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RULE 4 AND 5 VENUE AND UNIFORM RULES IN MTC AND RTC; RULE 6, 7, 8, 9 AND 10RULE 4Venue of ActionsSection 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)Section 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found. (2[c]a)Section 4. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply.(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (3a, 5a)ARQUERO VS. FLOJO, G.R. No. L-68111 December 20, 1988PARAS, J.:On November 27, 1983, the petitioner and private respondent Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), entered into a contract for services for the transmission of a telegraphic message thru RCPI's branch office in Aparri, Cagayan to Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan at his office address in Quiapo, Manila. The text of the telegram contract form for transmission (as well as the telegram itself) reads: Send the following message subject to the condition that the RCPI shall not be liable for any damage howsoever same may arise except for the refund of telegraphic tolls. The sender agrees that as a condition precedent for a cause of action against the RCPI any complaint relative to the transmittal of this telegram must be brought to the attention of the company within three months from date, and that venue thereof shall be in the courts of Quezon City alone and in no other courts. ATTY. CALASANROOM 401 PAYAWAL BLDG.709 PATERNO, QUIAPO, MANILA CONGRATULATIONS PREPARE ONE XEROX COPY DECISION SEE YOU BONI'S BIRTHDAY. BERNOLI (Annex "D", P. 16, Rollo) Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan received a copy of the telegram the next day but he was made to pay the sum of P 7.30 for delivery charges. Thereafter, on November 30, 1983, at the birthday party of Asst. Fiscal Bonifacio Sison in Quezon City, Atty. Calasan confronted and censured the petitioner anent the said telegram. Despite the petitioner's explanation that the telegram had been duly paid for he was branded as a "stingy mayor who cannot even afford to pay the measely sum of P 7.30 for the telegram," (p. 2 Memorandum; p. 55, Rollo) in the presence of many persons. Thus, the petitioner filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan. RCPI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, contending that pursuant to the service contract, the parties had agreed that the venue of any action which may arise out of the transmittal of the telegram shall be in the courts of Quezon City alone. On February 13, 1984, the trial court dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration re said dismissal. Hence, the instant petition. Citing the case of Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Bernardo Teves, et al., 83 SCRA 361, the petitioner claims that the condition with respect to venue appearing on the ready printed form of RCPI's telegram for transmission is void and unenforceable because the petitioner had no hand in its preparation. The Court there held that contracts of adhesion, where the provisions have been drafted only by one party and the only participation of the other party is the signing of his signature or his adhesion thereto, are contrary to public policy as they are injurious to the public or public good. WE DISAGREE. The agreement of the parties in the case at bar as to venue is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs. The parties do not dispute that in the written contract sued upon, it was expressly stipulated that any action relative to the transmittal of the telegram against the RCPI must be brought in the Courts of Quezon City alone. We note that neither party to the contract reserved the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by law (i.e., where the plaintiff or defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff [par. 'b'], Section 2, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court), as is usually done if the parties purported to retain that right of election granted by the Rules. Such being the case, it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of action, in connection with the written contract sued upon, in the courts of Quezon City only. Section 3, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court sanctions such stipulation by providing that "by written agreement of the parties the venue of action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." (Bautista vs. de Borja, 18 SCRA 474). As aptly held in the case of Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169,By said agreement the parties waived the legal venue, and such waiver is valid and legally effective, because it was merely a personal privilege they waived, which is not contrary to public policy or to the prejudice of third persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law give unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such nature that its renunciation would be against public policy. In Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al. supra, the Supreme Court, in declaring the stipulation which limited the venue of actions as void and unenforceable held: By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered intonamely, that it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party, in this instance the passengers, private respondents, who cannot change the same and who are thus made to adhere hereto on the 'take it or leave it' basiscertain guidelines in the determination of their validity and/or enforceability have been formulated in order to insure that justice and fair play characterize the relationship of the contracting parties. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which we can take judicial notice, that there is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter-island vessels plying between the country's several islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be transported. The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when passengers literally scramble to secure whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their safety. ... Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush hours, for conditions that may be printed thereon, much less charge them with having consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number. of such conditions in fine print, as in this case. RULE 5Uniform Procedure In Trial CourtsSection 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. (n)Section 2. Meaning of terms. The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (1a)

