rules and francisco impeachment

8/11/2019 Rules and Francisco Impeachment

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Republic of the PhilippinesHOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES

Manila

15th Congress

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

RULE IAPPLICABILITY OF RULES

Section 1. Applicability of Rules. - These Rules shall apply to allproceedings for impeachment in the House of Representativesagainst the President, Vice-President, the Members of theSupreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissionsand the Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution,treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes orbetrayal of public trust.

RULE IIINITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shallbe initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committeeon Justice of: *

(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by anyMember of the House of Representatives; or

(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon aresolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachmentfiled by at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of theHouse.

Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. - A verifiedcomplaint for impeachment by a Member of the House or by any

citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereofshall be filed with the office of the Secretary General andimmediately referred to the Speaker.

The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business withinten (10) session days from receipt. It shall then be referred to theCommittee on Justice within three (3) session days thereafter.

RULE IIIFINDING A PROBABLE CAUSE

A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. -Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determinewhether the complaint is sufficient in from and substance. If thecommittee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shallreturn the same to the Secretary General within three (3) sessiondays with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The SecretaryGeneral shall return the same to the complaint(s) together withthe committee's written explanation within three (3) session daysfrom receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaintinsufficient in form.

Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shallthen determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. Therequirement of substance is met if there is a recital of factsconstituting the offense charged and determinative of the

jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that thecomplaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss thecomplaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.

Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If thecommittee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, itshall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of theresolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, withwritten notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to thecomplaint(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within theperiod to answer the complaint.

The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmativedefenses. If the respondent fails or refuses to file an answerwithin the reglementary period, he/she is deemed to have

interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) daysfrom receipt of the answer, the complainant may file a reply,serving a copy thereof to the respondent who may file a rejoinderwithin three (3) days from receipt of the reply, serving a copythereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply,all the material allegations in the answer are deemedcontroverted. Together with their pleadings, the parties shall filetheir affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may be, with theirdocumentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shallbe subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on

Justice or the Secretary General. Notwithstanding all theforegoing, failure presenting evidence in support of his/herdefenses.

When there are more than one respondent, each shall befurnished with copy of the verified complaint from a Member of theHouse or a copy of the verified complaint from a private citizentogether with the resolution of endorsement by a Member of theHouse of Representatives and a written notice to answer and inthat case, reference to respondent in these Rules shall beunderstood as respondents.

Section 6. Submission of Evidences and Memoranda. - Afterreceipt of the pleadings and affidavits and counter-affidavits andrelevant documents provided for in Section 5, or the expiration ofthe time within which they may be filed, the Committee shalldetermine whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds forimpeachment.

If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, theCommittee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the reportrequired hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient groundsfor impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a hearing. Tothat end, the Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit theperiod of examination and cross-examination. The Committeeshall have the power to issue compulsory processes for theattendance of witnesses as well as the production of documentsand other related evidence.

The hearing before the Committee shall be open to the publicexcept when the security of the State or public interest requires

that the hearing be held in executive session.

After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require thesubmission of memoranda, after which the matter shall besubmitted for resolution.

Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. - The Housemay, upon proper petition, provide adequate protection to acomplainant or witness if it is shown that his/her personal safety isin jeopardy because of his/her participation in an impeachmentproceeding.

Section 8. Report and Recommendation. - The Committee onJustice after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,shall submit its report to the House containing its findings and

recommendations within sixty (60) session days from the referralto it of the verified complaint and/or resolution. Together with thereport shall be a formal resolution of the Committee regarding thedisposition of the complaint which shall be calendar forconsideration by the House within ten (10) session days fromreceipt thereof.

If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Membersthat a probable cause exists, it shall submit with its report aresolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the basisof the evidence adduced before the Committee. Otherwise, thecomplaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 11 of these Rules.

Section 9. Report to be Calendared. - The Committee on Rulesshall calendar the report and the accompanying resolution of theCommittee on Justice regarding the disposition of the complaint inaccordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives. TheHouse shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session daysfrom its submission by the Committee on Justice.

B. HOUSE ACTION

Section 10. Vote Required for Approval. - A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House is necessary for theapproval of the resolution setting forth the Articles ofImpeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, itshall then be endorsed to the Senate for its trial.
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On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure theapproval by the required vote, the same result in the dismissal ofthe complaint for impeachment.

