sail training and tall ships - loss of concordia · 2012. 2. 1. · to seven knots. i reviewed the...
TRANSCRIPT
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Loss of Concordia
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REPORT ON THE CAPSIZING AND LOSS
OF THE
S.V. CONCORDIA
FEBRUARY 17, 2010
Prepared by Capt. Bill Curry
from accounts by the ship’s crew, faculty and students.
On February 8th, 2010, the SV CONCORDIA departed Recife, Brazil on a 2,100 mile voyage leg toward Montevideo, Uruguay. This was the first leg of the 2010 Semester II voyage which would take the ship from Brazil to Nova Scotia, Canada via Uruguay, South Africa, Namibia, St. Helena, Ascension Island, Fernando de Noronha, Trinidad and Bermuda. Aboard were sixtyfour persons: eight professional crew, eight faculty members of Class Afloat, thirtytwo high school and gap year students who had been aboard since September, 2009, and sixteen newly arrived Semester II students. The students had undergone five days of predeparture training while alongside at Recife.
12:00, Tuesday, 16/02
Around noon of the 16th, in approximate position Lat. 24° 45’ S x Long. 039° 32’ W, I
acquired weather warnings issued by the Brazilian Met Service forecasting near gale and
gale force winds in the ocean areas toward which the ship was sailing. Seas of up to 4.5
meters were also forecast. The situational analysis located a low pressure area
approximately 730 NM to the south of the ship’s position with a cold front extending from
the low to the coast (Figure 3, p 37.) The low was moving NE at about 10 knots. I
anticipated that the low would pass to the east of the ship’s position and that when the front
passed the wind would shift toward the southeast relatively quickly and would be
accompanied with heavy rain showers and squally conditions.
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I notified the students and faculty of the heavier weather expected to impact the vessel beginning on Thursday morning. The weather warnings were printed out, applicable sections underlined in red ink and the bulletins were posted in the chartroom. The cook was advised that she might want to prepare Thursday’s meals ahead of time.
The mates and I discussed weather forecasts and warnings routinely during watch changes on the bridge.
The Day of the Knockdown
00:00, Wednesday, 17/02
At midnight on the morning of the 17th the CONCORDIA was in position 26° 10.9’ S by 039°
43.2’ W. The wind was from the NNE varying between 18 and 22 knots. The seas were
from the north at 2.5 meters. The course was 220 PGC. CONCORDIA had averaged 6.6
knots over the past 24 hours. Barometric pressure was 1018, having fallen 2 hpa in the
preceding 24 hours.
The ship was on a broad reach with the apparent wind about 2 points on the starboard
quarter. The vessel was under inner jib, course, lower topsail, upper topsail, t’gallant,
t’gallant staysail, gaff mainsail and mizzen. I finished my 2000 to 2400 watch and turned
the bridge over to the 2nd mate, who would stand until 0400.
04:00
At approximately 03:55 prior to the change of the watch, the 2nd mate called me as per the
night orders to notify him that the wind speed had increased to 23 to 25 knots. I decided to
douse the mizzen to reduce sail area and weather helm.
The deck was illuminated using the spreader and deck working lights, and the mizzen was
doused and furled by around 0430. The off‐going student watch group was mustered and
sent below and the bridge watch was handed over to the 1st mate, who was assigned to the
0400 to 0800 watch. The 2nd mate was relieved and went below. I discussed my night
orders with the 1st mate before also leaving the bridge.
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07:30
At 0730 I joined the students in the mess for breakfast and then relieved the 1st mate on the
bridge at 0800. The wind was 15 to 20 knots and the vessel was moving easily making six
to seven knots.
I reviewed the day’s weather forecast for Met Area V, the northern sections of Bravo and
South Oceanic Zones, received as EGC messages via Inmarsat‐C. The forecast, due to take
effect beginning 0600 UTC Feb. 18th, was for the wind to back from north to the northwest
with wind forces of Beaufort 5 and 6, (17 to 27 knots) then to continue to back into the
southwest and to eventually shift toward the southeast with wind forces increasing to 7 to 8
(28 to 40 knots.)
09:00
At 09:02, I sent the ship’s Daily Report to the office in Lunenburg via Sat‐C. The Daily
Report was a snap‐shot of the conditions (weather, sea, position, course, speed, etc.)
experienced the previous midnight. This report was made every morning around 0900
regardless of other communications that might follow throughout the day.
During the early morning hours, the wind had continued to slowly back and by 0900 was N
x W (north by west), 16‐18 knots with 1.5 to 2 meter seas also from the north. The
barometer was steady. The sky was mostly clear with scattered mid‐level cumulous.
During the forenoon watch, I observed a longer southerly swell begin to integrate with local
sea conditions. This indicated to me that the southerly winds expected south of the front
had been in effect in that area for some time.
At this time the CONCORDIA was broad‐reaching, still making an average of approximately
6.5 knots. The sail plan was comprised of the inner jib, course, lower topsail, upper topsail,
t’gallant, t’gallant staysail and full main. As a routine I would shorten sail around dusk and
generally make sail again in the morning if conditions warranted. On previous mornings
during the 0400‐0800 watch, the 1st mate had been following this plan and had been
adding the royal staysail, the royal and the outer jib (plus the full mizzen) soon after dawn
in order to maximize the ship’s progress during daylight hours.
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On the morning of the 17th however, I decided to spend the forenoon preparing the ship for
stronger winds and squalls, conditions forecasted to begin taking effect in approximately 18
hours. I asked the bosun to have his day watch (typically 8 to 12 students assigned for one
to two hour work periods) available to handle sail by 09:30.
09:30
Under my supervision, the bosun and the day watch doused and furled the t’gallant staysail,
set the main staysail below it, clewed up and furled the t’gallant, furled the royal, clewed up
and furled the course, set the forestaysail and tucked a deep reef in the mizzen and set it.
After dousing, furling, reefing and setting sail as described, the CONCORDIA was under
storm reefed mizzen, full mainsail, mainstaysail, forestaysail, inner jib, and upper and lower
square topsails. With this configuration, the ship was carrying approximately 446 square
meters of sail area, 43% of CONCORDIA’s full sail plan of 1,034 square meters. This sail plan
was chosen to reduce both the sail area and the height of the CONCORDIA’s center of effort
but leave her enough sail to make good steerage way. It also moved the center of effort
forward, relieving weather helm and balancing the vessel to run off easily.
The deep reefed mizzen and the full mainsail were then sheeted out to the maximum trim
angle possible, just shy of chaffing on the port standing backstays. The yards were braced
up one point (to a position one point (11.25 degrees) forward of square relative to the
weather side of the ship.)
Although they were not drawing well with the wind so far abaft the beam, the fore staysail
and the inner jib were set to balance the sail plan if the breeze hauled ahead closer to or
forward of the beam, as was expected as the wind backed ahead of the front.
In this reduced configuration, the vessel was under canvassed for the wind conditions at the
time. In wind conditions of 20 to 25 knots with the wind abaft the beam the CONCORDIA
had been proven to stand up well to full sail.
I planned to gradually sheet in and eventually steer full and bye as the wind backed toward
the SW. The CONCORDIA could make good speed with the true wind as far forward as on or
slightly forward of the beam (apparent wind about 2 points forward of the beam, i.e. 65 to
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70 degrees on the bow.) If the wind headed the ship, she would be allowed to fall to
leeward and the intended track would be adjusted accordingly. I planned to tack or wear
ship sometime prior to the passage of the front in order to be on the port tack as the wind
went into the SE. Since the ship was at that time about 300 NM off the coast, there would be
plenty of sea room to the west.