Procedure In Regional Trial Courts

RULE 6Kinds Of PleadingsSection 1. Pleadings defined. Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (1a)Section 2. Pleadings allowed. The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him.An answer may be responded to by a reply. (n)Section 3. Complaint. The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)Section 4. Answer. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses. (4a)Section 5. Defenses. Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (5a)Section 6. Counterclaim. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. (6a)Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. (n) OCA CIRCULAR NO. 96-2009 For the guidance of all concerned the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated September 21, 2004, suspending payment of the filing fees for compulsory counterclaims remains in effect. For ready reference, the resolution reads as follows:The Court further Resolved to AFFIRM the actions of the Honorable Associate Justices, in its informal meeting held on 20 September 2004, and suspend the new rates of the legal fees under Rule 141, effective 21 September 2004, viz:a) Solemnization of marriage;b) motions, andc) compulsory counterclaims

Section 8. Cross-claim. A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. (7)Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. A counter-claim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)Section 10. Reply. A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. (11)Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. (12a)Section 12. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained. (14)Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff's claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff. (n)

RULE 7Parts of a PleadingSection 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties.Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a, 2a)Section 2. The body. The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading. (n)(a) Paragraphs. The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings. (3a)(b) Headings. When two or more causes of action are joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the others.When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect. (4)(c) Relief. The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable. (3a, R6)(d) Date. Every pleading shall be dated. (n)Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)CASES ON FORUM SHOPPING:a)The Executive Secretary vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998MENDOZA, J.:This is a petition to declare respondents Richard J. Gordon, Anacleto M. Diaz, and Orlando E. Mendiola in contempt of court. Respondents Diaz and Mendiola are the counsels of respondent Gordon in G.R. No. 134071, entitled "Richard J. Gordon v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, Felicito Payumo and Senior Superintendent Arturo C. Lomibao." The petitioners in this case are the respondents in that case.The aforesaid case was filed on June 29, 1998 because of respondent Gordon's apprehension that he would be removed and replaced as chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of administration from President Fidel V. Ramos to President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The petition was for prohibition to prevent Gordon's ouster as chairman of the SBMA on the ground that he had a fixed term of office of six years which would not expire until February 10, 2004.As respondent Gordon apprehended, upon assuming office on June 30, 1998, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 1, "recalling, withdrawing, and canceling the appointment of Richard J. Gordon as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority for a term of six (6) years, dated February 10, 1998, by former President Fidel V. Ramos."On July 1, 1998, instead of pressing his motion for a temporary restraining order, respondent Gordon fried a "Notice of Withdrawal of [his] Petition." This was done at 9:21 in the morning. At 11:30 A.M. of that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 255-0-98.The filing of the case in the Olongapo court gave rise to the present petition to declare respondents in contempt of court filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora and Arturo C. Lomibao. The petition is filed against respondents Richard Gordon and his counsel Anacleto M. Diaz and Orlando E. Medina, the latter having filed the case in the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court after filing a notice of withdraw the case pending in this Court. Petitioners charge that "the act of respondents in filing two (2) petitions involving the same issues before this Court and the Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City, both pending, constitutes forum-shopping and contempt of court."Petitioners cite the following provision of Rule 7, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as basis for their action:Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.This provision applies to petitions for certiorari and prohibition.In its resolution of July 7, 1998, this Court granted respondents' prayer for leave to withdraw their petition in G.R. No. 134071, without prejudice to the disposition of the present petition for contempt.Respondents deny the charge against them. They contend that they in fact complied with Rule 7, 5 of the Rules of Court by disclosing in the certification of non-forum shopping attached to their petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, the existence and subsequent withdrawal of their petition for prohibition before this Court. They argue that, as held in PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 1 it is neither forum-shopping nor defiance of a court's authority for a party to file a case in the lower court, even after applying for a similar relief in the Supreme Court, where such party had first sought the withdrawal of the case before the Supreme Court in order to seek recourse before the lower court.We find for respondents.Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, 2 or(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open," 3 or(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same from the original court. 