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Supplementary Online Material

Appendix 1: Framework for characterising governance arrangements according to Driessen et al. (2012)

Appendix 2: Interviews and topic list

Appendix 3: Detailed characterisation and evaluation of governance arrangements

Appendix 4: Literature Online Supplementary Material

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Appendix 1: Framework for characterising governance arrangements according to Driessen et al. (2012)

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Source: Driessen et al. (2012: 146-147).

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Appendix 2: Interviews and topic list

Interviews (anonymous)1 Director of a provincial environmental and nature conservation NGO, dd. 26/08/’152 Regional officer reserve area management organisation, dd. 25/09/’153 Dairy farmer and coordinator knowledge network for agricultural landscapes, dd. 29/09/’154 Dairy farmer and coordinator of a farmer collective, dd. 13/11/’155 Coordinator of a farmer collective, dd. 13/11/’156 Dairy farmer and coordinator of an environmental cooperative and farmer collective, dd. 22/09/’157 Senior policy maker AES, ministry of Economic Affairs, dd. 14/03/’158 Manager sustainability at a large agri-food processor, dd. 07/12/’159 Senior advisor at a consultancy company for agriculture and environment, dd. 28/08/’1510 (Double interview) director and senior policy maker agricultural landscapes from a large nature

conservation NGO, dd. 16/12/’1511 (Double interview) manager sustainability at a large agri-food processor and former director of a

supply chain governance arrangement, dd. 26/10/’1512 Manager at an interest group for farmer collectives, dd. 21/10/’1513 Independent consultant agriculture and environment, dd. 30/11/’1514 Research coordinator cooperation of Dutch provinces, 18/03/’1615 Independent consultant and volunteer in a regional partnership, multiple informal talks

Topic listInterviews were semi-structured, in which the following topics were discussed:

Identification and characterisation of governance arrangements: What governance arrangements exist that aim to promote nature conservation in agricultural

landscapes? How can these arrangements be characterised (with the Driessen et al., 2012 framework as a

‘checklist’ in mind)?

Evaluation of governance arrangements: What has been achieved (in a broad sense; related to performance in terms of scope and quality

but also open to other interpretations)? What are the explanations for the performance and what are main challenges (in terms of

participation of farmers, implementing the arrangement, outcomes etc.)?

Exploration of alternative governance arrangements: How could existing governance arrangements be improved, and with what purpose? What alternative governance arrangements are promising and why?

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Appendix 3: Detailed characterisation and evaluation of governance arrangements

‘Centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ governance arrangementsi

Arrangement 1: Prescribed habitat measures on agricultural fieldsThe EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) contains the following requirements that target habitat amelioration (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/cross-compliance/index_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/greening/index_en.htm; Sanders and Westerink, 2015):

At least 5% of arable areas of farms larger than 15 hectares should consist of semi-natural habitat (‘ecological focus areas’: e.g., field margins, ditch banks, trees, hedges, buffer strips, nitrogen fixing (‘catch’) crops, etc.);

Member States re required to designate environmentally sensitive permanent grass lands where ploughing is prohibited;

Farmers must comply with EU and national environmental legislation. Relevant national and regional regulations in the Netherlands concern the protection of woody elements in agricultural fields (bushes, groves, thickets, tree hedgerows, etc.), and ditches, which may not be removed.

These requirements are preconditions for income support. Formally, the habitat requirements do not apply to all farmers since application for income support is voluntary, but since most farmers do apply the requirements can be considered as mandatory. Therefore this arrangement targets a relatively alrge share of farmers, without a specific geographical focus.

Instruments encompass legal requirements (i.e., the preconditions for income support) and penalties in the case of non-compliance. Although objectives are to a large extent based on scientific research, they are also subject to lobbying by farmers’ organisations and environmental NGOs (Pappi et al., 1999; Hart 2015). Once objectives are decided upon, however, EU and state actors interact with farmers in a hierarchical manner.

Arrangement 2: Farmed nature reserve areasOver the decades, about 50,000 hectares of former agricultural land was bought from farmers by the state and decentral governmentsii and transformed from agricultural fields into nature reserve areas, which kept the characteristics of historical agricultural landscapes but with the aim to preserve associated biodiversity. These areas were not randomly chosen but concern areas with particular ecological values (e.g., the presence of populations of meadow birds). Instruments include land purchase on a voluntary basis or buying-out farmers (which is costly) and planning law (changing land use). Ownership and (subsidised) management of these areas is usually transferred to so-called reserve area management organisations (‘TBOs’) such as the State Forestry Service (SBB), Vereniging Natuurmonumenten, or Provincial Landscapes (the latter two being NGO’s)iii. Often, these areas are farmed out, under conditions set by reserve management organisations, but still targeting at species connected to traditional farming such as meadow birds, geese, or low fertility grassland plant species. Ecological expertise dominates reserve management.

One of the TBOs, Vereniging Natuurmonumenten, aims to acquire additional land in order to connect existing reserve areas, with co-financing from business, private funding, crowdfunding and so on. This can be considered as a form of self-governance, next to the centralised/decentralised governance of land sparing described above. Thus far no land has been acquired in this way, however (pers. comm. Vereniging Natuurmonumenten).

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http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/greening/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/cross-compliance/index_en.htm

Arrangement 3: Agri-environment schemes (until 2015)As was explained in Section 3.1, in 1975 an AES system was introduced in which farmers are stimulated (on a voluntary base) to implement nature conservation measures on their fields (e.g., postponement of the mowing date, no use of pesticides). Farmers received a financial compensation for these measures, actually mounting up to about €60-70 million yearly. About half of the budget originated from the CAP, pillar 2. The typical instrument hence was a subsidy (formally titled compensation). Terms for subsidies were usually 6 years. In the past, contracting of farmers was conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but since 2013 decentralised to the provinces.iv

The AES not only consisted of a remuneration system but also the assignment of areas where AES would apply. These areas were considered of importance from an ecological perspective, although the designation has been criticised (e.g., Kleijn, 2012). The designation, a form of zoning, was contested, because it hindered future expansion of mainstream agricultural practices in the assigned areas. Contracted areas of ‘farmed nature management’ increased slowly, from a few hundred to a few thousand hectares per year. Around 1990 the growth in numbers of contracts accelerated and passed the 25,000 hectares. The largest amount of contracted hectares (approximately 64,000) was achieved around 2000. In 2013, this number had dropped to about 59,000 hectares (www.compendiumvoordeleefomgeving.nl).

Nature conservation objectives were determined by the government. Cooperation with AES was voluntary, but farmers were not free to implement their own conservation measures. Instead, they have to choose from a ‘catalogue’ of measures that are predetermined by government and based on scientific research (Westerink et al., 2015), and approved by the EU. Working with predefined measures is in part explained by EU regulations that specify that only compensation is allowed for measures that would otherwise not be implemented by farmers (in order to avoid unlawful state aid: unfair competition)v. Only ‘costs incurred and income foregone’ could be compensated according to the EU state aid regulations. In the past this was different. In 2000 results-based payments were allowed, which meant that these payments were linked to the achieved nature results (e.g., the number of pairs of breeding waders). This allowed (cooperating groups of) farmers more room to shape their activities for nature conservation and stimulated entrepreneurship. Some authors have also suggested that results-based payment schemes instead of the measure-based schemes might enhance farmers’ willingness to cooperate with AES and contribute to nature conservation (e.g., Gibbons et al., 2011). In 2010, however, this system was abandoned. Next to incompatibilities with EU state regulations (see above), it proved difficult to monitor the results which resulted in high overhead costs. The system was also observed to have perverse incentivesvi. Results-based payments were therefore replaced by rewards based on measures that were expected to contribute to conservation of targeted species (Buizer et al., 2015).

The AES have been updated regularly. The adjustments concerned the reimbursement system and the measures to be compensated. Reasons for the updates included an improvement of the ecological effectiveness of measures, a better fit into mainstream agricultural practices, and reduce farmers’ resistance against what was perceived a top-down approach of the government due to detailed requirements and control. The 2016 change in AES is substantial, and in terms of governance arrangements it has changed from a (de)centralised governance arrangement to a predominantly public-private arrangement. Hence we discuss the new system under the latter heading.

