme Realism holding that there are unexemplified properties


which cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified propertiesand which are mind-independent in the strong sense of (ii)-(iii). 48

Notice that if the existence of a property entails that there is a consciousbeing who can grasp or pick out that property, then there is a sense in whicha property is mind-dependent. However, although Strong Extreme Realismentails that a property cannot be identified with a concept, this form ofRealism is consistent with the claim that the existence of a property entailsthat God grasps or picks out that property. In contrast, since RadicalRealism asserts that some properties are mind-independent in the strongsense of (ii)-(iii), Radical Realism is not consistent with this claim. Hence,Radical Realism is a higher grade of Realism than Strong Extreme Realism.If my argument in this book succeeds, then Radical Realism is justified.

48The reader may find it useful to compare these positions on the ontological status of

properties with the related traditional responses to the problem of universals described in SectionII of this chapter. A relevant and up-to-date overview of various positions on the ontologicalstatus of properties is provided in H. Burkhardt and 13. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysicsand Ontology, 2 vols. (Munich: Philosophia, Verlag, 1991). The following handbook entriesare especially relevant: Attribute (pp. 65 -70), Abstract/Concrete, (pp. 4- 5), Conceptualism (pp.168-174), Metaphysics VI: Systematic Metaphysics (548-553), Nominalism (pp. 618 -619), andUniversals (pp. 921-553).

56

CHAPTER 1

VIII - THE CONCRETE/ABSTRACT DISTINCTION

"Logicians in almost every age have endeavoured to frame schemesof classification in which things should be arranged according totheir real nature. To these the name of Categories-has been given."

(1849 Abp. Thomson Outline of the Laws of Thought § 97)

Realists and antirealists presuppose an intuitive distinction between abstracta

and concreta in their debates about the problem of universals and theontological status of properties. In order to remind ourselves of the data forthis distinction, let us look once again at examples which illustrate the

distinction. Examples of abstracta are Triangularity (a property), Diversity

(a relation), there being horses (a proposition), my singleton set, and the

number 7. Examples of concreta are a stone (a material substance), God (a

disembodied spiritual substance), Hurricane Carol (an event), instants andseconds (times), points and expanses of space (places), the particularsquareness of a certain item (a trope), the sum of Venus and Pluto (acollection), the Earth's surface (a limit), and shadows and gaps (privations).It is desirable that a philosophical analysis of the concrete/abstract distinctionallow for the possibility of entities of any intelligible sorts, given someplausible view about the nature, existence conditions, and interrelationships

of entities of those sorts. This desideratum seems to require allowing for thepossibility of entities of the aforementioned kinds. Six attempts have beenmade to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction.

(1) Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially located or spatially related to

something.(2) Unlike abstracta, concreta are capable of moving or undergoing

intrinsic change.(3) Concreta have contingent existence, whereas abstracta have necessary

existence.(4) Unlike concreta, abstracta are exemplifiable.

(5) Unlike concreta, abstracta are (intellectually) graspable.

(6) Unlike abstracta, concreta can be causes or effects.(1) is inadequate because a disembodied spirit is concrete but neither

spatially located nor spatially related to something. Alternatively, we might


amend (1) to read as follows. (1') Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatiallyor temporally located, or spatially or temporally related to something.Arguably, it is necessary that a soul is temporally located or enters intotemporal relations. Still, (1') is flawed: properties are abstract, but it seemsthat some properties enter into temporal relations, for example, Wakefulnessis exemplified by Aristotle at one time and not at another. Although somephilosophers claim that abstracta are outside of time, this claim is problem-atic, since as the example of Wakefulness and Aristotle implies, abstractaundergo relational change. An entity's being temporal does not imply thatit undergoes nonrelational change, for instance, a sphere which does notundergo nonrelational change and which other spheres orbit is in time.

(2) is inadequate because points and instants are concrete but incapable ofeither moving or undergoing intrinsic change.

(3) is subject to three complaints or difficulties. Firstly, a being such asthe theistic God is concrete yet has necessary existence. Secondly, accordingto Aristotelian Realism a property cannot exist unexemplified. AristotelianRealism implies that some properties are abstract yet have contingentexistence. Thirdly, sets of ordinary concreta are abstract but seem to havecontingent existence.

(4) is objectionable because sets, propositions, and properties such asbeing a spherical cube are abstract but could not be exemplified.

(5) is unsatisfactory because it seems that abstracta of certain kinds couldnot be grasped, for instance, sets of concreta or haecceities which can beexemplified by necessarily nonconscious material substances.'

(6) is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. According to one camp,causes and effects are concrete events.' On this view, (6) has the absurdimplication that substances are nonconcrete. One reply is that substances(but not abstracta) can be involved in causal relations. But, if causes andeffects are concrete events, then it is hard to fathom the sense of "involve-

49For an argument that such haecceities are ungraspable see Chapter 5, section X.

50See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in

Honor of C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234,"Causal Relations," Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967), pp. 691-703, and "Events as Particulars,"Nous, IV (1970), pp. 25-32.

58 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES 59

ment" intended. For according to an event ontology, an event's occurring

does not entail that a substance exists, and an event is not a substances'sexemplifying a property at a time or the like. Moreover, since causalrelations hold in virtue of laws correlating properties of things, in a sense

abstracta are involved in causal relations. Finally, there is evidence that

facts or the like can be causes or effects, but facts are abstracta. 51

Below, I attempt to devise an adequate analysis of the concrete/abstractdistinction.' The basic idea of my analysis is that an entity is abstract orconcrete in virtue of meeting certain conditions qua being an instance of the

ontological category to which it belongs. This notion of an ontologicalcategory needs to be explained, since every entity is of many different kindsor categories of varying degrees or levels of generality or specificity. Thus,to develop my analysis I must specify the degree of generality of theontological categories I have in mind. This is a kind of generality problem

51 These observations provide a reply to the following argument. (1) An abstract entitycannot enter into causal relations. (2) We have knowledge about an entity only if that entityenters into causal relations. Therefore, (3) We cannot have knowledge about an abstract entity.In the light of those observations, it would seem that either (1) or (2) is false. That is, either(1) is false because facts or the like are abstract and can enter into causal relations, or (2) isfalse for either of the following two reasons. (i) We have knowledge about material substanceswhich cannot enter into causal relations. (ii) Although abstracta cannot enter into causal

relations, there is a sense in which abstracta are involved in causal relations, and we can haveknowledge about an entity if it is involved in causal relations in that sense. Compare JaegwonKim, "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," Philosophical Studies,

40 (1981), pp. 339-354.

52It seems that a consideration of difficulties such as the foregoing ones have led somephilosophers to doubt whether there is such a ""-g as the concrete/abstract distinction at all.For example, in "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," p. 348,Jaegwon Kim wrote as follows. "The force of saying that something is 'abstract' or 'platonic'has never been made clear. One sense sometimes attached to 'abstract' is that of 'eternal'; anabstract object in this sense neither comes into being nor perishes. Another closely related senseis that of not being in space and time. Abstract entities in this sense are atemporal andnonspatial: they lack location in space-time. A third sense is that of 'necessary'; abstract entitiesin this sense are said to 'exist necessarily'. It is by no means obvious that these three sensesare equivalent: for example, one traditional concept of God makes him abstract in the first andthird sense but not in the second." Kim's skepticism about the very existence of theconcrete/abstract distinction will prove to be unwarranted if I succeed in providing aphilosophical analysis of this distinction, and in arguing that this analysis is adequate to theintuitions philosophers have had about how the distinction applies to particular cases.

(of which there are many examples in philosophy). I shall provide a solutionto this problem by giving informal and formal accounts of the appropriatedegree of generality of an ontological category or kind of entity.

As I have indicated, ontological categories are of different levels ofgenerality, and are related to one another as species and genus. Thus, thesecategories constitute a system of classification which reflects these logicalrelations. In what follows, I will (i) characterize this system, and (ii)analyze a level of generality (which I shall call level C) within this systemwhich is crucial to my attempt to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction.

Step 1A category, Cl, and a category, C2, are equivalent just provided that Cl

and C2 are necessarily coinstantiated; Cl is instantiable if and only if Cl ispossibly instantiated; and Cl subsumes C2 just in case Cl and C2 are suchthat necessarily, any instance of C2 is an instance of Cl, and possibly, someinstance of Cl is not an instance of C2. For example, being an event andbeing an occurrence are equivalent categories. Any two equivalentcategories are at the same level of generality. On the other hand, if Asubsumes B, then A is at a higher level of generality than B For instance,being an abstract entity subsumes being a property. Notice that in thistechnical or logician's sense of subsumption a noninstantiable category issubsumed by any instantiable category, and a category that must beuniversally instantiated subsumes any category that need not be universallyinstantiated.

Step 2

There is an intuitive notion of a hierarchy of levels of generality amongontological categories." At the highest level (level A) is the category ofbeing an entity which everything instantiates and which is therefore a kindof limiting case. At a lower level (level B) are the categories of Concrete-ness and Abstractness. At a yet lower level (level C) are the categorieswhich are the various types of concreta and abstracta, just provided thatthese categories are instantiable. Below, I list typical or core categories that

53See Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance,"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835 -853.

Level A Entity

Level B Abstract Concrete

Level C Property Relation Proposition Event Time Place Substance Limit Col ection Privation Trope

60 CHAPTER 1

are at level C on the foregoing proviso."

List L: Property, Relation, Proposition, Event, Time, Place, Trope,Collection, Limit, and Privation.

Seemingly, some categories at C level are not on L, for example, Substanceand Set. At a level of generality lower than C (call it level D) are those

instantiable ontological categories which are the various types of the

categories at level C. For instance, at level D we find types of Substance,for example, Material Object, or Spirit; types of Event, for instance, MaterialEvent, or Spiritual Event; types of Limit, for example, Surface, or Line, orInstant; and types of Privation, for instance, Shadow, or Hole. More specifictypes are at lower levels of generality.


(Al) There are at least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories ofconcreta at level C (at least one of which is on L), and there are atleast two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of abstracta at levelC (at least one of which is on L.)

I employ intuitive conceptions of the categories on L, and presuppose(plausibly, I think) that not every instance (actual or possible) of a categoryon L is identifiable with an instance of another ontological category. (Theirreducibility of a category on L that this implies is consistent with theeliminability of an entity of such a category in favor of an entity of anotherontological category.) If the foregoing presupposition is mistaken, then thecategories that make it so should be removed from L. The only limitationI place on this process of removal is that (Al) be true, and that whatevercategories satisfy (Al) be compatible with the above presupposition.

Step 3

Presumably,

(D1) A category Cl is at level C =df either (i) Cl is on L, and Cl isinstantiable, or (ii) [(a) Cl is not on L, and Cl does not subsume aninstantiable category on L, and no category on L subsumes Cl, and(b) there is no category C2 which satisfies the conditions in(ii)(a) and which subsumes C/1 55

Observe that by a 'category' I mean an ontological category in an intuitivesense, paradigm cases of which include Property,. Relation, Proposition, Set,Substance, Event, Time, Place, Trope, Collection, Limit, and Privation.Such categories are the more general or more fundamental kinds of being.A system of classification which is comprised of such categories and whichis applicable to all possible kinds of beings helps clarify the nature of reality.Although the intuitive concept of a genuine ontological kind may be hard toanalyze, it is necessary to use this notion both in the study of ontology ingeneral, and in the framing of a particular ontology - enterprises involved in

55That CI is instantiable if it is not on L is ensured by the condition in (ii)(a) that nocategory on L subsumes Cl, because (as noted earlier) a noninstantiable category is subsumedby an instantiable one, and because (A 1) implies that some category on L is instantiable.

Figure 1

Level D

Material Object Spirit

54Compare Aristotle, Categoriae, in J. L. Ackrill trans., Aristotle's Categories and De

Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

62 CHAPTER 1

any attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the world. Whileall categories are properties, some properties are not categories, for example,Redness, Squareness, Bachelorhood, and (the disjunctive property of) beinga substance or a surface.' A property which is not an ontological categoryipso facto fails to satisfy (D1).

As noted earlier, the categories of being a substance and being a set are

not on L but are at level C (assuming they are instantiable and irreducible).A category of this kind satisfies (D1) by virtue of satisfying clause (ii) of(D1). This clause has two parts (a) and (b). Let us see why being a

substance and being a set (if they are instantiable and irreducible) satisfyboth of these parts. First of all, the category of Substance (Set) satisfies

(ii)(a) because it is not on L and neither subsumes nor is subsumed by a

category on L. In aristotelian terms, the category of Substance (Set) isneither a genus nor a species of a category on L. In addition, the categoryof Substance (Set) appears to satisfy clause (ii)(b), since it seems that everycategory that subsumes Substance (Set) also subsumes an instantiablecategory on L. For instance, given (Al), being concrete is a category that

subsumes Substance, and being abstract is a category that subsumes Set.

56Do Contingent Being and Necessary Being count as ontological categories? If theContingent Being/Necessary Being distinction is necessarily coextensive with the Con-crete/Abstract distinction, then perhaps they do. On the other hand, it has often been maintainedthat there is a concrete being that has necessary existence, e.g., the theistic God. If so, thensome substances, e.g., tables, are contingent beings and some are necessary beings. It has alsobeen held that there are sets of ordinary concrete objects which are abstract and have contingentexistence. If so, then some sets are contingent beings and some, e.g., the null set, are necessarybeings. In that case, even though Substance and Set are ontological categories, neitherSubstance nor Set is subsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being. However, aclassificatory system of ontological categories is a hierarchial system of genera and species inwhich every ontological category is a genus or species. If the universal category, Entity, wereto be divided into Contingent Being and Necessary Being, and neither Substance nor Set weresubsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being, then neither Substance nor Set wouldbe an ontological category which is either a genus or a species in the classificatory system inquestion. This is contrary to my assumption that Substance and Set are such categories. Hence,a classificatory system of the sort required has not been provided, and the modal categories ofNecessary Being and Contingent Being are not genuine ontological kinds or categories.Analogously, assuming that Lion is a biological kind, a proper biological system of classificationwould not divide living things into two kingdoms Female and Nonfemale, since in that caseLion would not appear as a genus or species in the classificatory hierarchy: only Female Lionand Nonfemale Lion would so appear.


Moreover, given (Al), being concrete subsumes some instantiable categoryon L, that is, being a time, or being a place, or being an event, and so forth,and being abstract subsumes some instantiable category on L, namely, beinga property, or being a relation, or being a proposition, and so on. It seemsthat parallel considerations apply to, any category that subsumes Substance(Set)."

Figure 2

Above C level Concrete

Level C Substance (off L) Event Time Place... (on L)

Below C level Material Object Material Event

Figure 3

Above C level

Level C

Abstract

\■Set (off L) Property Relation Proposition... (on L)

57Thus, my account of a level C category in terms of L and (DI) generates a "list" ofcategories of being that is open-ended. In other words, (DI) is logically compatible with twothings. Firstly, that there are one or more level C categories which are not on L. Secondly, thatone or more of the categories on L are not at level C (because they are not instantiable). Hence,(DI) differs from Aristotle's list of the categories of being, which has afixed membership. (SeeAristotle, Categoriae, Chapter 4.) My general approach to the theory of categories is compatiblewith Brian Carr's account of the "metaphysical enterprise of categorial description" in hisMetaphysics: An Introduction (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987),Chapter 1. On page 9, Carr states that such a descriptive enterprise "seeks to spell out thefundamental features of our thought and talk about reality, assuming neither the adequacy orotherwise of such categories to reality in itself nor the fixed or changing nature of that thoughtand talk."

64 CHAPTER 1


65

It should also be observed that a category C* not on L which is at ahigher level than C both fails to satisfy (i) of (D1), and fails to satisfy (ii)(a)of (D1) (because C* subsumes some instantiable category on L). Thus, such

a category C* does not meet (D1). (An example is the category of beingconcrete.) Furthermore, a category C* (at a level lower than C) that is sub-

sumed by a level C category on L fails to satisfy both (i) of (Dl) (inasmuchas C* either will not be on L or else will not be instantiable) and (ii)(a) of(D1) (because C* is subsumed by some instantiable category on L). Hence,

a category C* of this kind does not satisfy (Dl). (An example might be thecategory of being a material event). In addition, a category C* (at a levellower than C) that is subsumed by a level C category not on L both fails to

meet (i) of (D1) (since C* will not be on L) and fails to meet (ii)(b) of (D1).

Therefore, such a category C* does not satisfy (D1). (An example might bethe category of being a material object.) 58

58Since (D1) presupposes (A1), which implies that there are at least two instantiablecategories of abstracta at level C, a nominalist might object to (D1), arguing that no category

of abstractum is instantiable. As I have implied, I framed (D1) in as ontologically neutral afashion as possible. Nevertheless, an altemative to (D1) can be framed which is compatiblewith Nominalism. In that case, the category of being concrete would be necessarily coextensivewith the category of being an entity, and categories of concreta such as Substance, Time, Place,etc., would be at the second level (level B). (Al) would be replaced with (A1*): there are atleast two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of concreta at level B (at least one of which is

on L). A formal account of a category's being at level B would then parallel the account Iprovide of a category's being at level C in (DI), where the term, 'level C', is replaced with theterm, 'level B'. Similarly, if an extreme platonist were to object to (DI) on the ground that nocategory of concretum is instantiable, (D1) could be revised in order to satisfy such a criticalong lines parallel to the foregoing.

Although I refer to various ontological categories, which I regard as abstracta, if thenominalist program were to be successful, it would have the resources to paraphrase all suchreferences in nominalistic terms, including any references of these sorts which involveattributions of a metaphysical modality, de dicto or de re. For the purposes of my theory ofcategories, I do not rule out the possibility of the nominalist program being successful.However, since I argue in this book that a form of Property-Realism is correct, I do not takeseriously the claim that no category of abstractum is instantiable when formulating my analysisof Concreteness in (D2) below. If no category of abstractum is instantiable, then my analysisof Concreteness in (D2) can be amended by replacing the term 'level C' with the term 'levelB'.

Step 4

(D2) x is concrete =df x instantiates a level C category which possibly hasan instance having spatial or temporal parts.

(D3) x is abstract =df. x is nonconcrete. 59

My analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction incorporates the classicalnotion that this distinction can be understood in terms of spatiality andtemporality. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that this analysisadequately handles the problem cases presented earlier.

To begin with, notice that a disembodied spirit instantiates the level Ccategory of Substance. Likewise, for a necessary being such as the theisticGod. However, the category of Substance possibly has an instance havingspatial parts, that is, a complex material substance. Hence, a disembodiedspirit, or the theistic God, satisfies (D2): it instantiates a level C categorywhich possibly has an instance having spatial parts. Thus, (D2) has thewelcome implication that a disembodied spirit, or the theistic God, is aconcretum. (D2) has this welcome implication even if God is a soul whohas necessary existence and who is neither spatially located nor spatiallyrelated to anything.

A point instantiates the level C category of Place, and an instantinstantiates the level C category of Time. Yet, the former category possiblyhas an instance having spatial parts, for example, some expanse of space, andthe latter category possibly has an instance having temporal parts, forinstance, some period of time. Thus, (D2) has the happy consequence that

59As (D3) illustrates, Abstractness can be explicated in wholly negative terms, inasmuch

as the concrete/abstract distinction is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Notice that a categorialdivision of this kind is possible only at level B. No intelligible ontological category below levelB can be explicated in wholly negative terms. Attempting to explicate such a category, x, inwholly negative terms is, after all, not to distinguish x from other categories which are at thesame level of generality as x and which can also be described in those negative terms. Toexplicate such a category and to distinguish it from other categories at the same level ofgenerality, one must sufficiently characterize the positive nature of that category. Of course,these considerations do not apply to an explication of Abstractness, since it is at level B, andConcreteness is the only other category at level B.

66 CHAPTER 1

points and instants are concreta. (D2) has this happy consequence despite

the fact that points and instants are incapable of either motion or intrinsic

change.Notice that the level C categories of Property and Trope could not be

coinstantiated. Unlike the category of Trope, the category of Property does

not possibly have an instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A

property does not satisfy (D2): it does not instantiate a level C category

which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. Therefore,a property is not a concrete entity. Hence, (D3) has the desired result thata property is an abstract entity. (D3) has this desired result with respect to

a property, P, even if P has contingent existence, P is necessarily unexempli-

fied, P is necessarily ungraspable, P is temporally located, or P enters into

temporal relations.Analogously to the level C categories of Property and Trope, the level C

categories of Proposition and Event could not be coinstantiated. Unlike thecategory of Event, the category of Proposition does not possibly have an

instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A proposition does not meet

(32): it does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has aninstance having spatial or temporal parts. Consequently, a proposition is nota concrete entity. Thus, (D3) has the desirable outcome that a propositionis an abstract entity. (D3) has this desirable outcome despite the fact that a

proposition cannot be exemplified.Finally, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated by something

having spatial or temporal parts. This follows from the fact that a set cannot

have parts. Aside from any elements a set may have, a set has no parts.For example, the empty set has no parts. Although a set can have elements,it is demonstrable that an element of a set is not a part of that set. It isaxiomatic that the relation of proper parthood is transitive: necessarily, if x

is part of y, and y is part of z, then x is part of z. But the relation of

elementhood is not transitive: for example, x is an element of {x}, {x} is an

element of {{x} }, but x is not an element of {{x}}. Therefore, Elementhoodcannot be identified with Parthood. Since aside from its elements a set hasno parts, a set cannot have parts. Hence, unlike the level C category of

Collection, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated bysomething having spatial or temporal parts. A set does not satisfy (D2): it


does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an instance havingspatial or temporal parts. Therefore, a set is not a concrete entity.Consequently, (D3) has the desired result that a set is an abstract entity.'(D3) has this desired result with respect to a set, S, even if S has contingentexistence, S is necessarily unexemplified, or S is necessarily ungraspable.

I shall conclude by answering a possible criticism of (D2) and (D3). Itmight be objected that (D2)'s account of Concreteness is viciously circular,on the ground that (D2) employs the notion of a level C ontologicalcategory, while my intuitive characterization of an ontological category'sbeing at level C makes use of the level B distinction between Concretenessand Abstractness. However, although this is true of my intuitive character-ization of what it is for an ontological category to be at level C, my formalaccount of this notion in no way utilizes the level B notions of Abstractnessor Concreteness. My formal account captures the notion of a level Ccategory solely in terms of certain logical relationships that such a category

60In his Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), David Lewis argues that thesingleton subsets of a set, s, are parts of s (though not spatial or temporal parts), and s is themereological sum of those singletons. Unlike the elementhood relation, the subset relation istransitive. Yet, it is not clear that Lewis employs the standard notion of a set that I employ: heis explicitly skeptical about its intelligibility. If this notion is unintelligible, then my category,Set, is noninstantiable. Moreover, Lewis's view of the natures of sums and sets is incompatiblewith my classificatory system of ontic categories. He permits the mereological addition of anytwo entities (even assuming that there are both concreta and abstracta), but I cannot, becauseI uphold the concrete/abstract distinction as exhaustive and exclusive, and because the sum ofa concretum and an (equally complex) abstractum, e.g., the sum of a point and a (simple)property, respectively, has an equal claim both to be concrete and to be abstract. Unless Lewis'sconceptions of sumhood and sethood fit into an altemative system of ontic classification whichis at least as good as the one that I have picscuted, these Lewisian claims about sums and setscan reasonably be rejected. I would argue that there is no such alternative system.

Penelope Maddy, in her Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), incontradistinction to Lewis, denies that sets of concreta are abstracta. However, Maddy operateswith an inadequate understanding of abstractness. She accepts the view that abstractness canbe identified with not being in space and time, a view whose inadequacy follows from acriticism presented earlier. In particular, souls would not be in space and time, but they wouldnot be abstract entities. Moreover, her substantive thesis that a set of concreta is located inspace and time is formally consistent with my claim that a set of concreta is an abstract entitywhich lacks spatial or temporal parts, since an entity's being located in space and time does notentail that it has spatial or temporal parts, as illustrated by the possible case of a spatially andtemporally located point-particle which lacks both spatial parts and temporal parts.

68 CHAPTER 1


must bear to my core list L of categories. Hence, (D2) is not conceptuallycircular in the way alleged, and the criticism under discussion is unsound. 61

IX - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVEPROPERTIES

"These conceptions are either of particulars, viz., individual things,or of generals."[1773 Monboddo Of the Origins and Progress of Language I. i. 5(1774)]

The distinction between qualitative and nonqualitative properties orpropositions is often explained in linguistic terms. For example, a nonquali-tative property is characterized as a property which is expressed by apredicate manufactured with the help of a proper name or indexical indicatordesignating a concrete object, and a qualitative property is characterized asa property which is expressed by a predicate which is free of any suchsingular term.

Such a linguistic account is not wholly satisfactory. This is because anaccount of this kind characterizes a distinction among nonlinguistic entities,for instance, properties, by appealing to linguistic criteria. A deeper accountof such a distinction characterizes it in terms of nonlinguistic criteria. Apreliminary formulation of such an account is given below.

(Dl) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative (i) there is ahaecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii)P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P grasps H.

(D2) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative P is not nonquali-tative.

Let us consider an objection to this initial formulation of my account. Itmight be argued that there are qualitative properties or propositions ofinfinite length, for example, ones which involve infinitely many conjunctsor disjuncts, and that an infinitely long qualitative property or propositioncould not be grasped. According to this objection, since anything whateverfollows from an impossibility, and since someone's grasping P is animpossibility, anything whatsoever necessarily follows from someone's6I This section is based on my article "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa,

eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993).

70 CHAPTER 1

grasping P. Hence, a qualitative property or proposition, P, which could not

be grasped trivially satisfies both clauses of (Dl): (i) there is a haecceity, H,

which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such

that whoever grasps P grasps H.62 In that case, (Dl) mistakenly implies

that P is a nonqualitative property or proposition, and (Dl) does not provide

a logically sufficient condition of a property's or proposition's beingnonqualitative.

There are two replies to this objection. First, even if there is a qualitativeproperty or proposition, P, of infinite length which none of us could grasp,

it appears possible that there be a conscious being who has infinitely manyideas and who grasps P. 63 In that case, the objection under discussion does

not undermine either (Di) or (D2).Second, the preceding objection asks us to suppose that there are

properties or propositions of infinite length. It seems that there is an

intuitive notion of length applicable to a property or proposition. After all,it appears that there is a generic concept of length, species of which includespatial length, temporal length, and logical length. The concept of logicallength stands to the concepts of spatial or temporal length as the concept ofa logical part stands to the concepts of a spatial or a temporal part. Just asthere is the aforementioned generic concept of length, there is a genericconcept of parthood whose species are spatial, temporal, and logicalparthood. Examples of Logical Parthood include abstracta which are

conjuncts, disjuncts, or negands of other abstracta. Since the genericconceptions of parthood and length are comparable, and since the formerconception seems to be legitimate, I conclude that the latter conception isalso legitimate. When it is said that a property or proposition is finitely or


infinitely long, the operative notion is that of logical length. Even if thereare necessarily ungraspable qualitative properties or propositions of infinitelength, it seems that we can capture the distinction between qualitative andnonqualitative properties or propositions along the following lines.

(D3) A property or proposition, P, of finite length is nonqualitative=df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by aconcretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such that whoever graspsP grasps H.

(D4) A property or proposition, P, of infinite length is nonqualitative=df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified bya concretum, and (ii) P has a finite stretch, F, which is necessarilysuch that whoever grasps F grasps H.

(D5) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative =df. P is either anonqualitative property or proposition of finite length, or a non-qualitative property or proposition of infinite length.

(D6) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative =df. P is not nonquali-tative.'

621t also follows that a nonqualitative property or proposition which could not be graspedtrivially satisfies (Dl). (In Chapter 5, section X, I will argue that there are such nonqualitativeproperties.) However, unlike a qualitative property's satisfying (D1), this consequence iswelcome!

63Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person. Chisholm implies that all abstracta are

qualitative, and that some abstracta are worlds or infinitely long conjunctive propositions. SinceChisholm maintains that every proposition could be conceived by someone, Chisholm iscommitted to the view that there are infinitely long qualitative propositions which are possiblygrasped by someone.

64Compare the account of the qualitative/nonqualitative distinction in Gary Rosenkrantz,

"The Pure and The Impure," Logique et Analyse, 88 (1979), pp. 515-523.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 73

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THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION

"In Peter, James, and John, you may observe in

each a Certain collection of Stature, Figure,Color, and other peculiar Properties, by whichthey are known asunder, distinguished from allother Men, and if I may say so, individuated."[from Berkeley Alciphron, or the minute phi-

losopher VII 5 (1732)]

"Of course, if provision is made only for hisgeneral humanity, and not for what makes himhic or ille, not for his haecceity as the schoolmen

used to say, a man will have cause to complain."(Journal of Education I Nov. 1890 629/1)

I - METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATIONS

"Metaphysics, even bad metaphysics, really restson observations...and the only reason that this isnot universally recognized is that it rests uponthe kinds of phenomena with which everyman's experience is so saturated that he usuallypays no particular attention to them."

[1898 C. Peirce Collected Papers Vol. 6 ¶2 (1935)]

A standard argument in favor of Realism about abstracta posits the existenceof a property in order to explain why several particulars are of the samekind. For example:

Argument A(Al) A number of particulars are red.(A2) There is something about these particulars in virtue of which all of

them are red.

(A3) This something can only be their Redness, that is, each of themhaving the property of being red.

Therefore,(A4) Redness exists.

A is an argument from experience. Based upon our everyday experiences,we learn that a number of particulars are of the same kind or have somesimilarity. For instance, as a result of my having certain visual experiencesI am justified in believing that an apple, a scarf, and a book are red, thatRover, Fido, and Spot are dogs, and that these three sticks appear bent.Thus, (Al) is a logical consequence of the empirically justified propositionthat an apple, a scarf and a book are red. That a number of particularshave Redness is hypothesized as the best explanation of (Al). In otherwords, it is argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful atexplaining (Al) than the hypothesis in question, acceptance of this hypothe-sis is warranted. Thus, the argument is justified partly by an inference to thebest explanation.

Arguments of this kind imply that there are universals or sharablequalitative properties, for example, being red, being a dog, and being bentin appearance. If such arguments are sound, then a number of particulars'being red is best accounted for by those particulars' having Redness, anumber of particulars' being dogs is best explained by these particulars'having Dogness, a number of particulars' appearing bent is best accountedfor by those particulars' having the property of appearing bent, and so forth.In an explanation of this kind, traditionally known as a formal cause, theexplanans provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of theexplanandum. For instance, a number of particulars' having Redness is alogically necessary and sufficient condition of their being red. Moreover, inan explanation of this sort the explanans provides a philosophical analysisof the explanandum, for example, a number of particulars' being red can beanalyzed as their having Redness.

It should be noted that to analyze a concept, C, is to explicate C, that is,to enhance one's understanding of C by explaining what it is for somethingto be an instance of C. In an analysis, in addition to the analysans and the

72

,Z4

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analysandum's being necessarily equivalent, the analysans provides a certainkind of explanation of the analysandum.

Most philosophers who reject the existence of abstracta admit that (Al)is well justified by experience. For this reason, most nominalists findthemselves compelled to hold either (a) that (Al) is a brute fact that has noexplanation, or (b) that there is an alternative explanation of (Al) which issuperior to the realist's account. According to (a), the fact that a number ofparticulars are red is unanalyzable; whereas according to (b), this fact can beanalyzed without recourse to an abstract entity.

But it is not generally recognized that Realism about abstracta can besupported by an argument that posits the existence of a property in order toexplain the diversity of particulars at a time. However, if the similarity ofparticulars might stand in need of explanation, then so might the diversityof particulars. Specifically, compare Argument A and the following:

Argument B(B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse.(B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from

y at t.(B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks

at t.Therefore,

(B4) A property exists.

As with A, B is an argument from experience. The diversity or discrete-ness of particulars at a time is no less salient a feature of our everydayexperience than their likeness or similarity. For instance, I can see thatpresently Rover and Fido are diverse individuals. Likewise, for this appleand that scarf, this stick and that stick, and so forth. Thus, (B1) is a logicalconsequence of certain empirically justified propositions, for example, thatcurrently Rover and Fido are diverse particulars.

Clearly, if at a time, t, a particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, thenin being diverse from y at t x is related to y at t. Hence, in seeking toexplain x's being diverse from y at t, it is something relational whoseexplanation we are seeking.

That particulars which are diverse at a time are individuated by their


properties is hypothesized as the best explanation of (B1). In other words,it is, argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful atexplaining (B1) than the hypothesis in question, belief in this hypothesis isjustified. Therefore, as with the argument in favor of the existence ofabstracta based on similarity, the argument in favor of the existence ofabstracta based on diversity is justified partly by an inference to the bestexplanation.

If such an argument is sound, then the diversity of a particular, x, from aparticular, y, at a time t is best explained by there being some property, F,such that: (i) at t x has F, and (ii) at t y lacks F. Such an explanationprovides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of x's being diversefrom y at a time. Thus, an explanation of this kind provides a philosophicalanalysis of the diversity of x and y at a time. In particular, the explanationof the diversity of x and y at a time offered in (B3) entails that x is the onlyparticular which has F at t, and that it is this which individuates x at t.

The problem of accounting for the diversity of particulars at a time istraditionally known as the problem of individuation.' To solve this problemone must discover an appropriate principium individuationis or criterion ofindividuation. An appropriate principle or criterion of individuation providesan analysis of the diversity of particulars at time which is a logicallynecessary and sufficient explanation for the diversity of particulars at atime.' In aristotelian terminology, a criterion of individuation provides a

'For a historical introduction to this problem see Jorge Gracia, Introduction to the Problemof Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984). CompareGracia's Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany: State Universityof New York Press, 1988).

2For example, Duns Scotus wrote as follows. "I first explain what I understand byindividuation, whether numerical unity or through singularity: not, indeed the indeterminateunity according to which anything in a species is called one in number, but a unity demarcatedas 'this', so that...it is impossible for an individual to be divided into subject parts. And whatis sought is the reason for this impossibility. So I say that it is impossible for an individual notto be a 'this', demarcated by this singularity; and it is not the cause of singularity in generalwhich is sought, but of this specially demarcated singularity, namely, as it is determinately`this'." See The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) inHyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 588.

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formal cause of the diversity of particulars at a time. 3

Most philosophers who deny the existence of abstracta allow that (B1) issufficiently warranted by experience. Therefore, most nominalists findthemselves forced to maintain either: (i) that (B1) is a brute fact that has noexplanation, or (ii) that there is an alternative explanation of (B1) which issuperior to the realist's account. According to (i), the diversity of particularsat a time is unanalyzable; whereas according to (ii), the diversity ofparticulars at a time is analyzable without appeal to an abstract entity.

Independently of any case for Realism about abstracta based on similarity,I shall argue that the case for Realism about abstracta based on diversity isa success. As we shall see, an argument for Realism which infers theexistence of a property as the best explanation of the diversity of particularsat a time implies that there are haecceities of particulars.

31 am concerned exclusively with the concept of such a formal criterion of individuation.This concept should not be confused with the notion of an epistemic principle of individuation.A formal criterion of individuation specifies a condition which is logically necessary andsufficient for diversity, and which may (but need not) be experientially accessible. On the otherhand, an epistemic principle of individuation specifies an experientially accessible factor whichcan rationally justify a belief in diversity, and which may (but need not) be logically necessaryor sufficient for diversity.


II - QUALITATIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLECONCRETA

"They agree indeed so much...that their specificality is swallowed up in theirgeneral likeness."

[1756 J. Clubbe Miscellaneous Tracts, Physiognomy 1. 20 (1770)]

Apparently, in the actual world no two particulars have the same qualitativeproperties, counting both those that are intrinsic, for instance, being a sphere,and those that are relational, for example, being next to a sphere. Hence, aslong as we confine ourselves to the actual world, it seems that particulars canbe distinguished from one another by differences in their qualitativeproperties. Some philosophers go further, arguing that it is impossible forthere to be two particulars having the same qualitative properties. Leibniz,for instance, argued that any two entities must differ qualitatively!' Mostphilosophers now reject "Leibniz's Law" and allow for the possibility of twoqualitatively indistinguishable concreta. 5 Two individuals of this kindwould exist at the same times, and at any given time of their existence,would have the same qualitative properties. In a classic example, Max Blackconsiders a possible universe consisting of two spherical objects, x and y (ina Euclidean space), which are exactly alike in all intrinsic qualitativerespects. 6 Throughout their existence, x and y are composed of the samekind of stuff arranged in the same way, have the same shape, size, mass,color, and so forth. Obviously, x and y would have the same intrinsic

4Leibniz based his argument on Theism and the principle of sufficient reason. God couldnot create two qualitatively indiscernible spheres x and y, since there would not be a logicallysufficient reason for God's positioning x in some place rather than y, and vice-versa. In myjudgement, Theism is subject to doubt, and the principle of sufficient reason should not beaccepted. In this book, I shall not presuppose either of them.

5 "Leibniz's Law" can be formulated as follows. Necessarily, for any x andy, and any time

t, at t x=y for any property P, x has P at t y has P at t. `P' ranges over qualitativeproperties, including intrinsic and relational ones.

6See Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," in M. Loux, ed., Universals andParticulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 204-216.

78 CHAPTER 2

qualitative properties. But would x and y have the same relationalqualitative properties? It might seem that they would, since each of themwould have the property of being next to a sphere, and so forth. Neverthe-less, this has been questioned. Ernest Sosa, for example, has argued thatgiven a choice of the point of origin for a spatial coordinate system, thereis a qualitative difference between positive and negative directions in that

system. ? (Although the choice of the point of origin is an arbitrary one,Sosa would argue that this qualitative difference remains regardless of thepoint chosen.) If Sosa is right, then each of the relational qualitativeproperties, being at a finite distance from a sphere in a positive direction,

and being at a finite distance from a sphere in a negative direction, is hadby only one of the two spheres. In that case, Max Black's two spheres donot have the same qualitative properties after all. Be that as it may, thereare two variations on Max Black's example which succeed in showing thatthere could be two individuals with the same qualitative properties. In thefirst variant, noted by Sosa, instead of just two spheres with the sameintrinsic qualitative properties, we suppose infinitely many such spheres,equally spaced, whose centers lie on a single straight line. In the secondvariant, we suppose just two spheres with the same intrinsic qualitativeproperties, but instead of a Euclidean space, we suppose a Riemannian orspherical space having a finite radius, and position the spheres so they areequidistant from one another in all directions.

There are two other (more controversial) examples that might be putforward to illustrate the possibility of two particulars having the samequalitative properties. The first example presupposes that there could be"immaterial" or "ghostly" spatial objects. 8 These objects would be spatiallylocated, mobile, and would have chApe, volume, color, and perhaps otherqualities. However, they would lack impenetrability or inertial mass, thepossession of which is often thought to be a necessary condition ofsomething's being a material substance. Hence, two objects of this kind can

7See Ernest Sosa, "Subjects Among Other Things," Philosophical Perspectives, 1,

Metaphysics (1987), pp. 155-187.

8See John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.

140-141.


move towards each other, then totally interpenetrate, and then move awayfrom each other, more specifically, they can pass through one another. Thus,two such objects can occupy the same place at the same time. According tothis example, possibly, there is a universe consisting of two objects of thissort which occupy the same places at the same times and which at thosetimes have the same intrinsic qualitative properties. Surely, these twoobjects have the same qualitative properties, including relational ones.' Thesecond example presupposes that there could be either nonspatial Cartesianspirits or nonspatial Humean impressions,' and maintains that possibly,there is a universe consisting of two nonspatial spirits or two nonspatialimpressions, x and y, such that: throughout their existence, x and y have thesame intrinsic qualitative properties, for instance, the same intrinsicqualitative mental features or experiential characteristics. Clearly, x and yhave the same qualitative properties, including those which are relational.

In the light of the foregoing examples, it is highly plausible that therecould be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. However, IanHacking claims that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not therecould be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars." He argues thatnatural laws and theories of space and time are intimately interconnected,and these theories are underdetermined by empirical evidence. Accordingto Hacking's argument, the descriptions 'at t the universe is a highly curvedRiemannian space containing just one sphere' and 'at t the universe is aEuclidean space containing two spheres with the same qualitative properties'are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe. Hacking infers thatno possible world must be described as containing two objects having thesame qualitative properties. For Hacking, the alternative description we

9Actually, according to a current physical theory some fundamental particles exhibit aphenomenon known as transparency: under certain conditions two fundamental particles of acertain kind can "pass through" one another, occupying for a moment the very same place.

10See Rea Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations II and VI. CompareDavid Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford, 1888), Part IV, Section V,p. 233. Nonspatial Humean impressions seem to be either nonspatial concrete events ornonspatial tropes.

" Ian Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp.249-256.

80 CHAPTER 2

choose to apply to a possible universe is largely a matter of taste, and if wewish, we can adopt a meta-principle to the effect that no possible universeshould be described as containing two objects having the same qualitativeproperties. As Hacking says, such a meta-principle

is not true in each possible world. It is true about possible worlds. It is a meta-principle

about possible descriptions.