Section 11 . Where Dismissal Recommended. - When the reportof the Committee on Justice dismisses the complaint, it shallsubmit to the House a resolution for the dismissal of the verifiedcomplaint and/or resolution of impeachment. A vote of at leastone-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall benecessary to override such resolution, in which case theCommittee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the Articles ofImpeachment.

Section 12 . Vote by Roll Call. - The voting on a favorableresolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee onJustice or a contrary resolution shall be by roll call, and theSecretary General shall records the vote of each Member.

RULE IVVERIFIED COMPLAINT/RESOLUTION BY ONE-THIRD OF

MEMBERS

Section 13. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to theSenate. - A verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed byat least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shallconstitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case theverified complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate inthe same manner as an approved bill of the House.

The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified andsworn to before the Secretary General by each of the Membersconstituting at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House.

The contents of the verification shall be as follows:

"We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state:That we are the complainants in the above-entitledcomplaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused thesaid complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read thecontents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of ourown knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading andappreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.

___________________(Signature)

RULE VBAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. - No impeachment proceedings shallbe initiated against the same official more than once within aperiod of one (1) year.

RULE VI

PROSECUTOR IN ALL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

Section 15. Impeachment Prosecutor. - The House ofRepresentatives shall act as the sole prosecutor at the trial in theSenate through a committee of eleven (11) Members thereof tobe elected by a majority vote.

RULE VIIAPPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 16. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of CriminalProcedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable,apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

Adopted, 3 August 2010Published, September 2, 2010

End Note

* The Supreme Court decision in Francisco et al. vs.House of Representatives (GR No. 160261, 10November 2003), states that Impeachment proceedingsare initiated upon filing of the complaint and/orresolution and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J .:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it mayappear to be, over the determination by the independentbranches of government of the nature, scope and extent of theirrespective constitutional powers where the Constitution itselfprovides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nations history is repl ete with vivid illustrations of theoften frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationshipamong these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted withone such today involving the legislature and the judiciary whichhas drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not afew of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to thecharacterization that the present controversy subject of the instantpetitions whether the filing of the second impeachmentcomplaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with theHouse of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided inthe Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a politicalquestion has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even moretruth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis ofconscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that ourConstitution is sufficient to address all the issues which thiscontroversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, atthe first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutionalmethods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legallypermissible. Both its resolution and protection of the publicinterest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from thecontroversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth thatthe inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by nomeans prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by eachof that part of the governmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks andbalances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitutionto temper the official acts of each of these three branches mustbe given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines ofrepublican government, intended as they are to insure thatgovernmental power is wielded only for the good of the people,mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordinationamong these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unityof governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest andwell-being of the people. Verily,salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers andemployees must at all times be accountable to the people, servethem with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members ofthe Supreme Court, the Members of the ConstitutionalCommissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office,on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of theConstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other highcrimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers andemployees may be removed from office as provided by law, butnot by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall havethe exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by anyMember of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon aresolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall beincluded in the Order of Business within ten session days, andreferred to the proper Committee within three session daysthereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority voteof all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixtysession days from such referral, together with the corresponding
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resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration bythe House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the Houseshall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the

Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contraryresolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment

is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, thesame shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by theSenate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against thesame official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide allcases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, theSenators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President ofthe Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Courtshall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convictedwithout the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of theSenate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend furtherthan removal from office and disqualification to hold any officeunder the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shallnevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, andpunishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment toeffectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of theConstitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representativesadopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in ImpeachmentProceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,2001, superseding the previous House ImpeachmentRules [1]approved by the 11 th Congress. The relevant distinctionsbetween these two Congresses House Impeachment Rules areshown in the following tabulation:

11 TH CONGRESS RULES 12 TH CONGRESS NEW RULES RULE II

INITIATINGIMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode ofIni t iat ingImpeachment . Impeachment shallbe initiated only by averified complaint forimpeachment filed by anyMember of the House ofRepresentatives or by anycitizen upon a resolutionof endorsement by anyMember thereof or by averified complaint orresolution ofimpeachment filed by atleast one-third (1/3) of allthe Members of theHouse.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATIONOF IMPEACHMENT

PROCEEDINGS AGAINSTTHE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. ImpeachmentProceedings DeemedInitiated . Incases where a Memberof the House files averified complaint ofimpeachment or acitizen files a verifiedcomplaint that isendorsed by a Memberof the House through aresolution ofendorsement against animpeachableofficer, impeachmentproceedings againstsuch official are deemed

initiated on the day theCommittee on Justicefinds that the verifiedcomplaint and/orresolution against suchofficial, as the case maybe, is sufficient insubstance, or on thedate the House votes tooverturn or affirm thefinding of the saidCommittee that theverified complaint

and/or resolution, as thecase may be, is notsufficient in substance.

