Royal Aeronautical Society T: +44 (0)20 7670 4300

No.4 Hamilton Place F: +44 (0)20 7670 4309 London W1J 7BQ E: raes@aerosociety.com United Kingdom www.aerosociety.com

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Drones Regulation and Policy Lead Drones Consultation IASE 1/26, Aviation Directorate Department for Transport Great Minster House 33 Horseferry Road London SW1P 4DR 15 March 2017 Dear Sir or Madam Royal Aeronautical Society response to Unlocking the UK's High Tech Economy: Consultation on the Safe Use of Drones in the UK Please find enclosed a response to Unlocking the UK’s High Tech Economy: Consultation on the Safe Use of Drones in the UK from the Royal Aeronautical Society. The production of this consultation response was led by the Society’s Unmanned Aerial System Specialist Group. The Society would be delighted to elaborate on any areas of our response upon request. About the Royal Aeronautical Society The Royal Aeronautical Society (the Society) is the world's only professional body dedicated to the

entire aerospace community. Established in 1866 to further the art, science and engineering of

aeronautics, the Society has been at the forefront of developments in aerospace ever since. The

Society seeks to: i) promote the highest possible standards in aerospace disciplines; ii) provide

specialist information and act as a central forum for the exchange of ideas; and iii) play a leading role

in influencing opinion on aerospace matters.

The Royal Aeronautical Society Unmanned Aerial Systems Specialist Group focuses on all aspects

of unmanned aviation across industry, academic and government. Visit www.aerosociety.com/UAS

for more information.

Yours sincerely Simon Whalley Head of External Affairs

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Department for Transport

Unlocking the UK's High Tech Economy: Consultation on the Safe Use of Drones in the UK

Response by the Royal Aeronautical Society

General Comments Regarding the Consultation Approach

This consultation process is a positive and encouraging step being taken by the Department for

Transport (DfT), but as we look ahead to a future drone enterprise it is important to understand the

role of Government within this enterprise; we would want to see the Government becoming better

informed on how to both support and regulate the drone industry. That said, drones do not really

form an industry of their own. They are a piece of technology that enables several vertical industries

(not aviation specific) to implement new services which:

a. save money;

b. increase safety;

c. remove need for human intervention in “Dull and Dangerous” environments;

d. increase quality of data collected in space and time; and

e. facilitate new opportunities for data collection that were not previously technically and/or

financially feasible

This increases the difficulty of identifying the benefit of supporting the adoption of the technology, but

is fundamental in understanding how this technology will integrate into business and society as a

whole.

Generally, the consultation was well received by the members of the Royal Aeronautical Society

Unmanned Air System Specialist Group (UASSG). It covers a wide range of challenging topics and

makes some useful and pragmatic proposals; however, there are several significant topics that have

been not afforded the necessary discussion and without consideration of which many of the

challenges currently facing the industry will remain unaddressed. The following paragraphs highlight

a number of critical areas where deeper discussion would be beneficial:

Autonomy

The Consultation does not address autonomous operation at all, despite most drones of weight

exceeding 2 or 3kg effectively capable of operating autonomously (as per the International Civil

Aviation Organisation (ICAO) definition of without human intervention) or at least in a fully automatic

mode. In fact, any drone that can automatically comply with geo-fencing constraints (while in the air

rather than as a take-off restriction) can be set to fly a pre-programmed route without human

intervention. This has significant security implications, which are as follows:

a. Some limitations in the use of autonomous drones as well as a technical requirement that if

there is no human intervention (which could be as simple as an ‘I-am-awake’ button) the

device lands or returns to base via a safe route;

b. A similar requirement should be specified for lost C2 link events; and

c. In general, autonomous operation should be prohibited until the technology is sufficiently

mature. A parallel can be seen with road vehicles where autonomous operation is emerging

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slowly, starting in highly constrained environments (e.g. on a defined track or in a convoy)

before general usage occurs.

Airworthiness and Certification

There is no real discussion about the airworthiness and certification of drones and, in the absence of

design or manufacturing organisation approval, which is not required for small drones, this should

look to tackle issues such as manufacturing standards, continuing airworthiness and condition-based

maintenance.

Legal Guidance

The consultation concentrates upon the publication and awareness of Safety Legislation, through the

Dronecode and other vehicles. What should be equally important is the publication and awareness

of the legislation surrounding data protection, privacy, trespass and security. There is only passing

reference in the consultation to the implications from a privacy perspective, which was a major

discussion point in the ‘Public dialogue on drone use in the UK’ exercise. In general, we advocate

privacy-specific considerations continuing to operate through the Information Commissioner's Office

rather than being a particular focus of aeronautical regulation.

Privacy

There is mention throughout the consultation of privacy, but it does not appear to address many

important issues, which are as follows.

a. One of the proposals from the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) is for manufacturers

to consider ‘privacy by design’, by which features such as face and number plate ‘masking’

are available as automatic functions; this does not seem to have been considered;

b. Given the large number of scientists and hobbyist users who are equipping their own drones

with standard cameras, it is unreasonable to expect this kind of ‘privacy by design’ feature

to be integrated in such systems by manufacturers unless it applied to all consumer grade

cameras. This would then require individual users to apply such practices on a case-by-

case basis, and would fall into individual operators’ hands rather than to drone

manufacturers;

c. A summary of legislative requirements as they pertain to drone operators, as well as other

privacy guidance, should be made available to the public – what mechanism could be best

used: leaflets, websites, apps?

d. The section on privacy should explicitly refer to and acknowledge the countervailing right to

public interest information, the collection of which might be facilitated by the use of drones.

e. It should also be emphasised that privacy is never an absolute right, is inherently vague and

it is always contestable by another competing right.

Spectrum

Drones typically have two requirements for communications bandwidth: i) a requirement for flight

control communications, normally abbreviated to C2 Link (command and control link), and ii) a

requirement for payload communications so that the payload on the drone can communicate to

remote clients during the mission. The C2 Link is regarded as a safety critical link but it is unlikely

that the payload requirements would be regarded as safety critical. Therefore, attention is required

for safety critical C2 Link requirements. Payload communications are normally a commercial

consideration:

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a. In current manned aviation, safety critical communications use 'protected bandwidth' which

is reserved for such use and which is maintained to ensure availability for safety critical

users. At present, many drones, especially at the small or light end of the sector, use

bandwidth used by the model aircraft community (and other users) typically at 35MHz,

2.4GHz and in the 5GHz band. These are not protected bandwidth. While 35MHz

propagates relatively well, the number of channels is limited. Many more channels are

available at 2.4GHz and in the 5GHz band but with the currently permitted transmission

power levels the effective communication ranges are limited, particularly in humid

atmospheric conditions;

b. 35Mhz, 2.4GHz and the 5GHz band are unlikely to be suitable for beyond visual line of

sight (BVLOS) operations without other measures, such as rebroadcast. Safety critical C2

Links ought to use protected bandwidth. Therefore, for all safety critical C2 Link

communications, drones should be using protected spectrum for both visual line of sight

(VLOS) and BVLOS operations. Protected bandwidth for aviation purposes is limited and

appears unlikely to be available for the growing plethora of small drones. Studies are

underway of the re-use of protected frequencies based on regional separation so some

management mitigation is possible; and

c. An expert view is required on which drones require the allocation of limited safety critical

protected bandwidth for their C2 Links, and a policy on this issue needs to be promulgated.

