saving lives together - crs...improve the collective security of the humanitarian community....

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Saving Lives Together“A Framework for improving Security Arrangements

Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field”

Executive Summary

TheTaskForceonCollaborativeApproachestoSecuritywasestablishedundertheauspicesofthe Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2004. This report emanates from its Sub-Working Group (SWG), led by InterAction and UNICEF in close liaison with the UNDepartmentofSafetyandSecurity(DSS)andtaskedtoexaminetheimplementationoftheMenuofOptions forUN/NGO/IGOSecurityCollaboration (MoO)which had been approved by theIASCin2001.TheSWGsoughttoexaminethecurrentrelevanceoftheMoOanddetermineitsutility througha survey thatwasdistributedboth to IGO/NGO/UNstaffby InterActionand toFieldSecurityCoordinationOfficers(FSCOs)byDSS.

AnalysisofthefindingsindicatedasignificantlackofknowledgeoftheMoOinthefield.Thereweresomeexamplesofimplementation,buttheseappearedtobelimitedtosituationsofextremeinsecurity and probably resulted out of necessity, as opposed to standard application of theprinciples.Further,therewasnoevidencethatlessonslearnedweresharedoradoptedroutinelyasgoodpractice.Whatbecameclearfromthesurvey,however,wasthat therecommendationsthatemergedin2001remainasrelevanttodayastheywerewhenfirstformulated.

Withtheaboveinmind,itistheconclusionoftheSWGthattheMoOstillprovidesaverysoundframeworkforimprovingsecuritycollaborationbetweenallhumanitarianactorsinthefieldand,as such, should be re-launched. To this end, the SWG has updated, revised and renamed theMoOtobetterreflectitspurposeandintent,andstronglyrecommendsthatitbeadoptedbytheIASCforactiveandrobustimplementationonacountrybycountrybasis.

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Introduction FollowingtherecommendationsofaDecember2003Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee(IASC)Principalsmeeting,aTaskforceonCollaborativeApproachestoSecurity(TCAS)wasformedtoexplorecollaborativemeasures thatcouldbe takenby thehumanitariancommunity to addressincreasinginsecurityinthecontextoffieldmissions.Ultimately, theHigh-LevelHumanitarianForum(HLHF)heldinMarch2004laidoutthedimensionsoftheTCAS’swork.

TheHLHF,attendedbytheUN,theRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement,IOM,aswellasapproximately 20 international and national NGOs, focused on the changing securityenvironment and on options for the humanitarian community to respond to it. The resultingdiscussions that took place at theHLHFeffectively charged theTCASwith examining issuesthatwouldassistthehumanitariancommunityinansweringthequestionofhowtorespondtotheperceivedincreaseinsecuritythreats.

The TCAS in consultation with the IASC Working Group determined the requirements fordistinctSub-WorkingGroups(SWGs)onthefollowingissues:

1. Initiating the Dialogue -Establishregularandsustainedcontactwith‘unconventional’interlocutorswhohaveinfluenceinzonesofconflictandinstabilityinwhichwework.TheSWGwilldeterminehowthiscanbepracticallyachieved.

2. Codes of Conduct - Assemble relevant existing codes of conduct for humanitarianpersonnel(withafocusonstaffbehaviour),identifyelementsofthosecodespertinenttothis discussion and determine the most effective way to ‘roll-out’ what they haveidentifiedforsystemwideconsideration.

3. Recommendations for Action & Menu of Options -ProposeadisseminationschemefortheMenuofOptionsforsecuritycollaborationinthefieldbetweenUNorganizationsand their IGO/NGO partners, as well as make recommendations for monitoring itsimplementation.

4. Pilot Countries for Collaborative Action-Determinecriteriaforselectionofcountriesandsuggestcollaborativeinitiatives,derivedfromtheworkoftheotherthreeSWGs,thatcanbeeffectivelypiloted.

ThisreportisfocusedpurelyontheresultsofthethirdSWG(‘RecommendationsforAction&MenuofOptions’).

Recommendations for Action & Menu of Options Sub-Working Group ChairedbyInterActionandUNICEF,theSWGearlyonsoughtthecounselandparticipationofUNSECOORD(nowincorporatedundertheumbrellaofUNDSS),acknowledgingthatanyworkonthistopicwouldbeincompletewithoutitsparticipation.

