safety management system performance report
TRANSCRIPT
Trim: FSYD2020/319372
Sydney Trains Electricity Distribution Network
Safety Management System Performance Report 2019 - 2020
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Version control
Version Date Comment
1.0 16 October 2020 First issue
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Contents 1. Annual Performance Report 1
1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. Context 1 1.3. High-voltage distribution network scope 1 1.4. Data source 1
2. Summary of Performance Statistics — 2020 1
Table A.1 - Major Incidents 3 Table A.2 — Safety Incidents 4 Table A.3 - Network asset failures 4 Table A.4 - Vegetation contact with conductors 5 Table A.5 - Unintended contact, unauthorised access and electric shocks 5 Table A.6 & A.7 — Reliability and Quality of Supply 7 Table A.8 - Network-initiated property damage events 7 Table A.9 - Amendments and improvements to Formal Safety Assessments
(FSA) or Associated Risk Treatments 8 Table A.10 - Design, construction and commissioning 8 Table A.11 - Asset Inspections 8 Table A.12 — Inspections (vegetation) aerial or ground based 9 Table A.13 — Public electrical safety activities 9 Table A.14 — Internal audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS 9 Table A.15 — External audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS 10
3. Notes 11
3.1. Glossary 11 3.2. Referenced Documents 11
Appendix A — Endorsement 12
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
1. Annual Performance Report 1.1. Introduction This report presents the performance achieved by Sydney Trains' Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS) for the calendar year ending 30th September, 2020. This report is produced in accordance with the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 and is based on the template provided by the regulator (IPART) in Appendix A of their Electricity Networks Reporting Manual, September 2020.
1.2. Context Sydney Trains is the operator and maintainer of the electric passenger heavy-rail network throughout the greater metropolitan Sydney region as shown on Sydney Trains website at https://www.transport.nsw.qov.au/svdneytrains.
As an essential part of this enterprise, Sydney Trains operates a high-voltage electricity distribution network which provides reliable power to the railway assets including traction for the rolling stock, signalling and other infrastructure necessary for the safe operation of the railway.
In this context the "customer" is the railway network operation - Sydney Trains does not supply electricity to retail customers outside the rail corridor.
1.3. High-voltage distribution network scope The high-voltage distribution network comprises of the electricity assets between "bulk supply points" (where electricity is received from the major network providers) and the equipment supplying traction power (1500VDC) and low-voltage.
Note: This report excludes incidents and statistics for assets that do not form part of the high-voltage distribution network, such as:
• 1500VDC traction assets,
• Rolling stock and all non-rail infrastructure, signalling, voice/data communications systems and facilities.
1.4. Data source The performance statistics are extracted from Sydney Trains Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) system for the year ending 30th June 2020. Sydney Trains adopted EAM effective 1 July 2017 and consequently some legacy data is no longer available prior to that date. EAM is a single system developed to satisfy the needs of the whole railway enterprise and support long-term trend analysis; hence there are limitations on the data available for this report and in some tables the categorisations used do not entirely match those in the !PART manual.
2. Summary of Performance Statistics 2020 Incident statistics are reported in four groups as required by the !PART Reporting Manual, as follows:
Tier 1 and Tier 2 performance measures, which are lagging indicators, align with the network operator's incident reporting requirements and the objectives of the ESSNM Regulation. They are relevant to all network operators and reflect the outcomes achieved from the actions taken to manage risks associated with the regulatory objectives.
Tier 3 and Tier 4 performance measures, which are leading indicators, are also aligned with incident reporting requirements (where applicable) and are intended to monitor the risk controls that each network operator has put in place as articulated through its SMS Formal Safety Assessments. Tier 4 measures are leading indicators that monitor operational
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
activities associated with maintaining the control environment. Tier 3 measures are leading indicators that signal the potential for a Tier 1 or 2 incident to occur.
Major incident
(eg. asset failures with major
consequences (eg, bush fire))
Minor incident (eg, asset failures with minor consequences
(eg, fee starts))
Significant i Tier 1 reportable incident
Tier 2 Reportable consequence realised
4. Near miss
(eg asset failures without consequence)
Tier 3 Barrier failure
Safety Management System non-compliances (eg, controls not
implemented Of delivered)
Tier 4 Process failure
Tier Refer Summary of Performance Statistics —2020
1 Major incidents with consequences >$500k
Table A.1 1 major incident — poles destroyed by external bushfire near Mt Victoria- Blackheath (Gospers Mountain fire) December 2019-January 2020.