Scalability

Throughout the consultation there is a tendency to presume that ‘one-size-fits-all’ but, in many cases,

the solutions will need to be scalable to take account of the wide range of variables:

a. The complexity of rules required should be dependent upon the category of drone and the

nature/location of drone operations;

b. The nature and size of the test sites will be dependent upon their use;

c. Licensing and Permissions of Aerial Work (PFAW) should be tailored to be flexible; and

d. Medical requirements.

Enabling Infrastructure

The DfT Pathfinder Projects may well deliver what the specific commercial Pathfinder company

requires but will fail to deliver long-term sustained growth without tackling some of the key enabling

infrastructure challenges and many of the key issues that are raised in this consultation.

a. The paper talks to the laying of foundations; it would be worth quantifying at least the areas

in which these foundations and enabling infrastructure lie. This infrastructure of systems

and processes should be scalable and put in place early to support growth of the UAS

enterprise. Without Government direction or resolution to which it will be difficult if not

impossible for the drone enterprise to move forward;

b. Moreover, for this to happen, and noting the risk of commercial sensitivities there should

be a mechanism for institutional learning such that the wider drone industry can benefit

from the specific Government support that is afforded to the Pathfinders;

c. From a UK PLC perspective, extracting valuable information products, both spatial and

volumetric (e.g. remote sensing data, atmospheric monitoring data) from raw data collected

by drones is likely to be a far more important growth area than the supply or operation of

drones themselves. Government support for the development of appropriate analysis

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software, including Standards and Patent protection, should be considered for drone

operations where new products can arise from drone data exclusively (by virtue of scale,

resolution and agility);

d. Who will own/control the communication infrastructure, will this be the same entity that

provides the unmanned aircraft systems (drones) traffic management (UTM) service? For

BVLOS, especially at low level, only satellite communication solutions are currently viable

for long-range operations; these are essentially available, for a fee, without restriction.

Security

The consultation’s discussion on Security & Criminal Use of drones appears to focus on a very narrow

element of security. The discussion should also consider:

a. The security of command and control links to either prevent the hijack of drone operations

or steal the data being collected;

b. Whether the Government should be considering regulations, technologies and standards

to protect the security of command and control (C2) of drones and the security of data

being transmitted from the drone;

c. The risks to drone operations caused by emerging technologies, such as GPS signal

jamming, and how ground-operations by individuals with GPS signal jammers (which may

or may not be related to drones at all) could affect proximal airborne operations. The ability

of these non-drone related GPS jammers (e.g. jamming of vehicle trackers) could have a

range of impacts on responsible drone operations. Therefore, it is not just the C2

bandwidths that need legislating, the ability to legislate for GPS signal jamming at localised

scales and the need for technology that can detect the proximal use of a signal jammer,

also need to be considered; and

d. The risk of jamming or spoofing of satellite navigation information used in some drones.

We recommend building on UK Government and industry’s lead position in Europe’s

development of jam-and-spoof-resistant satellite navigation technology and systems.

Proposal A – Evaluating the UK’s drone testing site provision and processes

It is believed that specific testing sites will only be of use to a few top-end aviation specialists, mostly

orientated towards developing platforms for the military, who are developing new fixed wing

(specifically) aircraft which are designed to fly Extended and or Beyond VLOS. Companies developing

Vertical Take-off and Land (VTOL) aircraft can most likely find an empty field (sterile environment)

that conforms to the regulations, and test their system within VLOS that is within a convenient

distance to their headquarters. Convenience is key in this case, because small drones can be quickly

modified and updated, so regular testing intervals are necessary, and it far easier for M-SMEs to have

a local testing site to save on transport, subsistence and accommodation overheads.

Most new application and service development and testing is currently done in public parks, farmers’

fields and other people’s gardens based around some solid local relationships and agreements. There

is also network of flying sites for the British Model Flying Committee (BMFC), which could be used

and these have well-established flying areas, rules of operation and based upon solid long-standing

arrangements. There is an opportunity for a national network of ‘safe drone zones’ that could take

into account seasonal restrictions, such as bird migrations.

Q1. Is the UK’s current testing site provision for drones adequate? Why?

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The aim is to have drone testing sites in convenient locations (for developers, manufacturers and

operators) around the UK which are suitably equipped to handle all sizes and classes of drones (or

possibly all drones requiring registration) and types of operation. It appears unlikely that this is the

case at present.

Q2. Which of the above Proposal A, Options 1-4 is your preferred option and why? It is a mix between 1 and 3 and should be driven by demand. Option 1 could support small VLOS

testing but Option 3 (and only when it can be proven that West Wales is not suitable) could be

considered for large drones and BVLOS testing.

Q3. What other options could you suggest?

No comment.

Proposal B: Pilot competency, training and licensing

It is assumed that a licensing framework would be developed that would establish different level of

training and competence, and hence licence, depending on the category of drone and the

nature/location of the drone operation. One approach could be to align with ICAO, which is currently

developing a single drone pilot licence with specific endorsements for different capabilities, but this

would fail to capture full range of scale required. Clear articulation in a matrix would be beneficial

and useful.

Similarly, the medical requirements for a recreational pilot licence (RPL) should be scalable

depending on the nature of the drone operation and the risk to life posed. This could effectively

reduce the medical requirements set out by ICAO, and could range from self-declaration to full and

current medical performed by a general practitioner (GP).

Q4. Are new competency standards and qualifications required? Why?

There is a currently a lack of clarity and, while it may be manageable in the current climate, future

growth must be underpinned by a robust framework of new standards and qualifications. These are

required because:

The competency standard of operators that are entering the commercial industry is too low

for the majority of commercial operations;

Existing qualifications emphasise the wrong areas of knowledge and skill, and fail to instill

the appropriate philosophy in non-aviators (most drone pilots entering the sector do not stem

from an aviation background);

While much can be gained from the experience of the manned aviation-licensing regime, the

licensing requirements for drones have to be developed to cater for the very different crew

requirements and to allow for the very disparate system type and operational environments;

At the moment regulators from third parties who require evidence of company and pilot

competency expect to see the term ‘licence’, whereas there is considerable value in the

terms of a ‘qualification’ and ‘permission’. Utilising this terminology would benefit the

operators by the increased public perception and awareness of what a licence represents;

and

The standard PFAW process for commercial piloting that many scientists undertake to fulfil

insurance requirements for their institutions requires a more nuanced approach with more

specific training. The current training for PFAW lacks operational guidance for surveying in

the kinds of settings where most scientists are working.

