safeguarding measures in blockchains: how participants

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Safeguarding measures in blockchains: How participants weigh the trade-off between security and transparency in blockchain networks Master Thesis MSc-BA Change Management By Ruhi Chatterjee S3206106 [email protected] Thesis supervisor: Marvin Hanisch University of Groningen Faculty of Economics and Business Thesis completed with IBM CIC Groningen Date: 10/08/21 Word count: 9,652

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Page 1: Safeguarding measures in blockchains: How participants

Safeguarding measures in blockchains: How participants weigh the

trade-off between security and transparency in blockchain networks

Master Thesis MSc-BA Change Management

By

Ruhi Chatterjee S3206106

[email protected]

Thesis supervisor: Marvin Hanisch

University of Groningen

Faculty of Economics and Business

Thesis completed with IBM CIC Groningen

Date: 10/08/21

Word count: 9,652

Page 2: Safeguarding measures in blockchains: How participants

1

Abstract

Blockchains represent a decentralised solution to governance issues across networks, however,

significant issues still lie in the governance of the blockchains themselves. Since a blockchain is

transparent, all transaction information is shared between different network nodes. The

information shared between the nodes may be misused by the blockchain participants, creating a

need for privacy measures at each node. However, such misappropriation of knowledge

negatively impacts the trust required to run a blockchain project. On the other hand, blockchains

create efficiency by lowering transaction costs and cutting out the “middleman”. This paper

explains how the participants in a blockchain network would react to joining a network and how

their perception of blockchain safety could trigger more serious attempts at information

protection. Next, this paper considers knowledge spillovers in the blockchain context and aids

further understanding of how blockchain governance should develop based on the reaction of the

participants. Further, this paper attempts to illustrate how protective or opportunistic behaviour

by participants can negatively impact the value of the blockchain and influence others within the

blockchain project. More importantly, this research suggests a direction for a practical balance

between security measures and transparency to achieve the purpose of trust within the

blockchain network

Keywords: Blockchain, Network governance, Transparent hand, Natural selection and

Safeguarding measures.

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Table of Contents

Abstract 1

Introduction 3

Theoretical model 8

Background on blockchain technology and governance 8

Blockchain projects in practice 9

The translucent hand perspective 10

The invisible hand and natural selection 11

Blockchain Governance 12

Research hypotheses 13

Safeguarding issues of blockchains 13

Absorptive capacity 15

Competitive intensity 17

Firm network embeddedness 18

Control variables 19

Conceptual model 20

Methodology 22

Study Measures 22 Dependent variable safeguarding measures 22 Independent variable network embeddedness 23 Independent variable absorptive capacity 24 Independent variable competitive intensity 24 Control variables 24 Data collection procedures 25 Validity and reliability 26

Analysis 26

Results 28

Correlation and descriptive statistics 29

Regression results and hypothesis testing 33

Further insights based on interviews 37

Discussion and conclusion 38

Research limitations and future research 40

References 42

Appendices 45

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Introduction

Blockchains may famously promise immutability and transparency for participants, however, a

certain level of uncertainty still exists in terms of their governance (Ziolkowski et al., 2020).

Blockchains represent a decentralised solution to governance issues across networks but

significant issues are still prevalent in the governance of the blockchains themselves (van Pelt et

al., 2020; Ziolkowski et al., 2020). Blockchains work by recording a transaction occurring at one

node of a network within a blockchain which is then confirmed by all the participating nodes in

the project, after which this transaction gets recorded as a block and is added to the pre-existing

chain of blocks or starts a new blockchain (Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019). Blockchains allow

various use cases such as transparency and traceability but this also implies that various

organisations taking part in the project may have access to each other's transaction information

(Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019). To keep such collaborative interactions in check, governance

mechanisms beyond what automatically occurs in a blockchain code may be needed (Shermin,

2017). Therefore, the question of how participants could effectively behave in this situation

arises as they would have the opportunity to either create safeguards for themselves in a project

or potentially exploit information that they might come across in a blockchain project. Therefore,

this paper focuses on the participant opportunism issues in relation to network composition and

proposes the question: How do blockchain participants weigh the tradeoff between safeguarding

and transparency in a blockchain network?

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When a blockchain network is made, one must consider issues pertaining to how the network

should be composed, controlled, what kind of legal affairs it entails, and what technology should

be associated with it (Hanisch et al., 2021). Due to the fact that a blockchain is transparent, a lot

of information is shared between different network nodes (Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019). This

blockchain feature can allow efficiency across industries through an interconnected network. A

higher number of blockchain participants could imply more collective information for the

network and more efficiency as transaction costs diminish (Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019).

However, the inclusion of an entire supply chain or network could also mean including

competitors in the blockchain network. Moreover, the misappropriation of the shared

information is a significant risk in such networks (Murray et al., 2019). Even though a

blockchain promotes the idea of “trustless trust” this is only valid as long as blockchain

participants have trust in the blockchain itself (Murray et al., 2019). Therefore, including

competing participants to have an effective network and securing the intellectual property at the

same time is difficult.

Leakage of intellectual property may happen naturally in the form of employee mobility, social

network embeddedness, and the reciprocity of knowledge sharing in an industry (Inkpen, 2019).

A blockchain only shares information regarding transactions and information storage that takes

place in the project while sharing a copy of this information with every participant (Cong & He,

2019). However, one must consider that this still provides the opportunity to possibly gain

organisational information that would not be available outside a blockchain project under normal

circumstances. Contractor (2019) explains how highly networked industries may have a net

benefit of disclosing or leaking information which outweighs the drawbacks. Moreover, Alnuami

and George (2016) illustrate how information leakage may not be the worst possible scenario as

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knowledge retrieval may be a way to gain from knowledge spillovers. Companies may have the

opportunity to repurpose the information they gain to their own advantage. However, the factor

of trust within the network would not work if every participant attempts to make use of

knowledge from other companies within the network for personal gain (Murray et.al, 2019).

