s i aug 2 aug 2 9 2m 2m- engineering data edt/67531/metadc738856/... · rpp-5831, rev. 0 failure...

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6300 14 AUG 2 9 2m ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL 1. EDT

2. To: (Receiving Organization)

D i s t r i b u t i o n

5. Proj./Prog./Dept./Div.:

P r o j e c t w-314 /RPP

I AUG 2 9 2m- ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL

3. From: (Originating Organization)

TFRhSO N/A - 7. Purchase Order No.: 6. Design AuthorityIDesign AgenVCog. Engr.: D . E . Bowers N/A

4. Related EDT No.:

9. Equip./Component No.: 8. OriginatorRemarks: .T ,,,>$ mcA,&Kb;Lp,., d' . ) ( flp o c 1 w p c i ev. \.

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N/A 10. System/Bldg./Facility:

11. Receiver Remarks: 11A. Design Baseline Document? Yes No

16. KEY

N/A 13. PermitlPermit Application No.:

14. Required Response Date: N/A

I I I I I I

SIGNATL (See Approval Desi 17.

Approval Designator (F)

@- I &A, I (J) Name (K) Signature (L) Date (M) MSlN

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Reason for Transmittal (G) Disposition (H) 8 (I)

SUI8 I ' I

I 1 / 1 DesignAuthority DE Bower& & ~ & & G 1 3

E, S, Q, D OR NIA (See WHC-CM-3-5,

Sec. 12.7)

Env. 111

1. Ap roval 4. Review 2. Rekase 5. Post-Review 3. Information 6. Dist. (Receipt Acknow. I

RR Bev ins Signature of EDT Originator

-I Date

1. Approved 4. Reviewed nolcomment 2. Approved wlcomment 5. Reviewed wlcomment

squired) 3. Disapproved w/comrnent 6. Receipt acknowledged

7ElDISTRIBUTION nator for required signatures)

,,.% I

d.:!. I dzb, I (J) Name (I() Signature (L) Date (M) MSlN

21. DOE APPROVAL (if required)

Ctrl No.

0 Approved

Disapproved wlcomments Authorized Re resentative Design Authority/ 0 Approved wlcomments for Receiving grganization Cognizant Manager

-

@& Date 1 ED-7400-172-2 (10197) 8D-7400.172-1

-

DISTRIBUTION SHEET

TL Bennington

To Distribution Project Titlework Order

R2-89 X

EDT No. 630014 I Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations

DE Bowers 55-13 X

CA Burke

RR Bevins (4 L ~ ~ C S )

RJ Fogg

JD Guberski

WM Harty

I F K Hamada I G3-12 I X I I I I

R3-25 X

R3-25 X

55-12 X

R1-51 X

55-13 X

(DE Leaare I R3-25 I X I I I I J W Lentsch

TE Nugent

SH Pearce

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R3-25 X

55-50 X

57-75 X

I R P Raven I so-09 I x I I I I

RM Tanner

I B L Svverson I G3-12 I X I I I I G3-08 X

CDC (Immediate Copy)

1 Project Files 1 R3-25 I X I I I I 55-50 X

1 Central Files 1 B1-07 1 X I I I I (DOE Readina Room I H2-53 I X I I I I

A-6000-135 (10197)

___ - __ - - ___

RPP-5831, Rev. 0

Failure and Reliability Analysis for the Master Pump Shutdown System

R.R. Bevins CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc.

U S . Department of Energy Contract D E - A C 0 6 0 C D ' f + * . n

EDTIECN: 630014 u c : Org Code: 7C900 Charge Code: 109749 B&R Code: Total Pages: 314

Richland, WA 99352 *a- '**7

Key Words: Master Pump Shutdown System, Project W-314, Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations

Abstract: This failure/reliability analysis examines the Master Pump Shutdown System (MPSS) design developed as part of the W-314 Project. The analysis examines the probability the MPSS will perform its intended safety function when called upon to do so. The analysis examines the configuration in phase 1 and phase 2 of Project W-314.

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation. 01 favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors.

Printed in the United States of America. To obtain copies of this document, contact: Document Control Services, P.O. Box 950, Mailstop H6-08, Richland WA 99352, Phone (509) 372-2420: Fax (509) 376-4989.

Release Approval Date

Approved For Public Release

A-6400-073.1 (10197)

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

FAILURE AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR THE MASTER PUMP SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

Prepared by: David J. Braun Fluor Federal Services, Inc.

Date Published August 2000

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A failure and reliability analysis was performed for the Master Pump Shutdown System of the Hanford Tank Farms. A typical waste transfer path was identified for the purpose of this evaluation. The failure probability and reliability of the system at ten different leak detector locations were determined. Failure probabilities ranged in value from 1.9 x 10-3 to 4.9 x 1.0-4 resulting in system reliabilities greater than 99.8%. This analysis also provided answers to the following key questions for the MPSS design process:

Are there single component failures, which could prevent the Master Pump Shutdown System from performing its safety function?

For the Phase 1 design configuration there are many ganged relay contacts and motor control contactors whose failure will prevent the MPSS from performing its safety function. It is intended in Phase 11, the ganged relay be replaced with individual leak detectors.

For the Phase 11 design where the ganged relays are replaced, there is one active component for each leak detector location analyzed whose failure would prevent the MPSS from performing its safety function. The component is the waste transfer pump motor control contactor, with a 4.66 x 10-4 failure probability. Removal of this Component from the analyses resulted in an increase in reliability of the MPSS Safety Function from greater than 99.90% to greater than 99.995% for the Phase I1 MPSS design configuration.

For Phase I1 design where the ganged relays are not replaced additional single component(s) (ganged relay) could prevent the MPSS from performing its safety function. The reliability of the MPSS would then become equal to the Phase I design configuration.

Are there any components, which will not allow the MPSS to perform its safety function upon loss of electrical power to that component?

1,

2.

No components were identified which would prevent the Master Pump Shutdown System from performing its safety function upon loss of electrical power. All MPSS and leak detection system components, which were part of this assessment, transfer to a de-energized state resulting in a tripped MPSS and shutdown of the waste transfer process.

3. Is physical isolation of the MPSS safety class cables from each other necessary?

The cable configuration of a single conduit was evaluated for safety-class cables for both analog and discrete signal wires. I n the case of a single conduit configuration the failure rate is orders of magnitude less than the 1 x /yr failure rate criterion of the Project Development Specification document (HNF 2000a). External events such as seismic, fire, wind, or excavation accidents were not accounted for in this failure analysis.

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4. Is physical isolation o f Safety Class Wiring from General Service wiring necessary?

The cable configuration o f a single conduit for safety class wiring and general service wiring was evaluated for both analog and discrete signal wires. I n the case of a single conduit configuration the failure rate i s also orders o f magnitude less than tlie 1 x /yr failure rate criterion o f the Project Development Specification document (HNF 2000a). External events such as seismic, fire, wind, or excavation accidents were not accounted for in this failure analysis.

5 . Does the current MPSS design meet or exceed the Option Ib (RPP 1999) system reliability estimate?

The MPSS Option Ib system reliability estimate i s 99.887%. The current Safety Function MPSS design reliability was calculated to be 99.855%. The current design has reliability slightly less than t l ie Option 1 b system reliability estimate.

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Table of Contents ... Executive Summary .......... ........... ...............................................

1 .O Introduction ................ ............................. 1 , I Purpose ............. ............................. 1.2 Scope .................................

2.0 Summary ................................... .................................................. 3

3.0 System Descriptions .................................... .................................... 3.1 Waste Transfer Route ........................ .................................... 3.2 Leak Detection Systems .......... .......................................... 3.3 Master Pump Shutdown System ........ ...........................................

4.1 Methodology ........................................... ............................................... I9 4.2 Analysis Assumptions and RBD Model Bases .. ..................................... 20 4.3 Analysis Input ...................................... 4.4 Analysis Mode ....................................... 4.5 Analysis Results .........................................

..................................... 19 4.0 Analysis ............................................

............................ 21 .................. 22

................................ 22

............................ 33

.......... 35

5.0 Results ..........................................

6.0 References ............... .....................................

APPENDIX A Waste Transfer - Master Pump Shutdown System Fault Trees A-la A-lb A-2a 241-SY-A Valve Pit Phase I ............................... A-2b 241-SY-A Valve Pit Phase 11 ........................................ A-3 6241-A Diversion Box Phase ase I1 ...................... A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 A-9a A-9b

241-241-SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02APhase I ..... 241-241-SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Phase 11 ...

6241-V Vent Station Phase I & Phase I1 ........................................

241-AZ Valve Pit Phase I & Phase 11 ..... 241-AP-A Valve Pit Phase 1 & Phase 11 . 241-AP-A Valve Pit Phase 1 & Phase II ................................... 241-AW-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Phase I ............................................ 241-AW-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Phase I1 .............................................

241-AN-IO1 Central Pump Pit 01A Phase I &Phase I1 ..................... ................................... ................................

A10 MPSSiPLC Safety Function .........................................................

APPENDIX B Basic Events and Type Codes ...............................................................

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Table of Contents (Continued)

APPENDIX C Cutsets and Importance Factors .............................................. c-l en ral Pump Pit 02A Phase 1 ..... C-3 C-la

C-lb C-2a C-2b C-3 C-4 C-5

C-6 C-7 C-8 C-9a C-9b C-IO

Cutsets and Importance Factors for Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-241-SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Phase II ..... C-9 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-SY-A Valve Pit Phase I ................................... C-15 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-SY-A Valve Pit Phase 11 .................................. (2-21 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 6241-A Diversion Box Phase I & Phase I I ............ C-27 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 6241-V Vent Station Phase I & Phase I1 ............... C-33 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AN-IO1 Central Pump Pit 01A Phase I & Phase I1 .......................... c-39 Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AZ Valve Pit Phase I & Phase I1 . Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AP-A Valve Pit Phase 1 & Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AP Valve Pit Phase I & P Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AW-102 Central Pump P Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AW-102 Central Pump P Cutsets and Importance Factors for MPSSIPLC Safety Function ...

..........................

APPENDIX D Conduit Configuration Evaluation ...................................... D- 1

APPENDIX E Peer Review Checklist ..................................................... E- 1

List of Figures

3-1 3-2

3-3 3-4

3-5 3-6 3-7

Transfer Path for Master Pump Shutdown System Failure and Reliability Analysis ...... Phase I and Phase II Simplified Diagrams for SY Tank Farm Transfer Route Leak Detector Elements. .................................................. Phase I and Phase I1 Simplified Diagrams for Cross-Slte Transfer Line Leak Detector El Phase I and Phase II Simplified Diagrams for Waste Transfer Route ANIAZIAP Leak Detector Elements .................................... ....................................... 14 Phase I and Phase I1 Simplified Diagrams for Waste Transfer Route AW Leak Detector Element 1 5

..................................... 16 Master Pump Shutdown System Used for Option 1 b Safety Function Analysis ........................... 17 Master Pump Shutdown System Used for Waste Transfer Path

List of Tables

2-1 3-1 4-1 4-2 4-3

MPSSISYS Single Component'Event Failures ....................................................... MPSSISYS Waste Transfer Route System Components ................. MPSSiSYS Failure Probability and Reliability Given a Waste Transfer Leak ...... MPSSIPLC Failure Probability and Reliability Given a Waste Transfer Leak MPSSISYS Single ComponentIEvent Failures ...............................

