russia's security relations with the west

8/3/2019 Russia's Security Relations With the West

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RUSSIAS SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE WEST:

IDENTITIES AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS FROM PUTIN TO

MEDVEDEV

Dr Javier Morales

Senior Associate Member

St Antonys College, University of Oxford

Paper presented at the 3rd

Global International Studies Conference

Porto, Portugal, 1720 August 2011

Work in progress Please do not quote

Abstract: Perceptions of external threats to national security are determined by the

states own conception of its identity as an international actor. In this paper, we argue

that the evolution of Russias relations with the West has been influenced by competing

definitions of Moscows role in the world, which we have called great power

(derzhava), Eurasian civilisation or European country. Although there are many

similarities between these conceptions, they differ in their specific location of the West

within the ally-rival-enemy continuum, as the main Other in relation to which Russian

identity is still defined. We compare their respective influence during the Putin and

Medvedev presidencies, as they appeared in the official discourse on foreign and

security policy. Our conclusions are twofold: first, the Russian elites have primarily

viewed their country as a great power which should remain an autonomous international


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actor, although there is also an increasing recognition of common threats that implies a

rejection of essentialist Eurasianist views, incompatible with cooperation with the West.

Secondly, Moscow has not only been concerned by safeguarding its territory, resources

or population, but also by the ideational security of its international role. This has

caused challenges to Russias great power identity to be perceived as equally important

for national interests as more traditional, material threats; and intertwined with them.

1. INTRODUCTION

Perceptions of external threats to national security are determined by the states own

conception of its identity as an international actor. In this paper, we argue that the

evolution of Russias relations with the West has been influenced by competing

definitions of Moscows role in the world, which we have called great power

(derzhava), Eurasian civilisation or European country. Although there are many

similarities between these conceptions, they differ in their specific location of the West

within the ally-rival-enemy continuum, as the main Other in relation to which Russian

identity is still defined. We compare their respective influence during the Putin and

Medvedev presidencies, as they appeared in the official discourse on foreign and

security policy.

Russias views of its own role as a great power have caused many observers, both inside

and outside the country, to fear an increased confrontation with other states over world

influence. These political rivalries have been often defined in security terms, presenting

Moscow and the West as having incompatible identities and goals, therefore becoming a


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threat to each other. In this paper, we adopt a conventional constructivist approach to

analyse the relationship between Russias own identities as an international actor and its

attitudes toward the West. We will explore the ideational component of the Kremlins

threat perceptions, in order to show how questions of status and prestige have been

securitised to become national security issues, to the same extent as traditional defence

against armed attacks. Finally, we will try to assess the prospects for a shift in mutual

perceptions as a result of President Medvedevs rapprochement toward the US and

Europe.

The analysis of Russias security policy in Western think tanks and academia has been

traditionally dominated by a realist approach, especially during the Cold War. However,

as other theories of International Relations (IR) have shown, realism emphasizes the

competitive nature of an anarchical political system, therefore adding a certain bias

towards non-cooperative behaviour in a states foreign policy. The result is that, even

when an author does not purposefully adopt a realist framework for analysis, there are

often realist assumptions about Moscows motives and goals that are not explicitly

acknowledged.

2. ROLES, IDENTITIES AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS

2.1. The ideational turn in International Relations theory

The consideration of identities understood here as the ideas and conceptions of an

international actor about itself and its position in relation to others as a source of

foreign policy is one of the main issues in the current fourth debate in IR theory,


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starting with the critical reaction against neorealism by reflectivist authors. Even before,

the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) emphasised the importance of

individual decision-makers, as the point of intersection between material/structural

factors and the ideas that determine state behaviour (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 2002: 59;

Hudson, 2007: 7-9).

As several authors have argued (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4; Hyde-Price, 2000:

23), realist theorists apply a rational choice logic that assumes that actors always try to

maximise their benefit, which is interpreted in terms of power and influence. According

to Waltz (1979), states that act following this strategy are more successful than those

who do not; therefore, power maximisation becomes the guiding principle of the

international system. Consequently, the role of decision-makers is reduced from this

point of view to acting according to their states relative international position, with a

very narrow room for manoeuvre (Webber and Smith, 2002: 53).

