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EBI Case Study

Scenarios

It was a cool November day in 2007 in Berkeley, CA. Beth Burnside was reading the final version of the

press release for an upcoming news conference at noon. This press release would announce the

successful completion of negotiations for a $500 million collaboration with BP over 10 years, to fund the

creation of the Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) at UC Berkeley. This announcement would be the

largest corporate Sponsored Research Agreement (SRA) in the University's history. In fact, it was the

largest industry SRA ever received by any university. 1

Burnside was Vice Chancellor for Research and had been tapped by University of California

Berkeley, Chancellor Robert Birgeneau to lead a team of people through the process of responding to a

Request for Proposal (RFP) from BP. The team had spent the last nine months working on the

agreement. They felt proud of the role that Berkeley might play in the exploration of renewable biofuels.

They felt their approach was the right plan at the right time for UCB to create a new model for

innovation between industry and the University. However, UC Berkeley was a public land-grant

university supported by the State of California, bringing with it important social responsibilities. Past

agreements with industry had been viewed as controversial by some because of the perceived threat of

corporate influence over a public university. Had Burnside and her team crafted a new model for

university-industry collaborations, or would they be accused of selling out the university instead?

1 SCIENCE VOL 315 9 February 2007 p 747.

Meanwhile, Paul Willems was packing up his office in Naperville, IL, a Chicago suburb, sorting through

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what he would need right away and what he would carry on the plane with him to San Francisco. He had

been anticipating the move for months, and now Willems was to join the EBI as Associate Director.

Outside of the EBI Governance Board, Willems would be the senior BP Corporation employee involved in

the project and would be located on-site, in BP’s rented proprietary section of the EBI. It was his job to

build a team that would make this project a success.

UC Berkeley’s background and mission

UC Berkeley (UCB) was founded in 1868 through the merger of two institutions, one being the

Agricultural, Mining, and Mechanical Arts College, a new state land-grant institution to provide

“teaching, research and public service;” and the other the private College of California, in Oakland. Land-

grant institutions were established when the federal government provided land to states for the

purpose of creating higher education facilities for the education of the working class that focused on

agriculture and mechanic-arts.2 The university had grown to become the No. 1 public university in the

country according to the 2008 U.S. News & World Report rankings of research universities. Since the

early 20th century, the California institution had attracted world-renowned scholars, talented students

and quality staff that have challenged conventional thinking and made significant contributions not only

in the sciences, but also in the social sciences, arts and humanities. In the early 1920s, the actions of

these free-thinkers led to the unprecedented role of “shared governance “of university affairs by the

Academic Senate. According to the university website, “that tradition has kept the Berkeley faculty

independent, outspoken, and powerful in the formation of academic policy for nearly a century.”3

The funding challenges to maintain this world-class public research institution had increased

2 UC Berkeley Website - http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/uchistory/general_history/overview/tour1.html

3 UC Berkeley Website - http://www.berkeley.edu/about/hist/activism.shtml

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dramatically over the past 30 years. Not only had the mix of funding sources changed, but the costs of

research had increased (especially in the sciences and engineering), both requiring the university to

operate differently. State funding fell over the last 30 years from 52.1% to 30%, and federal from 22%

to 17% over the same period. Government sources that used to provide more than 74% of funds

(adding state and federal support together) 30 years ago now provided only 47% of university budget

funds. See the exhibit below for a chart comparing the sources of funds for Berkeley in the 1976

academic year vs. the 2006 academic year.

1976-77 Sources of Funds

General Funds 52%

Tuition and Fees 9%

Federal Government 22%

Private Gifts, Grants and Contracts

3%

Endowment and Similar Funds

5%

Sales and Services of Educational Activities

2%

Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises

4%

Other Sources 3%

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Source: Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research

The decrease in federal and state funding represented a gap between 1976 and 2006 of over $418

million.4 University Administration made up the shortfall by raising more funds from private gifts,

student fees, and industry research funds.