Hacking's argument depends on his contention that the two aforemen-tioned descriptions are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe.But this contention is unintelligible. No possible universe is such that bothof these descriptions apply to it. The first of these descriptions applies to apossible world with a Riemannian space containing only one sphere, and thesecond of these descriptions applies to another possible world with aEuclidean space that contains two spheres. Consequently, Hacking'sargument should be rejected. Thus, we are entitled to assume that therecould be two particulars which have the same qualitative properties. I2

Since an adequate criterion of individuation for particulars provideslogically necessary and sufficient conditions for the diversity of particularsat a time, this criterion must apply not merely to actual cases of particularswhich are diverse at a time, but to all possible cases. Hence, a criterion ofindividuation must be adequate to the possibility of qualitatively indistin-guishable particulars, at least in the case of the two Max Black variants. Ofcourse, if the more controversial examples of qualitatively indistinguishableparticulars are possible, then a criterion of individuation must be adequateto those examples too. With respect to each of the kinds of entity involvedin these examples, namely, spatial objects which can literally interpenetrateone another, nonspatial spirits, or nonspatial Humean impressions, one canquestion whether it is possible for there to be entities of that kind. In each

12For an argument in support of the assumption that there could be two qualitativelyindistinguishable particulars, and criticisms of Hacking's attack on this assumption see RobertAdams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp.5-26. Additional criticisms of Hacking may be found in Ronald Hoy, "Inquiry, IntrinsicProperties, and The Identity of Indiscernibles," Synthese, 61 (1984), pp. 275-297, which I drawon in my own discussion of Hacking.


instance, it seems that an affirmative answer to such a question implies thepossibility of the corresponding example of two qualitatively indistinguish-able particulars. Are entities of the three kinds in question possible? Theyappear to be. In any case, the burden of proof is on those who believe thatentities of these kinds are impossible. They need to provide good reasonsfor thinking that entities of these kinds are unintelligible. Joshua Hoffmanand I have replied to arguments purporting to show that nonspatial spirits areunintelligible. ° Hence, there is some reason to require that a criterion ofindividuation be adequate to the more controversial 'examples. Even if weought to suspend judgement on the possibility of these examples, all otherthings being equal, a proposed criterion of individuation which is compatiblewith their possibility is epistemically preferable to a proposal which is not.Nevertheless, in arguing for my solution to the problem of individuation, Iwill follow the most conservative course I can with respect to thesecontroversial examples. I shall not reject competing proposals on the groundthat they cannot accommodate these controversial cases, but I will requirethat my own proposal adequately handles them. This course is more thanfair to the opposition.

Furthermore, although I shall presuppose that there could be particulars,I will remain neutral about what kinds of particulars there could be. Morespecifically, I shall allow not only for the possibility of substances (forexample, material objects and spirits), but also concrete events, places, andtropes (these latter being concreta such as the particular wisdom of Socratesor that particular redness). Max Black's example and its variants envisionthe possibility of two spherical material objects which are qualitativelyindistinguishable. It should be noted that these examples can be reinter-preted or reformulated in terms of the possibility of two spherical places,events, or tropes that are qualitatively indistinguishable.

13Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffinan, "Are Souls Unintelligible?" Philosophical

Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212.

82 CHAPTER 2

III - PROPOSED CRITERIA OF INDIVIDUATION

All things counter, original, spare, strange; whatever is

fickle, freckled (who knows how?)..."(1877 G. M. Hopkins Pied Beawy)

According to a qualitative criterion of individuation, a particular isindividuated at a time by a qualitative property it has at that time. In formal

terms:

(P0) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a qualitative property Q such that: (i) at t x exemplifies Q, and

(ii) at t y does not exemplify Q.

(P0) is an implication of Leibniz's view that qualitatively indiscernibleparticulars are identical?' (P0) fails to provide a logically necessarycondition for the diversity of particulars at a time, since it is possible that ata time two particulars have the same qualitative properties. Hence, (P0)should be rejected. Thus, the demand for a criterion of individuation seemsto rest on something like the following three premises.

(i) There could be two particulars, each of which have the same qualitativeproperties.

(ii) For each of these particulars, there would be some fact about it thataccounts for or explains its diversity from any other particular.

(iii) In the case of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, this fact canonly be that each particular has either a nonqualitative property, or hasa relationship to some other particular, that any other particular lacks

In very general terms, there are two sorts of responses to the problem ofindividuation: an ontological response, and a nonontological response. An

ontological response attempts to explain the diversity of x and y by relating

14See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, section 8.


x or y to a third entity z, whereas a nonontological response does not makesuch an attempt. I call a response of the former sort ontological because theattempt it makes to explain the diversity of x and y is ontologicallycommitted to the existence of a third entity. On the other hand, I call aresponse of the latter sort nonontological because it does not attempt toexplain the diversity of x and y by postulating the existence of any thirdentity: such a response has no ontological implications beyond the existenceof x and y. An ontological response accepts premises (i), (ii), and (iii) statedabove, but a nonontological response rejects either premise (ii) or (iii).According to a nonontological response, the diversity of x and y either hasno explanation or can be explained without relating x or y to a third entityz.

The failed attempt to provide a qualitative criterion of individuation in(P0) is an example of an ontological response, since it seeks to explain thediversity of x and y by relating x and y to a third entity z, namely, aqualitative property. In this case, x and y are related to z by the relations ofexemplification and its complement, respectively.

Other than a qualitative criterion, there are ten types of responses to theproblem of individuation that need to be considered. Of these, eight areontological responses, and two are nonontological responses.

The first of the ontological responses is a material criterion. According tosuch a criterion, a particular is individuated at a time by the quantity orportion of stuff which constitutes it at that time, for example, a portion ofmaterial stuff such as iron, wood, water, or air. Put formally:

(P1) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a quantity of stuff S such that: (i) at t x is constituted by S, and(ii) at t y is not constituted by S.'

15Why is the material criterion formulated as it is, rather than as follows? (P1') At time

t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a quantity of stuff Si and aquantity of stuff S2, such that: (i) at t x is composed of SI, and (ii) at t y is composed of S2,and (iii) S/#S2. (P1) has two advantages over (P1'). Firstly, (P1) is more economical than(P1'). Parallel considerations apply to (P0) and to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5), (P6), and (P8) below.Secondly, (P1') seems vulnerable to a charge of vicious conceptual circularity to which (P1) isimmune: since a quantity of stuff composing a particular is itself a particular, it appears thatclause (iii) of (P1') employs the very concept that (P1') attempts to explicate, viz., the concept

84 CHAPTER 2


85

(P1) resembles the thomistic view that a body is individuated at a time byits quantity of matter at that time."

A second ontological response is a substratum criterion. A substratum isa propertyless or "bare" particular. According to substratum theory, anyordinary particular, that is, one which has certain properties, consists of abare particular combined with those properties. The notion of a substratumis similar to the notion of formless matter suggested to some by Aristotle'sform/matter distinction. According to a substratum criterion, a particular isindividuated at a time by the substratum which supports it at that time. Inprecise terms:

(P2) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a substratum S such that: (i) at t x is supported by S, and (ii)

at t y is not supported by S.

Gustav Bergmann and Edwin Allaire are examples of philosophers who seemto accept a substratum or bare particular criterion."

A third ontological response is a locational criterion. According to sucha criterion, a concrete entity is individuated at a time by the place which itoccupies at that time. Specifically:

(P3) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a place L such that: (i) at t x occupies L, and (ii) at t y does notoccupy L.

(P3) recalls the traditional view, defended by contemporary philosopherssuch as Keith Campbell, that an individual substance is individuated at a

of the diversity of particulars at a time. Parallel considerations apply to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5),and (P7) below.

16See St. Thomas Aquinas, Concerning Being and Essence, George G. Leckie, trans.

(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 3-38.

17Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: Universityof Wisconsin Press, 1967), and Edwin Allaire, "Bare Particulars" in M. Loux, ed., Universals

and Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 235-244.

time by the place it occupies at that time."The fourth ontological response is a mereological criterion. According to

a criterion of this kind, concrete entities are individuated at a time by theparts they have at that time. More piecisely:

(P4) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular); =df. Thereexists a particular P such that: (i) at t P is a proper part of x, and (ii)at t y does not have P as a proper part.

I do not know of a philosopher who defends a mereological criterion.The fifth ontological response is a causal criterion. According to such a

criterion, particulars are individuated at a time by their causes or effects.Formally stated:

(P5) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Either (i)there exists a particular z such that: (a) at t z is a cause of x, and (b)at t z is not a cause of y, or (ii) there exists a particular z such that:(a) at t z is an effect of x, and (b) at t z is not an effect of y.

(P5) reminds us of Donald Davidson's view that a concrete event El isidentical with a concrete event E2 if and only if El and E2 have the samecauses and effects.' 9 (P5) is also similar to a related view of WilliamMann's that a trope TI is identical with a trope T2 just provided that TI andT2 have the same causes and effects? ) According to Davidson, concreteevents are the relata of the causal relation. However, Mann holds that tropesare relata of the causal relation. Others have thought that substances are

18Keith Campbell, Body and Mind (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 44-45.

19Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in Honorof C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234.

20See William Mann, "Epistemology Supernaturalized," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985),pp. 436 -456. Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Necessity, Contingency, and Mann," Faith andPhilosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 457-463, and William Mann, "Keeping Epistemology Supernatural-ized: A Reply To Rosenkrantz," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 464-468.

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relata of the causal relation.'The sixth ontological response is a tropal criterion. According to a

criterion of this kind, particulars are individuated at a time by the concrete"properties" or tropes they possess at that time. In formal terms:

(P6) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a trope T such that: (i) at t x possesses T, and (ii) at t y doesnot possess T.

A tropal criterion appears to have been endorsed by G. F. Stout. 22

The seventh ontological response is a relational criterion. According toa criterion of individuation of this sort, particulars are diverse at a timebecause one bears a qualitative relation to the other at that time. Such arelation is irreflexive: it is a relation which nothing can bear to itself.Otherwise, the criterion does not provide a logically sufficient condition forthe diversity of particulars at a time, and should be rejected for that reason.Examples of relations which appear to be irreflexive include x being to theleft of y, x being spatially apart from y, and x being a soul which couldn'tbe directly aware of a mental state of a soul y. A relational criterion mightbe formulated in this way:

(P7) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, xbears the relation of spatial apartness to y.

'For example, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II,Chap XXII. According to Locke: "Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, thesubstances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes; andthe substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas [qualities] which areintroduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects." Compare GeorgeBerkeley's use of the related notion that there are agent causes, i.e., spiritual substances whichare efficient or active causes. See Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,Second and Third Dialogues.

22See G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular,"symposium in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122. OnStout, see Maria van der Schaar, G. F. Stout's Theory of udgement and Proposition (Universityof Leiden, 1991), especially pp. 120-122, and p. 164..


(P7) is reminiscent of a thesis that seems to have been held by Jack Meiland:that it is spatial relations between bodies which individuate them.'

Here, is another example of a relational criterion: At time t, a particular xis diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x bears to y the relation of u beingpossibly such that u has a property, P, at a time t* and v lacks P at t". 24

The final ontological response is a haecceity criterion, often attributed toDuns Scotus. According to a criterion of this kind, a particular is individu-ated at a time by a haecceity it has at that time. Namely:

(P8) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y = df. Thereexists a haecceity H such that: (i) at t x exemplifies II, and (ii) at ty does not exemplify H.

Compare (P8) and the following proposal.

(PW) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Thereexists a nonqualitative property N such that: (i) at t x exemplifies N,and (ii) at t y does not exemplify N.

Apparently, there are philosophers who would prefer (P8') to (P8). Suchphilosophers either doubt or deny the existence of nonqualitative haecceities,but nonetheless believe that a particular is individuated by its having anonqualitative property other than a haecceity. A nonqualitative property ofthis kind might be a relational property such as being in that place, or beingto the left of that sphere, or being diverse from that sphere, or beingpossibly to the left of that sphere, or being capable of direct awareness ofa mental state of mine.

However, there is good reason to think that (P8') is not preferable to (P8),as the following argument shows.

23See Jack Meiland, "Do Relations Individuate?" in M. Loux, ed., Universals and

Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 258-263.

24 `U , and are (of course) variable letters.

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(1) Necessarily, a property is nonqualitative if and only if it pertains to aparticular.

Given our understandings of the notions of a nonqualitative property and ofa property's pertaining to a particular, it is obvious that (1) is true.

(2) Necessarily, there is a nonqualitative property which pertains toa particular, x, if and only if there is a haecceity which could be hadby x.

For example, surely, if there is a nonqualitative relational property such asbeing next to Jones, then there is a nonqualitative relational property such asbeing identical with Jones, and vice-versa. As examples of this kind

indicate, (2) is highly plausible.

(3) Necessarily, if there is a haecceity which could be had by a particular,then every particular has a haecceity.

(3) is extremely plausible: considerations of parity, deriving from a need forlogical generality, seem to demand that if there is a haecceity exemplified bya particular, or which can be exemplified by a particular, then everyparticular exemplifies a haecceity. If H is a haecceity which is, or could be,exemplified by a particular, then there must be a true singular existentialproposition of the form `0(3x)(x=a)' which asserts the possibility of therebeing something which is identical with the particular in question. As I haveargued, Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning that propositionshave truth-values, logical entailments, modal features, and so forth.' Inthat case, considerations of logical comprehensiveness like those discussedearlier seem to require that if there is a true singular existential propositionasserting the possibility of a particular's existence in one case, then theremust be a true singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of aparticular's existence in every case. But it appears that if there is a truesingular existential proposition asserting the possibility of there being

25 See Chapter 1, section III.


89

something which is identical with a certain particular, then there must be ahaecceity, a property of the form 'being identical with a', which could beexemplified by the particular in question. Thus, it seems that necessarily, ifthere is a haecceity which could be had by a particular, then every particularhas a haecceity.

(4) Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a haecceity, then x has a nonquali-tative property.

Since it is evident that a particular's haecceity is a nonqualitative property,it is clear that (4) is true. (1), (2), and (3) together entail that

Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property, then x has ahaecceity.

The latter entailment and (4) together imply that

(5) Necessarily, a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property if and onlyif x has a haecceity.

Since (5) entails that (P8) and (P8') are necessarily equivalent, we shouldconclude that (P8') commits us to the existence of nonqualitative haecceities,just as (P8) does. Consequently, if one doubts the existence of nonqualita-tive haecceities, then this doubt should not lead one to prefer (P8') to (P8).Rather, it should lead one to doubt both (P8') and (P8). As far as I can see,(P8') is not preferable to (P8), and in any case the question of which one ofthem is preferable is unimportant. For the sake of convenience, I shallconcentrate on (P8) rather than (P8').

The remaining two responses to the problem of individuation arenonontological. The first of these nonontological responses is a nonontolog-ical criterion. According to such a criterion, the diversity of concreteentities x and y at a time is analyzed or explained in terms of x's beingirreflexively related to y in some manner. It is required that the manner inwhich x is related to y be irreflexive for reasons paralleling those whichrequire that the relation used in a relational criterion be irreflexive. A

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nonontological criterion might be formulated in this fashion:

(P9) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is

spatially apart from y.

Notice that a nonontological criterion, unlike an ontological criterion, does

not individuate a particular x from a particular y by relating x to a third

entity z.26 Since (P9) does not individuate a particular x from a particulary by relating x to a property, relation, or any other sort of abstract entity,(P9) is compatible with Nominalism.

The second nonontological response to the problem of individuation is that

there is no criterion of individuation. According to this response, the

diversity of particulars at a time is primitive or unanalyzable. In otherwords, the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact, that is to say, a

fact that has no explanation?'Material, substratum, locational, mereological, causal, tropal, relational,

and haecceity criteria qualify as ontological responses, because they attempt

to explain the diversity of particulars x and y by relating x and y to a third

entity z. For instance, on a material criterion, x and y are individuated byrelating them to another particular, namely, the quantity of stuff constituting

x. In this case, the relevant relationships are those of constitution and its

complement. On a substratum criterion, x and y are individuated by relatingthem to another particular - the substratum of x. Here the relationships in

question are those of support and its complement. On a locational criterion,

x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular, namely, theplace x occupies. In this instance, the relationships involved are those of

occupation and its complement. On a mereological criterion, x and y are

individuated by relating them to another particular - a proper part of x. In

26Compare two other examples of nonontological criteria: (1) At time t, a particular x is

diverse from a particular y at t, x is not spatially coincident with y; and (2) At time t, a

particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is possibly such that (i) x occupies a place,

p, at some time, 0, and (ii) y does not occupy p at t*.

27See Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles". Black seems to argue that particularshave no criterion of individuation.

this case, the relevant relationships are those of being a proper part and itscomplement. On a causal criterion, x and y are individuated by relatingthem to another particular, namely, a cause or an effect of x. Here it is therelationships of cause and effect and their corresponding complementaryrelationships which are brought into play. On a tropal criterion, x and y areindividuated by relating them to another particular - a trope of x. In thisinstance, the relationships in question are those of possession and itscomplement. On a relational criterion, x and y are individuated by relatingthem to another entity, an abstractum, namely, a qualitative irreflexiverelation. In this case, the pertinent relationships are those of bearing and itscomplement. On a haecceity criterion, x and y are individuated by relatingthem to (another) entity which is abstract - a haecceity had by x. Here it isthe relationships of exemplification and its complement that are involved.On the other hand, both a nonontological criterion, and the claim that thereis no criterion of individuation, are nonontological responses, because thesereplies do not seek to explain the diversity of x and y by relating x or y toa third entity z. Finally, it should be noted that a material, substratum,locational, mereological, causal, or tropal criterion, as well as a nonontolog-ical response, is consistent with Nominalism, whereas a qualitative,relational, or haecceity criterion presupposes Realism.

What of the reply that the diversity of particulars at a time has noexplanation? As a rule, when an explanation of X is requested, we areentitled to assume that there is some way in which X can be explained,unless we are given a good reason for supposing otherwise. Therefore, weare entitled to assume that there is some way in which the diversity ofparticulars at a time can be explained, unless we are given a good reason forsupposing otherwise. In other words, there is a prima facie presumption infavor of (B2). This prima facie presumption is defeated if a cogentargument is presented which implies that there is no adequate account of thediversity of particulars at a time. The claim that the diversity of particularsat a time is a brute fact is acceptable only if all available explanations of thediversity of particulars at a time are undermined.

In what follows, I shall argue that a haecceity criterion ought to beaccepted as the result of an inference to the best explanation, on the grounds

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that there are decisive objections to all of the other criteria, and no IV - PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION FOR THEsuccessful objection to a haecceity criterion. PROPOSED CRITERIA

"That is to prove the same by the same, or else to argue circularly."(1651 Baxter Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Church Membershipand Baptism 35)

I begin by setting forth principles for evaluating the preceding proposals fora criterion of individuation. Those proposals seek to provide a formalprinciple of individuation for entities belonging to a certain very generalontological category - the category of Particular or Concretum. Since acriterion of individuation for concreta is an analysis of the diversity ofconcreta at a time, a proposed criterion of individuation for concreta isinadequate if it possesses any of the following five defects.

(1) The proposal fails to provide a logically necessary condition of thediversity of concreta at a time.

(2) The proposal fails to provide a logically sufficient condition of thediversity of concreta at a time.

(3) The proposal is conceptually circular. Such conceptual circularityoccurs just when there is an attempt to analyze a concept in terms of itself:a purported analysis, A, of a concept, X, is conceptually circular if and onlyif X is employed in A's analysans. For example, the following proposedanalysis is (obviously) conceptually circular:

A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is diverse fromy at t,

Given that an analysans, 17, could be grasped, it is plausible that a concept,X, is employed in Y just in case necessarily, if a person, S, grasps Y, then Sgrasps X. Since an analysis provides a certain kind of explanation of whatis analyzed, and since it is impossible that something help explain itself, itis impossible that an explanation be circular. Consequently, conceptuallycircular analyses are viciously circular. It follows that a purported analysisof the diversity of particulars at a time suffers from vicious conceptualcircularity of the sort in question if and only if it employs the concept of the

94 CHAPTER 2


95

diversity of particulars at a time in its analysans.(4) The proposal exhibits familial triviality. A purported analysis, A, of

a concept, X, suffers from familial triviality just when A's analysans employsanother concept Y such that X and Y belong to a family of logicallyinterrelated concepts whose members stand equally in need of analysis. Twoconcepts belong to such a family only if a logically necessary and sufficientcondition for either concept can be stated by employing just the otherconcept and logical notions. For instance, the concepts of de dictopossibility, necessity, and impossibility form a family of this kind. Thus, itis trivial to propose an analysis of one of these modal concepts in whichanother one of these modal concepts is employed in the analysans.Likewise, the notions of the diversity of particulars at a time and the identityof particulars at a time form a family of logically interrelated conceptswhose members stand equally in need of analysis. Accordingly, aparticular's (x's) being nonidentical with a particular, y, at t is logically

necessary and sufficient for x's being diverse from y at t, and x's beingnondiverse from y at t is logically necessary and sufficient for x's being

identical with y at t. Therefore, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity ofparticulars at a time in which the concept of the identity of particulars at atime is employed in A's analysans is trivial. For instance, the analysisproposed below is trivial:

A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is not identicalwith y at t.

(5) The proposal presupposes circular individuation. For any ontological

category, C, an attempted explication, E, of the diversity at a time of

instances of C presupposes circular individuation if in every possible case Eseeks to explain two instances' of C being diverse (x and y's being diverse)

at any time, t, by relating x (or y) to another entity, z, which is an instanceof C at t, in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entails

that x#z (or y#z). In particular, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity ofconcreta at a time has this defect if in every possible case A seeks to explaintwo concreta x and y's being diverse at t by relating x or y to another

concretum z existing at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so

related entails that x#z (or y#z). In what follows, I give a formal statementof conditions under which a proposed analysis of the diversity of particularsat a time presupposes circular individuation, and explain why an analysis ofthe diversity of particulars (x and y) at a time, t, cannot presuppose circularindividuation. A proposed analysis, A, of x's being diverse from y at tpresupposes circular individuation if A meets the following three conditions.

(CI) (i) It is possible that A's analysandum and A's analysans arejointly satisfied, and (ii) Where being a G is a category, either Ahas the structure: (S1) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular,y, at t =df. There is a G, z, such that (i) x is related in way R to z att, and (ii) y is not related in way R to z at t, or A has the structure:(S2) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df at t,x is related in way R to y, and (iii) When A has structure (S1), itis necessarily true that if A's analysandum and A's analysans aresatisfied, then z is a particular which is diverse from x (or y) at t;and when A has structure (S2), it is necessarily true that ifA's analysandum and A's analysans are satisfied, then y is aparticular which is diverse from x at t.

Let me explain why an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a timecannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI). To begin with,suppose that A is a proposed analysis of the diversity of particulars at a timewhich satisfies (CI). In that case, A entails that if x and y are particulars,then x is individuated from y by virtue of x's being related in a certain wayto something, z, at t (clause (ii) of (CI)), and z is a particular other than x(clause (iii) of (CI)). If there are particulars, and if A explicates theirdiversity at a time, then it follows that one particular is individuated fromanother by virtue of a particular's being related in a certain way to anotherparticular which exists at that time. Specifically, when A has structure (Si),a particular, x, is individuated from another particular, y, by virtue of x'sbeing related in a certain way at t to a third particular, z, and when A hasstructure (S2), a particular, x, is individuated from a particular, y, by virtueof x's being related in a certain way at t to y. However, p by virtue of qentails that q helps to explain p. For example, if the car moves down the

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road by virtue of the car's wheels rotating, then this entails that the car'swheels rotating helps to explain why the car moves down the road.Therefore, if A is an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time, thena particular's being related in a certain way to another particular at a timehelps to explain why a particular is diverse from a particular at a time. But

this consequence is an impossibility. That a particular is related in a certainway at a time to another particular could not help to explain the diversity ofparticulars at a time, since any such attempt to explain the diversity ofparticulars at a time seeks to explain a fact in terms of itself - somethingwhich is viciously circular. This means that A's being an analysis of thediversity of particulars at a time implies an impossibility. Since whateverimplies an impossibility is itself impossible, A could not be an analysis ofthe diversity of particulars at a time. Hence, an analysis of the diversity ofparticulars at a time cannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in(CI).

It should be noted that a proposed criterion of individuation for particularscan presuppose circular individuation without satisfying (CI). As we haveseen, a proposal which is an instance of (CI) is ruled out because aparticular's being related to another particular at a time could not help toexplain (in every case) the diversity of particulars at a time. Thus, aproposal which implies that such a thing could help to explain (in everycase) the diversity of particulars at a time is inadequate. A proposal, X, isinadequate for this reason if X meets two conditions. First, X'sanalysandum and analysans could be jointly satisfied. Second, X'sanalysans is a disjunction or conjunction one of whose disjuncts orconjuncts is the analysans of a proposal which is an instance of (CI). Aproposal presupposes circular individuation if it either satisfies (CI) or isa disjunctive or conjunctive proposal of the sort described above.


V - EVALUATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CRITERIA

You dispute in a circle as all Logicians know."(1647 H. More A Platonicall Song of the SoulI. II. lxxx)

We now possess the tools to evaluate (P1)-(P9). I will argue that (P1)-(P7)and (P9) do not provide a satisfactory criterion of individuation forparticulars, but that (P8) does provide such a criterion. Crucial to myargument is the claim that (CI) militates against (Pi)-(P7) and (P9), but notagainst (P8).

To begin with, note that most of our proposals for a criterion ofindividuation for particulars have structure (Si), namely, (P1)-(P4), (P6), and(P8). (P5) can also be grouped together with these, since its analysans is adisjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals which have structure(S1). On the other hand, relational and nonontological criteria such as (P7)and (P9) have structure (S2).

For the sake of argument, I grant that (P1)-(P9) satisfy clause (i) of (CI).That is, I grant that in each of (P1)-(P9) the analysandum and the analysanscould be jointly met. The purpose of clause (i) of (CI) is to prevent aproposal whose analysandum and analysans are not jointly satisfiable fromtrivially satisfying (CI). Henceforth, we may ignore this clause of (CI).

Let us first consider relational and nonontological criteria, for example,(P7) and (P9). Because proposals of these kinds have structure (S2), theysatisfy clause (ii) of (CI). In addition, since such a proposal's analysansconsists of a particular, x, that is irreflexively related to a particular, y, suchan analysans necessitates that x and y are diverse. Hence, proposals of thesesorts meet the requirements of clause (iii) of (CI) for proposals which havestructure (S2). Because relational and nonontological criteria satisfy all of(CD's clauses, criteria of this kind presuppose circular individuation.'

28If a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to an

irreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope, thena criticism of the same kind applies to the modified criterion, as such a concrete "relation" isalso irreflexive.

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The remaining proposals for a criterion of individuation are ontological incharacter, that is, (P1)-(P6) and (P8). I aim to show that (P1)-(P6)presuppose circular individuation, whereas the haecceity criterion, (P8), doesnot presuppose circular individuation, and is otherwise unobjectionable. Aswe shall see, my argument also generates counter-examples to a number ofthese proposals. Based on these considerations, (P8) will be inferred as the

best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time.With regard to (P1), it is necessarily true that a quantity of stuff which

constitutes a particular is itself a particular. Because (P1) covers anythingbelonging to the category of particulars, it follows that such a quantity ofstuff itself falls under the scope of (P1). Therefore, inasmuch as (P1)proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of stuff that

constitutes x, (P1) raises the specter of a quantity of stuff's constituting aparticular and this quantity of stuff's being itself constituted by a quantity ofstuff. Since the relevant relation of constitution can only hold between aquantity of stuff and an object which is not a quantity of stuff, for instance,as when a quantity of bronze constitutes a statue, such a state of affairs isabsurd. On the one hand, there could not be a quantity of stuff which is

constituted by another quantity of stuff. On the other hand, it is impossible

that there be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by itself Although we

may assume that there could be a quantity of stuff which is identical with

itself this is a quite different matter.Because there could not be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by a

quantity of stuff, any two particulars which are quantities of stuff fail tomeet (P1)'s requirement that each of these particulars be constituted by aquantity of stuff. Since there could be particulars, and since (P1) proposes

that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of matter which constitutes

x, it follows that (P1) fails to provide a logically necessary condition of thediversity of particulars at a time.

It can now be argued that (P1) satisfies (CI). Because (P1) has structure(S1), (P1) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'quantity of matter' being

substituted for `G'. We can demonstrate that (P1) satisfies clause (iii) of(CI) by examining clause (i) of (P1). Clause (i) of (P1) says that at t a

quantity of stuff S constitutes a particular x. There are two crucial points

which relate to clause (i) of (P1) and which are based on the foregoing

critique of (P1). First, it is impossible that a quantity of stuff constitutesitself Second, it is a necessary truth that if a quantity of stuff constitutes aparticular, then that quantity of stuff is a particular. Given these two points,it is evident that clause (i) of (P1) necessitates that S is a particular whichis other than x. Therefore, it clear that (P1) satisfies the part of clause (iii)of (CI) covering proposals having structure (Si). Inasmuch as (P1) satisfiesall of the clauses of (CI), (P1) presupposes circular individuation.

As we shall see below, similar arguments apply to (P2)-(P6). Withrespect to (P2), it is a necessary truth that a substratum of a particular isitself a particular. Due to the fact that (P2) covers anything which is aparticular, it follows that such a bare particular falls under the scope of (P2).Hence, since (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by asubstratum that supports x, (P2) confronts us with the strange prospect of asubstratum's supporting a particular and this substratum being itselfsupported by a substratum. But such a state of affairs is incoherent. Anordinary particular is alleged to be some sort of combination of a substratumand properties. However, since a substratum is "bare", it seems that therecould not be a substratum which is itself some sort of combination of asubstratum and properties. Thus, there could neither be a substratum whichis supported by another substratum, nor be a substratum which is supportedby itself While some philosophers are willing to assume that there could bea substratum which is identical with itself, this is something altogetherdifferent.

Since there could not be a substratum which is supported by a substratum,any, two particulars which are substrata fail to satisfy (P2)'s requirement thateach of them be supported by a substratum. Because there could beparticulars, and because (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated bya substratum which supports x, it follows that (P2) does not provide alogically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time.

I am now prepared to argue that (P2) satisfies (CI). Since (P2) hasstructure (Si), (P2) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'substratum' beingsubstituted for 'G'. It can be shown that (P2) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) byexamining clause (i) of (P2). Clause (i) of (P2) says that at t a substratumS supports a particular x. There are two key observations which relate toclause (i) of (P2) and which derive from the preceding criticism of (P2).

Thron yliopis to

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First, it is impossible that a substratum supports itself. Second, it isnecessarily true that if a substratum supports a particular, then thatsubstratum is a particular. Given these two observations, it is clear thatclause (i) of (P2) entails that S is a particular which is diverse from x.Thus, it is evident that (P2) meets the requirements which clause (iii) of (CI)prescribes for proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P2) satisfies allof (CI)'s clauses, (P2) presupposes circular individuation.

Moving on to (P3), it is necessarily true that a place occupied by aparticular is itself a particular. As (P3) covers every particular, we shouldconclude that such a place falls within the scope of (P3). Thus, since (P3)proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place which x occupies,(P3) raises the bizarre prospect of a particular's occupying a place and thisplace itself occupying a place. However, since the relevant relation ofspatial occupation can only hold between a nonplace and a place, forexample, as when a body or an event is in a place, a state of affairs of thiskind is absurd. For one thing, there could not be a place which occupiesanother place. For another, it is impossible that there be a place whichoccupies itself Although it may be assumed that there could be a placewhich is identical with itself, this is a very different affair. It is also true

that every place is either a proper or improper part of some place, and standsin spatial relations to other places, for example, relations of distance. Butthese facts certainly do not imply that a place occupies (or is in) a place.

Inasmuch as there could not be a place which occupies a place, any twoparticulars which are places do not meet (P3)'s requirement that each ofthese particulars occupy a place. Since there could be particulars, and since(P3) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place that x occupies,we should conclude that (P3) fails to give a logically necessary condition ofthe diversity of particulars at a time.

Now I am ready to argue that (P3) satisfies (CI). Because (P3) hasstructure (S1), (P3) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'place' being substituted

for 'G' . We can see that (P3) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) through anexamination of clause (i) of (P3). Clause (i) of (P3) says that at t a

particular x occupies a place L. There are two crucial points which relate toclause (i) of (P3) and which derive from the foregoing counter-example to(P3). First, it is impossible that a place occupies itself. Second, it is a

necessary truth that if a place is occupied by a particular, then that place isa particular. Given these two points, it is evident that clause (i) of (P3)necessitates that L is a particular which is other than x. Consequently, it isplain that (P3) satisfies the part of clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposalshaving structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P3) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI),(P3) presupposes circular individuation.

The argument that (P4) satisfies (CI) is straightforward. Since (P4) hasstructure (S1), (P4) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'particular' beingsubstituted for ' G' . We can verify that (P4) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) if weexamine clause (i) of (P4). Clause (i) of (P4) says that at t a particular P isa proper part of a particular x. But it is impossible that a particular be aproper part of itself. Hence, clause (i) of (P4) necessitates that P is aparticular which is other than x. Therefore, (P4) satisfies the conditions inclause (iii) of (CI) pertaining to proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuchas (P4) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P4) presupposes circularindividuation.

Notice that (P5) is the only one of our proposals whose analysans consistsof a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals. Specifically, thefirst disjunct of (P5)'s analysans concerns causes, and the other disjunct of(P5)'s analysans concerns effects. There is a rather direct argument that theproposals corresponding to (P5)'s first and second disjuncts satisfy (CI).Because these proposals have structure (S1), they satisfy , clause (ii) of (CI),with 'particular' being substituted for ' G' in each case. We can confirm thatthese two proposals satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) by examining clause (a) of(P5)'s first disjunct and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Clause (a) of(P5)'s first disjunct says that at t a particular z is a cause of a particular x,and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct says that at t a particular z is aneffect of a particular x. However, it is impossible that a particular be acause (effect) of itself. Therefore, clause (a) of (P5)'s first disjunct necessi-tates that z is a particular which is diverse from x, and likewise for clause(a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Hence, the proposals corresponding to (P5)'sfirst and second disjuncts meet the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI) coveringproposals having structure (S 1). Since the proposals corresponding to (P5)'sfirst and second disjuncts satisfy all of the clauses of (CI), these proposalspresuppose circular individuation. But if a proposal, X, presupposes circular

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individuation, then so does a proposal, Y, meeting the following twoconditions. First, Y's analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable.Second, Y's analysans is a disjunction of X's analysans and the analyticalportion(s) of one or more other proposals. Because (P5) is a proposalwhose analysans is a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposalswhich presuppose circular individuation, and because the analysandum andanalysans of (P5) are jointly satisfiable, (135) presupposes circular individua-

tion.Finally, let us consider the reasons for thinking that (P6) satisfies (CI).

According to a theory of tropes, a trope is a "property" or "relation" that isa concrete individual, for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, or thatparticular squareness. If a concrete individual, x, possesses a trope, T, then

either (i) in an intuitive sense T is in x, or (ii) T is a proper part of x. Forexample, either (i) the particular wisdom of Socrates is in Socrates insomething like the way Aristotle seems to have thought, or (ii) the particularwisdom of Socrates is a proper part of Socrates, as maintained by thosephilosophers who identify Socrates with a complex of tropes. However, itis impossible for a concrete individual to be in itself in the intuitive sense inquestion. (Of course, it is possible for a concrete individual to be identical

with itself, but that is an altogether different case.) Nor is it possible for aconcrete individual to be a proper part of itself. Hence, it is impossible that

a trope possesses itself. Furthermore, it is a necessary truth that a tropepossessed by a particular is itself a particular. Since clause (i) of (P6) saysthat at t a particular x has a trope T, we should conclude that clause (i) of

(P6) entails that T is a particular which is other than x. Because (P6) has

structure (S1), (P6) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'trope' being substituted

for 'G' , and it follows that (P6) meets the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI)covering proposals having structure (S 1). Inasmuch as (P6) satisfies all ofthe clauses of (CI), (P6) presupposes circular individuation.'

Since (P8) has structure (S1), (P8) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with`haecceity' being substituted for 'G' . But (P8) fails to satisfy the conditions

29If a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to anirreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope orconcrete "relation", then the modified criterion does not escape this sort of criticism, as it isimpossible that a trope be related to something by itself.


in clause (iii) of (CI) which pertain to proposals having structure (Si). Wecan appreciate (P8)'s failure to satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) if we study clause(i) of (P8). Clause (i) of (P8) says that at t a particular x exemplifies ahaecceity H. However, a particular's haecceity is an abstract entity, and sonot a particular. Therefore, clause (i) of (P8) does not necessitate that H isa particular which is other than x. Hence, (P8) does not meet the require-ments of clause (iii) of (CI) for a proposal having structure (S1). Conse-quently, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI).

The moral of this story is that an attempt to individuate a particular quaparticular by relating it to another particular commits us to circularindividuation as specified in (CI), whereas trying to individuate a particular

.

qua particular by relating it to an abstract entity does not commit us to suchcircular individuation. Analogously, an attempt to analyze the concept of thediversity of particulars in terms of itself is conceptually circular, but tryingto analyze this concept in terms of the concept of the diversity of abstractobjects is not circular in this way. For example, it is conceptually circularto claim that particulars x and y are rendered diverse at t by x and y's havingdifferent particulars as proper parts at t, whereas it is not conceptuallycircular in this way to claim that x and y are rendered diverse at t by x andy's having different properties at t.

The fact that (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specifiedin (CI) is not (P8)'s only advantage. For one thing, on the assumption thatparticulars have haecceities, there is no good reason to doubt that (P8)provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition for the diversity ofparticulars at a time. Indeed, (P8) can even accommodate the possibility ofthe following sorts of particulars, which are exotic or whose possibility iscontroversial: nonspatial souls, nonspatial Humean impressions, spatialobjects which literally interpenetrate one another, Boscovichian point-particles, and random quantum events which have no causes or effects. Incontrast, criteria such as (P3), (P7), and (P9) which rely on spatial factorscannot accommodate the possibility of nonspatial particulars, either souls orHumean impressions, or spatial objects which literally interpenetrate oneanother; a mereological criterion such as (P4) cannot accommodate thepossibility of simple objects such as nonspatial souls or Boscovichian point-particles; and a causal criterion such as (P5) cannot accommodate the

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105

possibility of random quantum events which have no causes or effects. Notethat if particulars of these kinds are possible, then (P3), (P7), (P9), (P4), and(P5), respectively, fail to provide a logically necessary condition of thediversity of particulars at a time."

Although an entity's haecceity is a relational property, an entity's intrinsic

nature includes its haecceity.' After all, the haecceity of an entity does notpertain to anything other than that entity. Indeed, for every complex object,x, there are relational properties of x which pertain to entities other than xand which are components of x's intrinsic nature, namely, relationalproperties of the form 'having y as a proper part'. Thus, in typical casessome of the properties included within an entity's intrinsic nature arerelational. No matter how tempting it might be to do so, it would be wrongto declare an entity's intrinsic nature nonrelational by definition.

Since an individual's intrinsic nature includes the haecceity of that thing,(P8)'s explanation of an individual's (x's) being diverse from an individual,y, in terms of the haecceity of x explains x's being diverse from y in terms

30Recall that a recent theory in physics implies that two fundamental particles having thesame intrinsic qualitative properties can wholly coincide in space. As noted earlier, if thistheory is correct, then there is a possible world consisting of two spatially coincident particlesof this kind which have the same qualitative properties. Thus, premises drawn from empiricalscience arguably lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities. In a similarvein, on some interpretations of certain quantum mechanical theories, fundamental particles canmove in a spatially discontinuous manner. If fundamental particles can "leap" through spacein this way, then the most popular criterion of the identity over time of particles is mistaken,that of spatio-temporal continuity. For an argument that such a criterion of identity throughtime is mistaken (even if it is supplemented with causal constraints on temporal stages beingstages of the same body), see my and Joshua Hoffinan's Substance Among Other Categories:A Conceptual Investigation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 5,Section 9. That spatio-temporal continuity together with these causal constraints fails to furnisha criterion of identity through time for fundamental particles suggests that haecceities are neededto provide this criterion. Thus, there are reasons to suspect that theoretical developments inempirical science lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities.

31 AII I mean by the intrinsic nature of a thing is the conjunction of all of a thing's intrinsicproperties, and an intrinsic nature of a thing is simply any intrinsic property of a thing. Anintuitively plausible example of an intrinsic property of some item is the property of beingsquare. An example of a nonintrinsic property of some item is the relational property of beingbetween a rock and a tree.

of an intrinsic nature of x. 32 But explaining x and y's being related in way,W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is a natural mode ofexplanation in cases of a certain kind. For instance, if a is related to b bya's being taller than b, then a's being related to b in this way is explainedby certain facts about the intrinsic natures of a and b, say, that a is 6 feettall and b is 5 feet tall. A dyadic relation, R, holding between x and y maybe said to be supervenient if R could not cease to hold between x and y(while x and y continue to exist) without there being a change in the intrinsicnature of x or y. Clearly, being taller than is a supervenient relation. Onthe other hand, distance is not a supervenient relation. However, diversityqualifies as an (extreme case) of a supervenient relation: if diversity holdsbetween x and y, then it could not cease to hold between them (while theycontinue to exist) without x and y's becoming identical, a most radicalchange in their intrinsic natures! Furthermore, explaining x and y's beingrelated in way, W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is anatural explanatory pattern when x and y's being related in way. W super-venes upon an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both). In addition, we have seenthat an entity's intrinsic nature includes its haecceity. It follows that (P8)'sexplanation of x's being diverse from y in terms of the haecceity of x is anatural one.