From the start, AES can be considered as an instrument to serve two objectives: one, nature conservation and two, engaging and financially compensating and supporting farmers. It has been observed that these

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two objectives are difficult to reconcile, which has yielded criticism from the part of both ecologists and farmers (e.g., Kleijn et al., 2001; Termeer, 2009).

Arrangement 4: Fauna fundIn addition to AES, since the 1990s a financial compensation scheme exists (the so-called Fauna Fund) to compensate damage caused by species which the state has labelled as protected and for tolerating these species on private land (e.g., overwintering geese feeding on grassland, Badgers spoiling crop land, tits causing fruit damage etc.). Compensation is only paid if the farmer has done his utmost to prevent damage. Since 2014 provinces instead of the state are responsible for the Fauna fund. The state compensated all eligible damage, but the provinces employ different rules concerning budget exceedances (interview 14). In the last few years budgets have not been sufficient to cover all damage (and claimed damage always exceeds damage that is eventually compensated; interview 14). In principle the Fauna fund does not designate particular areas, but the damage is not distributed evenly across the Netherlands.

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Table A1: Characterisation of ‘(de)centralised’ governance arrangementsArrangements

Features

Arrangement 1:Prescribed habitat measures

Arrangement 2:Farmed nature reserve areas

Arrangement 3:AES (until 2015)

Arrangement 4:Fauna fund

Actor features

Initiating actors EU, state and provincial gov’t Central and decentral gov’t (provinces)

Central and decentral gov’t (provinces)

Central and decentral gov’t (provinces)

Stakeholder position

Stakeholder autonomy determined by principal agency

High likelihood of stakeholder involvement

Autonomy of farmers within predetermined boundaries, but (some) room for negotiation*

Autonomy of farmers within predetermined boundaries

Policy level (Supra)national state National state and lower levels of gov’t (provinces)

National state and (mainly) lower levels of gov’t (provinces)

National state and (mainly) lower levels of gov’t (provinces)

Power base Coercion, authority, legitimacy Coercion, authority, legitimacy, but also autonomy*

Coercion, authority, legitimacy but also contracts*

Coercion, authority, legitimacy but also contracts*

Institutional features

Model of representation

Pluralist (important role of lobby) Pluralist Pluralist and corporatist* Pluralist

Rules of interaction

Formal rules Institutions in its broadest form* Formal rules Formal rules

Mechanisms of social interaction

Top down (after measures have been decided upon)

Top-down, interactive and bottom-up*

Farmers decide autonomously about collaboration, after which relationships are top-down*

Top down

Features concerning content

Framing of nature conservation objectives

General requirements regarding habitat

Both specific predetermined species and habitat types

Specific predetermined species and habitat types

Specific predetermined species

Goals and targets Uniform (environmental quality and habitat quality), but flexible implementation*

Both uniform, level-specific and tailor-made goals and targets*

Uniform and level specific goals and targets

Uniform

Instruments Legislation, penalties Legislation, spatial planning, performance agreements (covenants or contracts), incentive-based instruments (subsidies mainly)*

Subsidies/compensation, legislation, norms and standards, performance contracts

Subsidies*

Policy integration Explicit aim* In-between sectorial and integrated (nature first, then agriculture)*

Explicit aim (but nature first)* Explicit aim

Policy-science interface

Primacy of generic, expert knowledge Primacy of generic expert knowledge; room for issue and time-and-place specific knowledge

Primacy of generic, expert knowledge

Primacy of generic, expert knowledge (determining species) but also room for farmers’ knowledge (observing and reporting damage)

Note: *: deviates from the characterisation of (de)centralised governance arrangements by Driessen et al. (2012).

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Table A2: Evaluation of ‘(de)centralised’ governance arrangementsArrangements

Conditions and performance





Governance conditions*

Motivation Assessment: low: farmers have a low motivation because (PBL, 2016; interview 5; 6): It concerns additional

requirements for income support that previously did not apply (g)

sometimes intrinsic motivation (f)

negative cost-benefit ratio for farmers (c)

scale enlargement and intensification conflict with maintaining landscape elements (c)

these elements have lost their original functions (c)

Variability: high: one category of farmers would like to maintain landscape elements but the majority of farmers is not motivated, i.e. would not cooperate with this arrangement if it would not be mandatory (interview 5; 6)

Assessment: high: apparently it is attractive for farmers to farm on nature reserve areas (usually farmers are compensated for forgone income or higher costs due to farming out conditions) (c) (interview 1; 2; 3)

Variability: low: some farmers have a higher intrinsic motivation than others (f) but in general we think there are no large regional differences in willingness to farm on nature reserve areas

Assessment: moderate: given the available budget, enough farmers were willing to participate (g). However there is a low willingness to choose measures that potentially have a large ecological impact because: These measures also have major

consequences for farming systems (c; Westerink et al., 2015)

Bureaucracy and extensive control of farmers who receive AES payments conflicts with autonomy and reduces trust and motivation and a feeling of being co-responsible for AES (f; Smits et al., 2008; Westerink et al., 2015; SCAN, 2015; Kuindersma et al., 2015; PBL, 2016; interview 5; 6)

Variability: low: no (large) regional or inter-farm differences reported

Assessment: moderate: apparently participation in this arrangement is attractive (g), because yearly about 50,000 claims are submitted, mounting to €16 million in 2014 (Faunafonds, 2015). It is unknown how much damage is not claimed and not all claimed damage is compensated (interview 14). 90% of the damage claimed is caused by Graylag Geese. The number of claims however has dropped because of the introduction of an administrative fee of €300 (although some provinces decided not to levy this fee or not for particular species), which suggests a reduced willingness of farmers are to participate in this governance arrangement (g). There is some societal pressure to ask for compensation instead of illegal killing of animals causing damage (but that is difficult to monitor) (c)

Variability: low: no figures but we have no signs of (large) regional or inter-farm differences or differences per species, the damage of which is compensated by the Fauna fund

Demand Assessment: moderate: requirements apply to many farmers but not (mainly for arable farming) and for farms exceeding a particular size (g); prescriptions are relatively mild and can be implemented flexibly (g) Van Doorn et al., 2015)

Assessment: moderate: farmers voluntarily opt to farm on nature reserve areas, but if they choose to do so their farming practices are limited by requirements clearly described by TBOs (g); hence this positively affects performance of this

Assessment: low: participation on a voluntary basis (g) and no strong societal demand for participation in AES (c)

Variability: low: no (large) regional or inter-farm differences reported

Assessment: low: participation on a voluntary basis (g), but it is in farmers’ self-interest to participate; f). There is some societal pressure to ask for compensation instead of illegal killing of animals causing damage (c) but illegal killing is

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Arrangements






Variability: low: requirements apply equally to all farms mentioned above

arrangement in terms of nature quality

Variability: low: no large regional or inter-farm differences expected

difficult to monitor (g)

Variability: low: no figures but we have no signs of (large) regional or inter-farm differences or differences among species listed

Ability Assessment: high: there are no technical limitations to implement the requirements (g) but farmers indicate that it is difficult to pass on the extra (but low) costs to suppliers (c; interview 5; 6)

Variability: low: we do not think there are large differences in ability between farms

Assessment: high: farmers receive compensation for limiting conditions (g)


Assessment: moderate: farmers could choose measures that fitted their farming system (g/c) so the main part of the AES budget was spent to measures that were easy to implement but that had limited ecological effects (g; Van Vliet, 2013; interview 7). The AES budget was sizable but could not be used for compensating many more farmers (g). Factors that reduced ability included: Participation was limited to

‘core areas’ where AES applied Sometimes side-effects were

reported (c; e.g., weeds; Smits et al., 2008)

There have been complaints about bureaucracy (g; PBL, 2016)

It appeared difficult to find extra funding to cover all costs (c) (interview 5; 6)

Farmers felt that prescribed measures left little room for area-specific measures (g/c; SCAN, 2015) and that AES was too much based on scientific input, leaving too little room for farmers’ knowledge and neglect of local circumstances (g; Termeer et al., 2013)

Assessment: moderate: the budget is sizable but does not compensate all claimed damage. When more is claimed than the budget could cover, sometimes extra fund is provided (g; interview 14). Not all damage can be claimed because damage can only be claimed for a preselected list of protected species and a threshold value for damage applies (g)

Variability: low: no figures but we have no signs of (large) regional or inter-farm differences or differences among species listed