The “Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration,” also referred to as “Menu of Options”–MoO - see annexes II and III))isineffectalistofpotentialrisk-mitigatingstrategieswhichmaybe undertaken both individually and jointly byUNagencies,NGOs, and IGOs toimprove the collective security of the humanitarian community. Security coordination andcollaboration between the UN and NGOs is a well-established and widespread practice –applicationoftheGuidelinesismanifesttovaryingdegrees,knowinglyornot.Themembersof

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the sub-workinggroupagree that theGuidelines, representing theculminationofcollaborativeeffortsoftheIASCWorkingGroup,remainasounddocument.

Workingfromthispremise,itwasconcludedthatwhilethedocumentissound,awarenessofthedocument’sexistenceisminimalwithinthehumanitariancommunityandbringingituptodatewasessentialtoreflectthecurrentrealities,aswellasaddressingthelong-standingimpedimentsto its implementation. This report presents the conclusions drawn by the SWG based on itscollective knowledge and the findings of a survey it conducted. The survey, entitled“Implementing the Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration – where does thehumanitarian community stand?” (cf. annex IV) was distributed to UN offices and NGOsglobally.

Work Plan Basedon theaboveassumptions, theSWGdeveloped the followingstrategy toaccomplish itstask:

1. Develop a survey aimed at collecting experienceswith the use of theMoO, includinginstancesinwhichtheMoOhadbeenspecificallyimplementedaswellasothersinwhichtheUNandNGOshaddevelopedcollaborative relationshipswithoutknowledgeof thedocument.

2. Distribute the survey, accompanied by theMoO, aswidely as possible throughout thehumanitariancommunitytoassessknowledgeoftheMoO’sexistence.

3. Re-distribute the MoO accompanied by the final report in the hope that collectiveexperiences from the field captured in the report would assist in demonstrating thepossiblebenefitswhichcouldbeachievedwithitsimplementation.

Development and Distribution of the Survey The survey was intended to be short and easy to navigate while remaining open enough tocapturecollaborativeexperiencesinspiredbytheMoOorotherwise. TheinitialdistributionofthesurveyandtheMoOwasaccomplishedthroughanumberofchannelsandincluded:

1. UNDSSFSCOsincountrieswithaUNConsolidateAppeal2. InterAction

• WorldFoodProgramNewsletter(WFP)• NGONetworks

a. TheAmericanCouncilforVoluntaryInternationalAction(InterAction)b. InternationalCouncilforVoluntaryAgencies(ICVA)c. SteeringCommitteeforHumanitarianResponse(SCHR)d. VoluntaryOrganizationsinCooperationinEmergenciesNewsletter(VOICE)

• NGOFieldSecurityMechanismse. AfghanistanNGOSecurityOffice(ANSO)f. NGOCoordinatingCommitteeinIraq(NCCI)g. NGOSecurityPreparednessandSupportProject(NGO-SPAS),Somaliah. BalochistanNGOSecurityOffice(BINGO)


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Survey Results Fromthesurveyresponses(cf.annexV),anumberofre-occurringhurdlestoUN/NGOsecuritycollaboration as well as a list of recommendations to overcome such hurdles and improvecooperationwereidentified.

Reoccurring Hurdles

1. Personalities Aclashofpersonalitiesbetweenkeyactorsinsecuritymatterscanseverelyhindercooperation.Good formal and informal communication amongUN security personnel, IGOs andNGOs isessential for collaboration to work well – in large part, personal relationships and individualefforts tounderstandeachothers’mandatesandconstraintsgoalongwayinestablishingtrustandunderstandingthatareattheheartofsharingsensitiveinformation.

2. ResourcesAgeneral lack of human and financial resources for security often hampersUNagencies andNGOs fromcontributing toorfullyparticipatingincollaborativeefforts. While theUNoftenhassubstantiallymoreresourcestodevotetosecurity,theyoftenfallshortofwhatisneededtoprovidethelevelofservicethatisexpectedfromtherestofthehumanitariancommunity.

3. Diversity of Security ApproachesSometimes approaches to security are substantially different betweenNGOs and theUN (andamong NGOs themselves). These differences can make collaboration on common securityservicesdifficult.

4. ConfidentialityConcernsabout indiscreteuseofsensitiveinformationsharedincollaborativemechanismscanoften be a substantial barrier to sharing information – there are several examples whereinformationsharedincollaborativeforumshasturnedupinthepress.

5. Priorities and Time ConstraintsSecurity is often only one of many priorities organizations have as they administer theirprogrammesontheground.However,ithasbeenshowntimeandtimeagainthatpoorsecuritypracticesonthepartofoneorganizationcanimpactonthesecurityoftheentirecommunity.