As the campus shifted its funding strategy to include more private funds, university leaders needed to

prevent the erosion of their basic academic values. In Universities in the Marketplace, former Harvard

University President Derek Bok warned that “closer ties between university science and industry create

all sorts of risks for compromising the openness, objectivity, and independence of academic research.”5

4 This is calculated by the amount of funds Berkeley would have received in 2006 if state and federal sources had continued to provide 74% of its funds. The source of these calculations is from the 1976-77 and 2006-07 UC Berkeley Schedule 1-B Current Funds Expenditures.

5 Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2003), p. 156.

2006-07 Sources of Funds

General Funds 30%

Tuition and Fees 16%

Federal Government 17%

Private Gifts, Grants and Contracts

12%

Endowment and Similar Funds

6%

Sales and Services of Educational Activities

3%

Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises

6%

Other Sources 10%

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Structuring a University-Industry Partnership

Berkeley was not alone in facing these changes. The role of the university in the U.S. innovation system

was also changing. Many companies were retreating from basic scientific research and relying instead

on partnerships with academia to explore new knowledge.6 G. Pascal Zachary, New York Times journalist

and Stanford journalism teacher, describes in Exhibit 1 that companies were willing to pay for access to

professors, graduate students and basic research in hopes that they “learn more about scientific and

technical developments that might influence its business, even decades from now”. UC Administrators

tried to fill the funding gap left by declining state and federal support by capitalizing on corporate

America’s withdrawal from funding internal research and development centers. This elevated the

importance to society of basic research at universities, and it required new approaches to collaborating

with industry as well.

To that end, in 2004 UCB‘s Office of Intellectual Property and Industry Research Alliances (IPIRA)

introduced a new kind of Technology Transfer & Licensing (TTL) organization that was more focused on

measuring collaboration, uptake, social impact, innovation acceleration, translational efficiency, global

outreach, partnership, sharing and reputational gains than on the traditional “pharma-type” royalties

model. The traditional model was faulted for counting licensing revenue received and focusing on

potential blockbuster deals. Carol Mimura, Assistant Vice Chancellor of IPIRA, described Berkeley’s

approach as “developing long-term relationships with industry, not a single transaction, with many

points of engagement. Our goal is to maximize the social impact of Berkeley’s research, which is not the

same thing as maximizing the income from royalties to the university.”

6 Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass. ,2003), Chapter 3.

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Industry R&D executives supported IPIRA’s approach and expressed frustrations with other universities’

focus on near-term returns, unrealistic valuations of university Intellectual Property (IP), and their

unwillingness to share in the risks of commercializing IP. R. Stanley Williams, senior fellow at Hewlett

Packard, stated that “Largely as a result of the lack of federal funding for research, American universities

have become extremely aggressive in their attempts to raise funding from large corporations [via

licensing]. … Large U.S. based corporations have become so disheartened and disgusted with the

situation they are now working with foreign universities, especially the elite institutions in France, Russia

and China, which are more than willing to offer extremely favorable intellectual property terms.”7 Other

critics complained that “by focusing too much on churning out jobs and products, universities risk

shortchanging the most important economic functions they perform, namely teaching and basic

research.” 8 Mimura’s new model for industry engagement thus faced significant challenges in balancing

the commercial needs of industry with preserving the university’s independent role of research and

teaching.

7 Williams, S. R., Testimony of R. Stanley Williams before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the United States Senate September 17, 2002. (http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/government/testimony-nanotechnology.pdf)

8 Jennifer Washburn, University Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education (Basic Books, New York, 2005), p 193.

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BP background

In 2007, BP (formerly British Petroleum) was one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies and

claimed to be the largest investor in U.S. energy development9 with nearly 100,000 employees and $284

billion in revenues. The Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statements (shown in Exhibits

2, 3 & 4) illustrate the company‘s high degree of profitability. Its business segments included

Exploration & Production, Refining & Marketing and other businesses. BP’s position extended beyond

petroleum. The company had a strong commitment to its global biofuels business which was reflected

by its $1 billion commitment to advanced biofuels development to further its efforts in finding longer-

term commercial alternatives to oil and gas.