However, this does not sufficiently explain the variation among foreign and security

policies of all states, which are treated as like units. It also ignores the redefinition of

national interests very comprehensive in some cases that takes place whenever a

new government takes office. Although most, if not all, political leaders would probably

agree with the abstract principle of power maximisation, this is not always defined in

terms of material capabilities. Moreover, policies designed to achieve their goals can

vary greatly depending on the decision-makers perceptions of that is, their ideas

about national interests. Both ideational and material factors influence andconstitute

foreign and security policy: actors interpret and attribute meaning to power according to

their own ideas, rather than taking the capabilities of others and their own at face value.


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The fourth debate has stimulated constructivist and poststructuralist theories (for

example, Wendt, 1999; Hansen, 2006) that stress the importance of ideas as an

explanatory factor in IR, criticising the excessive attention by neorealists to the

distribution of material capabilities. These authors consider that national interests are

not given by the structure of the international system, but are constituted by identities

which are, in turn, constructed and reconstructed within the interactions between actors

(Wendt, 1992).

Social constructivism has emphasised that ideational structures condition state

behaviour as well as material structures. According to them, national interests are not

given by the material distribution of power in the international system, which according

to neorealism would make all actors try to increase their relative power vis--vis the

others. On the contrary, far from being like units, every state perceives itself and the

international environment according to its own identities, which constitute its definition

of national interests. Therefore, its identities are not automatically derived from its

degree of relative power, but are the result of a social construction (Agius, 2010: 50-51;

Wendt, 1992).

Constructivists share with other approaches, like poststructuralism, the argument that

reality is not completely separated from the observer that analyses it: social phenomena

are the product of a process that makes us perceive them as such. Agents and structures

mutually constitute each other; the anarchical international system is not objectively

such, but is a consequence of the actors behaviour and of a specific perception of


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national interests. In this way, constructivism can be more efficient in explaining

changes in the international system than realism (Agius, 2010: 50-51, 59).

For these authors, identities define who actors are, and therefore what their interests are.

Identities are shared ideas, intersubjective meanings not pre-existent realities that

are formed in the interaction between actors. Consequently, interests are endogenous:

they arise from these relations, instead of being derived from the international

distribution of power: anarchy is what states make of it, according to Wendt. He

makes a distinction between three cultures of anarchy that have been predominant in

different historical times and places: a Hobbesian culture, where actors consider each

other as an enemy and force is the main power resource; a Lockean culture, where there

is only a rivalry as each actor is moved by its own interests; and a Kantian culture,

where actors are allies that wish to cooperate with each other, with shared norms that

are perceived as legitimate. However, the fact that there are shared ideas does not

necessarily cause cooperation to happen (Wendt, 1992; Agius, 2010: 53-54, 60-61).

Culture means in this sense the beliefs and values that are institutionalised in a society

and are assumed by political decisionmakers, influencing national identity and

behaviour towards other actors. Among these ideas are norms, both constitutive those

that define identity and regulatory, which establish certain limits to acceptable

behaviour. New ideas and norms are created by epistemic communities of experts,

which cause state learning and socialisation and influence the conduct of foreign policy

(Agius, 2010: 56-58).


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By analysing the official discourse, we can also find which role conceptions or ideas

about their own states position and identity as an international actor are linked to

specific foreign policy orientations (Holsti, 1970). This state-level and individual-level

perspective is still relevant today, as an alternative to the primacy of the international

system as the main explanatory factor in most rationalist and reflectivist approaches.

But, while FPA is focused on the individual/group ideas of foreign policy-making elites

as a source of state behaviour, constructivism argues that the ideational structure

culture, roles, norms and values cannot be disaggregated from society to the

individual level.

Consequently, although role identity is present in Wendts conventional

constructivism (Wendt, 1999), he does not agree that its origins can be traced to the

ideas of individual decisionmaker, but to society and culture as a whole. As identities

have a social origin and function, their meaning is intersubjective, not individual;

individual conceptions are dependent on the prescriptions and expectations of other

actors. Both constructivism and neorealism criticize FPA, considered to be reductionist:

for Waltz (1979), the main source of state behaviour is not domestic, but resides in

structural factors: the power distribution among states.