Based on the weather and sea conditions the ship was experiencing at noon and with
stronger winds not expected until the following morning, I placed no special restrictions on
the status of the ship’s weather deck closures during the afternoon watch. Hatches not in
use were closed and secured. The deckhouse doors and ventilation ducts were open. The
crew and students were free to come and go and use the portholes and weathertight doors
in the superstructures as was convenient and comfortable during the remaining daylight
hours.
12:00
The wind speed was 15 to 18 knots, direction N x W, the sea was 1.5 to 2.0 meters from the
north with a long low southerly swell, the temperature was about 30 degrees and the
barometer at 1016‐1018 hpa was trending slowly downward. The course was
approximately 220 PGC and CONCORDIA was now making between 5.0 to 5.5 knots over the
ground. The vessel was broad reaching and heeling to port at about 5 degrees. The horizon
was clear; the sky was mostly clear with scattered, moderately sized mid‐level cumulous
clouds.
The 2nd mate and I discussed the sail changes that had been made during the forenoon
watch and I went over my orders and the strategy for the afternoon. Specifically, the 2nd
mate was asked to: 1) if possible, keep the wind abaft the beam, 2) sheet in if the wind
backed and hauled ahead, but keep her full (not to pinch as this would lead to increased
pitching and discomfort for the students) 3) alter course to port of the intended track if
headed and 4) fall off and run before any squalls and return to course after the associated
wind shift had passed.
The 2nd mate asked which sails would be handed next and I told him that the current
reduced sail plan would be good up to 40 knots but that subsequent reductions might
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include reefing the main and dousing the upper topsail among other options but that,
because of the time it would take to reef the main, the immediate line of defence would be to
bear off in gusts.
13:00
After turning over the watch, I joined the students in the mess for the 1300 lunch seating
and soon after went below to rest.
The 2nd mate had two lookouts to assist him on the bridge; the vessel was being steered by
autopilot. (Typically, a student helmsman would also be assigned to the bridge, but the hand
steering station outside the pilothouse had been secured a few days earlier due to a
hydraulic oil leak at that station.)
13:45
At this time the bosun’s afternoon “day watch”, or group of students assigned to
maintenance and sail handling duties, mustered forward for day work. As the wind had
backed a point or two, the 2nd mate ordered the mainstaysail sheeted in moderately and
the yards braced up an additional point (to a position two points forward of the beam.)
14:00
The early afternoon is typically a rest period for many crewmembers and students not in
class. Besides myself, the1st mate, academic director, medical officer, 1st and 2nd engineers
and the cook were resting in their cabins. Some students and faculty were also resting in
their cabins or relaxing or doing home work in the accommodations.
Classes started in both the mess (forward deckhouse) and the classroom (after deckhouse)
at 1400. History class was meeting in the mess and biology class in the classroom. A small
class group was also meeting in the Seminar Room, a small study and work space on the
accommodations deck at the foot of the forward companionway.
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The Knockdown
14:05
Soon after 14:00 the 2nd mate later reported that he noticed a change in the weather
conditions in the ship’s vicinity. Cloud cover was increasing. The wind had been mostly
steady between 15 to 18 knots but was starting to increase slowly. The barometer had
remained steady over the first two hours of the watch. A number of small or moderately
sized squalls were forming. No whitecaps were visible beneath or ahead of any of the
squalls.
The 2nd mate consulted the radar for additional information about the squalls. A number
of cells were noted within six miles of the vessel, in the form of tightly compacted circles
of rain, each of about 1 to 1.5 nautical miles in diameter. One or two of the squalls, just
abaft the starboard beam, appeared to moving on trajectories that would impact the vessel
(see Windstorm Review, p. 33.)
14:15
The mate sent the bridge lookouts to retrieve their wet weather jackets. He also asked the
bosun to go below and stow the mate’s camera which he had left on his bunk. The
lookouts were asked to check that all the windows were closed against the rain. The 1st
and 2nd mates shared a cabin and when the bosun entered the cabin to stow the 2nd’s
camera, the 1st mate asked if there was a squall and was told there was a small one to
weather. Around this time the 2nd mate went on the public address system to warn
students with laundry hanging to dry on the mizzen deck that rain was expected.
This public announcement on the speaker in my cabin woke me while resting on my
bunk. The vessel now heeled before the oncoming squall to an angle of 10 or 15 degrees
to port and accelerated. The 2nd mate observed that the wind built steadily from 16 knots
to 20 knots just ahead of the rain.
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14:20
As the rain began the lookouts were back on their posts suitably attired and the 2nd mate
closed the starboard side (windward) bridge door as he moved into the pilothouse to
monitor the anemometer and control the ship from the interior helm station (as
mentioned, the ship was being steered by autopilot.) At this point in time, the vessel
heeled to approximately 25 to 30 degrees, (just below her deck edge immersion angle)
and steadied up, remaining at this angle for 15 or 20 seconds.
I sensed that the angle of heel had approached deck edge immersion and got up from my
bunk and gathered my shoes and watch in preparation for going on deck.
14:21 (Note that the times included here are estimated; the times of the following
events were not reliably recorded during the emergency. Many actions were taken
simultaneously.)
Due to the increased heeling and the fact the apparent wind angle was hauling ahead the
2nd mate initiated a turn to port by making a rapid series of one degree course changes on
the autopilot. Determining that the rate of turn was too slow, he then dialed in a course
change of over 20 degrees to port, and when the ship still did not react quickly enough,
disengaged the autopilot, engaged hand steering and toggled the rudder to over 35
degrees to port. At about the same time the port wing lookout retreated into the
pilothouse ahead of the rising water and called out for help.. The vessel had submerged
her port rail and continued to increase her angle of heel. The 2nd mate grabbed the
lookout by the harness and kept her from falling through the leeward door into the sea. At
this time the anemometer showed an apparent wind angle of 150 degrees from the
starboard bow and a wind speed climbing through 30 knots. The mate pushed the call
button to my cabin and called out “Captain!”
14:22 Capsize
When I felt the vessel start her rapid and secondary heel to port I abandoned my shoes
and deck gear and was attempting to exit my cabin when I heard the 2nd mate’s call on
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my cabin speaker. Seconds later and before either I or the 1st mate could get out of our
cabins the vessel was knocked down to an angle of over 90 degrees and lay on her side
without any apparent motion of recovery.
14:22:10
Immediately after the capsize the ship’s diesel powered generator shut down and the
generator and emergency power alarms sounded. Emergency lighting in the
accommodations hallways went on. Crew and students began evacuating their cabins and
the accommodations deck. Because the vessel was inclined to almost 100 degrees, the
leeward bulkheads had become the floor and people had to evacuate by crawling over the
doorways of the port side cabins.
14:22:20
I went immediately to the top of the companionway and entered the reception room located
just abaft the pilothouse. There I saw the 2nd mate still in the pilothouse. I asked what had
happened and the 2nd mate replied that the auto helm steering had been overwhelmed by
the squall. I first ordered the 2nd mate to close the pilothouse portside watertight door.
The 2nd mate answered that the door was underwater and he could not get to it. I then
ordered the 2nd to send a distress call via the Sat‐C transceivers, but several seconds later
the 2nd mate reported that the chart room/radio room was already flooded. (The
pilothouse was raised about 1.2 meters above the main deck and was the highest deck
structure aboard.)