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ASL CAFTA FT HMI MCC LDE LDK MPSS MPSS/PLC MPSS/SYS PDS PLC

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Analo Shutdown Loop Comp er Aided Fault Tree Analysis Fault Tree Human Machine Interface Motor Control Center Leak Detector Element Leak Detector Relay Master Pump Shutdown System PLC portion of Master Pump Shutdown System Master Pump Shutdown System and Leak Detection Systems Project Development Specification Programmable Logic Controller

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FAILURE AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR THE MASTER PUMP SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

1.0 Introduction

The Master Pump Shutdown System (MPSS) will be installed in the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site to monitor and control the transfer of liquid waste between tank farms and between the 200 West and 200 East areas through the Cross-Site Transfer Line. The Safety Function provided by the MPSS is to shutdown any waste transfer process within or between tank farms if a waste leak should occur along the selected transfer route.

The MPSS, which provides this Safety Class Function, is composed of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), interconnecting wires, relays, Human to Machine Interfaces (HMI), and software. These components are defined as providing a Safety Class Function and will be designated in this report as MPSSIPLC. Input signals to the MPSSiPLC are provided by leak detection systems from each of the tank farm leak detector locations along the waste transfer route. The combination of the MPSSPLC, leak detection system, and transfer pump controller system will be referred to as MPSSISYS. The components addressed in this analysis are associated with the MPSSISYS.

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this failure and reliability analysis is to address the following design issues of the Project Development Specification (PDS) for the MPSSiSYS (HNF 2000a):

1. Single Component Failure Criterion, 2. 3. 4. 5 .

System Status Upon Loss of Electrical Power, Physical Separation of Safety Class cables, Physical Isolation of Safety Class Wiring from General Service Wiring, and Meeting the MPSSIPLC Option 1 b (RPP 1999) Reliability estimate.

The failure and reliability analysis examined the system on a component level basis and identified any hardware or software elements that could fail and/or prevent the system from performing its intended safety function.

1.2 Scope

The scope of this failure analysis included the Safety Class MPSS design (MPSSIPLC) and all of the related leak detection systems associated with the selected waste transfer path. This analysis identified those system components, operator actions, and software failures, which would prevent the MPSSK'LC from performing its required safety function. The failure analysis was conducted in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fault Tree Handbook, NUREG-0492. The reliability of the MPSSPLC and leak detection systems was evaluated as a system (MPSSISYS) without recovery capability from

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component failures. As a result the reliability was determined taking the compliment of the MPSS/SYS failure probability for each leak detection location evaluated.

The scope included the field elements (leak detectors and motor control relays that interrupt the transfer pump motor control circuit), the Programmable Logic Controllers, and the HMI waste transfer route identification and download process. These components and actions were included each time a transfer route leak detector location was selected for analysis. The HMI configures the PLC logic for the particular transfer route selected. The analysis examined the potential for failure of the HMI to properly configure the PLCs for the intended transfer route. The new W-3 14 leak detector design was evaluated in the failure analysis using the same analytical techniques as was used for the existing leak detector designs.

The installation ofthe MPSS/SYS will be accomplished i n two phases: Phase 1 and Phase 11. Phase 1 will use some of the existing leak detection systems where one gang relay for the entire tank farm will provide a single signal to the MPSSiPLC regardless of where the leak occurs in the tank farm. For Phase I1 the tank farm leak detection systems will be upgraded and two trip signals will be provided to the MPSSiPLC for each of the leak detector locations within a tank farm.

The MPSSiPLC Programmable Logic Controllers/Human Machine Interfaces (HMls) use commercially available application software. The PLC manufacture, RTP Corporation, does have a software quality assurance program that meets the requirements of NQA-I . Additionally the PLC manufacturer routinely supplies PLCs and software for their PLCs to Nuclear Power Plants. Therefore, software failures resulting from potential programming errors in the application software were not addressed in this analysis. The success ofthe MPSSPLC depends on the transmission of a shutdown signal between PLC nodes. The

analysis included in this report did examine data transport between PLC nodes.

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2.0 Summary

The failure of the MPSSiSYS was assessed using fault tree methodology. The allowed time for a waste transfer was taken to be 115 days. Evaluations have been made for nine different leak locations along a transfer route which begins in the 200 West Area at the SY 102 waste tank, goes through the Cross-Site Transfer Line and ends at 241-AW-102 waste tank in the 200 East Area. A range of failure probabilities from 2.9 x 10 ' to 5.8 x 1 .0-' was determined for the various leak detection sites along the selected transfer route (Figure 3-1) for Phase 1 and Phase I1 design configurations.

1. Single Component Failure Criterion

Single componenUevent failures were identified which would result i n the failure of the MPSS/SYS from shutting down a waste transfer as a result of a leak. These components are associated with the various leak detection systems used along the transfer route. A list of the single component failures is provided in Table 2-1. These component failure probabilities are greater than the 1 x 10-6 criterion as provided by the customer (BEH-99-009). A more detailed discussion of these results is provided in Section 4.5.

One common failure for each of the addressed leak detection locations is the improper address verification for the leak detector at that site. This is a human error where the leak detector site is not included into the transfer route. The rest of the failures are associated with the individual leak detector systems at the leak detector locations being assessed (leak detector elements, relays, discrete signal wires). A common component failure to all of the leak detector assessments is a failure of the motor control center

contactor to open on demand (MCC-A3).

2. System Status Upon Loss of Electrical Power

No MPSS/SYS components were identified which would prevent the MPWSYS from performing its safety function upon loss of electrical power. All MPSSiSYS components, which were part of this assessment, transfer to a de-energized state resulting in a tripped MPSSiSYS system and shutdown of the waste transfer process.

3. Physical Separation of Safety Class cables 4. Physical Isolation of Safety Class Wiring from General Service Wiring

The cable-wiring configuration of a single conduit was evaluated and compared against a separate conduit configuration for safety-class and general-service cables for both analog and discrete signal wires. These frequency calculations are provided in Appendix D ofthis document. The failure mode of concern is a short of a safety-class or general service analog or discrete signal wire to another energized wire in a separate analog or discrete signal cable resulting in a false permissive signal. Shorting of wires within the same cable would be the same for both the separate conduit and single conduit configurations and therefore was not made part of the frequency assessment.

The frequencies calculated for this failure mode in a single conduit was conservatively determined to be 2.3 x 10.'" /year for an analog circuit of ten miles i n length. The ten miles usas used to provide an upper bound to the distances between tank farm area nodes and also the distance between the 200 West and 200 East Areas.

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The frequency of such a failure mode for a discrete signal wire was conservatively determined to be 2.55 x 10-9 /year for a circuit of one mile in length in the same conduit. The one-mile distance was used to provide an upper bound to the distance that would occur within a tank farm coming from a particular leak detector cabinet and ending at the PLC area node for the tank farm.

Both frequencies are less than the failure criteria of 1 x /year as provided by CHZM HILL Hanford Group.

5. Meeting the MPSSPLC Option I b Reliability estimate

A fault tree was developed forjust the MPSS/PLC, which was defined as providing only the Safety Function. The scope of the fault tree is provided in Figure 3-7. The MPSS/PLC Safety Function failure probability was determined using this fault tree which is provided in Appendix A-IO.

For this analysis reliability is defined as the probability that the system can transfer the safety function signal from the 242-A Evap Area Node to the 242-S Evap Area Node. The mission time for the analysis was selected to be 5 years in length (RPP 1999). The failure probability of 1.45 x 10-3 and reliability of 99.855% was determined for the MPSSiPLC System Safety Function.

A preliminary estimate for the MPSS/PLC Safety Function reliability was determined in August of 1999 via a parts count methodology and is provided in Table 3-B, Option IB of (RPP 1999). The calculated reliability via this method is 99.887% over a 5-year time frame. I n the report an estimate for the reliability of the MPSS, currently being used in the Tank Farms, was provided for comparison purposes of 97.13%.

The calculated reliability for the MPSSiPLC safety function in this report (99.963%) exceeds the reliability of the Options report Option 1B estimate (99.887%) and the current MPSS reliability estimate (97.13%) ofAugust 1999.

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Phase 11 241-SY-A Valve Pit SY Tank Farm

Phase I & II Diversion Box

Leak Detector LDE- 144 Elements Mechanically Fail Circuit from K-241-SY-PPB to S252AiB-PLC Shorts to Another Active Loop Circuit for LDK-I44 Shorts to Ground (100 ft) Improper Downloading of LDE-144 Address for Transfer Route Improper Address Verification for LDE-144 for Waste Transfer Route Relayicontactor MCC-A3 Fails Closed Leak Detector LDE-144 Elements Mechanically Fail Circuit from LDE-133 Shorts to Another Active Circuit (100 ft) Improper Downloading of LDE-144 Address for Transfer Route Relay/Contactor MCC-A3 Fails Closed Improper Address Verification for LDE-3 150 and LDE-3 150A for Transfer Route

6241-A Cross-Site Transfer Line

Phase I & I I Vent Station 6241-V Cross-Site Transfer

. . - Common Cause

Relayicontactor MCC-A3 Fails Closed Improper Address Verification for LDE-3151 and LDE3151A for Transfer Route - Common Cause

5

Line Phase I & I I

Tank AN-101 Central Pump Pit 01A

I I

Improper Address Verification for LDE-201 for Transfer Route RelayiContactor MCC-A3 Fails Closed Leak Detector LDE-20 1 Elements Mechanically Fail Improper Downloading of LDE-70 I Address for Transfer Route

I

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24 I-AP-A Valve Pit

Table 2-1. MPSSlSYS Single ComponentEvent Failures

I Single Component/Event Failures Leak Detection . ,.