WhatemergedfromthesurveyresultswasanalmostcompleteendorsementoftheoriginalMoOof2001.Sincethisindicatesthattoday’srequirementsandneedsinsecuritycollaborationaretoa largeextentconsistentwiththoseidentifiedin2001, theSWGrecommendsthat theMoObere-launched.Tothisendithasupdated,revisedandrenamedthedocumenttobetterreflect itspurpose and intent, and strongly recommends that it be adopted by the IASC for active androbust implementation on a country by country basis. The following overarchingrecommendationsareessentialforasuccessfulimplementationofthedocument:


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Recommendations

1. Approval

ThattheIASCadopttheFrameworkforimprovingSecurityArrangementsamongIGOs,NGOsandtheUNintheField,entitled“SavingLivesTogether”(cf.annex1).

2. Dissemination

a)ThattheIASCchairwritestoprincipalsofallIASCmemberswitharecommendationthattheFrameworkbedistributedwidelythroughouttheirrespectiveorganizationstoincludetheheadsofcountryoffices.

b)ThattheIASCchairrequesttheUnder-Secretary-GeneraloftheUNDepartmentofSafetyandSecurity (DSS) to seek endorsement of the Framework through the Inter-Agency SecurityManagementNetwork(IASMN)andthatitbedistributedtoallHumanitarianCoordinatorsandDesignatedOfficialsthroughouttheUNsystem.

3. Raising Awareness

That every effort be made within the IGO, NGO and UN communities to raise the level ofawarenessof theFrameworkwithintheirorganizations,andstronglyadvocatefor itsuseasanenablingmechanismforenhancingcollaborativesecuritymanagement.

4. Implementation

a) That IASC members urge their constituents and/or field staff to convene a meetingdedicated to discussing the MoO and perhaps compare existing collaboration with theFrameworkasawayofidentifyingopportunitiestoenhancecollaboration.

b) That all IGO, NGO and UN organizations which do not employ professional securitypersonnel appoint a suitably experiencedSecurityFocal Point to act as their representative insecuritycollaborationforums.Thismeasurewouldfacilitatethedevelopmentofacoherentandcohesivenetworkwithasharedunderstandingoftheneedtorespecteachother’spositionsand,wherestated,themaintenanceofconfidentiality.

Conclusion There are few organizations within the humanitarian community that do not agree that thehumanitarian working environment is becoming increasingly dangerous. While it must beacceptedthattherewillalwaysbeacertainlevelofrisk,muchcanbedonetomitigatethedegreeofdanger facedby fieldpersonnel.TheMoOwasoriginallydesigned todo just thatand isasrelevanttodayasitwaswhenitwasfirstconceived,representingthecollectiverecognitionthatonly in a joint effort can the humanitarian community minimize its risk in insecureenvironments. With this in mind, and with reference to the Survey Findings andRecommendationsashighlightedabove,anupdatedandrevampedMoOentitled“SavingLivesTogether”isattachedatAnnex1,andshouldbeimplementedintheFieldattheearliestpossibletime.


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Annex I: Saving Lives Together

“A Framework for improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field”

1. Collaboration in the UN Security Management Team with Participation of NGOs/ and IGOs

a)ThatIGOs,NGOs,andtheRedCrossMovementmayparticipateinrelevantmeetingsoftheUNSecurityManagementTeam(SMT)onanex-officio1,representativebasis.

b)ThatUN/NGO/IGOSecurityCollaborationbetakenasaregularagendaitematUNSecurityManagementTeammeetings.AspermittedwithintheframeworkoftheUNSecurityManagementSystem,considerationshouldbegiventoinvitingSeniorManagersoftheNGOandIGOCommunitiestoattendrelevantportionsofSecurityManagementTeammeetings.

c)ThatProtocolsforsharinganddisseminationofinformationdiscussedinSecurityManagementTeammeetingsshallbeagreedtoinadvancebyallpartiesinattendance.

d)Thatwhereappropriate,theDOshouldcoordinatesecuritydecisionswithnon-UNhumanitarianactors.

e)ThatIGO/NGOpartnerstoUNorganizationsinspecifichumanitarianoperationsselectamongthemselvesoneoralimitednumberoffieldsecurityfocalpoints.

2. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration and information sharing a)That foraforpractical securitycollaborationamongallhumanitarianactorsatarea,countryandsub-officelevelbeconvened,atregularintervals,inordertoaddresspracticalsecurityissuesofcommonconcern.

b)Thattheforamayincludethefollowingregularparticipants:• DO/FSO/AreaSecurityCoordinatororotherDODesignee;• MembersoftheSMTasappropriate;• NGOfieldsecurityfocalpoint(s);• RepresentativesofIGOs;• RepresentativesoftheRedCrossMovement.• Thechairpersonmaybechosenonarotatingbasis.