321t should be noted that since a haecceity is an individual essence, such an intrinsic natureof x is also essential to x.

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CHAPTER 2

VI - THE HAECCEITY CRITERION: NEITHER TRIVIALNOR CIRCULAR

"This he explodes as a circle, and so derides it."(1659 South. Sermons Preached Upon GeneralOccasions 1. 101)

"The triflingnes of this discourse, is much toomuch enlarged."[1581 Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie (Arb.) 71]

Despite (P8)'s advantages, some philosophers have rejected it on the groundthat it is trivial. Such a charge is based on the following argument, whosefirst premise admits of several variations.

Argument C(C1) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical

with a, and to say that a has this property is to say that a is identical

with a.33

Consequently,(C2)' If a particular is individuated by its having a haecceity, then the

diversity of particulars at a time can be analyzed in terms of a

33For example, see Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," p. 206. Actually, Black'sprotagonist claims that "All that you mean (my italics) when you say 'a has the property ofbeing identical with a' is that a is a." According to this claim, to say a has the property ofbeing identical with a is to say a is a, and vice-versa. However, notice that in some cases to

say p is to say q, and vice-versa, and in other cases, to say p is to say q, but not vice-versa. Forexample, to say that something is green and round is to say that something is green and round,and vice-versa, whereas to say that something is green and round is to say that something isgreen, but not vice-versa. (Seemingly, if it is possible that someone says p, then to say p is to

say q just in case a person's saying p necessitates his saying q.) In (C1), it is claimed that to

say a has the property of being identical with a is to say a is a, but the converse is not claimed.

Hence, Black's protagonist's claim is stronger than the corresponding claim in (Cl). Moreover,Black's protagonist's claim appears to be false, since to say that a has the property of beingidentical with a is to say that something has a property, whereas to say that a is a is not to saythat something has a property. Clearly, though, this is no reason to reject the correspondingclaim in (C1). Furthermore, it is just as plausible that the latter claim implies (C2) as it is thatBlack's protagonist's claim implies (C2). For these reasons, Argument C is the formulation of

choice for this sort of triviality objection.


particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself at a time.In addition,

(C3) The diversity of particulars at a time cannot be analyzed in thisway, since any attempt to do so suffers from (familial) triviality.

Therefore,(C4) A particular is not. individuated by its having a haecceity.

My reply to Argument C begins with the observation that in (C1) theexpression 'to say that a is identical with a' is ambiguous. This expressionrefers to either a relational statement that a is identical with a, or anattributional statement that a is identical with a. The statement referred tois relational if and only if that statement ascribes to a the qualitativereflexive relation _ being identical with_, and the statement referred to isattributional just in case that statement ascribes to a the nonqualitativeproperty (haecceity) of being identical with a. Since a haecceity, a so-calledrelational property, is not a dyadic relation or two-termed abstract entity, likeIdentity, but is rather a property, an abstract entity with but a single term,the attributional statement that a is a cannot be identified with the relationalstatement that a is a. More specifically, to make the attributional statementthat a is a is not to say what is said by making the relational statement thata is a, and to make the relational statement that a is a is not to say what issaid by making the attributional statement that a is a. Nevertheless, eitheran attributional statement or a relational statement can be made by utteringthe sentence `a is identical with a'. Finally, there are parallel distinctionswhich can be drawn between a relational thought (or belief) that a is a andan attributional thought (or belief) that a is a.

Accordingly, if in (Cl) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a'picks out an attributional statement, then (Cl) seems true, but adequatereason has not been provided to believe that (C1) implies (C2); and if in(C1) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a' picks out a relationalstatement, then although (Cl) entails (C2), (C1) is false. Either way, we donot have adequate reason to think that C is sound. Thus, Argument C doesnot give us a good reason to believe that (P8) is trivial.

So, although it is trivial to propose analyzing the relation of diversity forparticulars in terms of a particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself,

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analyzing the former relation in terms of a particular's having a certain kindof property might not be trivial in this way. The analysis of particulars'being diverse at a time proposed in (P8) commits us only to there being ananalysis of the latter sort, as (P8)'s analysandum consists of a particular's(x's) being related to a particular, y, by x's being diverse from y, and (P8)'s

analysans consists of x's having a certain property which y lacks.In the following four variants of Argument C, (C1) is revised, but (C2)

and (C3) remain unchanged. According to the first variation, (C1) isreplaced with

(Cla) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identicalwith a, and this property is identical with the ordered pair of a andthe identity relation.

Is (Cla) acceptable?' A number of considerations speak against (Cla).First of all, a haecceity is a property and an ordered pair is a set. Yet, it isintuitively plausible that Property and Set are nonoverlapping categories ofabstracta. Hence, it seems that (C1 a) is false. In other words, it can beargued plausibly that the identification of a haecceity with an ordered pairis an example of a Rylean category mistake. Moreover, the following relatedline of reasoning implies that (C1 a) is false. Necessarily, a haecceity is aproperty which can be exemplified, but it is impossible that a set (an orderedpair) be exemplified; and necessarily, an ordered pair is a set which haselements, but it is impossible that a property (haecceity) has elements. Forthese reasons, it is a necessary truth that a haecceity and an ordered pairhave different characteristics. It follows that there could not be a haecceitywhich is identical with an ordered pair of the identity relation and an object.Thus, (Cla) should be rejected, along with the corresponding revised version

34According to some philosophers, a haecceity may be represented (in a model) by theordered pair of the identity relation and an object. For example, see Felicia Ackermann, "ProperNames, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies, 35(1979), pp. 55-69. However, a haecceity's being represented in a model by such an ordered pairdoes not imply that a haecceity can be identified with an ordered pair of this kind. After all,a thing can be used in a model to represent something other than itself: what is representeddepends upon the intended interpretation of the model.


of Argument C.The second variation on Argument C replaces (C1) with

(Clb) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identicalwith a, and this property is identical with a collection (sum) of aand the identity relation.

It would appear that (C1 b) is unacceptable. For one thing, (Clb) is untrueif Property and Collection are nonoverlapping ontological categories, and itis intuitively plausible that this is so. Moreover, the following relatedargument entails that (Clb) is untrue. Necessarily, a haecceity is an abstractentity, and an abstract entity does not have a particular as a part. Thus, anonqualitative haecceity does not have a particular as a part. However,necessarily, a collection of a particular, a, and the identity relation, has aparticular as a part. It follows that necessarily, a nonqualitative haecceityand a collection of a particular and the identity relation have differentproperties. Hence, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with acollection (sum) of the identity relation and a particular. Therefore, (Clb)and the corresponding version of Argument C ought to be rejected.

According to the third variation on Argument C, (C1) is replaced with

(Clc) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identicalwith a, and this property is identical with the property of being anx such that x is identical with a.

A proponent of this variant presupposes that the phrase 'x is identical witha' as it occurs in (C1 c) ascribes the qualitative dyadic relation of identity.

Should we accept (Cl c)? One argument which supports (Cl c) is basedon the following two premises.

(a) The property of being identical with a and the property of being an xsuch that x is identical with a are necessarily coinstantiated.

(b) If a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, thenA=B.

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(b) represents a coarse grained view of property identity, and there is goodreason to reject such a view in favor of a fine grained view of propertyidentity. A fine grained view can be justified by appealing to the fact thatsometimes a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, butit is nevertheless possible that a person grasps A without his grasping B. For

example, Trilaterality and Triangularity are necessarily coinstantiated, but aperson could grasp either without his grasping the other. In other words,there could be a person who has the concept of a three sided closed planefigure, but lacks the concept of a three angled closed plane figure, andconversely. However, for any properties, x and y, if x is possibly such thatx has a certain property or bears a certain relation to a particular thing, wheny does not, then x#y. 35 It follows that Trilaterality and Triangularity aredifferent properties despite their necessary coinstantiation. Hence, propertyidentity is a fine grained affair. 36

According to Ernest Sosa, two properties can seem to differ in theircognitive content, and yet be identical, if one of them is an analysis of theother.' But this argument does not suggest that Trilaterality—Triangularity.After all, it is intuitively plausible that being a trilateral is not an analysis

of being a triangle, and vice-versa.This intuition is supported by two arguments. First of all, if A is an

analysis of B, then A explains B. Since A explains B entails '-(B explains A),

if A is an analysis of B, then B is not an analysis of A.38 However, theclaims that something is a triangle because it is a trilateral, and thatsomething is a trilateral because it is a triangle, appear to be epistemicallyon a par. If one of these claims is more plausible than the other, then either

35See Chapter 1, section VI.

36For a defense of the claim that property identity is fine grained see Roderick Chisholm,Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 117-120.

37Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710. Seethe discussion of Sosa's "Classical Analysis" in Chapter 1, section VI.

38(A explains B) entails —(B explains A) whenever the sense in which it is said that A

explains B is the same as the sense in which it is said that B explains A - which is the case inthe example at hand.


(i) X is a closed plane figure with three straight sides because X is aclosed plane figure with three angles having straight sides,

is epistemically preferable to its converse, or vice-versa. But (i) is notepistemically preferable to (i)'s converse, and (i)'s converse is not epistemi-cally preferable to (i).

Second of all, Sosa's view implies that an analysis resolves a complexattribute, A, into more fundamental structural units, namely, A's logical parts.Two implications of such a view should be noted. (1) In an analysis, theanalysandum is a term, 7', which is neither conjunctive, disjunctive, nornegative, but which represents a complex concept or attribute, P, involvinga conjunction or disjunction of factors, or a negation of a factor, et cetera.(2) The complex, P, is represented in the , analysandum as the simple, T,because our initial grasp of P does not reveal P's conceptual or logicalcomplexity, inasmuch as we initially grasped P from a nonreflective intuitiveperspective. Thus, for Sosa, in an analysis, the analysandum is a noncon-junctive, nondisjunctive, and nonnegative term which is analyzed by acomplex term in the analysans which is conjunctive, disjunctive, negative,and so forth. It is easy to see that this requirement is not met if one sets outto analyze Triangularity as Trilaterality, or vice-versa. The terms represent-ing these properties are either both noncomplex or both complex, and eitherway Sosa's requirement is not satisfied. For these reasons, it is implausiblethat Triangularity is analyzable as Trilaterality, and vice-versa. Thus, Sosa'sviews on property identity do not suggest that Triangularity is identical withTrilaterality. 39

Yet another way of justifying a fine grained view of property identity isby appealing to the fact that sometimes a property A and a property B arenecessarily coinstantiated, but A involves an abstract object that B does notinvolve.' If A involves an abstractum that B does not involve, then A and

39From what he says in "Classical Analysis" there is reason to think that Sosa would concur

in this judgement.

40A graspable property or proposition, P, involves a property, proposition, or relation, Q,just in case P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P, grasps Q. On the other hand, if thereis a nongraspable property or proposition, P1, which shares a generic logical structure, K, with

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B differ in their intrinsic nature. For example, Trilaterality and Triangularityare necessarily coinstantiated, but each involves an abstractum which theother does not involve. In particular, the former involves the property ofbeing three-sided, whereas the latter does not, and the latter involves theproperty of being three-angled, whereas the former does not. However, ifa property X involves a property, Z, and a property Y does not involve Z,then X#Y, since if x has a certain attribute or bears a certain relation to aparticular thing, when y does not, then x#y. Hence, Trilaterality andTriangularity are different characteristics, despite their necessary coinstanti-ation. Therefore, property identity is fine grained.

I am now prepared to argue that there is no reason to think that the variantof Argument C based on (C1 c) is sound. In the first place, suppose for thesake of argument that a person, S, could grasp the property of being identicalwith a. In that case, it seems that S could grasp the former property withoutS's grasping the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. Thatis, it seems metaphysically possible that S has the relatively uncomplicatedconcept of being identical with a without S's having the more sophisticatedconcept of being an x such that x is identical with a, since the latter concept,but not the former one, is a concept of being an x such that x is related ina certain way to a. Utilizing a by now familiar pattern of argument, we mayconclude that the property of being identical with a and the property ofbeing an x such that x is identical with a seem not to be identical with one

another.Furthermore, the property of being identical with a and the somewhat

gerrymandered property of being an x such that x is identical with a appearto differ in their intrinsic logical structure. In particular, these propertiesseem to involve different abstract objects: the latter property appears toinvolve the dyadic relation of identity, but the former property seems not toinvolve this relation. Employing a pattern of argument utilized earlier, itagain follows that being identical with a and being an x such that x is

a graspable property or proposition, P2, then it seems clear that PI involves abstracta of thesame kind as P2 involves. If an abstractum, Al, involves an abstractum, A2, then Al'sinvolving A2 is an intrinsic feature of Al. For example, in virtue of their internal structure, aconjunctive, disjunctive, or negative property or proposition, P1, involves another property orproposition, P2, which is a conjunct, disjunct, or negand of Pl.


identical with a appear to be different properties.Since being identical with a and being an x such that x is identical with

a seem to be diverse based on the criteria of grasping and involvement,(C1 c) appears to be false. It seems that these two properties are identicalonly if either the former property is analyzable as the latter property, or vice-versa. However, it does not appear to be true that something's being an xsuch that x is identical with a is a philosophical analysis of something'sbeing identical with a. For one thing, this putative analysis does not seemto have the required explanatory power: it may be trivial. After all,something's being an x such that x is identical with a hardly seems toexplicate what it is for something to be identical with a. In addition, aputative explication of this kind does not analyze the property of beingidentical with a into logical parts, for instance, conjuncts, disjuncts, or thelike. Finally, a property such as being an x such that x is identical with aappears to be in some sense a jury-rigged property which is less fundamentalthan the property of being identical with a. Thus, it seems incongruous tosuppose that the property of being identical with a is analyzable as theproperty of being an x such that x is identical with a. For all of the abovereasons, it does not appear to be true that the property of being identical witha is analyzable as the property of being an x such that x is identical with a.Accordingly, let us ask whether the latter property is analyzable as theformer one. The claim that the property of being an x such that x isidentical with a is analyzable as the property of 11 eing identical with a is alsoopen to question. This is because such a propos d analysis does not analyzethe former property into logical parts of the aforementioned sort. Thus, itmay be true that the necessary equivalence of being identical with a andbeing an x such that x is identical with a is a mere equivalence, so thatneither one of these properties is an analysis of the other. If this is true,then this state of affairs parallels the one which holds (I have argued) in thecase of Trilaterality and Triangularity. On the other hand, if the property ofbeing identical with a is a philosophical analysis of the property of being anx such that x is identical with a, then the former property explicates the latterone. In that case, although (Cl c) is true, we have been given no reason tothink that (Cl c) implies (C2). For all of the preceding reasons, I concludethat there is no justification for believing that the variant of Argument C

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 1151 14 CHAPTER 2

based on (Cie) is sound.'As we have seen, the property of being identical with a is not a mereolog-

ical compound, or an ordered set, of the relation of Identity and the objecta. Nor, as I have argued, is this property plausibly identified with a propertylike being an x such that x is identical with a. Nevertheless, it might beclaimed that the property of being identical with a is a logical offshoot of

Identity and a, and has Identity and a as logical constituents or ingredients.(By the way, this objection has the .consequence that the existence of theproperty of being identical with a logically entails the existence of Identityand a.) Accordingly, the fourth and final variation upon Argument Creplaces (Cl) with

(Cid) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identicalwith a, and this property has a and the relation of Identity as logicalconstituents.

An advocate of (Cid) maintains that the idea behind this premise can beunderstood from the fregean perspectives of linguistic expression, sense, andreference. From the perspective of linguistic expression, a name such as`being identical with a' is created from the predicate `_is identical with_'by "plugging in" two names 'a' and 'bo' to produce the sentence 'a is

identical with b', "plucking out" 'a', and nominalizing the result. From theperspective of sense, it is impossible to grasp the sense of 'being identicalwith a' without grasping the senses of the identity predicate and the name`a'. From the perspective of reference, the compound relational property ofbeing identical with a derives from a's being "plugged" into the right handvariable position in the relation, _being identical with_, resulting in themonadic attribute _being identical with a.42

41 If (Clc) is amended so that it proposes that the property of being identical with a=theproperty of being an x such that x bears Identity to a, then an argument of the same kindapplies.

42This objection is based upon a criticism raised by an anonymous reviewer for CambridgeUniversity Press. Edward Zalta has used the term "plugging" to refer to a putative logicalanalog of the linguistic operation of partially saturating a multi-place predicate with a name.See Zalta's Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,

In my reply, I consider the perspectives of expression, sense, and referencein turn. In the first instance, the fact that a property-designating expressionhas a certain structure does not provide a conclusive reason for thinking thatthe property it designates has constituents corresponding to each of the partsof that expression. Consider, for example, the expression 'being a believerin Santa Claus'. This expression has the same general structure as 'beingidentical with a'. Are we to conclude that Santa Claus is a constituent of acompound property whose other constituent is the relation x being a believerin y? It seems not. Since a property is not a linguistic entity, the determi-nants of a property's logical ingredients are to be found at a level deeperthan the superficial one of property-designating expressions and theirlinguistic form. Accordingly, let us proceed, first, to the level at whichsenses are grasped, and second, to the level of reference, which are such(apparently progressively) deeper levels.

The crucial question about grasping is whether or not it is possible for aperson to grasp a's haecceity, being identical with a, prior to his graspingthe sense of the identity predicate, the two-term relation of Identity. As thefollowing discussion makes clear, it seems that this is possible. Thedistinction I drew between the relational thought or belief that a is a and theattributional thought or belief that a is a can be used to help us understandsuch a possibility. If a person has an attributional belief that a is a, then heattributes to a the property of being identical with a - a's haecceity. On theother hand, if a person has a relational belief that a is a, then he relates a toitself by attributing a two-place reflexive relation of Identity to a. Therefore,it is possible that a person has an attributional thought that a is a without hishaving a relational thought that a is a, and it is possible that a person has arelational thought that a is a without his having an attributional thought thata is a. Thus, it appears that to have an attributional thought that a is a isnot to have a thought of the reflexive two-place relation of Identity in whichone relates a to itself by attributing that relation. Rather, having the formerthought is having a thought of the property of being identical with a, andattributing that property to a. Hence, it seems possible that at a time t aperson attributes a's nonqualitative haecceity to a without thereby grasping

1983).

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117

the qualitative reflexive relation of x being identical with y. Once this isadmitted, there is no reason whatsoever for saying that necessarily, such aperson grasps the Identity relation at a time earlier than t. Surely, therecould be a being whose first beliefs, including his initial beliefs about theidentity of things, consist of property-attributions, and who makes his firstrelation-attribution at a later date. (Indeed, this might be true in our owncase.) Such an individual's initial grasping of "identity" would occur withinthe context of some attributional belief in which he attributes a haecceity tosomething, for example, himself. At that point, the individual would not yethave grasped the two-place reflexive relation of Identity, and would not yethave had a relational thought in which he attributes this relation tosomething. I conclude that from the perspective of the grasping of senses,there is reason to believe that the Identity relation is not a logical ingredientof (and is not involved in) a haecceity.

Finally, from the perspective of reference, it is of questionable coherenceto say that the property of being identical with a derives from a's being"plugged" into the "right hand" variable position of the Identity relation.How does a, a concrete entity, "plug into" the Identity relation, an abstractentity? "Plugging" is not any intuitive or familiar relation which holdsbetween properties or relations and concreta. Since one place in a dyadicrelation can be "plugged" without "plugging" the other place, it is possiblefor a relation to be "plugged" without its being exemplified. Thus,"plugging" is not an exemplification relation of the sort that relations bearto concreta. If the relevant conception of "plugging" is not to be a mystery,an explanation of this conception is needed. But it is problematic whethersuch an explanation is available. Furthermore, the notion that an abstractentity has a concrete entity as a logical constituent or ingredient appears tobe unintelligible. To appreciate the difficulty of conceiving of a haecceityas a relational property having Identity and an object as logical constituents,consider the following argument.

(1) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a property.(2) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is an abstract entity.(3) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is a one-place or

monadic attribute.

Consequently,(4) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a one-place or

monadic abstract entity.Furthermore,

(5) Necessarily, for any x, if x is an abstract entity which consists(logically speaking) of a two-place relation one of whose places is"plugged" by an item, then x is a two-place abstract entity.

Therefore,(6) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x does not consist,

logically speaking, of a two-place relation one of whose places is"plugged" by an item.

We can now see that (a), (b), and (c), below, should be distinguished fromone another:

(a) _being identical with_ (Identity has two places, both of which are"unplugged"),

(b) _being identical with a (A haecceity is a property and has one place),and

(c) _being identical with a (Since this putative entity has two places[one of which is "plugged" by a], it is not a property).

According to my argument, if Identity and a are logical constituents of theproperty of being identical with a, then (b) is identical with (c). Since, asI have argued, this implies a contradiction, I conclude that Identity and a arenot logical constituents of the property of being identical with a. For thisreason, it appears that the claim that a haecceity, is a relational propertyhaving Identity and an object as logical ingredients is untenable. Theconception of haecceity embodied in this claim seems to be ill-conceived, orof dubious coherence, for a haecceity which satisfies this conceptionapparently exemplifies contradictory features characteristic of abstract entitiesbelonging to different ontological categories, that of Property and Relation.For the preceding reasons, I believe that this conception of haecceityinvolves a category mistake: a categorial confusion between a property anda relation. Given such a conception, haecceities are fantastical and

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119

monstrous entities which seem even less intelligible than the singing anddancing teapot depicted in Disney's animated film version of Beauty and theBeast.' Now that we understand the serious problems faced by the ideathat a concretum's haecceity has Identity and a concretum as logicalconstituents, it is clear that (Cid) and the corresponding version of Argument

C should be rejected.It might be countered that although a partly "plugged" relation being

identical with a cannot be identified with a haecceity, a haecceity somehowemerges from a partially "plugged" relation. In that case, a haecceity isdependent upon a partly "plugged" relation, and perhaps a nonqualitativehaecceity is "constituted" by an object and such a relation in some sense.However, a notion of an entity's emerging from another more basic entitynaturally arises in a domain of a certain kind. In particular, such a domainhas members which either (i) have spatial or temporal parts, or (ii) canundergo a change in their intrinsic properties. For example, arguably, an icecube emerges from, and is in some sense constituted by, a quantity of water,and arguably, a spherical surface emerges from, and is in some sensedependent upon, a spherical object. In the first of these examples, the ideaseems to be twofold: (a) an ice cube cannot exist without a quantity ofwater, but a quantity of water can exist without an ice cube, and (b) themelting of the ice cube necessitates its destruction, but typically, the quantityof water continues to exist after the ice cube melts. In the second of theforegoing examples, the idea appears to be that a spherical surface issomehow parasitical upon a spherical object. Whatever one might make ofsuch notions of emergence, they appear to be meaningless in a domainwhose members are immutable, that is to say, incapable of undergoing achange in their intrinsic properties, and whose members have neither spatialnor temporal parts. Yet, since haecceities are abstract properties, they belongto a domain of this latter sort. 44 Therefore, the notion that a haecceitysomehow emerges out of a partly "plugged" relation seems to be senseless.

In the light of the foregoing arguments, there is no reason to think that a

43Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans.(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 97, ¶ 282.

44See the discussion of these characteristics of abstracta in Chapter 1, section VIII.

viable explanation of a haecceity's derivation from Identity and an object isavailable. The notion that haecceities are somehow "compounded" out ofIdentity and objects can now be seen to be a rather implausible one. Whyis this notion as widely accepted as it is? A reasonable hypothesis is that thenotion results from a common tendency to conflate characteristics of aproperty-designating linguistic expression and characteristics of the propertyit designates.' More exactly, in the case of haecceities, there appears tobe a confusion of the features of a haecceity-designating linguistic expres-sion, compounded out of the identity predicate and a name of an object, andthe features of the haecceity it designates. As we have seen, although ahaecceity is designated by a compound expression of this kind, the notionthat a haecceity is itself a compound of Identity and an object seems to begroundless. Another possible source of the idea that an abstract object, inthis case a nonqualitative haecceity, is "built" or "constructed" by "combin-ing" an object and a relation, is the notion that abstract properties are mentalconstructs. However, this idea is incoherent: since a mental construct is aconcrete entity, namely, a mental state or the like, an abstractum cannot beidentified with such an entity.

A final objection can be stated as follows. In my definition of the conceptof haecceity given in Chapter 1, section IV, there is quantification into theobject-place of expressions for haecceities. According to this definition,

F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that (3x)(F is the property ofbeing identical with x).

But, the objection goes, "if a haecceity is not logically compounded ofIdentity and an object, then we should not be able to quantib, into the object-place in the compound predicate: it should be an inviolable logical unit."'Hence, a haecceity is logically compounded of Identity and an object.

45Cf. Chapter 1, section II, where it is argued that a "relational property" cannot be

identified with a relation, and that the sense in which such a property is "relational" can beunderstood in terms of the sort of linguistic expressions which designate such properties.

461 quote an anonymous reviewer who read an earlier version of this book for CambridgeUniversity Press.

120 CHAPTER 2

However, there is no reason to accept this argument, unless there is a truegeneral principle to the effect that whenever there is quantification into theobject-place of a compound predicate which is part of a referentialexpression, the value of the quantified variable is a constituent of the referentof that referential expression. Unfortunately for this objection, this generalprinciple is subject to a wide range of counter-examples of the following

sort.(1) Suppose that Hillary=the wife of Bill. Then,

(3x)(3y)(x=Hillary & y=Bill & x is the wife of y).

But, it is false that Bill is a constituent of Hillary.(2) The number 8-=the predecessor of the number 9. Hence,

(ax)(3y)(x=the number 8 & y=the number 9 & x is the predecessor of y).

Yet, it seems incoherent to say that the number 8 has the number 9 as aconstituent.

(3) Let S=the surface of the Earth. In that case,

(3x)(3y)(x=S & y=the Earth & x=the surface of y).

Surely, though, it is absurd to suppose that the surface of the Earth has theEarth as a constituent.

(4) Finally, suppose that e=that event which is Jones's falling. Inconsequence,

(3x)(3y)(x=e & y=Jones & x=the falling of y).

However, this consequence does not seem to provide us with a good reasonfor rejecting Donald Davidson's view that an event does not have an object

as a constituent. 47 However, the aforementioned consequence should

47See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," and "Events as Particulars," Nous,

IV (1970), pp. 25-32.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 121 .

provide us with such a reason if it is true, as a general principle, thatwhenever there is quantification into the object-place of a compoundpredicate which is part of a referential expression, the value of the quantifiedvariable is a constituent of the referent of that referential expression. Hence,it seems that this general principle is false.

Given the foregoing counter-examples to the general principle in question,this principle should be rejected. Once this is recognized, we have no reasonto accept the proposition that if we can quantify into the object-place ofexpressions for haecceities, then a haecceity has an object as a constituent.Thus, we have not been presented with any evidence that my quantificationinto the object-place of expressions for haecceities implies that a haecceityhas an object as a constituent. I conclude that the objection under discussionis without merit.

Having surveyed a wide range of arguments which purport to imply that(P8) suffers from familial triviality, and having found all of these argumentsdeficient, I infer that there is no reason to believe that (P8) is guilty of thischarge.

Does (P8) suffer from vicious conceptual circularity? (P8) is viciouslycircular just in case (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the diversity ofparticulars at a time. Since the concept of this relation does not appear tobe employed in (P8)'s analysans, (P8) does not appear to be viciouslycircular. (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the relation of diversityfor particulars only if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates hishaving the concept of the relation of diversity for particulars. However, itappears to be metaphysically possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysanswithout his having the concept of the dyadic relation of diversity forparticulars. It might be objected that if a person grasps (P8)'s analysans,then he must have some sort of general or singular conception of aparticular's (x's) being diverse from a particular y. I am not sure that thispremise is true, but it might be. In any case, the premise may be granted.For it is possible that when a person has some sort of general or singularnotion of x's being diverse from y, this notion is attributional, and eitherascribes a concept of the nonqualitative property of being diverse from y tox, or ascribes a concept of the qualitative property of being diverse fromsomething to x. Furthermore, there could be an individual who has an

122 CHAPTER 2 THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 123

attributional conception of x's being diverse from y, but lacks a relationalconception of x's being diverse from y. Unlike ourselves, an individual ofthis kind would fail to grasp the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars.Hence, even if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates his havingsome sort of general or singular concept of x's being diverse from y, it is

nevertheless possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysans without hishaving a concept of the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars. .

Therefore, it seems that (P8) does not suffer from vicious conceptualcircularity.

To recapitulate, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation asspecified in (CI), and does not suffer from either familial triviality or viciousconceptual circularity. As far as I can tell, the superficially plausible chargethat (P8) is in some sense trivial or circular is unjustified.

Let us take stock. As we have seen, proposal (P0) does not provide alogically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time,proposals (P1)-(P4), (P6), (P7), and (P9) presuppose circular individuationas delineated in (CI), and proposal (P5) presupposes circular individuation,since (P5)'s analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and (P5)'s

analysans is a disjunction of the analytical parts of proposals which meet(CI). Recall that a proposal, X, presupposes circular individuation if Xmeets two conditions. Firstly, X's analysandum and analysans are jointlysatisfiable. Secondly, X's analysans has as a disjunct or conjunct theanalysans of a proposal which meets (CI). Therefore, if a proposal'sanalysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and the proposal'sanalysans has one or more of the analytical parts of (P1)-(P7) or (P9) as adisjunct or conjunct, then the proposal in question presupposes circularindividuation.

It follows that among all of the aforementioned proposals, including anyof these disjunctive or conjunctive ones, only (P8) is viable. As far as I cansee, the range of proposals reviewed is comprehensive enough that there isno need for us to consider any other proposals. It is arguable that if noneof these proposals provides a criterion of individuation for particulars, thenthe diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact. 48 Thus, it seems that

(P8) can be inferred as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars ata time, unless there is a plausible a priori objection to the possibility ofnonqualitative haecceities. Accordingly, the next order of business is toaddress a priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities.

48This seems to be Max Black's position in "The Identity of Indiscemibles".

124

CHAPTER 2


VII - RESPONSES TO A PRIORI OBJECTIONS TOHAECCEITY

"Every attribute is what the ancients called an universal."

(1785 Reid Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 440)

"Quality is used as the generical name of every thing in objects,

for which a seperate notation is required."

[1829 JAS. Mill Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mindxiv. II. 60 (1869)]

A priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities imply thata haecceity, an abstract property, has a feature which is incompatible withPropertyhood or Abstractness. Given my arguments in favor of the existenceof nonqualitative haecceities, if these objections to the intelligibility ofnonqualitative haecceities can be answered, then the conclusion thatparticulars have haecceities is warranted.

The first of these objections infers the impossibility of a particular'shaving a haecceity from two premises.

(1) The haecceity of a concretum, x, is an abstract entity which consistsof two parts: the identity relation, and x, respectively.

(2) It is impossible that an abstractum has a concretum as a part.

An objection of this kind is unsuccessful for the following reasons. Firstof all, how are we to understand (1)'s implication that an abstract entity and

a concretum are parts which together comprise the nonqualitative haecceityof that concretum? Surely, they are not spatial or temporal parts of such anabstract entity. Nor are they conjuncts, disjuncts, or any other sort of logicalpart of a nonqualitative haecceity. It seems that the haecceity, H, of a

concretum, x, has x as a part only if H is some sort of collection or sum of

the identity relation and x.49 However, if (2) is true, then we should inferthat a collection which has a concretum as a part is not an abstract entity.Because a haecceity is an abstract entity, it follows that the haecceity of aconcretum, x, cannot be identified with a collection of the identity relationand x. Hence, if (2) is true, then (1) is false. Furthermore, since (2) is quiteplausible, it seems that (1) is false. For the foregoing reasons, the first ofthese objections is unsound.

The response might be to revise (1) and (2) as follows.

(1') Although the haecceity of a concretum, x, does not have x as a part,there is a sense in which such an abstract entity intimately involves x.

(2') It is impossible that an abstract entity involves a concretum in sucha sense.

A weakness of this revised objection is that it is unclear in what sense thehaecceity of a concretum is supposed to "intimately involve" that concretum.For this reason, it is problematic whether (1') is true. Perhaps there is asense of Constituenthood which differs from Parthood or Elementhood, andwhich is the intended sense of "intimate involvement" in this objection.However, if the haecceity, H, of a concretum, x, has x as a constituent, thenx must be a proper constituent of H, otherwise H would be identical with x,which is obviously absurd. But if something has one proper constituent, thenit must have another. If a concretum, x, is a proper constituent of thehaecceity of x, then what other proper constituent does x's haecceity possess? ,

My reply to the contention that it, is viciously circular or trivial to analyzethe diversity of concreta at a time in terms of their haecceities seems toimply that such a haecceity does not have the identity relation and aconcretum as proper constituents, and does not involve the relation ofidentity. However, it appears that if a haecceity of a concretum, x, hasproper constituents, then x and the identity relation are among them. Hence,

49Note that such a collection is not a set, since it is possible that a set have elements, butnot parts. The relation of proper parthood is transitive and irreflexive, whereas the relation ofelementhood is not transitive and (on some views) not irreflexive.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 127126 CHAPTER 2

it seems that a concretum x is not a proper constituent of the haecceity of x,and (1') is false if Constituenthood is the intended sense of "intimateinvolvement" in (1').

Because a haecceity, H, of a concretum, a, that is, being identical with a,appears to have neither the identity relation nor a as an element, part, orconstituent, and because H seems not to involve the identity relation, it isappropriate to designate such a haecceity with a hyphenated expression suchas 'identity-with-a', as Alvin Plantinga has done."

The objection based on (1') and (2') may also be unsound due to thefalsity of (2'). After all, possible abstracta include sets of concreta, andthey intimately involve concreta in the sense that they have concreta aselements (though not as parts or constituents.)

In a somewhat similar vein, Chisholm has argued against the possibilityof nonqualitative haecceities based on two premises. 51

(1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then an individual's conceiving P doesnot entail his conceiving of a particular concretum.

(2) Necessarily, if an individual conceives the haecceity of a concretum,then by conceiving this property he conceives of a particular concre-tum.

According to (1), Qualitativeness is a logically necessary condition ofPropertyhood, and according to (2), the haecceity of a concretum isnonqualitative. Although (2) is true, why should we accept (1)? After all,the haecceity of a concretum seems to have a feature which is a logicallysufficient condition of Propertyhood, namely, being monadic and exempli-

fiable. 52 Thus, there is no reason to accept (1), and Chisholm's objectiondoes not succeed.

A similar objection deduces the impossibility of a concretum's having ahaecceity from the two premises stated below.

(1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then P is possibly exemplified bysomething, x, and P is possibly exemplified by something, y, whichis not identical with x.

(2) Necessarily, the haecceity of a concretum is a property which couldnot be exemplified by something other than that concretum.

(1) advances the thesis that a logically necessary condition of Propertyhoodis that a property be capable of exemplification by different things. Butthere is no good reason to accept this thesis, since, as noted above, ahaecceity appears to have a feature which is a logically sufficient conditionof Propertyhood, that is, being monadic and exemplifiable, despite the factthat a haecceity is not capable of being exemplified by different things.Furthermore, it seems that there are properties which are possibly exempli-fied by something and not possibly exemplified by anything else, forexample, being even and prime, being the successor of 1, and being identicalwith 2, which appear to be possibly exemplified by the number 2 and notpossibly exemplified by any other thing. Thus, the first premise of theobjection under discussion seems to be false.

Alternatively, the impossibility of there being a particular which hascontingent existence and which has a haecceity might be inferred from thefollowing two premises.

(1) The haecceity of a concrete contingent being is an abstract entitywhich has contingent existence.

50See Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(1978), pp. 129-138.

51 Roderick Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1981), pp. 7-8.

52Notice that property exemplification and tropal possession are different relations,inasmuch as it is possible that an abstract entity bears the former, but not the latter, to aconcretum.

128 CHAPTER 2

(2) It is impossible that an abstract entity has contingent existence.

However, it is not obvious that (1) is true, and I shall argue later thathaecceities of concrete contingent beings have necessary existence. In anycase, for present purposes it suffices to point out that (2) seems to be false.For it appears possible that there be an abstract entity which has contingentexistence, for instance, a set of contingent concreta which exists if and only

if its elements exist.Another sort of objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities

goes as follows. The haecceity of a concretum is supposed to be a property,but such a haecceity has a diaphanous quality indicative of its lack ofcontent. Since a property must have some content, there could not be anonqualitative haecceity.

My reply is that the content of a concretum's haecceity is a concretum's

individuality or identity in a sense which is quite fundamental. Somephilosophers may be led to think that nonqualitative haecceities arecontentless by their inability to grasp the content of certain nonqualitativehaecceities. Nevertheless, whether a nonqualitative haecceity has content,

and whether that content is graspable by someone, would seem to be

different questions.A related objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities is based

on the following two premises.

(1) If concreta have haecceities, then there could be a property, namely,

some concretum's haecceity, which is necessarily ungraspable.

(2) Necessarily, a property is possibly grasped.

I am prepared to grant that (1) is true. As we shall see later, it can beargued plausibly that there are haecceities which can be exemplified bynecessarily unconscious material substances and which could not be graspedby anyone. •

Is there a good reason to accept (2)? Of course, if there are properties,then we grasp some of them. Yet, our grasping some properties does not

entail that every property is graspable. On the other hand, if properties can


be identified with ideas or concepts, then (2) is true. However, thecontention that properties are identifiable with such mental entities isunintelligible. After all, a property is an abstract entity and mental entitiesof this kind are concrete, and no entity can be both abstract and concrete.(In contrast, the thesis that properties are eliminable in favor of ideas orconcepts is intelligible.) It might be argued that an omniscient being ispossible, and that this possibility entails (2). But must an omniscient beinggrasp every property, or could a being be omniscient and fail to grasp aproperty provided that this property couldn't be grasped by anyone? If theformer, then how do we know that an omniscient being is possible, given (1)and (2) above? If the latter, then the possibility of an omniscient being doesnot entail (2). Either way, the premise that an omniscient being is possibledoes not provide a good reason to accept (2). In addition, even if somehaecceity is necessarily ungraspable, we have seen that it nonetheless has acharacteristic which appears to be a logically sufficient condition ofPropertyhood, namely, being monadic and exemplifiable. As far as I cansee, there is no reason to accept (2), and the objection under discussion isunsuccessful.

130 CHAPTER 2

VIII - HAECCEITY: A METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATIONOF DIVERSITY

That form which specifies the matter is more powerfulthan other forms."

(1750 trans. Leonardus's Mirror of Stones 59)

Since it appears that a priori objections to the existence of nonqualitativehaecceities can be answered, we are entitled to infer the existence ofnonqualitative haecceities as a plausible hypothesis which helps to explainthe diversity of particulars at a time. At this point, let us return to theargument concerning the diversity of particulars with which we began.

Argument B(B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse.

(B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from

y at t.(B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks

at t.Therefore,

(B4) A property exists.

Our acceptance of (B1) is justified on empirical grounds. In addition, we areentitled to assume that (B2) is true, unless we are given good reason forsupposing otherwise. It is arguable that this prima facie presumption infavor of (B2) is defeated if we have good evidence that all availableaccounts of the diversity of particulars at a time are inadequate. But I havetried to show that such evidence is lacking. If (P8) is warranted, then so is(B3), and the property referred to in (B3) and (B4) is a nonqualitativehaecceity. Since (B) is valid, and since (P8) is inferable as the bestexplanation of the diversity of particulars at a time, (B) is a plausibleargument for Realism about properties.

It might be charged that a scotistic ontology which posits nonqualitativehaecceities is over-inflated. An ontology of this kind is a full-blown realismof qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as of nonquali-tative properties and propositions. After all, if there are nonqualitative


haecceities, then there are also abstract entities of these other sorts.'However, to say that such a version of Realism is over-stuffed is to say thatit multiplies entities beyond necessity, thereby violating Ockham's Razor.Hence, if my argument that nonqualitative haecceities are needed as part ofthe best explanation of the diversity of individuals at a time is successful,and if we are justified in believing that the existence of haecceities impliesthe existence of abstract entities of the other aforementioned kinds, then afull-blown realism is required if there is to be an explanation of particulars'being diverse from one another. In this case, an ockhamist cannot justifiablydismiss nonqualitative haecceities either on the ground that their postulationis unparsimonious, or on the ground that the overall-ontology to which theybelong is over-inflated. Moreover, if the ockhamist claims that nonquali-tative haecceities do not provide an acceptable solution to the problem ofindividuation, then he ought to either give a reason for thinking that someother proposal offers a superior solution or else explain why my proposedsolution in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is defective.

A possible worry about the adequacy of my proposed solution arises asfollows. It appears that our notion of concreta's being diverse isconceptually prior to our notion of a concretum's having a haecceity. Thatis, it seems that we acquire the former notion before we acquire the latterone. This might be thought to constitute a reason for doubting thatconcreta's being diverse can be analyzed or explicated in terms of some-thing's having a haecceity. But it is not such a reason. For as Aristotlerecognized in the Physics, our preanalytic or prescientific ideas about thingsare epistemically prior to the first principles which are discovered throughanalytical inquiry and which explain the nature of things.' Similarly, ourprescientific idea of light is conceptually prior'to the notion of a photon, butthe fundamental laws which explain the nature of light tell us that light is astream of photons. Thus, it is to be expected that if a concretum's havinga haecceity can be used to explain why concreta are diverse, then our notionof concreta's being diverse is conceptually, , prior to our notion of aconcretum's having a haecceity.

53See Chapter 1, sections II and III.