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Q5. What should the new standards and qualifications be?

There are several initiatives within regulator organisations (both national and supra-national) and

standards bodies addressing the needs for licensing and qualification of not only drone pilots but also

other members of the 'flight crew'. Much can be learned from examining these other programmes of

work. As with other aspects of drones, 'one size' does not fit all and is not appropriate. Licences and

qualifications (and the associated training courses), while trying to use as similar language as

possible for analogous features in the traditional manned aviation regime, should be tailored to meet

the safety and operational needs in the most economically efficient manner. This does not appear to

be the case at present.

Q6. How should the new standards and qualifications be taught and tested?

No comment.

Proposal C: Insurance

A detailed consideration of UAS Insurance is provided at Annex A. Q7. Do you support Proposal C, Option 1: Working with industry to develop best practice, Proposal C, Option 2: The creation of an enabling primary power to set UK drone insurance requirements, or neither? Why? We favour Option 1, i.e. to continue to work with industry and operators to encourage best practice;

first, to ensure that operators fly in a safe manner and in a suitable location and second, that they do

take out insurance. This approach entails encouragement of domestic and residential insurers to

develop and promote affordable supplementary cover for leisure use, and to promote the

responsibility upon commercial operators to take out insurance. This principle should underlie the

approach to both commercial and leisure users, recognising that routes to achieve success for both

populations may be different.

As for Option 2, we see no legal impediment to the UK establishing a statutory power to set drone

insurance requirements, but note the apparent anomaly if drones were obliged to have higher levels

of insurance than conventional aircraft. This may also cause confusion among operators from other

countries if, as may be hoped, drone operations develop to enable an operator from one country to

operate in another.

Annex A expands on the reasoning behind our conclusions (in responses to both Questions 7 and

8), and sets out additional factors, which we think the Government should bear in mind when

formulating policy in relation to drones insurance. Insurance is often thought to be a universal solution

to certain hazards. A number of limitations on its role should be taken into account.

Q8. In which of the areas A-E would you be supportive of action being taken? Why do you

support action in the areas you have picked and not in others?

A. The levels of public liability insurance required; such as raising the minimum amount of

public liability cover required by commercial drone operators.

Minimum insurance levels for surface damage under EU Regulation 785/2004 are generally regarded

as low, and, we understand that as a result, commercial operators frequently take out higher levels

of cover. However, we note as follows:

The Commission reviewed the requirements under EU Regulation 785/2004 in 2010 and

only made modest changes to the mandatory limits (in relation to liability for baggage and

cargo);

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We do not see a principled reason for imposing different liability insurance limits for

unmanned aircraft than for manned aircraft. The hazard, in the extent of loss which may be

suffered by a third party, should be the same for an aerial vehicle of a given weight, kinetic

energy or configuration.

The original passenger liability limits in Regulation 785/2004 were also low and have been

replaced by an obligation to hold such insurance as "is adequate to ensure that all persons

to compensation receive the full amount to which they are entitled" (under the E air carrier’s

liability regime). In any event, a third-party liability limit of SDR750,000 (c.£833,000 at

current rates) does, to us, seem low for a vehicle of 500kg. If well-placed, however, this

argument is a reason for raising aircraft insurance requirements generally.

The absence of mandatory insurance for leisure aircraft below 20kg has often been called

into question and a 20kg platform can certainly cause considerable damage. As a matter of

practice, the model aircraft community in the UK has long had insurance for its membership

well in excess of that minimum limit – even though insurance is not mandatory under the EU

regulation.

Mindful, however, that Regulation 785/2004 requires mandatory insurance to include a level

of war and terrorism risk cover, we ask whether it would be realistic to expect a domestic

insurance policy for leisure users to cover the terrorist risk (for example, the drone is stolen

and a third party who subsequently suffers loss seeks to establish liability on the part of the

owner).

In any event, we do not envisage that it is realistic to expect leisure or light commercial users

ever to be able to carry sufficient insurance for the largest catastrophe risk. i.e. a major

accident to a large commercial passenger aircraft.

B. Completeness of Insurance Policies: the House of Lords1 report also identified that the

quality of certain insurance products was in doubt. Anecdotal evidence suggests that

user-error may not be covered under traditional policies leaving scope for the insurance

to be rendered useless.

The House of Lords report2 seemed to rely on anecdotal evidence as to the adequacy or otherwise

of certain insurance products. It is difficult to comment in detail since none of our members have

experience of any instances of terms proving inappropriate. We do note, however, the following points

which are material:

It is rare for a traditional aviation liability policy to exclude cover on the basis of user error.

Most policies exist precisely because the risk of error exposes an operator, manufacturer or

service provider to financial liability. Many policies have to respond to presumed or strict

liability and are, therefore, not predicated on fault-based liability;

It is also rare for a traditional aviation liability policy to contain a breach of warranty exclusion.

In the context of mandatory motor insurance, such exclusions are ineffective: the insurer

cannot deny liability cover in the event of a breach of warranty in the insurance policy (such

as the owner's obligation to maintain the vehicle and to drive in accordance with the law).

This is a crucial protection for a third party who may suffer injury, particularly if an accident

1 House of Lords European Union Committee (2015) Civilian Use of Drones in the EU: 7th Report of Session 2014-15. London, Authority of the House of Lords. 2 Ibid.

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occurs while a driver is speeding or driving a defectively maintained vehicle. This is

embedded in the mandatory motor insurance regime; and

Even though there is no comparable prohibition (on an exclusion of cover in the event of

breach of warranty or non-compliance with the law) in relation to an aviation liability

insurance policy (and there is no requirement of this nature in EU Regulation 785/20043) we

are not aware of an instance in which an aviation insurer has denied liability cover on these

grounds. However, the Government may wish to consider whether this is an attitude which

may change in relation to leisure drone operators.

C. Tailoring insurance requirements to reflect the risk profiles for different commercial uses,

which may be considerably different for each segment of the market.

We consider that tailoring insurance requirements to types of operation is likely to be complex. The

important point in defining insurance requirements is that limits of cover be set by reference to the

hazard (i.e. the maximum liability realistically likely to occur), while leaving the market to set premium

rates by reference to the likelihood of such a hazard coming to pass.

We can nevertheless see a logic that operators in congested areas may require higher levels of cover

(for the same type of vehicle) than those operating in rural areas or ones where there is no third-party

personal injury hazard. A well-advised business should take out cover by reference to the maximum

surface damage that might be occasioned, recognising that this is likely to be higher in an urban area.

A business should not expose itself to the risk of third-party loss (for which there may often be strict

liability) that exceeds available insurance cover.