1Exofficioherereferstothefactthatrepresentativesofnon-UNorganizationsarenotboundby,norparticipateformallyin,SMTdecisionsonUNsecuritypolicy.


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c)Thattheforamayincludetopicsofdiscussion,suchas:• Theexchangeofsecurityrelatedinformation;• Incidentreports;• Securityandtrendanalysis;• Jointoperationalplanning,asappropriate;• Protocols for the sharing and further dissemination of information and documents

presentedordiscussed.

3. Including Staff Security Concerns in the Consolidated Appeals That structured efforts to include well conceived and developed UN / NGO / IGO securityprojects within CAPs to cover the additional resources potentially required for enhancedcollaborationonstaffsecuritybyUNAgenciesandNGOs/IGOs,suchastelecommunicationsandsecuritytraining.

4. Meeting Common Security-Related Needs and Sharing Resources Thatwhilst recognizing that individualNGOs’ financial resourcesareoftenmoremodest thanthose of the UN or IGOs, their contributions are nonetheless needed and that considerationshould be given towhat resources could bemade available to help address common securityrelatedneeds.

ThatUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners,committedtosecuritycollaborationineachspecifichumanitarianoperation,participate,totheextentfeasibleandbasedontheextentoftheirinvolvement,inmeetingtheuncovered,security-relatedneedsofthehumanitariancommunity.

5. Sharing Resources That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian fieldoperations,developalocalinventoryforthesharingoftheirspecialized,security-relatedhumanandmaterialresources.

6. Facilitating Inter-Agency Security and Emergency Telecommunications.

ThattelecommunicationamongUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersatfieldlevelbefacilitatedby:

a)TheDOadvocatingwiththerelevantauthoritiesfortheuseoftelecommunicationequipmentwithintheframeworkofexistinginternationalagreements;

b)TherelevantUNbodynegotiatingwiththeauthoritiesacommon,inter-agencyfrequencytofacilitategreaterinteroperabilityforsecuritycollaborationforUNorganizationsandIGO/NGOoperatinginthesameareawithoutdenyingtheneedforagenciestohavetheirowninternalandintegralcommunicationsinfrastructure.

c) Humanitarian actors committing to security collaboration using standard communicationproceduresand,totheextentpossible,providingstaffwithcompatiblecommunicationsystems.


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7. Collaborating and Consulting in Security Training

ThatallUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersatHQandatfieldlevel:

a)Carryoutjointsecuritytrainingincollaborationand/orconsultationwithotheragenciestotheextentpossible.

b)Whenfeasible,poolnecessaryresourcestoconductfieldsecuritytraining;

c)Seektoincreasetheircapacityforsecuritytrainingatalllevels;

d) Give consideration to the development of training packages that focus specifically onimprovingsecuritycollaboration.

8. Sharing Information

That security-related information be shared among UN organizations and their IGO/NGOpartners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as theconfidentialityrequiredwhendealingwithsensitiveinformation.

9. Identifying Minimum Security Standards

ThatUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersjointlyidentifyandagreeonhowtoapplyminimumsecuritystandards,principles,and/orguidelinesadaptedtolocalcircumstances.Insodoing, humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, principles,and/orguidelinesforexampletheUNMOSS(MinimumOperationalSecurityStandards)thatarebindingforthemembersoftheUNsystemandInterAction’sSecurityPlanningGuidelines.

10. Seeking Adherence to Common Humanitarian Ground-Rules

ThatthesecuritycollaborationoftheUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersinspecificfieldoperations, to theextentpossible,reston respect forcommon, locallydevelopedground-rulesforhumanitarianaction.


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Annex II:

The Menu of Options or

UN/NGO/IGO Guidelines for Security Collaboration

INTRODUCTION

As the organizations of the United Nations are increasingly working closely with Inter- and Non-GovernmentalOrganizationinhostileenvironments,thereisaneedtoprovideaframeworkforsecuritycollaboration. The Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration provide Designated Officials,Security Management Teams and Security Focal Points with practical options for enabling andmaintainingsecuritycollaborationwithNGO/IGOs.

UNSECOORD Guideline on UN/NGO Security Collaboration

TheDesignatedOfficialshallundertakeeveryefforttocreateandmaintainanenvironmentconducivetointer-Agency Security collaboration. The following guidelines provide a number of practicalmeans ofachieving thisobjective, someorallofwhichmaybeapplicable to theparticular circumstancesof thedutystationorareaofoperation.TheDesignatedOfficial,inconsultationwiththeSecurityManagementTeam, must determine the most appropriate options. As the guidelines are the result of extensiveconsultation includingNGOs, some of the guidelines describe actions to be undertaken voluntarily bynon-UNbodies.

A. Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team

1. That IGOs, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement may participate in the UN SecurityManagementTeam(SMT)onanexofficio,representativebasis:

2. Thatwhereappropriate,theDOshouldcoordinatesecuritydecisionswithnon-UNhumanitarianactors.

3. That IGO/NGOpartners toUNorganizations in specific humanitarian operations select amongthemselvesoneoralimitednumberoffieldsecurityfocalpoints

B. Convening broad-based fora for field security collaboration That fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area, country and sub-office level be convened, at regular intervals, in order to address practical security issues of commonconcern.Theforamayincludethefollowingregularparticipants:DO/FSO/AreaSecurityCoordinatoror other DO Designee; members of the SMT as appropriate; NGO field security focal point(s);representativesofIGOs;representativesoftheRedCrossMovement.Thechairpersonmaybechosenonarotatingbasis.

C. Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals That the CAPs include a project to cover the additional resources potentially required by enhancedcollaborationonstaffsecuritybyUNAgenciesandNGO/IGOs,suchastelecommunicationsandsecuritytraining.


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D. Meeting common, security-related needs ThatUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners,committedtosecuritycollaborationineachspecifichumanitarianoperationparticipate,totheextentfeasible,inmeetingtheuncovered,security-relatedneedsofthehumanitariancommunity,includingcosts,accordingtothescopeoftheirrespectiveinvolvement.

E. Sharing resources ThatUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnerscooperatinginhumanitarianfieldoperationsdevelopalocalinventoryforthesharingoftheirspecialized,security-relatedhumanandmaterialresources.

F. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at field level arefacilitatedby:

1. The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication equipmentwithintheframeworkofexistinginternationalagreements;

2. The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common frequency for securitycollaborationforUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersoperatinginthesamearea;

3. Humanitarian actors committed to security collaboration using standard communicationproceduresand,totheextentpossible,providingstaffwithcompatiblecommunicationsystems.

G. Collaborating and consulting in security training ThatallUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersatHQandatfieldlevel:

1. Carryoutsecuritytrainingincollaborationand/orconsultationwithotheragenciestotheextentpossible;

2. Seektoincreasetheircapacityforsecuritytrainingatalllevels.

H. Sharing information Thatsecurity-relatedinformationissharedamongUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnerswhilerespectingthehumanitariancharacteroftheparticipantsaswellastheconfidentialityrequiredwhendealingwithsensitiveinformation.

I. Identifying minimum security standardsThatUNorganizations and their IGO/NGOpartners jointly identify and agree how to applyminimumsecurity standards adapted to local circumstances. In so doing, humanitarian actors will take intoconsideration already existing standards, for example the UN MOSS (minimum operational securitystandards)thatarebindingforthemembersoftheUNsystem.

J. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules That the security collaboration of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific fieldoperations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locally developed ground-rules forhumanitarianaction


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Annex III:

IASC Approved Menu of Options

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IASC-WG FromtheIASC-WGStaffSecurityTaskForceFinal, 18 January 2002

General recommendations

1 Strengthening security collaboration in Humanitarian operations That allUNorganizationsand their IGO/NGOpartners2 adoptapolicyof strengtheningcollaboration on staff security, both at HQ and at the field level, in the context ofreinforcingtheircommitmenttostaffsecurity.

2 Advocating for security ThatallhumanitarianagenciesandorganizationsrepresentedintheTaskForceengageinadvocacyforgreaterawarenessoftheneedforincreasedresourcesinsupportoffieldstaffsecurity,includingresourcesforUN/non-UNsecuritycollaboration.

3 Appointing agency security focal points That humanitarian agencies andorganizations represented in theTaskForce that do nothaveanagencystaffsecurityfocalpointattheHQ,appointone,andincludeinter-agencycollaborationonstaffsecurityinhis/hertermsofreference.

4 Strengthening security management, including collaboration ThatallhumanitarianagenciesandorganizationsrepresentedintheTaskForceensurethatsecuritymanagement,includingtheserecommendationsareincorporated:(1) Aspart of the job description and the performance evaluation of their directors and

managers,especiallyatthefieldlevel;(2) As an indicator of effectiveness and efficiency in the evaluation of humanitarian

operations.

2ThisincludesthoseorganizationsateachdutystationthatareworkinginclosecollaborationwithUNagencies,programmesandfunds.