54Aristotle, Physics, Book I, Ch. 1, 184a-184b.

132 CHAPTER 2


Surely, if concreta have haecceities, then abstracta have them as wel1. 55

Since it seems that concreta have haecceities, it appears that abstracta havethem too. However, for any x, x is either concrete or abstract. I concludethat every entity has a haecceity.

Does this imply that the diversity of abstracta at a time is analyzable?'I do not believe so. First of all, an analysis of the diversity of entities whichinstantiate some category, say, being abstract, at a time, t, analyzes thediversity of entities belonging to that category at t by relating them toentities which instantiate some category at t, either the category of beingconcrete or the category of being abstract. But, for any ontologicalcategory, C, an attempted analysis, A, of the diversity of two instances of Cat t presupposes circular individuation if A implies that possibly (there aretwo entities x and y belonging to C at t, and the diversity of x and y at t canonly be explained by relating x (or ),) to another (third) entity, z, belongingto C at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entailsthat x#y (or y#z), z's being diverse from some fourth instance of C at t can

only be explained by relating z (or that fourth instance) to a fifth instance ofC at t in such a manner that z and that fifth instance's (or the fourth instance

55This premise can be defended as follows. As we have seen, it seems that if concreta

have haecceities, then there are abstracta, including properties and propositions, both qualitativeand nonqualitative. Moreover, as I argued in Chapter 1, section III, Proposition is a categoryof logical entity, i.e., propositions have truth-values, logical entailments, modal properties, andso on. Therefore, it is plausible that if there is a proposition, then for certain kinds ofpropositions, there must be a logically comprehensive variety of propositions of those kinds.Specifically, it is intuitively plausible that if there are abstracta of the aforementioned sorts, andA is an abstract entity, then there is the proposition that (3x)(x=A). But this proposition saysthat some•:'-g is identical with A. It is plausible that if there is a proposition of this kind, thenthere is the property of being identical with A. Hence, it seems that if concreta have haecceities,then abstracta have haecceities. Notice that this conclusion is based upon a need for logicalgenerality: it has not been argued that haecceities of abstracta are needed in order to explain thediversity of abstracta. In fact, i shall argue in the text below that haecceities of abstractacannot help to explain the diversity of abstracta.

56According to some philosophers, abstracta are outside of time. If these philosophers are

correct, then abstracta are not diverse at a time. In that case, the only kind of diversity whichabstracta can have is timeless diversity, and the question in the text should be replaced with 'Isthere an analysis of the timeless diversity of abstracta?' However, the claim that abstracta areoutside of time is problematic, since it seems that properties, relations, and propositions undergorelational change, e.g., Sobriety is exemplified by Socrates at one moment and not at another.

and the fifth instance's) being so related entails that they are diverse, thefifth instance's being diverse from some sixth instance of C at t can only beexplained by relating this fifth instance (or the sixth instance) to a seventhinstance of C at t in such a fashion that the fifth instance and the seventhinstance's (or the sixth instance and the seventh instance's) being so related'entails their diversity, and so on ad infinitum). The inadmissibly circularcharacter of an attempted analysis of this kind is analogous to that found inthe earlier attempt to analyze or explain the diversity of concreta at a timeby relating one concretum to another concretum. In other words, such anattempt to explain why an instance of an ontic category, C, is diverse fromanother instance of C by relating an instance of C to another instance of Cis viciously circular. Thus, any proposed analysis which presupposes suchcircular individuation is fatally flawed, including one which attempts toanalyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta toabstracta. 57 However, the attempts to analyze the diversity of abstracta ata time by relating abstracta to abstracta which need concern us presupposecircular individuation of this very sort. For example, it might be proposedthat:

(AB) At time t, an abstractum A is diverse from an abstractum B =df.There exists a property P such that: (i) at t A exemplifies P, and (ii)at t B does not exemplify P.

57Note that conditions or criteria such as those we usually employ to differentiate oneproperty from another cannot be used to construct an analysis or explanation of the diversity ofproperties at a time. For example, at t, property A 1#A2 if at t, Al and A2 are not necessarilycoinstantiated; and at I, property A 1#A2 if at t, AI is possibly grasped without A2's beinggrasped. Such conditions, or criteria involving them, distinguish Al and A2 by irreflexivelyrelating AI to ,42: they distinguish abstracta (properties) from one another by relating abstracta(properties) to other abstracta (properties) in such a way that these abstracta's (properties')being so related entails their diversity. Consequently, such conditions or criteria presupposecircular individuation. Thus, criteria or conditions of this sort cannot provide an analysis orexplanation of the diversity of properties at a time. Nonetheless, conditions or criteria of thiskind have an epistemic utility: they can provide intellectual justification for the claim thatcertain properties are diverse. Parallel remarks apply to abstracta such as propositions andrelations, and the criteria we customarily employ to differentiate them. See footnote 3 in thischapter for a discussion of the distinction between formal criteria and epistemic principles ofindividuation.

134 CHAPTER 2

But in some possible circumstances, two abstracta, for instance, theproperties Red and Round, can be distinguished from one another only interms of (second-order) properties they exemplify which are other than Redand Round, for example, being a color and being identical with Red (Red'shaecceity), these two (second-order) properties can be distinguished from oneanother only in terms of (third-order) properties they exemplify which areother than the second-order properties in question, the preceding two (third-order) properties can be distinguished from one another only in terms of(fourth-order) properties they exemplify which are other than the aforemen-tioned third-order properties, and so on ad infinitum." Consequently, (AB)implies that the diversity (at a time) of a pair of n-order abstracta in sucha possible hierarchical series can only be explained by using the relation ofExemplification to relate an n-order abstractum to an (n+1)-order propertyit exemplifies, for instance, its haecceity. Because (AB) implies that suchexplanations are possible, and because an abstractum's (A's) exemplifyinga second (or higher)-order property, P, entails the diversity of A and P (with

P itself being an abstractum), (AB) violates the prohibition on circularindividuation formulated above.' It follows that the diversity of abstracta

58Presumably, Red and Round are not self-exemplifying: they are first-order properties,

properties which could only be exemplified by concreta. On the other hand, a second-orderproperty is one which could only be exemplified by a first-order property, a third-order propertyis one which could only be exemplified by a second-order property, and so forth.

59Observe that although my argument for this conclusion resembles the earlier argument,based on (CI), which rules out circular individuation in the case of concreta, these argumentsare not completely parallel. Because the exemplification relation seems not to be irretlexive,in constructing the present argument it was necessary to diverge somewhat from the pattern ofthe earlier argument. As a result of the apparent nonirreflexivity of exemplification, thereappears to be a possible case in which a property A exemplifies A, and some other property, B,does not exemplify A. For example, possibly, the property of being grasped by someone hasthe property of being grasped by someone, and some other property, say, being red, does nothave the property of being grasped by someone. Hence, (AB)'s analysans seems not to entail

that P is an abstract entity which is other than A. Notice that my argument for the conclusionthat a proposal such as (AB) is inadmissibly circular does not imply that there is such anentailment, unlike an argument for this conclusion based on a principle which parallels (CI) andwhich results from replacing each occurrence of 'particular' in (CI) with an occurrence of`abstractum'.


at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta.Second of all, since we have analyzed the diversity of concreta at a time

by relating concreta to abstracta, we cannot also analyze the diversity ofabstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, on pain of viciouscircularity. 60 Hence, the diversity of abstracta at a time cannot be analyzedby relating abstracta to concreta. And it was shown above that the diversityof abstracta at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta.However, it appears that every entity is either abstract or concrete.Therefore, it seems that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyz-able brute fact.

As we have seen, an attempt to both analyze the diversity of concreta ata time by relating concreta to abstracta, and analyze the diversity ofabstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, is viciously circular.But even aside from this point, there appears to be no way to analyze thediversity of qualitative abstracta at a time by relating qualitative abstractato concreta. Qualitative abstracta are related to concreta by the converse ofExemplification, namely, being exemplified by. It seems that there is norelation between abstracta and concreta which is any more useful than thisconverse relation for analyzing the diversity of qualitative abstracta at atime. Yet, a qualitative property's (P Ps) being exemplified by a concretum,x, at a time t and a qualitative property's (P2's) not being exemplified by xat t, is not a logically necessary condition of the diversity of P1 and P2 att, since a concretum can exemplify two qualitative properties at once. Onthe other hand, a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of property such that aconcretum could only exemplify one property of that kind at a time. Thus,a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of abstract entity whose diversity at atime might be analyzable by using the converse of exemplification to relateabstracta to concreta. Specifically, the following analysis might beproposed.

60The general principle at work here can be stated as follows. Where being F and beingG are diverse ontological categories, attempting to both analyze the diversity of Fs at a time byrelating Fs to Gs, and analyze the diversity of Gs at a time by relating Gs to Fs, is viciouslycircular.

135

136 CHAPTER 2


(H) A nonqualitative haecceity, HI , is diverse from a nonqualitativehaecceity, H2, at a time t =df. there is a concretum x such that (i)HI is exemplified by x at t, and (ii) H2 is not exemplified by x att.

Of course, it is viciously circular to try to analyze the diversity of nonquali-tative haecceities at a time by relating them to concreta as in (H), whiletrying to analyze the diversity of concreta at a time by relating them tononqualitative haecceities as in (P8). Thus, if (P8) is accepted as ananalysis, then (H) should be rejected as an analysis; and if (H) is acceptedas an analysis, then (P8) should be rejected as an analysis. Therefore, wehave two options, we can either

(1) accept (P8) as an analysis, and reject (H) as an analysis,

Of

(2) accept (H) as an analysis, and reject (P8) as an analysis.

Is there any reason to prefer one of these options to the other? Thefollowing considerations count decisively in favor of option (01). If we takeoption (02), then although we might be able to explain the diversity ofnonqualitative abstracta at a time, we cannot explain either the diversity ofconcreta at a time or the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time. On theother hand, if we select option (01), then we can explain the diversity ofconcreta at a time, but not the diversity of abstracta at a time. The pointwhich tips the balance decidedly in favor of option (01) concerns the wayin which the explanations put forward by (01) and (02) correspond to anadequate classificatory scheme of ontological categories. According to (01),concreta have a principle of individuation, and abstracta lack one: adistinction neatly corresponding to the core ontological division between thecategories of the concrete and the abstract. In this sense, the distinction inquestion is a natural and intuitive one. In contrast, (02)'s distinctionbetween those entities which have and those entities which lack a principleof individuation is gerrymandered and unintuitive: it lumps together

qualitative abstracta and concreta as lacking a principle of individuation, anddistinguishes them from certain nonqualitative abstracta which have aprinciple of individuation. In other words, (02)'s distinction not only failsto correspond to the core concrete/abstract division, but in lumping togetherqualitative abstracta and concreta it seems not to correspond to any intelligi-ble classificatory system of ontological categories.

For these reasons, (01)'s account of diversity at a time in (P8) providesa greater degree of systematization and explanatory coherence, and so is abetter explanation, than (02)'s account of diversity at a time in (H).Consequently, (01) or. (P8) is intellectually preferable to (02) or (H).

I conclude that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyzablebrute fact, unlike the diversity of concreta at a time 6 1 There being sucha brute fact is incompatible with the claim that for every ontologicalcategory, there must be a principle of individuation for entities of thatcategory. My , argument that concreta have a principle of individuation is notbased on such an assumption, but rather on an inference to the bestexplanation: it is based on the idea that an analysis of the diversity ofconcreta at a time in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is the best of allavailable explanations of their diversity at a time.

But on the assumption that the ontological categories of the abstract andthe concrete are fundamental, it might seem to be somewhat of an anomalythat there is no explanation of the diversity of abstracta, when there is anexplanation of the diversity of concreta. However, if abstracta areontologically prior to concreta, then this is not an anomaly. After all, ifentities of one kind are ontologically prior to entities of another kind, thenit is natural to explain the diversity of entities of the second kind in terms

61The extreme realism of properties that I defend in this book entails that abstracta lackspatial location. Even if moderate realism can be used to defend the idea that abstract propertiesare spatially located where they are exemplified, there could be coexemplified properties whichare spatially coincident. Consequently, spatio-temporal location cannot be a principle ofindividuation for abstracta. However, as the numerical diversity of abstracta is a brute fact,abstracta have no need of a principle of individuation. Thus, the fact that spatio-temporallocation cannot serve as a principle of individuation for abstracta is of no comfort to anominalist. Nor does the fact that the numerical diversity of abstracta is inexplicable give thenominalist grounds for complaint, since my argument implies that the numerical diversity ofconcreta is inexplicable unless there are abstracta, viz., nonqualitative haecceities.

138 CHAPTER 2


139

of entities of the first kind, and it is not anomalous if the diversity of entitiesof the second kind is explicable, and the diversity of entities of the first kindis an inexplicable brute fact. In what follows, I describe my reasons forthinking that abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta.

To begin with, consider the traditional view that abstracta are necessarybeings, whereas concreta are contingent beings. If this view is correct, thenabstracta are ontologically prior to concreta: necessarily, if there areconcreta, then there are abstracta, but possibly, there are abstracta and noconcreta. Moreover, in the next chapter I argue that if there are nonquali-tative properties, then properties, relations, and propositions, whetherqualitative or nonqualitative, have necessary existence. If we suppose thatabstracta of these kinds have necessary existence, then concreta areasymmetrically dependent upon abstracta, even if some abstracta havecontingent existence or some concreta have necessary existence. In therelevant sense of asymmetrical dependence, an entity which instantiates anontic category, Cl, is asymmetrically dependent upon an entity whichinstantiates an ontic category, C2, just in case there being an instance, i,, ofCl entails that i, bears a certain relation to an instance of C2, and therebeing an instance, i2, of C2 does not entail that i2 bears the converse relationto an instance of Cl. Supposing that abstracta of the aforementioned kindshave necessary existence, concreta are asymmetrically dependent uponabstracta in the foregoing sense. For in that case, necessarily, if xinstantiates the ontic category of being concrete, then x bears a relation tosomething which instantiates the ontic category of being abstract, butpossibly, there is something which instantiates the latter ontic category andwhich does not bear the converse relation to something which instantiates theformer ontic category. For example, if we assume that properties, relations,and propositions, whether qualitative or nonqualitative, have necessaryexistence, then necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x exemplifiesproperties, but possibly, there is a property which is not exemplified by aconcretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then there are propositionswhich are true of x, but possibly, there is a proposition which isn't true ofa concretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x enters intorelations, for example, Exemplification, but possibly, there is a relation, R,such that no concretum enters into R; and necessarily, if there is a concre-

turn, x, then there is a set of which x is an element, but possibly, there aresets, for instance, the null set, which do not have a concretum as an element.If the existence of nonqualitative haecceities implies that abstracta areontologically prior to concreta in the way indicated, then there is nothinganomalous about concreta's having a principle of individuation andabstracta 's lacking one.' An upcoming argument implies that the exis-tence of nonqualitative haecceities has this very consequence.

The time has come for a summary of the implications of my argumentsfor the existence and nature of properties. Firstly, there are nonqualitativehaecceities. Secondly, a nonqualitative haecceity is a property, a kind ofabstractum. Thirdly, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with anabstractum of another category such as a relation, a proposition, or a set.Hence, it would appear that there are properties, and that Propertyhood is afundamental ontological category. In other words, it would seem that RobustRealism is true.

62S inceSince the diversity of abstracta is unanalyzable, it clearly follows that the diversity ofentities in general is unanalyzable. Of course, this conclusion is compatible with my claim thatthe diversity of concreta is analyzable.

NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 141

CHAPTER 3

HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLEINDIVIDUALS

"Conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nordid, nor will exist."(1785 T. Reid Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man iv. i. Wks.

368/1)

"I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent."

[Jowett The Dialogues of Plato (ed. 2) I. 230 (1875)]

I - THE INDIVIDUATION OF NEPS

"Essence, in its primary signification, means the principle of indi-viduation, the inmost principle of the possibility of anything, asthat particular thing."

[from Coleridge Biographia Literaria 175 (1817)]

I have argued that there are nonqualitative haecceities,' and that if this is thecase, then there is a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative propertiesand propositions.' I conclude that there exists a full range of qualitative andnonqualitative properties and propositions. It seems that if there areabstracta of these kinds, then metaphysical possibility can be understood interms of them. Therefore, it appears that metaphysical possibility can beunderstood in terms of qualitative and nonqualitative properties andpropositions. In particular, it is highly plausible that a possibility or possibleworld is identifiable with an abstractum, that is, a proposition or property,

'See Chapter 2.

2See Chapter 1, section II.

or conjunction of them.' Using a term coined by Alvin Plantinga, the viewwhich endorses such an identification will be called Modal Realism. 4 I shallargue that the postulation of unexemplified nonqunlitative haecceities isjustified because Modal Realism requires the existence of such properties.

To begin with, recall that there is a distinction between NEPs which aremereological or causal products and NEPs which are mereologically andcausally disjoint.' For example, consider two particular steel blocks whichare never joined in a certain fashion to create a third material object, butwhich could be joined in that fashion to create such a material object. Apossible material object which would be created if the two blocks werejoined in some manner is both a mereological and a causal product. Amereological or causal product is a NEP which is connected to concreteexistence in the sense that it either would be created by the assembly orarrangement of certain objects, or would be produced by certain items undersome nomologically possible circumstance. On the other hand, since amereologically and causally disjoint NEP is neither a mereological nor a

3For instance, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,1974). Notice that any property, proposition, or state of affairs which can be identified with apossible world or universe must be very large and "maximal" or suitably complete. For anaccount of possible worlds as possible complete states of affairs see Alvin Plantinga,"Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals" in M. Loux, ed., The Possible and The Actual(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 147. According to Plantinga: "A pair of states ofaffairs S and S' may be so related that it is not possible that both obtain, in which case Sprecludes S'; and if it is impossible that S obtain and S' not obtain, then S includes 5... Stillfurther, a state of affairs S may be such that for any state of affairs S, S either includes orprecludes S', in which case S is maximal. Now we may say that a possible world is just amaximal possible state of affairs." On Plantinga's conception of a possible world, the maximalpossible state of affairs which obtains is the actual world, and a maximal possible state of affairswhich does not obtain is a possible world which is merely possible. To allow for the fact thatsome states of affairs, for example, Socrates's drinking, occur at some time, but not others,Plantinga revises his account in the following way. A temporally invariant state of affairs is onethat necessarily, either always occurs or never occurs. A possible world is a possible state ofaffairs which is temporally invariant and maximal with respect to temporally invariant states ofaffairs. See Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile" in James Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, eds.,Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 90-91.

4See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.

5 See Chapter 1, section IV.

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142 CHAPTER 3

causal product, such a NEP is not connected to concrete existence in thissense. It is intuitively plausible that some NEPs neither would be created byassembling or arranging actual bits of matter, nor would be produced byactual items under a nomologically possible circumstance, including eithersome nonexistent possible spirits or material things which do not have a partor constituent present in the actual world.' Thus, it seems that some NEPs

are mereologically and causally disjoint, including some nonexistent possiblefundamental particles, some nonexistent possible nonfundamental materialobjects, and/or nonexistent possible spirits.

I will argue that for each NEP there is a property which individuates that

NEP. But what exactly is meant by saying that a property individuates a

NEP? A large number of philosophers would find the notion of a property'sindividuating a nonexistent possible concretum to be a rather perplexingone. It is therefore crucial that this notion be precisely characterized. Idefine the concept of a property's individuating a NEP as follows.

(D1) A property, P, individuates a NEP =df. (i) in some possible worldthere is an individual i which exemplifies P, i exemplifies P in every

possible world in which i exists, and i does not exist in the actualworld, and (ii) For any possible worlds W1 and W2, if in W1 there is

an object o i that exemplifies P, and in W2 there is an object 02 that

exemplifies P, then o1o2 . 7

Assume that a property P satisfies (Dl). In that case, if we consider thetotality of possible objects, actual as well as merely possible, we can see that

6Note that since a spirit is unlocated or unextended, it is a simple, as is a Boscovichian

point-particle. Cf. Chapter 1, section IV.

7Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Nonexistent Possibles And Their Individuation," Grazer

Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147. In that article, I implied that (DI) would benecessary and sufficient for a property's individuating a' NEP even without the inclusion of thephrase `i exemplifies P in every possible world in which i exists' in clause (i) of (Dl). Thisstill seems to me to be the case, but for the broader purposes of this book it will prove usefulto have a formulation of (Dl) that includes this phrase in clause (i). There are a number ofalternative equivalent formulations of (D1), and the question of which one of them is to bepreferred (if any) is of no great importance.


one and only one of them could exemplify P, and this possible object is aNEP. Thus, P individuates a specific NEP. However, suppose a propertyP is such that if in some possible world W, P is exemplified by an object oh

then in some possible world W2 P is exemplified by an object 02 diversefrom 01. In that instance, P does not meet (D1), for either P is notexemplified by a NEP (clause (i) of (Dl) is not satisfied by P), or P isexemplified both by a possible object 0, in WI and by another possibleobject o2 in W2 (clause (ii) of (D1) is not met by P). Because of this, P failsto single out a specific NEP from among the totality of possible objects, bothactual and merely possible. Therefore, P does not individuate a NEP.

According to (D1), P individuates a NEP if and only if P is an unexempli-fied individual essence which is possibly exemplified by a concretum. Sinceall unexemplified haecceities which are exemplifiable by concreta areindividual essences of this sort, (DI) implies that such an unexemplifiedhaecceity individuates a NEP. On the other hand, it seems that someindividual essences are not haecceities Thus, if NEPs are individuated byunexemplified individual essences, it is not obvious that these unexemplifiedindividual essences are haecceities. However, I shall argue that NEPs areindividuated by unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities.

The first order of business is to show that Modal Realism requires NEPsto be individuated by unexemplified individual essences. To begin with, itis a datum that possibly, there exist objects which never exist in fact. Inother words, surely, in one possible world or another there exist objectswhich do not exist in the actual world. Notice that this datum doesn't pickout a specific possible object. Rather, it uses a kind of quantification to talkabout NEPs in purely general terms. However, there being a generalpossibility of this kind entails that there are specific possibilities which areinstances of that general possibility. That is, there being such a generalpossibility presupposes the possible existence of specific objects which donot exist in fact, or the existence in some possible world of specific objectswhich do not exist in the actual world.

Bearing this in mind, let o be a nonexistent possible, an object which doesnot exist, but which exists in some nonactual possible world W. Thus, the

8See Chapter 1, section VI.

144 CHAPTER 3


singular proposition about o that it exists is true in W. Call this propositionT. Recall that Modal Realism maintains that a possible world is an abstractentity. Accordingly, since W is a nonactual possible world, Modal Realismentails that W is a false or an unexemplified abstract entity, that is, either acomplete conjunctive proposition with some contingently false conjuncts, one

of which is T, or a complete conjunctive property with some contingentlyunexemplified conjuncts. In that case, inasmuch as there exists a full rangeof qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions, there is sucha proposition as T. However, since T is a singular proposition about o to the

effect that it exists, either (i) in some sense o itself is involved in T, or else

(ii) T involves a property, P,9 which can go proxy for o in the sense that oexemplifies P in some possible world, o exemplifies P in every possible

world in which o exists, and in no possible world is there an object diversefrom o that exemplifies P. Such a property, P, is an unexemplifiedindividual essence which could be exemplified by o. With respect todisjunct (ii) above, notice, firstly, that the proposition that there exists athing which exemplifies P is necessarily equivalent to T, and secondly, thatP satisfies (D1) and hence individuates o. Thus, a property P of this kindmight be able to serve as a proxy for o in T.

For the purposes of a reductio, let us suppose that there does not exist anindividual essence which individuates o. That is, there is no property whichsatisfies (D1). In this case, for any property, P, either P is not exemplified

by o in W, or P is exemplified by an object other than o in some possibleworld. Plainly, this implies that there does not exist anything which can goproxy for o in T. Moreover, since o is nonexistent, there is obviously no

sense in which T involves o itself. But, as I have argued, T either involves

o itself or involves something which can go proxy for o. Hence, there is no

such proposition as T. However, as argued above, on the modal realist view

that a possible world is an abstract entity, if T is true in some possibleworld, then there is such a proposition as T. Consequently, there is nopossible world in which T is true. So, there is no nonactual possible worldW in which o exists, a result which contradicts our assumption that o is a

9For an elucidation of the notion of a proposition's involving a property see Chapter 2,section VI, footnote 40.

NEP. Thus, o's being a NEP is incompatible with the conjunction of ModalRealism and the claim that there is no property which individuates o: ModalRealism implies that for each NEP, there is an individual essence whichindividuates that NEP.

146 CHAPTER 3

II - THE INDIVIDUATION OF DISJOINT OBJECTS

"Of all the infinite Number of Possibles."

(1754 Edwards Freedom of Will 11. iii. 46)

I shall now argue that there isn't anything which individuates disjoint NEPs,unless disjoint NEPs are individuated by unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceities.

To begin, take any possible physical object or person whose existence ornonexistence is a contingent matter. As we have seen, it is intuitivelyplausible that for each such individual, there could be another objectcomposed of numerically different stuff which is an exact double of it. °Two such possible objects are numerically distinct but are indiscernible intheir intrinsic qualitative properties throughout their histories. That is, ateach moment of their existence they would be of the same kind, have thesame color, shape, weight, size, internal structure, mental states, and so on.

Thus, the following assumption is justified. For any physical object or

person, op which has contingent existence in a possible world, W1 , there is

a possible world, W2, in which there is an object, 02, such that: 02 is other

than op 02 is made up of numerically different stuff than o / , and 02 and o,

are twins in the sense that for any time t, o, has the same intrinsic qualitative

properties at t in W2 as 0 / has at t in W,. Since it is plausible that 0 / could

have such a twin 02, considerations of parity make it plausible that 02 could

have a twin o3 which is other than op o3 could have a twin 0, other than 0,

and 02, and so forth. For parallel reasons, it is equally plausible that if o / is

a disjoint object, then ever so many of o,'s possible twins are also disjoint.Furthermore, in some possible world W3 02 exists, o, never exists, and 02

occupies each space-time position that o, occupies in W,. In addition, o l

could fail to exist and have its place taken in this way by a twin 02, while

everything else in W3 is the same as it is in W, - with the only possible

exception being the existence of either parts of 02, things in 02 's causalancestry, descendants of such ancestors, or parts of these ancestors or



descendants.. Let us say that things which stand in relation to an object inthe ways in which things of the latter four kinds stand in relation to 02 aremereologically or causally related to that object. It follows that in somepossible world W3 things are exactly as they are in W1 with the exceptionthat neither 0 / nor a thing mereologically or causally related to 0 / ever exists,and their places are taken by twins. For example, suppose that in 1{ 7, o l isa material object which is created by the assembly of its right and left halvesat a certain point in time. Then there is a possible world W3 such that: forany time t, a twin of 0 / is spatially located at t in W3 where 0, is located att in W1, a twin of 0,'s right half is positioned at t in W3 where 0,'s right halfis positioned at t in W„ similarly for o l 's left half, and so on - with o, andeach thing mereologically or causally related to o, having a twin occupy eachone of its spatio-temporal positions. For any physical object or person, 0,,which has contingent existence in a possible world W 1 , there is a possibleworld W3 of the kind described. And a world W3 of this sort can involveany of the many possible twins of both 0 1 and each of the things mereolog-ically or causally related to op Hence, for each world W1 , there are manysuch worlds W3.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that there does not exist anunexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of a disjoint object. In that case, theforegoing line of reasoning implies that there are worlds W 1 and W3, anddiverse twin disjoint objects o, in W1 and o, in W3 such that o, in PV/ and02 in W3 are alike in all respects, with the only possible exception being that02 has different disjoint things mereologically or causally related to it in W3

than o l has mereologically or causally related to it in Wp " However, we

I I ignore so-called world-indexed properties, whose existence was defended by AlvinPlantinga in The Nature of Necessity. Among such properties are those of the form 'being theso & so in W, where W' designates a specific possible world. Plantinga's theory implies thatif a property of this form is instantiable, e.g., the property of being the first president of the U.S. A. in the actual world, then it is an individual essence. Still, a world-indexed property standsin need of analysis in terms of a maximal conjunctive proposition which is identical with theindexed world and which involves non-world-indexed individual essences of all entities in theindexed world. In other words, any attempt to individuate a NEP with a world-indexed propertypresupposes that the NEP in question is individuated by a non-world-indexed individual essence.Because my argument in the text is designed to show that all relevant properties which are notworld-indexed fail to individuate a disjoint object, there is no need to consider world-indexed

NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 149148 CHAPTER 3

have seen that there can be a nonqualitative relational property whichpertains to a concretum only if there are nonqualitative haecceities ofconcreta.' It follows that there can be a nonqualitative mereological orcausal relational property which pertains to a disjoint object only if there arenonqualitative unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects.Thus, our assumption that there are no such haecceities implies that there areno relational properties of these kinds. Consequently, on this assumption o,in W1 and its diverse twin r)2 in W3 are alike in every respect whatsoever,whether qualitative or nonqualitative. This means that for any property P,if P is exemplified by o, in WI , then P is also exemplified by a diverseobject o)2 in W3. Hence, P fails to satisfy (D1). Therefore, P doesn'tindividuate a disjoint object. It follows that there is not anything whichindividuates a disjoint object.

We can now argue as follows. Modal Realism implies that for everyNEP, there is a property which individuates that NEP. And the intuition thatsome NEPs are disjoint presents us with a datum about what is possible withwhich Modal Realism should be compatible. Moreover, as we have seen,there exists something which individuates a disjoint object if and only ifthere exists an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuatesthat disjoint object. Hence, Modal Realism implies that there are unexempli-fied nonqualitative haecceities of disjoint objects. Since Modal Realism isquite plausible, the claim that there are unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceities which individuate disjoint objects is plausible too.

My argument for this conclusion entails that an unexemplified nonquali-tative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is equivalent to aconjunction of other properties only if at least one of the properties in thatconjunction is a nonqualitative mereological or causal relational propertywhich pertains to a disjoint object. Since such a relational property isunexemplified, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuatesa disjoint object is not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties.

Notice that although my earlier analysis of the diversity of particulars ata time implies there are exemplified nonqualitative haecceities, this analysis

does not entail there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. Theargument I gave for Robust Realism is based upon the need for thisanalysis. ° However, in the light of our latest results, we can see that thereis a need for unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuatedisjoint objects. Since it seems that there are unexemplified properties, wecan infer that Extreme Realism is true. Moreover, inasmuch as an unexem-plified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is notequivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties, we are entitled toconclude that Strong Extreme Realism is true.

Because in the actual world there exists such an unexemplified haecceity,H, which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object, o, andbecause it seems that in every possible world it is true that possibly, o exists,considerations of parity dictate that H exists in every possible world, W, inwhich o cannot be either assembled out of or produced by what exists in W.And obviously, if H exists in every such world W, then H exists in everypossible world, W, in which o can be either assembled out of or producedby what exists in W. Thus, it seems that H exists in every possible worldor has necessary existence. Certainly, if there are haecceities of this kind,then there are also unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individu-ate mereological or causal products and which possess necessary existence.Inasmuch as there are haecceities of the former sort, there are haecceities ofthe latter sort. Since a NEP is either a mereological or causal product, orelse is disjoint, and since an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceityindividuates a NEP, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity eitherindividuates a mereological or causal product, or individuates a disjointobject. It follows that all unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities havenecessary existence. Moreover, surely, if unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceities possess necessary existence, then exemplified nonqualitativehaecceities possess necessary existence as well. Hence, haecceities of thelatter kind have necessary existence. In sum, every nonqualitative haecceityhas necessary existence, including those which are exemplified and thosewhich are not.

properties in the text.

12See Chapter 1, section II.13 See Chapter 2.

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CHAPTER 3 NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 151

III - OBJECTIONS TO UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES:A REPLY

"For you will not find thought without what is, in relationto which it is uttered; for there is not, nor shall be, any-thing else besides what is..."

(from Parmenides The Way of Truth)

"Every Concept must denote some existing object, - existingthat is, either really or potentially."

[Bowen A Treatise on Logic IV. 61 (1864)]

Among those philosophers who think that concreta exemplify nonqualitativehaecceities, there are some who would deny that there are unexemplifiednonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects." A principalobjection to the existence of such unexemplified haecceities is based uponthe following principle of haecceity dependence.

(HD) The existence of a haecceity, being identical with a, either entailsthe existence of a or entails the existence of objects whose assemblywould result in a's creation.

Evidently, (HD) is incompatible with the existence of an unexemplifiedhaecceity which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object.Given the not implausible assumption that material objects or persons, andtheir parts, have contingent existence, (HD) implies that a haecceity of amaterial object or person has contingent existence. This entails that such ahaecceity does not exist in every possible world.

In what follows, I argue that (HD) should be rejected, and defend myargument against a number of possible rejoinders. To start with, consider

140ne such philosopher is Robert Adams. See his "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49(1981), pp. 3-41. For a response to Adams see Alvin Plantinga, "On Existentialism,"Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 1-20. My argument in this section is a descendant of anargument in Chapter 9 of my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences (Brown University,1976).

argument (A) below.

(1) Haecceities are properties.(2) Properties have necessary existence.

Therefore,(3) Haecceities have necessary existence.

Given the not implausible assumption that material objects, persons, and theirparts have contingent existence, (HD) and (A) conflict. On this assumption,(HD) implies that the haecceity of a material object or person has contingentexistence, whereas (A) implies, that haecceities have necessary existence.Clearly, (A) is logically valid, and (A)'s first premise is true given mydefinition of the concept of haecceity. However, is there a good reason toaccept (A)'s second premise? According to a position I shall call BifurcatedRealism, defended by philosophers such as Robert Adams, nonqualitativeproperties or propositions, unlike qualitative ones, have contingent exis-tence.' Hence, Bifurcated Realism entails that (A)'s second premise isfalse. Bifurcated Realism gives a nonuniform account of the nature ofabstracta: nonqualitative abstracta have contingent existence, and qualitativeabstracta have necessary existence. The conflicting claim that properties,relations, and propositions have necessary existence will be called PlatonicRealism. Platonic Realism entails the truth of (A)' s second premise,although it is consistent with the falsity of (A)'s first premise. Finally,Platonic Haecceitism is the thesis that qualitative properties, relations, andpropositions, as well as nonqualitative properties and propositions, havenecessary existence. Platonic Haecceitism entails that both of (A)'s premisesare true.

What is the bifurcated realist's reason for thinking that qualitativeproperties and propositions have necessary existence? Presumably, he hassomething like the following reason. There are qualitative propositionswhich are necessary truths, for example, if something is square, then it issquare, Squareness is a shape, if something is red, then it is colored, and soforth. These qualitative necessary propositions are true in all possible

15See Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness".

152 CHAPTER 3


worlds. Hence, these propositions, as well as the qualitative properties theyinvolve, exist in all possible worlds or have necessary existence.

But the platonic haecceitist can invoke a parallel argument which impliesthat nonqualitative properties and propositions have necessary existence. Forexample, the nonqualitative proposition

(1) if I exist, then I exist

appears to be a necessary truth. Thus, it seems that (1), as well as thenonqualitative haecceity (1) involves, have necessary existence.

It might be thought that (1)'s being a necessary truth implies that / havenecessary existence. But (1)'s being a necessary truth appears not to havethis (absurd) implication. In particular, because (1) is a material conditional,and because a material conditional with a false antecedent is true, it seemsthat (1) would be true if its antecedent were false, that is to say, if it werefalse that I exist. Hence, it appears that (1) does not imply that I exist.Thus, it seems that (1)'s being a necessary truth does not have the absurdconsequence that I have necessary existence. Moreover, since (1)'s being anecessary truth implies that (1) has necessary existence, (1)'s havingnecessary existence also appears not to have this absurd implication.

To the claim that (1) is a necessary truth, the bifurcated realist wouldreply that although (1) is not a necessary truth, (1) has a feature easilyconfused with necessary truth. In particular, he would correctly note that (1)is essentially true: that (1) has the characteristic of being necessarily suchthat it is true or being true in every possible world in which it exists. (1)'s

essential truth is compatible with (1)'s failing to exist in those possibleworlds in which I fail to exist. Therefore, (1)'s essential truth is consistentwith (1)'s not being true in all possible worlds. However, when a bifurcatedrealist asserts that a qualitative proposition is a necessary truth, his assertionis subject to a moderate realist reply which parallels the bifurcated realist'sanswer to the platonic haecceitist. To see this, consider the following threeclaims about the property of being red which a moderate realist wouldprobably accept. First, Redness exists. Second, Redness exists if and only

if a concretum exemplifies Redness or a concretum is red (a moderate realistmaintains that every property is exemplified). Third, possibly, there does not

exist a red concretum. These three claims together imply. that Redness hascontingent existence. Thus, a moderate realist may well hold that thequalitative proposition

(2) if something is red, then it is red

has contingent existence, on the ground that (2) exists only if a redconcretum exists. After all, (2) does not exist unless Redness exists, andRedness has contingent existence. It follows that (2) is not a necessary truthwhich is true in all possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which ared concretum does not exist, and (2) isn't true in those worlds. In contrast,a bifurcated realist would claim that (2) is a necessary truth. To this claim,our moderate realist would reply that although (2) is not a necessary truth,(2) has a characteristic easily confused with necessary truth. Specifically, hewould correctly note that (2) is essentially true: (2) is true in every possibleworld in which (2) exists. However, if (2) isn't a necessary truth, then noproposition is a necessary truth. Thus, Moderate Realism implies that thereare no necessary truths, only essential ones.

Bifurcated Realism can regard (2) as a necessary truth only if it discountsthe moderate realist's claim that (2) is merely essentially true. But then itwould seem that a bifurcated realist is not justified in rejecting (1)'snecessary truth in favor of (1)'s essential truth. Thus, the bifurcated realist'sclaim that every necessary proposition is qualitative is questionable. In otherwords, there might be a nonqualitative proposition which is necessary. Andsince a necessary proposition has necessary existence, there might be anonqualitative proposition which has necessary existence. Hence, thebifurcated realist's claim that every nonqualitative proposition has contingentexistence is problematic. Moreover, nonqualitative propositions involvenonqualitative properties, and if abstracta of the former sort have necessaryexistence, then abstracta of the latter sort have necessary existence. Conse-quently, the bifurcated realist's contention that nonqualitative properties havecontingent existence is problematic as well. For these reasons, the bifurcatedrealist's rejection of Platonic Haecceitism should be regarded with suspicion.

Yet, Moderate Realism implies that a haecceity cannot exist unless it isexemplified: a concretum's haecceity cannot exist unless that concretum

154 CHAPTER 3

exists. Thus, Moderate Realism entails (HD), just as Bifurcated Realismdoes.

In attempting to show that (HD) ought to be rejected, I shall argue thatBifurcated Realism as well as Moderate Realism merit rejection (in thatorder). To begin this task, compare (HD) and the following principle ofqualitative property dependence.

(QD) The existence of a qualitative property, being F, either entails thatan F exists or entails that a concretum exists.

I will try to establish that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. If I am.right, then (HD) and (QD) are equally plausible or implausible, and theystand or fall together.

Let us make the not implausible assumption that a concretum hascontingent existence. It is desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysi-cal topics be compatible with this assumption. I6 Given our assumption,(QD) implies that the property of being red fails to exist in some possibleworld, for instance, a possible world in which there is not a red thing, or apossible world in which there is not a concretum. Of course, the propertyof being red exists in other possible worlds in which there are red concreta.Hence, if (QD) is true, then the property of being red has contingentexistence. Observe that necessarily, (QD) is true just provided that a first-order qualitative property, for example, being red, does not exist in an"empty world", namely, a possible world in which there does not exist aconcretum."

On the other hand, Platonic Realism or Bifurcated Realism implies that aqualitative property such as Redness has necessary existence, or exists in allpossible worlds, even in an empty one. Therefore, both Platonic Realismand Bifurcated Realism reject (QD). (QD) expresses an aristotelian ormoderate realist view of the existence conditions of qualitative properties.

16It may also be desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysical topics be compatiblewith the claim that some concretum has necessary existence.

17A first-order property is a property which could only be exemplified by a concrete entity.


Notice that if W is an empty world, then every red concretum which existsin a possible world other than W is mereologically and causally disjointrelative to W.' 8 This suggests that

Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum

is epistemically on a par with

the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, andobjects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had neverexisted.

After all, in each case (i) there is nothing which could exemplify theproperty in question, and (ii) there are no things whose assembly wouldcreate an instance of the property in question. Still, there is a certaindissimilarity between Redness and a nonqualitative haecceity. So it mightbe thought that (i) and (ii) are more damaging to the idea that a concretum'shaecceity exists independently of any concretum, than they are to the ideathat Redness exists independently of any concretum. The dissimilarity I havein mind is that the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, pertains to x,whereas a qualitative property such as Redness does not pertain to aparticular concretum. 19 Nevertheless, because Redness could only beexemplified by red concreta, Redness appertains generally to red concreta.Therefore, in the final analysis (i) and (ii) appear no more damaging to theidea that a concretum's haecceity exists independently of any concretum,than they are to the idea that Redness exists independently of any concretum.Thus,

18The notion of a concretum's being disjoint relative to a possible world can be definedin two steps as follows. A concretum, x, is a mereological or causal product relative to a worldW =df. (i) x does not exist in W and (ii) in W, either x would be created by the assembly orarrangement of some bits of matter which exist in W, or x would be produced by someparticular(s) which exist in W under a nomologically possible circumstance. A concretum, x,is disjoint relative to a world W =df. (i) x does not exist in W, and (ii) x is not a mereologicalor causal product relative to W, and (iii) x exists in some possible world.