Much of the risk related to current operations is usually a matter between the drones service provider

and their customer (e.g. the risk that when conducting infrastructure inspection, a drone failure will

cause damage to the customer's infrastructure) rather than a significant third party risk. Care needs

to be exercised to avoid over-regulating in this respect, since a sensible risk allocation (including

insurance therefore) should be a matter for the parties.

D. The relationship between risk and Maximum Take-Off Mass (MTOM): this may mean that insurance requirements could be put in place which reduce unnecessary burden on smaller / lower risk drone users.

We are not in a position to comment on the extent to which MTOM is the sole factor relevant to third-

party risk; however, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Prototype Regulation for

Unmanned Aircraft Operations4 considers other factors such as kinetic energy and the extent to which

a drone could cause injury by reference to the ‘Abbreviated Injury Scale’ (used in the automotive

sector). Such factors could also be used, although care needs to be taken not to overcomplicate

regulation of small drones.

Given that the lowest band under EU Regulation 785/2004 is a broad range (0 to 500kg), the third-

party hazard will vary very considerably within that range. It is to be expected that the cost of the

minimum level of cover (SDR750,000) for an operator of a very small drone (say 1kg) should not be

excessive, since the premium should reflect the lower risk of any injury being sustained.

E. How to use insurance requirements to encourage self-regulation of the drones market, particularly by leisure users. This could include mandating all owners of drones of a certain weight to have insurance. Insurance companies could then set safety requirements to mitigate their risk assessments.

3 Regulation (EC) No. 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance requirements

for air carriers and aircraft operators. 4 European Aviation Safety Agency (2016) ‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations. Cologne, EASA.

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Insurers undoubtedly play a role in enforcement of good operational practice and become a means

of promotion of good practice in a number of sectors. Poor operating practices which result in losses,

which tend to have a direct effect on future premia. There is anecdotal evidence that in some markets,

insurers are playing a significant role for drones; however, this should be seen as a complement to,

and not a substitute for, appropriate and effective regulation, including insurance requirements.

Proposal D – Improving leisure drone user awareness of the law Q9. Other than those already described here, what other options could the Government consider to improve leisure drone user awareness of the law? No comment. Q10. Would you support a requirement to issue guidance on flying your drone safely and legally by manufacturers, sellers, or both? Why? No comment. Q11. Have you read any official drone guidance (such as the CAA’s Dronecode, the Information Commissioner’s guidance or any other official guidance on drones)? No comment. Q12. What guidance have you read? No comment. Q13. How can the content and formats of official guidance on drones be improved? Guidance to operators and users should cover not only aviation safety but also:

other relevant health and safety aspects;

privacy;

trespass;

data protection requirements;

personal, physical, information; and

communications security.

Q14: Do you support the creation of official guidance specifically aimed at helping parents

and adults responsible for supervising children fly drones safely? Why?

The aim of the guidance is to get the basic messages across to all drone users. Therefore, if the user

is under a specific age (e.g. 16) it is the responsibility of the parent/guardian to ensure they are aware

of the guidance. This could feed into a licensing framework which identifies training and licence

requirements for different types of drone and drone operations – child leisure use would be at the

bottom end of the scale, but it would still be required.

Q15. Do you support the creation of a labelling system on drone packaging stating the age

suitability? Why?

Yes, a labelling system on packaging would be useful as a guide, as it is with any toy or book, but

clearly it cannot be enforceable.

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Q16. Would you support for leisure users the introduction of a knowledge test, situational

awareness or both? Why?

Yes, both, but it would need to be proportional, tied in with the licensing framework, and exclude

those drones below the minimum threshold. Yes, a labelling system on packaging would be useful as

a guide, as it is with any toy or book, but clearly it cannot be enforceable.

Q17. Are you supportive of the changes to the Air Navigation Order (ANO) 2016 small drone

flying rules to make them simpler? Why?

It is highly desirable that rules for small drones are readily understandable by both leisure users and

commercial operators. It should be remembered that many individuals operating drones do not

necessarily have an aviation background. More complicated rules do not necessarily enhance safety.

For the following reasons the ANO 2016 rules should be simplified. We suggest that the 7kg limit is

irrelevant and that the rules regarding proximity to aerodromes and operation in controlled airspace

should apply to all drones, even those below the minimum weight threshold.

In that context, the small drones regime in Articles 94 and 95 ANO 2016 may seem counter-intuitive:

while reflecting the assessment that drones under 7kg do not pose the same threat as larger platforms

when in close proximity to other aircraft, it rather suggests that the smallest – which are more likely

to be used by unlicensed leisure users, who have not been through a permission process with the

CAA – can fly freely in controlled airspace or above 400ft, for example. Other rules continue to apply

for small drones under 7kg, such as maintaining unaided visual contact and ensuring that the flight

can safely be made, even if the specific limitations for larger drones do not apply – and there must

be difficulty in meeting these when a small drone is over 400ft agl. These combine, in our view, to

cause confusion among leisure operators.

Given that almost the entirety of the ANO is disapplied whilst operating within the small drone regime,

we do not see any significant limitation on development of visual line of sight operations whilst

maintaining a rule of a maximum of 400ft above ground level, whether below or above 7kg.

We do not agree with a rule predicated on operations up to 150ft above ground level within an ATZ

but outside the boundary of a licensed aerodrome. Many small airfields have a runway threshold

close to the boundary with aircraft crossing the threshold at 50ft. Despite the existence of the reckless

endangerment rule or the requirement to be satisfied that the flight can be operated safely, this would

be interpreted in some quarters as enabling some drone operators to operate at up to 150ft

immediately outside the aerodrome boundary, i.e. an ideal position for filming aerodrome activity from

just outside its boundary. The risk of such drones coming into conflict with aircraft on approach is

evident.

As far as separation requirements which differ between small surveillance drones and other small

drones is concerned, the rules are not easy to grasp at first instance. The separation criteria now

contained in Article 95 were originally introduced to provide additional protection from a privacy

perspective. Given that, as the consultation document notes, most small drones are now camera-

equipped, it may be attractive to have a default setting for all small drones, adopting separation criteria

comparable to those in Article 95. This, however, begs the question of whether a small drone without

any surveillance device could fly closer to third parties. This may seem curious when set against a

default rule. Given the prevalence of cameras on small drones, we do not see an undue burden in

applying a consistent set of rules whether or not a camera is on board.

Proposal E – Improving Deterrents

Q18. Do you support increasing deterrents for breaking any of the small drone laws in the Air

Navigation Order 2016? Why?

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We do not believe that increasing the level of penalty would act as a deterrent for drone misuse. As

stated, in most cases, misuse is down to ignorance, but in those cases where misuse is intentional

the perpetrator will be unlikely deterred by increased penalties.