Despite these differences with regard to the level of analysis, constructivism and the

cognitive theories of FPA agree that there is no direct causal link between structural

factors and foreign policy-making, because the former are filtered by actors ideas and

beliefs (Hyde-Price, 2000: 23-24). In the case of Russia and Western powers, their

changing mutual perceptions and self-identities as international actors are not just ex

post facto justifications of their respective policies. On the contrary, they form the


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interpretative framework with which their leaders analyse the external environment and

define their national interests. Therefore, changes in Russias identity towards the West

are not just the consequence of a rivalry derived from the asymmetry of capabilities, but

also one of the causes that have made competition or cooperation possible.

2.2. The ideational turn in Security Studies

The identification of security with the military sector, and of national security with the

states power vis--vis the others (Buzan, 2007: 30), was fully accepted by the realist

approach that was dominant during the Cold War. Due to the geopolitical situation and

the demands of political decisionmakers at that time, security experts in the United

States and Western Europe considered that Security Studies was about the threat, use

and control of military force (Nye y Lynn-Jones, 1988: 6-7); assimilating them into

Strategic Studies, which Buzan (2007: 32) defines as the study of the effects of the

instruments of force in international relations. Therefore, the phenomena analysed by

security scholars were limited to war and the use of armed force, according to Walt

(1991: 212).

However, other authors such as Arnold Wolfers and Richard Ullman already pointed

out the insufficiency of such a limited definition. For Wolfers (1952: 484-485), security

measures the absence of threats to previously acquired values, without specifying that

the former must necessarily be military threats, or that the values to be protected must

exclusively be the states sovereignty and independence and the lives of its citizens. In

this regard, Ullman (1983: 133) criticised that military threats, and more broadly those


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coming from outside the state borders, were implicitly assumed to be more dangerous

for national security than those of a domestic origin.

These shortcomings became evident with the end of the Cold War, when the threat of an

armed conflict between the two superpowers disappeared as the main preoccupation. As

Baldwin (1995: 132) remarks, Security Studies did not have at that time adequate

instruments to analyse those international problems that had neither a military character

not a military solution1. The progressive broadening of the concept of security was

twofold: first, with regard to the type of threats including non-military ones and

second, with regard to the referent objects, now not limited to the state.

The main author of this renovation was Buzan, who started from neorealism and its

conception of international society as an anarchical system; although he did not identify

anarchy with the Hobbesian sense of an inevitability of conflict, but as simply the

absence of a central authority or world government above the states (Buzan, 2007: 38-

39; McSweeney, 1999: 52-55). However, in his bookPeople, States and Fear, he would

push forward a renovation of neorealisms state-centric approach, with security being

defined as the capacity by societies and states of maintaining their independent

identity and functional integrity against undesired, hostile changes (Buzan, 2007: 37).

This central role of sovereignty and independence, and the fact that it is states that make

security policy through their respective governments (Buzan, 2007: 258-263), still

implicitly accepts the primacy of the military sector and the idea of national security. In

1

However, as McSweeney (1999: 35) indicates, some realist authors already stressedthe existence of non-military threats to national security.


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this way, there are two fundamental types of security strategy: national focused on

reducing the states vulnerabilities to defend itself; for example, in the military

capabilities and international, neutralising potential threats by political means to

prevent them from affecting national security; for example by establishing alliances

with like-minded states. However, the second element in his definition the

preservation of the normal functioning of the state and society would allow him to

consider non-military threats and other referent objects apart from the state2.

Buzan considers that security is the absence of threats to a human collectivity, rather

than to an individual, so traditional nation-states who are also the actors who create

and maintain the international order in an anarchical system are still the main referent

object. However, as ethnic and political borders do not always coincide, he stresses the

need to take other actors into account: national groups and also humankind as a whole,

which is globally affected by certain military or environmental threats (Buzan, 2007:

37, 40). This multiplicity of referent objects that is, those collectivities that should

be protected against security threats takes the focus both towards the sub-state level

and towards international society.