In a strategic review led by Chief Scientist Steve Koonin, BP’s diversification and investment in

alternative energy research was necessary given the increasing costs and risks within all of BP’s business

segments. Many oil deposits were located in areas of significant political risk, and new oil reserves were

becoming more difficult to discover in addition to requiring more expensive extraction methods and

higher transportation and labor costs. The five key drivers of the energy future – Supply & Resources,

Demand Growth, Technology, Security of Supply, and Environmental Constraints are described below.

9 BP Website - http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/us/bp_us_english/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/f/AboutBP_factsheet_0108.pdf

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Source: Courtesy of Steve Koonin, BP Chief Scientist

BP needed to develop a long-term strategy with numerous options to mitigate these risks.

When Koonin was exploring capabilities in bioscience-based energy technologies, he found a significant

void. As shown in Exhibits 5 and 6, U.S. federal funding for energy research was near historic lows with

Department of Energy (DOE) funding focused largely on fossil fuels, energy conservation, and solar.

In a company of 100,000 employees, there was not an abundance of bio-based expertise. Koonin

realized that a largely in-house R&D effort would not be up to the job. BP needed to do something in a

significant and material way to boost its capabilities in this critical new area, and quickly. Using his prior

experience as the provost of California Institute of Technology (Caltech), he saw the need to create an

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external research organization that had the scale, scope, and multidisciplinary interactions required to

bring BP up-to-speed in the energy biosciences. As Koonin described it, the EBI would become “the

world’s first organization focused on both basic and applied biological research relevant to energy.”

Koonin’s past experience at Caltech also helped him realize he would need a new model of collaboration

with universities. He wanted to move beyond the typical scan-the-opportunity-horizon approach of

issuing a call for proposals from individual university researchers, and instead opted to pursue “a hybrid

concept of a single organization embracing both open and proprietary research.”10 This approach could

facilitate a more effective two-way interdisciplinary information exchange and enable this research to

be done on a greater scale, in order to have more impact sooner. Koonin needed an environment that

could focus on long-term approaches and at the same time be somewhat coupled to BP business units’

shorter-term requirements. The co-location of open and proprietary research (in adjacent space) could

enable BP to quickly identify breakthrough developments and subsequently initiate proprietary activities

as well as attract quality researchers to BP-sponsored projects.

While Koonin envisioned the creation of a “public-private think tank” to be BPs best option for becoming

“the leader in energy biosciences,” he also saw this as a new collaborative approach between industry

and academia for solving one of society’s major problems - energy use and supply. In his view, the EBI

model should be similar in scale to the Salk, Broad and Whitehead institutes, with 150 key researchers.

This size was small enough for scientists to know each other, yet diverse enough to broadly analyze the

problem -- not only from a technical standpoint, but also from the social, economic, political and cultural

aspects. As opposed to commissioning a report on the state of energy biosciences research from a

10 Koonin, Remarks at President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) Panel on University-Private Sector Partnerships for Research, Washington, DC, January 8, 2008.

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consulting company, the EBI could provide BP with continual access to information on worldwide issues

from the best researchers. Koonin thought corporations and universities could embrace this model as

an approach to solving other long-term societal problems such as environmental degradation, food and

water availability, land use, public health and emerging diseases.

BP’s commitment to renewable biofuels extended beyond the EBI. Along with the $500 million

earmarked for the EBI, BP announced the formation of the BP Biofuels unit within its Refining &

Marketing business that committed another $500 million over five years. Plans included commercial

development of biobutanol and the construction of a $400 million world-scale bioethanol plant in

partnerships with Dupont and a joint venture with the UK’s D1 Oils to invest $160 million over five years

in developing plantations of Jatropha, a non-edible oil-bearing crop which can be grown on marginal

land. 11

11 BP Website - http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9021757&contentId=7041016

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EBI Proposal Background:

Koonin’s vision began to take form when his recommendation to BP’s Chief Executive, John Browne, for

EBI’s creation was accepted. As Koonin recalled, “I had a meeting with Lord Brown and reviewed with

him the strategic importance of biofuels to BP. Within two months, we had formal approval for $500

million over 10 years.” On June 14, 2006, just months after that conversation, BP announced that it

planned to establish a dedicated biosciences energy research laboratory that was associated with a

major academic center, backed by a commitment of $500 million.