Gains can be made from participating in a blockchain network without appropriating

information, but one may feel the need to protect their information and take safeguarding

measures against knowledge leakage.

Blockchain participation benefits clients by coordination amongst participants in a network, with

automated execution, transparency, ease of scalability, safeguarding in terms of automated

enforcement, verification, automated adaptation, fast reactivity, and increased reliability

(Hanisch et al., 2019; Shermin, 2017). Additionally, this online medium allows these benefits in

comparison to the traditional contracts which may be much more costly and time consuming

with the need to include lawyers and other parts of the organisation (Murray et al., 2019). In the

case of blockchain participation, the transaction costs may be lower considering that they would

be shared throughout the network (Shermin, 2017). However, we must consider that even

blockchains making digital contracts and implementing them can be expensive (Murray et al.,

2019). Further costs can arise from the inflexibility of blockchains, accuracy of information used

for a digital or “smart contract”, and the possibility of an attack on the blockchain before the

information is saved in a block (Murray et al., 2019). More importantly, additional costs that

may arise from firms trying to tighten securing measures while participating in a blockchain have

not been considered. This factor should be considered when the governance of these blockchain

projects is planned.

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While blockchain technology poses many benefits, many questions still lie with regards to how

they should be governed. Enough research has not been conducted on the topic of how

blockchains self-regulate and how do managers with low knowledge on the topic feel about the

effectiveness of this governance method (Shermin, 2017). Managers need to trust experts on

what form of governance is established based on the code they write and determine how this

automated governance method should be updated. Moreover, this process of governance may

need more than standardised code to govern this novel area for organisational applications.

Consequently, the trend of governance structure in an external environment such as blockchain

projects would be appealing to managers. This is also an important consideration, taking into

account the potential of blockchain solutions automating processes not only within firms but also

across industry networks. As technology gets integrated further into businesses, managers and

researchers must think of an optimal governance solution for all participants to facilitate

coordination and exchange. Moreover, the paper by Altman et. al (2017) identifies a deficiency

in research on the tensions created when multiple methods of governance structures could be

implemented. This paper adds to the field of research by combining the translucent hand

approach by Altman et.al (2021) to the field of blockchain governance which will be discussed

further in the following section.

This paper further contributes to several aspects of network governance within blockchains.

While blockchain technology has become a popular topic of discussion, little research has been

done on the impact of safeguarding measures of the blockchain network. Firstly, this paper

explains how the participants’ perception on blockchain safety could trigger more serious

attempts at information protection. This paper considers knowledge spillovers in the blockchain

context and aids further understanding of how blockchain governance should develop based on

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the reaction of the participants. Subsequently, the paper attempts to illustrate how protective or

opportunistic behaviour by participants can negatively impact the value of the blockchain and

impacts others within the blockchain project. More importantly, this research should suggest a

direction for a practical balance between security measures and transparency for the purpose of

trust within the blockchain network. Finally, this would further contribute to Network theory in

relation to blockchains which has been sparsely researched, and the specific behaviour of firms

while joining blockchain projects which is even more uncommon. Managers may use this

research to determine what they should expect while participating in blockchain projects and to

understand the governance effects behind blockchains. Finally, the paper aims to explain

governance mechanisms as multiple layers that can be implemented on blockchain projects

which can be impacted by social and firm related variables.

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Theoretical model

Background on blockchain technology and governance

Blockchain technology has been described as a decentralised ledger that is immutable, traceable,

and transparent (Lumineau et al., 2020). However, firms that participate in a blockchain may

have the opportunity to make use of external information available to them through this system.

They may not have had access to such information without their participation in such a

blockchain project. The features of the autonomous blockchain solution would go on by itself

considering that an automated program cannot react to breaches in governance or confidence by

participants means that there is room for concern or doubt during firm participation in a project.

Jones et.al, (1997) indicated that network governance comprises two essential factors: patterns of

interactions or exchange; and the flow of resources taking place between organisations.

Furthermore, the need to effectively manage a network to find benefits from it without

opportunism is relevant to the management of blockchain projects (Altman et.al, 2021). The

paper further argues that there is a need to move beyond tightly controlled systems for the

protection of intellectual property especially since there may be multiple approaches applications

that may need varied approaches to governance (Altman et.al, 2021).

One of the many use cases of blockchains includes supporting the paradox of a decentralised

automated solution with a centralised procedure (Altman et.al, 2021). Possible agency issues

may also lie in any adjustments that contracts may need within blockchains as they require a

majority consensus from participants in the network to implement the change (Sherman, 2017).

Moreover, most clients in blockchain projects must rely on the expertise of the people who set up

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the blockchain technology for the automated governance mechanisms of majority consensus or

other governance techniques (Sherman, 2017). While blockchains focus on the decentralisation

of transactions and processes within the project, a lead organisation may influence the

implemented governance structure and additional governance, or security measures implemented

in the blockchain project.

In a digital environment such as that of blockchain projects, with regulatory governance

methods, the social interactions and dynamics within the network may be overlooked. Therefore,

further exploring the idea of such managed ecosystems without opportunism can be investigated

in terms of blockchain. Additionally, the idea of highly networked industries making gains from

information sharing may also be prevalent within blockchain networks (Inkpen et al., 2019).