In addition to that, the distinction that Buzan establishes between strong and weak

states according to their internal cohesion, governability and degree of liberty makes the

latter developing and/or non-democratic countries more difficult to analyse, as other

actors such as the ruling elite or the opposition groups take a special relevance. The

security concept at that moment the Cold War was determined by the situation of

2

Buzan gives priority to threats against collectivities and groups, rather than againstindividuals, which sets him apart from the debate on human security.


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Western powers, for which the main threats were external; this was not the case for

weak states. However, Buzan questions the degree to which domestic problems can be

legitimately treated as national security issues, as this can be used by non-democratic

regimes to legitimise their repressive policies (Buzan, 2007: 96-99). In this regard he

comes close to the concept of securitisation introduced by Wver.

Buzan also considers that threats to human collectivities are not limited to military

issues, but there are other four security sectors as well: political, economic, societal

and environmental. The military sector refers to the states armed capabilities; the

political sector includes its political system and the ideologies that give legitimacy to it;

the economic sector is concerned with having access to the necessary resources to

maintain an acceptable level of state power and social welfare; the societal sector is

about language, culture, religion and national identity; and the environmental sector

considers the biosphere as the essential support to all human activities (Buzan, 2007:

38).

It is nonetheless difficult to determine with sufficient clarity the respective areas of the

economic and environmental sectors. Furthermore, it is also necessary to keep the

military sector as a distinct area (Buzan et al., 1998: 2). In this way, Buzan creates a

distinction between traditional Strategic Studies, focused on military security, and the

broader International Security Studies, as a sub-discipline of International Relations that

would encompass all security sectors.

This conception implies that, although the state is the actor that decides and implements

security policy that is, the subject that makes security, countering risks and threats


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can be considered to be existential is in itself a subjective process: the same fact can be

considered as such or not in different moments and societies (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-

31); except for the most extreme scenarios, such as a direct armed aggression.

The process of securitisation consists of the intersubjective assumption through a

discourse that is accepted by its participants of the idea that a certain topic is not in the

realm of ordinary politics, but is a security issue, and therefore requires emergency

measures and resources beyond the normally permitted limits. This has the effect of

granting political leaders an ample room for manoeuvre to make decisions on that

subject. However, attempts at securitisation can also be unsuccessful, as not every actor

is able to transform an issue into a security problem, nor all referent objects have the

required legitimacy to present their disappearance as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 28-29,

36).

The relationship between an actors self-conceptions or identities and its perceptions of

risks and threats is explained by what some authors call ontological security, that is,

the need to preserve a relatively stable identity or sense of self through which we can

interpret the environment, define our interests and take decisions accordingly. In this

way, a states perceptions are not only concerned with material threats to the physical

existence of its population, territory or resources; but also with challenges to its own

ideas about itself and the role it plays in the international system (Mitzen, 2006: 342,

344, 351-352; McSweeney, 1999: 154-156). The idea of ontological security explains

the elements of continuity in different stages, in spite of the changes in the level of

relative power and available resources. Therefore, role identities and above all,

Russias self-perception as a great power have evolved much more slowly that this


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countrys international influence, determining the perception of certain factors as threats

to national security.

3. RUSSIAS PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO ITS WORLD ROLE

3.1. Role identities in Russias foreign policy thinking

There have been three main role identities that have influenced in one way or another

Russias foreign policy in the post-Soviet era. Here we call them Great Power,

Eurasian Civilisation and European Country, which correspond to a similar

terminology used in the scholarly literature: nationalists/derzhavniki/New Western

Russian/Responsible-Independent Great Power, national-patriots/Eurasianists/New

Soviet Russian, or liberal/Westernisers/Essentialist Liberal (see for example Light,

1996; Pravda, 2001; Hopf, 2002; Thorun, 2009). Grossman (2005) employs an

inductive methodology to identify 11 conceptions in the Russian official discourse,

every one of which can be ascribed to one of these three broad identities.

Role identities have provided Russian decisionmakers with different frameworks to

assess the international environment and detect risks and threats to national interests. At

the same time, the need for ontological security has prevented these identities from

adapting to international changes too quickly, therefore causing a great degree of

continuity. The variation in security policy has depended to a large extent from the

domestic balance of power between the different governmental agencies and leaders,

and the resources to implement security policies, which have limited the number of

available options. These identities have linked the generic national interest of improving


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Russias position in the world which is a constant in foreign policy with the actual

foreign policy decisions, by interpreting the power structure of the international system

according to a set of preferences and values, and choosing certain policies instead of

others to achieve national objectives.