In cases where a verifiedcomplaint or a resolutionof impeachment is filed orendorsed, as the casemay be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members

of theHouse,impeachmentproceedings aredeemed initiated at thetime of the filing of suchverified complaint orresolution ofimpeachment with theSecretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINSTIMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of

B ar . No impeachmentproceedings shall beinitiated against thesame official more thanonce within the periodof one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar AgainstIni t iat ion Of ImpeachmentProceedings . Within a periodof one (1) year from the dateimpeachment proceedings aredeemed initiated as provided inSection 16 hereof, no

impeachment proceedings, assuch, can be initiated againstthe same official . (Italics in theoriginal; emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted aResolution,[2] sponsored by Representative Felix William D.Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conductan investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner ofdisbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). [3]

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filedan impeachment complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint)against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate

Justices[5]

of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitution,betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. [6] The complaintwas endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to theHouse Committee on Justice on August 5, 200 3[8] in accordancewith Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed byany Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizenupon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, whichshall be included in the Order of Business within ten sessiondays, and referred to the proper Committee within three sessiondays thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majorityvote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House withinsixty session days from such referral, together with thecorresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for

consideration by the House within ten session days from receiptthereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 thatthe first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, [9] butvoted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for beinginsufficient in substance.[10] To date, the Committee Report to thiseffect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary inaccordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of theConstitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after theHouse Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the secondimpeachment complaint[11] was filed with the Secretary General ofthe House [12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (FirstDistrict, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated byabove-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachmentcomplaint was accompanied by a Resolution ofEndorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one -third (1/3) ofall the Members of the House of Representatives .[13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House ofRepresentatives, et. al. , most of which petitions contend that thefiling of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional asit violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of theConstitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
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against the same official more than once within a period of oneyear.

In G.R. No. 160261 , petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco,Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Barof the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop anunconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in hispetition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are oftranscendental importance, and that he himself was a victim ofthe capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the12th Congress, [14] posits that his right to bring an impeachmentcomplaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had beenviolated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the HouseImpeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V,Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereofbe declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ ofmandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of theConstitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/orstrike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and topromulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and(3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House ofRepresentatives from proceeding with the second impeachmentcomplaint.

In G.R. No. 160262 , petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et.al. , as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the caseare of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition forCertiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetuallyprohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any

Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with theSenate; and for the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibitingrespondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon fromaccepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justiceor, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, fromproceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263 , petitioners Arturo M. de Castro andSoledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers andmembers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging thattheir petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involvesthe use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment

trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuanceof a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting furtherproceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277 , petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, allegingthat this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bringpetitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.PCGG [15] and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay DevelopmentCorporation ,[16] prays in his petition for Injunction that the secondimpeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292 , petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al. ,as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in theirpetition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent Houseof Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving andtransmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the

Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.In G.R. No. 160295 , petitioners Representatives Salacnib

F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that,as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legalinterest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachmentproceedings are initiated, pray in their petition forCertiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint andany act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310 , petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonsoet al. ,claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms ofsenseless spending of taxpayers money and that they have anobligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, andthe integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorariand Prohibition that it is instituted as a class suit and pray that(1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment

complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom bedeclared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate andthe Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, tryingand deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writof prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agentsto desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on theimpeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318 , petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc.,whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitionerCrispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of thePhilippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not statewhat its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment

complaint involves paramount public interest and pray thatSections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and thesecond impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment bedeclared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342 , petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito,as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association andof the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for theissuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent

Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives fromproceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343 , petitioner Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code ofProfessional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in itspetition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 ofRule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the HouseImpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that theHouse of Representatives be permanently enjoined fromproceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360 , petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Floresprays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the HouseImpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365 , petitioners U.P. Law Alumni CebuFoundation Inc., et. al ., in their petition for Prohibition andInjunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of allcitizens, citing Oposa v. Factora n [17] which was filed in behalf ofsucceeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writprohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senatefrom conducting further proceedings on the second impeachmentcomplaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional thesecond impeachment complaint and the acts of respondentHouse of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters ofthe Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370 , petitioner-taxpayer Father RanhilioCallangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition forProhibition are of national and transcendental significance andthat as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has adirect and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of theSupreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties inaccordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writprohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the

Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate fromreceiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint duecourse.