The chartroom, located on the port side of the bridge just abaft the pilothouse, housed the
CONCORDIA’s Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) mandated
communications suite. A secondary locker, just inside the pilothouse’s portside watertight
door, was used to charge and stow the ship’s Iridium satellite phone and the ship’s
handheld Very High Frequency radiotelephones (VHFs.) These spaces flooded completely
within seconds of the vessel capsizing. Two Digital Select Call (DSC) VHFs were also located
on the portside of the bridge, one in the chartroom and one in the pilothouse and these
were also immediately submerged. A single bridge‐to‐bridge VHF was located to starboard.
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14:22:30
I then ordered the 2nd mate to collect the Search and Rescue Transponders (SARTs) from
their brackets inside the pilothouse and to prepare to abandon ship. The 2nd mate managed
to retrieve the starboard side SART and he then left the pilothouse for the deck.
14:22:00
As the 1st mate was exiting the accommodations below he encountered the medical officer
who had just escaped from his portside cabin. The medical officer had fallen and injured his
shoulder and ribs during the knockdown. The medical officer was unable to climb out the
inverted companionway so the 1st mate helped him by dropping on all fours and forming a
step. From this position the 1st mate was able to see all the way forward through the
accommodations which were still free of water. A number of students and faculty were
evacuating the accommodations forward via the forward companionway to the mess.
The 1st mate helped the medical officer up the after companionway to the reception room
and then boosted him through the watertight door, now overhead, and outside onto the
starboard side of the after (mizzen) deckhouse.
In the forward deckhouse, history class was underway when the vessel capsized. As the
room tilted, some students slid from their seats at the starboard tables and fell to leeward.
The bosun (who was mustering his day watch in the mess) and two or three students
managed to climb up the tables and companionway railings and open the starboard side
door, now overhead, which had been shut minutes before to keep out the rain. Students
pulled others of their classmates from the leeside tables and helped them make the vertical
climb to the starboard door. Kneeling outside the door, the bosun and those students first
to get out reached into the mess and pulled others up and out where they congregated on
the side of the deckhouse, sheltered from the wind and sea by the vertical deck.
The mess room and galley portside doors and portholes were open for ventilation and the
port side of the mess and galley flooded in seconds. Seawater was prevented from flooding
down the companionway to the accommodation deck below however, because the interior
companionway was offset to the starboard side of the ship’s center line. The history teacher
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was the last pulled out of his classroom and the group on deck then shouted down the
companionway to try to determine if anyone was still below.
Down below, the psychology class was meeting in the seminar room located near the
foremost companionway and on the port side of the vessel. This small class was comprised
of the teacher and two students. When the vessel initially heeled to the onset of the squall,
one of the students asked for and was granted permission to go on deck. When the vessel
was knocked down a few minutes later, a starboard side storage locker door flew open and
the seminar room was pelted with falling items. The teacher initially tried to close and dog
down the portlight cover as she knew that the portlight was now deeply submerged and
would flood if broken by falling debris. When her remaining student suggested that they
should leave the room immediately she abandoned the attempt and the two evacuated up
the horizontal companionway and were helped out of the mess room and onto the side of
the deckhouse.
Several students and faculty members were also evacuating from their cabins down below.
All faced similar challenges, as those in the port side cabins had to climb vertically up to
open their doors and escape to the accommodations hallway while those to starboard had
to descend vertically to the hallway. The leadership class teacher was one of the first to get
out of his cabin. Three other faculty members were having trouble either climbing down or
climbing up from their own cabins so he climbed into their respective doorways and helped
them escape. All went up the forward companionway to the mess and were then helped
outside by the students and faculty waiting at the door.
Students also helped each other climb out of their cabins and exit up the forward
companionway. The last student to exit climbed out of her cabin on her own and followed
the emergency exit arrows to the companionway and then up to the mess where she was
lifted out onto the deck.
There were several students on deck at the time of the knockdown. As the vessel came to
rest on her beam ends one student ended up standing on the main fife rail, one was on the
main starboard pinrail, one was perched on the starboard side ‘midships capstan, and one
had grabbed a line and was left dangling a few feet above the water. The bosun crawled out
onto the starboard topsides and moved into position to help the student on the starboard
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pinrail. He then dropped a line to the student on the mainmast fife rail and helped her climb
to the side of the forward deckhouse. Likewise, the student on the capstan was helped up to
the bulwarks. The student suspended from the vang began to slide so she let go and
dropped into the sea. The vessel was dead in the water at this time and she swam the few
strokes needed to reach the pilothouse. As she swam under the starboard side life rafts
(stowed in the waist just forward of the pilothouse,) she saw the cook preparing to cut the
rafts free from their cradles and called out for her to stop. The cook helped the student
climb up onto the side of the pilothouse.
In the after superstructure, students from the classroom were arriving in the reception
room. Seconds earlier as the vessel fell onto her beam ends the biology teacher had ordered
her students to evacuate the classroom and to make their way to the deck. Although the
classroom had a starboard side door opening onto the deck, they evacuated forward via the
reception room as it was easier to reach the (now overhead) watertight door from there.
This evacuation route was suggested by one of the students who had been aboard for
several months. The 1st mate (who had just arrived in the reception room) and I with the
help of a student boosted the last several students and crew up through this door. When
the reception area had been completely evacuated, I exited and made my first survey of the
scene on deck.
14:25
The vessel lay on her port side with the masts in the water having inclined to about 100
degrees from the vertical. There was no apparent righting effort. The trucks of the masts
were below the surface. The starboard sides of the yards and of the two square sails
protruded above the surface. The upper topsail was torn from head to foot. The main and
mizzen booms, which were sheeted out, were deeply submerged in the water, as were the
leeches of their sails. The deep reefed mizzen was torn from luff to leech in two or three
long rents. The headsails were not visible from the after house.
From the vantage point of the starboard side on the deckhouses, sheltered by the vertical
deck, there appeared to be little wind. The sounds of a normal squall were absent. It was
raining moderately hard. The sky was overcast and the sea was about one to two meters. At
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this time, the masts were pointed at some angle away from the wind and the overturned
hull shielded the deck area from the seas.
Students and crew who had evacuated from the deckhouses and below were congregating
on the side of the forward deckhouse (mess) and aft on the side of the after deckhouse
(pilothouse, reception area, classroom.) The starboard emergency locker had been opened
by two students who were pulling out the immersion suits and passing them up to others to
don. The 1st and 2nd engineers had already launched one of their assigned rafts, the
starboard mizzen‐deck 20‐man raft, and were in the process of inflating it.
I asked the mates if they could see the Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
(EPIRB.) The three of us looked for it but it was apparently still in its bracket on the
portside mizzen deck railing, now several feet under water and hidden by the folds of the
rent mizzen sail. The EPIRB was fitted with a hydrostatic release and would self‐release and
actuate as the vessel sank lower.
I considered downflooding to the hull to be the most important factor and since the vessel
was in an open condition at the time of the knockdown, I expected the vessel to flood and
sink within minutes. Getting people into intact rafts immediately was my priority. I issued
instructions intended to get emergency floatation gear deployed and the ship’s company
into the rafts as quickly as was possible.