Blockchain projects in practice

Projects that fell under the scope of this research paper were similar in blockchain participant

behaviour as described in the article by Sherman (2017). More specifically, while lead

organisation influence was present in making the code for the blockchain project, it was not

adjusted when new participants joined pre-existing projects. New participants trusted to join

existing projects based on existing regulations. Project changes or adjustments were made only

when the project was revised for further development. Unless the project was ended or

abandoned, these blockchain projects continued indefinitely based on the originally written

project code. Consequently, the unique nature of these projects with a certain degree of

automated governance is taken into account while delving deeper into the theoretical background

on blockchain governance.

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The translucent hand perspective

The translucent hand entails a governance solution falling between the visible hand of the market

and invisible hand of company hierarchy (Altman et. al, 2021). This proposed governance

structure allows a varying level of governance implemented by an organisation, meaning that the

level of implemented governance measures may determine the level of translucency (Altman et.

al, 2021). This is an interesting concept in relation to blockchain governance since the locus of

control may be influenced by a lead organisation for a blockchain project but is automated for

the program to run automatically making this a case partly governed by both the visible hand of

the market and the invisible hand of the company hierarchy.

While Altman et.al explain the concept of managed ecosystems, this does not exactly apply to

blockchain cases as the locus of activity or value creation may or may not be actively led by

people outside the organisation in this case (Altman et. al, 2021). However, the concepts of

multiple governance mechanisms and incumbent transitions can be seen as relevant to the

blockchain case. This is because the incumbent transitions would refer to the adaptation of the

blockchain participants to the governance methods which are a part of the blockchain project as

opposed to the governance that would traditionally be enforced upon their firm and inter

organisational projects.

Blockchain projects have arguably an external locus of control, while it entails automated

regulation, it is only as efficient as the “expert” or joint effort that makes the program for

automated governance (Sherman, 2017). Locus of control in this case means the rules that would

be asserted for blockchain participants. As mentioned in the article by Sherman (2017), users

joining a blockchain project mostly comply with the pre-existing rules set by the lead

organisations of the blockchain project. While the lead organisations can influence the rules that

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make the blockchain project, in principle once the code is written, the project runs on its own

outside the immediate control of the blockchain lead organisation. Further applying this to the

model by Altman et.al (2020), as seen in appendix F, the external locus of control is also not

exactly comparable to the governance structures as seen in the upper left quadrant of the model.

In a blockchain context, multiple governance mechanisms may entail the choice to include layers

and pieces of additional security measures.

The invisible hand and natural selection

Here, the concept of natural selection implies that organisations in a group or ecosystem show

variability and the wealth of favourable variability can be learned by others for their own

improvement and advancement opportunities (Carey, 1998). In the blockchain context, the

importance of including this theory promoting self-regulating natural order may display the

downsides of naturally selective behaviour that may occur within blockchain projects or

networks. More clearly, a blockchain participant learning the “wealth” of an organisation that

makes it unique may lead to the loss of its competitive advantage. Moreover, the idea of other

participants possibly learning of their organisational information possibly leading to loss of

competitive advantage may be a legitimate concern for possible blockchain participants.

Therefore, this concerns the “visible” activity or the activity that is not automatically controlled

by blockchain code.

The theoretical perspective as explained above regarding the translucent hand and its ties to

natural selection through the invisible hand seem appropriate to describe the combination of the

nature of blockchain governance measures while addressing conscious competitiveness as

Darwinian.

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Blockchain Governance

The concepts of bounded rationality and opportunism must be considered for the purpose of

coordinating transactions amongst various organisations. Lumineau et.al (2021) explain

governance measures for coordination and collaboration through binding legal contracts and

relational mechanisms. Here, legal contracts would fall under the “visible hand” of the

organisation. On the other hand, self-regulated relational mechanisms fall under the invisible

spectrum of the market. Within blockchains, the complexity and added governance structures

may take place in the visible part of blockchain code. Relational mechanisms may comprise of

trust and relational norms, with more socially embedded organisations being more trustworthy

for the purposes of information exchange and reduced concerns about opportunistic behaviour by

collaborators. While Lumineau et.al (2021) separately classify blockchain governance as a self-

contained and automated system using formal rules, which are not legally enforced; they do not

make considerations for the level of governance measures enforced which may be of the

“visible” or “transparent” kind. Moreover, they emphasize that the identities of blockchain

participants do not matter. Contrastingly, the paper by Sherman (2017) describes the need for

knowing organisations as it involves joining existing blockchain projects without implementing

any changes for individual participants who join. This phenomenon of joining prominent projects

without demanding changes in security measures was also noticed in the projects studied for the

purpose of this paper and will be discussed further in the following sections.

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Research hypotheses

Drawing from the concept of the translucent hand and opportunism in transactions, the concepts

of competition, capabilities and additional governance measures can be considered. The article

by Sherman (2017) highlights the standardised transactions for governance associated with

blockchains, moreover, the theory of blockchain governance under the translucent hand theory as

described in the previous section describes the paradox of some level of centralisation in

decentralised blockchain projects. Consequently, this phenomenon may be described in terms of

security measures, absorptive capacity, Network embeddedness and competitive intensity. These

variables sufficiently describe the concept in terms of blockchains describing the possibility of

multiple governance mechanisms and concepts described from the theoretical framework. The

proposed hypotheses are further described below.

Safeguarding issues of blockchains

The issue of having a decentralised blockchain network while relying on a consultant or lead

organisation, among other variables shows how “translucent” an organisation can be. Mitigating

the issue of having no control over governance problems immediately once the automated

governance system is in motion may entail the addition of governance or security measures in

blockchain projects.