19See Chapter 1, section 11.

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NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

157

Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum

seems to be epistemically on a par with

the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, andobjects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had neverexisted

Finally, an argument of this kind applies to any qualitative property. Forthese reasons, it seems that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par.

Since (HD) and (QD) appear to be equally plausible or implausible, theclaim that

there does not exist an unexemplified haecceity of a disjoint object,

and the claim that

Redness does not exist in an empty world,

seem to stand or fall together.Because Bifurcated Realism rejects (QD) and accepts (HD), and because

(QD) and (HD) appear to be epistemically on a par, Bifurcated Realismseems to be untenable. Moreover, given the bifurcated realist or platonicrealist position that qualitative properties have necessary existence, (QD)should be rejected. Inasmuch as (HD) and (QD) appear to be epistemicallyon a par, it seems that (HD) ought to be rejected as well. Hence, (HD)cannot be used to provide a plausible defense of Bifurcated Realism.

As we have seen, (HD) is plausible only if the aristotelian view expressedin (QD) is plausible. Consequently, if (QD) is implausible, then (HD)cannot be used to justify either the claim that there are no unexemplifiedhaecceities which individuate disjoint objects, or the claim that a haecceityof a material object or person has contingent existence.

A bifurcated realist would probably respond by trying to refute the crucialclaim that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. In making such a

response, he argues that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. A bifurcatedrealist might argue, firstly, that nonqualitative haecceities have a peculiarfeature, F*, which qualitative properties lack, and secondly, that sinceproperties of these two sorts differ in this way, (HD) is plausible and (QD)is not. F* is either the property of having a concretum as a part, element,or constituent, or the property of having a name of a concretum as a part, orthe property of essentially making singular reference to a concretum. Let F*be identified with any one of these properties. If a nonqualitative haecceityhas F*, then a haecceity which individuates a disjoint object either has adisjoint concretum as a part, element, or constituent, or has a name of adisjoint concretum as a part, or essentially makes singular reference to adisjoint concretum. A bifurcated realist can argue plausibly that a NEPwhich is mereologically and causally disjoint is not a part, an element, or aconstituent of anything, is, not named by anything, and is not an object ofsingular reference. Thus, if it is plausible that a nonqualitative haecceity hasF*, then (HD) appears to be true. In that case, it seems that there does notexist an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. Onthe other hand, a bifurcated realist can plausibly maintain that a qualitativeproperty does not have F*. Consequently, there is no good argumentconcerning qualitative properties which parallels the foregoing argumentabout nonqualitative haecceities and which implies (QD). Thus, (HD) and(QD) are not epistemically on par: (HD) appears to be true and (QD) doesnot. This counter-attack makes the crucial assumption that a nonqualitativehaecceity has F*. In what follows, I argue that since this assumption ismistaken, the counter-attack is unsuccessful.

Firstly, I have already argued that a nonqualitative haecceity does not havea concretum as a part, element, or constituent, otherwise such haecceitieswould not provide a nontrivial criterion of individuation for concreta. 2°

Secondly, a name is a linguistic item and a property is not.. Perhaps somelinguistic items have a name as a part, for example, the predicate 'is identicalwith Smith', which has the name 'Smith' as a part; but it is absurd tosuppose that a property, for instance, a nonqualitative haecceity, has a name

20See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII, where I defend the thesis that haecceities provide anadequate criterion of individuation for concreta.

158 CHAPTER 3

as a part. Therefore, a concretum's nonqualitative haecceity does not havea name of that concretum. as a part.

Finally, the idea that a nonqualitative haecceity makes singular referenceto a concretum is problematic. It seems that the only things which can refer(in a primary sense of the term) are either conscious beings or linguisticexpressions. A linguistic item such as a name may be said to make singularreference to a concretum, but in normal circumstances it is incongruous tosuppose that a property or a nonqualitative haecceity refers to something.Therefore, we should not assume that a nonqualitative haecceity essentiallymakes singular reference to an object. 21

The foregoing line of reasoning shows that a nonqualitative haecceitylacks F* on any of the three interpretations of F*. Since the precedingcounter-attack on my position assumes that a nonqualitative haecceity has F*on one of these interpretations, this counter-attack does not succeed.

Nonetheless, it can be argued plausibly that nonqualitative haecceitiesessentially have a function resembling reference. Let us call this function"quasi-reference". It seems that the nonqualitative haecceity, H, of aconcretum, x, quasi-refers to x in virtue of H's being necessarily such thatH is exemplified if and only if x exists. Similarly, since H is exemplifiedby x in every possible world in which x exists, and since in no possibleworld is H exemplified by an entity other than x, in a strict sense Hindividuates x. It follows that in a manner of speaking H quasi-refers to x.Such quasi-reference resembles singular reference, that is, the sort ofreference that holds between a name or a definite description and its uniquereferent. Let quasi-reference of this kind be called quasi-singular reference.These reflections on quasi-singular reference suggest a new defense of thebifurcated realist's claim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not.

According to this latest defense, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarilymakes quasi-singular reference to a concretum, whereas a qualitative propertydoes not essentially make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. The

21Perhaps a person could stipulate that a certain nonqualitative haecceity is to serve as aproper name of some concretum. However, in such an unusual case this haecceity wouldaccidentally be a name of that concretum. Thus, the haecceity in question would not essentiallybe a name of some concretum. The most that such an unusual case shows is that it is possiblefor a property to be used as a symbol or a linguistic expression.


bifurcated realist needs to establish that if a nonqualitative haecceity and aqualitative property differ in this way, then (HD) is plausible and (QD) isnot. He attempts to establish this by means of the following argument.

First of all, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarily makes quasi-singularreference to a concretum. For this reason, an unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceity which individuates a disjoint object makes quasi-singular referenceto a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causallydisjoint. Yet, there couldn't be anything that makes quasi-singular referenceto a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causallydisjoint. It follows that (HD) is true and a nonqualitative haecceity couldn'tmake quasi-singular reference to such a merely possible concretum. Hence,there does not exist an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity whichindividuates a disjoint object. On the other hand, a qualitative property doesnot necessarily make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. Consequently,there is no good argument concerning qualitative properties which parallelsthe foregoing argument about nonqualitative haecceities and which implies(QD). Hence, (HD) and (QD) are not epistemically on a par: (HD) isplausible and (QD) is not.

I argue below that this defense of Bifurcated Realism is no moresuccessful than the earlier ones. In the first place, singular reference is notthe only kind of reference: there is also denotational reference, the sort ofreference that holds between a general term and its extension, that is, eachof the items which satisfies the general term. For example, the general term`dog' denotes each dog, that is to say, Rover, Fido, Spot, and so on. It canbe argued cogently that a first-order qualitative property necessarily quasi-refers to a concretum in a manner which resembles a general term'sreference to each of the items in its extension. Let quasi-reference of thiskind be called quasi-denotational reference. The argument that a qualitativeproperty makes quasi-denotational reference to a concretum goes as follows.A first-order qualitative property, being F, is necessarily such that it isexemplified if and only if it is exemplified by an F. Since being F isexemplified by an F in every possible world in which an F exists, and in nopossible world is being F exemplified by a non-F, it appears that being Fnecessarily has a function which resembles the denotational reference of a

160 CHAPTER 3 NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 161

general term 'F' to Fs. Notice that this argument for saying that

(QQ-DR) a qualitative property essentially makes quasi-denotationalreference to concreta,

is parallel to the bifurcated realist's argument for saying that

(HQ-SR) a nonqualitative haecceity essentially makes quasi-singularreference to a concretum.

Quasi-denotational and quasi-singular reference are quite analogous: theformer occurs in virtue of there being a property which could only beexemplified by things of a certain kind, and the latter occurs in virtue ofthere being a property which could only be exemplified by a certain thing.I conclude that (QQ-DR) and (HQ-SR) are epistemically on a par.Therefore, since the bifurcated realist accepts (HQ-SR), he should accept(QQ-DR). However, I argue below that the bifurcated realist's acceptanceof (QQ-DR) commits him to the possibility of certain cases of quasi-denotational reference, cases whose possibility is no more plausible than thecases of quasi-singular reference to disjoint objects which the bifurcatedrealist finds impossible.

To start with, notice that a bifurcated realist supposes that a first-orderqualitative property exists in an empty world. If this supposition and (QQ-DR) are true, then

(QQ-DR*) In an empty world, W, there is a first-order qualitativeproperty, being F, and this unexemplified property makesquasi-denotational reference to possible concreta which do notexist in W and which are disjoint relative to W, namely, eachF in a possible world other than W.

Because a bifurcated realist should accept (QQ-DR), it follows that abifurcated realist ought to accept (QQ-DR*). On the other hand, recall thata bifurcated realist would deny the possibility of

(HQ-SR*) In the actual world, there is an unexemplified haecceitywhich individuates a disjoint object, o, and this haecceitymakes quasi-singular reference to a possible concretumwhich does not exist in the actual world and which is disjointrelative to the actual world, namely, o.

If there exists an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjointobject, and (HQ-SR) is the case, then (HQ-SR*) is true. Notice that (HQ-SR*) and (QQ-DR*) are analogous: each implies there is an unexemplifiedproperty, P, in a possible world, W*, such that P quasi-refers to a concretumwhich is mereologically and causally disjoint relative to W*. Given theanalogy between (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*), the bifurcated realist's denial ofthe possibility of (HQ-SR*) does not square with his commitment to (QQ-DR*).

The incongruity of the bifurcated realist's position is brought into sharperfocus by the following example which illustrates (QQ-DR*). In (QQ-DR*),let being F=being concrete. In actuality, there are concreta. Of course, thisimplies that concreta are possible. But even if there were never anyconcreta, concreta would be possible. Notice, that being, a concretum is aqualitative property, and according to Bifurcated Realism such a property hasnecessary existence. Assuming this, (QQ-DR*) implies that if, counter tofact, there were never a concretum, then there would be an unexemplifiedqualitative property, being a concretum, which would make quasi-denotational reference to every possible concretum, each of which ismereologically and causally disjoint relative to the counter-factual situationin question. Moreover, since we may assume that in some possible situationthere is never a concretum, it follows that in such a situation an unexempli-fied qualitative property, being a concretum, makes quasi-denotationalreference to each of the possible concreta which exist in every other possiblesituation. But if such quasi-denotational reference is possible, then isn'tquasi-singular reference to a disjoint object possible too? Thus, it seems thatthere could be an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which makes quasi-singular reference to an object which is mereologically and causally disjoint.Furthermore, it appears that if there exists an unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceity, H, which individuates a disjoint object, o, then H makes quasi-

162 CHAPTER 3

singular reference to o. Because the bifurcated realist's argument for theclaim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not, implies that such quasi-singularreference is impossible, his argument seems to be unsound.

In the light of the foregoing argument, we can see that the bifurcatedrealist's hybrid of Extreme or Platonic Realism and Moderate or AristotelianRealism is an unstable union. Accordingly, Bifurcated Realism ought to berejected. With the demise of Bifurcated Realism, there are only two otherviews which need to be considered. (1) Moderate Realism, a view whichimplies that qualitative properties have contingent existence, and (2) PlatonicRealism, a view which implies that qualitative properties have necessaryexistence.

However, there is good reason to accept the platonic idea that qualitativeproperties have necessary existence. In the first place, we may assume thatpossibly, no concretum ever exists. Thus, we may suppose that in somepossible world there does not exist a concretum. Ex hypothesi, in a world

of this kind it is true that there does not exist a concretum. Surely, given

Modal Realism, 22 and given that qualitative propositions or properties exist,it follows that in a world devoid of concreta there exists either thequalitative property of Concreteness or the qualitative proposition a

concretum does not exist. Moreover, it is plausible that necessarily, there arequalitative propositions only if there are qualitative properties. Hence, in aworld devoid of concreta the qualitative property of Concreteness exists, aproperty involved in the qualitative proposition that a concretum does notexist. Therefore, Concreteness exists in a world in which no concretumexists, and the moderate realist's (QD) is false. Certainly, if Concretenessexists in a world of this sort, then it also exists in a world in which there isa concretum. It follows that Concreteness exists whether or not a concretumever exists. This means that Concreteness exists in every possible world orhas necessary existence. Parallel arguments show that every qualitativeproperty has necessary existence. Hence, Moderate Realism should berejected in favor of Platonic Realism. Consequently, (QQ-DR*) should beaccepted. Furthermore, in the preceding section I argued that there areunexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects, while in this

22Modal Realism was defended in section I of this chapter.


section I argued that such a haecceity makes quasi-singular reference to adisjoint object provided that (QQ-DR*) is true. I conclude that (HD) -which cannot be upheld by an appeal to either Bifurcated Realism orModerate Realism - ought to be rejected, and that (HQ-SR*) should beaccepted. Since (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*) jointly entail Platonic Haeccei-tism ), Platonic Haecceitism ought to be accepted. That is, we should acceptthe idea that qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well asnonqualitative properties and propositions, have necessary existence.

Let us consider a final reply available to the moderate realist. Themoderate realist might appeal , to a parmenidean argument to justify hisrejection of (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*).

(1) If a property, P, makes quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) referenceto a NEP, then quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) reference is arelation which could hold between two terms, one of which exists andthe other of which fails to exist.

(2) It is impossible for a relation to hold between two terms, one of whichexists and the other of which fails to exist.

Therefore,(3) It is impossible for a property, P, to make quasi-singular (quasi-

denotational) reference to a NEP.

But there is no reason to think that the first premise of this argument istrue. If an unexemplified haecceity, H, makes quasi-singular reference to aNEP, a, then it can be denied that H's quasi-singular reference to a is arelation H bears to a. Instead, it can be said that H's quasi-singularreference to a is a property of H. In particular, if H is the property of beingidentical with a, then Hs quasi-singular reference to a consists in H's havingthe nonqualitative property of being only possibly exemplified by a.Similarly, if a property, F-ness, makes quasi-denotational reference tononexistent possible Fs, then it can be said that this property's quasi-denotational reference to Fs is not a relation holding between F-ness andthose Fs. Instead, we can say that this property's quasi-denotationalreference to Fs is a property of F-ness. Specifically, F-ness's quasi-denotational reference to Fs consists in F-ness's having the property of being

164 CHAPTER 3


only possibly exemplified by an F. Moreover, there is no more reason tothink that the properties of being only exemplifiable by a and being onlyexemplifiable by an F contain or involve a relation,' or have a relation asa part or constituent, than there is to think that the property, being identicalwith a, contains or involves a relation, or has a relation as a part orconstituent. But as we've seen, being identical with a neither contains orinvolves a relation, nor has a relation as a part or constituent. 24 Hence, theproperties of being only exemplifiable by a and being only exemplifiable byan F neither contain nor involve a relation, nor have a relation as a part orconstituent. Thus, the first premise of the parmenidean argument should notbe accepted, and the attempt to use this argument to justify ModerateRealism does not succeed.

There is one other somewhat different objection to the existence ofunexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. It goes as follows.' The claimthat

(1) there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities,

implies that

(2) there are nonexistent possible concreta.

Inasmuch as (2) is self-contradictory, (1) is false.However, (2) is ambiguous between two readings. On one of these

23The concept of a property's involving a relation is explained in Chapter 2, section VI,footnote 40.

24See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII.

This objection is suggested by the following remark from John Pollock's paper "Thinkingabout an Object" in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds.,Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1980), p. 498. "Propositions have been supposed to be abstract entities havingnecessary existence, but if a de re proposition can only be entertained by a single individual,it is at least plausible to suppose that its existence is contingent upon the existence of thatindividual. To suppose otherwise smacks of talk of 'merely possible objects,' which I at leastfind repugnant."

readings, (2) says that there exists a nonexistent possible concretum -something which is an absurdity. But on that reading (1) does not imply (2):because an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity is neither nonexistent norconcrete, there being such a haecceity does not imply that there exists anonexistent possible concretum. On the other reading, (2) is just a somewhatmisleading way of saying that there are cases in which the existence of aconcretum is possible even though the concretum in question never exists,or of saying that in some possible world there exists a concretum which doesnot exist in the actual world. On that reading, (1) seems to imply (2), but(2) appears to be true. Since (2) cannot be derived on the first reading, andsince (2) is not self-contradictory on the second reading, the foregoingobjection fails to show that there are no unexemplified nonqualitativehaecceities.

In sum, none of the foregoing objections undercut Platonic Haecceitism.As far as I can see at present, there is no reason to abandon the idea thatthere are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjointobjects and which have necessary existence.

166 CHAPTER 3

IV - THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICAL MODALITIES

"Man loves the Universal, the Unchangeable, the Unitary."[a 1842 Channing The Perfect Life 64 (1888)]

Because properties, relations, and propositions have necessary existence, andbecause everything has a haecceity, 26 there is a kind of unity or interdepen-dence among metaphysical modalities. This unity or interdependence isdemonstrated in the following series of definitions. These definitions showthat attributions of de re necessity and de dicto necessity are intertranslatable,and that attributions of necessary existence are translatable into attributionsof either de re necessity or de dicto necessity.

(D1)H is an exemplified-haecceity =df. (3x)(H is the property of beingidentical with x).

(D2)x is necessarily F <=> (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity, beingidentical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii) theproposition that whatever is N is F is necessary.'

(D2) demonstrates that attributions of de re necessity can be translated intoattributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodalconcepts).

(D3) The proposition, p, is necessary a p is necessarily such that it istrue.

(D3) shows how attributions of de dicto necessity can be translated into

26See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.

27This definition is schematic, and the letters 'F' and 'N' should be replaced with anappropriate predicate and name, respectively. Note that substitution of a name 'N' for theschematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is aname of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

167

attributions of de re necessity.

(D4) x has necessary existence a (i) there is a haecceity, H, and (ii)x exemplifies H, and (iii) H is necessarily such that it is exempli-fied.

(D4) demonstrates that attributions of necessary existence are translatableinto attributions of de re necessity (in conjunction with the use of othernonmodal concepts).

(D5) x has necessary existence a (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity,being identical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii)the proposition that N exists is necessary. 28

(D5) shows how attributions of necessary existence can be translated intoattributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodalconcepts).

Moreover, attributions of de dicto necessity and other cognate de dictometaphysical modal notions are intertranslatable. 39 In addition, attributionsof de re necessity and other cognate de re metaphysical modal notions areintertranslatable. 3° Furthermore, attributions of necessary existence andcontingent existence are intertranslatable. 31 Three consequences follow. (i)For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de re modalconcept. (ii) For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dictomodal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingentexistence can be understood in terms of either de dicto or de re modalconcepts.

28This definition is schematic, and the letter 'N' ought to be replaced with an appropriatename. Observe that replacing the schematic letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in thesatisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identicalwith N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

29See Chapter 1, section IV.

30See Chapter 1, section IV.

31 See Chapter 1, section IV.

SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES 169

CHAPTER 4

SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIEDHAECCEITIES

"The conversion...of these innate potentialities into actual

existences."

[from Huxley Hume iii. 85 (1879)]

"What is and will be latent is little better than nonexistent."

[Sir T. Browne Christian Morals 75 (1716)]

I - MEREOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OFUNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES

"Particularize a few drops of the sea, by filling a glasse fullof them; then that glasse-full is distinguished from all the restof the watery Bulke."

[1643 Digby Observations upon Religio Medici 84 (1644)]

"Let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate,these little atoms cohere."(1690 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.

xxiii. § 26)

In the preceding chapter, I argued that there are unexemplified nonqualitative

haecceities which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, including both

nonexistent possible concreta which are mereologically and causally disjoint,and nonexistent possible concreta which are mereological or causalproducts.' As noted earlier, this line of reasoning implies that StrongExtreme Realism is true. Since bifurcated and moderate realist objections

'See Chapter 3, section II.

to my argument were also answered in that chapter,' there seems to be nobarrier remaining to the acceptance of Strong Extreme Realism. Accord-ingly, in the arguments to follow I assume that Strong Extreme Realism istrue, and hence that no form of Moderate Realism is correct.

Supposing, then, that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceitieswhich individuate nonexistent possible concreta, it would be most surprisingto discover that we can grasp any of these haecceities. 3 After all, it isquestionable whether any of us can even grasp an exemplified haecceity ofan external concretum. However, even if I lack the ability to grasp thehaecceity of the pen in my hand, I can nonetheless pick out this haecceity bydescription, for example, as the haecceity of the pen in my hand.' Ofcourse, in this case, unlike the first, the haecceity in question is exemplified,and it would be rather surprising to learn that we can pick out certainunexemplified nonqualitative haecceities by description. Nevertheless, I shallargue that there are cases in which we can use a definite description to pickout or denote an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of , a mereologicalor causal product.'

Let us begin with a discussion of the notion of a piece (or mass) ofmatter. Roughly speaking, by a piece of matter I mean a number of bits ofmatter attached or bonded together to form a complex material object. 6 A

2See Chapter 3, section III.

3Our inability to grasp such an unexemplified haecceity will be demonstrated in Chapter5.

4That I have this ability even if I am unable to grasp the pen's haecceity was shown inChapter 1, section V. That I am unable to grasp the haecceity of an external concrete thing willbe established in Chapter 5.

The distinction between grasping a property and identifying a property by description isdiscussed in Chapter 1, section V.

6It seems that if two objects x and y bond with one another to form a complex materialobject at a time t, then at t there must be a definite distance d such that if x were farther thand from y at t, then x and y would not bond with one another. However, physicists tell us thatx and y never actually touch because of repulsive forces between fundamental particles.However, notice that the assumption that d>0 does not entail there is no distance d of the sortthat appears to be required. For example, there might well be a precise positive distance (or adefinite spatial region) at which (or within which) the forces which bind x and y together and

168

170 CHAPTER 4

piece of matter of this sort is a kind of community of material parts. Thereis a sense in which such an assemblage can be identified or differentiated interms of its parts. That an assemblage of this sort can be identified ordifferentiated in this way seems implicit in the very meaning of a sortal orcount term like 'piece of matter' or 'mass of matter'. More specifically,given the sense of such a sortal or count term the following argumentappears plausible. Suppose that in some possible world W there is a pieceof matter m. If in W or some other possible world there is a piece of matter,m', which does not have one of the fundamental particles composing m inW as an attached part, then m ' is diverse from m. And if in W or someother possible world there is a piece of matter, x, which is composed of thesame parts as m is in W, then x is identical with m. The foregoing argumentis highly plausible based in purely a priori or intuitive grounds, and I knowof no good counter-argument.'

The thesis of mereological essentialism endorsed above can be interpretedin at least two ways, one strict, and one loose. The strict interpretation orstrict essentialism can be formulated as follows: (i) if in some possible worldthere is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same parts joinedtogether in every possible world in which m exists; and (ii) for any possibleworlds W & W2, if in W1 there is a piece of matter o composed of certainparts, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 02 composed of the same parts,then 0 1=02. On this interpretation the term 'part' is understood in a strictsense, as illustrated in the following example. There are two pieces ofmatter x and y, and x is composed of a right half r and a left half 1. If x andy are joined with their surfaces and edges aligned in a certain way, then apiece of matter is assembled which has an object made up of r and y as apart. However, if x and y are joined with their boundaries aligned in a

the repulsive forces which keep x and y apart come into a sort of balance or dynamicequilibrium, and it would be plausible to identify d with this distance (or with the maximumwidth of the region in question). I shall understand the attachment or bonding of two pieces ofmatter x and y, or the joining of a surface or edge of x to a surface or edge of y, in such a waythat it is compatible with, but does not require, x's literally touching y.

7Further support for the conclusion of this argument can be found in Roderick Chisholm'sPerson and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 145-158.


different way, then a piece of matter is assembled which does not have anobject made up of r and y as a part, but has an object made up of 1 and y asa part. Hence, clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that the piece ofmatter assembled in the first instance is not identical with the piece of matterassembled in the second instance. I call a piece of matter to which strictessentialism is applicable a strict mereological assembly (an SMA). Giventhe foregoing explanation of the term 'part', we can see that clauses (i) and(ii) of strict essentialism together entail that if there is an SMA in somepossible world, the (arrangement of) parts of this SMA is both essential toit and necessarily repugnant to any other possible SMA.

A less strict interpretation or loose essentialism was apparently held byJohn Locke.' According to this interpretation, (i) if in some possible worldthere is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same fundamentalparticles attached to one another or bonded together in every possible worldin which m exists; and (ii) for any possible worlds WI & W2, if in W1 thereis a piece of matter oi composed of certain fundamental particles, and in W2

there is a piece of matter 02 composed of the same fundamental particles,then 0 1=02, regardless of the arrangement of the fundamental particlescomposing oi or 02. A piece of matter of this sort retains its identity eventhough its fundamental particles have been rearranged. Thus, I call a pieceof matter to which loose essentialism is applicable a plastic mereologicalassembly (PMA).

The formulation of loose essentialism stated above presupposes that abody is ultimately composed of indivisible particles. It should be noted thatloose essentialism can be formulated independently of this presupposition.Let the mereological sum of all of a piece of matter's parts be called thepiece of matter's sum. Loose essentialism can then be stated like this: (i) ifin some possible world there is a piece of matter, m, then m consists of thesame sum of parts joined together in every possible world in which m exists;and (ii) for any possible worlds W, & W2, if in W there is a piece of mattero i having a certain sum, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 02 having thesame sum, then 0 1=02 .

8See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII,Section 4.

172 CHAPTER 4

There seems to be a sense in which strict and loose essentialism are eachtrue of some type of physical entity or other. As a first step towards seeingthis, consider the following thesis. When a complex material object is in aplace, p, at a time, t, there are at least two spatially coincident entities in pat t: an SMA and a PMA. Since SMAs and PMAs have different identitycriteria (strict and loose essentialism, respectively), an SMA and a PMA arediverse objects of different kinds. And there is no reason why two suchobjects cannot occupy the same place at the same time.

Moreover, the thesis that some SMAs and PMAs are diverse objects whichare spatially coincident at a given time appears to be just as plausible asanother view which it is reasonable to accept, namely, the view that whena bronze statue occupies a place, p, at a time, t, there are at least two itemswhich spatially coincide in p at t: the statue, and a piece of matter. Theseitems are diverse either because (i) when some such piece of matter ismelted into a blob, a piece of matter which was spatially coincident with thestatue survives the melting, but the statue thereby ceases to be, or because(ii) when a tiny bit of bronze is chipped off the edge of the statue, the statuecontinues to exist after this alteration, but a piece of matter which wasspatially coincident with that statue thereby perishes. Cases such as (i) and(ii) above lead me to conclude that a statue, a table, a ship, a tree, et cetera,and a spatially coincident piece of matter are diverse entities of differentkinds. Because this conclusion is justified, and because the thesis that SMAs

and PMAs are diverse objects sometimes located in the same place at thesame time is equally plausible, our acceptance of this latter thesis iswarranted.

Furthermore, cases like (i) and (ii) above illustrate the fact that neitherstrict nor loose essentialism is true of an object such as a statue, a ship, andso on. Hence, the identity criteria that apply to SMAs and PMAs do notapply to statues and the like. Analogous reasoning explains how it is thata piece of matter and the sum of that piece of matter's material parts can bein the same place at once. For pieces of matter and sums have differentidentity criteria. Thus, a piece of matter made up of two bodies x and y isnot identical with the sum of x and y. The latter exists if x and y exist andthey are unjoined. But the former does not exist under these conditions - itexists only if x and y are joined. In other words, pieces of matter cannot


survive disassembly, whereas a sum of objects exists both when those objectsare joined and when they are not.

It should now be clear that there is a significant sense in which each ofthe identity criteria I have mentioned is applicable to some physical item,either an SMA, a PMA, an ens successivurn like a ship, or a sum. What wehave in all such cases are physical items distinguished from one another bytheir characteristic identity criteria. Of course, one could raise issues aboutthe ultimate ontological status of such physical items. One could ask, forexample, if in the final analysis they (or some of them) are genuinesubstances, dependent entities, or logical constructions. But issues of thiskind are not easy to resolve, and detailed discussion of them falls outside thescope of this book. For the purpose of my argument, I shall assume(plausibly, I believe) that either SMAs or PMAs exist.

Below, I argue that a person can pick out or refer to an unexemplifiedhaecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA or PMA by using a definitedescription that denotes this unexemplified haecceity. To begin, it seemsthat there are physical items which could be assembled but never are. Forexample, it is likely that the PMA spatially coincident with my kitchen sinkat time t is never joined to the PMA spatially coincident with the bookcasein my living room at t. Even more probable is the claim that the SMAsspatially coincident with these two PMAs are never assembled. Yet morelikely is the claim that these SMAs are never assembled with their boundariesaligned in a certain way that is possible. Since innumerable claims of thesekinds are probable, the following things are quite plausible. First, there aremany cases of PMAs that are never joined but could be. Likewise for SMAs.Finally, there are numerous instances in which SMAs could be assembledwith their surfaces and edges aligned in a particular way, but never are.Given these assumptions, it is not difficult to show that a person can use adefinite description to denote the unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistentpossible SMA. To see this, consider a situation like Case (1) below.

There exist two SMAs a and b. a and b are congruent cubical pieces ofsteel. f is one of a's faces, and g is one of the edges along ./ fl is one ofb's faces, and gi is one of the edges along f,. In fact a and b are neverattached to one another. But it is possible for a and b to be attached to oneanother to form an SMA as specified in the following definite description:

a b

A representation of an SMA satisfying the condition in Da

174 CHAPTER 4

SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES

175

`the x such that x is an SMA, a is half of x, b is half of x, and the halves ofx are attached so that every part off is joined to some part off,, and everypart of g is joined to some part of gl .9 Let us call this description Da.Now, consider the following definite description:

'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by anSMA, y, if and only if one half of y=a, the other half of y=b, and thehalves of y are attached in such a way that every part off is joinedto some part off! , and every part of g is joined to some part of g1 '.

Let this definite description be called Da*. 1°

9The letters a , b , f , etc., are schematic, and are to be replaced with names of particularactual items of the appropriate sorts. Thus, we do not really have a definite description here,just a definite description form. Nonetheless, to avoid awkwardness I shall speak of this formas if it were a definite description - and likewise in other parallel cases later on.

10Da* specifies that a certain seven-term relation necessarily holds of x and the other sixthings named in Da*. Thus, the metaphysical necessity involved here is de re. Parallel remarksapply to the other similar definite descriptions constructed below. See Chapter 1, section IV fora discussion of attributions of de re necessary properties and relations to things.

Suppose it is insisted on Russellian grounds, or the like, that 'a', 'b', etc., be replaced bydefinite descriptions such as 'the object in the right half of my field of vision', 'the object inthe left half of my field of vision', etc. Such a Russellian assumption is not incompatible withDa* specifying the desired condition. This is because in Da* the terms 'a', '6', etc., fall withinthe scope of a de re necessity operator. The context thereby created in Da* is one that is withrespect to x and the objects designated by 'a', 'b', etc., regardless of the way in which thesesingular terms designate their referents. Consequently, Da* and other parallel descriptionsspecify the desired conditions regardless of the mode of designation of the referents of singularterms like 'a', 'b', etc. Thus, it is not necessary to assume either that 'a', 'b', etc., connoteindividual essences or that these singular terms are logically proper names or rigid designators.In other words, "rigid reference" does not require the use of rigid designators, but only the useof de re modal operators.

It is clear from the foregoing description of Case (1) that in some possibleworld there exists an individual, i, which satisfies the condition in Da.Clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that i exists in a possible world onlyif in that world i is composed of a and b joined together. Since byhypothesis a and b are in fact never joined, i does not exist in the actualworld. Thus, such an individual i is a nonexistent possible.

Furthermore, assume that in a possible world WI there exists an object 01satisfying the condition in Da, and in a possible world W2 there exists anobject 02 satisfying the same condition. Thus, in . W1 there is an SMA ocomposed of the SMAs a and b joined in the exact way specified in Da, andin W2 there is an SMA 02 made up of the SMAs a and b joined in the precisefashion delineated in Da. Moreover, clause (i) of strict essentialism impliesthat an SMA (such as a or b) consists of the same parts joined together inevery possible world in which it exists. Consequently, in WI 01 is an SMAcomposed of the same parts as an SMA 01 is composed of in W2. Thisconsequence and clause (ii) of strict essentialism together imply that 0 1=02 .

Hence, one and only one possible entity could satisfy the condition in Da,and this possible concrete entity is an SMA which does not exist. Moreover,as argued in the preceding chapter, a nonexistent possible concretum isindividuated by an unexemplified haecceity. Furthermore, corresponding toa given nonexistent possible individual, there is but one such haecceity."It follows that there is one and only one haecceity which meets the conditionin Da*, and it is an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA.Therefore, Da* denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possibleSMA. Da* picks out this unexemplified haecceity by specifying a definiteway in which certain actual objects could be joined to form the only possibleobject that could exemplify this haecceity. Clearly, there are innumerablesimilar descriptions, each of which denotes a different unexemplifiedhaecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. Such descriptions pick out theseunexemplified haecceities by specifying different ways in which variousphysical items, including macroscopic things and any microscopic or basicphysical items composing such things, could be assembled or arranged.

11 That there couldn't be an entity which has two haecceities was established in Chapter 1,section I.

1 76 CHAPTER 4

But what if the boundaries or positions of physical items are ontologicallyvague? Such items have no precise corners, edges, and surfaces, or no exactlocations. One might question the coherence of such an idea, but putting thisaside, let us see what it entails. Apparently, it follows that in some senseitems have approximate boundaries. But this seems to imply only that there

are descriptions which denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistentpossible SMAs by specifying various ways in which certain actual physicalitems could be joined or configured in terms of such approximate boundariesor positions.

In any event, there are descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities

of NEPs without specifying a boundary of an object or a particular way inwhich things could be arranged, for example, a description like

`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by

a PMA, y, if and only if y's sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's

sum'.

Call this description Db *, and let the description 'the x such that x is a PMA

whose sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's sum' be called Db. To

see that Db * denotes, recall the argument which shows that descriptions like

Da* pick out unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs. An

analogous argument in which we speak of the sum of a possible PMA and

presuppose loose essentialism, instead of talking about the parts of a possible

SMA and presupposing strict essentialism, implies that descriptions like Db*

denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs.I have argued that unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs

are denoted by descriptions specifying ways in which various physical itemscould be attached or configured. But do we ever produce a description ofthis kind, and determine with respect to it, that it denotes such an unexempli-fied haecceity? If we can ascertain the true boundaries of a physical item,then perhaps the answer is yes. But it seems that the most accuratemeasurements we can make are trustworthy only within a certain limitedrange. For example, as an object is examined under progressively strongermicroscopes, this object appears to have different boundaries. Furthermore,microscopes and all other measuring instruments are inherently limited in


their resolving power and are subject to experimental error. Consequently,if an item's boundaries or position are of a precise nature, then it seems thatwe cannot ascertain them.

However, suppose that the boundaries of a physical item are onticallyvague or approximate in character. In that case, since our best measurementsare authoritative insofar as they are regarded as highly accurate approxima-tions, there appears to be a better chance of our having the ability todetermine the true boundaries of a physical item. Of course, all of the issuesraised by these reflections cannot be settled here. But let us see whatfollows if we cannot determine the true boundaries or position of a physicalitem, inasmuch as there is a good chance that this is the case.

It follows that there is no description (such as Da* or the like) specifyinga definite way in which particular physical items could be joined orarranged, such that we can determine with respect to it, that it denotes anunexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible S'MA. But this iscompatible with our knowing that there is some such description whichdenotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind. Indeed, since a physicalitem has boundaries (or if it is a point-particle position only), it is quiteplausible to suppose that there are innumerable denoting descriptions of thissort. And although there being such denoting descriptions is compatible withno one ever producing one, the claim that we never employ such adescription appears unwarranted. If we happen to use one of thesedescriptions, then we have denoted an unexemplified haecceity of anonexistent possible SMA even if we do not know that we have. Forexample, we can produce one of these descriptions under such conditions ofignorance if we measure the boundaries of certain things as accurately astechnologically possible and correctly conjecture the boundaries of thesethings based on those measurements.

On the other hand, issues about boundaries are irrelevant when it comesto the denotation of an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possiblePMA. As we have seen, Db * picks out an unexemplified haecceity of thistype, and it does not specify a boundary or position of a thing. Because ofthis, doubts raised about our abilities to ascertain an item's boundaries orposition do not discredit either the claim that we use descriptions like Db *to denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs, or the

178 CHAPTER 4

claim that we have good reason to believe in particular cases of this kindthat we have employed a description which accomplishes this. And givenmy arguments, these two claims are plausible.


II - CAUSAL DESCRIPTIONS OF UNEXEMPLIFIEDHAECCEITIES

"A causall definition geuen by the Cause efficient."(1570 Billingsley The Elements of Geometrie of..Euclid XI. def. xii. 316)

There also seem to be descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities ofnonexistent possible SMAs by specifying laws of nature and initial condi-tions, rather than by literally specifying arrangements of objects. To see this,consider a situation like Case (2) below.

In room r at time t there exist two pieces of clay d and e. d and e are sixinches apart at t. d has been loaded onto a catapult like device, and if at tI were to press a button, then d would be shot towards e in a particular wayw, that is, with a specific force and direction. d could be propelled towardse, but in fact it never is. If at t d were pushed towards e in way w, then thiswould result in a piece of clay (mostly or completely made up of stuff thatcame from d) being joined to another piece of clay (mostly or completelymade of stuff that came from e). In this manner, an SMA (mostly orcompletely made up of stuff that came from d or e) would be assembled att+1. Given the circumstances, just one SMA would satisfy the followingcondition at t+1:

(1*) being the largest and most massive SMA assembled in room r att+1. 12

In addition, there are certain conditions obtaining at t such that: if at t dwere pushed in way w, then these conditions would be causally relevant bothto their being just one SMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and to such an SMA'sbeing composed of certain parts - in the strict sense of the term 'part'. Letthese conditions be called C, and call the laws of nature L. Included in C

12(1*) is compatible with the fact that if two pieces of clay were joined, numerous SMAswould be formed, many of which would be unarticulated and nested inside of others.

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181

are the positions of d and e, their temperatures, their masses, their degreesof hardness, the external forces acting on d and e, and so forth. The

conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), is physically contingentand logically contingent, and logically implies both that there is just oneSMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and that such an SMA is composed of particular

actual bits of matter m 1 , m2, m,, et cetera, joined together in a specific wayR, in other words, attached along certain of their boundaries. Finally, it ispossible for m 1 , m2 , m3 , and so on, to be joined in way R, but in fact m l , m2 ,

m3, and so forth, are never joined.Let us now consider the following two descriptions. Firstly: 'the x such

that x is an SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in way

w at t and L & C obtain'. Call this description Dc. Secondly:

`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an

SMA, y, just in case y satisfies (1*) at t+/ if d is pushed in way Wat t &

L and C obtain'.

Call this description Dc*. In the light of the aforementioned implications ofthe conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), we can see that itis a necessary truth that the condition specified by Dc is satisfied by anobject if and only if this object is the SMA composed of m i, m2, m3, et

cetera, joined together in way R or attached along certain of their boundaries.

Hence, Dc is necessarily equivalent to a description which literally describesa particular arrangement of particular bits of matter to form an SMA. In

other words, Dc is equivalent to some description similar to Da. Moreover,the bits of matter under discussion are never joined, but these bits could bejoined in the way in question. Hence, an argument based upon strictessentialism which is parallel to the one used to establish that Da* denotes

an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA, shows that Dc*

denotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind.Notice that unlike Da*, a description like Dc* does not pick out an

unexemplified haecceity by literally specifying the (arrangement of) parts ofthe only possible object which could have this unexemplified haecceity.Rather, such a description denotes an unexemplified haecceity of anonexistent possible SMA by specifying laws and initial conditions which

together imply that certain actual bits of matter would be joined in a specificfashion to assemble a definite object. ° However, to employ a descriptionsuch as Dc* one need not be in a position to enumerate the laws andconditions in question. It is enough to pick out these laws and conditions inthe way that I did when I described Case (2). That is, it is sufficient to pickthem out as L and C, where the reference of 'L' and 'C' is fixed with the aidof descriptions like 'the laws of nature' and 'the relevant conditions'.Furthermore, a person, S, can use Dc* to denote an unexemplified haecceityeven if certain microscopic particles that did not come from d or e would beparts of the SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in wayw at t and L & C obtain, and certain microscopic particles that came fromd or e would not be parts of that possible SMA, and S is ignorant of thesethings. Clearly, then, being in a position to pick out an unexemplifiedhaecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA by picking out laws of nature andinitial conditions does not require being in a position to literally specify theparts that would be had by that possible SMA. Nor does it require being ina position to specify how those parts would be arranged.