All three identities or strands of foreign policy thinking have been formed with the West

as the main Other in relation to which they define Russias role: part of the West, for

the European democrats; part of Eurasia, an alternative geopolitical entity

incompatible with Western values, for the Eurasianists; or an actor neither inside nor

outside it, which has a distinct identity but can also cooperate with the West where

there are common interests, for those who see Russia as an independent Great Power.

Therefore, their perception of the West has been influenced by each of the three

cultures of anarchy defined by Wendt, moving along the continuum conflict-

cooperation rather than adopting a static, inflexible position.

Moreover, we argue that role identities have not been limited to this interpretative

function, but have become referent objects of national security themselves. In this

regard, the official definition of risks and threats has included not only those challenges

to the countrys material security, but also to the roles that Russia wished to play in the

international society. This has been clearly reflected, for example, in Moscows attitude

towards NATO: while some decisionmakers like the General Staff of the armed forces

have often been concerned about military security, perceiving the Alliance in terms of

the worst case scenario of an attack against Russia, the Kremlins position at least

since the end of the Yeltsin presidency has been determined to a greater extent by the

ideational threat of being excluded from European security decisions, because of not


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being a member of NATO. The Alliance has therefore been considered a political rival

for Moscows status as a great power, rather than an enemy with aggressive intentions.

We can also see that, in spite of the official emphasis on the interests of the individual,

society and the state, the latter has preserved its almost exclusive role in the definition

of security threats: assessing the material conditions of national security, and defining

the role that Russia wanted to play in the world, which had to be protected in the same

way. The Great Power identity has been predominant thanks to its less axiological

orientation: national interest is the supreme value, not only defined in terms of material,

hard power, but also as political influence, soft power and recognition of its status as

a relevant international actor. This identity has shared the Eurasianist concern about

protecting Russian interests in the post-Soviet space, but with a pragmatic approach

rather than a civilisational or essentialist rejection of Western influence.

With regard to Moscows identity as one of the European democracies, the

Europeanness of Russian history and culture has been used by Russian leaders as a

means of influencing the EU, without identifying themselves with the European

integration or political regimes. However, while the EU and other Western countries are

no longer accepted as models for Russias domestic political system as they appeared

to be at the beginning of Yeltsins presidency , there is no rejection of

European/Western culture as such.


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3.2. Threat perceptions in the National Security Concept (2000)

Putins presidency started with a redefinition of the foreign policy, security and defence

doctrines. The review of the 1997 National Security Concept had started two years later

at the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which was then coordinated by Putin.

The updated document, published in January 2000, was the most comprehensive

summary of Russian security policy in that period; although it was linked to two other

main documents, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine, also updated in

2000. It is therefore the most appropriate text to analyse the security conceptions and

role identities that were present in Russias official discourse.

First, the new National Security Concept (Russia, 2000) continued with a trend that had

started in the previous document. It is considered that the objective of security policy is

to protect the individual, society, and the state from internal and external threats.

Moreover, it seems that society is the most important referent object, as it is stated that

Russias national security consists of the security of its multinational people, as the

bearer of sovereignty. National interests are defined as an adequate balance between

the interests of the individual, society and the state in the economic, political,

informational, military, environmental and other areas.

With regard to the political sector(Buzan et al., 1998: 144), one of the main perceived

threats at that moment was Russias own imperfect system of government, which

made it necessary to protect the stability of the constitutional regime and the

institutions. According to the document, there was an erosion of the unified legal

space in the national territory, with an insufficient obedience to norms and lack of


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coordination between administrative levels. The fight against this threat was one of

Putins first tasks as Russian president, centralising the decisionmaking process and

consolidating the power vertical within the state, with the Kremlin as the supreme

authority.

The inadequate governance of the country was intimately linked, according to the

Concept, to the problem of the criminalisation of social relations, with an extension of

organised crime and corruption to members of the executive and legislative powers.