- r r

RelaylContactor MCC-A3 Fails Closed Leak Detector LDE-APA Elements Mechanically Fail

Locarion I Phase I & I I 1 Improper Address Verification for I.DE-221 for Transfer Route

Phase I & I I 241-AP Valve Pit

Phase I

I ianically Fail 1

Improper Downloading of LDE-APA Address for Transfer Route Improper Address Verification for LDE-227 for Transfer Route RelaylContactor MCC-A1 Fnilc C l n d

Leak Detector LDE-227 Elements Mechanically Fail Improper Downloading of LDE-227 Address for Transfer Route Improper Address Verification for LDE-I 84 for Transfer Route

Leak Detector LDE-221 Elements Mecl Improper Downloading of LDE-221 Address for Transfer Route

1 Imnroner Address Verification for LDE-APA for Transfer Route Phase I Rr. I1

Phase I

ft) Improper Downloading of LDE-184 Address for Transfer Route lmnroner Address Verification for LDE-I 84 for Transfer Route

Central Pump Pit 02A AW Tnnk Farm

Tank 241-AW-102 Central Pumo Pit

RelaylContnctor MCC-A? Fails Closed h t a c t K-241-AW-PP Fz

Leak Detector LDE-184 Elements Mechanically Fail Circuit from LDK-I84 to K-241-AW-PP Shorts to Another Active Circuit (1000 ft\