Lumineau et.al (2021) state that knowing participants is not required, however, they also contrast

this thought by stating that social relationships are a relevant factor for trust and coordination in

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projects. The possibility of opportunistic behaviour by every person in a network can destroy the

value of the network (Zeng & Chen, 2003). One participant in the blockchain could potentially

make information gains through blockchain participation. However, if every member of the

blockchain does the same, the trust participants would have in the blockchain itself would be

ruined (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Zeng & Chen (2003) The authors further explain problems such as

underinvestment in the alliance in case they do not receive equal value as their partners. In terms

of blockchains, one may recognise unequal value gains in the case of uneven power distribution

in the network (Murray et al., 2019; Shermin, 2017). Unequal power in a blockchain network

would not only mean holding more influence over others but also giving way to the possibility of

a “51% attack” (Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019). A 51% attack means that those participants who

control more than 51% of the blockchain project may launch an attack that can control how

transactions are written and invalidate the blockchain (Quinou & Debonneuil, 2019). Besides a

51% attack and consensus in a blockchain being swayed by influential parties, risks also lie in

the information or delayed data propagation (Zhang et al., 2020). The delayed information

reaching different participants of a blockchain can lead to the creation of different forks of

information being saved in the blockchain (Conti et al., 2018). While one blockchain continues

storing new blocks, an old fork may be tampered with (Conti et al., 2018). A “sibyl” attack may

also occur when fake participants are made and the same strategy as a 51% attack is attempted

(Erbguth & Morin, 2019).

The second risk associated with multiple partner alliances, as explained by Zeng & Chen (2003),

is the possibility of competitors misappropriating leaked information, which may lead to

participants overprotecting any exposed information during alliances. Similarly, this

overprotection and need for safeguarding may occur among partners in a blockchain alliance as

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their transaction information is revealed and an attack would cause them to be left out from the

invalidation of the blockchain.

The paper by Contractor (2019) explains the possibility of the optimal balance between openness

and secrecy for companies. This paper written in response to Inkpen et al.(2019) explains how

the paper by Inkpen and colleagues overestimates the value of knowledge leakage. While Inkpen

and colleagues argue that the benefits of knowledge sharing outweigh the costs, Contractor

(2019) states that in highly networked industries there may be a net benefit of knowledge

sharing. Furthermore, investing in excessive safeguarding measures may end up being very

expensive, invalidating the gains from lowered transaction costs of blockchain participation

(Inkpen et al., 2019). One must also consider that there is a difference between the willingness of

people wanting to participate in the blockchain to benefit from openness and transparency versus

the fact that they would also have to share their own information.

Considering these factors and referring back to the translucent hand theory, participants may

choose to add more or less governance or security measures while participating in a blockchain

project. Here the managers must decide how transparent they wish to be between gaining

information and reducing transaction costs through the involvement of blockchain technology or

adding extra governance measures for protecting their information.

Absorptive capacity

Conceptually, the concept of blockchains eradicates the opportunism problem through its

automated rule process (Shermin, 2017). However, the social wealth that can be picked up by

organisations operating in this market of automated governance can depend on the ability of a

company to absorb information. Drawing from the concept of companies in a free market ruled

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by the invisible hand, companies interacting with each other can also pick up information or

practices (Carey,1998). Absorptive capacity may be used to describe the ability of a firm to

draw information from participants in the market. Absorptive capacity can be defined as the

ability of a company to gather information and repurpose it for their own sustained competitive

advantage (Zahra & George, 2002).

The paper by Striukova (2007) suggests that the intellectual value is embedded in different

entities, systems or structures, and patents. Applying this to blockchains, the information shared

cannot be controlled since it takes place automatically, leaving such embedded intellectual value

vulnerable to attackers. Therefore, the governance of intellectual property such as that existing in

patents is imperative (Striukova, 2007). Managers may choose to take more stringent measures

to safeguard intellectual property, making the governance structure less transparent.

Being aware of the possible combinations of information or value gained from interacting in a

market may mean that firms are willing to be more transparent to gain such information for

competitive advantage. Companies that are capable of gaining such value through the market

may be less concerned about multiple governance measures as they could gain from the

automated governance system of blockchains. Based on these theories of intellectual property

and knowledge leakage, the following may be proposed: companies that have the ability to make

use of such available information and repurpose it for their own competitive advantage would be

more willing to share information. Opposingly, companies with low capabilities to repurpose the

information for their own advantage would be more hesitant to share their information and may

feel the need for more security measures.

Consequently, the following hypothesis was developed:

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H1: Companies with lower absorptive capacity are more likely to take additional safeguarding

measures.

Competitive intensity

Strategic alliance theory by Zeng & Chen (2003) further contributes that misappropriation of

information may allow individual benefit but diminishes value creation and destroys the

established partner cooperation. Furthermore, those who are aware of the knowledge leakage

taking place within the blockchain network may choose to approach this in a strategic manner

and create gains for their organisation (Alnuaimi & George, 2016). In Contrast, industries where

knowledge sharing is prevalent either through the rotation of employees or by the network, may

not feel as opposed to information sharing as compared to industries where information sharing

is less prevalent. Moreover, depending on the industry, the information shared may be more or

less sensitive and may be misused. Such sensitivity and competition in the market can be

described as competitive intensity.

Further, market uncertainty may have negative impacts on operating performance (Jones et.al,

1997). Under such an uncertain market, companies may make the conscious decision of

opportunism in the form of natural selection while interacting with firms in a market (Carey,

1998). However, this absorbed information may or may not be useful as individuals try to

compose a sustained competitive advantage.

Companies operating under such sensitive conditions may feel the need to have higher

safeguarding measures. Blockchain projects under such highly competitive environments may

feel the need to be less transparent as opposed to companies operating in low competitive

intensity environments. This may happen as blockchain participants may be exposed to more

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information about companies in their ecosystem as opposed to information they would normally

receive outside the blockchain project. Again, firms may see this as an opportunity to create a

sustained competitive advantage to survive in highly competitive industries (Alnuaimi & George,

2016).

Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H2: Companies with higher competitive intensity are more likely to take additional safeguarding

measures.

Firm network embeddedness

A firm can potentially have a better competitive advantage with a better bridging position in the

network (Cohen et.al, 1990). Moreover, the connection of networks can lead to the increase of an

organization's ability to learn. Therefore, the social value embedded in a blockchain network

could potentially be used as a competitive advantage by the recombination of information and

ideas that may be available in a blockchain network. However, an organisation that is more

embedded allows for a smoother transfer of knowledge and collaboration and would be

perceived as less opportunistic (Lumineau et.al, 2021).

Lumineau et.al (2021) propose that social embeddedness in relationships are an indicator for

trusting the reliability of potential partner companies. Moreover, the article by Shermin (2017)

further states that having the assurance of an established project may make companies feel more

at ease while participating in group efforts. Moreover, joining such blockchain projects may also

entail reputational incentives as interests would be aligned between the participants.

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Having a connected network could also imply that coordinating misuse of information on the

blockchain would be more difficult with social connectivity. This could possibly damage the

firm's reputation, keeping them from performing in such an opportunistic manner (Cohen et.al,

1990). The assurance of joining larger groups that are socially established or have reputational

benefits may put blockchain participants more at ease as opposed to less socially embedded

firms. While the social embeddedness of a company can be reassuring, having the ability to join

established companies for collaborating in blockchain may provide further psychological relief

for participants. Moreover, this implies joining a project associated with a more socially

embedded company triggers more transparency as firms would be less concerned about

opportunism. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: The stronger the firm embeddedness, the less likely the firm is to take safeguarding

measures.

The hypotheses formulated can be visualised in the following conceptual model presented in

figure 1.1 below.

Control variables

Considering factors that may influence safeguarding measures, the control variables of the

development stage, presence of competition in the network, inter-organisational data sharing

have been taken into account, based on theory adapted from Jones et.al, (1997) regarding social

ties, and the creation of value through networks. The development stage for a blockchain project

may actually entail multiple projects proposing different solutions to clients before an ongoing

self-sufficient solution is placed. The presence of competition may indicate if this project

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occurred in a participant group with apparent competitors. Lastly, the presence of inter-

organisational data sharing implies data is shared outside the organisation.

Conceptual model

Figure 1.1: Conceptual model on Network governance in blockchain projects.

The following relationships have been displayed in the model:

H1: Absorptive capacity is negatively related to safeguarding measures. Higher levels of

absorptive capacity trigger lesser precautions in terms of safeguarding measures in a blockchain

network.

H2: Competitive intensity is positively related to safeguarding measures. Higher levels of

competitive intensity would mean higher safeguarding measures before joining a blockchain

project.

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H3: Network embeddedness is negatively related to safeguarding measures. Larger lead

organisation networks imply more safeguarding measures before joining the blockchain network.

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Methodology

Study Measures

Even though blockchain research may be a relatively new field, many prominent network

theories have not been applied to this field yet. Therefore, this paper uses a theory testing

approach. The paper makes use of concepts proposed in the article by Shermin (2017) to describe

these factors that influence blockchain governance.

The research will be conducted at the firm level. Lead participants in the network would be

analysed for the study. Firstly, linear regression analyses will be conducted for the selected set of

companies to explore relationships between:

1. Competitive intensity and safeguarding measures

2. Absorptive capacity and safeguarding measures

3. Network embeddedness and safeguarding measures

Next, information understood through interviews will be taken into account for the purpose of

explaining observed relationships.

The following variable dimensions have been described with the use of academic articles and

guidance from the interviews of blockchain professionals.

Dependent variable safeguarding measures

As elaborated in the literature review section, in this study the variable safeguarding measures

are being defined as measures taken beyond the normal level of security or safeguarding in a

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company while being a part of a blockchain (Zeng & Cheng, 2003). Furthermore, this would be

evaluated through questions inquiring about the number of measures the lead organisations took

for the project.

Lead organisations entail companies that largely invest or lead the direction of the blockchain

project, defining the scope of functions for other participating companies as well. Since the

automated process of blockchain governance is influenced by lead organisations, it is appropriate

to consider the measurement of the firm level variables such as network embeddedness and

absorptive capacity to assess the expected social dynamics and creative capabilities while

forming the automated governance system. The dependent variable was measured as the total

number of security measures to suitably indicate the degree to which an organisation takes up

safeguarding measures. The security measures refer to the translucent hands level of

transparency, the larger number of security measures making the translucent hand more

transparent (Altman et.al, 2021).

Independent variable network embeddedness

Network embeddedness entails the social ties and strength an organisation may have (Cohen &

Levinthal, 1990). This would be measured through the number of participants in a blockchain

network, firm age and their firm size. This is developed for Shermin (2017) and Lumineau et.al’s

suggestion that the social relational strength of a network can make it more trustworthy. For the

purpose of this paper, these factors describe the network richness and strength of a lead

organisation. Moreover, it describes this as larger firm sizes measured by total lead organisation

assets are expected to indicate the firm’s strength and reach within the network. Participant

numbers can be quite large when it is a blockchain with a public key or public access to

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everyone, or a private blockchain where the participants who join are controlled (Quinou &

Debonneuil, 2019). For the purpose of a network based theoretical lens, the number of

participants in private blockchains will be counted to determine network size, and firm size

should add to their possible capabilities as a lead organisation. Firm age may further elaborate

the on level on firm embeddedness and the presence of pre-existing relationships that may aid in

the recombination of knowledge for the purpose of gaining competitive advantage.