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Field-related recommendations

5 Enhancing the role of the DO in security collaboration ThatthefunctionsoftheDOreflecttheneedforaprofilewhichincludes:(1) Skills in creating an environment conducive to inter-agency collaboration, including

staffsecurity;(2) Securitytraining;(3) Fieldexperienceinsecuritymanagement.

6 Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team (1) ThatIGOs,NGOs,andtheRedCrossMovementmayparticipateintheUNSecurity

ManagementTeam(SMT)onanexofficio3,representativebasis(cf.recommendation7);

(2) That, where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisionswith non-UNhumanitarianactors.

7 Selecting NGO field security focal point(s) That IGO/NGO partners toUN organizations in specific humanitarian operations selectamong themselves one or a limited number of field security focal points (cf.recommendation6).

8 Convening broad-based forums for field security collaborationThat fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area,countryandsub-officelevel beconvened,atregularintervals,inordertoaddresspracticalsecurityissuesofcommonconcern,forexampleby:(1) Identifying, from amenu of options on security collaboration, those fitting into the

specificfieldsituation(seeappendix);(2) Implementing and updating such practical collaboration in its various forms on a

regularbasis.

Theforamayincludethefollowingregularparticipants:DO /FSO /AreaSecurityCoordinator or otherDODesignee;members of theSMTasappropriate;NGOfieldsecurityfocalpoint(s);representativesofIGOs;representativesoftheRedCrossMovement.Thechairpersonmaybechosenonarotatingbasis.

3Exofficioherereferstothefactthatrepresentativesofnon-UNorganizationsarenotboundby,norparticipateformallyin,SMTdecisionsonUNsecuritypolicy.


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9 Including staff security concerns in the CAPs ThattheCAPsincludeaprojecttocovertheadditionalresourcespotentiallyrequiredbyenhancedcollaborationonstaffsecuritybyagenciesandorganizationsrepresentedintheTaskForcesuchastelecommunication(cf.rec.12)andsecuritytraining(cf.rec.13).

10 Meeting common, security-related needs ThatUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners,committedtosecuritycollaborationineachspecifichumanitarianoperationparticipate, to theextent feasible, inmeeting theuncovered, security-related needs of the humanitarian community4, including costs,accordingtothescopeoftheirrespectiveinvolvement.

11 Sharing resources That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian fieldoperationsdevelopa local inventory for thesharingof their specialized, security-relatedhumanandmaterialresources.

12 Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at fieldlevelbefacilitatedby:(1) The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication

equipmentwithintheframeworkofexistinginternationalagreements;(2) The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common frequency for

securitycollaborationforUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersoperatinginthesamearea;

(3) Humanitarian actors committed to security collaboration using standardcommunicationproceduresand,totheextentpossible,providingstaffwithcompatiblecommunicationsystems.

13 Collaborating and consulting in security training ThatallUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartnersatHQandatfieldlevel:Carryoutsecuritytrainingincollaborationand/orconsultationwithotheragenciestothe

extentpossible;Seektoincreasetheirowncapacityforsecuritytrainingatalllevels.

14 Sharing information Thatsecurity-relatedinformationbesharedamongUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as theconfidentialityrequiredwhendealingwithsensitiveinformation.

4Humanitariancommunityinthisreportreferstothetotalityofhumanitarianactorsinagivenplace,addressingthesamehumanitariancrisis.


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15 Identifying minimum security standards That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners jointly identify and agree how toapply minimum security standards adapted to local circumstances. In so doing,humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, for exampletheUNMOSS(minimumoperationalsecuritystandards)thatarebindingforthemembersoftheUNsystem.

16 Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules That the security collaboration of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners inspecific field operations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locallydevelopedground-rulesforhumanitarianaction.

Recommendations on follow-up

17 Disseminating and evaluating ThatthemembersoftheUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners:Disseminate the recommendations on security collaboration within their respective

agenciesandorganizations,especiallyatthefieldlevel;Ensure that the utility of the recommendations is evaluated within their respective

agenciesandorganizations.

18 Learning lessons ThattheUNorganizationsandtheirIGO/NGOpartners:(1) Disseminatetherecommendationsonstaffsecuritycollaboration;(2) Reviewtheimplementationofthepresentrecommendations;(3) Prepare and disseminate regular Lessons Learnt reports on security collaboration,

basedonreportsfromtheiragenciesandorganizations.


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Annex IV:

The Survey

Implementing the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration

Where does the humanitarian community stand?

AcompletecopyoftheGuidelineshasbeenattachedforyourreference.

1. AreyouawareoftheGuidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration?Ifyourresponseto this question is NO, we encourage you to respond to question number two below for anycollaborativeactionstakenwithinthehumanitariancommunitytoaddresssecurity.