4In Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court, summarizing the rulings on the issue of what constitutes forum-shopping, stated:Forum-shopping or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition, has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the Courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.Conversely, since a party resorts to forum-shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. 6In the case at bar, although respondent Richard J. Gordon filed a petition for prohibition before this Court and, after two days, filed substantially the same petition before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the Olongapo court he first flied a notice of withdrawal of his petition which this Court later granted and (2) he withdrew his petition in this Court for the following reason:Due, however, to the present policy of the Court requiring parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of courts and in order to obviate any technical objection on this ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw, as he hereby withdraws, the instant petition so that it may be filed in the proper court where it can be ventilated on its merits.No adverse decision had been rendered by this Court against respondent Gordon for which reason he thought it proper to institute the second action in the trial court. The situation he found himself in is similar to that in which a party, after filing a suit, realizes he made a mistake because the court in which he has brought the case has no jurisdiction. He, therefore, withdraws his action and refiles it in the proper forum. For, indeed, the policy of this Court respecting the hierarchy of courts and consequently prohibiting the filing of a petition in this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts has been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for departing from such policy. It is clear from respondents' actions and explanation that they had no intention of disregarding court processes. They in fact complied with Rule 7, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.This case is distinguishable from E. Razon, Inc. v. The Philippine Port Authority. 7 In the E. Razon case, petitioners, after filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the Supreme Court, filed an hour later a similar petition before the Regional Trial Court and, having been assured of a favorable action by the latter court, then sought the withdrawal of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forum-shopping. "The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes," it was held.In contrast, in the case at bar, respondent Gordon filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition before this Court prior to the filing of his petition in the Regional Trial Court as the appropriate forum. While it is true he and his counsels did not wait for this Court to act on the "Notice of Withdrawal of Petition" filed by them before filing substantially the same petition in the Regional Trial Court, the Court understands their situation. They were faced with a predicament: Administrative Order I ousting respondent Gordon from the chairmanship of the SMBA had been issued and was in fact about to be enforced hence a writ of preliminary injunction had to be obtained if respondent Gordon was to remain in office.A similar predicament confronted the parties in PCGG v. Sandiganbayan (Minute Resolution, G.R. Nos. 105808, 105809, and 109592, July 22, 1997), cited by respondents. There, as found by this Court As regards TMEE's lawyers, they obviously believed that under this Court's dispositions just reviewed, it was their client, instead of the PCGG, that had the right to vote the sequestered shares, prior to the determination by the Sandiganbayan of whether or not there would be dissipation, loss or wastage of corporate assets if TMEE were permitted to vote said shares. They wished their client to exercise that right to vote at the stockholders' meeting of January 10, 1997; but PCIB was adamant in its position that it should be the PCGG which should be accorded the right to vote. Time being of the essence, said lawyers be took themselves to this Court; on December 23, 1996, they filed here an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order."A few days' reflection, however, apparently made them doubt that the Court would act on their motion because in its Resolution of December 3, 1996 it had said "that no further motion for reconsideration or clarification of the issues treated or, of the dispositions herein made, will be entertained." They thus decided that relief should properly be sought in the Securities & Exchange Commission which in their view had "jurisdiction to act on the subject matter (which) refers to the corporate acts of PCIB and its corporate officers (Garcia Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan 237 SCRA 552) (their cause) not being directly aimed at the PCGG as an entity, but at a private corporation (Holiday Inn [Phils.] vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 186 SCRA 447]." But first they had to withdraw their motion for TRO before this Court. This they sought to do by filing on January 9, 1997, a "Notice of Withdrawal of 'Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.'" That done, they filed the corresponding petition with the Securities & Exchange Commission to stop the PCIB stockholders' meeting scheduled the following day, as above narrated.This Court considered the parties' predicament with understanding and overlooked their lapse:The Court sees no reason to reject this explanation of the TMEE lawyers, or to doubt their good faith. Their explanation is not on its face implausible; it is in truth consistent with the admitted facts on record. Considering that condemnation for contempt should not be made lightly, and that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, the Court finds no difficulty whatever in reaching the conclusion that there was no willful disregard or defiance of its orders, or forum-shopping, by the TMEE lawyers or, through his permissiveness, by the SEC Hearing Officer.By no means does the Court by the present decision wish to convey the impression that it will tolerate any act of disrespect or discourtesy. To be sure, respondents could have apologized at the very least for the time of the Court which they had taken and made an effort to explain why they have to refile their case without awaiting the Court's resolution on their notice of withdrawal of the petition. But, exercising restraint lest a contrary action be seen as mere peeve or petulance, and considering this case instead with compassion, bearing in mind that the purpose of contempt is preservative rather than punitive, this Court has chosen to overlook respondents' lapse.WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is DISMISSED.b) Samahan ng mga Manggawa sa Samma-Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (Samma-Likha) vs. Samma Corporation, G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009.- Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping is not required in a Petition for Certification Election.b) Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009PUNO, C.J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a resolution issued by the Court of Appeals. The resolution denied the petition for review filed by petitioner Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp. The present proceedings emanate from a complaint for regularization, subsequently converted into one for illegal dismissal, filed before Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan by private respondent Sheryl Oabel.It appears that private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. This lasted until February 7, 1997.1 Respondent worked in Century Park Hotel, an establishment owned by the petitioner. On September 16, 1996,2 petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development Corporation.3 Subsequently, private respondent Oabel was transferred to MANRED, with the latter deporting itself as her employer.4 MANRED has intervened at all stages of these proceedings and has consistently claimed to be the employer of private respondent Oabel. For the duration of her employment, private respondent Oabel performed the following functions: Secretary, Public Relations Department: February 10, 1997- March 6, 1997

Gift Shop Attendant: April 7, 1997- April 21, 1997

Waitress: April 22, 1997- May 20, 1997

Shop Attendant: May 21, 1997- July 30, 19985

On July 20, 1998, private respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a petition for regularization of employment against the petitioner. On August 1, 1998, however, private respondent Oabel was dismissed from employment.6 Respondent converted her petition for regularization into a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision on July 13, 1999, dismissing the complaint against the petitioner. The decision held:While complainant alleged that she has been working with the respondent hotel in different department (sic) of the latter on (sic) various capacities (although not all departments are part and parcel of the hotels), complainant never disputed the fact that her work with the same were on a per function basis or on a "need basis" co-terminus with the function she was hired for.Considering that complainant job (sic) with the respondent hotel was on a per function basis or on a "need basis", complainant could not even be considered as casual employee or provisional employee. Respondent hotel consider (sic) complainant, at most, a project employee which does not ripened (sic) into regular employee (sic).7 Private respondent appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that: (1) MANRED is a labor-only contractor, and (2) private respondent was illegally dismissed.Of the first holding, the NLRC observed that under the very terms of the service contract, MANRED shall provide the petitioner not specific jobs or services but personnel and that MANRED had insufficient capitalization and was not sufficiently equipped to provide specific jobs.8 The NLRC likewise observed that the activities performed by the private respondent were directly related to and usually necessary or desirable in the business of the petitioner.9 With respect to the termination of private respondents employment, the NLRC held that it was not effected for a valid or just cause and was therefore illegal. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads thus: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. xxxx Respondents Century Park Hotel and Manila Resource Development Corporation are hereby declared jointly and severally liable for the following awards in favor of complainant: 1) her full backwages and benefits from August 1, 1998 up to the date of her actual reinstatement; 2) her salary differentials, share in the service charges, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from July 20, 1995 to July 31, 1998. SO ORDERED.10 Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held:After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We resolve to DISMISS the present petition on the ground of non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping taking into account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel Director of petitioner corporation without attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of petitioner corporation per board resolution or special power of attorney executed by the latter.11 Petitioner duly filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 30, 2001.12 In the present petition for review, the petitioner invokes substantial justice as justification for a reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals.13 Petitioner likewise contends that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum shopping attached constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement.14 There is no merit to the petition.Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance applies only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its presence in the pleading wherein it is required. Petitioners contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons. Petitioner relies upon this Courts ruling in Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals15 to show that its Personnel Director has been duly authorized to sign pleadings for and in behalf of the petitioner. Petitioner, however, has taken the ruling in Digital Microwave out of context. The portion of the ruling in Digital Microwave upon which petitioner relies was in response to the issue of impossibility of compliance by juridical persons with the requirements of Circular 28-91.16 The Courts identification of duly authorized officers or directors as the proper signatories of a certificate of non forum-shopping was in response to that issue. The ruling does not, however, ipso facto clothe a corporate officer or director with authority to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping by virtue of the formers position alone. Any doubt on the matter has been resolved by the Courts ruling in BPI Leasing Corp. v. Court of Appeals17 where this Court emphasized that the lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.18 Specific authorization, the Court held, could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.19 This Court has not wavered in stressing the need for strict adherence to procedural requirements. The rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly administration of justice. They are not to be trifled with lightly.For this reason alone, the petition must already be dismissed. However, even if this grave procedural infirmity is set aside, the petition must still fail. In the interest of averting further litigation arising from the present controversy, and in light of the respective positions asserted by the parties in the pleadings and other memoranda filed before this Court, the Court now proceeds to resolve the case on the merits. Petitioner posits that it has entered into a service agreement with intervenor MANRED. The latter, in turn, maintains that private respondent Oabel is its employee and subsequently holds itself out as the employer and offers the reinstatement of private respondent. Notably, private respondents purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996, way after she was hired by the petitioner as extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. There is thus much credence in the private respondents claim that the service agreement executed between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to circumvent the law on employment, in particular that which pertains on regularization. In this regard, it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself do not cease with the end of each event or function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioners business. Thus, although the tasks themselves may vary, the need for sufficient manpower to carry them out does not. In any event, as borne out by the findings of the NLRC, the petitioner determines the nature of the tasks to be performed by the private respondent, in the process exercising control. This being so, the Court finds no difficulty in sustaining the finding of the NLRC that MANRED is a labor-only contractor.20 Concordantly, the real employer of private respondent Oabel is the petitioner. It appears further that private respondent has already rendered more than one year of service to the petitioner, for the period 1995-1998, for which she must already be considered a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code: Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)IN VIEW WHEREOF, the present petition is DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 2001 is affirmed. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeRULE 8

Manner of Making Allegations in PleadingsSection 1. In general. Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. (1)If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated. (n)Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. (2)Section 3. Conditions precedent. In any pleading a general averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient. (3)Section 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge. (4)Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.(5a)Section 6. Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. (6)Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrum`ent or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (7)Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (8a)Section 9. Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. (9)Section 10. Specific denial. A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a, R9)Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom. (5, R9)RULE 9Effect of Failure to PleadSection 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. (4a)Section 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (2a, R18)(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18)(c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (4a, R18).(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. (5a, R18).(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18)RULE 10Amended and Supplemental PleadingsSection 1. Amendments in general. Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. (1)Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (2a)Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. (3a)J. ARTIE VERGEL DE DIOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 80491 August 12, 1992CRUZ, J.:Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.It is unfortunate, however, that on occasion procedural rules are invoked not to uphold but to frustrate the prescriptions of substantive law. This usually happens where the party does not expect to win on the merits of his cause and so seeks to out-maneuver and delay his opponent by resorting to clever if futile technicalities. The many ingenious gambits to this end are not unknown to the Court. It was not born yesterday. When it comes across any such subterfuge, it easily recognizes and rejects it, that the rules of procedure may not be perverted into engines of injustice.By its Board Resolution No. 939B-82, adopted on December 28, 1982, the Philippine Veterans Bank conveyed a parcel of land under a conditional sale to Averdi Marketing and Development Corporation. 