Independent variable absorptive capacity

This will be determined by checking the value for the number of granted patent publications.

This paper focuses on determining the ability of a company to create their own intellectual

material, based on Striukova’s (2007) proposition of intellectual value being embedded in

various entities and Chohen et.al’s suggestion of R&D value producing innovation, measured in

granted patents rather than R&D investment to check innovation outcomes.

Independent variable competitive intensity

Industry competitiveness would be measured through how difficult it would be to enter a

particular industry depending on the country of origin of the lead organisation. This indicator for

world development adapted to assess the competition in the lead organisation industry indicates

how they approach their leading tasks in a blockchain network. This is adapted from the theory

of the invisible hand and natural selection by Carey (1998).

Control variables

Stage of development: This was collected through the survey in the various stages of project

development that occur as shown in Appendix A. Here, IBM participates as a third-party or

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participant in the blockchain project and collaborates with potential clients for the purpose of

launching blockchain projects. These are:

● No development completed: The project did not go beyond the initial design thinking or

proposal phase.

● Proof of concept: An experimental representation of how the project would run.

● Pilot or production pilot: A pilot of how the project runs.

● Production: A running and fully functional project

● Other: Situations such as the progression of the project continuing in-house, with no

further third-party interactions.

Presence of competitive relationships and presence of inter-organisational data sharing: These

were also measured through the use of a binary variable as seen in Appendix A.

Data collection procedures

This research was conducted together with IBM, where 110 IBM blockchain project managers

were contacted for the purpose of conducting interviews. These project managers were asked to

verify contact information and recommend people for a cross-sectional survey. The survey was

conducted through online interviews using video calls where participants could both explain

which answers they would pick for the survey questions and provide the rationale for their

answers. The survey was then filled in in accordance with their answers. Survey questions

affiliated with this research can be found in appendix A.

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Validity and reliability

The study avoids common method bias by only measuring the dependent variable of

safeguarding measures through the survey and uses external secondary data for measurement of

the independent variables. Two of the control variables have also been measured using the

survey. Data triangulation takes place from three different sources, being the World bank data for

world development indicators and Orbis data for patent and company size data in addition to the

survey data.

Analysis

Due to the nature of this study and confidentiality requirements, standardised information was

manually entered into the dataset, standard firm specific values were taken from the Orbis and

World bank databases. This study makes use of Stata SE17 for the analysis of the raw data.

The continuous dependent variable of the number of security measures that has a “count” nature

prompts the use of a Poisson regression in Stata. Given the skewed distribution due to the count

nature, the Poisson model is appropriate since the count of security measures range from 0 to 7.

The analysis is conducted through arranging descriptive statistics drawn from the raw data which

can be visualised in appendices B, C, D and E. Next, Stata is used to generate a pairwise

correlation with some descriptive statistics between the independent, dependent and control

variables as seen in Table 1 of the next section. Further, to find possible evidence to support the

hypotheses, a Poisson regression is conducted. Firstly, the dependent variable safeguarding

measures is run against the control variables for model 1. Next, the independent variable

measures are added sequentially for model 2, 3, and 4. These models are then used to discuss the

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log pseudolikelihood, chi square test of model coefficients and the goodness of fit of the models

in the next chapter.

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Results

Firstly, the distribution of projects per country can be seen in Table 1. Looking at the distribution

of the kind of blockchain projects from appendix B, it can be seen that the majority of projects

were proof of concepts which means that most projects made an estimation for the required

security measures at this stage. Only 23.3% of projects entailed ongoing autonomous governance

in the form of blockchain technology. Notably, since the largest share of technological maturity

is the “proof of concept” indicating that these projects have room for more participants and

security measures in the future before they are implemented. Appendix C shows that the majority

of the projects used event-based data meaning that all participants would receive information

related to a particular event within the blockchain network. Moreover, Appendix D indicates that

tracing information was the most popular use case and the different types of governance methods

centred around access restrictions followed by authentication, off-chain storage and data-sharing

specifications as seen in Appendix E.

Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are produced as seen in table 2. Furthermore, to

determine the validity of the hypotheses, a poisson regression is performed in four parts. Even

with multiple variables measured in a categorical manner, the method of probit regression was

not required as the data was converted into binary measures of “0” and “1”, a linear regression

would have been inappropriate considering the count nature of the dependent variable. The first

model measures the effects of the dependent variable against the control variables as seen in

Table 4 . Next, the independent variables are regressed for model 2. Finally, the effect and size

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and validity of the relationships are discussed in the next section. Further meaning is derived

from the interview results as seen in appendices B, C, D and E.

Correlation and descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics indicated that the 60 observations showed weak to moderate correlation

coefficients as seen in table 1. The statistics of mean, standard deviation, minimum and

maximum can be seen in table 1. The average blockchain project consisted of 6.14 participants.

Moreover, a statistically significant positive correlation can be seen between the presence of

competitive relationships and number of security measures at p<0.05 with r= 0.3152. Other

moderate correlation can be seen between the number of participants and security measures (r=

0.3569), presence of competition with the number of participants and data sharing in

organisations, and significant negative correlations with no development completed projects with

the number of security measures, data sharing and presence of competition as seen in table 1.

Furthermore, more development at production was positively correlated to participants, the

number of security measures, competition and the assets of the lead organisation. Finally,

Industry competitiveness seemed to be significantly correlated to firm age and patents granted.

These correlations are significant at 90 and 99% (p<0.05, p<0.01 and p<0.10). Given that none

of the correlation coefficients exceeded the value of 0.59, under the threshold of 0.6,

multicollinearity is not expected. Since the value of r=0.59 is quite close to the threshold, a VIF(

variance inflection factors) test is performed to completely rule out multicollinearity. As seen in

table 2, the mean VIF=3.44 , meaning multicollinearity can be ruled out based on the threshold

value of VIF=10.