CONCORDIA carried life raft capacity for 138 persons in eight rafts: six 20man rafts, one 10
man raft and one 8man raft. Four 20man rafts were stowed on the main deck, in the waist of
the vessel, two to either side. Two 20man rafts were stowed on the mizzen house deck, one to
either side. The 8 and 10man rafts were stowed on the stern deck. All rafts had undergone
their annual inspection and repacking in August, 2009 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
The ship carried 72 lifejackets for abandon ship (plus two for the rescue boat operators and
approximately 12 more for occupants of the shore excursion boats.) 32 were kept in a stowage
box on the forward deckhouse (the mess deck) and an additional 32 were stowed in a similar
box on the mizzen deck, midway between the two 20man rafts. Both boxes were fitted with
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hydrostatic release lids. The remainder of the abandon ship lifejackets were stowed in the
bridge and in the emergency locker below the bridge.
CONCORDIA had 75 immersion suits stowed in the emergency locker below the bridge. This
locker had hatches that opened on to the main deck to both port and starboard of the bridge.
The ship had two inflatable boats. The forward boat, stowed on chocks on the mess deck and
launched by means of a dedicated boom and electric winch falls, was the ship’s SOLAS
approved rescue boat with rated capacity of 6 persons. The after boat, stowed on davits over
the transom, was a nonrated backup and shore excursion boat with a capacity of 8 persons.
The vessel had eight life rings (buoys) positioned around the deck variously fitted with smoke
signals, lights and manoverboard poles.
I ordered the 1st and 2nd mates to go aft and launch as many rafts as possible and to have the
students and crew board the rafts as soon as they were ready. The mates moved to the
stern. The 1st mate began launching the remaining 8‐ and 10‐man rafts. The 2nd mate
donned an immersion suit and began supervising the boarding. I passed the command for
everyone to move aft to the mizzen deckhouse and students and crew were told to don
immersion suits or lifejackets and to prepare to board the life rafts. The bosun went
forward to direct those waiting on the forward deckhouse to move aft along the bulwarks to
the mizzen deckhouse where the rafts were being deployed. Several faculty members
forward positioned themselves to help students and each other climb from the side of the
forward deckhouse, up through the starboard railing and then along the bulwark. The cook
and students, standing on the side of the after deckhouse, helped people down off the
bulwarks onto the mizzen house side and then helped them don exposure suits.
The two portside 20‐man life rafts mounted in cradles just forward of the bridge were
underwater but not deep enough to activate the hydrostatic releases. The port side 20‐man
raft on the mizzen deck was also underwater but likewise, not deeply enough to self release.
These rafts were not accessed during the abandon ship procedure.
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14:30
The two starboard side 20‐man life rafts, also mounted in cradles just forward of the bridge
were being washed by the sea but were accessible. I climbed down to the rafts and
attempted to release the Stenhouse (quick release) clips securing the webbing holding the
rafts in their cradles but because of the weight of the rafts now hanging in their webbing, I
was unable to open the clips. I called out for a knife. The cook was standing just above the
rafts and she passed me her knife with which I cut the webbing. The rafts fell into the sea,
still in their canisters. They were prevented from floating free of the ship because they
were trapped on four sides by vessel structure: the deck (now vertical,) the aft side of the
forward deckhouse, the forward side of the pilothouse and finally by the metal catwalk that
ran from the pilothouse to the forward deckhouse. I inflated the rafts in an attempt to use
the extra buoyancy to get the rafts to float over the catwalk. I was joined by the bosun and
the two then tried to remove the catwalk to allow the rafts to float free. It became apparent
that the rafts would soon float over the catwalk on their own as the vessel settled so the two
moved forward to release the lifejackets.
14:33
The bosun asked about the forward rescue boat stowed in chocks on the mess deck and I
told him to cut it loose, as it might be important floatation if the rafts fouled or were
punctured. It was hanging in its gripes and fell free of obstructions but landed in the sea
upside down. The bosun and I tried briefly to right the boat but the boat was too heavy and
had to be abandoned. We then climbed to the forward lifejacket box on the mess deck and
the bosun released the now vertical lid. Most of the PFDs fell into the sea and were then
fished out and passed up to students and crew who had been sent by the 1st mate to help.
The PFDs were passed aft to the students and crew congregating on the side of the mizzen
deckhouse. During this procedure the engineers had already boarded a 20 man raft they
had launched from the mizzen deck and were protecting it from the superstructure. The 2nd
mate climbed out onto the davits and called to the academic director to send students down
the stern rail to him to be helped into the rafts. The 2nd mate had understood from my
orders that he was to start boarding the rafts as soon as they were available.
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The 1st mate had by now launched the 8‐ and 10‐man rafts and these were successfully
inflated right side up. All the rafts aft were in danger of being punctured by the stern davits
and the railing as the seas surged up and down the transom. The 1st and 2nd engineers were
attempting to position the 20‐man raft clear of danger from the ship’s structure. The 1st
mate returned to the pilothouse to retrieve additional emergency equipment. The radios
were submerged, but the mate secured the emergency medical bag and passed it out to
students waiting on the house side.
As more students and faculty gathered on the side of the mizzen deckhouse, watch groups
were asked to identify themselves and students began to account for their members. Crew
and students checked their muster groups and, to the extent possible under the conditions,
determined that all were on deck
14:35
All of the available exposure suits had been donned by this time. About half of the ship’s
complement of suits had been extracted from the starboard side of the emergency locker.
The other half remained in the port side of the locker. The leadership teacher and the
history teacher and a student offered to go into the starboard locker to attempt to reach the
port side suits, as the lockers formed a continuous space from port to starboard beneath the
pilothouse. This effort recovered three additional suits but because the vessel was settling
the locker became too dangerous and everyone was called out.
The vessel was slowly turning around in the water and at this point in time had rotated
horizontally about 90 degrees. The full brunt of the wind and sea was now directed onto
the transom of the ship. The after inflatable, still hanging partially in its gear, was smashing
up and down in the increasing sea. The starboard falls, attached to the inflatable’s bow, had
broken free and the boat lay on the surface forming a bridge to the rafts. As he assisted
students across to the rafts, the 2nd mate was struck by the inflatable’s outboard engine
several times. The 2nd mate and the engineers managed to embark about 15 or more
students into the 20‐man raft before the 2nd mate was knocked from the davits into the sea.
He was drawn under by loose lines and gear and only after a struggle managed to get back
to the davits. He then signalled for the boarding to recommence. As students passed across
the after inflatable the seas slammed up under the inflatable making it difficult to cross. The
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Loss of Concordia
17
2nd mate jumped into the inflatable to assist two students and all three were tossed into the
sea by the next wave to strike the ship’s transom and ricochet off under the rubber boat.
The engineers pulled the students into the 20‐man raft and the 2nd climbed into the 10‐man
raft, which was empty except for him. The 2nd mate noticed that the 10‐man raft’s canopy
had either been damaged or had failed to inflate.
14:37
The 1st mate now called out from his position on the side of the pilothouse that the two 20‐
man rafts amidships were about to go free over the submerging catwalk and he, the history
teacher and several students pushed from the top. I was below in the water and cut loose
and untangled the rafts’ cords and straps that were fouling on protrusions from the
superstructure. The rafts went free, both right side up. By this time everyone forward had
made their way aft to the area of the mizzen deckhouse.
I told the 1st mate and bosun to send the students out along the nearly horizontal ratlines of
the mizzen mast so that the midships rafts could be positioned further from danger of
puncture by the ship. With the help of several students, the rafts were manoeuvred clear of
the ship and boarding began.
Aft, the crew in the fully loaded 20‐man raft were trying to get clear of the dangers under
the transom of the ship. The 1st engineer called out to the 2nd mate (who was at this time in
the 10‐man raft) for a knife, and after cutting the painter to the 10‐man raft the mate passed
his folded knife to the engineer. The engineer cut his painter, detaching his raft from the
ship. The 2nd mate also passed the bag of emergency equipment from the empty 10‐man
raft to the crew in the 20‐man.