In G.R. No. 160376 , petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as ataxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondentsFuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the secondimpeachment complaint, were absolutely without any legal powerto do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles ofImpeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the ChiefJustice to disburse the (JDF).

In G.R. No. 160392 , petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Floresand Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law theyhave an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petitionfor Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issuewhich they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students,pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined fromendorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachmentand that the second impeachment complaint be declared null andvoid.

In G.R. No. 160397 , petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr.,without alleging hislocus standi , but alleging that the secondimpeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or notthe Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordancewith law and that the House of Representatives does not haveexclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, praysin his petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack ofCause of Action and Jurisdiction that the second impeachmentcomplaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403 , petitioner Philippine Bar Association,alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the secondimpeachment complaint involve matters of transcendentalimportance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1)the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arisingtherefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House ofRepresentatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles ofImpeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate beprohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and fromconducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405 , petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et.al. , as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition forCertiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
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as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by therespondent House of Representatives be declared null and voidand (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilonbe prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment againstthe Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted thesame, that they be prohibited from proceeding with theimpeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261,160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were

filed before this Court,[18]

prayed for the issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent theHouse of Representatives from transmitting the Articles ofImpeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint tothe Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001House Impeachment Rules as null and void for beingunconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277,160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket numberG.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (callingfor a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justiceof the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation ofpowers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle offiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of theHouse of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the secondimpeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, butit was not carried because the House of Representativesadjourned for lack of quorum,[19] and as reflected above, to date,the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to theSenate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which werefiled on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitugoffered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected theiroffer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directedhim to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, thisCourt in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House ofRepresentatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General,to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5,2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal expertsas amici curiae .[20] In addition, this Court called on petitioners andrespondents to maintain the status quo , enjoining all the partiesand others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committingacts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House ofRepresentatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/orits co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted aManifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, whichis an independent and co-equal branch of government under the

Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionallymandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motionto Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela )[21] and Comment, praying thatthe consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction ofthe Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedingsand that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senateas the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, berecognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI ofthe Constitution. [22]

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed,this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlierconsolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file theircomment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003 , the Senate of the Philippines,through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestationstating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainlypremature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as ofthe time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue waspresented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constituteitself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receiptof the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) theprincipal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to theproceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petitionfor Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the statusquo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on theground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court ina constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all thepetitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicialdetermination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and

Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion for Leaveof Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein IncorporatedPetition in Intervention.

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mgaManananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc . filed a Motionfor Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, WorldWar II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed aPetition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos.160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both SenatorPimentels Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and QuadrasPetition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views ofthe amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenorsSenator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General

Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisoryissued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may beinvoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; andwhether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) Houses exclusive power to initiateall cases of impeachment;

e) Senates sole power to try anddecide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules onImpeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5)of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary andsubstantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as themyriad arguments and opinions presented for and against thegrant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted anddetermined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novelissue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends tothose arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or notthe essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of

judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issuesyet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim .

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court toexercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity ofthe second impeachment complaint.

This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of ourpresent 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
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and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustivelyexpounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936case of Angara v. Electoral Commissio n [23] after the effectivity ofthe 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the presentConstitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII,Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, JusticeLaurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the greatlandmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if notentirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is t heonly constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine theproper allocation of powers between the several departments andamong the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfectionand perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is theexpression of their sovereignty however limited, has establi shed arepublican government intended to operate and function as a harmoniouswhole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specificlimitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.TheConstitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions andlimitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If theserestrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivableif the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which todirect the course of government along constitutional channels , forthen the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rightsmere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good governmentmere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictionsembodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any livingconstitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant isfound in their constitution,the possession of this moderating power ofthe courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, hasbeen set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one anda half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if notexpressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of ourConstitution .