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Country Number of participants

Spain 2

Netherlands 4

Switizerland 3

United States 17

Lithuania 1

Norway 1

Japan 8

France 11

Germany 6

Phillipines 1

UAE 1

Poland 1

Ireland 1

Great Britain 1

India 1

Denmark 1

Total 60

Table 1: distribution of projects per country

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Table 2. Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. (Number of observations=60, Significant

levels at * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p<0.01)

Table 3. Variance inflection factors

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Regression results and hypothesis testing

The Poisson regression was first conducted with DV safeguarding measures and the control

variables.

Model 1

This model with The dependent variable security measures and control variables presence of

competition, data sharing between organisations and level of technological maturity. It can be

seen that with every value increase in the control variables, the difference in logs would increase

by a very small amount as seen in the coefficients in model 1 with the exception of no

development completed technological maturity. Unfortunately, these values were not significant

at 90%, 95% or 99%. Moreover, upon assessing the goodness of fit, both the pearson and

deviance goodness for fit values are statistically significant implying that the model is not a good

fit with deviance goodness of fit=91.62*** and pearson goodness of fit=71.15**. However, the

result of the chi square fit of the full model over the null model stands significant at p<0.01.

Model 2

Adding the constructs of Social embeddedness by number of participants, firm age and total

assets, small coefficients are once again noted. The values of total assets and firm age stand

significant at p<0.01, however these effects are very weak with their values being less than 0.001

as seen in table 4.

Next, the goodness of fit of the model was conducted. This model is not a good fit with deviance

goodness of fit=89.11*** and pearson goodness of fit=69.97**. However, the result of the chi

square fit of the complete model of model 2 over the null model stands significant at p<0.01.

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Model 3

This model includes industry competitiveness in the model for the variable of competitiveness. It

can be seen that the variables depict weak effects. The effects of total assets and firm age are

again statistically significant at p<0.01 with the negative weak effect of the constant b being less

than 0.001. Industry competitiveness stands significant at p<0.05 with b=-0.0077 showing

another weak negative relationship.

This model is not a good fit with deviance goodness of fit=88.84*** and pearson goodness of

fit=69.68**. However, the result of the chi square fit of the complete model of model 3 over the

null model stands significant at p<0.01.

Model 4

Finally, patents granted publications is added for the independent variable of absorptive capacity.

Again total assets and firm age show weak negative relationships. The effect of industry

competitiveness is slightly stronger at b= -0.0105 and p<0.05.

The model is not a good fit with deviance goodness of fit=88.38*** and pearson goodness of

fit=68.18**. However, the result of the chi square fit of the complete model of model 4 over the

null model stands significant at p<0.01.

Noting no statistically strong significant results between competitive intensity, absorptive

capacity, network embeddedness and safeguarding measures while observing the statistically

significant correlations in table 1 the hypotheses can neither be confirmed or rejected at this

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stage. Interesting correlations were seen in table 2 with the positive relationship between

competitive intensity and security measures; technological maturity and investment in security

measures as well as openness to share information with competition; lower technological

maturity and the lack of security measures and collaboration; and finally, the positive unexpected

relationship between industry competitiveness and patents, and firm age. However, these

relationships must be further explored considering correlation does not equate to causation. A

larger data-set would be required for future research to further explain the variation in the dataset

and possibly more significant regression results.

While more investigation is required to further understand the significant regression results, the

weak negative but statistically significant relationships for security measures with firm age and

total assets indicate the need for further investigation on hypothesis 3. Similarly, the negative

relationship between industry competitiveness and security measures indicate cause for

investigating hypothesis 2. Moreover, the surprising result of a positive relationship between

absorptive capacity and security measures must be investigated, giving cause to possibly reject

hypothesis 1.

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(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES Totalsecuritymeasures Totalsecuritymeasures Totalsecuritymeasures Totalsecuritymeasures

Datatransaction -0.43 -0.46 -0.44 -0.44

(0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)

Competition 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.23

(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)

Nodevelopmentcompleted -17.21 -17.51 -17.51 -17.65

(-1.11) (-1.28) (-1,28) (-1.36)

PoC -0.55 -0.56 -0.54 -0.52

(0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)

Pilotproductionpilot -0.18 -0.19 -0.17 -0.14

(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.469)

Production 0.11 0.05 0.0901 0.0928

(0.42) (0.44) (0.439) (0.442)

Other 0.12 0.16 0.156 0.196

(0.65) (0.66) (0.661) (0.665)

Numberofparticipants 0.0059 0.0055 0.0059

(0.00449) (0.00455) (0.00458)

Totalassets -1.72e-13 -0.000049 -0.000091

(-7.21e-13)*** (-0.037)** (-0.0037)**

Firmage -3.51e-04 -4.95e-05 -9.18e-05

(0.0017)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0018)***

Industrycompetitiveness -0.00772 -0.0105

(0.0153)** (0.0157)**

Patentsgrantedpublications 1.05e-06

(1.50e-06)***

Constant 1.40 1.45 1.47 1.46

(0.57) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62)

Log-likelihood 46.79 49.30 49.56 50.03

Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18

N 60 60 60 60

Table 4: Regression analysis results (Number of observations=60, Significant levels at * p < 0.1;

** p < 0.05; ***p<0.01)

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Further insights based on interviews

While the relationships could not be proven definitively, the interviews still provided interesting

insights for managers. This included them recommending safeguarding measures based on the

type of information shared within the network regardless of the presence or absence of

competitors. Adding to the interesting correlations, most managers did not consider security

measures as an important part of projects with lower technological maturity. Moreover, project

managers confirmed that projects in sensitive industries required the most security measures. The

security measures centred around the sensitivity of the project rather than the type of sensitive

data such as personal data as can be seen in Appendix E. Furthermore, many participants have

been adopting blockchain technology to test and integrate it into their organisations without any

overarching need. Finally, clients without an understanding of the technology were most likely to

stop their projects before they matured further. More importantly, many interviewees for larger

projects insisted that the blockchain projects themselves have no competitive behaviours, further

supporting hypothesis 3 on the strength of network embeddedness. However, the pairwise

correlation showed a positive correlation between the presence of competition and security

measures. Therefore, these could be interesting avenues for future research, as projects may try

to find a tradeoff between the competitiveness they see in the market and how socially embedded

the firm is.