iils Closed ~~ . . .. - ..

~~~~~ 1 Improper Downloading of LDE-I 84 Address for Transfer Route

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3.0 System Descriptions

This section presents system descriptions and one line diagrams (Figure 3-1 - Figure 3-5) developed from information obtained from piping and instrumentation and electrical elementary diagram drawings provided in the reference list. The drawing numbers are provided in Section 6.0, "Hanford Drawings". The one line diagrams are the basis for the fault tree models discussed i n Section 4.0 and provided in Appendices A through C. The installation ofthe MPSS/SYS will be done in two phases, Phase I and Phase I1 designs. In Phase 1 some of the older style leak detector circuitry (gang relays) will be used until the newer leak

detector circuitry is installed throughout the tank farms during Phase 11.

3.1 Waste Transfer Route

The waste transfer route selected for the failure analysis of the MPSS/SYS starts at the 241-SY-102 waste tank in the 200 West Area, passes through the Cross-Site Transfer Line, through the AN and AP tank farms, and ends at 241-AW-102 waste tank in the 200 East Area. A one-line diagram ofthis waste transfer route is provided in Figure 3-1, Transfer Route for the Master Pump Shutdown System Failure Analysis. A listing of all of the components that are associated with the MPSSISYS is provided in Table 3-1. The

transfer route analyzed was selected, based on system complexity, to bound all other potential transfer routes between and within the 2OOW and 200E tank farms.

3.2 Leak Detection Systems

The two types of leak detection systems are included in the MPSS/SYS failure analysis. The new Pit Leak Detection system provides individual signals to the MPSSPLC. The older leak detection systems, which are more common for this transfer route, provide trip signals to common relays, which then provide permissive signals to the MPSSPLC. The single line diagrams for the leak detector elements of the 241-SY tank farm are provided in Figure 3-2. For Phase I the signals from the two leak detector elements provide signals to a single circuit, which trips a common relay, K-241-SY-PP. The status of this relay is monitored by the MPSSIPLC. For Phase I1 two signals are provided via each of the leak detector elements. One signal goes to the Channel A PLC and the other to the Channel B PLC.

The single line diagrams for the leak detector elements for the Cross-Site Transfer Line are provided in Figure 3-3. The signals from the 6241-A Diversion Box and the 6241-V Vent Station leak detector elements provide signals to relays for each leak detection element which are monitored by the MPSSPLC at the 252-S Substation. Based on these signals, permissive signals are sent to the master permissive for the 241-SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A pump and the master permissive for the Cross-Site Transfer Line Booster Pumps. There are no design differences between Phase I and Phase I1 designs for this area node.

The single line diagrams for the leak detector elements for the 241-AN-IO1 Central Pump Pit OlA, 241-A2 Valve Pit, 241 -AP-A Valve Pit. and the 241 -AP Valve Pit are provided in Figure 3-4. Each ofthese leak detector elements provides two discrete signals to the MPSSIPLC for Channel A and Channel B. There are no design differences between Phase I and Phase I I designs for these area nodes.

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The single line diagrams for the 241-AW-102 Central Pump Pit 02A leak detector are provided in Figure 3-5. For Phase I the signals are sent to a common relay for the AW tank farms. This common relay provides signals to the AW AreaNode PLCs for processing. For Phase I1 design two discrete signals are sent directly to the AW Area Node PLCs.

Based on this information permissive signals are generated and passed on to other PLCs via analog signal wires which are in bundles of eight. Each MPSSiPLC PLC has the capability of transferring information toward the 200 West area (clockwise) or toward the 200 East Area (counter-clockwise). The PLCs at the very end of the MPSSiPLC can only send and receive information in one direction.

3.3 Master Pump Shutdown System

The portion of the MPSSISYS, wliicli controls the waste transfer process through the selected waste transfer route (Figure 3-l), is provided in Figure 3-6. This figure shows all of the PLCs involved in monitoring the waste transfer process, input and output PLC information, and the interconnection between the PLCs and Cross-Site Transfer Line. The front end ofthe waste transfer route is monitored by The 2 5 2 4 Area Node PLC monitors and controls the waste transfer process by providing permissive signals to 241-SY-IO2 Pump 02A and the Cross-Site Transfer Line Booster Pumps. The other PLCs in Tank Farms 241-AN, 241-AZ, 241-AP, and 241-AW monitor leak detection relays along the selected waste transfer route and pass the analog permissive signals onto the next PLC in the clockwise and counter-clockwise directions.

The MPSSiPLC Safety-Class-Function hardware is represented in Figure 3-7. The safety class PLCs for all of the MPSSiPLC area nodes is shown. For the safety class function the input signal is taken to come into the system via the 242-A EVAP Area Node. The signal is then transferred through AW-Farm, AP-Farm, AYiAZ-Farms, AN-Farm, Cross-Site Transfer System, and 2 5 2 4 Substation area nodes to the 2 4 2 4 Evap Area Node. The signal is then delivered out of the Safet)..-Class-Function portion of the MPSS.

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output

Input 4

SY241 -WT-K-P002-EIA WTL IONE SL CCW Permissive WTL 9NE SN CCW Permissive W L Ai-2-9-9 I N B CCW Permissive

WTL IONE SL CW Permissive WTL 9NE SN CW Permissive WTL I N E CW Permissive K-241-SY-PP-E

W T L IONE SL CCW Permissive \NIL 9NE SN CW Permissive WTL Ai-2-9-9 l N E CCW Permissive

WTL 9NB SN CCW Permissive WLM-2-10-1 I N E CW Permissive K-241-AN-PP-A

output WTL AP-2-4-9 1NE CCW Permissive WTL AN-2-9.1 I N E CW Permissive '

4 Input WTL AN-2.10-1 l N E CCW Permissive

WTL AP-2-5-1 1NE CW Permissive

output - WTL AW-2-9-1 I N E CCW Permissive WTL Ai-2-9-1 I N E CW Permissive

WTL Ai-2-10.9 IN8 CCW Permissive

WTL AW-2-10-1 l N E CW Permissive

KLD-SN-ENC-1

lnput - output

WTL AP-2-5-9 I N B CCW Permissive

Input WTL AP-2-5-9 I N B CCW Permissive

K-241 -AW-PPA

16

WP-583 1 Rev. 0

Output

N E z

Input . 17

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


18

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

4.0 Analysis

This section describes the failure analysis and contains a discussion of the methodology, assumptions, input, fault tree models and the results of the analysis.

4.1 Methodology

Fault tree methodology is an analytical technique where an undesired state ofthe system is specified and the system is analyzed according to its environment and operation to find all credible ways in which the undesired event can occur. The fault tree itself is a graphical representation of the various parallel and sequential combinations of faults that will result i n the occurrence of the event of interest.

A fault tree is composed of entities known as gates, which serve to permit or prevent the passage of fault logic up the tree. Two types of gates are used to construct a fault tree: the AND gate and the OR gate.

The fault tree models were developed and evaluated using a software program. This system was developed and evaluated using the CAFTA software program developed by Science Applications International Corporation. The users’ guide for this software program is referenced in Section 6.0 (SAIC 1993). Testing and acceptance of the CAFTA software program was performed and was documented (WHC 1993).

The CAFTA software package can be used to quantify a fault tree to obtain cut sets (one or more events that results in the failure of the system), which then can be used to obtain sensitivity and important information about system components. Basic event and failure rate information generated during the fault tree development is also used during the quantification of the fault tree.

The MPSS/SYS architecture is reasonably “typical” for each tank farm. This similarity was used throughout the analysis in the construction of each of the fault trees for each of the evaluated leak detector locations along the transfer route.

Based on the results of the model quantification, a listing of critical system components can be developed. This listing of system components is sorted based on importance factors for each component. The importance factor for a system component is based on the mean time between failures for that component.

The safety function of the MPSSISYS is “To Shutdown a Waste Transfer In or Between Tank Farms when a Leak Occurs Along the Transfer Route.“ Any single component failures were identified and listed in tabular format. The single failure cases are “Acceptable” if they are immediately detectable or shown to have a probability of occurrence of less than 1 x 10-6 as provided by the customer’s statement of work (BEH-99-009).

System Component Importance Factors

A system component or cut set contribution to the system failure(s) is termed its importance. It is a function of time, failure characteristics, and system design. Inspection, maintenance, and failure detection

19

.I

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

can be applied to system components according to their order of importance, and systems can be upgraded by improving components having the largest importance.

For the CAFTA evaluation process, the Fussell-Vesely method was used as the basis for calculating the importance of system components to the reliability of the system. The Fussell-Vesely component importance factor uses the comparison of the ratio of the probability of a system component contributing to a cut set failure to the total system failure rate based on all the system components and various system failure modes. This provides a relative ranking of the system components in relation to the total failure probability of the system.

Each component is ranked and listed on the basis of these importance factors in tabular format. The components with the highest importance factors are at the top ofthe list and the components with the lowest importance factors at the bottom of the list (Appendix C).

4.2 Failure Analysis Assumptions and Model Bases

The scope of this failure analysis is bounded by the following assumptions:

The fault trees for each of the waste transfer leak paths were developed without accounting for any recovery of system components during the active waste transfer process.

There is no common mode failure between cable runs that is random in nature. External events can cause common mode failures in cable runs such as seismic events, and excavation events.

External events (digging, heavy equipment, seismic, etc.) were not accounted for in the failure and reliability analysis.

The Mission Time used for the MPSSiSYS failure and reliability analysis of 115 days was determined using the surveillance requirements (92 days) plus the 25% extension period (23 days) allowed for the Hanford Tank Farms leak detection systems Section 1.4, and Table 1.4-1 in (HNF 2000b).

All system components (PLCs, Leak Detector Elements, Relays, etc.) are verified to be functioning properly prior to the initiation of a waste transfer.

Waste transfer route and all related MPSSiSYS components are correctly identified via written procedures. The waste transfer route data file is generated by trained personnel for use in the transfer route set up.

Failure to shutdown the Main Transfer Pump by the MPSSiSYS constitutes a failure of the system.

HMI and PLC software is correct and bug free

Failure of an Analog Shutdown Loop (ASL) occurs when a short occurs with another active ASL resulting in undetected continued operation of the ASL.

1,

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7 .

8.

9.

20

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

IO. Loss of electrical power to any MPSS/PLC PLC area node results in the loss of all permissive signals generated by the PLC (fails safe) by engineering design.

1 1. Failure Analysis of the MPSSiSYS does not include the effects of a seismic event, during or after the event

12. Three analog wiring cables with individual grounded sheathings consisting of eight circuits apiece will be housed in a single conduit of four inches in diameter.

4.3 Analysis Input

The drawings used i n the development of the fault trees are provided in Section 6.0 under the heading of "Hanford Drawings." The data used in the development of the Type Code files provided in Appendix B was obtained from the following references: (IEEE, 1984), (Powers 1992), (Blanton 1993), (RAC 1995), and (RAC 1991). These references are referred to i n the Type Code files provided in Appendix C under the "Source" column and sometimes in the basic event definitions in the Basic Event file in Appendix B.

Failure rates for the PLC, analog input/output modules, and digital inputloutput modules were calculated using the Military Handbook for Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment (MIL-HDBK-217F 1995). The calculations are provided in Appendix B for each of the above components. Also provided is the estimation of the length ofthe runs for each of the circuits used in the transmission of

analog signals between the various PLCs of the MPSSIPLC.

The failure rate for the MPSSRLC PLC analog signal circuits was determined using the failure rate data from (IEEE-493 1990). This failure rate accounts for all types of failures of circuits. The particular types of failure that is of concern for this analysis is a short ofthe circuit of concern to another active circuit. There are a total of eight circuits (six active) per wiring cable. There is a maximum of two safety-class cables and one general service cable in a MPSSIPLC conduit.

A conservative estimate was made for the percentage of the failure rate representing a short to another active analog circuit within a safety-class cable between two sheathed wire pairs. The sequence of events that would be required for a circuit short to another active analog circuit would be:

1. Deactivated signal wire shorts to its sheathing (1.60 x lO-lO/hrlft), 2 . Sheathing ground fails at terminal box, 3. Active signal wire shorts to its sheathing (1.60 x 10-10/hr/ft), 4. Sheathing ground fails at terminal box, and 5 . Both sheathings come in electrical contact with each other.

Ignoring events 2 , 3, and 5 and only accounting for events 1 and 3, one can see that the failure rate of these two independent events would be extremely small (2.6 x If the events are not independent but have a Common Cause, this can be accounted for numerically using a Beta Factor methodology as provided in (Fullwood 1988). The failure rate for the MPSSiPLC PLC analog signal circuits used in this analysis was calculated using a conservative Beta Factor value of 10% (Fullwood 1988) times the wire short failure rate obtained from (IEEE-493 1990).

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

The programming of the waste transfer route into the area node PLCs is done via the HMI by operations. It was assumed that independent personnel would tightly control this activity via written procedures and multiple oversight checks. Based on this process the lowest human failure rate was selected for this activity, 1 x 10-3 per component. For the cross-site transfer route there are two leak detectors in the diversion box and the vent station. If one of the leak detector elements for one of these locations is not included into the transfer route PLC data file, there is a high probability that the second one will not be included also. This event was accounted for through the use o f a Beta factor of 0.10 (Henley 1981).

4.4 Analysis Models

As described in Section 4.1, Methodology, the models used in the failure analysis consist of Fault Trees. These Fault Trees are shown in Appendices A-la through A-9b for each of the waste leak locations along the transfer route. Three ofthe area nodes have a different design for the Phase I and Phase II design configurations and therefore have a fault tree provided in Appendix A for each of the design phases. Component failure modes and associated failure probabilities are provided in Appendix B, "Basic Event File - MPS-I 1SDay."

The MPSSRLC Safety Function fault tree is provided in Appendix A-I 0. This fault tree is modeled on the basis of the system provided in Figure 3-7. The component failure modes and associated failure probabilities are provided in Appendix B, "Basic Event File - MPS-5Year."