2. Below are the ten guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO collaboration. Please take a moment tocomment on the extent to which options (detailed on the attached Guidelines) for each of theGuidelinesbelowhasbeenconsideredand/orimplementedatyourcurrentorpastfieldposting.Your comments on what has worked and what has not worked when implementing the Guidelines are very important to us and will be shared with the entire community, without individual attribution,once compiled.

a. EnhancingcollaborationintheUNSecurityManagementTeam:b. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration: Including staff security

concernsintheConsolidatedAppeals:c. Meetingcommon,security-relatedneeds:Sharingresources:d. Facilitatinginter-agencytelecommunications:e. Collaboratingandconsultinginsecuritytraining:f. Sharinginformation:g. Identifyingminimumsecuritystandards:h. Seekingadherencetocommonhumanitarianground-rules:

BestpracticeinSecurityManagement: Aspartofitsefforttopromoteeffectivesecuritycollaboration,the IASC Working Group is particularly interested in fostering efforts which promote a commonunderstandingof thesituationand the factors thataffect securityaswellascommonefforts topromoteacceptanceofhumanitarianactionandthesecurityofhumanitarianactors.

This survey is beingdistributed tomembers of the humanitarian community in an attempt to get a betterunderstandingoftheextenttowhichtheGuidelinesarebeingused,whatapproachestoitsimplementationshaveworked,andwhichhavenot.WhileweappreciateANYtimeyoumayhavetocompletethissurvey,yourthoughtfulandreflectiveanswersaregreatlyappreciatedprior to close of business Friday, December 17th, 2004.Wewouldliketothankyoufortakingthetimetocompletethisquestionnaire.Yourcompletedsurveysshouldbereturnedviaemailtosbardwell@[email protected].


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3. Has the humanitarian community undertaken collective efforts to develop a commonunderstandingofthesituationintermsofthepoliticalandsecuritycontext,humanitarianneeds,localcommunities/powerstructuresandnational/localperceptionsofhumanitarianactorsandtheirwork?Ifso,whatparticularapproachesandmethodshavebeenutilizedtodoso?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ W e wel come any additional comments you may have regarding th e Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration.


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Annex V:

Summary of Survey Findings and Conclusions

Awareness of the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration Findings:

• 100% of UNDSS personnel surveyed but only 44% of NGO and UN humanitarian agencyrespondentswereawareoftheMoO.

Conclusions: • LackofawarenessoftheMoOdespitewidedistributionsince2002.• Wide-spread confusion regarding security-related Memorandums of Understanding signed

betweentheUNandNGOsandtheMoO.

Enhancing Collaboration in the UN Security Management TeamFindings:

• Normally, UNDSS conveys the deliberations of the Security Management Teams (SMTs) toNGOs in the context of other regular coordination and security information. It also acts as aprimaryconduitofsecurityinformationfromNGOstotheUNSMTs.

• Due to confusion regarding the difference between security coordination meetings and SMTmeetings,thelatterarewidelyperceivedasinternalUNmeetings.Onesecurityinitiativemanagercommented that “according tomy experience, [participation on theSMT]depends a lot on theUNpersonalitiesandisnotreallystandardacrosscountries.”

Conclusions: • IfcriticalsecurityinformationandanalysisthatmayallowNGOstobetternavigateaninsecure

environmentisnotsharedwithNGOs,theUN’sownhumanitarianresponsewillbecrippled.• Responsible NGO participation, as observers, on UN SMTs will facilitate the sharing of vital

informationthatwouldnototherwisebesharedinmore“public”generalorsecuritycoordinationmeetings.

• There exists a need for a cultural change within the UN humanitarian system that recognizesNGOsasanindispensablepartofitsownresponse,albeitindependentoftheUNsystem.

Convening Broad-based Forums for Field Security Collaboration & Information Sharing Findings:

• Information sharing is the most prevalent form of security collaboration. Regularly scheduledmeetings including a security component are standard practice in the proceedings betweenUNpersonnelandNGOsininsecureenvironments.

• Thefrequencyandprominenceofsecurityasatopicinthesemeetings(generallyheldatthefieldlevel rather than in the capitals) is largely a function of the level of insecurity of theworkingenvironment.

• Thesemeeting becomemore frequent and substantive when NGO security initiatives or NGOsecurityfocalpointsexist.


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Conclusions: • While the security of aidworkers is a central concern,meetings covering this issue tend to be

geared toward a recitation of incident specifics rather than involving critical discussion oranalysisofthecircumstancessurroundingtheincidents.