Jim Breson, BP Project General Manager, was asked to spearhead the Request for Proposal (RFP)

process and began by visiting more than 30 universities to assess initial capabilities and develop a short

list of candidates. Breson and his team of project specialists wrote the RFP with the intent of opening up

a dialog with the academic leaders in the field. The RFP was eventually sent to only five “pre-qualified”

consortia and gave these academic experts the opportunity to recommend an overall approach. This RFP

differed markedly from most companies’ RFPs. Instead of providing a detailed specification of research

objectives and requirements, BP asked bidding institutions to “Help us to Invent the Future.” The

internal review process was also atypical. Breson had the foresight to establish and communicate an

evaluation methodology within BP in advance, so that there would be less chance of favoritism

influencing the evaluation of research institutions. In December, 2006 BP arranged for teams from each

of the potential host institutions to meet in London and present their proposals.

Meanwhile, when BP made its June announcement, Steve Chu, Director of Lawrence Berkeley National

Laboratories (LBNL) and Chancellor Robert Birgeneau of UC Berkeley discussed the possibility of

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responding to the RFP with a joint proposal. They agreed that this would be a great opportunity for the

two institutions to "combine the intellectual diversity of the campus and the energy research legacy of

the laboratory to help solve what is arguably the planet's most important problem to be solved by

science and technology," according to Chu. In addition, Birgeneau knew from many conversations with

both undergraduate and graduate students that “there was an intense desire of many students to work

on the challenges of sustainability, energy self-sufficiency and global climate change. This partnership

seemed to present an incredible opportunity for our students and faculty.”

The areas of sustainable alternative energy sources and global climate changes were not new to Director

Chu. Exhibit 7 details Chu’s EBI timeline. Prior to the RFP’s arrival, Chu as Co-chair of the InterAcademy

Council Study panel on Lighting the way Toward a sustainable energy future, held a workshop with

participants UCB Professor Jay Keasling, Stanford Professor Chris Somerville, UIUC Professor Steve Long,

and LBNL Deputy Director Graham Fleming, among others. The dependence on foreign oil and changes

in climate were driving LBNL to explore a multitude of areas -- new energy sources, challenges with

large-scale production and distribution, and the impacts of global warming. Chu could not see how the

application of existing technology could replace fossil fuels for transportation needs anytime soon and

had recently begun Helios, a joint LBNL-UC Berkeley project to develop methods of converting solar

energy into renewable sources of usable energy, including transportation fuels and photovoltaic

production of electricity. Soon after the EBI RFP was released, LBNL-UCB also bid on the DOE’s five-year

$125 million effort to create the Joint BioEnergy Institute (JBEI), which focused on finding new ways to

turn cellulose into fuel. With the combination of these three initiatives, Chu saw that UC Berkeley/LBNL

had the opportunity to become the leading energy research center in the world.

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Co-Principal Investigators Chu and Burnside formed the EBI planning committee and Birgeneau asked

Burnside to take the overall lead in preparing Berkeley’s response to the proposal. The group led by

Fleming and Burnside, which also included Keasling, College of Engineering Dean Rich Newton, and

Special Assistant to the Chancellor for Science and Technology Tom Kalil, quickly decided that the

proposal team for the California Institute for Quantitative Biomedical Research (QB3) should be utilized

in order to develop this large-scale proposal. QB3’s Diane Leite took charge of the proposal

development process and created the infrastructure for a cross-departmental response. The proposal

needed to present a breadth of capability, demonstrate creativity and ingenuity in assessing BP’s need

and be as transparent to the campus community as possible given the competitive nature of the bidding

process.

One of the first orders of business to fulfill the requirements of the RFP was to find a third partner to

provide a breadth of agricultural expertise. UC Davis had been considered, but due to a possible conflict

of interest (COI) from a recent Chevron research project, a mid-west “ag school” was recommended by

BP personnel, one which had a strong reputation, access to land, and experience in large-scale crop

production. Others recommended universities abroad. However, the logistics of coordinating a 6-week

proposal response, let alone a 10-year project, seemed too risky. Paul Ludden, dean of UC Berkeley's

College of Natural Resources, spearheaded the search and set-up phone interviews with a number of

mid-western schools.