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Arrangements






Variability: high: extent to which compensation covers all costs is partly region-specific (land prices differ substantially (c)); extent to which measures are compatible depended on farming style (intensive/extensive)

Legitimacy Assessment: high: legislation allows flexibility in implementing the requirements (g); society and a growing group of companies in agri-food chains increasingly ask for more sustainable agriculture (c)

Variability: low: we do not think there are large differences between farms

Assessment: moderate: farming under (strict) conditions set by TBOs but also some autonomy (g)


Assessment: moderate: there was no legislation that inhibited participation (c); farmers could choose among measures but once chose AES regulations were strict and did not allow experimentation or tailor-made solutions (g)

Variability: high: opportunities to participate in AES limited by location (AES core area or not); social norms (among farmers themselves and from neighbours) to participate in AES or not differed across regions

Assessment: moderate: there is no legislation or social norm that inhibits participation. In contrast, there is some societal pressure to participate as (illegal) killing of animals is not acceptable or socially allowed anymorevii (c; Runhaar et al., 2015). Participation however is limited because: Only a specified list of protected

species is eligible (g) The threshold value for damage

(g)

Variability: high: no hard evidence but we expect differences between farmers, regional differences (e.g., in the past in the province of Limburg much illegal trapping of Badgers was reported; Runhaar et al., 2015 Supplementary materials), and differences in tolerance for different species listed

Performance Scope Assessment: moderate: ambitions: regulations address a relatively large number of farmers and apply to these farmers equally; conditions: motivation is low but demand is high for the group of farmers to which the regulations apply; ability and

Assessment: small: ambitions: small area as % of the total agricultural landscape; about half of the intended area is realised (i.e., about 50,000 ha; PBL, 2016); conditions: this arrangement scores moderate to high on the governance conditions,

Assessment: moderate: ambitions: AES applied to less than 5% of the agricultural landscape (but almost 20% of the farmers) (interview 7; VNBL, 2015; PBL, 2012; 2016); conditions: given the budget there were enough farmers willing to

Assessment: small: ambitions: the scope is limited to a specified list of animals (that are not equally distributed spatially) and not all damage can be claimed due to the threshold value (g); conditions: the budget was enough to compensate

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Arrangements






legitimacy score high and thus form no barrier

Variability: low: we do not think there are no large differences between farmers, but very large farms may refrain from applying for pillar 1 income support

but the total size of nature reserve area is limited by among other things budget to buy and manage such areas

Variability: high: large regional or inter-farm differences expected (opportunities for acquiring land differ greatly among regions (c))

participate; moderate scores on ability and legitimacy mainly have consequences for the types of measures to be chosen

Variability: low: to the best of our knowledge there have not been regional problems to attract enough farmers to spend the AES budget

all claimed damage (respondent 14), but that not all damage is claimed because of the threshold value (which reduced motivation, ability and legitimacy to participate; interview 14)

Variability: high: damage by e.g., Greylag Geese is not spatially distributed evenly

Quality Assessment: low: ambitions: greening requirements in CAP are relatively mild and thus very humble ecological effects are expected (Pe’er et al., 2014; Hart, 2015; Van Doorn et al., 2015); conditions: motivation of farmers to participate is low and we think few farmers to be willing (and able) to go beyond the minimum requirements; although demand is moderate, enforcement is low because only a sample of farms is checked annually

Variability: low: we do not think there are large differences between farms

Assessment: moderate: ambitions: trends in strict nature reserves overall are positive whereas those in farmed reserve areas are variable and those in mainstream agricultural landscapes are poor (CBS, 2012); conditions: although TBOs are able to set ecological requirements, motivation is high (because of compensation) and ability and legitimacy score high (g), ecological results also depend on other factors (e.g. climate change and N deposition) (c)

Variability: high: regional differences in terms of ecological benefits (interview 2)

Assessment: low: ambitions: AES aimed to protect species such as meadow birds, and measures that were developed in combination would protect these bird during the breeding and chick-rearing stage; conditions: ecological effects were limited, mainly because of a low motivation of farmers to choose for measures that were expected to have a large ecological impact but also would have a substantial impact on farming practicesviii. Various bottlenecks were reported regarding demand (i.e., the extent to which AES prescribed what participating farmers had to do): The freedom of farmers to

choose measures themselves Continuity was not guaranteed;

after a few years farmers could end participation and ecological benefits were forgone

Measures were not always implemented at the right scaleix or in the right place

In addition, some measures appeared counter-effectivex and ecological

Assessment: moderate: ambitions: compensation is limited because of the preselected list and the threshold value; conditions: we do not know what share of total damage is claimed and to what extent farmers take measures themselves to chase animals that cause damage. We think motivation to participate is higher than choosing these alternatives. Illegal killing seems to have been reduced substantially. E.g., illegal killing of Common Buzzards and Badgers on agricultural fields has dropped substantially since the 1960s (e.g., Runhaar et al., 2015) because this is no longer socially acceptable (legitimate). The most import indicator is that the favourable conservation status is not in danger, which seems to be the case for most species in Fauna fund regulations. There is some logic that the Fauna fund has contributed to this, but next to other contextual factors such as a legal ban on killing of many wild animals which is a requirement but from another source (c)

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Arrangements






effectiveness was reduced by factors not addressed by AESxi (c; Kleijn et al., 2001; Kleijn, 2012; Breeuwer et al., 2009; Melman et al., 2008)

Variability: low: general patterns in terms of ecological restoration due to AES were similar across the Netherlands, although in some areas better results are achieved (e.g., Amstelland, Eemland, parts of the province of Friesland)

Variability: high: we expect regional differences, see under Legitimacy

Note: (*): (g) = related to governance arrangement; (c) = related to context; (f) = related to farmers’ characteristics (see Table 1).

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‘Public-private’ governance arrangements

Arrangement 5: ‘New style’ AES (as from 2016)The arrangement now predominantly qualifies as ‘public-private’ (see Table A3). Due to the persistent critique on the ecological effectiveness of the AES (e.g., Westerink et al., 2015), a major revision of the system was being prepared in recent years under the supervision of the central state, in close cooperation with the umbrella organisations of agri-environmental and provinces. The ‘new style’ AES arrangement entered into force January 1st, 2016. Leading principles for this reform were (Van Doorn et al., 2015; www.portaalnatuurenlandschap.nl):

A narrower focus on species (particularly birds) for which the Netherlands bear responsibility under the European Bird and Habitat Directive and for which it is expected that ANM may substantially contribute to their conservation;

A stricter focus on ‘core areas’ where more or less viable populations are present or that have the potential of being repopulated;

A collective approach in which groups of farmers organised into ‘farmer collectives’ instead of individuals are eligible for compensation.

Besides an increased focus on international nature conservation objectives and ecological effectiveness, the new system also involves expectations such as decreased implementation costs, increased cooperation between land users and more flexibility (Kuindersma et al., in prep.; interview 7).

Compliance with international nature conservation objectives of the European Bird and Habitat Directive is an important rule of the game in the new style AES. However, within this framework provinces and cooperatives choose their own focus in which local ecological knowledge, willingness of farmers, cultural aspects and integration with other objectives play an important role. The province of Drenthe for example, focuses on the realisation of ecological corridors, the province of Fryslân on meadow birds, and the province of Limburg on landscape elements (connected to species) (Kuindersma et al., in prep.).

Anticipating the implementation of the new subsidy scheme 40 farmer collectives were formed. Some of these cooperatives are based on or rooted in existing cooperatives (see arrangement 8), whereas other farmer collectives were newly formed. The number of farmer collectives differs between provinces. In some provinces only one farmer collective was formed, operating at a provincial level, while in other provinces several farmer collectives were formed (Kuindersma et al., in prep.). Farmer collectives in some cases also involve citizens (e.g., ecologists, volunteers in nature conservation) who cooperate within a particular geographical area on nature and landscape conservation and restoration (interview 4; 5). One farmer collective is led by a landscape conservation NGO. Farmer collectives had to be certified, meaning they have to meet some criteria regarding size, organisation and professionalisation.

Central to the new system are the contracts between provinces and the farmer collectives, indicating a public-private governance modexii. To guarantee flexibility the contracts between the provinces and the farmer collectives contain general agreements on nature management and compensation. The farmer collectives in their turn close contracts with individual farmers on the specific nature measures to be taken on their fields (Kuindersma et al., in prep.). The farmer collectives and their members, therefore, have room to decide on specific measures and locations as long as they fit into the list of predetermined measures and in the general subsidy regulation. Furthermore, farmer collectives are responsible for monitoring the compliance with these contracts.