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? TheConstitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciaryas the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocateconstitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over theother departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of thelegislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assignedto it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authorityunder the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an act ualcontroversy the rights which that i nstrument secures and guaranteesto them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicialsupremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under theConstitution . Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actualcases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argumentby the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or thevery lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead todialectics and barren legal questions and to steril e conclusions unrelated toactualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does notpass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Morethan that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative

enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actualcases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the peopleas expressed through their representatives in the executive and l egislativedepartments of the governmen t.[24] (Italics in the original; emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power todetermine the proper allocation of powers of the differentbranches of government and to direct the course of governmentalong constitutional channels is inherent in all courts [25] as anecessary consequence of the judicial power itself , which is thepower of the court to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable. [26]

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicialreview is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by itsConstitution, such power has been set at rest by popularacquiescence for a period of more than one and a halfcenturies. To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading caseof Marbury v. Madiso n [27] that the power of judicial review was firstarticulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shallbe the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; andnot the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall bemade in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the UnitedStates confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential

to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution isvoid; and that cour ts , as well as other departments, are bound by thatinstrument .[28] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before itsexpress grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicialreview was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionallyinfirm acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted political law professorand former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza ,[30] theexecutive and legislative branches of our government in fact

effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, andtheir violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with theConstitution, the former shall be void and the latter shallgovern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulationsshall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws orthe Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission ,[31] judicialreview is indeed an integral component of the delicate system ofchecks and balances which, together with the corollary principleof separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican formof government and insures that its vast powers are utilized onlyfor the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in oursystem of government. It obtains not through express provisionbut by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its

jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does notfollow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separateand distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutelyunrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitutionhas provided for an elaborate system of checks and balancesto secure coordination in the workings of the variousdepartments of the government. x x x And the judiciary inturn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectivelychecks the other departments in the exercise of its power todetermine the law, and hence to declare executive andlegislative acts void if violative of theConstitution .[32] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court JusticeFlorentino Feliciano, x x x j udicial review is essential for themaintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers andthe balancing of powers among the three great departments ofgovernment through the definition and maintenance of theboundaries of authority and control between them. [33] To him,[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the o nly, medium ofparticipation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary inthat balancing operation. [34]

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review tocurb grave abuse of discretion by any branch orinstrumentalities of government , the afore -quoted Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into itshistory, into block letter law the so-calledexpanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, the nature of andrationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from thesponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief JusticeConstitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

x x x

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. Itsays:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lowercourts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first andexplain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
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of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part orinstrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of ourexperience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has someantecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposedregime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in anumber of cases against the government, which then had no legaldefense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of politicalquestions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principlesconcerning particularly the writ ofhabeas corpus , that is, the authority ofcourts to order the release of poli tical detainees, and other matters relatedto the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government setup the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: Well,since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it. The Committeeon the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of t hequestions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment uponthe rights of the people, but it, i n effect, encouraged further violationsthereof during the martial law regime. x x x

x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of theagencies and offices of the government as well as those of itsofficers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on thequestion whether or not a branch of government or any of its officialshas acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or socapriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting toexcess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicialpower but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that thecourts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature,by claiming that such matters constitute a political question .

[35] (Italicsin the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs thewell-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis , that is, wherever possible, the words used in theConstitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure

Administration ,[36] this Court, speaking through Chief Justice EnriqueFernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for itsmeaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where webegin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutionalprovisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed in which case the significance thus attached tothem prevails . As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document , itbeing essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present inthe peoples consciousn ess, its language as much as possible should beunderstood in the sense they have in common use. What it saysaccording to the text of the provision to be construed compelsacceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on thepostulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus theseare the cases where the need for construction is reduced to aminimum.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The wordsof the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of itsframers. And so did this Court apply this principle inCivil Liberties Union v.Executive Secretar y [38] in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intentionunderlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held thatthe Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object soughtto be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to beprevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light ofthe history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under whichthe Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason whichinduced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particularprovision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, inorder to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to thatreason and calculated to effect that purpose .[39] (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied supplied)

As it did inNitafan v. Commissioner on InternalRevenu e [40] where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with thefundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent ofthe framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should begiven effect . The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertainand thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and ofthe people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safelyassumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guidedmainly by the explanation offered by the framers .

[41] (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon ,[42] this Court,through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not havededicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of oneperson without considering that it could also affect others. Whenthey adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that saidprovision should function to the full extent of its substance and itsterms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisionsof that great document .[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary ,[44] thisCourt affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no oneprovision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, tobe considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon aparticular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpretedas to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sectionsbearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpretedtogether as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution andone section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by anyreasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and mustlean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory .[45] (Emphasissupplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to beclear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same caseof Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary , this Courtexpounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult thedebates andproceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at thereason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may behad only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless tovary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debatesin the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of theindividual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but theygive us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, muchless of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave thatinstrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe theconstitution from what appears upon its face." The properinterpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood bythe people adopting it than in the framers's understandingthereof .