Component failure rates that were used to generate the failure probabilities for both of the above basic event files are provided in Appendix B, "Type Code File" listing.

4.5 Analysis Results

Leak Detector Locations

A fault tree was developed for each of the nine leak detector locations along the selected transfer route (Figure 3-1). The twelve fault trees developed for this failure analysis are provided in Appendix A-la through A-9b. Three of the leak detector locations have a Phase I and a Phase II leak detector design configuration. Therefore two fault trees are provided for SY-102 Central Pump Pit, SY-A Valve Pit, and AW-102 Central Pump Pit. The MPSSiSYS failure probability for each ofthe leak locations and design phases was determined using these fault trees.

For these analyses reliability is defined as the probability that the system will stop the transfer of waste when a leak occurs at a particular location along the transfer route. The mission time of 115 days for each of the analyses was determined on the basis of the surveillance time plus the 25% allowed grace period (HNF 2000b, Section 1.4, and Table 1.4-1). The failure probability and reliability ofthe MPSSISYS System for each of the leak locations is provided in Table 4-1. The MPSSISYS failure probability for the various waste leak locations range in value from 2.9 x 10-3 to 5.8 x 10-4 when accounting for human failure to define the proper leak detection devices along the transfer route (MPSSISYS With Human Error). The higher MPSSKYS failure probabilities (lower reliabilities) are associated with the leak detector locations where all signals are channeled through a single relay (common relay) for the tank farm, such as

22

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

241-SY-102. The lower failure probabilities (higher reliabilities) are associated with the leak detector locations where two leak detectors are provided (6241-A Diversion Box and 6241-V Vent Station).

The newer leak detection systems (AN-101, AZ Valve Pit, AP-A Valve Pit, AP Valve Pit, and 241-AW-102) have a lower failure rate and higher reliability than the older leak detection system designs. The older designs are represented by the Phase I design of the 241-SY-102 Central Pump Pit and 241-SY-A Valve Pit systems.

The two columns of Table 4-1 labeled "MPSSISYS Without Human Error" provide the failure probabilities and system reliabilities without human error being accounted for in the analysis. The MPSSISYS failure probability for the various waste leak locations range in value from 1.9 x 10-3 to 4.8 x 10-4 for Phase 1 and Phase II design configurations. For just Phase 11 design configurations the MPSSISYS failure probability range in value from 4.7 x These failure probabilities result in system reliabilities greater than or equal to 99.945%.

to 5.5 x

The last two columns of Table 4-1 labeled "MPSSISYS Without Human Error or Single Component Failures" provide the failure probabilities and system reliabilities without human error or single component failures being accounted for in the analysis. The MPSSISYS failure probability for the various waste leak locations range in value from 8.3 x 10-5 to 7.7 x 10-6 for Phase I1 design configurations. These failure probabilities result in system reliabilities greater than 99.992%. These calculations were provided to show the impact of single component failures on the reliability of the MPSSISYS.

The cutsetiimportance files are provided in Appendices C-la through C-9b for each of the leak detector locations evaluated along the transfer route. The importance of the various components of the MPSSISYS is provided via the Fussell-Vesely importance factor ranking system. The results provided in Table 4-3 is based on the componentievent importance tables provided i n Appendices C-la through C-9b. Only single componentIevent failures, which result in the failure of the system, are provided in Table 4-3. The name ofthe waste transfer location, the system component basic event, failure probability of component or event and the Fussell-Vesely importance factor is provided in the table. The components are sorted from the highest to the lowest importance for each of the evaluated leak detection locations along the transfer route.

Safety Function

A fault tree was developed for a portion of the MPSS, which was defined as providing only the Safety Function, MPSS/PLC. The scope of the fault tree is provided in Figure 3-7. The MPSSIPLC failure probability was determined using this fault tree and is provided in Appendix A-10.

For this analysis reliability is defined as the probability that the system can transfer a signal from the 242-A Evap Area Node to the 2 4 2 4 Evap Area Node. The mission time for the analysis was selected to be 5 years in length (RPP 1999). The calculated failure probability of 1.45 x 10-3 and reliability of 99.855% for the MPSSPLC is provided in Table 4-2 row C-I 0.

A preliminary estimate for the MPSSIPLC reliability was determined to be 99.887% via a parts count methodology, Table 3-B of Option IB (RPP 1999). This value and its corresponding failure probability are provided in Table 4-2 in the row labeled "Options Report" for colnparison purposes.

23

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

The cutset/importance tiles for the MPSS/PLC analysis is provided in Appendices C-IO. The importance of the various components of the MPSS/PLC is provided via the Fussell-Vesely importance factor ranking system. There are no single component failures, which would result in the failure of the MPSS/PLC. Only single camponentievent failures, which result in the failure of the system, are provided in Table 4-3. As a result there are no entries provided in Table 4-3 for this analysis.

24

WP-5831 Rev. 0

c LL c

m 01 m 2 m

? 0 X P

2

2 2 m

m

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26

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t r - r - 0 I o

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I

27

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x .e .- 5 f

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t

+

I

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28

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29

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d

30

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” ? w 0 vi .- 4

31

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


32

...

WP-5831 Rev. 0

5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The failure and reliability analysis of the MPSSiSYS resulted in failure probabilities ranging in value from 1.5 x to 5.8 x 1 .0-4 and system reliabilities of 99.71 to 99.94 for both Phase I and Phase I1 design configurations. These MPSSiSYS reliabilities take into account human error in the definition of the waste transfer path for each of the waste leak detection locations for which the system was evaluated. When human error is removed a range of failure probabilities of 4.7 x 1 O 4 to 9.7 x 1 .0-4 and system reliabilities greater than 99.990 are obtained.

The purpose of this analysis is to provide input to the design process of the MPSS/SYS in the following key areas:

1. Single Component Failure Criterion

A list of single component or actions is provided in Table 4-2. The failure of any of these components or actions would result in the failure ofthe MPSS/SYS to perform the Safety Function of shutting down the waste transfer process at a particular leak detector location along the selected waste transfer path. There are a minimum of four and a maximum of nine component or activity failures, which would result in the failure of the MPSSiSYS and leak detector system to perform the safety function.

The MPSSiSYS PDS (HNF 2000a) specifies a maximum single system component failure probability of 1 x 10-6. The single component failure would result in the failure of the MPSS to perform its safety function. The Phase I1 MPSSiSYS design does not meet this failure probability criterion. For each of the leak detector locations selected and evaluated, there is one common system component which has a failure probability greater than 1 x 10-6: the transfer pump motor control contactors (4.66 x 10-4 failure probability).

Eliminating this component from consideration in each of the analyses would result in an increase in reliability from greater than 99.900% to greater than 99.992% (Table 4-1).

2. System Status Upon Loss of Electrical Power

No components were identified which would prevent the MPSS/SYS from performing its safety function upon loss of electrical power. All MPSSISYS and leak detection system components, which were part of this assessment, transfer to a de-energized state resulting in a tripped MPSSiSYS system and shutdown of a waste transfer process.

3. Physical Isolation of Safety Class Channel A wiring from Channel B wiring, and 4. Physical Isolation of Safety Class Wiring from General Service wiring

The signal cable configuration of a single conduit was evaluated and compared against a separate conduit configuration for safety-class and general-service cables for both analog and discrete signal wires. These frequency calculations are provided in Appendix D.

The failure mode of concern is a short of a safety-class or general service analog or discrete signal wire to another energized wire in a separate analog signal or discrete signal cable resulting in a false

33

WP-5831 Rev. 0

permissive signal. Shorting of wires within the same signal cable would be the same for both the separate conduit and single conduit configurations and therefore was not made part of this frequency assessment.

The frequency of such an occurrence for an analog signal wire was conservatively determined to be 2.3 x 10" /year for a circuit of ten miles in length in the same conduit. The comparable frequency for the case of having the analog safety class and general service signal cables running in separate conduits was determined to be 2.51 x 10-12 /year.

The frequency of such an occurrence for a discrete signal wire was conservatively determined to be 2.55 x 10-9 / year for circuit of one mile in length in the same conduit. The comparable frequency for the case of having the analog safety class and general service signal cables running in separate conduits was determined to be 3.46 x 10-11 /year.

External events such as seismic, tire, wind, or excavation accidents were not accounted for in this portion ofthe failure analysis. The frequencies provided above are less than the failure criteria of 1 x 10-6 /year as specified by the MPSS/SYS PDS (HNF 2000a).

Meeting the MPSSPLC Option l b (RPP 1999) Reliability estimate

The MPSS/PLC Safety Function failure probability was determined using a fault tree which is provided in Appendix A-IO. The scope of the fault tree is provided in Figure 3-7. This fault tree was developed for just the Safety Function of the MPSSIPLC.

For this analysis reliability is defined as the probability that the system can transfer the safety function signal from the 242-A Evap Area Node to the 2 4 2 3 Evap Area Node. The mission time for the analysis was selected to be 5 years in length (RPP 1999). The failure probability of 1.45 x 10-4 and reliability of 99.963% was determined for the MPSSPLC System Safety Function.

A preliminary estimate for the MPSSPLC Safety Function reliability was determined in August of 1999 via a parts count methodology and is provided in Table 3-B, Option IB (RF'P 1999). The calculated reliability via this method is 99.887% over a 5-year time frame. In the report an estimate of the current MPSS reliability was provided for comparison purposes of 97.13%.

The calculated reliability for the MPSS/PLC safety function in this report (99.855%) is slightly less that the reliability ofthe Options report Option I B estimate (99.887%) and greater than the existing MPSS reliability estimate (97.13%) of August 1999.

5.

WP-5831 Rev. 0

6.0 References

BEH-99-009, 1999, Man-Hour and Schedule Estimate for Master Pump Shutdown System Safety Function Failure Analysis, Fluor Federal Services, Richland, Washington.

Blanton, C.H., and Eide, S.A., 1993, Savannah River Site Generic Data Base Development (U), WSRC-TR-93-262, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

IEEE Std 493-1990, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Standards Board, New York, NY.

IEEE Std 500 1984, IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, Sensing Component, and Mechanical Equipment Reliability Data for Nuclear-Power Generating Stations, Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society, New York, NY.

Fullwood, Ralph R., and Hall, Robert E., 1988a, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Pergamon Press, New York, N.Y.

HNF-SD-W3 14-PDS-004, 2000a, Project Development Specification for Master Pump Shutdown System, Rev. 3, Fluor Federal Services, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-WM-TSR-O06,2OOOb, Tank Waste Remediation System Technical Safety Requirements, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

Henley, Ernest J., and Kumamoto, Hiromitsu, 198 I , Reliability Engineering and Risk Assessment, Prentice- Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Powers, T.B., et.al., 1992, Hanford Non-Reactor Failure Rate Datafile, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

RPP-5394, 1999, Master Pump Shutdown Safety Class Options, Fluor Daniel Northwest Inc., Richland Washington.

MIL-HDBK-217F, 1995, Military Handbook Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment, Reliability Analysis Center, Rome, New York.

NUREG-0492, 1986, Fault Tree Handbook, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA.

RAC, FMD-91, 1991, Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions, Reliability Analysis Center, Rome, NY.

RAC, NPRD-95, 1995, Noneleclronic Parts Reliability Datu 1995, Reliability Analysis Center, Rome, NY.

Thompson, J. R., 1987, Engineering Safely Assessment. National Nuclear Corporation Ltd., Knutsford, Cheshire, England.

35

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix A

Master Pump Shutdown System

Fault Trees

A- 1

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A-2

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Appendix A-la

SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Fault Tree

Phase I

A-3

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


A-4

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

1

1

I* a ’ I B

3

A-5

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-6

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-7

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

-? ih

U

3 ?

WP-583 1 Rev. 0

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

1

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix A-1 b

SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A Fault Tree

Phase I1

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


A-12

UP-5831 Rev. 0

I

A-13

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

I-

- A-14

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-15

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-16

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

nIy

A-I7

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


A-18

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Appendix A-2 a

241-SY-A Valve Pit Fault Tree

Phase I

A-19

RF'P-583 1 Rev. 0


A-20

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

I?

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

U

A-22

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

n

a

U

A-23

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-24

RPP-583 I Rev, 0

n

U

n

A-25

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A-26

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

Appendix A-2b

241-SY-A Valve Pit Fault Tree

Phase I1

A-27

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RPP-5831 Rev. 0

A-29

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r--

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I

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A-30

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A-3 I

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U

A-32

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Appendix A-3

6241-A Diversion Box Fault Tree

Phase I & Phase I1

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RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

n

U

n

I

n

n