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Table A3: Characterisation of the ‘public-private’ governance arrangementArrangements

Features

Arrangement 5:‘New style’ AES (as from 2016)

Actor features

Initiating actors Decentral gov’t (provinces); private sector (groups of farmers) is granted a preconditioned role (but large role in the formation of this arrangement)*Stakeholder position

Autonomy of private stakeholders within predetermined boundaries

Policy level Provincial and regionalPower base Competitiveness (but in practice mostly one bidding actor); contracts and legal recourse; legitimacy but large role for market actors (groups of)*



Corporatist

Rules of interaction Formal and informal exchange rulesMechanisms of social interaction

Private actors decide autonomously about collaborations


Specific predetermined species and habitat types


Goals and targets Uniform goals; targets actor specificInstruments Performance contractsPolicy integration Integrated (nature conservation measures within farming practices)Policy-science interface

Primacy of generic, expert knowledge (but emphasis on learning and involvement of local knowledge; expert knowledge however dominates)

Note: *: deviates from the characterisation of public-private governance arrangements by Driessen et al. (2012).

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Table A4: Evaluation of ‘public-private’ governance arrangementsArrangements


Arrangement 5:‘New style’ AES (as from 2016)


Motivation Assessment: moderate: expected score predominantly similar to the ‘old’ AES (arrangement 3), although now more responsibilities transferred to the farmer collectives, including control and sanctioning, which may raise motivation as compared to the previous AES system (g)

Variability: low: no changes expected compared with the old systemDemand Assessment: low-moderate: participation is still on a voluntary basis, but we expect more pressure to participate because now farmer collectives are

responsible for recruiting farmers

Variability: high: the capacities of farmer collectives to persuade farmers will probably vary from case to case (g)Ability Assessment: moderate: expected score potentially better compared to the ‘old’ AES (arrangement 3); more responsibilities are transferred to the farmer

collectives (g), which may provide more room for adjustments to local circumstances (c). In addition, GIS tools are developed which supply cooperatives with site-specific information and knowledge which provides room for so-called learning management (learning by doing) (g). At the same time, however, the ambition of the scheme is broadened to new habitat types (arable fields, dry – and wet veining, without enlargement of the budget

Variability: high: at best slight improvement expected compared with the old system.Legitimacy Assessment: moderate: no changes expected compared with the old system. The number of management options in the scheme is limited (g)

Variability: high: no changes expected compared with the old systemPerformance Scope Assessment: moderate: ambitions: fewer farmers can participate because of a stricter designation of eligible (‘core’) areas (more attention is paid to

concentrate management in ecologically suitable areas); conditions: although demand may be a bit higher (score ‘moderate’ instead of ‘low’), the smaller core areas where AES applies means an even smaller scope

Variability: low: no changes expected compared with the old systemQuality Assessment: moderate: ambitions: the revision of the AES system was inspired by a desire to enhance the ecological effectiveness of AES, in order to meet

the international requirements for the protection of particularly birds for which the Netherlands bear responsibility under the European Bird and Habitat Directive and for which it is expected that AES may substantially contribute to their conservation; conditions: various bottlenecks from the old system regarding demand have been addressed in the new system (g): e.g., a focus on ‘core areas’ where more or less viable populations are present or that have the potential of being repopulated (g); a collective approach in which collectives of farmers instead of individuals are eligible for compensation, which should enable protection at landscape rather than at field level (g) (Van Doorn et al., 2015; www.portaalnatuurenlandschap.nl). Besides an increased focus on international nature conservation objectives and ecological effectiveness, the new system also involves expectations such as decreased implementation costs, increased cooperation between land users and more flexibility, which may enhance motivation (g; Kuindersma et al., in prep.; interview 7). Finally, provinces and the farmer collectives now have more freedom in adjusting their plans to local circumstances, which may enhance ability a bit (g/c)

Variability: low: no changes expected compared with the old systemNote: (*): (g) = related to governance arrangement; (c) = related to context; (f) = related to farmers’ characteristics (see Table 1).

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‘Interactive governance’ arrangements

Arrangement 6: Place-based partnershipsEspecially in areas where many actors work on nature conservation and landscape objectives (areas that are interesting from an ecological or landscape perspective), regional partnerships have emerged. These are often initiated by nature conservation or landscape restoration NGOs, agri-environmental cooperatives (see under arrangement 8), or local/provincial governments and involve farmers, citizens, state ministries, and other stakeholders. Usually, nature conservation is only one of the objectives, next to cultural history, tourism, and landscape development objectives. This broad approach potentially creates synergies. Characteristic is the area-specific approach to negotiating and formulating objectives and implementing measures. (www.collectiefdeltaplan.nl) A somewhat different type of place-based partnership is a recent initiative that is centred specifically round meadow birds in the province of Fryslân and that is initiated by citizens, and in which farmers, scientists, and artists participate (http://sytzepruiksma.com/project/kening-fan-e-greide).

Governmental actors at state level usually provide part of the funding for experiments and projects. The other actors are usually responsible for planning, implementation, and acquisition of additional funding. They operate relatively autonomously. Hence, the regional partnerships have characteristics of self-governance. (interview 15)

An example is the ‘Pilot areas landscape development’ partnership which resulted from a national ‘Delta plan’ formulated by national nature conservation NGOs for the development of a network of 200,000 km of new line-shaped landscape elements on agricultural land, covering 5% of all agricultural land, to enhance nature conservation and landscape quality. State ministries funded 5.6 million euro to enable the development of plans, initiate regional cooperation, and for implementing the plans in so-called ‘pilot areas’. Co-financing by private actors was a prerequisite: besides 25% funding from the State ministries and 25% from regional/local governments, private actors and regional actors also had to finance 25% each. (interview 15)

The available funds were sufficient for 4 areas (Amstelland, Groene Woud, Binnenveld, Ooijpolder) out of the 34 areas that applied for funding; two were initiated by NGO’s and two by local/regional governments. During the implementation the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries organised national meetings to exchange knowledge and lessons learnt, not just between key-actors in the selected areas, but also with actors of the non-selected areas. Also excursions to the pilot areas were organised. (interview 15)

The Ooijpolder pilot was the most successful in achieving its targets. The other pilots were less focused on landscape and nature conservation or followed a different approach in their area. In Textbox 1 this regional partnership is described as an illustration of what can be considered as ‘best practice’.

Textbox 1: Regional partnership “Pilot areas landscape development” - Ooijpolder

From 2009-2014 the project ‘Pilot area green-blue services’ was implemented in an area of 500 hectare in the Ooijpolder near the city of Nijmegen. The project coordinator from Landscape fund Via Natura - on behalf of three rural municipalities and the water board - and a local government official from the city of Nijmegen applied for funding. This area was selected as pilot project because of already existing contacts with the state ministries and because the area-based collaboration and ideas for implementation were already in place.

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http://sytzepruiksma.com/project/kening-fan-e-greide

http://www.collectiefdeltaplan.nl/

When selected, the implementation approach was set up, with some assistance from a consultancy, on behalf of all cooperating actors, and supported by the province. The national Association for the Preservation of Dutch Cultural Landscapes was able to attract private funding. The agri-environmental cooperative De Ploegdriever also played a key role in communication towards farmers, while the local government took a more distant position. The area based approach builds on experiences and lessons learnt during the development of the local landscape plan, an interactive process in the area between farmers, citizens and local governments. Three scenarios were presented, visualised, and discussed. When it became clear that continuity on the long-term could be guaranteed and landscape management would be financially compensated on a market base, more farmers showed interest to participate.

For the pilot project the national funding from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries covered the process costs while the Ministry of Environment and Spatial planning paid for investments in the landscape, in total 25% national funding. The three rural local municipalities, the Water board and the province also covered 25% of the public funding. Private funding was secured via the national ‘Zipcode lottery’, via a landscape auction, a Regional fund and funds for compensation of spatial developments. The auction organised in 2004 was a novelty in the Netherlands and resulted in 124.000 euro of citizens and businesses to secure a period of 10 year management of landscape elements such as hedgerows, bushes and ponds.