The 2nd mate tied the 10‐man raft to the 20‐man and then joined the bigger raft and
collapsed from fatigue among the raft’s occupants. Soon afterwards, the line connecting the
10‐ and 20‐man rafts pulled adrift and the 10‐man raft floated away unmanned. As the ship
had now spun around so the transom was somewhat to leeward, both rafts drifted free of
the ship. The last views the 2nd mate had of the ship was of the other raft crews struggling
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Loss of Concordia
18
to get free and of the after section of the keel and the rudder and propeller still above the
surface.
14:39
It was apparent that the vessel was now settling rapidly. The crew worked single‐mindedly
to get the people into the rafts. At this time the ship suddenly heeled another 30 or 40
degrees to port and air escaping powerfully from the ship’s interior caused the starboard
doors to flap open and closed. I was in the water positioning rafts and cutting tangled cords
and the 1st mate, cook and bosun were on the pilothouse side and in the mizzen rigging
helping students and faculty board the rafts. As he felt the ship heel, the 1st mate shouted
for everyone to jump into the rafts. Un‐used lifejackets and immersion suits were tossed
from the pilothouse side into the rafts. The crew began forcefully propelling students off
the ship and into the rafts. I boarded the raft I was attempting to free and pulled students
and faculty into the raft as they jumped and ushered them to the back of the raft as they
came aboard.
14:40
By this time the ship had swung around with her deck facing the oncoming waves. As the
waves reflected off the overhanging deck the rafts took on considerable amounts of water.
The 1st mate pushed the last of the students into the rafts and then jumped but ended up in
the sea. We pulled him aboard, and as soon as the mate was aboard I transferred to the 2nd
amidships 20‐man raft, which was still alongside the ship and already full of people. The
bosun helped the last faculty member off the stern of the vessel and into my raft and then
jumped into I’s raft. The 8‐man raft which had two or three students in it was close by. The
bosun told I he would take command of the 8‐man raft and then swam to it and was pulled
aboard by the students. The raft crews immediately paddled and pushed to get the rafts
clear of the vessel, which was now inclined to about 150 degrees. The 1st mate’s raft, still
attached by a line fouled on the ship, had some difficulty getting clear until the line was
found and cut using the life raft’s safety knife.
Moments after the rafts got free, the ship appeared to settle until very little of her hull and
keel remained visible. I noted that the rudder was hard a‐port. The wind was from the NW
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Loss of Concordia
19
at about 15 knots, rain was intermittent and the sea was about 1.5 to 2 meters. The sky
remained overcast. (Figure 4, p. 38)
The elapsed time since knockdown was approximately 18 minutes.
The Life Rafts
14:45
As the 8‐man raft drifted clear of the ship one of the students noticed the EPIRB floating
nearby, its strobe light activated. The EPIRB had automatically released itself from its
submerged bracket. The bosun instructed his raft to paddle toward the EPIRB and then
swam the remaining distance from his raft and recovered the device.
The rafts quickly started to drift apart. I tossed a quoits on a heaving line to the bosun and
these two rafts were drawn and lashed together. The 1st mate’s raft, the last to get free of
the CONCORDIA, was by now 50 meters to windward of our rafted pair. The 1st mate
attempted to fire the rocket line he had in his raft but the line throwing device failed to
ignite. I tied a lifejacket to my raft’s sea anchor rode and streamed it to weather, where it
was picked up by the 1st mate’s raft. Three of the life rafts were now tied together; the
fourth raft was 150 meters downwind. I hailed the distant raft and instructed them to
stream their drogue but this instruction was not heard and the rafts continued to separate.
I asked for a head‐count aboard each raft and confirmed 44 persons in the three grouped
rafts. The students were asked to identify each individual among their classmates that they
had either seen on deck and who was not now in the cluster of rafts, or that they had seen
boarding the 2nd mate’s 20‐man raft. In this manner, by checking through each group of
cabin mates and each watch group several times, it was determined that the now too
distant to be hailed 20‐man raft under the command of the 2nd mate held 17 students and
three professional crew. All 64 persons on board CONCORDIA were identified and
accounted for.
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Loss of Concordia
20
The Passage in the Rafts
14:50
As the rafts drifted away, I searched upwind for the ship but she had either sunk or
disappeared from view among the waves.
After the muster, I relieved the bosun of the EPIRB, tested its operation and turned it on
manually. The EPIRB’S water activated switch had turned the unit on when it was released
from the ship, and the unit was transmitting as soon as it reached the surface. I decided to
keep the EPIRB in my raft rather than risk losing it tethered alongside. For the next forty
hours, someone in the raft would be delegated to hold the EPIRB upright and keep it from
being damaged.
According to SAR authorities, the first signal picked up by the geostationary satellites was at
15:05:06 ship’s time (18:05:06 UTC) on the 17th. At 15:25:54 the Low Earth Orbiting
satellite picked up the signal and computed two possible positions, one of which was
latitude 27° 27.9’ South by longitude 040° 53.6’ West, approximately 265 nautical miles
south of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Figure 7, p.42.)
Over the next few hours before dark, the crews in all four rafts followed similar procedures.
The seasickness pills were located and distributed to all aboard. The safety equipment was
surveyed and organized. Flashlights and flares were located and set aside. Three of the
six 10‐liter emergency water jugs, stowed aboard the ship in the emergency lockers, had
made it aboard the rafts. A line‐throwing apparatus and the medical kit had also been
salvaged from the partially submerged pilothouse and were in the 1st mate’s raft. The 2nd
mate had a SART (from the starboard wing of the pilothouse) with him.
Individuals volunteered or were delegated to organize the students along the rafts’
perimeters, to check for injuries or trauma and to comfort those who were most frightened.
Lookouts were organized to rotate every 30 to 60 minutes. Bailers and sponges were found
and put to work. The clustered rafts deployed their sea anchors soon after clearing away
from the ship and the fourth raft deployed its some hours later after it was located beneath
the raft’s occupants.
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Loss of Concordia
21
The medical officer was aboard the 1st mate’s raft. The first‐aid kit, kept on the ship’s bridge
and recovered before abandoning ship, was transferred to his raft. The medical officer was
the only person injured having dislocated and broken his left shoulder and bruised his ribs.
He prepared a syringe with a pain‐killer medication and asked one of the students he had
qualified as a First Responder (in a class the medical officer had taught the previous
semester) to administer the shot, which was accomplished despite the motion in the raft.
15:00
The 8‐man raft was nearly half‐full of seawater and was suspected by the crew to have been
damaged while alongside the ship. As conditions in the 8‐man raft were too uncomfortable
for prolonged use, the 1st mate and I moved everyone into our 20‐man rafts, bringing each
raft up to 22 occupants, and the 8‐man raft was used to store bulky equipment, such as
lifejackets, the outer shells of the immersion suits, spare line that someone had tossed
aboard, the paddles, etc. The remaining time before dark was used to organize and stow
the rafts’ safety equipment.
The rafts leaked constantly and also shipped water over the pontoons. Rainwater also
spilled in as the canopies were opened and closed. The plastic bailers and sponges were
used more or less continuously. Bilge water was sponged or scooped into the plastic
immersion suit bags and then passed to people sitting under the canopy openings and
dumped overboard.