Hence, the doubts raised earlier concerning our ability to ascertain anobject's exact boundaries or position do not discredit either the claim that we

13 It might be objected that some form of indeterminism is true which implies that there areno laws and circumstances which logically determine the exact composition of an object. If so,then there are no situations like Case (2), and a description like Dc fails to denote anunexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA because two or more possible SMAssatisfy the condition on x in Dc. However, this objection is quite problematic. For it may bethat determinism is true. Or perhaps determinism is false, but the form of determinism requiredby the objection is not true. In any case, there being descriptions which denote an unexempli-fied haecceity by specifying laws and initial conditions is compatible with the claim that thelaws are probabilistic or nondeterministic. To see this, consider the following hypothesis.Whenever a series of events would result in an object's being assembled, the laws of nature, L*,and the initial conditions together imply that a number of assemblies could result, i.e., each hasa nonzero probability less than 1. This supposition is compatible with the claim that L* and theinitial conditions assign a probability to one of these possible assemblies which they do notassign to any other one of them, and this possible assembly is never actualized. If this claimis correct, then an unexemplified haecceity is denoted by a description identifying the probabilityof the possible assembly in question given L* and certain initial conditions, e.g., a descriptionof the form 'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an SMA, y, justin case y is the thing which most probably satisfies (1*) at t+ I if d is pushed in way w at t &L* and C obtain'.

use descriptions making reference to laws and initial conditions to pick outunexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMA s, or the claim that wehave good reason to believe in particular cases of this kind that we haveemployed a description which accomplishes this. And given my arguments,these two claims are not implausible. Analogous arguments show that it isat least equally plausible to suppose that corresponding claims are true ofcertain descriptions which denote the haecceities of nonexistent possiblePMAs by referring to laws and initial conditions. In this latter sort of case,the laws and conditions in question need only determine the sum of matterthat would compose a nonexistent possible PMA, and not the way in whichits parts would be arranged.

Let us now take stock. There are two sorts of descriptions that denoteunexemplified nonqualitative haecceities of mereological or causal products,that is, mereological ones like Da*, Db*, et cetera, and causal ones such asDc*, and in some cases we can use descriptions of these sorts to denoteunexemplified haecceities of this kind, and apparently have good reason tobelieve that we have done so."

14Suppose for the sake of argument that some possible tables, ships, trees, and persons are

mereological products, and neither strict nor loose essentialism is true of such products. Areunexemplified haecceities of products of these and similar kinds denoted by descriptions?

Our supposition is consistent with the claim that for any mereological product, o, o has thesame original composition in every possible world in which o exists, and there is no possibleworld in which o has the same original composition as does a diverse physical object of thesame kind in another possible world. If this claim is correct, then there is a description thatdenotes o's unexemplified haecceity by specifying a way in which certain actual objects couldbe arranged or assembled to originally compose o, e.g., 'the haecceity , x, which is necessarilysuch that x is exemplified by a table, y, if and only if y is initially made up of a and b joinedin way R*'.

Alternatively, suppose either that an atom which is originally part of o in one world is notoriginally part of o in another world in which o exists, or that the objects which originallycompose o are aligned (at the time of o's origin) in a slightly different manner in one worldthan they are in another world. This is compatible with o's being such that in every world inwhich it exists it is originally composed of at least 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a andb joined in way R*. If o's identity involves such a "threshold" of 99% or some other highpercentage of such parts, then the unexemplified haecceity of o is denoted by a description like`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by a table, y, just in case y isoriginally composed of 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a and b joined in way R*'

On the other hand, suppose that none of the matter which originally composes o in a world,W„ originally composes o in another world, W„ in which o exists, and that o in 11/1 and a

In the light of my argument, we can see that Russell's account of thesingular reference of definite descriptions is compatible with a person'spicking out an unexemplified haecceity. Russell's account implies that thereare occasions on which a person picks out an item, x, even though he neveridentifies x either by direct/ostensive means or in virtue of a causalconnection between himself and x. On Russell's account, an actual objectis sometimes an item of this kind, whereas on my account an unexemplifiedhaecceity of a NEP (a mereological or causal product) is sometimes such anitem. But on either account, when a person, 5, picks out such an item, x, heaccomplishes this (typically) by uniquely describing x in terms of one ormore existing items he has identified. For the purposes of my argument, Ileave open the way in which S identifies such an actual item, for instance,whether it is by direct/ostensive means, an identifying description, or invirtue of a causal connection between S and that item.'

diverse physical object of the same kind in W2 (made of the matter composing o in W1) aremereologically indistinguishable from one another throughout their histories in W, and W 2. Itthen follows that o's unexemplified haecceity cannot be denoted by a mereological or causaldescription of the sort I have constructed. However, it is not clear that this sort of extrememereological inessentialism is true of mereological products like pieces of matter, tables, ships,etc.

15Elsewhere I have argued that mereological and causal descriptions such as Da, Db, andDc make a kind of singular reference to nonexistent possible concreta, viz., certain mereologicaland causal products. In contrast, my current argument is not that there is a kind of singularreference to nonentities of a certain sort, but rather that some singular terms denote unexempli-fied nonqualitative haecceities - which are abstract entities. See Gary Rosenkrantz, "NonexistentPossibles and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147; and"Reference, Intentionality, and Nonexistent Entities," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 163-171. Compare Roderick Chisholm "Monads, Nonexistent Individuals, and. Possible Worlds:Reply to Rosenkrantz," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 173-175; and Gary Rosenkrantz,"On Objects Totally Out of This World," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986),pp. 197-208.

SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES 183182 CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE

"The phenomenon or sign of the being or of the thatness which itself

ever eludes us."

[E. B. Bax Outlooks From The New Standpoint III. 183 (1891)]

"But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence,cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be ex-pressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else.Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative.Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute...There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, byintuition and not by simple analysis. It is...our self which endures...an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is

possible."(1903 Bergson An Introduction To Metaphysics)

I - HAECCEITIES AND ACQUAINTANCE

"There are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge of things and know-

ledge of truths."[1902 Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy V. 46 (1943)]

Russell drew a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance andknowledge by description.' He regarded the former as a kind of directawareness of an item, and the latter as a kind of indirect knowledge of anitem. Russell maintained that unlike knowledge by description, knowledgeby acquaintance is logically independent of all knowledge of truths. He alsoheld that an individual is acquainted with his own sense-data, various

'See Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,"Mysticism and Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1917), pp. 209-232, and "On the Nature ofAcquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174.

ACQUAINTANCE 185

abstract entities, and (in all likelihood) himself, but not with physical objectsor persons other than himself. 2

I shall argue that there is a conception of acquaintance other than Russell'swhich is definable in terms of a person's grasping a haecceity. Althoughsimilar to Russell's conception of acquaintance in some ways, my conceptionof acquaintance differs from Russell's in a crucial respect, since accordingto my conception a person's being acquainted with an item entails that heknows a truth about that item. Nevertheless, my argument is Russellian inspirit. Utilizing my sense of acquaintance, I will argue that an individual isacquainted with himself, certain of his own mental states, and some abstractentities, but not with physical objects or persons other than himself.However, my argument for this claim will be quite different from any whichRussell offered. 3

The following definition will help me to explain the way in whichRussellian acquaintance and acquaintance in my sense are similar. Let ussay that an identifying property is a characteristic which is possibly had bysomething, but not possibly had by more than one thing at a time. 4

Haecceities are identifying properties, but so are other characteristics suchas being the oldest man, being the president of the U.S.A., being the evenprime number, and being the thing I perceive. The distinction between anidentifying property of this kind and a haecceity is analogous to thedistinction between two kinds of singular terms: those that are definitedescriptions, for instance, 'the oldest man', and those that are indexicalindicators or proper names that do not function as concealed definite

2See Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press,1950), Chapter 5.

31 was not the first to suggest a parallel between Russell's views and Haecceitism. SeeDavid Kaplan, "How to Russell a Frege-Church," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp.716-729. Kaplan believes that there is a metaphysical parallel in that both Russell and thehaecceitist accept the existence of singular propositions about individuals. In contrast, I discernan epistemological parallel concerning the objects of direct acquaintance.

4Here I borrow from Roderick Chisholm. I define an identifying property in the same wayas he defines an individual concept. See Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp.23-52.

184

186 CHAPTER 5

descriptions, for example, T. 5 Hence, there is an analogy between ahaecceity and such an indicator or name.

I have argued that if entities have haecceities, then there is a propositionalconception of direct or strict de re belief which is definable in terms of thenotion of haecceity. 6 I have also argued that every entity has a haecceity.'Based on these arguments, I infer that there is such a propositionalconception of direct de re belief. This strict conception of de re belief canbe defined as follows.

(DI) S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,being identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which isN is F, and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecce-ity and F-ness. 8

There is a corresponding conception of direct or strict de re knowledge,definable in the manner below.9

51 presuppose a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions or singular terms of the form`The so and so'. According to such an analysis, a proposition expressed by a sentence of theform 'The so and so is F', e.g., 'The oldest man is wise', is analyzable as (i) There exists atleast one so and so, and (ii) there exists at most one so and so, and (iii) whatever is a so andso is F.

6See Chapter 1, section V.

7See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.

8 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with an appropriate name andpredicative expression, respectively. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-calledis of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Replacementof the schematic letter 'N' by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematicdefinition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with 'N' (formed from 'N')designates x's haecceity.

91n the definition which follows, 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to bereplaced with appropriate linguistic expressions. In clause (ii) of this definition, the firstoccurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-calledis of predication. Substitution of a name 'N' for the schematic letter 'N' can result in thesatisfaction of this schematic definition only when 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'beingidentical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

ACQUAINTANCE 187

(D2) x is directly known by S to be F =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,being identical with N, and (ii) S knows that something which is Nis F, and in knowing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceityand F-ness.

Finally, the concept of haecceity can be used to define an intuitive notion ofknowledge by acquaintance, that is, a direct cognitive relation between aperson and an object. The conception of knowledge by acquaintance I havein mind is definable in the following way. 19

(D3) S is acquainted with x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, beingidentical with N, and (ii) S knows that there is something that is N,and in knowing this S grasps x's haecceity."

Suppose that a person, S, has direct de re belief or knowledge about anitem, x, as in (D1) or (D2), or is acquainted with x as in (D3). In that event,S's belief or knowledge about x involves his attributing x's haecceity to x,and thereby involves his grasping the haecceity of x. Such belief orknowledge about x is as direct or unmediated as propositional belief orknowledge of an item could be.

As we have seen, there is an analogy between a haecceity and anindexical indicator or proper name which does not function as a concealeddefinite description. Moreover, a person can express his thought when hegrasps x's haecceity just provided that he uses an indexical indicator or nameto designate x, and this indicator or name does not function as a concealeddefinite description. An exactly parallel remark applies to a person's ability

10Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, pp. 23-52. He argues, in a somewhatsimilar vein, that a person individuates a particular per se when he grasps its haecceity.Chisholm argues forcefully against this view in The First Person (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1981).

11The letter 'N' is schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate nominative expression.

In clause (ii), the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity. Replacing theschematic letter 'Ar by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition onlyif 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x'shaecceity.

1 88 CHAPTER 5

to express his thought if he has Russellian acquaintance with x. For thesereasons, Russellian acquaintance and the kind of acquaintance defined in(D3) are analogous. On the other hand, while Russell holds the controversialview that knowledge by acquaintance is logically independent of allknowledge of truths, clause (ii) of (D3) ensures that if a person is acquaintedwith an item, then this logically entails that he knows some truth about thatitem.

A person, S, is acquainted with an item, x, only if S grasps the haecceityof x. Hence, if it is impossible for S to grasp the haecceity of x, then it isimpossible for S to be acquainted with x. Duns Scotus wondered whetherit is possible for any of us to grasp a haecceity. He wrote as follows.

I concede that a singular is intrinsically intelligible on its side. But if it is not intrinsicallyintelligible to some intellect, for instance, ours, at least this is not an impossibility on thepart of the singular, just as it is not on the part of the sun that to see at night is impossible,

but rather on the part of the eye. I2

However, there is some reason to think that each of us grasps his ownhaecceity as well as the haecceities of numerous physical objects and personsin his environment. This follows from a principle deemed acceptable earlier,namely, (PG). 13

(PG) If at time t it is plausible for SI that F-ness exists, and at t it is plau-sible for SI that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si caninfer that it is prima facie plausible (for Si) that S2 grasps F-nessat t."

Given my earlier arguments, it is plausible for me that everything has ahaecceity, including myself. Thus, I am justified in believing that my

12Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections)in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 589.

13 See Chapter 1, section V.

141n this principle '' is a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriatepredicate expression.

ACQUAINTANCE 189

haecceity exists. In other words, it is plausible for me that there exists theproperty of being identical with me. Inasmuch as it is also plausible for methat I believe that something is identical with me, (PG) enables me toconclude that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that I grasp my haecceity.(I ignore temporal indices here for the sake of simplicity.) Moreover, I canargue in a parallel fashion with respect to each of us. For instance, it isplausible for me both that the property of being identical with Clinton exists,and that Clinton believes that someone is identical with Clinton. Thus, I amin a position to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of usgrasps his own haecceity.

Alternatively, suppose that I make a demonstrative perceptual identifica-tion of a physical object or person, x, that is to say, I perceptually identifyx as this. It is plausible for me that everything has a haecceity, includingthis. Therefore, I am warranted in believing that the haecceity of this exists.In other words, it is (now) plausible for me that there exists the property ofbeing identical with this. Since it is also (now) plausible for me that I havethe perceptual belief, there is something that it is identical with this, itfollows via (PG) that I can (now) infer that it is prima facie plausible (forme) that I grasp x's haecceity. Based on parallel arguments, I am in aposition to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of usgrasps the haecceities of many physical objects and persons in his environ-ment. However, this prima facie plausibility could be overridden or defeated(at a later time) by a suitably strong counter-argument. I shall present sucha counter-argument: an argument which shows that none of us grasps thehaecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. Nor will I stopthere. I shall argue further that it is impossible for anyone to grasp thehaecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, and hence thatit is impossible for a person to be acquainted with such an object.

Russell held the view that perceiving a physical object or person does notprovide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it. Russell'sargument for this view presupposes the questionable doctrine that sense-dataare a 'veil' cutting a person off from acquaintance with the external world.Other arguments advanced in favor of Russell's view rest on controversialclaims of Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology, for example, thatperceptual beliefs are uncertain, or that such beliefs can only be inferentially

190 CHAPTER 5

justified. I will argue that perceiving a physical object or person does notprovide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it in the sense ofacquaintance defined in (D3), but my argument shall not presuppose any ofthe questionable or controversial epistemological claims mentioned above.

ACQUAINTANCE

191

II - HAECCEITIES AND RE-IDENTIFICATION

"A matter of deduction and inference."

(1736 Bp. Butler The Analogy of Reli-

gion Natural and Revealed II. vi. 36)

What does it mean to say that perception of a physical object or person isan avenue for acquaintance with it? Suppose I perceive a single object.During such a perceptual episode I can identify the thing I perceive as this.Alternatively, I can baptize the object. For example, we may assume thatI name the thing I perceive Adam. My perceiving the object enables me tobe acquainted with it just in case both of the following things are true. (i)In the circumstances described above, if I identify the object by means ofknowing that the thing I perceive is this, then I know that there is somethingthat is this, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of beingidentical with this Hence, I'm acquainted with the object (ii) In thecircumstances described above, if I identify the object by means of knowingthat the thing I perceive is Adam, then I know that there is something thatis Adam, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of being identicalwith Adam. Consequently, I am acquainted with the object. The point indistinguishing (i) and (ii) is to allow for the possibility that haecceities canbe expressed by either indexical indicators or proper names. Of course,although in the preceding example I am the perceiver, remarks parallel to theforegoing ones apply to any perceiver.

Philosophical reflection raises doubts about whether sense-perception is anavenue for acquaintance with objects. For example, consider these remarksmade by Scotus.

Sincere truth is not grasped by the senses in such wise as to enable them to perceive theimmutability of the truth they apprehend, or for this matter, the immutability itself of theobject; for the senses perceive present objects only as long as these are present...evensupposing that I should have the object A uninterruptedly in my presence, and that I shouldgaze upon it without intermission, so that my vision would retain the same grade of sharpnessthroughout the whole process, I would still be unable to perceive the immutability of A, forat each moment of my vision I would perceive the object precisely as it is constituted at that

192 CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE 193

same moment... 15

It is sufficiently clear from this passage that Scotus is not a skeptic aboutsense-perception: he presumes that we have perceptual knowledge of externalobjects. Nevertheless, it is evident that Scotus finds sense-perceptionwanting in some respects. Similarly, while I assume that we have perceptualknowledge of external things, I will argue that an individual's perception ofa physical object or person fails to provide him with an avenue for acquain-tance with it. Moreover, my argument for thinking that perception fails toprovide such an avenue is related to Scotus's reasons for regardingperception as wanting in some respects. To see this, compare Scotus'sremarks in the passage quoted above to the following preliminary version ofmy argument.

1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to beacquainted with it, then he has the ability to identify an object x hepresently perceives with an object y he perceived earlier, by graspingthe haecceities of x and y, comparing them, and seeing that they are thesame.

t5Duns Scotus, Metaphysics I, q. 4, n. 23; VII, 65a. Quoted by Peter C. Vier in Evidenceand Its Function According to John Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York: The FranciscanInstitute, 1951), pp. 154-155. Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, p. 34.Chisholm observes that "If today I individuate something per se as being that thing and iftomorrow I individuate something per se as being that thing, I may well have picked out twodifferent things; whereas if today I individuate something per se as being identical with me andif tomorrow I individuate something per se as being identical with me, then I will have pickedout one and the same thing." In his endnote 24, on the passage just quoted, Chisholm alludesto an earlier version of the argument I will present in the text. This argument originated in mydoctoral dissertation, Individual Essences (Brown University, 1976). Also compare FrederickCopleston's account of De Anima (imputed by many to Scotus) in A History of Philosophy(New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1985), Volume II, p. 493. Copelston remarks: "If twomaterial things were deprived of all difference of accidents (of place, colour, shape, etc.), neithersense nor intellect could distinguish them from one another, even though their 'singularities'(Scotus's haecceitas) remained, and this shows that we have, in our present state, no clear andcomplete knowledge of the singularity of a thing." For a general discussion of Scotus's viewson sense-perception and epistemology, as well as their influence, see Katherine Tachau, Visionand Certitude In The Age Of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, And The Foundation Of Semantics,1250-1345 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).

2. None of us has such an ability.Therefore,

3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to beacquainted with it.

Before attempting to demonstrate the cogency of this argument, I shallrestate it by revising the premises in certain ways, and providing a precisemeaning for these revised premises. In particular, the restated argument willemploy the notion of (i) a person's re-identifying an object from oneperceptual situation to another, and (ii) the kind of inference a personperforms if he identifies an object he presently perceives with an object heperceived earlier by grasping the haecceity of the object. In what follows,I shall attempt to clarify these ideas.

If I assert that the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at ti (t, >t1), then I am making a re-identification claim. A person S re-identifies anobject from one perceptual situation to another if and only if S knows thatthe thing he perceives at t2 is the thing he perceived at t1 , where there is a

time between t1 and t2 at which S does not perceive this object. Forexample, suppose that t1, t2, and t3 are particular times (t3 > t, > t1). If Iknow that the thing I perceive at t3 is the thing I perceived at t1 , and at 1,1do not perceive this object, then I have re-identified an object from oneperceptual situation to another.

It is important to emphasize that the inference a person performs if here-identifies an object from one perceptual situation to another by graspingits haecceity is a deductive inference. In what follows, I will characterize thepremises from which such a person deduces a re-identification claim, andindicate the kind of deduction he performs.

The premises in the deduction are statements which are singular perceptualobservation reports of the form 'The thing I perceive at t is IV', where 't'designates a particular time, where 'IV' is either the indicator 'this' or aproper name with which the observer baptizes an object when he perceivesit, and where 'I' refers to the observer. Let such a statement be called aperceptual observation statement (POS). Here is an example of a POS: 'The

thing I perceive at t1 is this'.Suppose that perceiving an object acquaints me with it. Given this

supposition, if I know a POS or a statement of the form 'The thing Iperceive at t is N', then I grasp the haecceity of an object, namely, aproperty of the form 'being identical with N', and hence I am acquaintedwith that object. This is implied by what was said about my perceiving anobject in the first paragraph of this section.

If I know a POS, then I attribute an identifying property to an object, forexample, being the thing I perceive at t,. Such an identifying property canbe had by at most one item throughout all of time. I call an identifyingproperty of this kind a fixed property, and I define this notion as follows.

F is a fixed property =df. F is an identifying property such that: it isimpossible that (ax)(3y)(30(1 1)(x*y & x has F at time t & y has F at timet').

The identifying property, being the thing I perceive, is not a fixed property.On the other hand, the property of being the thing I perceive at t,, andsimilar temporally indexed properties involving t2, t3, or any other particulartime, are fixed properties. Another kind of fixed property is a haecceity.

The notion of a fixed property can be used to explicate the notion of a re-identification claim broadly understood. The statement that the G is the Fis a re-identification claim if and only if (i) being F is a fixed property, (ii)being G is a fixed property, (iii) –0(x)(Gx --> Fx), and (iv) –E1(x)(Fx -Gx). 16

If a person uses a haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim from POSs,then he is reasoning in accord with the following axiom concerning fixedproperties.

(Al) For any fixed properties F, G, and H, if the thing that has G has F,and the thing that has H has F, then the thing that has G has H.

(Al) is a necessary truth, and a person can perform simple deductiveinferences in accord with it. For example, if I know that the thing I

16The letters 'F' and `G' are schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate predicateexpression.

perceived at t2 is the thing , I perceive at t3, and if I also know that the thingI perceived at t, is the thing I perceive at t3, then I can deduce that the thingI perceived at t2 is the thing I perceived at t,. I call a simple deduction inaccord with (Al) an SD.

Since a haecceity is a fixed property, SD is the kind of deduction anindividual performs if he re-identifies an object from one perceptual situationto another by using its haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim fromPOSs. In particular, the deduction goes like this. Where being identicalwith N is the haecceity of an object: I know that the thing I perceive at t2 isN, and I also recall that the thing I perceived at t, is N. Since beingidentical with N is a fixed property, I can deduce that the thing I perceiveat t2 is the thing I perceived at t, by performing SD in accord with (Al).

We are now prepared to reformulate our original argument. Let the abilityto re-identify a physical object or person from one perceptual situation toanother by using its haecceity to perform SD from presently known andremembered POSs be called A.

1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to beacquainted with it, then he has A.

2. None of us has A.Therefore,

3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to beacquainted with it.

Call this revised argument R.

ACQUAINTANCE 195194 CHAPTER 5

196 CHAPTER 5 ACQUAINTANCE 197

III - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 1 OF R

It follows by easy and irrefragable deduction."(1789 Belsham Essays, Philosophical, Historical,and Literary I. i. 4)

Imagine that c is both the thing I perceive at t1 and the thing I perceive att2, where t2 is a minute later than 1'1 , and there is a time between ti and t, atwhich I do not perceive c. Suppose that during these perceptual episodes Ieither identify c as this, or bestow a proper name upon c. Further supposethat during each perceptual episode I know a POS containing an indexicalindicator or proper name designating c. In other words, what I know at t,is

the thing I perceive at t1 is N (call this statement p),

and what I know at t, is

the thing I perceive at t, is N (call this statement q).

p and q are schematic and the POSs known result from replacing occurrencesof 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name.

Assume for the sake of argument that perceiving c acquaints me with it.Then my knowing p at t1 acquaints me with c. That is, by knowing p at t1

I know that there is something that is N, and I thereby grasp the haecceityof c - the property of being identical with N. Furthermore, my knowing qat t, acquaints me with c. Thus, I grasp the haecceity of c by knowing q att2. These conclusions follow from what was said about my knowing a POSin section II. Notice that my argument here presupposes that perceptions ofc which occur at different times under similar conditions have an equal claimto be an avenue for acquaintance with c.

Because I have the ability to remember things I knew a short time ago, wemay assume that at t, I remember what I knew at ti when I knew p. Itfollows that at t, I remember (and hence know)

the thing I perceived at t, is N (call this statement r).

By my knowing r at t2 I grasp the haecceity of c, and in so doing I'macquainted with c. My argument here presupposes that if I grasp thehaecceity of c, then I have the ability to remember that haecceity.

Notice that if I know q and I know r, then I have the ability to know (q& r). Since I know both q and r, we may assume that at t2 I know (q & r).

The haecceity of c, namely, being identical with N, is a fixed property.Hence, by (Al) it is a trivial deductive consequence of (q & r) that

the thing I perceive at t, is the thing I perceived at t 1 (call this re-identifi-cation claim s).

As I have the ability to perform simple deductive inferences, we may assumethat at t2 I deduce s from (q & r) by performing SD in accord with (Al). Atthis point I know s because I have deduced it from (q & r). Thus, I haveexercised A by using c's haecceity to perform SD from the conjunction ofthe presently known POS q and the remembered POS r. Hence, ifperceiving c acquaints me with it, then I have A. Inasmuch as an argumentof this kind applies equally well to any of us, we should conclude thatpremise 1 of R is true."

170f course, there are persons, e.g., amnesiacs and idiots, who lack either the ability toremember or the ability to perform deductions. However, since a person who possesses theseabilities is in at least as good a position to be acquainted with an object as one who lacks them,this fact is compatible with my argument for premise 1 of R.

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ACQUAINTANCE 199

IV - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 2 OF R

"A joyful mother of two goodly sons....the one so like the otherAs could not be distinguished but by names."

(1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act I Scene I)

"These two Antipholus', these two so like...I know not which iswhich."

(1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act 5 Scene I)

"You must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration."(1734 Berkeley The Analyst § 19)

In this section I argue that A is an extraordinary epistemic ability which noneof us possesses. My argument will involve an analysis of certain kinds ofevidence available for re-identification claims.

Reports of observed similarities in the sensory properties of materialobjects justify re-identification claims about such objects. By sensoryproperties I mean shapes, sizes, colors, odors, tastes, sounds, temperatures,textures, degrees of bulk and hardness, and properties which fix, or partiallyfix, the spatial location of an object (and do no more). Let us consider arepresentative case in which observed similarities in sensory propertiesprovide evidence for a re-identification claim. Let the property of beingspherical & 2 inches in diameter & orange & fuzzy & soft & cold & sweet& at place p be called being EP. Suppose I know that the thing I perceive att2 is (ID and the thing I perceived at t 1 was 43, where there is a time betweenti and t2 at which I do not perceive the thing I perceived at tp Myknowledge of this similarity in sensory properties provides me with primafacie evidence for the re-identification claim, the thing I perceive at t2 is thething I perceived at tp This prima facie evidence is normally defeated if Ihave reason to believe that there is another object in the vicinity at the timewhich has the same qualitative sensory properties as the thing I perceive att2, for example, an exact look-alike.

In the case described above the statement 'the thing I perceive at t2 is 4.& the thing I perceived at t1 was justifies the re-identification claim 'thething I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at t; . However, the former

statement does not logically entail the latter claim, and the justificatoryrelationship between them is a nondeductive or inductive one. In general,the justificatory relationship between statements asserting the existence ofobserved similarities in sensory properties and re-identification claims is aninductive (nondeductive) one.'

The following discussion brings out the character of certain typicalgrounds for re-identification claims which do not consist solely in observa-tions of similarities in sensory properties. Suppose that at t1 I perceive asingle object. I then fall asleep for an hour. At t2 I wake up and perceivea solitary object in the same place. Let the claim, the thing I perceive at t2

is the thing I perceived at t1 , be called m. If at t2, I know that the object Iperceived an hour ago has been locked in a bank vault for the past hour,then I can justify m by arguing that under the circumstances it is causallyimpossible that the object I perceived an hour ago has been replaced byanother object. Or suppose I know that the object I perceived an hour agowas the item in the top draw of my desk, and that such an item's beingreplaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrence in the past. ThenI can justify m by arguing that in the circumstances it is improbable that theobject I perceived an hour ago has been replaced by another object. Orimagine that when I awake I notice that the thing I perceive is a pool ofwater, and I recall that the thing I perceived an hour ago was a hunk of ice.In this event, I can justify m by arguing that it is the best explanation ofwhat I have observed. Finally, imagine that someone assures me that therehas been just one object there all along. Then I can justify m by appealingto his testimony on this matter. Thus, each of the following procedures canbe employed in the justification of re-identification claims: observations ofsimilarities in sensory properties, causal reasoning, enumerative induction,inferences to the best explanation, appeals to testimony, and similar inductivetechniques. I call such procedures inductive methods, and any evidenceprovided by such methods inductive evidence. The discussion aboveprovides a representative sampling of the ways in which inductive methods

18Compare John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1974), Chapter 6. Pollock argues that justifying a re-identification claim ultimatelyrequires an appeal to observations of similarities in sensory properties which inductively confirmsome re-identification claim.

200 CHAPTER 5

can be used to justify a re-identification claim, doubtless it is true that thesemethods can be used to justify such claims in a variety of other ways.

We are now in a position to show that none of us has A. My strategy forshowing this involves doing two things: (a) Specifying circumstances whichare logically sufficient for anyone's exercising A if he possesses such anability; and (b) Showing that if any one of us is in such circumstances, thenthis does not logically entail that he exercises A. (a) and (b) together implythat none of us has A.

1 will accomplish (a) by describing a situation which may obtain undertypical conditions, and involves circumstances logically sufficient foranyone's re-identifying a particular object from one perceptual situation toanother by exercising A if he possesses such an ability. Such circumstancesare optimally favorable for the exercise of A. I9 An individual S (who maybe any one of us) is in this situation. I will accomplish (b) by showing,first, that it is possible for S to be in this situation and have inadequateinductive evidence for re-identifying the object in question, and second, thatif this possibility is realized, then S does not re-identify this object. Thesituation to which I refer is described below.

Situation (1): S knows that there are two objects which have the samequalitative sensory properties in the vicinity because he observes his friendMo displaying two such objects. Then Mo puts both of these objects behindhis back where S cannot perceive them. Following this, at 1, Mo displays asingle one of these objects (call this object o). At t1, o is the thing Sperceives, and S either identifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o.Then Mo puts o behind his back where S cannot perceive it. A minute laterat t2 Mo displays o again. At 12 o is the thing S perceives, and S eitheridentifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o. From his perceptionsat 11 and t2, S knows POSs containing indexicals or proper names whichdesignate o. In other words, what S knows at t, is

190f course, one who possesses an ability may fail in an attempt to exercise it. However,this can occur only if one is not in optimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of thatability. Hence, if a person possesses A, then this does not entail that he exercises A wheneverhe attempts to do so. However, if a person possesses A and attempts to exercise A when inoptimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of A, then this entails that he exercises A.

ACQUAINTANCE

201

the thing he perceives at t1 is N (call this statement pi),

and what S knows at t2 is

the thing he perceives at 12 is N (call this statement q 1).

p1 and q1 are schematic and the POSs known by S result from replacingoccurrences of 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t2

S remembers what he knew at t1 when he knew p1. Hence, at t2 S remem-bers

the thing he perceived at t 1 is N (call this statement r1).

At t, S knows (q1 & 1.1). At t, S meets the following condition. For anystatements p and q, if he knows p, and p trivially entails q, then if heattempts to deduce q from p he succeeds in performing this deduction. Aperson who meets this condition will be said to be logically accomplished.Finally, at t2 S attempts to deduce the following statement from (q1 & r1) byperforming SD:

the thing he perceives at 12 is the thing he perceived at t, (call this reidentification claim s1).

Initially, one should notice four things about Situation (1). (i) S islogically accomplished. (ii) S knows (q, & r1). (iii) Given the nature of A,if S possesses A, then (q1 & r1) trivially entails s1 . (iv) S attempts to deduces1 from (q1 & r1) by performing SD. (i)-(iv) together imply that necessarily,if S has A, then in situation (1) he deduces s1 from (q1 & r1). Given thenature of A, we should conclude that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1)S is in circumstances which are logically sufficient for his re-identifying ofrom one perceptual situation to another by exercising A. To say that S isin such circumstances is equivalent to saying that if S has A, then he is incircumstances which logically entail that he both knows s, and deduces s1

from (q1 & r1) by exercising A. Finally, notice that Situation (1) may obtainunder typical conditions. In sum, by describing Situation (1) I have


accomplished (a).In what follows I accomplish (b). Remember that in Situation (1) the two

objects involved have the same qualitative sensory properties, for example,they look exactly alike, they feel exactly alike, and so on. Moreover, it ispossible that in Situation (1) at t2 S has inadequate inductive evidence forLet us suppose that this is actually the case. I will argue that given this

supposition, S does not re-identify o from one perceptual situation to anotherin Situation (1). In other words, I shall argue that if at t2 S lacks adequateinductive evidence for s 1, then in Situation (1) he does not know s l, and hedoes not deduce si from (q1 & r1). To begin, notice that in Situation (1), theevidence provided for si by S's observations of similarities in sensoryproperties is defeated by S's knowledge that there is a "look-alike" in thevicinity. And since we are supposing that S has inadequate inductiveevidence for si , it is also true that he is not justified in believing that in thecircumstances it is causally impossible that the thing he perceived at t1 hasbeen replaced by another object during the interval between t1 and t2. Forthe same reason, he is not justified in believing that in such circumstancesan object's being replaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrencein the past, and he lacks adequate testimonial evidence for s i . Similarremarks apply to the other kinds of relevant inductive evidence which Slacks. If as supposed, S has inadequate inductive evidence for s1 in Situation(1), then the hypothesis that the thing he perceives at t2 and the thing heperceived at t1 are different objects which look like one another, iscompatible with everything S knows. That is, without additional informationhe does not know whether he has perceived the same object at t1 and t2 ordiverse "look-alikes". It follows, first, that in Situation (1) S does not knows1 because he has inadequate inductive evidence, and second, that inSituation (1) S does not deduce s from (q, & r1). But it has already been

shown that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1) S is in circumstances whichlogically entail that he both knows s1, and deduces s, from (q, & rd.

Consequently, S lacks A. Since the above argument holds equally well atany time during S's life, it follows that S never possesses A. Thus premise

2 of R is true. Now that both premises of R have been demonstrated, weshould conclude that perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint

any of us with it.'

20Si •tuatton (1) is a case in which o has a "look-alike" in the vicinity, and in certaincircumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from one perceptual situation to anotherbecause he has inadequate inductive evidence for a re-identification claim. Analogous cases canalso be used in my argument. For example, a case in which o radically changes its sensoryproperties, and in certain circumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from oneperceptual situation to another because he lacks adequate inductive evidence for a re-identification claim.

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ACQUAINTANCE 205

V - SYNCHRONIC VERSIONS OFR

"Perceiving is a general term for hearing, seeing, tasting,touching, smelling."

[1762 Kames Elements of Criticism 475 (1833)]

"The same material thing....can be present to our senses inmany different ways...."

[1932 H. H. Price Perception 145 (1964)]

Some philosophers have argued that physical objects and persons consist ofa sequence of temporal slices, each slice being an essentially ephemeral andnonrecurrable particular. It is impossible for such ephemera to be re-identified from one perceptual situation to another. This means that aperson's being acquainted with a temporal slice does not imply that he isable to re-identify it from one perceptual situation to another. Hence, thestrategy employed in R cannot be used to show that a person's perceiving anobject does not acquaint him with its present temporal slice. However, Ishall argue that considerations similar to those employed in defense of Rimply that an individual's perceiving a physical object or person, x, neitheracquaints him with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints him with x. Theseconsiderations concern a person's perceiving a single object by means of twosensory modes at once, for instance, simultaneously touching an object withboth your right and left hands.

We should affirm the following principle of parity concerning sensorymodes (call it the principle of equal treatment): if two observations of anitem, x, 0, and 02, are alike in all relevant cognitive respects, then thehypothesis that 0, provides an avenue for acquaintance with x is on a parwith the hypothesis that 02 provides an avenue for acquaintance with x. Forexample, the following sensory modes have an equal claim to be an avenuefor acquaintance with an item: seeing it with the naked eye, seeing it withthe aid of eyeglasses, seeing it through a periscope, and seeing it via itsreflection in a mirror. Furthermore: (i) glimpses of an item taken fromdifferent vantage points have an equal claim to be an avenue for acquain-tance with that item, and (ii) looking at an item with both eyes, looking atit with the right eye, and looking at it with the left eye, have an equal claim

to be an avenue for acquaintance with that item. Points analogous to theones made concerning sight in (i) and (ii) also hold for the other four senses.It is also plausible to suppose that each of the five senses has an equal claimto be an avenue for acquaintance with objects. If so, then if one sense is notsuch an avenue, none of them is. But there is an objection to this. If onesees or touches an object, then one is aware of a definite boundary betweenthat object and the rest of the world. But this is not true of, perceiving anobject with one of the other three senses. Because of this, sight and touchare superior to the other three senses as avenues for acquaintance. Whetheror not this objection succeeds, it seems safe to say that if seeing or touchingan item does not provide an avenue for acquaintance with it, then neitherdoes perceiving it with one of the other three senses.

A case in which a person simultaneously has two distinct visual percep-tions of a single object can be used to show that seeing an item does notacquaint one with it. As a first step towards describing such a case, imaginea device consisting of two long, straight, hollow ocular tubes mounted sothat a person can look through them in the same way as he looks throughbinoculars. The tubes can be adjusted so that they are either parallel or skewto one another. Call such a device a binocularscope, and imagine that anindividual is looking through one. The tubes may either be positioned sothat each of his eyes sees a different object, or be positioned so that each ofhis eyes sees the same object. In appropriate circumstances, the formersituation causes him to have two distinct simultaneous visual perceptions ofdifferent objects; and the latter situation causes him to have two distinctsimultaneous visual perceptions of a single object. Moreover, if he is in theformer situation and sees a pair of look-alikes, then his visual experiencesare qualitatively indistinguishable from the ones he has in the latter situation.Hence, in the latter situation a person is seeing a single object, but withoutadditional information he literally does not know whether he is seeing oneobject or a pair of look-alikes.

The following case in which I observe an object through a binocularscopecan be used to show that my seeing a physical object or person, x, neitheracquaints me with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints me with x.

Case (1): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objectshaving the same qualitative sensory properties which are within the

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immediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon take me into theroom and allow me to see at least one of these objects. Mo attaches myeyes to the ocular tubes of a binocularscope. However, since the ends of thetubes have been covered with black paper I do not see anything. While Icannot see, Mo brings me into the room and adjusts the binocularscope sothat if he removes the blinders then I see just one object, but have twodistinct visual perceptions of it. Then Mo removes the blinders, and at t1 Ihave two distinct visual perceptions of a single object. Let the object I amseeing (or a temporal slice of it at ti) be called d. Under these conditions,d is both the thing I see with my right eye at t1, and the thing I see with myleft eye at t1 . At t1 , based on each one of my visual perceptions of d, I

either identify d as this or bestow a proper name upon d. In other words,at t1 I know that

the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is N (call this observation statement

P2),

and at t1 I also know that

the thing I see with my left eye at t1 is N (call this observation statement

q2).

p2 and q2 are schematic, and the statements I know result from replacingoccurrences of 'IV' with the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t1 I amlogically accomplished, I know (p2 & q2), and I attempt to deduce thefollowing claim from (p2 & q2) by performing SD:

the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is the thing I see with my left eyeat t1 (call this identity claim r2).

Finally, I neither remove my eyes from the binocularscope, nor perceive anyof the objects around me in any other way.

Now let us see how Case (1) can be used to show that my seeing d doesnot acquaint me with it. Suppose that my seeing d acquaints me with it.

ACQUAINTANCE 207

Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (1) each of mytwo visual perceptions of d acquaints me with it. Thus, at t, I am acquaintedwith d both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2. That is, at t l I know thatthere is something that is N both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2. Hence,at t1 I grasp the haecceity of d, namely, being, identical with N, both byknowing p2 and by knowing q2. Therefore, an argument analogous to theone for premise 1 of R has the following consequence.' If my seeing dacquaints me it, then in Case (1) I have the ability to come to , know r2 byusing the haecceity of d to deduce r2 from (p2 & q2) through performing SDin accord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A'. I shall argue belowthat in Case (1) I lack A', and hence that my seeing d does not acquaint mewith it.

First of all, if I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances that arelogically sufficient for my exercising it I am logically accomplished, I know(p2 & q2), and I attempt to deduce r2 from (1,2 & q2) by performing SD. Thisis true because given the nature of A', what was said of A in the next to lastparagraph of section IV holds analogously for A'. In what follows, Idemonstrate that my being in Case (1) is not logically sufficient for myexercising A', and hence that I lack A'. I will accomplish this by showing,first, that it is possible for me to be in Case (1) and have inadequateinductive evidence for r2, and second, that if this possibility is realized thenin Case (1) I do not exercise A'.

To begin, an identity claim like r2 can be justified by employing inductivemethods. For example, I am using such methods if I justify r2 by inferringit from premises like these: when I have had two visual perceptions ofobjects which look exactly alike, I have usually had two perceptions of thesame object; when I put my finger down near the open end of one tube ofthe binocularscope this is accompanied by my having two perceptions of anobject having a finger looking exactly like mine next to it; someone tells me

21This analogous argument differs from the one for premise 1 of R in just two noteworthyrespects. Since this analogous argument concerns cases in which someone has two perceptionsof an item at once: (i) it applies to temporal slices, and (ii) it does not presuppose that ifsomeone grasps a haecceity, then he has the ability to remember that haecceity. Neither (i) nor(ii) is true of the argument for premise 1 of R, because in the cases relevant to this argumenta person has perceptions of an item at different times.