Penalties under the ANO 2016 may be thought low in the light of the hazard which may be caused

by the behaviour they are intended to deter; however, if, in the case of a drone operator causing an

accident to a large commercial aircraft, the evidence were adequate to support a charge of murder

or manslaughter, or attempted murder or manslaughter, then the penalties for those offences would

apply and enable the courts to sentence for greater than a 5-year term of imprisonment. In a similar

way, a person who used a drone to infiltrate drugs into a prison was sentenced recently under both

the ANO 2016 and under Scottish prison legislation5.

Nevertheless, the Government will recognise that establishing the requisite mental element in murder

and manslaughter cases is difficult. We can envisage situations where either (i) behaviour was clearly

negligent and the danger to an aircraft was such as to merit a term in excess of 5 years imprisonment;

or (ii) it is felt necessary to change the standard of proof to one closer to strict liability (such as is

proposed in the laser offence in clause 22 of the Vehicle Technology and Aviation Bill); however,

these are issues which go to the ability to secure a prosecution or to appropriate sentencing rather

than to pure deterrence.

Q19. Is there a need to amend current legislation to better enable prosecution relating to drone

misuse? Why?

The broad extent of current civil legislation has evolved to cover most eventualities; it is believed that

drone misuse could be prosecuted under existing non-drone specific legislations.

Proposal F – No Drone Flying Zones and Enforcement

The consultation lays out the Government approach to No-Flying Zones (NFZ), but what is not

covered in the discussion is the recognition that the CAA and indeed the DfT do not own all the

legislation and, therefore, are probably ill-equipped and resourced for the enforcement role unless it

directly pertains to aviation safety. The inclusion and clear allocation of responsibility to other

Government departments is imperative to adequately support the CAA. Other such areas include:

privacy, security, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and data protection.

Q20. Do you support Proposal F, Options 1 and/or 2? Why?

Support Options 1 and 2. The information needs to be communicated to all drone users by all means

possible, e.g. not all drone users will have a smart phone. Permanent NFZs may warrant restriction

signs to support geo-fencing but clearly this is impractical for all pop-up temporary NFZs where

security may dictate that the public will not be told of a NFZ/geo-fenced area. Option 2 also has the

benefit of addressing the issue of foreign visitors who bring their drone with them, e.g. travelling from

the continent by ferry.

Q21. Are you a public organisation or body with relevant flying restrictions?

No.

Q22. If so, would you make use of standardised signage to inform the public of restrictions on

drone operations? Why?

Not applicable.

5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-39220750.

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Proposal G – Registration of Drones

Within the discussion on the registration of drones, there is an opportunity to link registration with

identification, licensing and insurance. If we are to look forward to a robust future drone enterprise,

then these four aspects should be considered together.

The Government seems already to have concluded that registration is desirable. It seems likely that

European regulation will follow this path; however, we consider that the Government should be clear

of the desired outcomes and objectives from regulation. We can see it forming a valuable means of

promoting good practice, particularly at present, for leisure and recreational users, and for commercial

operations if a future regulatory regime no longer automatically requires specific permission for light

commercial operations. While we see difficulties in enforcing a registration system this has not

deterred many other jurisdictions adopting one.

The Government’s ‘Public dialogue on drone use in the UK’ activity in early 2016 identified the

desirability of improving accountability but, as the consultation notes, this is of limited benefit if the

registration process does not also improve identifiability. Inevitably, given the size of small UAVs,

this necessitates some form of electronic identification and, in all probability, mandatory equipment

requirements at the point of sale. This would have limitations in relation to home-built or modified

UAS although we can see an incremental benefit overall. The question is the extent to which

significant numbers of people will be put to a burden of registration without altering behaviour

significantly, whereas those posing the greatest risk avoid or ignore the requirement.

There is only passing reference in the consultation to the benefits of registration from a privacy/data

protection perspective, which it is understood was one of the major concerns in the ‘Public dialogue

on drone use in the UK’ process. In general, however, it is suggested that privacy/data protection-

specific considerations continue to operate through the ICO's Office rather than being a particular

focus of aeronautical regulation.

Regulation should only be introduced to mitigate a recognised mischief and should be proportionate

to that risk. There should, therefore, be a clear justification of the objective of a registration scheme

and the benefits that it will provide. This seems to be lacking.

As noted above, having a registration number painted on the side of a 350g drone will not improve

safety and as the registration number would rarely be recovered after an incident and will not help to

identify the pilot. The legislation to require re-registration, such as when one teenager gives his toy

drone to a friend, is going to be as heavy-handed as it is un-enforceable. Registration has value if,

after an incident, the device can be recovered by the police or a third-party with the registration

number still readable. But there is still the issue as to whether the registered ‘keeper’ can be

demonstrated to have been in control at the time of the incident – perhaps the approach taken with

road vehicles could apply in some cases whereby the registered owner is liable in certain

circumstances, although this may require primary legislation. It is possible to manage that objection

by introducing a reverse burden of proof (i.e. the registered owner must prove that s/he was not in

control at the time), but an excessively punitive approach runs the risk of discouraging registration.

The use of registration as a means of ensuring education material is available to potential users could

be met by enforcing the current situation whereby retailers must prominently display, and provide,

appropriate CAA and ICO material.

Q23. At what weight should a drone be excluded from registration? Please explain your

reasoning.

Drones designed to be flown beyond line of sight of the pilot regardless of weight should probably be

registered, but this would be used more to provide a lost property service than to enhance safety.

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Sensible weight limits

The consultation paper mentions several drone weight limits, 250g, 7kg, 20kg and 150kg; however,

new legislation should be in line with the EASA ‘prototype’ regulation which considers just 250g and

25kg. It is clear that the risk attached to drones of less than 1kg is small and will not be mitigated by

a registration process, application of which will be disproportionate for very small devices where the

people at risk are almost exclusively those ‘under control of the operator’, i.e. friends and family.

These devices have limited range and potential to cause damage. The registration should also

exclude home built models of less that at least 1.0kg (possibly 1.5kg) in order to encourage

innovation. This would significantly reduce the number of registrations and would reduce the cost.

Registration of drones of any size used for commercial activity should be (and already effectively is)

mandated.

20kg is a large drone, at such a weight the device could easily have a physical diameter of over 1m

with significant range and altitude potential. Such a device could not be used in a domestic

environment, but the Government is proposing that the same registration and operating rules should

apply to 20kg devices as to something so small that it will often be used within a building.

A further inconsistency occurs with the regulations that if a camera is not fitted to the drone, there is

no prescribed maximum operating height providing the weight is less than 7kg.

A more logical and proportionate approach to weight classification is required with the introduction of

a 1.0 or 1.5kg weight minimum for registration (as in the Republic of Ireland) and possibly the removal

of the unlimited height for camera-less devices below 7kg – although this would have significant

implications for the well-established model aircraft community. In general, a camera-less

classification will be very difficult to enforce (some would say that it will be unenforceable) given the

ubiquity and miniaturisation of camera technology.