The canopy arch in the center of my raft required periodic pumping to keep it inflated, as
did the upper of the two pontoons. Some people appeared flushed and hot and requested
more air, but when the canopy cover was lifted even a little the air soon cooled many to the
point of discomfort. Those who were too hot were asked to sit near the canopy openings
and those who were cold were asked to sit further inside. However, changing ones position
in the crowded rafts was physically difficult. Because of their proximity to the lookout’s
hole in the canopy, the oceanography teacher and the physics teacher took many of the
lookout rotations.
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Loss of Concordia
22
Despite having taken sea sickness tablets soon after boarding the rafts, most people in the
rafts were sea sick at one time or another. After a few hours, many also felt a strong urge to
urinate but release proved to be very difficult and even impossible for some until the
following day. When someone wanted to try, their raft mates would assist them by holding
their legs so they would not fall overboard. Later, because of the difficulty of moving about
in the rafts and the danger after dark, it proved easier for people to use one of the plastic
bailers.
The First Night
19:30:
Nightfall occurred around 19:30. The flashlights in my raft had leaked and, when recovered
from the floor of the raft, were inoperable. Interior overhead lights mounted on the canopy
arches worked the first night. Likewise, on the first night all the exterior flashing lights were
working on all the rafts, including the unmanned 10. This unmanned raft moved quickly
downwind and was lost to view within a few hours. Besides the student and faculty
lookouts who rotated through 30 minute watches, the 1st mate, bosun and cook in their raft
and I in mine kept a watch throughout the night. No lights of ships or planes were seen by
any of the lookouts the first night.
The weather continued mostly moderate throughout the first night, with periods of rain,
sometimes heavy, and occasional gusts of wind. The wind appeared to back toward the
west and averaged about Force 4‐5, 15 to 20 knots with some squalls to 25 knots. The sea
continued at around 2 meters, occasionally higher with the southerly swell and there were
few whitecaps. Never‐the‐less, the crew had some difficulty keeping the lines secured
between the rafts. The temperature was judged to be around 30 degrees Celsius. The
seawater was warm to the touch.
I had six faculty members and fifteen students aboard my raft. The faculty helped organize
students, sorted and organized the safety equipment and stood watch. The leadership
teacher told survival stories. The physics and international relations teachers took turns
singing to the students and students joined in to lead national anthems and songs from
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Loss of Concordia
23
movies. Several students took active roles in the work of the raft and many comforted their
more worried shipmates. All took their turn bailing and standing lookout.
The 1st mate had three additional pro‐crew (bosun, medical officer, cook,) two faculty
members and sixteen students aboard his raft.
The 2nd mate had two additional pro‐crew (1st and 2nd engineers) and seventeen students.
The flashing canopy lights of the two groups of rafts were visible to each other throughout
the first night.
The Second Day, February 18th
08:00
On the morning of the 18th, the weather was mostly cloudy; the wind was from a south‐
easterly direction at about Force 4. The sea was running around 1‐2 meters with few
whitecaps. The air temperature was judged to be around 30 degrees. The weather
continued moderate throughout the day, becoming clearer and hotter during the afternoon
(Figure 5, p. 39.)
Some rain water had been collected and distributed from the canopies of the rafts during
the previous evening. I consulted with the medical officer about issuing water rations from
the emergency supplies. The medical officer advised 5 ml per hour, to be repeated each
hour for several hours; thereafter the ration was to be doubled every six hours. Because of
the difficulty of dispensing such a small amount to so many people each hour, I initially had
10ml issued every two hours. This ration was doubled during the late afternoon. In all the
rafts, individuals who were chronically seasick received extra water.
The 2nd mate had experienced heavy rain during the first night and managed to collect from
the canopy and distribute about 600ml of water per person.
At some point during the early afternoon, the lines securing oukr rafts failed and the rafts
drifted apart. The bosun swam from the mate’s raft towing a line and I tossed him a heaving
line and the rafts were re‐secured.
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Loss of Concordia
24
Individuals were still having trouble urinating so the empty rocket line canister was placed
aboard the 8‐man raft and people used that raft as a restroom.
13:00
Early in the afternoon, the bottom pontoon of the 1st mate’s raft suddenly burst a seam
below the waterline and within two minutes the lower pontoon had completely deflated.
The upper pontoon was intact. The 1st mate dove under his raft several times attempting to
determine if the pontoon was repairable. The bosun located the glue and patch kit, but
because of the nature and location of the leak, it was not possible to repair the raft with the
equipment supplied.
The mate and I decided to move people out of his partially deflated 20‐man raft and into
both my 20‐ and 8‐man rafts. The bosun and a group of several students moved aboard the
8‐man raft and began bailing it out. After getting the 8‐man more or less bailed, it was
determined that the majority of the water must have come aboard during the battle to get
clear of the ship, as the raft was not taking on excessive water at this time. The emergency
rations, water, flares and safety equipment were now repackaged so that each manned raft
had all necessary emergency equipment in the advent the rafts became separated.
The extra lifejackets were passed into the mate’s partially deflated raft, where they were
used as cushions between the raft’s occupants and the now very flexible bottom. Also, if the
upper pontoon should burst a seam or otherwise leak air the people in the raft would have
PFDs immediately at hand.
The injured medical officer began to suffer from the deteriorated conditions in the mate’s
raft. The floor of the raft would depress a foot or two when stepped on and the medical
officer, who had to lie flat because of his injuries, was chaffed and trapped by the soft
bottom. It was decided it would be better to risk a transfer to another raft than to have him
endure these conditions. I cleared an area in the middle of my raft and once the medical
officer was aboard, emergency supply and ration bags were re‐filled and used as full body
splints to limit his movement.
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Loss of Concordia
25
16:00
Before dusk on the 18th, larger rations of water were issued, as the we knew that dispensing
water after dark would be difficult. The interior canopy lights no longer worked, and some
flashlights were full of seawater. In my raft, one of the faculty had brought a small LED
waterproof flashlight with him from the ship and this and chemical light sticks from the
PFDs were used for illumination.
2nd Evening, SAR Aircraft Spotted
19:30
Soon after dark, sometime between 19:30 and 19:40, the physics teacher, who was on
lookout aboard my raft, saw a bright light low in the sky and recognized it as an aircraft.
The shout went up immediately among the rafts. The 2nd mate, whose raft was furthest west
(the direction from which the aircraft appeared,) fired a rocket flare and about a minute
later the 1st mate and I also fired rockets from our rafts. The aircraft was clearly a SAR
craft, flying low and relatively slowly. Additional flares were ignited; these included a
number of hand held flares. The aircraft circled the positions of the rafts, now about three
miles apart, and made a number of passes. It flashed its landing lights, which the raft crews
took to indicate that the rafts had been spotted. Although the SART was activated aboard
the 2nd mate’s raft, it did not audibly indicate that it was being interrogated. The aircraft
then climbed in a spiral and after 10 or 15 minutes flew off toward the west. The aircraft
did not attempt to drop equipment of any kind.
The arrival of the SAR craft considerably cheered the students and crew who were showing
increasing signs of fatigue and pain and doubt. The 1st mate and I then issued additional
water and opened the dry rations which were passed around. Some of the people ate a half
square; others ate two or more squares. People were encouraged to eat and drink to boost
their strength for the upcoming transfer to rescuing vessels.
In the evening the wind shifted directions and increased considerably, building to over 25
knots; the sea built to around 4 meters. There were heavy rain showers accompanied with
gusts and strong wind. The sea was now breaking more regularly and the ride in the rafts
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Loss of Concordia
26
was more violent. Students asked me if our raft could capsize. I told them that because the
rafts were heavily laden there was very little danger of being blown over.