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A-35

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n

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A-34

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n

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A-37

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I

A-38

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U

A-39

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I

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A-40

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.-

Appendix A-4

6241-V Vent Station Fault l'ree

Phase I & Phase I1

A-4 I

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A-42

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-

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A-43

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A-44

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n

n

A-45

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U

A-46

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n

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RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

1

A-48

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Appendix A-5

AN-101 Central Pump Pit 01A Fault Tree

Phase I & Phase I1

A-49

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A-50

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n

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A-5 1

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I-

A-52

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n

U

A-53

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n U

U

A-54

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n

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A-55

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I I 8

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n

A-57

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r)

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A-58

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Appendix A-6

241-AZ Valve Pit Fault Tree

Phase I & Phase I1

A-59

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A-60

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n

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1

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A-6 1

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n

(38.

A-62

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I

1 I

I

I

A-63

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1

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A-64

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A-65

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A-66

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n.

1

I

1 8

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U

A-67

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A-68

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Appendix A-7

241-AP-A Valve Pit Fault Tree

Phase I & Phase I1

A-69

-

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


A-70

. -.

RF'P-5831 Rev, 0

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A-72

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I

A-73

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1 U I-

A-14

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A-15

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1 -

A-I6

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1

I

A-I7

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A-18

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n

A-79

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A-80

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Appendix A-8

241- AP Valve Pit Fault Tree

Phase 1 & 11

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


A-82

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

1

I

U

I

A-83

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A-83

d Q

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U

U

A-85

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A-86

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n

U

U

A-87

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A-88

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n

r-

I

U

A-89

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1

3i

1

A-90

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I

A-9 1

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A-92

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Appendix A-9a

AW-102 Central Pump Pit Fault Tree

Phase I

A-93

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A-94

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-95

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n

U

U

A-96

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I -

2 A-97

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

U

U

A-98

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

I I

A-99

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

n

A- 100

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-101

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A- IO2

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A- 103

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix A-9b

AW-102 Central Pump Pit Fault Tree

Phase I1

A- I05

~

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


RPP-5831 Rev. 0

A- 107

RF’P-583 1 Rev. 0

I - - I

A- 108

RPP-5X3 1 Rev. 0

1

(38

I

1 I I I

1

I

1

I

A-IO9

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

U

A-110

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

A - I l l

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

U

U

A-I 12

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

A-I I3

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

A-114

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0

n

l o

A-I15

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

U

-

A-116

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A-I I7

RPP-583 I Rev. 0


A-1 18

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

Appendix A-10

MPSS Safety Function Fault Tree

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


A- 120

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

U

U

A-121

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

I--

U

A-122

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

1

n

ns

U

A- 123

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

"

A- I24

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

A-125

.

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

A- 126

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

n

n s

A-127

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

n

A-128

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix B

Basic Events and Type Codes

B-1

RF'P-5831 Rev.0


B-2

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

3

P 0

N i ! 0 0

L, i

., !

B-3

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0

3 1 3 3 4 m m m m m c c c c c I n m m m m .j .j .j .j .j I O v i r o v i V I

c c m UI m .3 .+

i .i m lu

Y) m Y) "7 Y) Y) m YI m 4 4 4 3 1 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 Y) m Ln VI m VI m Ln VI 0 0 0 0 c<:> Cl Cl c/ c/ u1 in "1 u1", YJ In In In

n t i n ~ n ~ n n ~ z z z z z z z z z z z z n ~ ~ n n n n ~ ~ 000000000 m m 0 m 10 m m m m 4 3 i 3 3 -1 3 -1 3 4 3 3 m m "7 Ln Y) Y) "7 Y) Y) 3 3 1 * 1 3 4 3 4 1 m u , "> In "1 Y) In VI m 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 4 4 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 1 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 3 4 3 A 4 4 3

0 4 N m T Y) ID P m m 0 3 N m ., m LD P m m 0 3 N m * m LD r. m m (3 3 N " * m (0 r m 0 1 I:) 1 rU < _ 1 * "1 l o r m Y) m m m m m m m m m ID LD ID (D co ID ID LD ID ID r P r P P r P r r + m m m m m m m m m m , , , / I , "I 111 I>, I,/ /A "1 I,,

B-4

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ! d l i 3 i i - i 3 * 3 i i 3 3 i i i 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 i i 3 3 3 i 3 i * i i i 3 ~ i i i i i i i i * i x

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0

urn > ,

Y Y u U u u Y " " " " " " U m m l a m m m m Y U u U Y U u c c : c c c c c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 u v u u v u v \ \ \ \ \ \ \

I h h h h h h > m m m m m m m 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 m a J " a ' B a ' ' X y : y : y : b y : d [ r :

B-6

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

10

G)

n, : P 0

N 4

0 0

m 4

*

ol m

m 3

y1

m 3 m " " c c i i " U

* * * r - , * m a m n a m m m m r n m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , , , , , , , , I I , I I I , 8 I I I I

~ w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w o o o o o o o o o o o o o o w w w w w w o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B-I

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0

B-9

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

3

B-10

FWP-5831 Rev. 0

Failure Rate Frequency Calculations for MPSS Components

PLC Failure Rate Calculation

= &D KMFO XT KCD + k ~ p XE X, npT + &- Failurer/106 hrs

AB0 - 0.00 Failure Rale is usodaled wilh initial bum in

*MFQ = 2.00 Manufaduring Pmcass Consdion Fadw

%T = 1.00 Temperature Fador Taken to be 1 .OO

"C? = 5.20 Dla ComplexKy Comdion Fador - F.S. 1 .OO - A<.4

KE = 0.50 Envimnment Fador

u, = 1.00 Clu.YtyFador

~ P T = 1.00 Package Typs Corrsdlon Fador

- Din Base FaUum Rate - Not applicable

XBp = 0.0043 P.cluge Bsro Fallure Rate (120 Pins)

0.07 Eledtkal OventraPs Failure Rae - - k,, = (0.00 + 0.002 + 0.07)1106 hrs

= 7.20 x lodl hr

Ref: MILHDBK-217F Sedion 5.3 - Micmcirwils

Analog Logic Card Failure Rate Calculation

c, = 0.005 Complexity Failure Rate 101 lo 1000

KT = 1 .00 Tempersturn Fadw Taken t0 be 1 .00 Ca = 0.0059 Compledty Failure Rate 101 lo 1000

A6 = 5.20 Envlmnmanl Fadw

nQ = 1 .OO Qualily Fadw

XL = 1.00 bamln&l Fador- Years in Produdion ~ 2 . 0

= 1 (0.005 + 0.031) x 1 x I J/106hrs

= 3.57 x 1 O4 I hr

Rat MlLHDBK-Zl7F W n 5.1 Micmcircub. GltdLogic A m y . md Micmprcceswn

B-11

RPP-5831 Rev, 0

Failure Rate Frequency Calculations for MPSS Components

Digital Logic Card Failure Rate Calculation

a, = ab X~ xE FailursdlOo hm

l i b = 0.029 Tempentue Fador Taken l o be 1 .oO Xq = 5.20 Qualky Fador

7zE = 1 .oO Envimnment Fador

ap = [O.029 x 5.20 x IYIO'J hrr

=1.51x10~'7hr Ref MILHDBK-2l7F Sedion 13.2 Relays, SoiM SWe and Time Delay

MPSS ConduiVWire Runs Between Tank Farm PLCs

Origin 2424 EvsparPtor B!dg

252-S Substation

252-5 Substation

2524 Substation

252-5 Substation

241-AN-271 Insl Bldg ANA-PLC ANB-PLC

241-AZ-271 lnsl BMg AZA-PLC AZSPLC

241-AP-271 lnd Bldg APA-PLC APB-PLC

241-AW-271 lnsl Bldg AWA-PLC AWB-PLC

Dutlnation 252-8 Substation

241-SY-271 B b

Divemion Box (1211 A Booster Pump8

Vent Ststlon 62414

LDEJ13WA

LDE-31 51/A

W A Ind Encloaum Inlerf.cb Relay

241-AN-271 lnstr BMg ANA-PLC ANBPLC

24142-271 Ind Bldg AZA-PLC AZBPLC

241-AP-271 ind Bldg APA-PLC APEPLC

241-AW-271 Ind Bldg AWA-PLC A W P L C

241-A EV.poMW B N A24a-PLC A242B-PLC

DI.(.ncm 350 R

200 R

3,7wn

12,500 R

28,400 n

30,380 R

1.590R

2,100 n

580 R

240 n

B-12

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C

Cutsets and Importance Factors

c-1

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-2

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C-la

Cutsets and Importance Factors for SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A

Phase I

c-3

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-4

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

P r m m m 0 0 0 0 0

W w 0 0

w w w m 0 0

m m N o m m V N N N 3 3 3 - a a n

P P r - r ~ P P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

I ! ! 8 8 w w w P m m

w w w w w . m l o 0 w w (D 3 N N N 3 P

w. r . . , e m a a a a ( D

w I V I Y I I I I I I I , . . . I , w w w w g w

. . . . . . . . . . . m N . . 3 m O O I C 0 (D w w w (D m o, V N - m O a l u m 2 2 P l . d 3 v a a a d m P =

m ' P P P P P P r P P r- N N P P P P O P m r -m P m P m P P m 0 , o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I I I , , I I , I I I I , I I , , I t I , I I I I I I I

0 m m m m o o 0 m o m 0 0 m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 m o m o o o m 1.1 N O N m w w o m m m O N O N O o o m o m ~ m 3 m m m m m m m m m m 3 3 m m m m or- 3 P m r - m m d

w w w w w w w w w w w w Y w w w w w w w w w 2 w w w w w w

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

C-6

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

I O N N N N N O O O O N N O O O O N N O O I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

S l w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w O m m m m m m m m m m m w w m m m m m m h C I 0 1 1 ~ ~ v w w u w v ~ 3 3 w w c c w w 3 4 ; y1

c-7

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

Appendix C-lb

Cutsets and Importance Factors for SY-102 Central Pump Pit 02A

Phase I1

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-10

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

X I H I

P P 0 0 I ,

N 3 0

0 N N

- m o o P o 0 0 0 0 0 0 I , + + a + w w w w w w O P O O 3 0 * N O O N 0

N 3 3 3 N 3

P 0

: Y , " . .

. . . . . .

0

P P 0 0

w w P 3

P 3

N N

c . - o * * o 0 0 0 0 0 0 I ( + I I + w w w w w w

w w o w w o w w o w w o w . 4 . 3 e - 3 . . . . . .

P 0

w P 3

P 3

P 3

N N N

P 0

P 0

w w

0 m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m "7- m m m m m 4 3 3 3 3 4 i d 3 3 3 3 133 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 - 3 -1 3 3 3

~ 3 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 i 3 3 3 3 i 3 3 3 i 3 3 3 i

3 m m m m m m m m m m m m m 4 m 3 m

P P a P P P P a D I P P P P & P a P .? .?

c-11

....

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

c-13

w

0 0

3 0

m

WP-583 1 Rev. 0

o N N O O O O O O O O O N N N O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + t i + + + + + + + + + + + + + W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W o m m m ~ m m ~ ~ t - m ~ m m m m t - o ~ ~ m w a m w w w m w ~ r - ~ m w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 w w N N N N " " N w w w N N

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + t i + + + W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W 0 3 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 3 w o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o m 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 n 3 3 4 n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - w r n ~ ~ m m ~ ~ r w w " m w m e .

c-14

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix C-2a

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-SY-A Valve Pit

Phase I

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0


C-16

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m P P 0 s 0 0 I I I

w w w o m m 0 m m, . . . 3 m m

P 0

w m m m

P P P 0 0 0 I , ,

w w w m o o 1N.q m m m

P 0

w 0 N

m

P P 0 0

I , w w m o m N m m . .

r 0

W m m 0

3

C-17

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

(1

, O N " N N O O O 0 N N O O O O " o O I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

s i o m m m m m m m m m m m w w m m a m m m % I w w w w w w w ~ w w w w w w w w w w w w

C-19

.

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-20

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C-2b

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-SY-A Valve Pit

Phase I1

c-2 1

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-22

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

m ' P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P o < O O O o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 o o 3 o o o o o o o o O D o I , I , I , I I 4 0 , I I I t , I I , I , I I , , I I , I

w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w o m o o o m o m o m o m o m a o a o o m m m m m m m m m m 0 m N N , , . .y m N O N m N m~ m c y p.y w m m m m m m m m m m m M I

* I 2 1 4 m m m m _ m 001 m m m m m - m 3 - 3 m m m m m m m m m m m

w w 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0

I w w w w ~ m m N N N

N

3 3 3 3 3 - m m 3 3 3 3 4 w w

P P P P P P ~m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W w w w m N N N w w w W W w w w w

N o w m 3

N 3

m N N

N . l L O , V I 1 . I

tn o a 4 m XLL.8 0.

I , I ,

. m ' m 3 3 O P m n N N N N . . N 3 . . a n o 1

C-24

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

C-25

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

*

m