2 Minor incident - reportable consequence realised
Table A.2 None
3 Barrier failure — asset failures without consequence and control failure near misses
Tables A.3 — A.6
4 Process failure — controls not implemented or delivered
Tables A.9-A.15
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Commentary Discipline Meet
BLUE MOUNTAINS BUSHARE RECOVERY PROGRAM 12/02/2020 Number of Repaired /
Inspected Tested Damaged Assets Replaced Outstanding Cfsmaged
6 0 1
1 1
Corms Cable Sections • Rbre 12 12 12
2 1 1
75 75 0
Traffic Hut 1 1 0 1
Sleepers (Up and Down 82,000 82,000 NA SO SO 0 Main)
Turnouts 28 28 20 1 1 Poles 716 716 120
541 461
HVConductors (in) 256,300 256,300 N/A 37,000
OHW DC Conductors (m) 54,000 54,000 N/A 0 1500V
Section Hut 4 4 1 3 3 Substation 2 2 0 1 1 Distribution Locations 40 40 35 40 35 Trees 1000 1000 N/A
1 1 NewnesSubstation
The following table summarises the extent of the damage to railway assets as assessed at 12th February 2020. The rail corridor was closed and rail replacement bus services were implemented on 21 December between Lithgow and Mount Victoria, with rail services resuming on Tuesday 21 January.
Embankments /cuttings 35 35
100 Not to be replaced (higZai)
0
Tested Uthgow and Newnes Junction
10 A pole was recently identified with bums to the heed, this Is being assessed.
O Components were repaired or replaced associated with conductor
75 Minor damage
SO 110% repairs completed
100 AfechanIcal damaee does not require testing
54 Number of trees inspected unknown and uncountable
27,000 0 14
Total 395,193 394,834 837
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Signalling
Track
Track
Electrical
Elechical
Electrical
Electrical
Electrical
Electrical
Vegetation
Geotech Heritage
Cornms 25 2 2 25 25
Comma
Comms Comma
Comms
6
310 7
7
3
170 7
7
3
170 7
7
Comms 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 New number is 6 • additional required to get coverage In Zig Zag
33
10
0
11
30
a 11
4
54
158
8
5
56
30
6
23
130
205
45
32
40
130
205
53
53
44
184
363
53
53
Signalling
Signalling
Signalling
Signalling
Signalling
8 Power pending born 11ilv
SO 50,000M to be replaced R5 from Risk Registw
17 3,500m to be replaced
0 O Power pending from Edgecombe
14 Power Pending
DTR5
Cable Sections. Copper
Pits
Cornms Rooms
Zen worksite Repeater Systern
WS Ftadlo
0
3
140 0
Signals Track Circuit Ends
MulticoreCables
Point Ends
Locations 4 2 locations completely damaged Edgecombe remaining
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Table A.1 - Major Incidents
Tier 1 incidents are defined as a 'Major Incident' in accordance with the Electricity networks reporting manual — Incident reporting (Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting).
ESSNM Objective
Description of each major incident reported
Safety of members of the public None
Safety of persons working on the network None
Protection of property Third-party property None
Network property A One - During December, the Gospers Mountain Thegafire' caused extensive damage to a 25km stretch of the Blue Mountains rail line, particularly to power, communications and signalling infrastructure.
No external property or lives affected.
Safety risks arising from loss of electricity supply B None
Notes:
A. For the purpose of this report, a "major incident" involves losses exceeding $500,000 in relation to damage caused to electricity works as defined in the IPART Reporting Manual.
B. As defined for major reliability incidents in IPART's Reporting Manual incident reporting requirements
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Table A.2 — Safety Incidents
Tier 2 incidents are defined as an 'Incident' in accordance with the IPART Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting.