1 Petitioner Artie Vergel de Dios, as general manager of Averdi, then transferred his rights to Eduardo Lopingco, herein private respondent, subject to the terms and conditions specified in their Memorandum of Agreement 2 and the Addendum thereto, 3 both concluded in February 1983.On June 21, 1984, Lopingco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint against the petitioner and the Philippine Veterans Bank for revocation of the said board resolution and the rescission of his contract with the petitioner. Copies of the complaint, together with the corresponding summons, were served on the defendants.On July 6, 1984, the Philippine Veterans Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of a cause action and improper party.On July 13, 1984, at 9:15 o'clock in the morning, Lopingco filed an amended complaint and at the same time served a copy thereof on the petitioner by registered mail.On the same day, but after the filing of the amended complaint, the law firm of Fornier, Defensor, Rubinos and Fornier, through Atty. Alarico T. Mundin, filed its entry of appearance and motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading on behalf of the petitioner. The motion was subsequently granted but only for ten days.On August 10, 1984, the petitioner filed through counsel an omnibus motion asking that he be furnished a copy of the amended complaint. This was opposed by the private respondent, who said that the copy sought had already been sent directly to the petitioner by registered mail "because at the time said copy was mailed, there was as yet no appearance of counsel for said defendant."On September 12, 1984, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the private respondent moved for a declaration of default against the petitioner for failure to file his answer within the reglementary period. The trial court deferred resolution of the motion pending receipt of proof that the petitioner had indeed received the copy of the amended complaint sent to him by registered mail.On December 6, 1984, upon presentation of a certification from the Makati Central Post Office that the petitioner had received a copy of the amended complaint on July 17, 1984, he was declared in default and evidence for the other parties was subsequently received ex parte.On April 30, 1985, Judge Arsenio M. Gonong rendered a decision disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, based on the allegations and prayer on the complaint and the evidences adduced in support thereof, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, ordering the rescission of the Memorandum-Agreement and the Addendum thereto entered into between plaintiff Eduardo Lopingco and defendant J. Artie Vergel de Dios; ordering the defendant J. Artie Vergel de Dios to refund the plaintiff his downpayment of P725,000.00 with legal interest thereon from February 18, 1983; ordering defendant J. Artie de Dios to indemnify plaintiff in the amount of P 140,000.00 yearly from February 18, 1983 until plaintiff shall have received a complete refund of his investment; ordering defendant J. Artie Vergel de Dios to pay the plaintiff P20,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as litigation expenses; 10% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs.The case is hereby DISMISSED in so far as defendant Philippine Veterans Bank is concerned.On June 5, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial alleging error on the part of the trial court for declaring him in default although he had not yet been served with a copy of the amended complaint and his omnibus motion had not yet been resolved. Assuming that such service was not necessary, he contented that he was nonetheless not negligent for failing to file his answer within the extended reglementary period.This motion was denied in an order dated August 7, 1985. 4 On the validity of the service of the amended complaint, the trial court declared:. . . To repeat, the service of amended complaint directly on defendant De Dios is in accordance with Sec. 2, R-13, Revised Rules of Court, to the effect that service of notice, pleadings, orders, and the like, should be made on the party, if not represented by counsel (Elli vs. Ditan, 5 SCRA 503; PLDT vs. NLRC, 128 SCRA 402-403) for "Without any record before it of any attorney appearing for said party, it certainly was in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rev. Rules of Court to serve the judgment upon the party affected thereby. It would be an absurdity to hold otherwise." (Luzon Rubber & Manufacturing Co. vs. Estaris, 52 SCRA 392). By analogy, the instant plaintiff could only serve his amended complaint directly on defendant De Dios. Because of all this, it is not correct then for movant De Dios to claim that this Court did not resolve his Omnibus Motion before declaring him in default and that the default order has no legal basis.The trial court also found that the petitioner was negligent in not filing his answer on time, for reasons to be cited below.On August 30, 1985, the petitioner filed an appeal with the respondent court, alleging that the trial court erred in declaring him in default without first ruling on his Omnibus Motion and in denying his motion for new trial. The appellate tribunal affirmed the questioned order. 5 The petitioner then came to this Court, contending that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in holding that he was properly declared in default; (b) in not setting aside the judgment by default as improper for unjustly depriving him of his constitutional right to be heard, the right to fair trial and the right to due process of law; (c) in not declaring that the proper remedy or action of respondent Lopingco is reformation and not rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Addendum thereto; and (d) in not declaring that the decision appealed from as tainted with an award of excessive damages, insufficiency of evidence, and violation of the law.The petitioner submits that inasmuch as the amended complaint completely replaced the original complaint, the latter was stricken from the record and considered non-existent. So was the summons that accompanied it. As the amended complaint was a completely new pleading, a new summons should have been issued requiring the defendants to answer the same, conformably to Rule 14, Sec. 1, of the Rules of Court. For failing to do this and thereafter declaring him in default, the trial court denied him the right to be heard in violation of due process.This argument is not acceptable.The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court that another summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint. 6In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, the court must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint. 7 An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made in express terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same. 8A reading of the amended complaint in the case at bar shows that it merely supplemented an incomplete allegation regarding the subject property. The purpose of the amendment was merely to include the additional information that the subject property "was and is still under litigation and the contract was entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority."It