This made it not just a matter for the police or the judiciary, but a real threat for the

stability of the state, in a clear example of securitization: the fight against organised

crime and corruption is not only of a legal nature, but also political (Russia, 2000).

The second main problem in the political realm was political or religious extremism

connected to separatism and terrorism, referring to the situation in the North Caucasus.

This had also been undertaken by Putin as another of his main tasks even before

becoming president, by starting the second war in Chechnya in October 1999.

With regard to foreign policy, the most important political threat was the diminishing

international influence of Russia, both as an individual actor and in the framework of

multilateral institutions such as the OSCE or the UN Security Council. The clearest

example of this marginalisation was European security, where NATO was proceeding

with its enlargement and had recently sustained an air campaign against Yugoslavia, in

spite of Moscows opposition. This was the reason for the critical remarks in the

document about the attempts of the West to achieve world domination and use military

force in violation of International Law. Therefore, the referent object that was


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endangered was not so much multilateralism in the international system, or its legal

regulation; but Russias influence as a great power.

Threats in the military sector(Buzan et al., 1998: 50-52) included the use of force by

NATO without the specific authorisation of the UN Security Council, the development

of new weapons technology by some powers such as the United States, and the

problems in the reform and modernisation of Russias armed forces. With regard to the

first two challenges, it must be noted that there is no mention of the possible harm to

Russias military security as a consequence of them, that is, why they are considered

military threats with national sovereignty and independence as the referent objects

instead of political threats for Russias international prestige and influence.

It seems unlikely that the documents authors could have possibly considered that

NATOs campaign against Yugoslavia could be repeated against a nuclear power like

Russia. Therefore, the real danger would not be so much a military threat in the

absence of any intention by Western powers to attack Russia but Moscows own

technological disadvantage and the crisis of its armed forces, mentioned as the third

military threat; as well as the countrys decreasing world influence, included in the

political sector of security. This is a case of an unjustified securitisation

understandable in the domestic political context at that time of normal rivalry with

Western powers, an inherent feature of the international system that should be included

in the usual conduction of foreign policy instead of the extraordinary realm of

security; unless there was a clear intention by other actors to harm Russia itself.


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In the societal sector (Buzan et al, 1998: 119-120), threats were centred on ethnic

selfishness, egocentrism and chauvinism, as well as the rise of nationalism as a reaction

to illegal immigration, and separatist trends. Moreover, the crisis of the healthcare

system, public health problems such as alcoholism or drug addiction and the reduction

of the life expectancy and the birth rate endangered national identity because of their

large scale that affected society as a whole.

However, it could be argued that this is another case of an unjustified securitization, and

that these problems should be dealt with in the framework of social or economic

policies, not security policy. Furthermore, the existence of communities with their own

identity in the context of a multinational state makes it necessary to reconcile their

legitimate demands by ordinary channels within political institutions; the label of

threat should be limited, therefore, to the attempts at achieving these goals by violent

means.

The economic sector (Buzan et al., 1998: 100-101) is especially relevant in the

document as a result of the internal crisis and its implications for national security:

reduction of the GDP and R&D, problems in the agrarian and financial sectors, internal

and external debt, dependence from exporting energy resources and raw materials, and

importing food products and consumer goods. These and other challenges such as brain

drain and the technological gap with other powers were directly linked to the level of

security in the military and other sectors, because of the reduced resources for defence

spending and the dependence from foreign technologies. Moreover, economic

inequalities between the rich and the poor and between more and less developed regions


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endangered social cohesion and fostered nationalist and separatist trends, causing

political and societal security to decrease.

With regard to the environmental sector, there are just generic references to the need to

protect nature, clearly indicating that this was not a priority for the authors of the

document. The main threats are the damage to the natural environment, overexploitation

of natural resources and the storage of dangerous waste products.

3.3. Threat perceptions in the National Security Strategy (2009)

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (Russia, 2009) was

approved by President Medvedev in May 2009, a little over a year after his

inauguration. The strategy is part of a comprehensive review of security policy similar

to the one carried out by Putin in 2000 , which has also resulted in a new Foreign

Policy Concept (July 2008) and Military Doctrine (February 2010).