O N N O O O O O O O O O N N N O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + w Y w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w o m m m ~ m m ~ ~ ~ m ~ m m m m ~ O P P ~ W ~ ~ W W W ~ W P P P ~ W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 w w N " " N " N w w w N N

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + w w w w w w w w w w w Y w w w w w o 4 w o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 4 w o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 ~ 4 4 4 d d d 3 3 d 3 3 4 3 3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

m o d m n m m m m m m m + + - o m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I + , I I I I , I I I 1 I I I I I

w ~ w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w ~ o m n w m m w w w m w m m m m w r o m m a m m a a ~ m a m m m m w

I ~ ~ N N N N N N N N N ~ ~ ~ N N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0 3 d m m * I w w - , * - , * m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 1 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w o m w ~ ~ u w m m m r ~ o m m d m O P d m I N N P P P P O U 7 m P N m

d w m N N m m P P P * * 3 m w m * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0 3 3 m m w w * T * I * * m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + I I I I I I I I I 4 I I I I I I P w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w O ~ ~ N N P P O O O P ~ O U ~ ~ ~ O P d m d N N m m m P O m m P N m - w m ~ ~ m m r ~ ~ - r - - r n w m v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

o n * o m * * w P w - , ~ P P P m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + I I I I , , I I l i l , l l l l w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w 0 0 W P P W W W W W O O 3 m O N N O O w N N w w w w w * * N m O w w 3 4 a d d e * - m I - N N N 4 3 N N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix C-3

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 6241-A Diversion Box

Phase I & I1

c-21

WP-583 1 Rev. 0


C-28

-_ __

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m m m m m 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

m 4

m 3

m m m m m "5- m m 3 3 3 3 3

m i n 3rl

m 3

1 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 -

P T P ~ m m r - P P P ~m ~m ~m P O P O ~m P P ? r - m P P P P 0 ' 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I , , I I , , I , I I , I , I , I , , I I , I , I , I , , I

Y w w u w w w W Y Y w w w w W W w w w w w w w w w w w w w w m o o o o o o m o m m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m m m m o O N ? . O O N O N o o o o o n o n o n o n o o o n o m m n m m d m m - d m m m m - 3 m _ m~ m 3 0 3 m + m + 0 3 m c ) m p l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"

C-29

.....

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P r~ P P P P P P P ~ P 0 0 a0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

I , , I , I 0 I , I , I , I , 6 , I , I , I , I , , I I , , , I w w w w w w w w w w w w w w 2; w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w g o m m m 77 o m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m N O N

w , m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m o o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 : C;C; C;C; m m m m m m m m m m m m m c 1 o m m m m m m m m m m m m r m

C-30

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

w P

w w w m m m w w w

m m m m m N N

w w w 0 o m m m m m N N

a " I o m i i w

m m ~m r r m r m m ~m ~ m m m m m m m m 0 0 ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

5 I ) I , , I I 8 I I , I O , I I , , I Y w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w Y W 0 0 m o m o o 0 0 0 m o m o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 m o ~ y : ~m m m m m o o o m o m m m P P W P m m i m i 3 m 3 m r - r r i p i 3 - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WP-583 1 Rev. 0

0 0

3 0

m

C-32

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C-4

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 6241-V Vent Station

Phase I & I1

c-33

- -

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


c-34

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

c r- P P P P P m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

w Y m N

w w w w w w P r- m o o n m w w m w w w w w 3 3 N N Y ) m m m P N N N N

P r- 3 3

P 3

N N N N N 3 4 a * m m N 3 3 3 3

w m w m

~ - o a a o a a o a a o ~ a o a a m m o m m o Y ) o a Y ) o a m m o m ~ o o ~ m o m a o ~ a ~ Y ) a ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0

I 1 + 1 1 + 1 1 + 1 1 + 1 I + , , I 1 + 1 I + , + , I + , , 1 + 1 1 + + 1 1 + 1 1 + 1 , + , I I w w w w w w Y w w w w w w w w w Y w Y w W W W W W Y W W W Y Y Y W W W W W W W W w w w w w w w w w w 0 w w 0 w W O w w O w w O w w c w O P w o w o w w o w P N o c N o o w o o w w o w w o w w N w w O w w O w w o w w O w w o w w N w O ~ w o w o w w o w N w o N w o o P o o P w o P w o c w w " a 3 a a 3 a a 3 c a - " a 3 a a 3 m - - m 3 ~ - a ~ - a - ~ - 3 ~ - 3 ~ 3 - ~ a 3 ~ a - ~ a ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

m m m m o 0 0 0 0 3

w P

w M

w m

w m YI m m

N N

3 m N N w

_ . I m , V I - . . I

. m I al e 0 1 m o a t m Z P I &

w m

o r r m o 1 m Y I o m m o m m o m ~ o m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

+ I , + , I , + I 1 + 1 I + , , + . I w c i w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w N

m . m l O W N O W W W O W N O W N O N N O w o , o L D w o ~ m w o w w o w w o m w o . a , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m a t 3 r r ~ 3 r r m m + m ~ 3 m ~ - ~ ~ ~

0 0

M I 3 a ! 0 L 3 4 m 4 m 0 1

P l X I w , 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 4

o m m Y I m Y I m YIm m m 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 i 4 3 3

P m ' P m m m m m m m m 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I , I , , , I I , 0

w w w c i w w w w w w w m o m o o 00 0 0 0 0 m m m o o o m o m m m . . . . . . . . . . . . M 3 m P P P 3 P 3 3 3

.i .i .* .4 .* VI m m m m

W I

* a 0 P w a e w m

u z

c-31

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

C-38

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix C-5

Cutsets and Importance Factors for AN-101 Central Pump Pit 01A

Phase I & I1

c-39

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


RPP-5831 Rev. 0

n ) P L O P W P w P W P P l o rr- P P P P P P w m P P P P P P P r -P 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I , , I , 3 I , I , , 4 , I , I , I , I , I I , I , 4 , I ,

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C-46

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Appendix C-6

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AZ Valve Pit

Phase I & I1

C-41

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‘2-48

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C-56

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Appendix C-7

Cutsets and Importance Factors for New AP-A Valve Pit

Phase I & I1

c-57

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C-58

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C-64

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RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix C-8

Cutsets and Importance Factors for 241-AP Valve Pit

Phase I & I1

C-69

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C-70

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p m ' r m P a P m P r n P m P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P o o * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I , I I I , I , I 4 I , I t , I , , I > I I I I , I , / I I ,

w w w w w w w w w w W Y w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 * r n * m * m * . m _ a * m * a * m * a *

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W I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m m m m m 0 0 O D

3 3 3 0 w w

3 o m m m n o o m m m o m m u? 3 3 w w W w w w w w w w w W a

m . I P P P m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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w I: , . I N w N w 0 3 w w 3 w 3 w 3 A A A 4 I : A 3 3 3 W

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P P ' P P P P m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 I I I , I , I I , I I I , I , , I ! I I , , I , I I , I , , I I

w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w t m a m e m o o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m e m~ , , 1.9 m m m m m m m o m o m o m m a o m m m o m m m n o o 3 : c;; m - o 3 m o m m m o m o m o m m m m m o m m m m m o m m c m

w w w w E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

w . , m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

w w w N N m m

N m

w w L O l O

m m . . I w Y Y w U I I

o m m m m m o m

. m l 0 0 n o t m m - n m m m n m m 0 n N N N N

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& , Y) m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 3 0 m w%r w m w m w m 3 44 3 3 131 31 13 3 3 3 1 4 3 3 3 1 -1 N N 3 N 3 N 4 N 3 $ 1 3 3 1 4 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 ” 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 ~ N 3 3 N 3 m - 3 m 3 3 m 3 3 m 1

C-I6

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

P . I m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m V l l O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

w w w w N N N

N N

W w 3 3

w w N 3

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N N N m m m ~ M ( 1 W O

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a Z P I N N N N N N N i 3 3 3 3 i i 3 3 Ln o a k . P

4 w 3 w 3

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0 0 0 0 0 0 u u

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L o n m 2 : m m m m m m m m r ' m m m m m m m m u m u m m m m m m m m m m m m

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m ~ ' m m ~m ~m r m r m ~m ~m m ~m ~ m m m m m m m m m m m m I I I , I , , I I I 4 , I , I I I , , I , I , I

w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w cn M O O P O I ~m ~m ~m ~m ~m o w o u m m m m m m m m m m m m

0 777 77 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 : 3 M P P i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 P 3 P 3013 m 3 m 3 m 3 m 3 m 3

. .A .d .,I .,I 3 .4 .4 Lo m L o Lo m m L o ffl Lo

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4

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c-79

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0 3

0 0

m

0 0

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m

a

c-80

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

Appendix C-9a

Cutsets and Importance Factors for AW-102 Central Pump Pit 02A

Phase I

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


C-82

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c a 2 2 E. w v) E. 3 u

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N . 1 V I , V I , I I ,

w w w w m m m m w W W w w w w w w u w m w N N

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3 L D L D m m . m I

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P P ' P P P P P P P P P P P P C P P P P P N P P P P 0 - m P a P

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w w w W w w w w W w w w N N N O 4 3 " 4 3 o m m

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N N N N N i 3 3 3 3

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W I o o o o o o o 0 0 o o q m e m e m e m q m e m e m e m o o m o o N O N O N O N O N O P m P m r - m P m P m~ m r - m o m m m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 : P m r - m P m P m r m P 3 m 3 m 3 m 3 m + m 3 m 3 0 3 m 3 m m m

0 y ? y y y y y y .a? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

- . , m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0

w w W W W 0 0 m o m

m , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V I . . I w . m 0 3 w w W w w w w

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W I m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o m m m m m m m m m m m m m o o o m m m ~m ~m ~m ~m ~ r n ~m . . . . . > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z : m m m m o m m m m m m m m P o r m m 3 m)rl m - m - m 3 m - m 3 m -

0 0 9': 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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m . , m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m V I , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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m m o m m m m m m 0 0 0 ,

n Z P , N N N N N N N N N N 4 3 4 3 3 3 m o a t P

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m m

C-87

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

c-88

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RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m

m 0

m

C-90

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C-9b

Cutsets and Importance Factors for AW-102 Central Pump Pit 02A

Phase I1

C-91

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C-92

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O l m 0 - 0 Ol cn c c m m m c c n c n m m m c

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P P r- P P P r P P P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w m o m o m o m o m o m 0 m m m m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 00 O N m~ CI? 7 : 7 : 7 Y 7 7 7 7 7 7 17 17 7 7 ? ? ? "19

W I . . . . 2 ; m m o m o m o m o m 0 4 0 0 0 0 o m 00 0 0 0 0 i m p m P m P

c-95

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

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m m m 0 0 0

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N 3

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C-91

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

m m m m 0 0 0 0

Y 0 n

Y W 0

w -, -, -,

m m 0

m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0

Y m

0 0 0

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W Y w w W Y w w w w Y W w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m m m m m m m m n m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m o o m o C I O

m m m m o m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m o m m m m m or- CIP m r .

Y l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a .? .? .? .? .? 2 .? .? .* a .? .? a .? -i a .rl a -rl P P o 1 0. P P VI P P P 0. P 0.

.rl

C-98

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RPP-583 I Rev. 0

m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0

m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0

w N m

W W N m

N 01

w w w m M w 0 m a a M m c) m o m m m N N N N N N

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w w w w w w w w w w w o m o m o m o m o m a w m w m w m

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f. a 2 2 c Y Lo E- 3 u

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m 0. a:

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m m m 0 0 0

w w

m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 m

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Y 2 3 N w z 3 W O N m m

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3 3 3 N N N N N N N 3 4 4 3 3 3

m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m YIm m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 3 3 3 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 - 1 3 3 3 4 3 34 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 i i 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 i 3 3 - 3 - 3 3 ~ 3 3 3 i i 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

m P i o P m P m P m P m P m P m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , , I I , I , I , I , I , I , I , I , I , , I , I I , I , , I I w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o P O ~ 0 . ~ 0 P O P O P O P O m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m o m P T(P - P A P - P _ P _ P A P m p m~ m ~ p m~ m~ m~ m~ m P 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c- 100

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

m m m m m 0 0 0 0

W "7 m 0

ID ID ID ID m

m m o i m m m

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m m m m m

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0 0

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r m ' r m r m r m r m m r m r m r m r m r m r m r m r m m ~m ~m 0 0 , o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 I I I I ( I I , 1 4 , , I I I I , I , , I I , I t I , I I t 4 8

m o m o m o m o m o o c . 0 * o l o c.0 * o c.0 * o 0 0 0 0 0 m m o m y y m m m o o r - m r m r m r - m r m r m poi r m o w o ID^ 3 : p i - m 3 p i 3 m 3 p i r - r - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 4 - 3 3 P 3 m

$ I 3 3 ~ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 ~ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 3 3 3 3 3 1 d 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 o 3 3 m -