The goals of the pilot project were to invest in a network of green-blue services, consisting of 25 hectare new landscape elements, covering 5% of the land, to open 25% of the landscape elements for recreational use, to establish long-term contracts with farmers, to guarantee public and private financing and show visible results in the fields within 5 years. One of the objectives was to connect the river habitat with the hillside to benefit specific species (e.g., the Northern crested newt). The implementation approach in the form of nature plans on farm level and a network of landscape elements, had already been invented in the area. This approach and way of thinking had in fact informed the national Delta plan, which aimed to scale up this approach and transform 5% of agriculture land into landscape elements.

Eventually, when the project ended, in terms of output, 37 ha. of landscape elements had been realised and 42 km of ‘green network’ of which 14 km is accessible as food path over agricultural land. In fact the funds made it possible to increase the scale and also contract farmers in the municipality Groesbeek. Also an additional 10 ha of ecological roadside management was carried out. Participating farmers have made a farm landscape plan, which spatially matches the landscape structures. They received a 30-year contract with the municipality and payment for the investment in and management of the elements and a compensation for forgone income from the Foundation Landscape capital. In the context of the Pilot the area-specific payment per element was calculated and an area-specific guide was developed which described the elements and required maintenance.

With regard to ecological effectivity, this is monitored in two ways. Every 3 years the project coordinator of the Ploegdriever (who is a biologist) together with the farmer observes the results and they discuss how improvements can be made. Furthermore biodiversity was scientifically monitored in 2011 and 2014. Furthermore the voluntary bird research organisation SOVON has made inventories of birds in this area for the last 30 years. Biodiversity has increased, in terms of an increased spread of species (Northern crested newt, beaver, otter, and badger) and there is an increase in insects (e.g., grasshoppers) which is beneficial for birds. The numbers of some species (larks) have increased while the national average decreased.

Within 5 years new biotopes were created which increased the biodiversity; new rare species were spotted, part of the so called Red List. Almost all newly monitored animals and plants were spotted in the pilot area and not in the surrounding agricultural land, as a result of: 1) the introduction of species (via bushes and via the spreading of hay by farmers, from the dikes and onto the meadows), maintenance (e.g., changed ways of mowing the grass), the environment (the surrounding area includes Natura 2000 areas which contain source populations), and the area development over time.

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The results show that so called ‘mosaic management’ is effective but requires space, time, energy, knowledge and collaboration between implementing actors. Furthermore, the network of elements matched the objectives of the landscape development plan. Different line-shaped elements were spatially positioned next to each other (such as a hedge, a herb strip and a rugged walking strip), thus creating a buffer zone between nature and agricultural used grassland).

The pilot project was combined with other nature and landscape projects such as the implementation of two ecological corridors, the pilot project Food for Nature, new recreational investments (such as a small pond over the water) and an art project. In 2015 a new Landscape Development Project was agreed upon with the municipality. The increasing cooperation between different partners enhanced other spin-off activities such as an updated landscape development Plan in 2015 and the collaboration between more than 30 organisations in a network named Landscape community. In 2016 the area was nominated for a provincial price on Spatial Quality.

Arrangement 7: ‘Farming for Nature’The Farming for Nature concept was designed in the early 2000s by researchers as an extensive farming system to integrate farming and nature, based on self-sufficiency of manure and feed, higher water levels and 10% landscape elements. The concept aimed to better utilise knowledge from farmers and to enhance their commitment to nature conservation. Farming for nature was also developed as critique on the then dominant nature policy with ‘nature target types’, which suggested a malleability of nature and which was felt to leave little room for nature’s surprises. Instead, high biodiversity was considered in Farming for nature as outcome of extensive farming practices in a specific landscape: creating conditions was seen as more fruitful than setting specific biodiversity targets.

The governance arrangement is based on a long-term contract and payment from a regional fund and flexibility for the farmer within these rules. The ideas differed substantially from the then conventional agri-environmental and nature policies. After the 2001 research publication (Stortelder et al., 2001), a farmer in the Biesland area and the Twickel rural estate expressed interest in trying out the idea. In both areas a collaborative network was formed with farmers, municipalities, city regions, water boards, provinces, the Ministry of Agriculture, researchers, a citizen group and a rural estate (Twickel) (Buizer, 2008). Within these networks, the governance arrangement was elaborated and plans were made for adaptation of the landscape. The governmental actors agreed on financial contributions to the regional funds and the costs of landscape rearrangement. Simultaneously, a trans-disciplinary program of monitoring and evaluation was set up in which a broad range of stakeholders participated (Opdam et al., 2015). Because of the envisioned public payments to the farmers, a state aid procedure with the European Commission was followed. This changed the envisioned governance arrangement on a number of aspects, including the duration of the contracts and the way that payments were calculated (Buizer et al., 2015). The collaborative networks had to wait for the state aid decision before they could sign their contracts: among the participating governments, between governments and fund, and between participating farmers and the executing government.

In 2008, four farmers started working according to Farming for Nature and in 2009 their landscapes were re-arranged. The total of their farms amounted to about 270 hectares in 2012, but the impact of their adapted farming practice ranges beyond that area. For instance, in one case the water level was not only raised on the farm at issue, but also in the neighbouring moist heather field, which quickly recovered its biodiversity as a result. The development of the farms were monitored, as well as the effects on biodiversity and water quality and societal impact (Westerink et al., 2013). Because of the trans-

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disciplinary and learning character of the monitoring, lessons could be fed back into the farming practice. The ecological effects of the adapted farming practices could only be monitored for 5 years. However, favourable effects were recorded on meadow birds, fish and herbs (Westerink et al., 2013). The four farms were not randomly chosen, but were located in areas that were interesting from a landscape and ecological perspective.

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Table A5: Characterisation of ‘interactive’ governance arrangementsArrangements

Features

Arrangement 6:Place-based partnerships

Arrangement 7:Farming for Nature

Actor features

Initiating actors Multiple actors Multiple actorsStakeholder position

(More or less) equal roles for all network partners (gov’t mainly funding) (More or less) equal roles for all network partners (gov’t mainly funding)

Policy level Regional LocalPower base Legitimacy (agreement on roles, positions, procedures and process);

trust; knowledge)Legitimacy (agreement on roles, positions, procedures and process); trust; knowledge)



Partnership Partnership

Rules of interaction Institutions in its broadest form (formal and informal rules) Institutions in its broadest form (formal and informal rules)Mechanisms of social interaction

Interactive (but gov’t actors more at a distance) Interactive (but gov’t actors more at a distance)



Varies per partnership, in some cases the focus is on specific species (e.g. the Black-tailed Godwit in a Frisian partnership), in other cases nature conservation objectives are part of a broader plan to enhance landscape and natural values

Not specified; nature conservation and biodiversity part of a broader focus on more sustainable and natural forms of farming, and outcome of revised farming practices rather than specified in advance (which is considered as counter-productive)

Goals and targets Tailor-made, also process-oriented goals Tailor-madeInstruments Negotiated agreements and covenants but also subsidies* Negotiated agreements and covenants but also subsidies*Policy integration Integrated IntegratedPolicy-science interface

Transdisciplinarity Transdisciplinarity

Note: *: deviates from the characterisation of interactive governance arrangements by Driessen et al. (2012).

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Table A6: Evaluation of ‘interactive’ governance arrangementsArrangements



Arrangement 7:Farming for nature


Motivation Assessment: moderate: in the example of Ooijpolder willingness to participate was high, because of government funding and possibilities to combine goals and interests (g/c), but this case does not seem exemplary

Variability: high: we think willingness of farmers to participate will depend strongly on funding and opportunities to combine goals

Assessment: low: principles of this arrangement are not compatible with mainstream farming: the arrangement aims to change the farming system (g/c). This will appeal to some farmers and not to others because of farming styles (t). The farmers involved in this arrangement were intrinsically motivated (t), saw an opportunity to reduce the conflict between farming and nature (g/c), and were stimulated by the financial compensation and emphasis on farming skills and entrepreneurship (g) (Westerink et al., 2015).

Variability: low: few farmers will to be willing to substantially change their farming system.

Demand Assessment: low: there are no legal requirements to form or to participate in partnerships (g), but partnerships can combine efforts to comply with other legal requirements or realise policy goals (c). We have noted no signs of external pressure to form partnerships (c)

Variability: low: no local or regional requirements or demands to form partnerships

Assessment: low: participation on a voluntary basis (g), but for participants, a drastic conversion of farming practice is required (g/c). The involvement of citizens in the partnership increased demand (g).