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that I am seeing just one object, and so on. In Case (1), any evidenceprovided by the first premise I mentioned is defeated by my knowledge thatthere is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. Now, it is possible that in Case(1) at t, I have inadequate inductive evidence for r2. Let us suppose that thisis actually the case. Given this supposition, the hypothesis that I see twothings which look exactly alike, is compatible with everything I know. Thatis, without additional information I do not know whether I am seeing oneobject or a pair of look-alikes. Hence, in Case (1) I do not know r2 becauseI have inadequate inductive evidence, and I do not deduce r2 from (p2 & q2).Since to exercise A' is to come to know r2 by deducing it from (p2 & q2), itfollows that in Case (1) I do not exercise A'. But it was shown earlier thatif I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances which logically entailthat I exercise it. Consequently, I lack A'. Notice that my argument for thisconclusion is analogous to the one for premise 2 of R. Since I have alreadyshown that if my seeing d acquaints me with it, then in Case (1) I possessA', we should conclude that my seeing d does not acquaint me with it. Ofcourse, the same argument applies equally well to any of us at any time.Therefore, an individual's seeing a physical object or person neitheracquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices.

It might be thought that this argument is needlessly elaborate. Specifically,one might think that the conclusion of this argument can be establishedbased on not much more than Cartesian epistemology, and that myintroduction of the binocularscope is unnecessary. In response, I remind thereader that my argument does not assume the requisite controversial claimsof Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology: that perceptual beliefs areuncertain, and that such beliefs can only be inferentially justified. Rather,the assumption of my argument is that one's identification of an object fromone perceptual mode to another depends upon an inductive connectionbetween perceptual premises and the identification. This latter assumptionis much less controversial than the two aforementioned claims of founda-tionalist epistemology.

Case (1) is a situation of the following kind: I perceive a single object, butin certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or twobecause I lack adequate inductive evidence for an identity claim. In a caseof this kind I may have two simultaneous perceptions of a single object with

ACQUAINTANCE 209

a particular sense, for example, two simultaneous visual perceptions of anobject, two simultaneous tactual perceptions of an object, two simultaneousauditory perceptions of an object, and so on. If there is such a case, and wespell out the details in a way analogous to the details in Case (1), then it canbe used to show that perceiving an object with a particular sense does notacquaint one with it. For each one of the remaining four senses, this can beshown by means of an argument parallel to the one based on Case (1). Forexample, the view that a person's touching an object acquaints him with itcan be refuted with the help of the following analog of Case (1).

Case (2): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objectshaving the same qualitative sensory properties which are within theimmediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon lead me into theroom and allow me to touch at least one of these objects. However, sinceI have been blindfolded I do not see anything. While I am blindfolded, Mobrings me into the, room, and at t1 he puts the tip of my right index fingeron the right side of an object, and puts the tip of my left index finger on theleft side of the same object. Let the object I am touching (or a temporalslice of it at t1) be called e. Under the circumstances, e is both the thing Itouch with my right index finger at t1 and the thing I touch with my leftindex finger at t 1 . I have two distinct simultaneous tactual perceptions of e,and based on each one of them, at t1 I either identify e as this or bestow aproper name upon e. Thus, I have the following items of perceptualknowledge concerning e: at t1 I know that

the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement

p3),

and at t, I also know that

the thing I touch with my left index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement

q3).

Occurrences of 'IV' in these schemas are replaced by either 'this' or a propername. At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p3 & q3), and I attemptto deduce the following claim from (p3 & q3) by performing SD:

210 CHAPTER 5

the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is the thing I touch withmy left index finger at t1 (call this identity claim r3).

Finally, I do not perceive any of the objects around me in any other way.Let me explain how Case (2) can be employed to demonstrate that my

touching e does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that touching e acquaintsme with it. Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (2)each of my tactual perceptions of e acquaints me with it. Hence, argumentslike those based on Case (1) imply that if my touching e acquaints me withit, then in Case (2) I have the ability to come to know r3 by using thehaecceity of e to deduce r3 from (Th & q3) via the performance of SD inaccord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A". I shall argue below thatin Case (2) I lack A", and hence that my touching e does not acquaint mewith it.

First of all, if I possess A", then in Case (2) I am in circumstances whichare logically sufficient for my exercising it, that is, I am logically accom-plished, I know (113 & q3), and I attempt to deduce r3 from (p3 & q3) byperforming SD. This is true because given the nature of A", what was saidof A' in the argument based on Case (1) holds analogously for A". Anotheranalogy with Case (1) is that as with r2, inductive methods can be used tojustify an identity claim like r3. For instance, I am employing such methodsif I infer r3 from premises like these: when I have had two tactual percep-tions of objects which feel alike, I have usually had two perceptions of thesame object; when I press against the right side of the thing I am touchingwith my right index finger I feel an equal pressure against my left indexfinger; someone tells me that I am touching just one object, and so on. InCase (2), any evidence provided by the first premise I mentioned is defeatedby my knowledge that there are two objects in the vicinity which feel thesame. Moreover, it is possible that in Case (2) at ti, I have inadequateinductive evidence for r3. If in Case (2) I lack adequate inductive evidencefor r3, then I do not know r3 and without additional information I do notknow whether I am touching the opposite ends of one object or two differentobjects which feel alike. Consequently, arguments like those based on Case(1) imply that in Case (2) I lack A". Since I have already shown that if mytouching e acquaints me with it, then in Case (2) I possess A", it follows that

ACQUAINTANCE 211

my touching e does not acquaint me with it. Thus, there is an argumentbased on Case (2), parallel to the one based on Case (1), which implies thatan individual's touching a physical object or person neither acquaints himwith it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices.

One might think that for my argument to succeed I need to show that aperson's simultaneously seeing and touching an object does not acquaint himwith it. A case which can be used to show this can be constructed bycombining (1) and (2) in the following way.

Case (3): As I am looking through the binocularscope at d (and havingtwo distinct visual perceptions of d), Mo puts my fingers in contact with din the same way as he puts them in contact with e in Case (2). I have twodistinct and simultaneous joint visual/tactual perceptions of d. d is both thething I see with my right eye at t1 and the thing I touch with my right indexfinger at t1 , and d is both the thing I see with my left eye at t1 and the thingI touch with my left index finger at t1. From my perceptions, at t1 I knowp2 and I know q2. At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q2), andI attempt to deduce r2 from (p2 & q2) by performing SD. Finally, I neitherremove my eyes from the binocularscope nor perceive any of the objectsaround me in any other way.

Let us see how Case (3) can be utilized to establish that my simulta-neously seeing and touching d does not acquaint me with it. Suppose thatmy perceiving d acquaints me with it. Then the principle of equal treatmentimplies that in Case (3) each of my joint visual/tactual perceptions of dacquaints me with it. Hence, arguments like those based on Case (1) implythat if simultaneously seeing and touching d acquaints me with it, then in

Case (3) I possess A'. I will argue below that in Case (3) I lack A', andconsequently that perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it.First of all, observe that it is possible that in Case (3) I have inadequateinductive evidence for r2. And just as in Case (1), if this is actually the casethen in Case (3) I do not know r2, and without additional information I donot know whether I see a single object or a pair of look-alikes. For thisreason, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that in Case (3) I lackA'. Since I have already shown that if my simultaneously seeing andtouching d acquaints me with it, then in Case (3) I possess A', it follows that

my perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it. Hence, there is


an argument based on Case (3), parallel to the one based on Case (1), whichimplies that an individual's simultaneously seeing and touching a physicalobject or person neither acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with oneof its temporal slices.'

There are arguments, parallel to the ones I have advanced to show that apersons's seeing or touching a physical item, x, does not acquaint him withx, which show that a person is not acquainted with x either by perceiving xwith one of the other three senses, or by simultaneously perceiving x withany combination of the five senses. Such arguments may involve analogsof Case (1), Case (2), and Case (3), in which a person listens to an object byusing earphones attached to each ear, smells an object by using tubesattached to each nostril, tastes an object with each side of his tongue, and soforth.

Strategies like the ones I have developed in this chapter can also be usedto show that a person's perceiving an object does not acquaint him with anonsubstantial physical entity such as an object's surface or a temporal sliceof an object's surface. In other words, entities of these kinds can either beperceived at different times or be perceived by two modes of perception atonce, and arguments parallel to R, or its synchronic analogs, apply to them.

22Below, I describe three analogs of (1), (2), and (3) whose details can be spelled out ina way parallel to the details in (1), (2), and (3). If these details are provided, then there arearguments based on these analogs which are parallel to the ones based on (1), (2), and (3), andhave the same conclusions.

(1') At t, I know that there is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. At t, I have two distinctsimultaneous visual perceptions of a thing because I look at a thing which is in front of me andat the same time look at that thing either through a periscope or via its reflections in a numberof mirrors.

(2') At t, I know that an object in the vicinity has been broken in half, and thus that thereare now two objects there instead of one. At t, I perceive a single object and notice its rightand left halves. But I do not perceive the middle portion of this object because it is covered.

(3') At t, I know that there are two objects in the vicinity which are not joined together toform a single object. I also know that if I were to perceive these objects, then they wouldappear to be a single object either because they are an imperceptible distance from one another,or because they are in contact but not joined. At 1, I perceive a single object by looking at itand/or touching it, or by enclosing it in my hand.

(1), (2), (3), and their analogs, are cases of the following kind: I perceive a single object,but in certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or two because I haveinadequate inductive evidence for an identity claim.

Because these parallel arguments are substantially the same as those alreadydiscussed, I forego any further discussion of them here.

Each of us can identify a particular physical object or person other thanhimself in a variety of ways, for example, by perceiving it, by reading aboutit, and so on. None of these ways has a better claim to be an avenue foracquaintance with it than perceiving it. Consequently, since I have shownthat perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint any of us withit, it follows that none of us is acquainted with a physical object or personother than himself. Analogous arguments imply that none of us is ac-quainted with items of the following kinds: temporal slices of physicalobjects or persons other than himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporalslices of such surfaces.

Surely, if any one of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object orperson other than himself, then he thereby does so when he knows aperceptual observation statement about an object of this kind. But as wehave seen, when one of us knows such a POS, he does not thereby grasp thehaecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. It follows thatnone of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other thanhimself. 23 For parallel reasons, none of us ever grasps haecceities of itemsof the following kinds: temporal slices of physical objects or persons otherthan himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporal slices of such surfaces.

23Clearly, since none of us can grasp a haecceity exemplified by a material object or personother than himself, none of us can grasp a haecceity which is unexemplified (and so other thanone's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified, then it would be exemplified by amaterial object or person.

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ACQUAINTANCE 215

VI - OBJECTIONS TO R AND ITS ANALOGS:A REBUTTAL

"There is a reality that is external and yet given immediatelyto the mind. Common sense is right on this point, as against

the idealism and realism of the philosophers."(1903 Bergson An Introduction to Metaphysics)

"We can always easily convert an hypothetical syllogism of oneform into another, the modus ponens into the modus tollens."[a 1856 Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics & Logic I. 344 (1860)]

A possible objection to R goes as follows. R's conclusion is that none of usgrasps the haecceity of an external object. However, as we have seen, it isprima facie plausible that each of us grasps the haecceity of an externalobject. Since R is a logically valid argument whose conclusion is incompati-ble with something which is prima facie plausible, it is likely that R has afalse premise. In particular, it is probable that perception enables us to beacquainted with physical objects, but either none of us can recall aproposition involving the haecceity of an external object, or none of us canknow a conjunction of two propositions which involves such a haecceity.In other words, it is likely that premise 1 of R is false.

My reply is this. In the first place, the prima facie plausibility of theclaim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object is based on(PG), a principle which makes the plausibility of this claim dependent uponthe plausibility of the claim that external objects have haecceities. However,it is obvious that if external objects do not have haecceities, then none of usgrasps the haecceity of an external object. Hence, (PG) does not make theclaim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object any moreplausible than the claim that external objects have haecceities. But the latterclaim is based on highly theoretical considerations such as those advancedin Chapter 2. Although considerations of this sort make the claim thatexternal objects have haecceities plausible, this claim seems less plausiblethan the claim that each of us can recollect things he has recently learned,and can know conjunctive propositions. After all, it is evident that humans

have these epistemic abilities. Furthermore, it appears that each of us canrecall propositions involving his own haecceity, or haecceities of certainabstract entities, and in many cases can know a conjunction of two suchpropositions. For example, it seems that I can recall that the color I wasthinking of a moment ago is Redness, and, that I can know both that I recallthis and that the color I am now thinking of is. Redness. Thus, it is difficultto believe that if perception enables us to be acquainted with physicalobjects, then none of us is able to recall a proposition which involves ahaecceity of an external object, or know a conjunction of two suchpropositions. For these reasons, when forced to choose between acceptingR's conclusion that none of us is acquainted with an external object, andrejecting R's presupposition that each of us has the epistemic abilities inquestion, we should choose the former. Hence, this objection to R does notsucceed.

But a naive haecceitist would assert that when he perceives an externalobject he has a self-evident intuition that he grasps the haecceity of thatobject. Presumably, if a naive haecceitist grasps a haecceity of an externalobject in this way, then he can know that he grasps this haecceity. Thus, anaive haecceitist might argue that since he knows he grasps the haecceity ofan external object, he knows some premise of R is false. Such a naivehaecceitist rejects R on the ground that he knows its conclusion is false.However, I do not have a self-evident intuition that when I perceive anexternal object I grasp the haecceity of that object. For this reason, I do notattach any credibility to the naive haecceitist's claim to know that R has afalse conclusion. It would appear that if a person's perception of an externalobject is the occasion for his having a self-evident intuition of his graspingthe haecceity of that object, then he has such an intuition in virtue of aninnate epistemic ability. Surely, such an epistemic ability would bepossessed by all human perceivers. But, since I am a human perceiver andI lack a self-evident intuition of my perceptually grasping the haecceity ofan external object, I conclude that it is not likely that the naive haecceitisthas a self-evident intuition of his perceptually grasping the haecceity of anexternal object. Thus, I find the naive haecceitist's objection to R unaccept-able.

However, one might object to R and its synchronic analogs on the basis


of a theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism. Such a theory has threecomponents. (1) Any one of us, S, frequently grasps the haecceity of anexternal object, x, when he perceives x at different times or by means ofdifferent sensory modes. (2) Each of these episodes of perceptual acquain-tance is characterized by a different cognitive perspective which determinesa unique way in which either x's haecceity is grasped by S at a particulartime or x's haecceity is grasped by S via a particular sensory mode. (3) Justas S's re-identification of an object from one perceptual situation to anothercan only be inferentially justified by using inductive methods, S cannotinferentially justify the claim that the haecceity he grasps from one of thesecognitive perspectives is identical with the haecceity he grasps from anotherone of these cognitive perspectives except by employing inductive methods.

Sophisticated perceptual haecceitism is a rather unintuitive theory: thereis simply no intuition that for each perceptual occasion or sensory modethere is a corresponding unique cognitive perspective of the sort required.Furthermore, if there were such cognitive perspectives, then it is likely thattheir existence would be reflected in the structure of our language or in ourlinguistic practices. Since there is nothing in these linguistic phenomena tosuggest that there are perspectives of this kind, it seems that there are nosuch perspectives. In the light of the foregoing observations, we can see thatthe theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism preserves the idea that wegrasp haecceities of external objects only by postulating an infinite numberof apparently ineffable cognitive perspectives. Surely, such a theory isunacceptable.

Before considering the next objection, notice that my defense of premise1 of R presupposes that in a case of a certain sort, if I know a nonqualitativeproposition ((p & q) & (p & q) —> r), and I believe r as a result of deducingr from ((p & q) & (p & q) —> r), then I know r. Recall that in a case of thissort, (p & q) involves a haecceity of a physical object or person, I deducer from (p & q) via SD in virtue of (Al), and by knowing r I re-identify thephysical object or person in question from one perceptual situation toanother.

It might be urged against premise 1 of R that knowledge is not closedunder logical deduction: there could be a case in which I know a proposition(a & (a b)), I believe b as a result of deducing b from (a & (a —> b)),

but I do not know b. My argument for premise 1 of R might be rejected onthe ground that deductive closure does not apply in cases relevant to anassessment of this premise.

I am inclined to regard the principle that knowledge is closed underlogical deduction as something I know a priori. According to this principle,it is a necessary truth that for any person, S, if S knows a proposition (a &(a --> b)) and S believes b as a result of his deducing b from (a & (a —> b)),then S knows b. Thus, I view putative counter-examples to deductiveclosure with suspicion. Furthermore, even if genuine counter-examples exist,deductive closure usually applies in cases of knowledge. Finally, deductiveclosure seems to apply in all of the relevant parallel cases in which a personknows a proposition involving his own haecceity or a haecceity of anabstract entity. For these reasons, we may assume that deductive closureapplies in the cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R, until we aregiven good reason to suppose otherwise.

One could try to provide such a reason by drawing a parallel with thefollowing argument. According to philosophers such as Robert Nozick,accepting the existence of failures of deductive closure is the price we mustpay in order to avoid skepticism about external objects.' For example, Iknow that

(a) I am in Greensboro,

entails

(b) — (I am a brain in a vat on a spaceship in the Andromeda galaxy).

Nevertheless, Nozick would hold that although I know (a), I am not in aposition to know (b). If I am not in a position to know (b), then I amignorant of (a) and skepticism about external objects ensues, unless there isa failure of deductive closure.

Nozick assumes that skepticism about external objects is an extremely

24 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1981), pp. 167-288.

218 CHAPTER 5

undesirable conclusion, and that accepting failures of deductive closure is areasonable price to pay for avoiding that conclusion. He argues thatdeductive closure fails to apply when a person does not track the propositionhe deduces. On Nozick's conception of tracking, a person tracks aproposition, p, just in case (i) ifp were false, then S wouldn't believe p, and(ii) if p were true, then S would believe p. Apparently, if (b) were false,that is, if I were a brain in a vat, then I would nonetheless believe (b), inother words, I would think that I was not a brain in a vat. It follows that inthe case under discussion (b) violates (i). This means I do not track (b).According to Nozick, it is my failure to track (b) which explains why thereis a failure of deductive closure when I infer (b) from [(a) & [(a) --> (b)]].

But notice that in cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R I dotrack the re-identification claim r. In particular, (i) if r were false, then Iwouldn't believe r: I would grasp different haecceities (belonging to diverseobjects) at t1 and t2, and so I would not think that the thing I perceive at t2the thing I perceived at t1 ; and (ii) if r were true, then I would grasp thesame haecceity (belonging to the same object) at t1 and t2, and so I wouldthink that the thing I perceive at t 2=the thing I perceived at t2 .25

According to one of Nozick's rules, S's deductive inference of a from b(which is known) yields knowledge that a on this condition: if a were false,then S wouldn't believe b (or S wouldn't infer a from b). Nozick would saythat in the case at hand my deduction of r from my knowledge that ((p & q)& (p & q) ---> r) yields knowledge of r if this rule is satisfied: if r werefalse, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q) & (p & q) ----> r) (or I wouldn't inferr from ((p & g) & (p & q) r). It isn't difficult to see that Nozick's ruleis satisfied in this case. Firstly, if r were false, then I would fail to believeeither p or q. After all, p and q involve the haecceity of the same object,but if r were false, then either my belief that p or my belief that q would be

25 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 179-185. Nozick refines his accountof tracking in order to deal with various problem cases, primarily ones in which either adifferent method of acquiring knowledge is utilized in a close counter-factual situation ormultiple methods of acquiring knowledge are employed. But none of Nozick's refinements haveany effect on my verdict in the case under discussion. In this case only a single method isinvolved, and in my assessment of the relevant counter-factuals I hold the method of acquiringknowledge fixed, as Nozick requires.

ACQUAINTANCE 219

replaced by a belief in another proposition which involves the haecceity ofa different object. Hence, if r were false, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q)& (p & q) r). Secondly, it was shown above that if r were false, then Iwouldn't believe r. It follows that if r were false, then I wouldn't infer rfrom ((p & q) & (p & q) -> r). For these reasons, Nozick's rule for thetransmission of knowledge from the premises of a proof to its conclusion issatisfied in the case under consideration. I conclude that the sort of failureof deductive closure postulated by Nozick does not include failures ofclosure in deducing r from ((p & q) & (p & q) r) in cases relevant to anassessment of premise 1 of R.

Still, it might be argued along Nozickian lines that accepting failures ofdeductive closure for propositions involving the haecceities of externalobjects is the price we must pay for sustaining the belief that we grasphaecceities of external objects. But despite the analogy between such anargument and Nozick's, there are two reasons why these arguments are notcomparable in plausibility. First of all, our belief that we have knowledgeabout external objects possesses greater prima facie plausibility than thebelief that we grasp haecceities of external objects. In this connection,notice that a person's having knowledge of an external object does not entailhis grasping a haecceity of such an object, since a person can have indirectknowledge of an external object. Second of all, sustaining the belief that wegrasp haecceities of external objects is of far less importance to us thansustaining the belief that we have knowledge of external objects. Even ifaccepting the occurrence of certain failures of deductive closure is areasonable price to pay for sustaining the latter belief, it seems that acceptingthe occurrence of failures of deductive closure in cases which are relevantto an assessment of premise 1 of R is too high a price to pay for sustainingthe former belief.

On a final note, observe that replies parallel to those given in defense ofR in this section can be used in defense of R's synchronic analogs.

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VII - DIVINE COGNITION AND HAECCEITIES

"To distinguish well between Knowables and Unknowables."(1725 Watts Logick: Or the Right Use of Reason in theEnquiry After Truth I. vi. § I)

Although I have argued that none of us ever grasps the haecceity of aphysical object or person other than himself, I have yet to argue that aperson's grasping the haecceity of a physical object or person other thanhimself is an impossibility. Edward Wierenga is an example of a philoso-pher who believes it is possible for someone to grasp the haecceity of aperson other than himself. 26 Although Wierenga concedes it is plausiblethat none of us can grasp the haecceity of a person other than himself, hemaintains there is no reason to deny that God grasps the haecceities ofpersons other than himself. I will argue that Wierenga's position isuntenable, and that a person's grasping the haecceity of a physical object orperson other than himself is an impossibility.

To start with, where P is a person, it is at least frequently true that P'sbearing a cognitive attitude to a particular, x, is P's bearing a cognitiveattitude to a state of x, where a state of x is either x's being characterized insome way or x's being related in a certain way to one or more items.Likewise, it is at least often true that P's bearing a maximally directcognitive attitude to x is P's bearing a maximally direct cognitive attitude toa state of x.

It seems that P grasps the haecceity or nonqualitative "thisness" of x onlyif at some time P bears a maximally direct cognitive attitude to x thatenables P to grasp x's haecceity. Apparently, the most direct cognitiveattitude P bears to a physical object or person other than himself is aperceptual one. Consequently, it seems that P does not grasp the haecceityof a physical object or person other than himself unless at some time P has

26Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca andLondon: Cornell University Press, 1989). Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Critical Notice: TheNature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by Edward Wierenga," Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 725-728.

ACQUAINTANCE 221

a perception of a physical object or person, x, which enables P to grasp x'shaecceity. However, the following considerations make it plausible that Phas no perception of this kind.

As we have already learned, if P's perceiving x enables P to grasp x'shaecceity, then P has the ability to identify x from one perceptual occasionor mode to another by means of a deductive inference from perceptualpremises, without P's justification for this identification depending upon aninductive connection between the perceptual premises and the identification.Since none of us has this ability, perception does not enable any of us tograsp the haecceity of a physical object or person. Is divine perceptionsuperior to our own in this respect? We may assume that God perceives anobject, an event, or a qualitative attribute that we fail to perceive, forexample, an electron, a radio wave, or a transpectral color. But it seems thatsuch a superhuman perception would no more reveal the haecceity of anindividual thing than would a human perception. However, it might beargued that a divine perception is more direct than a human perception.After all, a human perception is causally mediated by physical states of asense-organ and the nervous system, but if an omniscient spirit such as Godhas a perception, then there is no need to suppose that this perception ismediated by a physical state. For this reason, it appears that a state, 0, ofa physical object or nondivine person, x, would directly cause God to havean internal perceptual state of 0, whereas 0 can at best cause a humanperceiver to have an internal perceptual state of 0 via a causal chain ofintermediary states. It might then be inferred that God would have aperception of 0 which is more direct than a human perception of 0. Bethat as it may, I shall argue that this perceptual awareness which God wouldhave of 0 is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude, for it is not as directas the introspective awareness which God would have of one of his owninternal perceptual states.

I begin by clarifying the notions of an internal perceptual or experientialstate and God's introspective awareness of such a state. An internalperceptual or experiential state is either an individual's having a percept, forinstance, my having a blue sense-datum, or an individual's being character-ized in some experiential psychological way, for example, my beingappeared to bluely. For any perceiver, P, and any state, 0, of a physical

222 CHAPTER 5

object or person, x, if P has a perception of 0, then P has this perceptionbecause P is in a certain internal perceptual or experiential state which iscaused by 0. It follows that God's perceptual awareness of a state, 0, ofa physical object or nondivine person is causally mediated by another state,namely, an internal perceptual state of God.

However, necessarily, a person's awareness of a physical or mental state,0, of a particular, x, is an instance of a maximally direct cognitive attitudejust provided that 0 directly causes that person's awareness of 0, that is,0 is directly impressed upon his consciousness in virtue of 0 causing hisawareness of 0 without the causal mediation of any other state. Surely, ifGod is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual orexperiential states, 0, then God's introspective awareness of 0 is aninstance of a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Clearly, when anindividual is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual orexperiential states, X, this awareness is not via his awareness of some otherperceptual or experiential state which is caused by X. Moreover, if theindividual engaged in introspection is an omniscient spirit such as God, thensuch an awareness is not causally mediated by any other sort of state, forexample, a brain state. It follows that God's introspective awareness of oneof his own internal perceptual states is not causally mediated by anyintervening state. In contrast, we have seen that God's perceptual awarenessof a state, 0, of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is causallymediated by another state, namely, an internal perceptual state of God.Hence, the perceptual awareness that God has of a state of a physical objector nondivine person is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude: suchperceptual awareness is not as direct as God's introspective awareness of oneof his own internal perceptual states.' Moreover, an omniscient God'sperceptual awareness of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is aninstance of a maximally direct cognitive relation only if an omniscient God'sperceptual awareness of a state of x is a maximally direct cognitive relation.Thus, divine perception of things or their states, like human perception of

271 assume that physical objects or persons other than God are not identifiable with divineideas or mental states, or sets or collections of such, items of which God is introspectivelyaware.

ACQUAINTANCE 223

such items, is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Since a persongrasps the haecceity of a particular, x, only if at some time he bears amaximally direct cognitive attitude to x that enables him to grasp x'shaecceity, perception does not enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of aphysical object or person. No means other than perception is available forgrasping the haecceity of an external physical object or person. For theforegoing reasons, it seems that God, along with the rest of us, cannot graspthe haecceity of a material object or person other than himself. Since evenGod would be unable to grasp such a haecceity, I conclude that it isimpossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity of this kind.' Thus, there couldnot be an omniscient being, in the sense of a being who knows (andtherefore grasps) every true proposition.'

In what follows, I answer three possible objections to the precedingargument. According to the first objection, God has a nonperceptual way ofexperiencing a physical object or person other than himself, and this formof divine experience is more direct than any perception God could have ofsuch a thing But what could the nature of such a divine experienceconceivably be? Of course, there are nonperceptual modes of awareness: aperson can experience himself and his own mental states introspectively, anda person can be aware of some abstract entities in an intellectual manner.However, this argument is of no help in understanding how God couldnonperceptually experience a physical object or person other than himself,since it is impossible that a person has either introspective awareness, or therelevant kind of intellectual awareness, of a physical object or person otherthan himself. Indeed, it seems that we cannot conceive of a nonperceptualexperience of an external thing. Thus, acceptance of the response underdiscussion entails acceptance of an incomprehensible mystery. Such an

28Clearly, since it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity instantiated by materialobject or person other than himself, it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity which isunexemplified (and thus other than one's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified,then it would be exemplified by a material object or person.

29For an opposing view, see Jonathan Kvanvig, The . Possibility of an All Knowing God(New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 26-71. However, my argument is compatible with theclaim that (i) there is an omniscient being, and (ii) omniscience does not require knowledge ofevery true proposition.

224 CHAPTER 5

irrational belief is out of place in a proper philosophical argument.The second objection contends that God has innate ideas of nonqualitative

haecceities of physical objects and persons other than himself. 3° I answerthis as follows. It is difficult enough to conceive of a person, S, who has aninnate idea of a qualitative property such as Pain or Pleasure, or (phenome-nal) Redness or Greenness, which is possibly an intrinsic characteristic ofS. But it is more difficult yet to conceive of a person, S, who has an innateidea of a nonqualitative haecceity of a physical object or person other thanhimself, a characteristic which is necessarily repugnant to S. Thus, it doesnot appear possible that God has an innate idea of a nonqualitative haecceityof such an external thing.

According to the third objection, God grasps a nonqualitative haecceity,H, of a physical object or person other than himself by abstracting H fromhis own nonqualitative haecceity or the nonqualitative haecceities of his ownmental states. But it seems that no first-order nonqualitative haecceity, H,bears a similarity to other first-order nonqualitative haecceities which wouldenable a person to abstract H from these other haecceities. Furthermore, anabstractive process of the sort in question can occur only if there is such asimilarity. Therefore, it appears that God couldn't grasp a nonqualitativehaecceity, H, of a physical object or person other than himself via theabstractive process envisioned by this third objection.

30For a person, S, to have an innate idea of F-ness is for S to have an innate ability toclassify something as an F, an ability S does not have because of some perception S has of anF. See Chapter 1, section V, and particularly footnote 17.

ACQUAINTANCE

225

VIII - THE OBJECTS OF ACQUAINTANCE

"The Sight of the Mind differs very much from the Sightof the Body."

(1735 Bolingbroke A Dissertation Upon Parties 135)

In his early writings Russell was inclined to believe that a person isacquainted with himself, his own sense-data, and certain abstract entities. Inthis section I argue that it is plausible that each of us is acquainted (in mysense) with himself, some of his own mental states, and a variety of abstractentities.

Since sense-perception does not acquaint any of us with physical objectsor persons, none of us is acquainted either with his body or with himself bymeans of sensory perception. However, it may be argued that a person isacquainted with himself by nonsensory means, namely, introspection?'

Typically, if a person has an item of self-knowledge, then he uses theidiom of the first-person to express what he knows. Bearing this in mind,let us consider the following case.

Case (4): At t1 I know that

the thing I am thinking of at t, is me.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. Upon awakening at6, I know that

the thing I am thinking of at t2 is me (call this statement q4).

At t2 I remember (and hence know) that

the thing I was thinking of at t, is me (call this statement r4).

31 For example, see Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1. He argues that eachof us grasps his own haecceity when he knows that he has a self-presenting state. Compare TheFirst Person, in which Chisholm attacks the position he held in Person and Object on thismatter.

Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I_know (q, & r„), and I attempt todeduce the following claim from (q, & r,):

the thing I am thinking of at t2 is the thing I was thinking of at t i (call

this re-identification claim s4).

Notice that because (q, & r„) trivially entails s„, in Case (4) I come toknow 54 by deducing it from (q, & r„). If I perform this deduction by usingmy haecceity to perform SD, then I am acquainted with myself. Is there anargument like R which shows that in Case (4) I do not perform thisdeduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (4), if att2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s4, then I do not deduce 54 from (q,

& r„). But in Case (4), it seems that when I deduce s„ from (q, & r,) I amrelying only on introspection and my memory of what I introspected, neitherof which involves any inductive methods. Thus, as far as I can see atpresent, in Case (4) I deduce s„ from (q, & r4) even if I have inadequate

inductive evidence for 54. For this reason, it appears that strategies similarto those employed in defense of R cannot be used to construct a soundparallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with himself.

Observe that a case in which I lack memory knowledge of r, cannot beused to construct a parallel argument of this kind, since such a parallelargument requires that I fail to come to know 5, by deducing it from (q, &

r4) in a case in which I possess memory knowledge of r„.

For example, suppose I forget r„. In that case, I do not come to know 54

by deducing it from (q, & r„), since I do not know r,. However, because I

do not have the requisite memory knowledge of r„, this does not suggest

there is a good argument parallel to R which implies I am not acquainted

with myself.Alternatively, imagine that an extraterrestrial with a duplication machine

is in the neighborhood. He sneaks up on people while they are asleep andduplicates them. A duplicate has the same apparent memories as theoriginal, at least to the extent that this is possible. I have just learned of theextraterrestrial's activities, and I am worried that I am a freshly createdduplicate. As it happens, I am not. In such a case, it seems that I would not

come to know s, by deducing it from (q, & r„). But this is because my

knowledge of the activities of the extraterrestrial defeats the justification ofmy memory belief in r,. Thus, once again the requirement that I havememory knowledge of r, is not met.

What of my freshly created duplicate? He too fails to have the requiredmemory knowledge: he does not remember that the thing he was thinking ofat a certain earlier time is himself: since he was just created, none of hisapparent memories are true. Moreover, even if my duplicate soon acquiressome true apparent memories, so long as he does not have more trueapparent memories than false ones, and remains unable to detect the falsityof his mistaken apparent memories, he continues, it seems, to be in noposition to possess the requisite memory knowledge. Hence, cases of thesekinds do not suggest there is a good argument parallel to R which impliesthat a person is not acquainted with himself.

Turning to the case of sense-data, they can be thought of as essentiallyfleeting and nonrepeatable particulars. In that case, it is impossible for asense-datum to be re-identified. Given this conception of sense-data, anargument like R cannot be used to refute the thesis that a person isacquainted with his own sense-data. Moreover, it is impossible for there tobe two simultaneous introspective experiences of a single sense-datum. Itfollows that an argument like the one brought to bear on temporal slices ofphysical objects in the preceding section cannot be used to discredit theclaim that a person is acquainted with his own sense-data.

Similar considerations apply to the claim that if a person, S, knows, at amoment t, that the time at which something is happening is now, then at tS is acquainted with t. 32 Notice that a person can have an awareness of tas now only at t. Hence, no argument like R can be used to refute the thesisthat S is acquainted with t. Furthermore, it appears that a person cannot beaware of t as now by means of two modes of awareness at once. Thus, itseems that no argument like R's synchronic analogs can be used to discredit

32Compare Ernest Sosa, The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?" The Journal

of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 26-42.

226 CHAPTER 5 J ACQUAINTANCE 227

228 CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE 229

the thesis that S is acquainted with t. 33

Finally, let us look at a representative case in which a person is aware ofan abstract entity, for instance, a property.

Case (5): At t, I know that

the color I am aware of at t, is Red.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, andI know that

the color I am aware of at t2 is Red (call this statement g5).

At t2 I remember that

the color I was aware of at t, is Red (call this statement r5).

Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q5 & r5), and I attempt todeduce the following claim from (q5 & r5):

the color I am aware of at t2 is the color I was aware of at ti (call thisre-identification claim s5).

Notice that since (q5 & r5) trivially entails s5, in Case (5) I come to knows5 by deducing it from (g,& r5). If I perform this deduction by using thehaecceity of Red to perform SD, then I am acquainted with this color. Isthere an argument like R which shows that in Case (5) I do not perform thisdeduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (5), if at

330n the other hand, it is clear that an argument parallel to R does yield the conclusion thatnobody has direct knowledge of a place when he identifies it as here. For relevant, historicallyimportant, material on the identification of bodies, souls; places, times, and other concreta seeFranz Brentano, Theory of Categories, Roderick Chisholm and Norbert Guterman, trans. (TheHague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Compare Brentano's Philosophical Investigations on Space,Time and the Continuum, Barry Smith, trans. (London: Croom Helm, 1988). Here Brentanomaintains that a time, a place, or a soul is individuated by its "individual peculiarity," but thatnone of us can grasp such a differentia individualis.

t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s5, then I do not deduce s5 from (q5

& 1.5). But in Case (5), it seems that when I deduce s5 from (g, & r5) I amrelying only on my grasping the property of being identical with Red and myremembering my grasping this property, neither of which involves anyinductive methods. Thus as far as I can tell, in Case (5) I deduce ,s5 from(q5 & r5) even if I have inadequate inductive evidence for s5. For thisreason, it appears that strategies similar to those used in defense of R cannotbe employed to construct a sound parallel argument which implies that noneof us is acquainted with an abstract entity.

As we saw above, in Cases (4) and (5) a person seems to epistemicallyjustify re-identification claims about himself or an abstract entity onnoninductive grounds, whereas none of us ever justifies a re-identificationclaim about a physical object or person other than himself on, such grounds.Notice that this epistemological asymmetry is explicable on the hypothesisthat a person grasps his own haecceity, or the haecceities of some abstracta,but does not grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other thanhimself. According to such an explanation, in Case 4 [Case 5] I justify s4

[55] by using a haecceity to deduce 54 [5.5] from (p„ & q4) [(p5 & q5)] via SD;whereas none of us ever utilizes a deductive method of this kind to justifya re-identification claim about a physical object or person other than himself.The fact that the epistemological asymmetry in question is explicable on theaforementioned hypothesis is a point in favor of that hypothesis.

As shown earlier, the claim that we grasp our own haecceities is primafacie plausible?' Moreover, arguments like R do not defeat the plausibilityof this claim. Furthermore, we have seen that the claim that a person graspshis own haecceity has a certain explanatory utility?' Hence, until there isgood reason to think otherwise, it is quite plausible to think that we graspour own haecceities.

I have , argued that the existence of abstracta is plausible, including the

34See section I of this chapter, and also Chapter 1, section V.

35The claim in question not only affords an explanation of the aforementionedepistemological asymmetry, it yields an analysis of a person's self-ascription of a property. Foran argument in support of the latter point, and a description of other possible explanatory rolesof the haecceity notion in the cognitive area see Chapter 1, section V.

230 CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE 231

existence of haecceities of abstracta. For example, it appears that bothRedness and being identical with Redness exist, the latter property being theformer property's haecceity. And since it seems that a person believes thereis something which is identical with Redness, (PG) makes it prima facieplausible that a person grasps the haecceity of Redness. Furthermore, itappears that there is no argument resembling R which defeats this prima

facie plausibility. Thus, until we have good reason to believe otherwise, theclaim that we grasp the haecceity of Redness is plausible. Since parallelconsiderations apply to numerous other properties, as well as to numerousrelations and propositions, it is prima facie plausible that we grasp haeccei-

ties of abstracta of these sorts.When it comes to the question of whether any of us grasps the haecceity

of an item, x, there is a difference between a case in which x is a person oran abstract entity and a case in which x is a sense-datum or a time. Thedifference is this: I have argued that abstracta exist, and it is evident thatpersons exist, but I have not argued that sense-data or times exist, and it is

not clear that the existence of sense-data or times is acceptable. However,unless it is plausible that sense-data or times exist, there is no haecceity, H,exemplifiable by a sense-datum or time of which we can plausibly say that

it exists. But given the structure of (PG), (PG) can make it prima facieplausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times only if thereis such a haecceity H. Hence, I doubt that (PG) can make it prima facieplausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times. Accord-ingly, I do not claim that we are acquainted with items of either of these twosorts.

However, it appears that whether or not sense-data or times exist, aperson's momentary occurrent mental states exist. For example, presentlythere is a momentary state my thinking that I see something red, 5 seconds

earlier there was a momentary state my feeling sad, and 5 seconds later there

will be a momentary state my being appeared to greenly. Clearly, arguments

like those based on (PG) which make it prima facie plausible that we graspour own haecceities and haecceities of certain abstract entities, make it prima

facie plausible that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own momentaryoccurrent mental states. Below, I try to show that there is no argument likeR or its synchronic analogs which defeats this prima facie plausibility.

To begin with, there are two conceptions of a momentary occurrent mentalstate: necessarily, either (i) such a state is nonrepeatable and cannot beintrospectively experienced at two different times, or (ii) such a state isrepeatable and capable of being introspectively experienced at two differenttimes. In the first case, if a momentary state, x, is earlier or later than amomentary state, y, then x is diverse from y. In the second case, amomentary state x's being F exists if and only if x has the property of beingF. Only in the latter case is it possible for a person to re-identify one of hisown momentary occurrent mental states. But it appears that in this lattercase each of us can re-identify such a mental state in a way analogous towhich I re-identify myself or an abstract entity in Case (4) or (5). Consider,for instance, the following state of affairs.

Case (6): At t1 I know that

the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared toredly.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, andI know that

the state I am introspectively experiencing at t2 is my being appeared toredly (call this statement g6).

At t2 I remember that

the state I was introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared toredly (call this statement r6).

Finally, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q6 & r6), and I attemptto deduce the following claim from (q6 & r6):

the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 2 is the state I wasintrospectively experiencing at t, (call this re-identification claim s6).

Notice that because (q6 & r6) trivially entails s6, in Case (6) I come to


know s6 by deducing it from (q6 & r6). If I perform this deduction by usingthe haecceity of my being appeared to redly to perform SD, then I amacquainted with this state. Is there an argument like R which shows that inCase (6) I do not perform this deduction in this way? There is such anargument only if in Case (6), if at t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence fors6, then I do not deduce s6 from (q6 & r6). But in Case (6), it seems thatwhen I deduce s6 from (q6 & r6) I am relying only on my introspecting thatI am being appeared to redly, my grasping the property of being identicalwith my being appeared to redly, and my remembering my grasping thisproperty, none of which involves any inductive methods. Thus as far as Ican tell, in Case (6) I deduce s6 from (q6 & r) even if I have inadequateinductive evidence for s6. For this reason, it appears that strategies similarto those used in defense of R cannot be employed to construct a soundparallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with one of hisown repeatable momentary occurrent mental states. On the other hand, ifa momentary occurrent mental state is nonrepeatable, then it also followsthat there is no argument resembling R which discredits the thesis that weare acquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states.Hence, it seems that there is no argument like R which defeats the primafacie plausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of ourown momentary occurrent mental states. In addition, it appears impossiblefor a mental state to be introspectively experienced by means of two modesof awareness at once. Consequently, it seems that there is no argumentresembling a synchronic analog of R which undermines the thesis that we areacquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states.Therefore, it appears that no argument of this kind defeats the prima facieplausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of our ownmomentary occurrent mental states.