The document is noteworthy for two reasons. First of all, the new denomination

Strategy instead of Concept, as in the 1997 and 2000 versions , which is in line

with the terminology used in most Western countries and seems to be less ideological or

doctrinaire. Secondly, there are many innovations in the Strategy that set it apart from

the preceding documents: while the 2000 National Security Concept was merely an

update of the previous document, the current Strategy explicitly repeals the 2000

Concept, in what appears to be an attempt by Medvedev at avoiding to be perceived as

Putins heir, lacking a political project of his own.


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In spite of the context of global economic crisis, the Strategy is remarkable for its

optimism in comparison to the previous stage. It is considered that Russia has overcome

the internal crisis that started in the 1990s, resisted separatist trends and restored its

economic and defence power. However, the distinction between the individual, society

and the state as referents of security is preserved from the 2000 Concept. The economic

sector is granted a special priority, linking the Strategy with the Concept for Long-Term

Socio-Economic Development until 2020. Perhaps the main conceptual innovation,

apart from the change in the title, is the definition of a set of strategic national

priorities, which are the most important measures to be adopted in order to achieve an

adequate level of national security.

With regard to the strategic environment, in the political sectorthe insufficiency of

collective security mechanisms such as the United Nations Security Council, and the

predominance of NATO in the European security architecture, are still considered to be

threats to international security. However, there is neither a sense of urgency and danger

comparable to that of the 2000 Concept approved after the Kosovo war , nor a

perception that these threats are specifically directed against Russias military security.

On the contrary, it is stated that the country is better prepared to defend its influence in

the international arena in spite of competition from the West, due to Russias renewed

potential and the pragmatic policies a combination of sticks and carrots that have

guided it (Russia, 2009).

There are also increased opportunities for multilateral cooperation with different states,

organisations and groups as a way of promoting Russias interests; that does not only

include the BRIC, but also the EU, the United States and even NATO, as long as this


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cooperation is conducted in an equal and mutually beneficial way. We can see here a

certain de-securitisation of the rivalry for international influence, previously considered

to be one of the most serious threats due to Russias relative weakness; which placed it

in a disadvantaged position for negotiating with other great powers and, therefore, made

a non-cooperative attitude more likely in order to show strength to rival states. This

does not imply that this rivalry has decreased, as can be seen in the inclusion once

again of foreign intelligence activities as one of the threats for the security of the state.

In the military sector, the main concern is not a direct aggression by traditional means,

but new threats that do not exclusively affect Russia, but are shared by the majority of

the international society. Among them we find the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, the employment of new technologies as a weapon including in the

cyberspace and the possible use of all of them by terrorist networks; as well as

instability caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The preoccupation about the

development of new military technology by other powers and the need for advancing

Russias own military modernisation and reform is still present.

In the economic sector, but also with clear implications for society, there is an

increasing competition over scarce natural resources, not only oil or natural gas in the

Middle East, the Caspian or the Arctic , but also others such as water. Global

economic crises are considered comparable in terms of the damage caused to the large-

scale use of military force. Among the strategic priorities identified by the Strategy we

find a list of priorities for sustainable development, such as economic growth,

research, development and innovation. However, threats in this sector are not limited to

external factors, but also include Russias model of economic development based on


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an excessive dependence from exporting energy resources and the lack of progress in

other, more technologically intensive sectors, which also creates dependence from

imported foreign technologies. This is considered a problem of technological security,

in which we can see an example of securitisation, as this is perceived to cause

vulnerabilities for national security as a whole.

The societal sectoris affected by the rise of ethnic and religious radicalism, as well as

transnational criminal networks and illegal trafficking of people or drugs, apart from

domestic crime and corruption. At the same time, the extension of AIDS, TB,

alcoholism and drug addiction combined with the deficient situation of the public health

system also present a serious threat. New diseases that could become pandemics are also

considered to be likely, in another example of a global challenge not exclusively

directed against Russia.

Individuals appear more clearly now at least, in the text as referents of security, with

priority given to personal safety and welfare, including the right to a decent salary and

housing or to obtaining food and medicines, in a certain approximation to the concept of

human security. Investments in education, culture and healthcare are also considered

strategic priorities. The Secretary of Russias Security Council Nikolay Patrushev even

stated that providing good living conditions was as important for national security as the

traditional priorities of defence and security of the state (President of the Russian

Federation, 2009). Nonetheless, other issues seem to be affected by an excessive

securitisation: for example, the definition of the mass culture or the permissive

lifestyle as threats for Russias culture.