Variability: high: Upscaling is expected to be limited to watersheds, buffer zones between nature reserve areas and conventional farmland, and peri-urban areas , because of societal demand is most probably higher in such areas (c) (Westerink et al., 2013).

Ability Assessment: moderate: in some cases there seem to be sufficient enabling factors such as government funding and knowledge, long term contracts, (time to build) regional cooperation, and capacities (g), and a supporting agri-environmental collective (c)

Variability: high: ability to participate seems partnership-specific, depending on available (government) funding and other forms of support and previous cooperation

Assessment: high: financial compensation and knowledge support for farmers who are willing to participate in this arrangement (g). The farming system approach is aimed at increasing ability (g/t).

Variability: high: payment so far is limited to a few areas (g) (Buizer et al., 2015). In addition, skills of the farmers are essential for success (f).

Legitimacy Assessment: high: case studies suggest there may be legal problems but that these are often overcome (c)

Variability: low: we have no indications that legitimacy differs between partnerships but there may be differences in provincial and local policies that influence the legitimacy of partnerships

Assessment: low: state aid regulations limit opportunities for gov’t compensation for larger groups of farmers (g); only a few ‘pilots’ are allowed (c; Westerink et al., 2015). This is expected to change in 2016.

Variability: low: the above limitation applies to all farmers in the Netherlands

Performance Scope Assessment: small: ambitions: no exact numbers but probably only small part of the agricultural landscape involved; conditions: due to the low demand to form or participate in partnerships and varying ability to do so, we expect their number to be limited

Assessment: small: ambitions: only 4 farmers involved, suitable for high-value landscapes (see demand); conditions: even when participation would be allowed to other farmers, it would probably mainly/only attract farmers in ‘high value areas’ (see under demand), depending on financial compensation

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Arrangements



Arrangement 7:Farming for nature

Variability: low: no data but we do not expect regional differencesand other forms of support (ability) given the required transformation of agricultural practices

Variability: low: the above limitation applies to all farmers in the NetherlandsQuality Assessment: moderate: ambitions: often nature conservation is only one of

the goals of regional partnerships; conditions: quality that is strived after or achieved are largely voluntary and dependent on ability

Variability: high: examples of success but also of failure

Assessment: moderate: ambitions: high ambitions and visible biodiversity gains, also for surrounding areas (Westerink et al., 2013), but nature conservation is only part of the Farming for nature concept; conditions: high quality achieved in the four pilot projects where intrinsically motivated farmers participated on a voluntary basis; much depends on ability, however, in order to finance the substantial transformation of the agricultural practice

Variability: low: no data, but we assume that motivation and ability will form the main conditions for achieving a high quality regarding nature conservation


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‘Self-governance’ arrangements

Arrangement 8: agri-environmental cooperatives (until 2015)It is an old Dutch tradition that farmers establish cooperatives to achieve joint interests. In the early 1980s the first environmental cooperatives (ECs) emerged. ECs are heterogeneous in terms of their size and activities, but also in how they are organised (e.g., working with volunteers or having professional staff for coordination, administration, ecological support etc.) (Horlings, 2006).

We distinguish two generations of ECs. In the 1990s farmers established the first generation of ECs as a means to create more room for self-regulation to develop locally effective measures to realise environmental objectives, and to collectively manage the landscape. Farmers believed that ECs could help them to better achieve environmental and nature conservation policy objectives in their own area without running into strict governmental norms and obligations (Horlings, 1997). In 1996 about 60 ECs existed (Horlings, 1997). The second generation shifted the focus to landscape and nature conservation. These ECs (so-termed agri-nature management associations) consist of farmers and in various cases also of citizens (e.g., ecologists, volunteers in nature conservation) who cooperate within a particular geographical area on nature and landscape conservation and restoration (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012).

ECs were established for a number of reasons. An important one is the growing unease amongst farmers with the evolving agri-environment policies, which were criticised for neglecting local circumstances, excluding farmers’ practices and knowledge, being based on distrust and control, and being contractionary with other regulations (Franks and McGloin, 2007; Termeer et al 2013). They therefore organised themselves in ECs to join forces and to show that they could tackle the reduction of emissions and the management of the landscape in their own area without running into strict norms and obligations (Smits et al., 2008). Farmers organising themselves in ECs also expected a higher effectiveness in realising environmental objectives and higher efficiency in landscape and nature management work compared to nature conservation organisations. Finally, ECs were expected to contribute to a better cooperation with other actors and access to (public) funding. (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012; Termeer et al., 2013)

The main tasks of the second generation ECs, next to nature and landscape management, included supporting farmers in applications and reporting for AES and enhance the effectiveness of AES by operating at landscape level (but this is now taken over by the farmer collectives), working as an intermediary between farmers and the government, and by generating group pressure to motivate other farmers to join AES or engage in other forms of nature and landscape management. ECs also provide knowledge about (and training in) environmental management and ecology (Horlings, 2005; Van Dijk et al., 2015; Westerink et al., 2015). Finally, activities of many ECs include acquisition of funding for landscape restoration, landscape maintenance for provinces, municipalities and private land owners, information dissemination, and school visits (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012; Buizer et al., 2015; Sanders and Westerink, 2015).

In 2008 about 10% of all Dutch farmers were member of a ‘second generation’ EC and nationally at least 25% of all agricultural land belongs to the operational field of the ECs (Smits et al., 2008). Some ECs covered 85% of all farmers in an area (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012). This still seems to be case (www.groeneruimte.nl/dossiers/agrarisch_natuurbeheer/home.html#verenigingen), albeit that many ECs have merged into farmer collectives (arrangement 5). In 2015 about 150-160 ECs existed, distributed over the Netherlands. In total, only a small part of Dutch farmers are involved in this governance arrangement.

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http://www.groeneruimte.nl/dossiers/agrarisch_natuurbeheer/home.html#verenigingen

Arrangement 9: NGO-farmer cooperationNGOs such as BirdLife Netherlands (about 150,000 members/donors) and World Wildlife Fund Netherlands (about 800,000 members/donors) cooperate with individual farmers on nature conservation amongst other thingsxiii. For instance, BirdLife Netherlands cooperates with about 80 dairy farmers on meadow bird protection (interview 10). There are also associations centred round specific species, such as butterflies, Badgers or Montagu´s Harriers. Nature conservation objectives hence are usually defined in terms of specific species.

The NGOs provide knowledge and advice and help by acquiring public and private funding for protective measures and developing business models for ‘nature-inclusive’ farming (e.g., Polderpracht cheese on the Terschelling Wadden isle or the recent campaign that aims to stimulate supermarkets to sell ‘rich meadow’ dairy products by having Dutch citizens sign petitions) (Arnouts and Boonstra, 2015). Participating farmers are also presented as examples for other farmers. Also meetings are organised for these farmers to share experiences and discuss alternative measures (Arnouts and Boonstra, 2015).

The farmers involved are most probably not representative of other farmers in terms of the ecological characteristics of their fields; farmers who have no meadow birds on their fields have no incentive to engage in a collaboration with BidLife Netherlands.

Arrangement 10: Supply chain governanceSeveral processors (of dairy products and sugar beets) have started programmes to stimulate their suppliers to adopt more sustainable practices, which includes, but is not limited to, nature conservationxiv. These programmes can be considered as extensions of their own Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes. Instruments employed are a bonus-malus arrangement where participating farmers receive a surplus and others face a slightly lower price persuasion, communication of the need for and benefits of these practices, and knowledge generation and exchange. Because of the broad objectives these arrangements do not focus on specific regions (e.g., with particular landscape or ecological values),

We observe both initiatives that have existed for almost 10 years, and more recent ones. An established initiative focuses on arable farming, and has nature conservation as one of the objectives, next to other objectives aimed at reducing environmental pressure. It started with a bonus-malus system but that faced large resistance among participating farmers (who also have a share in the processor). Nowadays, the main instrument is knowledge: bringing in scientific expertise and promoting knowledge exchange among participating farmers. A more recent initiative, by a major dairy processor, also considers a bonus-malus system. Although also in this case, farmers have a share in this company, its relationships vis-à-vis farmers is different; it has a stronger power position because milk is the only product associated farmers produce (in contrast to the arable farmers in the established initiative) and there seems to be fewer opportunities to switch to other processors.