We would encourage the Government to consider a threshold for implementation in the light of

thresholds at which other activity becomes subject to registration or specific regulation – for instance,

types of dog, firearms, other weapons such as air rifles or crossbows, and other means of personal

transport, such as scooters or bicycles.

On charging, it would be anomalous for this part of the aviation sector not to have to cover its own

costs in the way that the CAA is funded for conventional aviation. It is less easy to see how this

applies in relation to light leisure drones unless the objective becomes a deterrent.

The further question that must be addressed is whether it is ownership of a drone that requires

registration or whether registration is necessary solely for flying. Anecdotal evidence suggests that

many owners of drones have already consigned them to the attic and it would be unfortunate if all of

those individuals were to become criminals. The analogy with ownership versus usage of road

vehicles may be instructive. It is important that any registration scheme be enforced in accordance

with its terms since to do otherwise runs the risk that the entire scheme falls into disrespect.

Q24. Should the threshold for exclusion from registration be based on a different metric (such

as how height you intend to fly the drone)?

Maximum Take-off Mass (MTOM) is a good starting point. Additional factors which might be

considered are:

Below a certain maximum kinetic energy (or below a certain velocity)

VLOS use only.

Q25. If you think so, what more appropriate or different threshold do you suggest and why?

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See response to Question 24.

Q26. Who should be made responsible for collecting and holding small drone registration

details? The Civil Aviation Authority or another body? Why?

While the safe use of drones may be the responsibility of the CAA, the responsibility for registration

should reside within DfT. The DfT may well delegate that work to an agency or non-governmental

organisation (NGO) but procedures should be established to control access to commercially sensitive

or other data that should remain private.

Q27. Do you support registration requirements not applying for certain owners of model

aircraft below 20kg in weight? Why?

Any policy needs to be kept simple and unequivocal, the ability to separate model aircraft flyers from

drone operators will become increasingly difficult in the future, e.g. how do you discriminate under

the law a model helicopter from a drone? Model aircraft clubs are not mandated for all model aircraft

users and while they may have had a long-standing safety culture, the environment is changing and

there is an increasing number of new people entering the market who are not aviation minded.

If it is felt that discrimination between the two operator communities is required, then a clear and

unambiguous set of definitions is required.

Q28. Do you support the registration process proposed? Why?

Yes, in principle. There does, however, need to be a clear articulation as to its purpose and a

discussion regarding the openness of such a register.

Q29. Do you support a small charge being imposed on drone owners when registering their

drone? Why?

Yes. The costs for establishing and operating such a registration system need to be covered and this

cost should fall to the drone owners. The Government should also consider whether to levy charges

to cover the costs of all drone related activity within the CAA and DfT. As enabling infrastructure

comes on line in the future, the costs will need to be met from outwith the public purse and, therefore,

it may be that an annual licence fee becomes necessary; but, if the industry is to grow as the

Government hopes, the initial cost of infrastructure should be at least in part borne by Government.

Q30. What do you think about the parameters for a charging scheme outlined above?

No comment.

Q31. Should some anonymous/non-identifying data collected by registration (such as

numbers of drones in a local area) be made publicly available? What data and why?

No comment.

Q32. Having Considered some elements of how the registration scheme would be

implemented, which of the following options is your preferred option? Why?

Proposal G, Option 2.

The number of drones is growing exponentially each year so the sooner this is initiated the

better;

It will send a strong message to the public that the Government is taking this seriously; and

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Any such registration scheme should be linked with operator licensing and developed such

that it can be linked with drone ID in the future.

Proposal H – Airspace Management and Electronic Identification of Drones

The very act of having an ID system for drones that links to a registration system and identifies the

licensed operator will be a big step in satisfying the public's concerns. The public is not concerned by

cars on the road or general aviation (GA), because they know there is a robust system of registration

and identification behind it, even if they do not feel the need to regularly interrogate it.

Electronic identification will require additional spectrum for which mobile phone-like services have

been considered. This will have a cost for infrastructure and regular use. Who will pay for the public

to be able to interrogate a leisure or commercial drone, what level of security/integrity is required and

will existing infrastructure meet these requirements?

Q33. Do you agree with the proposed approach to implementing an electronic identification

requirement? Why?

No, not in its present form. The ability to identify registered drones is highly desirable and that, in

due course, it should be mandatory. The proposed approach does not appear to have examined in

sufficient detail the disparate requirements for drone identification and the proposal appears to call

for a 'one size fits all' solution, which is unlikely to be the best way forward; indeed, identification need

not be solely 'electronic' and that different identification solutions would be appropriate for different

identification requirements (e.g. local or remote and within visual range or beyond). Reasons for

wishing to identify a drone include:

Safety (i.e. risk to others) of the drone itself;

Safe and legal operation of the drone;

Security (information and physical) concerns;

Enforcement;

Privacy;

Curiosity;

Post incident investigation – flight history; and

Post incident physical investigation of the drone itself.

In addition to the solutions to meet the above requirements, solutions would depend on:

whether the drone was in visual range or beyond visual range;

the size of the drone;

the power parameters of the drone (to power additional devices);

whether the drone was to be remotely identified or if it was to be examined physically; and

bandwidth requirements and availability.

Identification need not only be 'electronic'. Larger drones could carry visual markings similar to those

of GA. Larger drones could also use aviation industry standard situational awareness systems such

as transponders and ADS-B. It should be noted that there are already bandwidth availability concerns

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in the protected spectrum. Smaller drones, within visual range, could permanently emit a coded LED

signal (which need not consume very much power) which provides its unique identifier.

Q34. Should all registered drones be electronically identifiable? Why?

Yes, all registered drones should be identifiable. Given the definition at Para 1.1, this requirement

should also include both model aircraft (flown for leisure) and those drones flown for commercial gain

(i.e. aerial work). As with registration, it would be useful for a clear articulation of the primary purpose

and requirement for electronic identification, as there will be several significant technical, financial

and privacy hurdles to be overcome.

Q35. If no, what drones should be excluded from electronic identification and why?

It is likely that for certain reasons (e.g. government security) some drones may not be identifiable by

unauthorised third parties; although this would reduce the value of the identification system as a

safety, i.e. collision avoidance system.

Q36. Do you support a pilot scheme mandating the use of an app to notify other app users

and authorities that you are flying a drone in a certain area? Why?

The concept of a 'system' that notifies other users and authorities is supported but mandating a pilot

scheme does not seem wise. A pilot scheme to test and evaluate app-based and other system

solutions would be highly desirable, particularly if they use existing Internet/WWW/3G/4G bandwidth

and widely available smart phones and commercial and domestic information technology. An 'App'

should be just part of this system that should include online or manual inputs. Successful and mature

solutions, subsequently made mandatory, would be of great value to operators and authorities.