The key cognitive and linguistic implications of my argument can now besummarized. First of all, it seems that if a person grasps the haecceities ofcertain entities, then he is acquainted with these entities. Of course, in mysense of acquaintance the converse is obviously true. Hence, it appears thatan individual grasps the haecceities of certain entities just provided that heis acquainted with those entities. Similarly, one of us can have direct de repropositional belief or knowledge about an item, x, if and only if he grasps

the haecceity of x. Likewise, one of us can use a proper name or indexicalindicator to express the haecceity of item, x, just in case he grasps thehaecceity of x. However, it seems that we can grasp our own haecceities,haecceities of some of our own mental states, and haecceities of certainabstract entities. Three consequences follow. Firstly, there is reason to thinkthat each of us is acquainted with items of these kinds. Secondly, it appearsthat we can have direct de re propositional belief or knowledge with respectto such items. Thirdly, it seems that each of us can use a proper name orindexical indicator to express haecceities of items of these sorts. Forexample, apparently, I can use `Rosenkrantz' or 'I' to express my haecceity;I can use 'this' to express the haecceity of some of my mental states; and Ican use 'Redness' to express the haecceity of Redness.

But it is impossible for anyone to grasp the haecceity of a physical objector person other than himself, or the haecceity of a surface of such a thing,or the haecceity of a temporal slice of a particular of any of these kinds.Three consequences ensue. First, no one can ever be acquainted with sucha particular. Second, no one can ever have direct de re propositional beliefor knowledge about a particular of this kind: our propositional de re beliefor knowledge about a particular of this sort is indirect. Third, no one canever use a proper name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity ofsuch a particular. 36 Thus, any version of the causal theory of reference or

36According to Roderick Chisholm's view in Person and Object, when I introspectivelyidentify myself as 'I', I grasp my haecceity or individual essence, viz., the property of beingidentical with me; but when I perceptually identify an external object as 'that thing' I do notgrasp the haecceity of that object. Alvin Plantinga criticized Chisholm's position in "DeEssentia," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 101-121. Plantinga rejects Chisholm'sargument for the claim that we do not grasp haecceities of external objects, and then seems toreject the claim itself. I cite some of Plantinga's critical remarks below. In interpreting thoseremarks, three things should be kept in mind. Firstly, Plantinga is attacking the foregoingChisholmian view. Secondly, Plantinga is using the term 'essence' as a synonym forChisholm's term `haecceity'. Finally, Plantinga is assuming (for the sake of argument) thatChisholm is right when he says a thing has just one haecceity or individual essence. Inreference to Chisholm's argument, Plantinga says the following. "These considerations,therefore, do nothing to show that the phrases 'that person' and 'that thing' don't typicallyexpress or intend essences. And isn't that the natural account to give of those phrases? SupposeI refer to Zwier as that person: surely he couldn't have existed but lacked the property of beingthat person, i.e., the property expressed on that occasion by 'that person'; and surely no, onedistinct from him could have been that person. So when I use the phrase to refer to Zwier, it

234 CHAPTER 5

the semantics of direct reference which implies that we can employ a propername or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of a particular of thistype is mistaken. 37

Three additional linguistic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there aresome haecceities which no one is capable of grasping or linguistically

expressing, for example, haecceities of nonsentient physical objects.Secondly, in some cases a haecceity can be grasped or expressed linguisti-cally by one and only one person, for instance, haecceities of certain personsand mental states. Finally, there are some haecceities which can be graspedor expressed linguistically by many people, for instance, haecceities ofabstracta such as Redness and Squareness. 38

We have seen that a person can be acquainted with (or can grasp thehaecceities of) certain nonexternal items and first-order qualitative properties,but that no one can be acquainted with (or can grasp the haecceities of)external things and their spatio-temporal slices. Surely, if any one of us cangrasp a haecceity, H, of a concretum or first-order qualitative property, thenhe can grasp a higher-order property, If, which is the haecceity of H, andno one can grasp If unless he can grasp H. For example, I can grasp thefirst-order property of Identity-with-me by thinking that something isidentical with me, if and only if I can grasp the second-order property ofIdentity-with-Identity-with-me by thinking that something is identical withIdentity-with-me. Likewise, I can grasp the second-order property ofIdentity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Redness,

expresses an essence; and when I use it to refer to someone else it expresses a different essence -just as the word 'I', when you use it expresses an essence, and a different essence from the oneit expresses when I use it." (p. 106) "Phrases like 'that person' do indeed express essences, sothat if I know such a proposition as that person is elegantly attired, I know a propositionentailing someone else's essence." (p. 107) From what Plantinga says in "De Essentia," heappears to be committed to the view that we grasp haecceities of physical objects and personsother than ourselves, and use indexical indicators to express those haecceities.

37For example, see M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity andIndividuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On PredicatingProper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498.

38Earlier versions of arguments supporting these conclusions can be found in my articles"Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107-119, and "Acquaintance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23.

ACQUAINTANCE 235

just provided that I can grasp the third-order property of Identity-with-Identity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Identity-with-Redness. Since a person can be acquainted with an item just in casehe can grasp that item's haecceity, it follows that a person can be acquaintedboth with haecceities of the indicated nonexternal items (including himselfand some of his own states of mind) and with haecceities of some first-orderproperties, but that no one can be acquainted with either haecceities ofphysical objects or persons other than himself or haecceities of spatio-temporal slices of such external things. Hence, any one of us can havedirect de re propositional belief (or knowledge) with, respect to haecceitiesof the nonexternal items and abstracta in question, but a person cannot havethis sort of belief or knowledge with respect to haecceities of the relevantexternal entities. Similarly, it follows that each one of us can use propernames or indexical indicators to express the haecceities of haecceities of theformer nonexternal items and abstracta, but a person cannot use names orindicators of this kind to express the haecceities of haecceities of the latterexternal entities.

236 CHAPTER 5

IX - OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELLIAN OBJECTS OFACQUAINTANCE: A RESPONSE

"Each man is at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite."[a 1901 F. W. H. Myers Human Personality I. p. xxvi (1903)]

It might be objected that an argument resembling a synchronic analog of Rrefutes the claim that a person is acquainted with himself. According to thisargument, a person can have a divided consciousness: a single person canhave two centers of consciousness at once, each with its own introspectiveexperiences. However, it is not obvious that there could be such a person.On the other hand, there are two sorts of cases in which a person, S, mighthave a divided consciousness: (i) S has a multiple personality disorder, and(ii) S's right and left brain hemispheres are no longer connected by thecorpus callosum. 39 I shall argue that S's having a divided consciousnessdoes not lead to an argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R andwhich militates against a person's being acquainted with himself.

To begin with, notice that a person's (S's) perceiving an object, x, by twomodes of perception at once can be used show that S's perceiving x does notacquaint S with x only if S compares his two perceptual experiences of x, ormore precisely, S knows a conjunctive proposition whose conjunctscorrespond to his two pieces of demonstrative perceptual knowledge aboutx. Likewise, there could be a plausible argument which resembles asynchronic analog of R and which implies that S is not acquainted withhimself only if possibly, at t S has two introspective experiences of himself,and at t S compares these two experiences, or more exactly, at t S knows aconjunctive proposition whose conjuncts correspond to the two pieces of

39It should be noted that in split brain cases only one side of the brain exhibits linguisticcompetence, suggesting (though not proving) that there is only one center of consciousness inthe person. Furthermore, the typical case of multiple personalities is one in which thepersonalities surface diachronically, suggesting that there is only one center of consciousness inthe person at a time. It would be bizarre to suppose that two such personalities manifestthemselves synchronically, e.g., one by speaking, and the other by writing. Nonetheless, sucha phenomenon is conceivable.

ACQUAINTANCE 237

introspective knowledge he has about himself at t. But suppose for the sakeof argument that at t S has two separate centers of consciousness, and at teach of these centers of consciousness has a separate introspective experienceof S. Since these introspective experiences belong to different centers ofconsciousness, at t S does not compare the two introspective experiences inquestion: at t S does not know a conjunctive proposition whose conjunctscorrespond to the two pieces of introspective knowledge under discussion.Consequently, such a case of divided consciousness does not generate anargument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which discredits theclaim that a person is acquainted with himself.

Likewise, if at t S has two centers of consciousness, and there is a mentalstate, M, or a property, P, such that each of these centers of consciousnesseither introspects M, or grasps P, or is aware of t as now, then at t S doesnot know the relevant conjunction of propositions about M, P, or t. Hence,a case of divided consciousness cannot be used to construct an argumentwhich resembles a synchronic analog of R and which militates against ourbeing acquainted with some of our own mental states, certain properties, ortimes.

Although I contend each of us can grasp his own haecceity, somephilosophers sincerely avow that when they reflect upon themselves it seemsto them they fail to find such a property." Yet others have the oppositeintuition. An eloquent evocation of this opposing intuition may be found inthe notebooks of the English poet Gerard Manley Hopkins.'" Hopkins wroteas follows: 42

40For example, see Jaegwon Kim, "Critical Notice: The First Person: An Essay onReference and Intentionality by Roderick Chisholm," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 46 (1986), pp. 488. Kim writes that "Chisholm is surely right about this: I have noidea what my own "me-ness" is like. There is no sense of 'conceive' that I can even faintlyunderstand in which I think I can conceive this me-ness."

41 Incidentally, Hopkins was an admirer of Duns Scotus, finding him "Of realty the rarest-veined unraveller; a not. Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece." See Hopkins's poem DunsScotus's Oxford (1879).

42 The Notebooks And Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Humphry House, ed. (London:Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 309-310.


When I consider my self being, my consciousness and my feeling of myself, that taste ofmyself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of aleor alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicableby any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it beto be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch,distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it,

except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this onlymultiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. Butto me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of myown being. The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of beingable to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it.

One may dwell on this further. We say that any two things however unlike are insomething like. This is the one exception: when I compare my self, my being-myself,with anything else whatever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff me with blankunlikeness; so that my knowledge of it, which is so intense, is from itself alone, they inno way help me to understand it. And even those things with which I in some sort identifymyself, as my country or family, and those things which I own and call mine, as my clothesand so on, all presupposes the stricter sense of self and me and mine and are from that

derivative.43

It would be fair to say that when Hopkins reflects upon himself it seems

°Compare the poet and the philosophers: Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, and H. D. Lewis."Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presentto no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded...and says 'I have beenwounded', he must use the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the senseof 'he who is speaking to you at this moment'..." Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: .A LogicalInquiry," Mind, 65 (1956), p. 398. "The word 'I' names a different person from case to case,and does so by way of an ever altering meaning. What its meaning is at the moment, can begleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it.If we read the word without knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless, but it is atleast estranged from its normal sense... In solitary speech the meaning of 'I' is essentiallyrealized in the immediate idea of one's own personality... Each man has his own I-presentation(and with it his individual notion of I), and that is why the word's meaning differs from personto person." Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970),pp. 315-316 (Investigation I, Section 26). "When I lose my memory I am no longer aware ofwho I am - in one sense, namely that I do not remember my name, where I live, what I havebeen doing in the past and so on. I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outsideobserver would place me on the basis of what is known about me. But I do all the samerecognize myself as the unique person I am. It is particulars of my past history and situationthat I cannot recover. In a more basic sense I have no doubt who I am - I am myself, the beingI expressly recognize myself to be in a way which is not possible for knowledge of any other."H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 235.

to him that he finds his haecceity! Nevertheless, to base the claim that wegrasp our own haecceities on intuitions like those of Hopkins invites adeadlock with those philosophers who have opposing intuitions. Since theseconflicting intuitions epistemically counter-balance one another, I set themboth aside.

In the following passage, Chisholm gives reasons for doubting that any ofus ever grasps his own haecceity.

It seems doubtful that I can ever be said...to grasp my individual essence or haecceity. If Iwere to grasp it, shouldn't I also be able to single out its various marks? I can single outsome of the marks of my individual essence - if I have one. Thus it may include variousuniversal essential properties (for example, being red or non-red, or being a musician ifa violinist). And perhaps I can single out certain non-universal essential properties (forexample, being an individual thing and beings person). But if I can grasp my individualessence, then I ought to be able to single out in it those features that are unique to it. Ifbeing identical with me is my individual essence and being identical with you is yours,then, presumably, each analyzes into personhood and something else as well - onesomething in my case and another in yours - but I haven't the faintest idea what this

something else might be as

I am puzzled by the argument in the preceding passage. On the one hand,if my haecceity is a simple unanalyzable property, then my haecceity is notanalyzable into personhood and something else. In that case, Chisholm'sassumption that if I have a haecceity, then it is analyzable into personhoodand something else is mistaken. On the other hand, if my haecceity isanalyzable into personhood and something else, then why should I beexpected to have an idea of what this something else might be? After all,I might reasonably believe that knowledge is analyzable as justified truebelief and something else, and yet have no idea of what this something elsemight be. Thus, Chisholm makes an unwarranted assumption: that if myhaecceity is analyzable into personhood and something else, then I have anidea of what this something else might be. Nor is it clear why we shouldaccept Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is analyzable, then it isanalyzable into personhood and something else. Let us grant that being a

"Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer PhilosophischeStudien, 7/8 (1979), p. 322.

person is logically necessary for being identical with me. Still, consider thefollowing parallel case. On the assumption that knowledge is analyzable asjustified true belief of a certain sort, the fact that grasping a proposition islogically necessary for knowing a proposition does not seem to imply thatpropositional knowledge is analyzable in terms of grasping a proposition andsomething else. Hence, Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is

analyzable, then it is analyzable into personhood and something else does notseem to be justified. If my haecceity is analyzable, then perhaps it can onlybe analyzed in some other way. For example, if my haecceity is analyzable,and if I am identical with a complex material object, then perhaps myhaecceity can be analyzed wholly in terms of the haecceities of my parts(given principles of mereological essentialism stated earlier which Chisholmwould accept') For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Chisholm'sdoubts about our grasping our own haecceities are unfounded.

45 See Chapter 4, section 1.

X - COGNITIVELY INACCESSIBLE HAECCEITIES

"The Unknowableness of Real Essences."

(1697 J. Sergeant Solid Philosophy Asserted

Against the Fancies of the Ideists 301)

My argument implies that any individual, S, whose awareness of a physicalobject or person other than himself depends upon his perceptual experiencescould not be intimately enough acquainted with such an object or person tograsp its haecceity. But, clearly, if S could not grasp the haecceity of aperceptual object of this kind, then S could not grasp an unexemplifiedhaecceity which individuates a NEP that (of course) he lacks perceptualacquaintance with. In other words, an individual who is able to grasp suchan unexemplified haecceity can be directly aware of a physical object orperson other than himself without his having a perceptual experience of thatphysical object or person. However; it appears that an awareness of thiskind is impossible. Thus, it is plausible that there couldn't be anyone whograsps a haecceity which individuates a NEP. Hence, it seems impossiblethat there be someone who grasps a haecceity which individuates a disjointobject.'

However, it is possible that a person picks out a property by descriptioneven though he is incapable of grasping that property.' Thus, it is still anopen question whether there could be someone who picks out an unexempli-fied haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. In what follows, I arguethat it is impossible for a person to pick out or make singular reference tosuch a haecceity.

To make this argument as strong as possible, I shall understand thedescriptive identification of an item in a most liberal fashion: S picks out anitem, x, by description just when S truly believes that something is F, where

46This is compatible with the fact that some unexemplified haecceities which individuatedisjoint objects are possibly grasped, e.g., an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a

disjoint person is possibly exemplified by a person who grasps that haecceity.

47See Chapter 1, section V.



the property of being F is an identifying property exemplified by x. Surely,if we are capable of picking out a property, P, which nobody is ever capableof grasping, then this entails that at some time someone is capable of pickingout P by description. Moreover, necessarily, someone is capable of pickingout P by description only if someone is capable of grasping an identifyingproperty which P exemplifies.

As we saw earlier, there couldn't be anyone who grasps a haecceity, H,which is never exemplified and which individuates a disjoint object. Thisimplies the impossibility of someone's grasping a nonqualitative relationalproperty which pertains to a disjoint object. Moreover, an earlier argumentimplies that a disjoint object, 0 1 , which could exemplify H is individuatedonly by such a relational property." Similarly, H is necessarily coinstanti-

ated with a property, P, only if P is a relational property of this kind. Afterall, H could only be instantiated by o 1 , and o f in a possible world, WI , has

a disjoint twin 02 in a possible world, W3, where o 2 in WI and 02 in W3 differfrom one another (apart frorti ° I 's and o2 's haecceities) only to the extentthat 02 and 02 are mereologically or causally related to different disjointobjects in WI and W3, respectively. The fact that His necessarily coinstanti-ated with a property, P, only if P is a nonqualitative relational propertywhich pertains to a disjoint object, together with the fact that it is impossiblefor anyone to grasp an unexemplified property such as H, implies that everyidentifying property exemplified by H is a relational property of theaforementioned sort. Because it is impossible for anyone to grasp a propertyof this sort, there couldn't be an identifying property had by an unexempli-fied haecceity like H which anyone is capable of grasping. Moreover,necessarily, someone is capable of picking out a property, P, by descriptiononly if someone is capable of grasping an identifying property which Pexemplifies. It follows that it is impossible for anyone to pick out anunexemplified property such as H by description. As it is also impossiblefor anyone to grasp an unexemplified property of this kind, we should


conclude that there couldn't be an individual who picks out such aproperty.' Likewise, singular reference to an unexemplified property likeH is impossible: there couldn't be a definite description, name, or indexicalindicator which refers to an unexemplified property of this sort.

In addition, if there is a haecceity, H, which could only be exemplified bya nonconscious physical object, then H could not be grasped by anythingwhich exemplifies H. Since it is impossible that a person grasps thehaecceity of a physical object other than himself, H could not be grasped byanyone who does not exemplify H. Thus, there couldn't be anybody whograsps H. It appears that there are such necessarily ungraspable haecceities.After all, it seems that possibly, some physical objects are nonconscious invirtue of certain natural laws. Stones and electrons might be examples ofsuch objects. It also appears that possibly, there are objects of this sortwhich are essentially subsumed under the natural laws in question. Thus, itseems that there could be essentially nonconscious physical objects. Sincethere are haecceities which could be exemplified by objects of this kind, itappears that certain haecceities could only be exemplified by nonconsciousphysical objects. Inasmuch as such a haecceity, H, could neither be graspedby an object which exemplifies H, nor be grasped by anything else, it seemsthat some haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. Perhaps some haecceitiesexemplified by physical objects are of this sort. In any case, it appears thatcertain unexemplified haecteities which individuate disjoint physical objectsare of this kind."

49This is compatible with the fact that a haecceity of this kind is possibly picked out by

someone. Such a haecceity, H, is never exemplified and individuates a disjoint object. Yet, His possibly such that H is exemplified and somebody picks out or makes singular reference toH by description, e.g., as the haecceity exemplified by the object I see on the left.

50Compare Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and ModalReductionism," Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics (1987), p. 190, and footnote 3, p.226. According to Plantinga, "Every proposition is such that it is possibly believed or possiblydisbelieved or both." As he notes in this connection, "According to the classical theist, everyproposition is in fact (and, indeed, necessarily) believed or disbelieved - by God, who is anecessary being and essentially omniscient." Plantinga makes clear that he is committed to theexistence of propositions involving nonqualitative haecceities. Such a proposition cannot begrasped without grasping a nonqualitative haecceity. However, given my understanding of whatit is to grasp a proposition, believing a proposition requires grasping that proposition. I

Ackermann, Felicia 31, 108Ackrill, J. L. 60Adams, Robert ix, 2, 80, 150, 151Allaire, Edwin 84Anscombe, G. E. M. 118Aquinas, St. Thomas 84Aristotle 60, 63, 84, 102, 131Armstrong, D. M. 25Arnauld, A. 42Audi, Robert xivBaron, Robert 1Box, E. Belfort 184Baxter, Richard 93Beaumont, Joseph 1Belsharn, William 196Bergmann, Gustav 84Bergson, Henri 184, 214Berkeley, George 72, 86, 198Billingsley, Sir Henry 179Black, Max 77, 78, 80, 90, 106, 122Boethius 30Boler, ;John 3Bolingbroke, Viscount Henry St John 225Bowen, Frank Charles 150Boscovich, Roger xiv, 20Brentano, Franz Clemens 84, 228Browne, Sir Thomas 168Bryskett, Lodovick 22Burkhardt, H. 55Burton, John Hill 53Butler, Bishop Joseph 191Campbell, Keith 5, 85Carr, Brian xi, 63Castafieda, Hector-Neri 31, 36

Channing, William E. 166Chisholm, Roderick M. ix, x, xiii, 11, 13,22, 30, 33, 36, 40, 41, 51, 70, 110, 126,127, 170, 183, 185, 187, 192, 225, 228,233, 237, 239, 240, 244Church, Alonzo 185Clubbe, John 77Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 140Copelston, Frederick 192Cudworth, Ralph 11Cusmariu, Arnold xiiiDavidson, Donald 57, 85, 120Descartes, Rene 38, 79Digby, Sir Kenelm 168Donnellan, Keith 30Duns Scotus, Johannes 1, 3, 43, 75, 87,

188, 191, 192, 237Edwards, Jonathan 146Faraday, James 20Frege, Gottlob 185, 238French, Peter A. x, 11, 164Goodman, Nelson 5Gracia, Jorge 75Guterman, Norbert 228Hacking, Ian 79, 80Hamilton, Sir William 22, 214Hampshire, Stuart 38Hempel, Carl G. 57, 85Hoffman, Joshua xiii, xiv, 59, 81, 104Hopkins, Gerard Manley 82, 237-239House, Humphry 237Hoy, Ronald 80Hume, David 79, 168Husserl, Edmund 238

244 CHAPTER 5

A summary of the implications of my argument for Realism about abstractentities is in order. Robust Realism is justified: my argument that particularshave haecceities implies that there are properties and that Propertyhood is afundamental ontological category.' Strong Extreme Realism is warranted:there seem to be unexemplified properties which cannot be identified withlogical complexes of exemplified properties, namely, haecceities which

individuate disjoint objects.' Finally, Radical Realism is justified: it isimpossible for anyone to grasp or pick out a haecceity which individuates adisjoint object, and some of these haecceities appear to be necessarilyungraspable. If I am right, then we are warranted in accepting a view whichis the very apotheosis and quintessence of Property-Realism.

conclude that Plantinga's views about these matters imply that every nonqualitative haecceityis graspable. Likewise, for the Chisholm of Person and Object, see pp. 117-120.

5t See Chapter 2.

52See Chapter 3.

INDEX OF NAMES

245

246 INDEX OF NAMES

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Huxley, Thomas H. 168Hyman, Arthur 3, 43, 75, 188Jowett, Benjamin 140Kames, Lord Henry Home 204Kaplan, David 33, 185Kant, Immanuel 20

Kelvin, Lord William Thomson 20Kim, Jaegwon xiv, 58, 68, 237Kvanvig, Jonathan 223Leckie, George G. 84Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 16, 42, 77, 82Leonardus, Camillus 130Lesniewski, S. 5Lewis, David 67Lewis, H. D. 238Locke, John 20, 86, 168, 171Lockwood, Michael ix, 36, 234Loux, Michael 77, 84, 87, 141Maddy, Penelope 67Mann, William 85Marsh, Robert C. 28, 184Maxwell, James Clerk 20Meiland, Jack 87Meinong, Alexius 84Mill, James 124Monboddo, James Burnett 69More, Henry 97Munitz, Milton ix, 36, 234Myers, Frederic W. H. 236Nozick, Robert 217-219Ockham 192Parmenides 150Parret, Herman x, 11Peirce, Charles Sanders 3, 72Plantinga, Alvin ix, 30, 31, 51, 126, 141,

147, 150, 233,'234, 243Plato 1Pollock, Jonathan 78, 164, 199

Price, H. H. 204Priestly, Joseph 1Primaudaye, Pierre De La 6Reid, Thomas 124, 140Rescher, Nicholas 57, 85Rosenkrantz, Gary xiv, 22, 39, 59, 71, 81,

85, 104, 142, 150, 183, 192, 220, 234Russell, Bertrand 27, 28, 34, 35, 40, 183-

185, 188, 189, 225Salmon, Nathan ixSelby-Bigge, L. A. 79

Sergeant, John 241Shakespeare, William 198Sidney, Sir Philip 106Simons, Peter 5Smith, Barry 55, 228Sosa, Ernest x, xiii, xiv, 11, 33, 49, 50, 68,

78, 110, 111, 227South, Robert 106Stout, G. F. 5, 86Stubbes, Philip ITachau, Katherine 192T. B. 6Tomberlin, James 141Thomson, Archbishop William 56Uehling, Theodore E. x, 11, 164'Van Inwagen, Peter 141Van Cleve, James xiiivan der Schaar, Maria 86Vier, Peter C. 192Walsh, James 3, 43, 75, 188Watts, Isaac 220Werenfels, Samuel 11Wettstein, Howard K. x, 11, 164Wierenga, Edward xiv, 220Williams, D. C. xi, 5Wittgenstein, Ludwig 118Zalta, Edward 114

Abstract entities x-xiii, 117, 228-230de re beliefs about 31-33, 233-235descriptive identification of 28-31grasping of 22-37individuation of 132-139qualitative and nonqualitative Ch. 1,

sect. IXAbstraction 22-24,-28,224Accidental properties 16, 17Acquaintance 28, 33-36, 40-41, 220-223,

Ch. 5and abstracta 22, 28, 33-35, 185, 228-

230, 233-235, 237and one's body 225, -228and one's mental states 33-35, 185, 230-

235, 237and oneself 34, 37, 40-41, 185, 188, 189,

225-227, 229, 233-240and physical objects and persons other

than oneself 35, 37, 40, 41, 185,188, 189-224, 228, 229, 233-235

and places 228and sense-data 184, 227, 230and souls 228and surfaces of external objects 212-213,

233-235and temporal slices of physical objects

and persons 233-235, 204-209, 211-213

and temporal slices of surfaces 213, 234,235

and times 227, 228, 230, 237Actual world 19, 161, 165Amenesia 36, 39, 197, 238

Analysis x, xi, 5, 43, 49-51, 73-76,110, 111, 113, 130, 239, 240

Anti-realism 4, Ch. 1, sect. VIIAtemporality 17, 57, 58, 132Atoms 5, 13, 14Attributes ix, 1-4, 9, 25, 26, 34, 36, 44, 50,

55, 116 see propertiesAttribution

direct 186indirect 34self- 36-41, 229

Baptism 191, 193Belief 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40 189, 208, 219

de dicta ix, 32-34, 41de re ix, 32-38, 40, 41, 186, 232, 233,

235direct de re 32-35, 186, 187, 232, 233,

235indirect de re 32, 34, 233

Bonding 169-171Boscovichian point-particles 20, 103, 142Boundaries 173, 176, 177, 180, 205Brute fact 74, 90, 91, 122, 135, 137, 138

Categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1, sect. VIII,108, 109, 117, 132, 133, 137, 138

Category mistake 108, 117, 118Causal products 19, 141, 142, 149, 155,

168, 182, 183Causal theory of reference 233, 234Cause and effect 57, 58, 85, 86, 91, 103,

104, 146, 147, Ch. 4, sect. II, 221,222

247

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 249248 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

agent cause 86efficient cause 86, 179formal cause 76

Change 56, 57, 66, 118, 132, 203Circular individuation 94-103, 122, 132-

136Collections xi, 5, 53, 60, 66, 109, 124,

125, 222Collectivism 5Colors xii, 46-51, 215, 228, 229Conceptual circularity 50, 67, 68, 83, 93,

94, 103, 121, 122, 125Conceptualism 4, 54, 55Concepts (ideas, mental constructs) 24, 53,

55, 70, 119, 129Concrete/abstract distinction x, xi, xii, 12,

55, Ch. 1, sect. VIII, 129, 135-139Concrete entities ix, x, xi, 93

individuation of Ch. 2Conjuncts 24, 34, 35, 37, 50, 69, 96, 111-

113, 122, 124, 141, 144, 147, 148,197, 201, 206, 209, 211, 214, 215,236, 237

Constituents 114-121, 118, 125, 126, 157Contingent propositions 17, 18Contingent existence 18, 21, 57, 62, 127,

128, 138, 150, 156Contradictories 48Contraries 48Corpus callosum 236

Deductive closure (of knowledge) 216-219Definite descriptions x, 21, 29-31, 158,

169, 173-183, 185-187, 243causal Ch. 4, sect. Imereological Ch. 4, sect. II

Descriptive identification 28-35, 40, 169,173, 177, 181--185, 241-243

Determinism 181Disjuncts 24, 50, 62, 69, 96, 101, 102,

111-113, 122, 124Diversity at a time (explanation of) x, xiii,

Ch. 2, 157

Diversity of the dissimilar 44Divine cognition Ch. 5, sect. VIIDynamism 20

Edges 173, 174Electrons 20, 221Elements 66, 67, 108, 125, 126, 128, 139,

157Elimination 53, 54, 61, 129Emergence 118Entities 59, 60, 64, 62, 139Epistemic principles 25-27, 188, 189Epistemology ixEssential properties 16, 17, Ch. 1, sects. VI

and VIEuclidean space 77, 79, 80Events xi, 5, 53, 57-60, 63, 66, 79, 81, 85,

103, 120Exemplification 1, 2, 12, 83, 91, 127, 134,

135, 138Explanation x, xii, xiii, 73, 75, 91, 123,

131, 133, 137Expression

linguistic expressions 2, 3, 8, 22, 28-31,35, 36, 53, 114, 115, 119-121, 158

a term's expressing a property ix, xi, 8,22, 28-31, 35, 36, 233-235

Externalism 25

Faces 173, 174Facts 58Familial triviality 94, 106-108, 121, 122,

125, 157First-person language ix, 36-41, 225, 235First science xiFoundationalism 189, 208Fundamental laws 131Fundamental particles 20, 79, 104, 142,

169-171, 175

Geometry 22Genus xii, 59, 62God 56-58, 62, 65, 77, 220-224, 243

Grasping ix, xi, x, 2, 22-32, 34-37, 44-49,56, 57, Ch. 1, sect. IX, 110-116,128, 129, 188, 189, Ch. 5passim

Haecceities ix, et passimas abstract entities 4, 91, 107, 109, 118,

119, Ch. 2, sect. VII, 103, 134, 139of abstract entities 6, 7,;13, 132, 134,

228, 230, 233-235and acquaintance Ch. 5defmition of xiii, 3, 20, 21versus individual essences Ch. 1, sect. VIand introspection Ch. 5, sects. VIII and

IX -and nonqualiative properties &

propositions Ch. 1, sect IIas a principle of individuation for

concreta Ch. 2and re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VIIand sense-perception Ch. 5, sects. II-VIIunexemplified haecceities andnonexistent

possible individuals Ch. 3, Ch. 4Haecceitism 185

naive 215platonic 151-153, 163, 165sophisticated perceptual 216

Holes 5, 60

Idealism 214, 222, 241Identification ix, 40, 41, Ch. 5, 213Identifying property 185Identity of Indiscernibles 77, 79, 80, 82Identity ix, 17, 44, 104, Ch. 2, sect. VI,

124-126Immutability 57, 166Impossibility 17, 18, 69Impressions 79, 80, 103Indeterminism 181Individual concept 185Individual essence Ch. I, sect. VIIndividuation ix, x

of abstract entities 137-139

of concrete entities Ch. II passimthe problem of 74-76causal criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97, 98,

101-104epistemic, criterion of 76formal criterion of 76haecceity criterion of 87, 90-92, 97, 98,

102-105locational criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97, 98,

100, 101, 103, 104material criterion of 83, 84, 90, 91, 97-99mereological criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97,

98, 101, 103, 104nonontological criterion of 89-91, 97,

103, 104qualitative criterion of 82, 83, 91, 142-

145relational criterion of 86, 87, 90, 91, 97,

103, 104substratum criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97-100tropal criterion of 86, 90, 91, 97, 98, 102

Individuals see concrete .entitiesInductive methods of re-identification 198-

200, 202, 203, 207, 208, 210, 226,229, 232

Innate ideas 24, 224Instantiability 59-64, 67Intellectual awareness 223Internalism 25, 27, 40, 41Interpenetrating physical objects 78, 79,

103, 104Intrinsic nature or, property 79, 104, 105,

112, 224Introspection 24, 25, 39, 222, 223, 231,

225, 226Intuitive induction 22

Knowledge 239, 240by acquaintance 28, 33-35, Ch. 5, 40by description 28, 28, 38, 40, 176, 177,

184de ditto 34de re 34, 35, 38-41, 186, 187, 232, 233

direct de re 34, 35, 186, 187, 232, 233,235

indirect de re 184, 219intellectual 223introspective 222, 223, 225-227, 231,

232, 236, 237perceptual 38, 39, 191-202, 206, 207,

209-211, 213, 215 -219, 221-223,225

memory 195-197, 201, 207, 214-215,225-229, 231, 232

self- ix, 38, 39-41, 59, 225

Leibniz's Law 77Length 70, 71Light 20, 131Limits 5, 60Logic xii, 1, 46

Mass 20, 78Mathematics xii, 46Mereology xiv, 5Mereological

assemblies 169-177, 179-182essentialism 170, 171, 175, 176, 180, 240inessentialism 183products 19, 21, 141, 149, 155, 168, 182,

183sums 5, 109, 114

Mereologically and causally disjoint objects19-21, 54, 141, 142, Ch. 3, sects. IIand III, 155, 159-161, 168, 241-243

Modalities ix, Ch. 1, sect. N, Ch. 3, sect.N, Chs. 3 and 4 passim

Modal Realism 141, 143-145, 148, 162Moderate empiricism 22, 24, 28Multiple personality disorder 236

Names ix, 2, 29, 30, 31, 36, 69, 157, 158,174, 185-187, 191, 200, 201, 206,209, 233-235, 243,

Necessityde dicto ix, 17, 18, 94, 166, 167

de re ix, 16, 17, 166, 167, 174Necessary

being 18, 62equivalence 3, 47, 52, 59, 62, 64, 74,

109-113existence x, 18, 21, 58, 128, 138, 149,

151, 154, 162, 165-167property 16, 17proposition 17, 18

Negation 24, 48, 50, 111, 112Negative definitions 65Nominalism xii, 4, 11, 12, 25, 43, 53-55,

64, 76, 90, 91, 137Nonexistent possible individuals (NEPs)

xiii, 19-21, Ch. 3, sects. I and II,Ch. 4, 168, 169, 173-183, 241-243

Nonqualitative properties x, Ch. 1, sects. II,HI, and IX

Nonqualitative propositions x,,Ch. 1, sects.II and IX

Numbers xi, 4, 5, 46, 120

Ockham's Razor 131Omniscience 129, 221-223, 243Ontology xi, xii, 61, 62, 130Ontological categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1,

sect. VIIIOpposites 48-50

Parmenidean argument 163Particulars see concrete entitiesParts 2, 5, 14, 19, 44, 50, 65-67, 70, 104,

109, 113, 118, 124-126, 146, 147,157, 158, Ch. 4, 170, 171, 179, 181,240

Photons 131Places xi, 5, 60, 63-65, 81, 228Plugging 114, 116-118Point-particles 20, 67, 142, 177Points 5, 56, 57, 66, 67Possibility 16-18, 21Possible proposition 18Possible worlds ix, 16-18, 21, 42, 70, 140-

144, 147, Ch. 3, Ch. 4Privations 5, 56, 60, 61Probability 173, 181Properties xi, 1-4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 8, 12, 22-

36, Ch. 1, sect. VII, 60, 62, 63, 66,67, 108, 117, 124, 126, 127, 133,139, 163, 164, 244, et passim

ego-centric xiiintrinsic 77-79nonqualitative Ch. 1, sect. II, 54qualitative x, Ch. 1, sect. II, 54, 77relational 8, 9, 78, 79, 87, 88, 104, 107,

114, 116-118, 242unexemplified x, xiii, 2, 16, 19-21, 25,

26, 42, 43, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67, 138,139, 143-149, Ch. 3, sect. III, Ch. 4,169, 173, 175-178, 213, 223, 241-244

world-indexed 147Propositions xi, 4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 11-14,

16, 22, 32, 60, 63, 66, Ch. 1, sect.IX, 88, 132, 133, 139, 220, 230

Qualitativeproperties x, 46, 77, Ch. 1, sects. H, ILL

and IXrelations x, 8-10propositions Ch. 1, sects. II and IX

Qualitatively indistinguishableindividuals x, 20, Ch. 2, sect. II, 104

Quantification 2, 3, 119-121, 143Quantum mechanics 103, 104

Radical empiricism 24Rationalism 24Realism 214Realism (Property-Realism) xii, xiii, 12,

24, 26, 32;64, 72, 74, 76, 91, 130,131

anemic 53bifurcated 151-154, 156, 157, 159-163,

168moderate (or aristotelian) 4, 25, 26, 54,

57, 137, 152-154, 156, 162-16168, 169

nonqualitative 11, 12, 15platonic or extreme x, xi, xiii, 4, 25:32,

54, 55, 137, 149, 151, 152, 154,156, 162, 244

qualitative 11-15, 33, 43robust 53, 54, 139, 149, 244strong 32strong extreme 54, 55, 149, 168, 169,

244weak extreme 54

Reductive identification 53, 61, 62, 129,139

Reference x, 29-31, 38, 114-116, 157-159,168, 169, 173, 175-183, 241, 243

Relations xi, 4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 22, 32, 53,60, 63, 86, 89, 91, 97, 105, 107-110,114-119, 121, 122, 133, 139, 163,164

Re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VIIRiemannian space 78, 80Rigid designators 174

Self-ascription see self-attributionSelf-evidence 215Semantics of direct reference 233-234Sense 114, 115Sense-data 184, 189, 225, 227, 230Sense-perception 36-40, 189-225, 236, 241Sets 4, 5, 53, 57, 56, 60-62, 66, 108, 114,

125, 126, 128, 139, 222Shadows 60Similarity 23, 73-75, 198, 199, 202, 203,

205, 212, 224Souls (spirits) 5, 19, 56, 60, 65, 67, 79, 80,

81, 86, 103, 142, 222, 228Spatial discontinuity 104Spatio-temporal continuity 104Species xii, 4, 5, 47, 59, 62, 70, 75States 9, 33, 34, 146, 220-222, 225, 230-

235Substances xi, 5, 19, 20, 56-58, 60, 62,65,

INDEX OF SUBJECTS250 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

81, 84, 86 173Subsumption 59, 61, 62Sufficient Reason (Principle of) 77Sums 5, 67, 114, 124, 171-173, 176Supervenience 105Surfaces 5, 56, 60, 62, 118, 120, 173, 212,

213, 233-235

Temporal slices 104, 204-209, 211-213,227, 233-235

Thatness see haecceityThisness see haecceityTimes 4, 5, 20, 60, 63-65, 227, 228, 230,

237

Translation xiiTransparency 79Tropes 5, 53, 56, 60, 61, 66, 79, 81, 85,

97, 127Truth 9

de dicto 9, 10de re 9, 10

Universal essential properties 43-46, 239Universals xii, 4, 5, 22, 33, 55, 56, 73

Vagueness 177

252 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES

Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor:

KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona

Board of Consulting Editors:

Jonathan Bennett, Allan Gibbard, Robert Stalnaker, and Robert G. Turnbull

1. JAY F. ROSENBERG, Linguistic Representation, 1974./ WILFRID SELLARS, Essays in Philosophy and Its History, 1974.3. DICKINSON S. MILLER, Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare. Selected

Essays and Chapters from Six Decades. Edited with an Introduction by Lloyd D.Easton, 1975.

4. KEITH LEHRER (ed.), Analysis and. Metaphysics. Essays in Honor of R. M.Chisholm. 1975.

5. CARL GINET, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 1975.6. PETER H. HARE and EDWARD H. MADDEN, Causing, Perceiving and

Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse, 1975.7. HECTOR-NERI CASTAREDA, Thinking and Doing. The Philosophical

Foundations of Institutions, 1975.8. JOHN L. POLLOCK, Subjunctive Reasoning, 1976.9. BRUCE AUNE, Reason and Action, 1977.

10. GEORGE SCHLESINGER, Religion and Scientific Method, 1977.11. YIRMIAHU YOVEL (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Papers presented

at the first Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974, 1978.12. JOSEPH C. PITT, The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions,

1978.13. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN and JAEGWON KIM, Values and Morals. Essays in

Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, 1978.14. MICHAEL,J. LOUX, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, 1978.15. ERNEST SOSA (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher: Discussion and

Replies, 1979.16. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. .Essays in the

Philosophy of Law, 1979.17. GEORGE S. PAPPAS, Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemol-

ogy, 1979.18. JAMES W. CORNMAN, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, 1980.19. PETER VAN INWAGEN, Time and Cause. Essays presented to Richard Taylor,

1980.20. DONALD NUTE, Topics in Conditional Logic, 1980.

rosenkrantz haecceity an ontological essay

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