The Berkeley team quickly saw the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) rise to the top. Not

only did UIUC have deep technical strength, but it also had an overall commitment to researching

agricultural issues. UIUC faculty knew how to talk with farmers, what farmers would grow, and what

new farm tools would be needed to harvest biomass crops. UIUC ‘s flexibility in structuring a

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partnership also gave the Berkeley team comfort that there would be a good cultural fit between the

universities. UIUC did not require a pre-defined rigid agreement and instead said “Let the science lead.”

(In developing these types of partnerships, the tasks of negotiating administrative issues such as funding

splits and Intellectual Property (IP) shares too often take precedence over working collaboratively on

developing solid technical solutions and approaches to the problems identified.) UIUC’s trust, flexibility

and commitment to the collaboration were best exemplified during the sites visits in London. As

Fleming recalled when UIUC was asked what they needed to participate in the project, the message

from UIUC Chancellor Richard Herman was “If it’s good enough for Berkeley, it’s good enough for us.”

With the proposal team completely formed and with support from the QB3 team, the proposal was

delivered in just six weeks. Four groups focused on the different aspects of the proposal: Science led by

Keasling, Facilities led by LBNL’s Michael Chartock, Contracts and Intellectual Property led by Mimura

and Management and Planning led by Leite. Chris Somerville provided key input to the scientific section

especially using his insights into BP’s overall intent learned from his former BP advisory role.

The proposal recommended creating a single master agreement for the open research performed under

the EBI. It was modeled after other master agreements (e.g. Intel and Yahoo! Lablets) designed to

streamline the contracting process. This would allow administrators to avoid having to re-negotiate the

main portion of the contract for each individual research project within the EBI and for each

modification to an ongoing project.

Lessons from the Novartis Agreement

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As the team created the proposal, they also wanted to incorporate lessons learned from an earlier

industry collaboration with Novartis. In 1998, the Novartis partnership (UCB-N) was one of the largest

Industry-UCB collaborations executed to date, comprising $25 million over five years. Critics were

concerned about its potential to “compromise faculty members’ independence and skew research

priorities,”12 which prompted campus administration to commission both internal and external studies

to evaluate the approach. The October 2002 internal administrative review conducted by Robert Price,

Associate Vice Chancellor for Research, found that students objected more to the process than to the

outcome. This was echoed in the external two-year study by Michigan State University (MSU); excerpts

can be found in Exhibit 8:

"In our interviews, one of the most common criticisms of the agreement was the ways that the process of

its negotiation –and subsequent exchanges between administrators and faculty – was illustrative of a

decline in the efficacy of faculty participation in the shared governance of the University." 13

The MSU study also discussed the long-standing disagreement about the way UCB was fulfilling its land

grant mission and how it stemmed from the way the Land Grant University (LGU) was initially

established with a dual populist and progressive mission.

“On the one hand, the Land Grant system was a reaction to pressures to extend higher education to

broad segments of the U.S. population (National Research Council 1996). …On the other hand, the

establishment of the LGUs was a response to demands by bankers, wealthy farmers and editors of many

of the agricultural journals for a more productive form of agriculture.” 14

12 The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 6, 2004

13 Busch et al., External Review, July 13, 2004, p. 141.

14 Busch et al., External Review, July 13, 2004, p 135.

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The MSU researchers discovered that “Plant and Microbial Biology (PMB) faculty and the administration

largely viewed industrial relations as fully congruent with the Land Grant mission. Faculty who were

critical of the agreement were mixed on whether or not industry relations fit with the Land Grant

mission… Populist agricultural and environmental advocacy organizations argued most vehemently that

industry relations went against the Land Grant mission. For them, biotechnology is large-scale

agriculture, and serving the interests of big agriculture does not fit the Land Grant idea.”15

The EBI Proposal Process

Proposal members sought to address this concern for the EBI proposal by directly involving the

Committee of Academic Planning and Resource Allocation (CAPRA) and the Committee on Research