There will inevitably be those who will not register their drones, who will disable in-built identification

systems and who will operate illegally. Criminals seldom have gun licences. There appears to be a

requirement for the non-cooperative identification of drones.

Proposal I – Drone Traffic Management

As a general principle of aviation, access to airspace is open to all on a first-come-first-served basis,

subject to the requirements of minimum equipage and pilot competence for the particular class of

airspace. The growing number of drone operation will bring an increase in demand for access to

airspace at low altitude (less than 1000 ft. AGL). It should be clearer as to what operations UTM is

supporting e.g. BVLOS >400'. It is essential that blocks of airspace should not be routinely allocated

to a particular commercial activity or operator so as to exclude others. Access to airspace which is a

‘public common’, (other than areas restricted for security reasons) should only be constrained on the

basis of safety or the need to maintained efficient traffic flow. Further, any charging regime associated

with access to airspace should be equitable and independently regulated as it is today. This will be

particularly important as UTM zones are established and with them the possibility of the competitive

advantage resulting from providing the UTM service.

If electronic identification is to be used to support a UTM (Control) service, rather than just a UTM

(information) service, it would be sensible to agree how this might work, and what information should

be made available to what resolution, integrity etc. before fitting identification ‘chips’ to tens of

thousands of drones. This implies a need to develop appropriate standards.

The consultation discusses electronic conspicuity, but it fails to identify why it would be required. This

rationale would help determine which of a number of approaches, with widely different costs and

benefits, would be most suitable.

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A ‘pet’ chip, such as used to confirm the inoculation status of cats and dogs, would allow the drone

(or the remains of it) to be identifiable (but only at centimetre range). The cost would be low and

power and spectrum implications would be minimal (as the chip would not be powered), and they

could easily just be glued to the drone. Such a device could provide registration data, e.g. address of

the owner but not current or recent operational data.

A chip remotely readable at moderate range (say 10-20 metres) would require a sophisticated reader

device and would imply a continuous power drain on the drone batteries. This approach would require

an approved communication link; although, existing Bluetooth technology may be sufficient if non-

cooperative protocols could be agreed. It would allow the police/general public (possibly) to identify

the registered keeper of the drone if it was flying very near to the interrogator. Integration into the

drone systems would be relatively easy but equally it could be readily disabled if the operator wanted

to remain anonymous.

An aviation-like transponder able to transmit limited flight date including, for example, altitude and

speed as well registration data, when interrogated by a suitable system. Alternatively, the required

parameters could be broadcast at regular time intervals. This surveillance date would be the minimum

necessary to support a UTM (control) capability. While this might sound attractive, it has significant

implications for spectrum use and radio frequency noise if a number of drones where operating in a

small area. It would also require potentially costly infrastructure to make use of the information

especially if extended to rural or remote areas. Installation of the transponder into the drone would

be complex and operation would be dependent on features in the drone, which are not present in all

types especially the small ones. The additional power demand on the drone battery could be

significant depending on the required range of operation. Control of access to the data may be

necessary to meet privacy and security requirements. There would also be a cost for ‘connecting’ to

the service, but connection may be mandated for certain UTM areas.

While paragraph 6.15 of the consultation outlines the objective for electronic conspicuity, until a

consensus among stakeholders on that objective is established, it would be preferable to wait until

the industry agrees on the most effective solution for future growth of the sector. This may be a

transponder system for UTM environments, ADS-B or a pet type ‘chip’ for others. After an incident in

which the drone sustained damage it is that likely that, of the three, only the, ‘Pet ‘chip would remain

functional.

Q37. Do you agree with the proposed characteristics of the drone traffic management system?

Why?

Yes, agree with the proposed characteristics of UTM, but it should be clearer as to the airspace and

operations that UTM will support i.e. BVLOS, >400'.

Q38. Do you agree with the proposed underlying principles for the drone traffic management

system? Why?

No comment.

Q39. Do you agree that it should be compulsory for a drone to be electronically identifiable in

order to use the UTM system? Why?

This will depend on the nature of the UTM system If it is a real-time traffic control service then yes,

but, if it is information update service, then real time identification would not provide benefit.

Identification is only useful if and when systems exist to read the information being transmitted. Also,

at the moment, there is a real risk that local UTM systems may have different identification

requirements.

Q40. Should electronic identification for manned general aviation be mandatory? Why?

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As technology is developed for electronic identification (eID) of drones it will become increasingly

affordable and, therefore, should be mandated for all types of general aviation. However, if the

primary purpose is collision avoidance it may be difficult to ensure the necessary integrity and

availability for all manned aircraft, especially for those without electrical power.

Q41. How should a drone traffic management system be funded?

UTM should be funded primarily by users/operators. This could be on a rating system depending on

type of drone, miles flown or location of operation. A scalable matrix approach would be required.

Ultimately, however, it should be commercially sustainable, but this is only likely to be possible

following initial government direction and investment, and the infrastructure requirements may need

government support if it is to be extended to low traffic density areas.

Consultation Annex C – The Law in the UK Today: Royal Aeronautical Society Comments. A summary of main UK laws applying to use of drones of no more than 150kg – Relevant to Privacy.

Section text: Drones should be flown at a height over the property of another person which is

‘reasonable’ in all circumstances. Failure to do so could amount to trespass if the flight interferes with

another person’s ordinary use and enjoyment of land and the structures upon it.

In the case of trespass, a civil claim may be brought against the drone user seeking

compensation for any damage suffered as a result of the trespass. Alternatively, an

injunction may be sought to prevent trespass in the future.

Points to consider:

a. As with manned aircraft, height is not the only factor to consider. The sophistication of the

surveillance equipment is equally important. An individual should have an expectation that

a drone passing overhead contains widely used surveillance equipment. A mass market

digital camera would fall within this characterization, but a powerful telescope or a multi-

spectral sensor or a sensitive radio listening device would not. Courts have ruled on this

issue in a number of countries in the case of manned aircraft, requiring the use of high

performance surveillance equipment to be authorized by court orders;

b. Privacy and trespass are two separable legal concepts (and the law of trespass differs north

and south of the border) – should they be conflated as they seem to be here?;

c. ‘Privacy’ protection is subject to European human rights law. But, Article 8 of the European

Convention on Human Rights only refers to “respect for private and family life”; and

d. Any situation will usually involve competing rights – so Article 8 might compete with Article

10 - public’s right to know.

So:

i. Recent Grand Chamber decision (Maygar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary) highlights the

limitation of the applicability of privacy in the face of disclosure of public interest information;

and

ii. Earlier Court decision (Haldimann and Others v Switzerland) legitimated use of secret filming

for bona fide journalistic purpose.