w w w w w w w w w w w LGg w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 2 0 P

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0 3

m m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0

m m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 0

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rn m m w

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m m rn m m m

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m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m N m N m m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 I , I , I ( I I \ I t I , I , I , I 8 I , I I , , w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y y . y : m m m m m m m m o m o m m w m w m m m m m . . . . , . , . . . , . . , . . . . 3 : ;; m 3 m 3 6 1 3 m - m 3 m 3 P 3 P 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

c- 102

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

Y) 0

m

C-103

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Appendix C-10

Cutsets and Importance Factors for MPSS Safety Function

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

m 0

w 0 0

3

- 3

C-107

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RPP-5831 Rev. 0

m 0

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C- 109

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c- 120

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Appendix D

Conduit Configuration Evaluation

D- 1

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0


D-2

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

Analog Signal Sepa ra t e Condu i t versus C o m m o n Conduit Compar i son

The analog signals between tank farm programmable logic controllers (PLC) of the Master Pump Shutdown System (MPSS) will be carried via ground-shielded cables. A representation of a single cable is provided in Figure D-I. Each cable consists of eight individual twisted electrical wiring pairs. The twisted wire pair carries the analog signal. A grounded sheathing covers each individual twisted wiring pair. These wires carry low voltage and amperage signals. The sheathing carry induced stray signals to ground. There is essentially no heating of the wire or cable sheathing. The resulting low wire temperatures promote high reliability of the wire insulation and cable coatings.

There is a Channel A and Channel B for the safety class programmable logic controllers (PLC) of the MPSS. For each of the channels there is a cable for the inward-bound analog signals to the PLC of an MPSS area node and a cable for the outward-bound analog signals from the PLC of an area node. The same is true for the general service PLCs. There is a total of three PLCs at each area node of the MPSS. This results in six cables running between the area nodes of the MPSS.

The MPSS is designed to shutdown a waste transfer process upon the loss of a safety class permissive signal. Any MPSS component failure, which results in the loss of a permissive signal, is defined as fail-safe. A short to ground is fail-safe since it results in the loss of a permissive signal. A short of an analog wire to a grounded sheathing results in the loss ofthe permissive signal to the receiving PLC. For the purpose of this analysis it was assumed that a wire shorts to the grounded shielding nine out of ten times. This is considered to be a very conservative estimate. One out of ten times it does not go to ground. A short from one analog signal wire to another analog signal wire is not considered to be fail- safe since it could result in a continuation of a permissive signal.

The two conduit-cable configurations evaluated are the Separate Conduit (Figure D-2) and Single Conduit (Figure D-3) configurations. The separate conduit configuration is the base case, which the single conduit configuration will be compared against.

Analog Signal Separate Condu i t Configuration

This configuration of the analog cable runs between individual tank farm programmable logic controllers has each of the pairs (inward-bound and outward-bound) of the Safety Class cables and the pair of General Service cables in separate conduits. Each ofthe conduits is separated by earthen fill. This configuration is shown in Figure D-2. This configuration is the base case for the purpose of comparison of the two configurations addressed in this analysis.

The most likely short that can occur for this cable configuration is between wire pairs within the same cable. A total of eight barriers must fail in order for a short to occur between wire pairs in separate cables, channels and conduits.

A short between twisted wire pairs of Channel A, Channel B or General Service requires the failure of six grounded barriers and two wire coatings. The fraction of shorts not failing safe from one analog wire to another conduit channel cable analog wire can be calculated by the following equation:

P,,F~ = f " x (N, Ndc N a d 0" NCic Nwd

y - fraction of failures not to grounded barrier - 1 x 10.'

D-3

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

f - ( 1 -e.") n - number of grounded barriers - 6 N, - Number of Other Conduits - 2 Ncic -Number of Cables per Conduit - 2 Nawi, - Number of Analog Signal Wires per Cable - 8 N,/, - Number of Wires per Cable - 16

Pnfs = (1 - e-")6 x (2 x 2 x 8)1(3 x 2 x 16) = 2.97 x

This does not take into account for the earthen fi l l between the three separate conduits.

The frequency of a wire shorting is 1.6 x IO-" per foot per year (IEEE 1990). Combining the fraction of non-safe failures with the wire shorting frequency gives the following frequency.

F,, = Pne x (1.6 x IO") = 4.15 x IO-'' I ft I year

Analog Signal Common Conduit Configuration

This configuration of the analog cable runs between individual tank farm programmable logic controllers has each of the two Safety Class cables and the single General Service cable in one conduit. This configuration is shown in Figure D-3.

The most likely short that can occur for this cable configuration is between wire pairs within the same cable. A total of six barriers must fail in order for a short to occur between wire pairs in separate cables and channels.

A short between twisted wire pairs of Channel A, Channel B or General Service requires the failure of four grounded barriers and two wire coatings. The fraction of shorts not failing safe from one analog wire to another analog wire in a separate conduit cable can be calculated by the following equation:

Pnrs = f " x (Ncic N M J ( N u c Nwd

y - fraction of failures not to grounded barrier - 1 x IO' f - ( l - e ' " ) n - number of grounded barriers between wire pairs - 4 N,,, - Number of Extra Cables in the Conduit - 4 Ncvc - Total Number of Cables in the Conduit - 6 N,,,, - Number of Analog Signal Wires per Cable - 8 NWi, - Number of Wires per Cable - 16

P,e = (1 - e- x (4 x 8)/(6 x 16) = 2.73 x 10.'

The frequency of a wire shorting is 1.6 x IO'' per foot per year (IEEE 1990). Combining the fraction of non-safe failures with the wire shorting frequency gives the following frequency.

D-4

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

F,, = P,e x ( 1.6 x lo-") = 4.37 x 10.'' / ft / year

Incremental Risk

Based on the above calculatioils the incremental risk associated with placing the wiring cables in one conduit versus separate conduits is:

AF = F,, / F,, = 4.37 x 10"' / ti / year / 4.75 x io-'' / ft /year = 92 / ft / year

This is less than two orders of magnitude increase in the frequency of a non-safe short when going from a separate conduit configuration to a single conduit configuration.

For a cable length of I O miles the yearly non-safe failure rate for an analog signal wire from cable to cable in separate conduits would be:

F = L x F,, = I O miles x (5280 ft /mile) x 4.75 x 1 0 - l ~ / ft / year = 2.51 x IO-'* /year

For a cable length of I O miles the yearly non-safe failure rate for an analog signal wire from cable to cable i n a single conduit would be:

F = L x F,, = lOmi lesx (5280f t /mi l e )x4 .37~ 10-15/f t /year = 2.3 1 x 10.'' /year

Conclusion - Analog Signal Conduits

The non-safe shorting ofthe analog wire cables between MPSS area nodes has a very small frequency for both the separate conduit configuration and the single conduit configuration. Raising the failure rate from cable is increased significantly to thousands of miles.

to IO-'' per foot per year is a negligible change in risk unless the length of wire and

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

Discrete Signal Separate Conduit versus Common Conduit Comparison

The discrete signals between tank farm leak detector elements to the Programmable Logic Controllers o f the Master Pump Shutdown System (MPSS) will be carried via ground-shielded cables. A representation o f a single cable i s provided in Figure D-4. Each cable w i l l consist o f a variable amount o f twisted electrical wire pairs depending on which tank farm is'being assessed. Each pair carries a discrete signal. The overall cable shield carries low current induced stray signals with a corresponding low voltage. There i s essentially no heating o f the wire insulation or cable sheathing. Low temperatures promote high reliability o f the wire insulation and cable coatings.

There is a Channel A and Channel B cable for the safety class signals going to the programmable logic controllers (PLC) o f the MPSS from the various leak detector systems. One channel carries the voltage trip signal and the other carries the current trip signal. A loss o f either one o f these signals would result in a shutdown o f the waste transfer process via the MPSS. There i s a general service cable carrying wires from the various leak detector systems to the MPSS PLC area node for that tank farm. There i s a total o f three PLCs at each area node o f the MPSS, two safety class and one general service.

The MPSS i s designed to shutdown a waste transfer process upon the loss o f a safety class permissive signal. Any MPSS component failure or leak detector system, which results in the loss of a permissive signal, i s defined as fail-safe. A short to ground i s fail-safe since it results i n the loss o f a permissive signal. A short o f a discrete signal wire to a grounded sheathing results in the loss o f the permissive signal to the receiving area node PLC. For the purpose o f this analysis i t was assumed that a wire shorts to the grounded shielding nine out o f ten times. This i s a very conservative estimate. One out o f ten times it does not go to ground. A short from one discrete signal wire to another discrete signal wire i s not considered to be fail-safe since it could result in a continuation of the permissive signal.

The two conduit-cable configurations evaluated are the Separate Conduit (Figure D-5) and Single Conduit (Figure D-6) configurations. The separate conduit configuration i s the base case, which the single conduit configuration w i l l be coniparcd against.

Discrete Signal Separate Conduit Configuration

This configuration o f the three discrete cable runs between a tank farm leak detector system and the area node programmable logic controllers are in separate conduits. Each o f the conduits is separated by earthen fill. This configuration i s shown in Figure D-5. This configuration i s the base case for the purpose of comparison o f the two configurations addressed in this analysis.

The most likely short that can occur for this cable configuration i s between wire pairs within the same cable. A total o f six barriers must fail in order for a short to occur between wire pairs in separate cables and conduits.

A short between twisted wire pairs o f Channel A, Channel B or General Service requires the failure o f four grounded harriers and two wire coatings. The fraction o f shorts not failing safe from one discrete wire to another conduit channel cable discrete wire can be calculated by the following equation:

y -fraction o f failures not to grounded barrier - 1 x IO-'

D-6

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

f - ( I -e-") n - number of grounded barriers - 4 N, - Number of Conduits - 2 Nds - Number of Cables per Conduit - 1 NdWa -Number of Discrete Signal Wires per Cable - 8 Nw/c - Number of Wires per Cable - 16

Pnfs = (1 - e-')4 x ( 2 x 1 x 8)/(2 x 1 x 16) = 4 . i 0 ~ 1 0 - ~

This does not take into account for the earthen f i l l between the three separate conduits.

The frequency of a wire shorting is 1.6 x IO" per foot per year (IEEE 1990). Combining the fraction of non-safe failures with the wire shorting frequency gives the following frequency.

F,, = Pnfs x (1.6 x IO-'') = 6.56 x I O " I ft I year

Discrete Signal Common Conduit Configuration

This configuration of the discrete cable runs between leak detector system and the PLC area node has each of the two Safety Class cables and the single General Service cable in one conduit. This configuration is shown in Figure D-6.

The most likely short that can occur for this cable configuration is between wire pairs within the same cable. A total of four barriers must fail in order for a short to occur between wire pairs in separate cables and channels.

A short between twisted wire pairs of Channel A, Channel B or General Service requires the failure of two grounded barriers and two wire coatings. The fraction of shorts not failing safe from one discrete wire to another discrete wire in a separate conduit cable can be calculated by the following equation:

P,f, = f " X ( h c Ndwdl @ct/c Nwd

y - fraction of failures not to grounded barrier - 1 x IO' f - ( l - e - " ) n - number of grounded barriers between wire pairs - 2 NcIc - Number of Extra Cables in the Conduit - 2 NCue - Total Number of Cables in the Conduit - 3 Ndwis - Number of Discrete Signal Wires per Cable - 8 N,/, -Number of Wires per Cable - 16

Pne = ( 1 -e-')' x (2 x 8)/(3 x 16) = 3.01 10"

The frequency of a wire shorting is 1.6 x 10." per foot per year (IEEE 1990). Combining the fraction of non-safe failures with the wire shorting frequency gives the following frequency.

D-7

RPP-5831 Rev. 0

F,, = P,r, x (1.6 x 10.") = 4.83 x IO'" I ft /year

Incremental Risk

Based on the above calculations the incremental risk associated with placing the discrete wiring cables in one conduit versus separate conduits is:

AF = F,, I F,, =4.83 x 10- '3 / f t / year /6 .56x 10'51ft lyear = 73.6 I ft /year

This i s less than two orders o f magnitude increase in the frequency o f a non-safe short when going from a separate conduit configuration to a single conduit configuration.

For a cable length o f 1 mile the yearly non-safe failure rate for a discrete signal wire from cable to cable 'in separate conduits would be:

F = L x F,, = I rn i lesx(5280ft /mile)x(6.56~ Ioi5/f t /year) = 3.46 x 10" /year

For a cable length o f 10 miles the yearly non-safe failure rate for a discrete signal wire from cable to cable in a single conduit would be:

F = L x F,, = 1 mile x (5280 ft I mile) x (4.83 x IO-" I f t l year) = 2.55 x / year

Conclusion - Discrete Signal Conduit

The non-safe shorting o f the discrete wire cables between MPSS area nodes has a very small frequency for both the separate conduit configuration and the single conduit configuration. Raising the failure rate from IO-'' to 1 O.l3 per foot per year i s a negligible change in risk unless the length o f wire and cable is increased from a run o f a few hundred feet to hundreds o f miles.

Venn Diagram

A graphical representation o f the failure space (short) oftwisted wire pairs i s shown in the Venn Diagram o f Figure D-7. The rectangular box represents the total possible number o f electrical shorts o f all twisted wire pairs (safe "to ground" and non-safe "to other active circuit"). The area outside the circular region and inside the box (Region A) represents the shorts to ground (fail-safe). The common circular overlap area (Region B) represents shorts within cables that do not fail-safe to ground. The crosshatched area (Region C ) represents the short between wires o f different cables in separate conduits. The last area (Region D) represents the short between wiws ofdifferent cables in the single conduit configuration.

D-8

RPP-583 I Rev. 0

U C m

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

D-10

RF'P-5831 Rev. 0

D-1 1

RPP-583 1 Rev. 0

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RPP-5831 Rev.0

Appendix E

Peer Review Checklist

E- 1

- _

UP-5831 Rev. 0


E-2

RF’P-5831 Rev. 0

RPP-5831 Rev. 0


s i aug 2 aug 2 9 2m 2m- engineering data edt/67531/metadc738856/... · rpp-5831, rev. 0 failure...

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