ESSNM Objective
Description of each major incident reported
Safety of members of the public 0 None
Safety of persons working on the network 0 None
Protection of third party property 0 None
Safety risks arising from loss of electricity supply 0 None
Table A.3 - Network asset failures
Performance Measure Population
5-year average annual
functional failuresA,F
Annual functional failures for reporting period
UnassistedA Assisted'
No fire
Fire N o
fire
Fire
Contained Escaped Contained Escaped
Towers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poles (including street lighting columns/poles & stay poles) 12477 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
Pole-top structures N/A 25 1 2 0 2 0 0
Conductor - HV OH (including sub-transmission) A, B, C 921km 3 4 1 0 2 0 0
Conductor- HV UG (including sub-transmission) A ' C 403km 3 o 0 0 3 0 0
Conductor - LV OH" N/A 10 1 0 0 0 0 0
Conductor - LV UGA, c N/A 3 0 0 0 1 0 0
Power transformers° 286 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distribution transformers 284 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reactive plantE 89 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switchgear - distribution (Overhead) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switchgear - distribution (Ground based) 1234 16 2 1 0 7 0 0
Protection relays or systems 2698 8 0 0 0 6 0 0
Substation SCADA system 260 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protection Batteries 1170 4 0 0 0 2 0 0
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Detail Event count
2016
Event count - Current reporting
period
Event count Event count Event count 2019 2018 2017
/A
/A
/A
/A
/A
/A
/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Electric shock and arc flash incidents
Public 0 0 4 I
[ I
)
Public worker 0 0 0
Network Employee / contractor 3 4 4
Accredited Service Provider 0 0 0 I
Livestock or domestic pet 0 0 1 I
Contact with energised overhead equipment
Public road vehicle 2 2 1 I
Plant & equipment 3 2 3 I
Agricultural or other 1 0 0
Network vehicle 0 0 0 I
Contact with energised underground equipment
/A N/A
/A N/A
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Notes:
A. Refer Glossary for definitions and acronyms.
B. Transmission and sub-transmission voltages are generally 33kV AC nominal and above. Transmission conductors form part of a transmission network. Sub-transmission conductors form part of a distribution network.
C. Overhead service and underground service as defined in the NSW Service and Installation Rules.
D. Power Transformers are transformers where the secondary/output voltage is 5kV nominal or above.
E. Reactive plants are reactors and capacitors.
F. Average based on actuals for the past 5 years.
In 2019-2020 the notable asset failures include:
• 2 incidents of live conductors failing and falling on the ground, with no adverse consequence, and
• 2 failures of pole-top equipment causing fire ignitions, resulting in minor damage to the pole.
• 2 substation circuit breaker failures.
Table A.4 - Vegetation contact with conductors Event count -
Performance measure Current reporting period
Event count 2019
, Event count Event count Event count
2018 2017 2016
Fire starts - grown in 0 0 iii. N/A N/A
Fire start - fall in and blow in 0 0 0 !.. N/A N/A
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
Interruption - grow in 1 8 7
Interruption - Fall in and blow in 1 2 4
Table A.5 - Unintended contact, unauthorised access and electric shocks
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2017 2016 2019 2018
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A N/A
Plant & equipment 2
Person with hand tool 3
Unauthorised access
Distribution Substations 4 10 8
Towers/poles 2 4 0
Other (eg communications equipment)
0 0 0
Safe Approach Distance
Structure/materials infringing SAD / EasementA
3 2 3
Network employee / contractor 4 3 3
Public 0 0 0
Public worker 0 2 0
TOTAL 23 32 28
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
Event count Current reporting
period
Event count Event count Event count Event count Detail
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Notes:
A. Includes structures, materials, containers constructed or placed infringing the safe approach distance or
easement as described in IS5C20.
Summary
In 2019-2020 the near-miss incidents include:
• 6 incidents of unauthorised access to poles and substations involving copper theft;
• 3 incidents involving structures or materials erected or placed under aerial lines or in easements contrary to ISSC20;
• 2 incidents of public vehicles striking poles
• 2 Configuration management errors
• 2 Operator errors (wrong asset/wrong action)
• 1 Structure erected/placed under aerial lines
• 1 Contractor exposing live buried cables
• 1 Design defect - inadequate safe clearance for maintainers
• 1 LV cable struck by excavator
• 1 LV cable cut by worker
• 1 Worker receiving an electric shock from a lighting strike
• 1 Worker infringed SAD
• 1 Working without Electrical Permit
• 1 Electrical Permit with persons not signed on, and
• 1 Worker minor injury (non-electrical).