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ANNEX A

Liability Insurance for Drones The Risks

The principal risks are first, the risk that a drone causes damage to third parties on the surface –

whether people or property, unconnected with the drone operation, and second, the air-to-air risk, i.e.

that a drone collides with another aircraft. The potential for catastrophic loss in the latter case is self-

evident although we make no judgment as to the likelihood of such a collision or the resilience of

conventional aircraft. The working assumption is that a drone would have the potential to cause the

loss of a large commercial aircraft.

We do not anticipate safety regulation concerning drones having more than a limited impact on the

malicious or terrorist use of drones. Likewise, we do not anticipate insurance playing any material

role in mitigating the damage caused by malicious or terrorist use, other than through first party or

third party liability war risk cover taken out by airlines or individuals. Villains and terrorists do not take

out insurance cover for the consequences of their acts.

Safety Regulation and Insurance

The role of insurance needs to be considered in the context of a multi-layered legal and regulatory

approach, prevalent in many areas of human endeavour, including aviation, to enable society to

benefit from activity which has the potential to cause damage to others.

First, the potentially hazardous activity is regulated in a manner intended to reduce risk to the

minimum practical level whilst balancing the benefit of the activity (whether to individual economic

actors or to society as a whole) against the potential for harm to others. Regulation should be directed

to a mischief. Those regulations are enforced regardless of loss to others and pro-active steps are

taken to ensure compliance.

Second, those participating in the hazardous activity are subject to legal liability for harmful

consequences which they cause. This may be based on ordinary principles of tort (whereby liability

accrues through failure to achieve a reasonable standard of care), on principles of product liability

(whereby a producer is obliged only to put "safe" products into the market), or under concepts of strict

legal liability such as the responsibility (under English law) of the owner of an aircraft for damage

caused by the aircraft on the surface. These principles act as a deterrent and encourage operators

to take out insurance;

Third, insurance acts as a safety net if the regulatory mechanism fails to avoid all accidents. Aviation

operators have in general taken out insurance for their liability to passengers and surface damage

for many years – this was almost invariable practice within the conventional aviation sector before

insurance became mandatory in Europe in 2005. As the consultation document notes, aircraft

operators, including operators of drones, are subject to mandatory third-party liability insurance

obligations, save with respect to model aircraft below 20kg. Insurance, therefore, acts as a safety net

when a loss occurs, and victims do not generally have to take the credit risk of the legally responsible

operator if they establish a right to compensation pursuant to applicable principles of law.

Legal Liability Principles

While insurance is an important level of protection it should not, therefore, be regarded as a substitute

for appropriate regulation as the primary means to minimise the occurrence of incidents and

accidents. Furthermore, it is important to keep the distinction between principles of legal liability, and

insurance in respect of that legal liability, in mind. Historically the concern in aviation operations was

the liability of an operator to passengers on board. This risk does not (yet) arise for unmanned

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operations, but neither principles of liability nor insurance requirements will change if unmanned

passenger aircraft do enter into operation in due course.

Aircraft operators are strictly liable, under English law, for surface damage caused by the aircraft or

anything falling from it. This applies whether the aircraft is manned or not. This strict liability does

not apply in the case of a mid-air collision which turns on principles of fault, such as failure to comply

with the rules of the air or clearances issued by an air traffic control agency.

Absent a change in that liability regime, it is important to avoid the assumption that the drone operator

will invariably be responsible for a mid-air collision involving a drone and a conventional aircraft.

While it seems unlikely that an operator using the UK’s small drone regime would have much defence

in the case of a collision with a large commercial aircraft in controlled airspace, the liability analysis

could be different in operations in class G airspace, or with operations of certified drones.

Liability Insurance Obligations

As matters stand, aircraft operators – whether manned or unmanned – must comply with EU

Regulation 785/2004 requiring minimum insurance levels for third party loss (i.e. other aircraft or

surface damage) by reference to the aircraft’s mass. Operators of “model” aircraft (generally accepted

to mean leisure/recreational users) under 20kg are not obliged to carry such insurance.

So far as the catastrophe risk is concerned, i.e. the risk to a large commercial aircraft suffering an

accident due to collision with a drone, any airline operating in Europe must carry insurance for its

liability to passengers and for surface damage. As a matter of practice, commercial airlines carry

considerably higher limits of cover designed to reflect typical damages awards in cases of fatal

accidents: for the largest commercial passenger aircraft, airlines typically have cover with a combined

single limit in excess of US$1 billion. This substantially exceeds the minimum requirements under

EU Regulation 785/2004. Therefore, insurance should be in place in respect of liability for loss of life

in an aircraft accident.

It is worth noting, however, that under the Montreal Convention 1999 and the EU air carrier liability

regime, an airline is able to limit its liability to SDR100,000 (c.£111,000) per passenger if it is able to

demonstrate that the damage was not due to its negligence or wrongful act of omission of the airline

or its servants or agents, or was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act of a third party. It is

possible to envisage a situation in which a UAV operating in controlled airspace was wholly

undetectable by the airline and that there was nothing they could do to avoid the accident. In those

circumstances, the airline and their insurers may limit their liability to SDR100,000 per passenger. By

western European standards for a fatal accident that is likely to leave many victims

undercompensated.

UAS Insurance Policies

We understand that many commercial policies that are presently available (whether underwritten by

specialist aviation insurers or by the major commercial and domestic insurance companies) offer

minimum limits of liability considerably higher than the minimum prescribed under EU Regulation

785/2004. This indicates a sensible approach being driven by the market and a realistic attitude by

the drone operators.

We also hear of reservations about the price of such insurance but are not in a position to comment

on pricing or availability. Many reasons are quoted for this, not least the difficulty of rating risk against

an uncertain loss record. Typically, we would expect that as insurers become more used to drone

insurance risk pricing will become more competitive: the conventional aviation insurance market is

generally regarded as having been "soft" for several years in response to a declining loss record and,

therefore, market forces.

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Leisure operations are different insofar as there is no insurance obligation. Traditionally, domestic

policies which insure a householder and family members for general third party liability – exclude any

kind of aviation related liability. We do not see why it would not be possible for the domestic insurance

industry to create "bolt-on" cover for UAS operation (at a premium) for leisure and recreational use.

Such offerings could follow models used under domestic policies for optional cover such as for

bicycles.

While the BMFA encourages leisure and recreational drone users to join its ranks (and thereby benefit

from their insurance) many have expressed the expectation that a proportion of leisure users will

always stay out of the club environment and resist taking out insurance. The concern is that some of

these will be those who are tempted to push the boundaries in terms of operating in a reckless

manner. With widespread availability of light drones at reducing prices, the existence of regulation

alone is unlikely to be wholly effective and there is a general expectation that police enforcement is

likely to be limited. The greatest success will come when it is as socially unacceptable to fly a drone

recklessly in public, or to fly one without insurance, as drink driving or driving without insurance.