In addition, a large bank that has a major share in loans and mortgages to farmers, has started working on a programme in which farmers are stimulated to take measures that contribute to more sustainable farming (which again includes, but is not restricted to, nature conservation). In turn, loans are offered at lower interest rates. Motives for the bank to work on this arrangement include its own Corporate Social Responsibility programme and the aim to reward measures that reduce costs (e.g., better soil quality) and that may benefit both the farmers involved and the bank (more certain income and lower risks).

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In some supply chain initiatives NGOs such as WWF Netherlands and BirdLife Netherlands are involved. There is cooperation but also conflict over the definition and operationalisation of nature conservation objectives between the processors, farmers, and NGOs (Arnouts and Boonstra, 2015; interview 8).

The criteria for sustainability are still in development. In one initiative, participating in AES is included in the sustainability criteria.

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Table A7: Characterisation of ‘self-governance’ arrangementsArrangements

Features

Arrangement 8:Agri-environmental cooperatives (until 2015)

Arrangement 9:NGO-individual farmer cooperation

Arrangement 10:Supply chain governance

Actor features

Initiating actors Initially private sector Civil society and private sector (farmers mainly) Private sector and/or civil societyStakeholder position

Self-governing entities Self-governance Self-governance

Policy level Local and regional mainly Local to international (but manly local – regional – national)

Local to national

Power base Autonomy Autonomy, leadership, group size, social capital; legitimacy

Autonomy, leadership, group size, social capital; legitimacy, but also contracts*



Partnership Partnership (but also individual operations) Partnership

Rules of interaction

Informal rules (mainly self-crafted rules) Informal rules Informal rules and self-crafted imposed and non-imposed formal rules

Mechanisms of social interaction

Bottom-up but also interactive Bottom-up Bottom-up



Very different across ECs, usually only one aspect of broader ambitions regarding landscape

Focus on specific species Usually no specific focus on species but more general ambitions regarding sustainable and more natural forms of farming

Goals and targets

Tailor-made goals and targets Often species-specific, but to some extent tailored*

Tailor-made goals and targets

Instruments Voluntary instruments Voluntary instruments (mainly knowledge, monitoring, volunteer work etc.)

Voluntary instruments; private contracts; labelling and reporting

Policy integration

Mainly integrated Integrated (nature conservation into agriculture; however, focus on limited number of species)*

Integrated (nature conservation often as part of broader strive for more sustainable agriculture)

Policy-science interface

Dominance of issue and time-and-place specific knowledge (expert and lay)

Expert and lay (but mainly expert)* Dominance of issue and time-and-place specific knowledge: expert and lay

Note: *: deviates from the characterisation of self-governance arrangements by Driessen et al. (2012).

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Table A8: Evaluation of ‘self-governance’ arrangementsArrangements


Arrangement 8:Agri-environmental cooperatives




Motivation Assessment: moderate: participation is usually limited to a small number of farmers (about 10% of all farmers; Smits et al., 2008), who are intrinsically motivated (f) and also see opportunities for additional income (c) (Horlings, 1996). Barriers to participate include usually negative cost/benefit ratios (c) and a lack of external pressure (c)

Variability: high: participation in agri-environmental cooperatives shows large regional differences (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012), which may be due to differences in external pressure which may give an incentive for farmers to organise themselves (c), physical opportunities and limitations for nature conservation and landscape restoration (c), and social capital in cooperative (g)

Assessment: low: only a very small number of farmers participates; perhaps there are more farmers who have intrinsic motivation to help protect e.g., meadow birds (f), but an important barrier seems to be the structural funding of nature conservation measures (c) (interview 5; 6; 10; 12)

Variability: unknown: no data

Assessmentxv: not clear yet: willingness to participate will strongly depend on whether the bonus on agriproducts and lower interest rates cover the costs of nature conservation measures (c). If not, farmers will have to recuperate part of the costs from other sources, which is challenging (c) (interview 5; 6; 10; 12)

Variability: unknown: not implemented yet

Demand Assessment: low: participation in ECs is voluntary (g) and there usually is not much external pressure to participate (c)

Variability: high: participation in agri-environmental cooperatives shows large regional differences, which may be due to differences in external pressure (see under Motivation)

Assessment: low: participation in this arrangement is voluntary (g) and there is not much external pressure to participate (c)

Variability: low: we do not think there are large regional differences regarding societal pressure to participate in this particular arrangement

Assessment: potentially high: not much pressure yet (c). However, one processor that considers implementing this arrangement and the bank work with a majority of farmers and seem to be in a favourable power position in terms of deciding upon the conditions of this arrangement (c). Although participation is voluntary (g), we observe a gradual trend towards processors and other companies in agri-food chains demanding more sustainable of agricultural production, which is expected to favour participation (c) (‘gentle demand’)

Variability: high: substantial differences in power between processors vis-à-vis farmers are reported which suggests large differences in possibilities to implement bonus/malus systems (interview 8; 11)

Ability Assessment: moderate: cooperatives provide Assessment: high: NGOs support farmers to Assessment: unknown: arrangement is not

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Arrangements





different kinds of support to participating farmers, such as coordination and organisation, mobilising and disseminating knowledge, mobilising citizen volunteers, finding additional income sources etc. (g; Horlings 1996; 1997; 2005; 2006). At the same time, farmers state that it is difficult to recoup costs of nature conservation measures (c)

Variability: high: difficulties in recouping costs of nature conservation measures will differ across regions, due to differences in land prices (and hence opportunity costs) and in competences, ambitions and extent to which nature conservation can be valorised by individual farmers (products, recreation, education, green care etc.)

implement nature conservation measures and knowledge, and help to find funding for pilots (g), but it seems difficult to recoup costs of profound nature conservation measures (c; interview 5; 6; 10; 12)

Variability: high: difficulties in recouping costs of nature conservation measures will differ across regions, due to differences in land prices (and hence opportunity costs) and in competences, ambitions and extent to which nature conservation can be valorised by individual farmers (products, recreation, education, green care etc.)

crystallised and hence it is not yet known what measures farmers have to implement to earn credits (g). One arrangement requires farmers to meet several times a year in order to share experiences and information (g). Much depends on what will be rewarded: measures or output (g) – regarding the latter, knowledge gaps regarding soil processes and limited possibilities to influence natural processes may be bottlenecks (g/c; Stuiver et al., 2013; interview 11). Also much depends on whether or not the bonus will be sufficient to recoup costs of nature conservation measures (g/c). On the other hand there is potential: currently, dairy farmers are stimulated by dairy producers and the ministry to intensify grazing, which originates from citizens’ demands to see more cows in meadows (c). The fact that there is specific ‘grazing milk’ for which consumers are willing to pay extra suggests that consumers can have a substantial role in steering the dairy sector (c; interview 8)

Variability: unknown: arrangement has to crystallise

Legitimacy Assessment: moderate: although we expect that neighbours, citizens and companies in agri-environmental chains will respond positively to participation in cooperatives (c), several tensions with (de)centralised governance are reported (c). At first, the ideas of self-governance did not fit into existing institutions, characterised by general legislation, prescribed implementation and central control. Cooperatives had to negotiate room for their initiatives with governmental actors who questioned the effectiveness, controllability and added value of self-governance by cooperatives (Wiskerke et al., 2003; Termeer, 2009). Only after a lot of lobby and pressure the minister agreed

Assessment: high: there is no legislation that inhibits nature conservation (c), but degrees of freedom in transforming farming practices in an innovative way limited by current legislation (e.g. concerning manure)

Variability: low: legislation is generic

Assessment: unknown: more sustainable agricultural practices will probably be welcomed by governments and society (c), but arrangements have to crystallise (g); some possible tensions with regulations ((de)centralised governance) are reported (c; e.g., regulations that do not allow experiments such as innovative ways of improving soil by means of organic manure; interview 11)

Variability: unknown: arrangement has to crystallise

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Arrangements





with experiments and ‘pilots’ at farm-level. In 2004, 82% of the cooperatives expressed to experience bottlenecks as a result of policy regulation; especially the lack of policy continuity was mentioned (Oerlemans et al., 2004). Problems continued as Termeer et al. (2013) report that cooperatives have been hindered by state regulations that allow little room for experimenting or employing new techniques that were expected to be more effective or that would produce less (environmental) side-effects. The pilots that were allowed between 2012 and 2014 opened room for the third generation cooperatives that now characterise ‘new style’ AES (arrangement 4).