is clear from a comparison of the allegations appearing in the original complaint and in the amended complaint that the cause of action of the private respondent had not been changed. The amended complaint also asked for the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Addendum and the return of the sum of P 725,000.00 which had been given by Lopingco to the petitioner as down payment on the subject property. Plainly, what was sought to be enforced against the petitioner both in the original complaint and in the amended complaint was his obligation to refund the said sum to the private respondent. The amended complaint did not change the cause of action but simply advanced the above-quoted additional information.We hold therefore that no new summons on the amended complaint was necessary.Apart from this, the record shows that, contrary to the petitioner's allegation, he received a copy of the amended complaint on July 17, 1984, through his authorized agent, as certified to by the Makati Central Post Office. The certification stated that Registered Letter No. 1933 (the amended complaint) posted on "July 13, 1984 at GSIS Post Office addressed to Artie Vergel de Dios, Studio 20, 3rd Floor, Makati Townhouse, 100 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, was delivered to and received by the authorized representative of the addressee, administrator Dado on July 17, 1984." 9 This certification has not been denied by the petitioner.The trial court was correct in holding that when the private respondent sent by registered mail a copy of the amended complaint directly to the petitioner, he was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, allowing direct service on a party if not represented by counsel. At the time the amended complaint was filed, the defendant was not yet represented by counsel, which entered its appearance only after the private respondent had filed his amended complaint.It is noteworthy that the trial court cautiously suspended resolution of the motion to declare the petitioner in default until the private respondent shall have furnished proof of service of the amended complaint upon the petitioner. It was only on December 6, 1984, after the private respondent had submitted the above-quoted certification, that the trial court declared the petitioner in default.As the trial court granted the motion for extension before declaring the petitioner in default, he cannot say that it had unduly favored the private respondent. Neither has the petitioner been denied due process, for he was given adequate opportunity, even extended by ten days more beyond the reglementary period, to file his answer to the amended complaint.It is true that this Court looks with disfavor upon default judgments, preferring to give the parties full opportunity to argue their respective positions at a regular trial. But there are limits to our forbearance. As we held in Pahilanga vs. Luna: 10It is within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of default and to permit a defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired, but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the court to refuse to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for the delay in the filing of the answer. In motions for reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being excused from not filing the answer within the reglementary period as provided by the Rules of Court, otherwise, these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure would be rendered meaningless. Unless it is shown clearly that a party has justifiable reason for the delay, the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor.In not exercising that discretion in the petitioner's favor, Judge Gonong correctly observed:. . . As a matter of fact, defendant De Dios was aware of his task to file his answer to the instant complaint within the time constraint provided by the Rules as can be gleaned from his motion through his counsel, Atty. Mundin, reading thus: 2. Undersigned counsel was informed by defendant that the LAST DAY FOR FILING HIS ANSWER AND/OR RESPONSIVE PLEADING IS TOMORROW, 13 July 1984, the summons and copy of the complaint having been received by herein defendant on 28 June, 1984' (par. 2, Entry of Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading, page 38, record; capitalization supplied). And yet, in spite of this consciousness upon receipt of the summons directing him within fifteen days after service to answer complaint, and also to serve a copy of said answer, within the same period, and failure to do so, judgment by default may be taken against him, still he (De Dios) did not upon receipt of the Amended Complaint sent on 13 July, 1984, and received by him four days after, on 17 July, 1984, rush to his counsel and handed to the latter the said amended complaint so that he would not run the risk of being declared in default. As it turned out, it was only when he filed, thru Atty. Defensor, his Motion For New trial on June 5, 1985, that he disclosed the fact that he did not consult his counsel as regards his receipt of the amended complaint (or 11 months and 18 days from July 17, 1984).This circumstance or inattention on his part simply demonstrates that defendant De Dios did not exercise due diligence and concern on the matter as an ordinary prudent person would do in order to have his answer filed within the reglementary period. Practical wisdom in taking care of one's affairs dictates that he should pay attention to the summons and at once see his lawyer without any delay. He did not. And so he has only himself to blame for the consequences of his act in treating the summons and complaint served upon him for granted. This court can do no less than to withhold exercising its discretion in his favor, it being convinced that said defendant's actuations of delay as pictured above can only be subsumed as one "not excusable negligence, mistake or accident."On the merits, the petition must also fail.The petitioner argues that the private respondent has no cause of action for rescission and contends that the proper action is for reformation of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Addendum.In the Memorandum of Agreement, the petitioner assigned to the private respondent the property rights he had acquired under Board Resolution No. 939B-82, subject to the following terms and conditions: 1. The down payment