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Detail Event count -
Current reporting period
Event count 2019 Event count Event count Event count
2018 2017 2016
Third party property (assets including vehicles, buildings, crops, livestock)
0
Network property (including non-electrical assets, vehicles, buildings)
Damage (e.g. Fire, physical impact or 0 electrical)
0 0 N/A N/A
Damage (e.g. Fire, physical impact or electrical)
0 0 N/A N/A
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Structure/materials infringing SAD / Easement
In recent years Sydney Trains has noted a number of incidents involving:
• Materials and structures located under aerial lines, on easements or against substation perimeter fences;
• Changes made to the terrain under aerial lines, compromising the safe approach distance;
• Changes of use of pre-existing structures (predating ISSC20) which would cause large numbers of people to congregate in a location at risk in the event of a conductor failure.
Some of these have triggered the relocation of the aerial line, or the constructor/owner has been directed to remove the structure or materials, at significant cost. Sydney Trains requires all new or modified structures near aerial lines to comply with the constraints defined in ISSC20.
Table A.6 & Al — Reliability and Quality of Supply Sydney Trains does not collect data in respect of quality of supply for the high-voltage distribution network as the system is inherently dedicated to supplying the railway (i.e. signalling and rolling stock) and the railway has its own standards for those which differ from consumer electricity standards.
Network reliability is measured in the form of "delay-minutes" to rolling stock for the 1500VDC supply to rolling stock; these events pose a business risk, not a safety risk. Short disruptions in the 1500VDC supplies to signalling and rolling stock are frequent events (daily) and the network includes redundancy to accommodate these with no operational impact.
Table A.8 - Network-initiated property damage events
Note: Table A.8 excludes Sydney Trains network assets damaged by external bushfire; that data is provided at Table A.1.
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Table A.9 - Amendments and improvements to Formal Safety Assessments (FSA) or Associated Risk Treatments
FSA Amendment / Improvements
Safety risks arising from Loss of Supply
Revised to include external references concerning the estimated likelihood of loss of supply, and systemic causes & controls
Safety risks to Workers and Public Revised to include systemic causes & controls
Safety risks arising from Bushfire Rewritten, external audit conducted in October 2020.
Table A.10 - Design, construction and commissioning
Performance Measure
Event count - Current
reporting period Event count 2019
Event count Event count Event count 2018 2017 2016
Project closeout reports completed
Project closeout reports audited
78 47 3 N/A N/A
0 1 2 N/A N/A
The design and implementation of Sydney Trains electrical projects may be undertaken internally or outsourced; that design is based on factors such as resourcing, scheduling constraints and the backlog of work assigned to external contractors; it is not "contestable" in the sense used by IPART.
Only "Type Approved" equipment may be used for the design, construction and maintenance of Sydney Trains assets and standard designs are used for most installations; this simplifies the safety assurance task considerably. Deviations are treated as new designs, including a safety hazard assessment in each case.
The Electricity Distribution Unit inspects all electrical installations prior to energisation.
Table A.11 - Asset Inspections
Asset tasks - by bushfire risk priority Region
10 (worst) z° 3-4'
North - Central Coast
Open 0 0 62
Outstanding 0 0 0
Blue Mountains
Open 0 0 102
Outstanding 0 0 21
South & Illawarra
Open 0 0 9
Outstanding 0 0 0
Metropolitan
Open 0 0 0
Outstanding 0 0 0
Defects - Total 0 0 ' 194
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Notes:
a Category 1 Defects: Refers to defects that are to be completed between 1-7 days. b Category 2 Defects: Refers to defects that are to be completed between 8-31 days.
Category 3+4 Defects: Refers to defects that are to be completed after 31 days or more.
As at 30 September there are no open or outstanding asset maintenance tasks in priority 1 or 2 locations, ie they are 100% complete. All tasks are planned for completion by 15 December.