Variability: low: the legal and institutional tensions have a generic character

Performance Scope Assessment: moderate: ambitions: about 10% of the farmers participate in ECs. At least 25% of all agricultural land is reported to belong to the operational field of cooperatives (Smits et al., 2008), but this encompasses more than only nature conservation; conditions: due to the voluntary character of participation (demand), and financial barriers (ability), usually only intrinsically motivated farmers participate

Variability: high: some cooperatives cover 85% of all farmers in an area (Gerritsen and Nieuwenhuizen, 2012)

Assessment: small: ambitions: NGOs have limited capacity to engage with many farmers (one of the largest to our knowledge is the cooperation between BirdLife Netherlands and 80 farmers); conditions: due to the voluntary character of participation (demand), and financial barriers (ability), usually only intrinsically motivated farmers participate


Assessment: unknown but potentially large: ambitions: this arrangement is in a development stage but potentially a large share of farmers is involved; the initiatives by a large dairy processor and a bank will target a majority of farmers; conditions: the dairy processor and bank are in a powerful position regarding farmers and therefore the arrangement can be ‘demanding’; other companies are in a less powerful position. Motivation to participate will depend strongly on the cost/benefit ratio farmers will face

Variability: high: the number of farmers that (potentially) participates fluctuates between 3% (currently) and over 90% (potentially; the major share of farmers delivers to the processor involved) (interview 8; 11)

Quality Assessment: low: ambitions: nature conservation is only one of the objectives of ECs. given the scientific interest in ECs we find remarkably little

Assessment: moderate: ambitions: NGOs usually have high ambitions regarding the target species. According to Sanders and Westerink (2015), active

Assessment: probably low: ambitions: ecological effects cannot be assessed yet; however nature conservation is only an aspect of the aim of more

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Arrangements





evidence of their performance, in particular in ecological terms. One of the exceptions is a study by Prager (2013), in which farmers and other stakeholders were asked about the achievements of ECs and also what they expected would happen if ECs cease to exist. Responses were mixed, but as general achievements were mentioned: protection of meadow birds and keeping the landscape open (i.e., protest against urbanisation), not further quantified; conditions: achieving high ecological results is mainly limited by negative cost/benefit ratios and problems in finding additional income sources to recoup the costs of nature conservation measures (ability)


protection of species by farmers in cooperation with BirdLife Netherlands and volunteers can be very effective; as anecdotal evidence they mention the increase in numbers of Barn Owls from about 100 pairs in the 1970s to about 3,000 nowadays (cf. interview 10). More quantitative data however are lacking; conditions: achieving high ecological results is mainly limited by negative cost/benefit ratios and problems in finding additional income sources to recoup the costs of nature conservation measures (ability)


sustainable agriculture (interview 8; 11). Indirectly, a better environmental quality of farmlands may also contribute to nature conservation. We expect a trade-off between scope and ambition – if the companies at issue want a large share of farmers to cooperate, they will probably have to employ (or at least start with) mild requirements; conditions: despite the relatively powerful position of the dairy processor and the bank they probably cannot force farmers to cooperate and therefore will have to make the arrangement attractive in order to motivate farmers to participate. Too ambitious ecological goals will require bonus/malus system in which non-participating farmers will face substantially lower prices, which is probably not acceptable to many farmers

Variability: unknown: programmes have not crystallised yet


31

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Endnotes

35

i Next to the four arrangements we discuss in future a fifth arrangement may emerge. Water boards namely are considering experimenting with lower water board taxes for farmers who leave strips along ditches uncultivated, which reduces leakage of e.g., nitrates into surface water (interviewee 9). This would form an arrangement that has characteristics of decentralised governance but also public-private governance (because of its market-based character) and that differs from the ones we discuss in our paper. We will not discuss this arrangement because it is not (yet) in place.ii Originally, the central state bought land to be transferred into nature reserve areas, but over time, responsibilities have been transferred to the provinces that now are the competent authorities.iii Due to EU regulations regarding state aid nowadays also farmers and other private actors can qualify for contracts for managing nature reserve areas. They are compensated for their loss of production capacity by means of financial compensation or replacing land. These arrangements mostly develop in close cooperation with provinces, municipalities and other stakeholders, as an alternative to land acquisition by TBOs or provinces. This is a variant of arrangement 2 and because it is new it will not be discussed in detail.iv EAS policy and regulations have been revised continuously, and there has been intense lobbying by farmers’ organisations. A description of these changes falls outside the scope of this paper, but see Kuiper et al. (2016).v The largest part of EAS funding is spent on measures to protect farmland birds (particularly meadow birds). Most of the resulting budget goes to buffer strips on arable lands and landscape element conservation (Desjeux et al., 2014).vi For instance, disturbing nests of Lapwings so these nests were abandoned and a new one made instead, which meant two instead of one nest to be paid for (pers. comm. Dick Melman).vii This does not mean of course that all farmers agree. Some farmers have a preference for avoiding damage by animals (by having them removed or killed) rather than being compensated for it. Anecdotal evidence from a radio interview with a representative of farmers’ interest group about Wolves in the Netherlands, 2015.viii Regarding meadow birds, for instance, nest protection was relatively often chosen, in contrast to measures that benefit meadow birds in the chick-rearing phase (Van Vliet, 2013).ix The field scale that is logically connected with the individual farmer cooperating with AES often was too small; landscapes are the preferred scale from an ecological perspective (e.g., in order to facilitate population dispersion; Kleijn, 2012).x For instance, using less fertiliser in order to slow the growth of grass (and hence postpone mowing) also results in fewer soil animals such as worms (Westerink et al., 2015).xi For instance, Melman et al. (2008) found that in over 40% of all areas where meadow bird protection measures were implemented, their effectiveness was negatively influenced by factors such as road traffic noise (disturbance), landscape closure (which reduces the opportunity for a timely observation of predators), and drainage (which hampers foraging for earthworms).xii During the preparation of the new system the responsibility for nature policy, including the new style ANM, was decentralised from the central state to the provinces. Therefore, the ANM has become the main provincial policy instrument for reaching international nature conservation goals outside the nature areas of the National Nature Network from 2013 onwards. However, for reaching these goals, the provinces are highly depended on agri-environmental cooperatives.xiii Awareness raising campaigns form another strategy by which NGOs aim to influence politicians, citizens, companies, and other actors (Arnouts and Boonstra, 2015). The aim is usually to put a particular issue on the agenda. An example is the so-called “Save the rich meadow” campaign initiated by BirdLife Netherlands in 2013 and that consists of (social) media outreach and the organisation of events. We have not labelled these activities as arrangements because we consider them instruments rather than arrangements.xiv For instance, dairy cooperative FrieslandCampina is developing criteria for sustainable dairy farming in cooperation with Rabobank, WWF Netherlands, and BirdLife Netherlands. Dairy farmers receive a bonus if they comply with these criteria; farmers who don’t receive a bit less. Another initiative is the so-called Stichting Veldleeuwerik (literally: the Skylark Association), founded in 2006, which aims to stimulate sustainable arable farming. Sugar processor Suikerunie, Unilever, Coca cola, Heineken, Plus supermarkets, arable farmers, and advisors are partners. Each farmer has to develop his/her own plan for sustainable arable farming, although there are some common themes such as soil fertility, erosion, pesticides, energy, and nature conservation. Participating farmers have to attend a minimum number of peer meetings where experiences are exchanged. (Stuiver et al., 2013; Sanders and Westerink, 2015) Suikerunie has also experimented with a bonus/malus arrangement but experienced resistance from the part of suppliers.xv Below we focus on farmers, similar to what we did with other governance arrangements. It is interesting to note that there are substantial differences in motivation to initiate and participate in this arrangement. For the initiating processors, motivation to contribute to nature conservation is related not only to external pressure from NGOs and sustainability demands from their customers, but also to benefits such as satisfaction and motivation of employees, opportunities to attract new employees, image, and their social licence to produce (interviewee 10). For farmers, these benefits apply to a lesser extent, or not at all, and benefits of participation in this arrangement will strongly depend on whether the bonus on agriproducts and lower interest rates cover the costs of nature conservation

measures.

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