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With regard to the environmental sector, the quasi-assimilation of national security with

sustainable development Medvedev summarised the Strategys main idea as security

through development (President of the Russian Federation, 2009) was in itself a

radical shift in Russias official doctrine. The priorities for sustainable development,

added to traditional security priorities, include the ecology of living beings, rational use

of resources or less contaminating energy sources. However, the actual measures to

achieve these goals seem to be even less defined than in other areas.

4. CONCLUSION: IS CHANGE POSSIBLE?

Our conclusions are twofold: first, the Russian elites have primarily viewed their

country as a great power which should remain an autonomous international actor,

although there is also an increasing recognition of common threats that implies a

rejection of essentialist Eurasianist views, incompatible with cooperation with the West.

Secondly, Moscow has not only been concerned by safeguarding its territory, resources

or population, but also by the ideational security of its international role. This has

caused challenges to Russias great power identity to be perceived as equally important

for national interests as more traditional, material threats; and intertwined with them.

Medvedevs rapprochement with the EU and the United States through new

partnerships and treaties does not imply a coincidence of interests in all foreign policy

issues. By obtaining Western support for domestic reforms, oriented to make the state

more efficient and the economy more competitive, Russia has increased its own sense

of security both in the material and the ideational sense, being recognized as a great

power and an equal partner by Western countries. However, as the short Russo-


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Georgian war demonstrated, Moscow will still resort to military force when it perceives

that fundamental interests are at stake, as in the case of the unresolved conflicts in South

Ossetia and Abkhazia.

That said, the harsh rhetoric during periods of crisis tends to obscure the practical, more

pragmatic dialogue and cooperation which is conducted on a regular basis between

Russia and the West, both on a bilateral and multilateral format. Therefore, although

Moscows relative material power continues to be inferior in most areas to that of its

Western partners like the United States, NATO or the EU , this asymmetry is

perceived in a less threatening way thanks to the reduced sense of insecurity at the

ideational level. An explanation of Russias disagreements with the West as a reaction

to its international decline omits the fact that these equal partnerships have also been

pursued by the Kremlin as a way of achieving its own foreign policy goals.

It must be said that the official discourse has not always reflected the role identities

really assumed by political decisionmakers, as can be deduced by the actual policies that

were implemented. On the contrary, the different agencies that take part in security

policymaking have frequently pushed forward their own conceptions of Russias role

identity to advance their own bureaucratic interests. For example, the armed forces have

been the most reluctant to stop considering NATO as a military threat, in the context of

a fierce competition over the security budget and military reform; which explains the

apparent contradiction between Russias desire to cooperate with the Alliance and its

definition of the same as a threat to national security.


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By accepting that role identities are not static, but evolve in the process of socialisation

and interaction with other states, as well as being influenced by the political leaders

own ideas and conceptions, we have introduced a dynamic factor into our theoretical

model in order to explain changes in security perceptions. However, as we have seen,

the need for ontological security usually prevents radical shifts in security policy, which

has contributed to moderate both Russias cooperative and uncooperative attitudes

towards the West

The increased sense of ideational security in the international arena has allowed the

Kremlin to recognise its own internal problems as the more serious for national security

across all sectors. However, the fragile basis of this new assertiveness of Russia as a

great power underscores the need for a security policy that translates the rhetoric of the

official discourse into practical measures to reduce the vulnerabilities that are most

pressing. In addition to that, there is still an excessive trend to securitise all the

problems that are considered important for the country; which can result in many of the

strategic priorities being reduced to the realm of ordinary politics, because of the lack

of resources to grant them a higher priority.

At the same time, the increasing importance of the societal, economic and

environmental sectors in the security doctrine can facilitate although gradually and in

the long term a real change in the mindset of all the actors who participate in security

policy decisionmaking, balancing the traditional bias towards military or political

security issues. A more influential role for non-governmental actors in establishing the

strategic priorities seems, however, much less likely.


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