Table A.12 — Inspections (vegetation) aerial or ground based
Performance measure Population Target (Feeders) (poles)
Achieved Outstanding Comments
Inspections—North Region 31 Feeders 2179 2179 0
Inspections — Blue Mountains _ 22 Feeders 2052 2052 0
Inspections — South & Illawarra 13 Feeders 753 753 0
Inspections - Metropolitan 0 Feeders 0 0 0
Inspections - Total 129 Feeders 4984 4984 0
Sydney Trains has completed its inspection program as at 30th September, with zero inspections outstanding.
Table A.13 — Public electrical safety activities Network operator public
safety programs! campaigns Details
Public Safety SP D 79038 V1.0 Sydney Trains Electricity Distribution Network Public Safety Awareness Plan prepared.
Look-Up & Live Sydney Trains is aware of the Look-up & Live website and is reviewing arrangements to contribute to this initiative
Table A.14 — Internal audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS
Audit scope Identified nonconformances Actions
1 internal audit in 2019-2020 on AEO Authroisation and Accreditation Requirements
Lack of full awareness of all statutory requirements
Briefings held and requirements published on RAILSAFE
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Audit scope Identified nonconformances
Actions
Creation of a suite of FSAs to demonstrate that risks associated with all primary objectives are reduced to ALARP, where at the time of the 2018 audit a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) had only been developed for bushfire risks.
Development of the Electrical Risk Register (ERR) to provide explicit and complete demonstration of the primary objectives of ESSNM.
Improved documentation of links between interfacing systems, processes and procedures to the ENSMS.
FSAs published internally (refer table A.9):
• Safety risks arising from Loss of Supply
• Safety risks to Workers and Public
• Safety risks arising from Bushfire
Electrical Risk Register converted to corporate Bow-Tie format
Single integrated dataset supports all FSA's.
Electrical Risk Register continues to evolve as causes, controls and evidence of implementation are identified.
September 2019:
ENSMS contents, processes and supporting procedures were appropriate and adequate to fulfil the requirements of the ESSNM, and the obligations sub-imposed by AS 5577
Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Table A.15 — External audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS
(Remainder of page left blank)
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
3. Notes 3.1. Glossary The following abbreviations, acronyms and definitions are used in this report.
AS Australian Standard
assisted failure a functional failure of a piece of equipment where the equipment was subject to an external force or energy source against which the standards for design and maintenance do not attempt to control (see also unassisted)
EAM Enterprise Asset Management (system), a whole-of-business data system adopted by Sydney Trains
ENSMS Electricity Network Safety Management System ESSNM Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014
FSA Formal Safety Assessment
HV high voltage, nominal voltage lkV AC and above IPART Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW, a state government
authority
LV low voltage, nominal voltage below lkV AC, nominal N/A Not Available / Not Applicable
OH overhead overhead as defined in the NSW Service and Installation Rules service
power transformers where the secondary/output voltage is 5kV nominal or above transformers
reactive plants Includes reactors and capacitors
SAD Safe Approach Distance
TfNSW Transport for New South Wales, a state government authority UG underground unassisted a functional failure of a piece of equipment where the cause of the failure is failure neither an assisted failure nor a maintenance-induced failure. underground as defined in the NSW Service and Installation Rules service
WHS Workplace Health & Safety
3.2. Referenced Documents
Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014
Electrical Networks Reporting Manual, IPART, August 2018
AS5577-2013 Electricity network safety management systems
ISSC20 Guideline for the Management of Activities within Electricity Easements and Close to Electricity Infrastructure
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Sydney Trains Electricity Network ENSMS Performance Report 2019-2020
Appendix A - Endorsement
Annual ENSMS Performance Report for 2019-2020
Submitted by Sydney Trains ABN 38 284 779 682
To: The Chief Executive Officer Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal PO Box K35 Haymarket Post Shop NSW 1240
Sydney Trains reports as follows:
1. This report documents the performance of Sydney Trains Electricity Network Safety Management System during the year 2019-2020 with all obligations to which Sydney Trains is subject to under the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014.
2. This report has been prepared by Sydney Trains with all due care and skill in full knowledge of conditions to which it is subject and in compliance with IPART's Electricity Network Reporting Manual.
3. This report provides information on all obligations with which Sydney Trains did not fully comply during the financial year 2019-2020.
4. This compliance report is approved by the Chief Executive:
Name. Suzanne Holden
Designation: Chief Executive
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