From glimpses of the stars throughout the night and during the morning, I estimated that
the wind had shifted from SW to SE. (At 2100 ship’s time, as revealed later by the track the
EPIRB was radioing to SAR authorities, the rafts were drifting NE, pushed by a strong SW’ly
breeze. Around 23:40 the EPIRB track showed a change in direction toward the NNW.) The
air temperature dropped somewhat and people in the rafts began to complain more about
being colder.
Also, nearly everyone was by now suffering from abrasions caused by constant rubbing
against the rafts. Exposure to salt water aggravated the wounds. Some students,
particularly those without survival suits or those who had elected to take them off, were
considerably chaffed and in pain. Others allowed those who were worse off to use their
bodies as cushions against the friction of the raft.
At some point several hours after the fly‐over by the SAR aircraft, the SART in the 2nd mate’s
raft began an audible alarm (beeping.) The mate said this was an indication that the SART
was being interrogated by a radar. The 1st engineer said it was an indication of a low
battery.
19th February. Rescue by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Merchant Vessels HOKUETSU DELIGHT
and CRYSTAL PIONEER.
01:30
Around 01:30 lights on the horizon were reported by the lookout in the 1st mate’s raft. I
confirmed these to be the lights of a vessel to the south and steaming toward the west. The
rafts each fired a rocket flare, followed several minutes later with a second. The vessel (the
HOKUETSU DELIGHT) altered course toward the rafts. Thereafter, at about 10 to 20 minute
intervals, hand held flares were ignited to allow the ship to get bearings on the rafts.
The lookout in the 2nd mate’s raft, three or four miles away, also saw the HOKUETSU
DELIGHT some minutes before we began firing off our flares. The 1st engineer turned on the
SART again, after previously turning it off without the 2nd mate’s knowledge, due to fears of
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Loss of Concordia
27
depleting the battery. The SART responded to the HOKUETSU DELIGHT’s radars with an
audible signal. The 2nd mate surmised that the vessel was attempting to pick up my raft
group and he watched the manoeuvrings of the merchant vessel, at one point firing a rocket
flare when he thought the HOKUETSU DELIGHT appeared to be heading away from the area
of the rafts. He instructed the students in his raft to rip off all the lifejacket and immersion
suit water lights and he Velcro fastened them together and wrapped some of them around
the blade of a paddle and used this improvised group of lights to signal his position. He also
fired a second rocket flare.
Soon after this a SAR aircraft appeared on the scene and began dropping illumination flares.
A second vessel, the CRYSTAL PIONEER, passed two or three miles off the 2nd mate’s raft
and the mate attracted this ship’s attention with his paddle lights and flares. This time, the
SART was responding audibly to the overhead passes of the SAR aircraft and to the radars
aboard the CRYSTAL PIONEER and HOKUETSU DELIGHT.
The HOKUETSU DELIGHT turned on her spotlights when she was a mile or so away from my
group of three rafts and thereafter used these lights to keep the rafts in sight. At some point
around 02:10 her captain manoeuvred around the rafts and attempted to create a lee and to
get close enough to get lines to the rafts.
After several passes the HOKUETSU DELIGHT manoeuvred close enough to get lines to the
rafts but because of the high sea that was running and the darkness and the residual
headway and sternway of the merchant vessel, it proved impossible to keep the rafts
beneath the pilot ladder and gangway. The gangway was initially positioned too low and
the crews in the rafts had a difficult time staying clear of this danger, which was alternately
plunging into the sea then rising clear of the surface almost 10 meters at times. It was not
possible to secure lines to the rafts as these were immediately torn free.
03:50
After two passes along the side of the ship, during which only two students managed to
jump onto the pilot ladder and climb aboard, I deemed the conditions too risky and ordered
the lines to the merchant vessel cast off. I hailed the ship and asked for the HOKUETSU
DELIGHT to send a boat but this was not done. Over the next two or three hours, the three
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Loss of Concordia
28
rafts drifted together never more than about 3 or 4 cables from the merchant vessel. The
people in the rafts were extremely tired at this point. Bailing and lookout duties were
suspended so people could rest until dawn.
04:10
At this point in time, the rescue vessels and life rafts were in approximate position 27° 18.2 S × 40° 49.4 W.
The CRYSTAL PIONEER had seen the signals from the 2nd mate’s raft and had diverted to
pick them up. The ship attempted to create a lee but on her first approach drifted past with
too much way on. The raft drifted under the counter and collided with the overhanging hull.
The PIONEER stopped her screw whenever the raft was near her stern. On the next pass,
the raft bounced off the bulbous bow and slid down the ship’s starboard side. The recovery
gear had been lowered on the ship’s port side. On the third pass the CRYSTAL PIONEER
brought the raft along her port side and stopped with the raft below the pilot ladder. Lines
were passed down and held by hand in the rafts by the 2nd mate and students, as the
connection points would not take the strain. A harness was lowered on a line and one by
one the raft’s occupants were helped into the harness by the engineers and sent up the pilot
ladder to the gangway where the PIONEER’s crew assisted them to the deck and inside for
drinks, water and rest. The PIONEER recorded photographs of each individual as they came
aboard. Twenty persons were rescued by the CRYSTAL PIONEER.
At dawn, the HOKUETSU came along side my rafts again and by now the wind had
decreased and the sea was going down. The HOKUETSU created a good lee and maintained
position with very minimal headway or sternway while the raft crews positioned
themselves below the pilot ladder. The bosun and I and groups of students held the lines by
hand, using gloves passed down from the ship to protect our hands.
The 1st mate and I now asked for volunteers to start up and the students and crew did so
one at a time. Each climber wore a lifejacket and was assisted on the pilot ladder and up the
gangway by crew of the HOKUETSU DELIGHT. On the deck of the ship, most of the people
from the rafts had difficulty walking and had to be assisted inside. In this manner, forty
people were evacuated from the rafts. I, the 1st mate and the bosun remained in the rafts
with the injured medical officer.
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Loss of Concordia
29
08:00
A net sling lowered over the starboard quarter of the HOKUETSU was used to evacuate first
the medical officer and then the bosun and mate. Because we were working close to the
ship’s propellers and there was considerable danger of becoming entangled in them, before
jumping in the sling I cut loose the rafts and allowed them to drift away from the ship’s
stern. They were not subsequently recovered.
The HOKUETSU DELIGHT had rescued 44 persons in total.
Aboard the merchant vessels:
I went directly to the bridge and met the HOKUETSU’s captain and his officers. The students
and crew were gathered in the ship’s mess and the HOKUETSU’s crew served hot drinks and
food. I mustered all our people and did one last count, verifying again that 44 persons had
been rescued by the HOKUETSU. I then confirmed by VHF radio call to the CRYSTAL
PIONEER that she had rescued the remaining 20 persons.
These numbers were forwarded to the Brazilian Naval Vessel CONSTITUTION which had
arrived on scene and had taken over SAR coordination. I then made contact with Class
Afloat administrators in Lunenburg. I advised them of the successful rescue of all hands and
that the merchant vessels had offered to take the CONCORDIA’s people to their respective
ports of call in Brazil and Argentina.
The crews of the two merchant vessels provided medical attention, clothing, shoes, food and
drink and a place to rest for all the CONCORDIA’s people.