of 20% for the purchase of the land (P700,000.00) from the Philippine Veterans Bank shall be paid by the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART through the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, on or before ___________, so that the latter could obtain a conditional sale of the property from the bank.2. The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART shall pay the sum of P1,000,000.00 to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART in the following manner:a. P500,000.00 upon payment of the 20% downpayment over the land;b. P500,000.00 in five (5) equal installments for a period of five (5) months beginning on the date of this agreement.FINAL ASSIGNMENT: The sale by the bank of the property to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART being conditioned upon the payment of the 20% down payment shall, upon fulfillment thereof, obligate the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART thereupon to automatically execute in favor of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART a deed of assignment over the said property.We find that the above-quoted conditions, specifically the stipulation in the last paragraph, are susceptible of only one interpretation. The plain meaning is that upon the down payment of the amount of P700,000.00 to the Philippine Veterans Bank by Lopingco, De Dios, as the first party, shall execute in favor of Lopingco, as the second party, a deed of assignment over the property subject of the agreement.The petitioner does not deny that he has not executed that deed. He submits, though, that it was the private respondent who violated the express terms of the contracts for failing and refusing to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to the petitioner upon his payment of the 20% downpayment to Philippine Veterans Bank. We are not persuaded. What we read from the agreement is that the private respondent shall pay the P500,000.00 to the petitioner only upon execution by the latter of the deed of assignment in favor of the private respondent as required by the above-quoted last paragraph. Otherwise, the private respondent would be paying P700,000.00 to the Philippine Veterans Bank and P500,000.00 to the petitioner without one single document to prove that the property rights acquired by the petitioner under Board Resolution No. 939B-82 no longer belong to him but have already been transferred to Lopingco.Under the circumstances of this case, there is no question that the private respondent could avail himself of the remedy of rescission as authorized under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, thus:Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.Interpreting this article in the case of Universal Food Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 11 we stated that "rescission will be ordered only where the breach complained of is so substantial as to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the agreement." In the case at bar, we find that the non-performance by the petitioner of his obligation to execute the deed of assignment, which has not been denied, was a substantial breach that warranted rescission.We again quote the trial court with approval:If there be any actionable wrong under the facts obtaining hereunder it would be the act of defendant J. Artie Vergel de Dios. By entering into the contract (Memorandum-Agreement and its Addendum) conveying his rights arising from Veterans Bank Board Resolution No. 9391-82 and having succeeded in having the plaintiff agree thereto on the assurance that defendant de Dios will be able to procure the approval and conformity of the Bank, of which he was not able to do so, and his subsequent receipt of the partial consideration of P700,000.00 and an additional amount of P25,000.00 knowing fully well that he could not transfer or convey his rights is a wrong, enforceable against him.Under the facts presented, rescission is the proper remedy and as provided for under Art. 1385 of the New Civil Code: Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore." In the case at bar, the plaintiff is very well entitled to the rescission of the Memorandum-Agreement and its Addendum, in fact the plaintiff was never in possession of the object of said contract as title and possession thereto cannot be transferred by the defendant de Dios, and pursuant to the same provision the plaintiff is likewise entitled to an indemnity for damages.The petitioner submits that by claiming that the agreements did not reflect the true intention of the parties, the private respondent thereby limited his recourse to reformation of the contract. We think not. Given a choice of remedies, the private respondent had a right to reject reformation of the contract as an available option and to choose rescission instead as the more effective relief for the protection of his interests.In demanding that the trial court serve new summons upon him because of the amendment of the complaint, the petitioner manifested his bad faith all too clearly. The amendment made was not substantial and did not change the original complaint so as to require the service of new summons upon him. Even if it was, it has been established that a copy of the amended complaint had been legally delivered to and received by him and that he in fact referred it to his counsel, albeit, through his own negligence, not soon enough. He cannot now claim that he was unaware of the amended complaint and was thus unable to answer it. That is a rank pretense. The trial court was not obliged to perform a charade. Courts do not lend themselves to empty gestures or useless rituals that can only impede the speedy a administration of justice. The petitioner's pious invocation of due process is nothing short of heretical and deserves to be dismissed.In these circumstances, the petitioner cannot complain that the damages awarded against him are excessive. Indeed they are not, and we sustain them completely.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

Section 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. (4a)Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (5a)Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading. (6a)Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. When any pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be filed. (7a)Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. (n)