• Muchprogresscouldbemade tobetter the timeliness,accuracy,and formatof the informationthatisshared.However,respondentsconfirmedthatinformationisonlypartoftheequationthatresultsinsoundsecuritydecisions.

Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated AppealsFindings:

• UNDSSandUNhumanitarianagenciesrespondentsaregenerallyscepticalabouttheviabilityofadequatelyaddressingsecurityconcernswithintheCAPprocess,despitethefactthatalmosthalfoftheUNresponsesindicatedthattheCAPhadgeneratedcontributionsforsecurityrequirementsin their AOR. This was apparently attributable to the lengthy delay in turning CAP securitycontributions into"bootson theground".With twoexceptions,NGOrespondentsperceived theCAPasasolelyaUNinitiative.OverallitwasevidentthatsecurityisnotoftenwellintegratedintotheCAPstrategy.

Conclusion: • In is in the best interest of the humanitarian community to ensure well-conceived security

analysis and achievable project proposals in the CAPS. Moreover it is essential that theDesignatedOfficialensurethatsecurityrequirementsandinitiativesareanintegralcomponentofhumanitarianstrategyand to reinforce this throughallaspectsof theCAPProcess.TheCAP isperhaps the best means of meeting common security requirements of the humanitariancommunityand to thisend, theUNandNGOsmust rampupefforts to includewellconceivedsecurityprojectsasacorecomponentofallConsolidatedAppeals

Meeting Common Security-Related Needs & Sharing ResourcesFindings:

• Responsestothisaspectofcollaborationtendedto focusonUNderivedservicesandresources(e.g.communicationequipment,networksinfrastructure,andnetworkmanagement)thatcouldbeprovidedtothehumanitariancommunity.

Conclusions: • There is perhaps an unbalanced expectation on the part of NGOs that the responsibility for

meeting common security-related needs lies largelywith theUN through sharing or providingsecurityrelatedresourcesandservices.

• While the resource poolwithin theUN is, inmost cases, substantially greater than that of theNGOcommunity,NGOshavemuchtocontribute.

Facilitating Inter-Agency TelecommunicationsFindings:

• Inter-Agency telecommunication services have come to be a standard service provided by theUN; the NGO community perceives these services to be a UN responsibility rather than acollaborativeeffortbetweenthetwo.

Conclusions:


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• While theUNisperhapsbestplaced toprovide this service, thedifficulties it facesareseldomrecognizedbythehumanitariancommunityasawhole.

• The UN is often confronted with numerous challenges such as restrictions imposed by hostgovernments, insufficient resources to provide adequate coverage for a large,widely dispersedcommunity,andcompatibilityissues.

Collaborating and Consulting in Security TrainingFindings:

• Sharing security-training resources between the UN and NGOs is not part of the “standardoperatingprocedures”ofeither.Sharingisoftenfarfrombeingcollaborativeorcooperative.

Conclusions: • GreatereffortsarerequiredonpartofboththeUNandNGOstobemoreopenaboutaccessing

andtrulysharingtrainingresources.• Simpleconsiderations,suchaslargervenuesormoreinclusiveanddiversecurricula,openupthe

possibilityofincreasingthenumberofindividualsthataretrained,aswellaspromotingabetterunderstandingofthevariousapproachestosecurityandhowtheyimpactononeanother.

Identifying Minimum Security StandardsUNDSS Response: UN MOSS is often seen as the most appropriate standard, however few NGOsobservefullMOSSinallsituations.UNandNGOstandardsaremuchcloserinhighriskscenariosthaninlessthreateningenvironments.

InterAction Response: UN respondents appear to be of the mind that a common set of MOSS isundesirableasitwouldlowertheUNstandards. SomeNGOrespondentsfeltacommonMOSSwouldhamper their work and cited several hurdles such as differences in resource availability and thepolitics/economicssurroundingUNsecurityphases

Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rulesUNDSS Response: ThisquestionwasnotwellunderstoodbytheFSCOs,howeversomesawthisastheresponsibilityofOCHA.

InterAction Response: It seems that for themostpart,people feel that there isenoughofadifferencebetweentheUNandNGOstohinder,ifnotprevent,thedevelopmentofcommonground-rules.

1TheUNDSS Guidelines for UN/NGO security collaboration of 14 February 2002 are almost identical to the IASC guidance and have been re-distributed on an annual basis since 2002.2SeeannexIforversionapprovedbyIASCandannexIIforversionapprovedbyUNSECOORD3SeeannexIII4Observer status entails participation in security discussions and in noway implies involvement inUN securitydecisionsoninternalpoliciesandprocedureswithregardtotheirpersonnel.


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