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Discussion and conclusion

This paper takes a step towards developing a solution for the dilemma between security and

transparency in blockchain networks. This paper takes a step in the direction of assessing both

older and newer governance theories against the changes that have come about with the

digitisation of connections and projects. This paper proposes to further look into Altman et.al’s

(2021) concept of the translucent hand with the idea of blockchain governance falling between

the self governed market and the directly governed firm up to an extent.

While the hypotheses cannot be confirmed at this stage, further investigation would be

appropriate especially for the variables of competition presence and network embeddedness.

Further investigations on this topic could perhaps assess the interaction between the competitive

intensity of the market and the social embeddedness of the lead organisation. While this paper

attempts to combine older network theories into blockchain technology many future avenues for

research still lie in this field as the concepts of new forms of open governance in the digital age

have not been researched thoroughly. The idea of gaining value in blockchain projects for

managers without data misuse will require further investigation.

Linking back to the discussion proposed by Contractor (2019), that there may be a small benefit

of knowledge sharing in highly networked industries, it seems that the projects with higher

number of participants were correlated to more security measures and competition, variables of

absorptive capacity and embeddedness. Moreover, the presence of competition indicates more

security measures. Therefore, the possibility of high competition environments supporting

possibly high absorptive capacities in, or higher competition in more socially embedded

environments possibly leading to higher security measures would be worth investigating.

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The different layers of governance and different security measures while facing social

embeddedness and competition as seen in the results section could possibly challenge the

concept of clearly distinguishing between blockchain governance, contractual governance and

relational governance as seen by the paper of lumineau et.al (2020). While they suggest that

blockchain governance can severely alter the use of contractual governance and relational

governance, this paper still expects the combined use of them as layers of governance. Referring

to the translucent hand, I further suggest that transparency as a part of relational governance and

the visible hand as a part of contractual governance must be investigated. This especially takes

into mind projects where participants join a pre-existing blockchain system without making their

own additions to the blockchain code proposing a more fluid rather than discrete balance of

governance transparency and safeguarding.

Looking back at network theory and the patterns of interactions and exchange, the correlations

also indicated higher exchanges happening at the most technologically mature project stages with

corresponding correlations to competition presence and security measures. Again, this topic

would have to be further investigated to confirm the proposed hypotheses and provide rationale

for the proposed correlations.

Finally, this study makes many propositions that may be of interest to both researchers and

managers considering the many possibilities of organisational activities that can take place

through blockchain technology. The topics of security measures in relation to network

embeddedness and competitive intensity show promise for the purpose of future research which

is further built upon in the next section.

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Research limitations and future research

Firstly, the research was supported by data from 60 interviews, however, more data would be

required for the provision of more robust results and to explain the variability in the data .

Secondly, I am aware that any future research in this field will require a sample that requires

more generalisability as the projects were concentrated in Europe and the US as seen in table 1.

Unfortunately, further information on the particular projects cannot be provided due to

confidentiality related reasons. Finally, while this research tries to take governance theory into

account to explain deviations in safeguarding measures, other theories should also be looked into

such as transaction cost economics . Lastly, some projects in the dataset were only proof of

concepts and some occurred around the personal network of one company. While the nature of

such projects is new to many companies to put into practice, data on projects which have reached

complete technological maturity with more variation in the number of blockchain participants

may provide more insight into this topic.

Company specifications cannot be shared for confidentiality purposes, but the majority of the

companies were medium-large businesses as indicated by their asset distributions. Relationships

in smaller blockchain networks have not been investigated yet.

This paper suggests primarily quantitative research, it is recommended that the number of

interviewees should be increased and a qualitative approach could be further investigated to

understand and possibly explain the observed correlations further.

While the differences in technological majority were controlled, the progression of blockchain

projects over the different phases and changes in safeguarding measures as the projects grew

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would be interesting to investigate. As many clients choose to have blockchains for the networks

of singular companies, the information safeguarding, and sharing would be intriguing to

research. The concepts of competition and social embeddedness under the theory of the

translucent hand and where blockchain governance falls within managed ecosystems should be

further investigated (Altman et. al, 2021). Furthermore, the paper by Altman et.al (2021) also

emphasizes the lack of research in the field of external loci of control and governance, also

providing reason to further investigate where the governance of such blockchain or

technologically related projects fall, especially if the scope of organisations can range from a

single organisation to large networks of multiple organisations. Finally, the infusion of social

interaction and blockchain technology could be investigated in terms of how they will change

corporate boundaries in the future (Lumineau et.al, 2020; Shermin, 2017).

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Appendices

Appendix A

IBM blockchain survey: relevant survey questions

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Appendix B

Level of technological maturity of projects

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Appendix C

Type of information shared

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Appendix D

Type of project use cases

Appendix E

Security measures used

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Appendix F

Governance structures: control and activity dimensions Altman et.al (2021)

Figure 1.1 Governance structures: control and activity dimensions as seen in the paper by Altman

et.al (2021)