[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop ofconstitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of thepower of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.al . and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument thatthe Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from thecoverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker DeVenecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannotassume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue orincident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding isbeyond the reach of judicial review.[47]

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that theSenates sole power to try impeachment case s [48] (1) entirelyexcludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)necessarily includes the Senates power to determineconstitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings .[49]

In furthering their arguments on the proposition thatimpeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicialreview, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenorSenator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principallythe majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States .[50] Thus,they contend that the exercise of judicial review overimpeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter tothe framers de cision to allocate to different fora the powers to tryimpeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checksand balances, under which impeachment is the only legislativecheck on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality anddifficulty in fashioning relief .[51] Respondents likewise point todeliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate

judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and Americanauthorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that theSenates sole power to try and decide impeachment cases, asprovided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is atextually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issuespertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusionof the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave
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abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonablysupport the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon theSenate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutionalquestions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are nolonger controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limitedpersuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law isconcerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC ,[52] [i]n

resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not bebeguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardlyapplicable because they have been dictated by differentconstitutional settings and needs. [53] Indeed, although thePhilippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the UnitedStates, their paths of development have long since diverged. Inthe colorful words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilicalcord.

The major difference between the judicial power of thePhilippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of judicial review is onlyimpliedly granted tothe U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, thatgranted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts,as expressly provided for in the Constitution , is not just a powerbut also a duty , and it was given an expanded definition toinclude the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the

part of any government branch or instrumentality.There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to thepower of the House of Representatives over impeachmentproceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power ofimpeachment to the House of Representatives withoutlimitation,[54] our Constitution, though vesting in the House ofRepresentatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachmentcases ,[55] provides for several limitations to the exercise of suchpower as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XIthereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, requiredvote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of oneand the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review ofimpeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to

conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they callupon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principlethat whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgmentof the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well theperils of judicial willfulness and pride. [56]

But did not the people also express their will when theyinstituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution?This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matterof impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, itprovided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Bakerv. Carr ,[57] judicially discoverable standards for determining thevalidity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of

judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Ynigue z [58] and Alejandrino v.Quezon ,[59] cited by respondents in support of the argument that

the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review,are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions forwrits ofmandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of

judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Courtexercised the power of judicial review over congressionalaction. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr .,[60] this Court ruled thatit is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquirewhether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of theConstitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of theirfunctions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara ,[61] in seeking tonullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that itcontravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a

justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislativebranch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it

becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary tosettle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda ,[62] this Court declared nulland void a resolution of the House of Representativeswithdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of acongressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal forbeing violative of Section 17, Article VI of theConstitution. InCoseteng v. Mitra ,[63] it held that the resolution ofwhether the House representation in the Commission on

Appointments was based on proportional representation of thepolitical parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of theConstitution is subject to judicial review. InDaza v. Singson ,[64] itheld that the act of the House of Representatives in removing thepetitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to

judicial review. InTanada v. Cuenco ,[65] it held that although underthe Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively inCongress, this does not detract from the power of the courts topass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.Electoral Commission ,[66] it ruled that confirmation by the National

Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whetherhis election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of amember of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for thecontention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachmentproceedings would upset the system of checks andbalances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a wholeand one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. [67] Bothare integral components of the calibrated system of independenceand interdependence that insures that no branch of governmentact beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission , thecourts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferredby the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1)an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicialpower; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing tochallenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as aresult of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality mustbe raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases andcontroversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by theparties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or thevery lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead todialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated toactualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does notpass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Morethan that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislativeenactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actualcases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the peopleas expressed through their representatives in the executive and l egislativedepartments of the governmen t.[68] (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that the partyhas sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged. The gist of thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges such personalstake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions.[69]

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of thepetitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing sinceonly the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain directpersonal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister andSolicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts thatpetitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,legislators in cases involving paramount public interest[70] andtranscendental importance ,[71] and that procedural matters aresubordinate to the need to determine whether or not the otherbranches of the government have kept themselves within the

limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have notabused the discretion given to them .[72] Amicus curiae Dean RaulPangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion,citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched ruleexception that, when the real party in interest is unable tovindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the caseof the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himselfinvoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grantpetitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is aconcept of civil procedur e [73] while the latter has constitutionalunderpinnings.[74] In view of the arguments set forth regarding
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