The Brazilian Warship CONSTITUTION
The commander of the Brazilian warship contacted the merchant vessels and told their
captains that he wished to transfer all CONCORDIA personnel to his vessel. The 1st mate,
who had overheard this plan on the radio, alerted me. After consultation with our medical
officer I determined there were no medical emergencies that required an airlift and I called
the warship and objected to the transfer on the grounds that CONCORDIA’s people were
now safe but still tired; they were being cared for and any transfer between vessels in the
current sea conditions would unnecessarily endanger them.
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Loss of Concordia
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Diversion to Rio de Janeiro:
18:00
Upon the request of the Brazilian commander, I agreed to be transferred by helicopter sling
lift from the HOKUETSU DELIGHT to the Brazilian warship. There I spoke directly with the
warship’s commander but, despite my objections, twelve students were transferred from
the CRYSTAL PIONEER by the warship’s helicopter using a sling lift. At dusk, the helicopter
transfers stopped.
Around 19:45 the merchant vessels were instructed to fall in and follow the Brazilian Naval
Vessel CONSTITUTION to Rio de Janeiro and the three vessels steamed through the night
and arrived at Rio the following day, the 20th of February.
10:00. Rio de Janeiro on the 20th.
The Brazilian warship arrived around 10:00 on the 20th. The merchant vessels arrived that
afternoon, and by 1600, all CONCORDIA crew were safely landed.
Notes:
1. Ship’s time was 3 hours behind Greenwich.
2. All times are approximate and are based on observers’ accounts.
3. Some positions based on SARSAT records for EPIRB beacon A749D70C34D34D1.
4. Details regarding CONCORDIA’s safety equipment are from the ship’s inspection
certificates.
5. The CONCORDIA was classed 100A1 Yacht by Lloyds Register.
6. Independent inquiries into this accident are being conducted by the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada, http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/index.asp
7. and by Barbados Maritime http://www.barbadosmaritime.com/index2.html
8. This report is based on accounts by crew, faculty and students and may contain errors
and omissions. However, I take full responsibility for the content and states that it
is factual and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
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9. No part of this report may be reproduced or distributed without the permission of the
author.
ADDENDII
I. List of Crew and Faculty
Appleton, Ashley Cook: B.S Culinary Arts
Braedley, Kate Teacher: Chemistry, Physics, Calculus
Byers, Geoffrey Bosun (STCW, Watchstander)
Curry, William Master (USCG Master, Ocean Sail, 1600 GT)
Farquharson, Meaghan Teacher: International Relations, English
Fitzpatrick, Heather Teacher: Psychology, Oceanography, Biology
Grzybowski, Krzysztof 2nd Engineer
Jablonski, Jan 1st Engineer
McArthur, Ruth Teacher: Math, Biology
McDonald, Robert 2nd Mate (MCA Master 200 GT; Watch Officer 500GT)
Plangger, Franz Leadership , P.E., French, Atmospheric Science
Sinker, Mark Teacher: English, Global History
Smith, Kimberley 1st Mate (Master Mariner, No Limitations)
Teegarden, David Medical Officer, MPH, PA‐C, CCEMT‐P, FP‐C, FACEP
Tripp, Jamie Ship Director: Academic administration
Tugwell, Maurice Professor: Economics
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II. Weather Analysis by NOAA meteorologist Ken Pryor
17 February 2010 S.V. Concordia Accident (from Pryor (2010))
During the afternoon of 17 February 2010, the Canadian Sailing Vessel (SV) Concordia sank off the coast of Brazil due to strong convective storm‐generated winds. The SV Concordia was capsized in a downburst that occurred near 1722 UTC, about 290 nautical miles south‐southeast of Rio de Janeiro (Capt. William Curry, SV Concordia, personal communication). GOES‐12 Southern Hemisphere imagery was very effective in identifying the developing convective storm complex and favorable pre‐conditions for downburst activity over one hour prior to the capsize of the Concordia. Satellite imagery indicated the presence of strong convective storm updrafts that resulted in heavy rainfall as well as the presence of a dry‐air channel on the rear flank of the storm complex that most likely resulted in downburst generation.
Soden and Bretherton (1996) (SB96), in their study of the relationship of water vapor radiance and layer‐average relative humidity, found a strong negative correlation between 6.5μm (channel 3) brightness temperature (BT) and layer‐averaged relative humidity (RH) between the 200 and 500‐mb levels. Thus, in the middle to upper troposphere, decreases in BT are associated with increases in RH as illustrated in Figure 4 of SB96. In the WV image in Figure 2, a notch of warmer brightness temperatures, indicated by the "V" pattern with light green shading on the southwestern flank of the storm complex, signified the presence of lower 500‐mb humidity air being channeled into the rear of the storm.
The BTD image in Figure 3 at 1709 UTC 17 February marks the location of the Concordia and Rio de Janeiro. Also shown in the image is the thunderstorm complex that produced the severe downburst. The purple shading in the thunderstorm complex indicates the presence of intense convection and associated strong updrafts that generated heavy rainfall. At the same time, a well‐defined dry‐air notch appears on the southwestern flank of the storm complex. This dry‐air notch most likely represents the drier (lower relative humidity) air that was channeled into the rear of the storm and provided the energy for
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intense downdrafts and the resulting downburst winds near 1720 UTC. Entrainment of drier mid‐tropospheric air into the precipitation core of the convective storm resulted in evaporation of precipitation, the subsequent cooling and generation of negative buoyancy (sinking air), and resultant acceleration of the downdraft. When this intense localized downdraft reached the ocean surface, air flowed outward as a downburst. The resulting strong winds then capsized the SV Concordia. Note that the dry‐air notch was pointing directly to the location of the Concordia, and thus, the vessel was in the direct path of downburst winds.
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Figure 2. GOES‐12 infrared (IR, top) and water vapor (WV, bottom) imagery at 1709 UTC 17 February 2010. Location of the SV Concordia is indicated by an "X".
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Figure 3. GOES‐12 channel 3 (WV)‐channel 4 (IR) brightness temperature difference (BTD) product at 1709 UTC.
References
Pryor, K. L., 2010: Microburst applications of brightness temperature difference between GOES Imager channels 3 and 4. arXiv:1004.3506v1 [physics.ao‐ph]
Soden, B.J. and F.P. Bretherton, 1996: Interpretation of TOVS water vapor radiances in terms of layer‐average relative humidities: Method and climatology for the upper, middle, and lower troposphere. J. Geophys. Res., 101, 9333‐9343.
Note: Section II above included with permission of Ken Pryor.
III. Weather Forecasts and Warnings
1) METAREA V
WARNING NR 043/2010: NEAR GALE/GALE WARNING
BRAZILIAN NAVY MARINE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE
NAVY HYDROGRAPHIC CENTER
ISSUED AT 1230 GMT ‐ TUE ‐ 16/FEB/2010
AREA BRAVO S OF 26S STARTING AT 180600 GMT. WIND SE/E FORCE 7/8 WITH GUSTS.
VALID UNTIL 190600 GMT
2) METAREA V
WARNING NR 044/2010: NEAR GALE/GALE WARNING
BRAZILIAN NAVY MARINE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE
NAVY HYDROGRAPHIC CENTER
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ISSUED AT 1230 GMT ‐ TUE ‐ 16/FEB/2010
SOUTH OCEANIC AREA S OF 26S STARTING AT 180600 GMT. WIND SE/E S OF 30S AND N/NW BETWEEN 26S AND 30S FORCE 7/8 WITH GUSTS.
VALID UNTIL 191200 GMT.