(COR) during the proposal process. Vice Chancellor Burnside met several times with the committees and

chairs to solicit their advice and input. The proposal team initially failed to properly communicate with

the Budget and Interdepartmental Relations (BIR) committee regarding the Full-time Equivalent (FTE)

requirements. This was later addressed by Burnside and the BIR committee chair, who agreed on “the

principle of shared governance with respect to any faculty FTE to be included in the BP biofuels

initiation, including BC review of any new appointments.”16 In a published February 23, 2007 message

from the Chair of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, William Drummond concluded that

“None of us saw in the EBI any threat to the public nature of the university. In fact, the traditional

tripartite mission of land grant institutions-- teaching, research, and service --is being served by this

project. “17

15 Busch et al., External Review, July 13, 2004, p 135.

16 Kirch et al., Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental relations Annual Report 2006-2007, December 12, 2007.

17 Drummond, “Message from the Chair”, Feb 23, 2007.

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As the proposal team prepared the response, it was vital to communicate to the UCB community as well

as to BP that this project would preserve academic freedom and support the mission of the University.

Exhibit 9 prepared by Mimura and Burnside details how academic freedom and academic principles are

safeguarded in SRAs.

Berkeley’s proposal was presented to BP in London by a strong contingency including UCB Chancellor

Birgeneau, UIUC Chancellor Herman, LBNL Director Chu, Vice Chancellor Burnside, and leading world

experts –- Stanford Professor Somerville, UCB Professor Keasling and UIUC Professor Steve Long. The

proposal included support from Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Bay Area

governmental and business economic development organizations, and members from the venture

capital and entrepreneurial community. Still, Berkeley faced strong competition for the EBI. MIT,

Imperial College of London, Cambridge University, and University of California, San Diego, all submitted

proposals.

The Detailed EBI Negotiations Begin

On February 1, 2007, BP made the much-anticipated announcement that it had selected the UCB-LBNL-

UIUC team to create the EBI. This marked the beginning of the negotiations process which renewed the

public’s interest and also critics’ attention. Although the agreement was based on the University

standard Sponsored Research Agreement, given the size and duration of the project, the proposal team

knew there would be increased scrutiny.

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Although the EBI proposal included few deviations from the standard Sponsored Research Proposal,

some exceptions, primarily due to specific RFP requirements by BP, were anticipated. Almost all were

exceptions that had been granted in prior industry agreements. However, considerations surrounding

Background IP (BIP) were negotiated and DOE waivers were required to allow BP to manufacture

outside of the U.S. and avoid government license and march-in rights for certain BP sole inventions.

These negotiations between UCB, LBNL and DOE proved especially challenging.

Over a nine-month period, the UCB negotiations team led by Mimura (on behalf of the academic

collaborators) focused on drafting the contract and negotiating the details of EBI governance, funding,

research proposal selection and administration, confidentiality, publication, proprietary development

space, and IP.

Staffing

While not normally found in a standard SRA, 10 new faculty members (seven at

UCB/LBNL, three at UIUC) were to be added as a result of the agreement (with BP

having no say in the selection process of these faculty). In addition, the EBI would

eventually hold 50 BP scientists on the campuses and accommodate nearly 200

additional postdocs, graduate and undergraduate students.

Governance

Governance of the open development space (described below) of the EBI was structured

with both a Governance Board and an Executive Committee. The Governance Board

included four BP and four UCB/UICU members with a quorum designated as five, with at

least one UCB member and one BP member in attendance. The provision required that a

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prevailing vote needed to be five, even if there were only five members present, to

ensure that both parties had to work together. In addition, the Board’s functions set

broad policy but were fairly limited, including hiring and firing of the EBI Director, the

EBI Deputy Director, and the approval of the slate of research proposals. “Cherry-

picking” of individual research proposals was prohibited; the Governance Board could

only approve or deny an entire slate of research projects. This last item was important

for academic freedom.

The Executive Committee performed the grant-making duties and created the slate of

proposals. The committee was comprised of at least five members, consisting of: (a) the

EBI Director (University employee), (b) the EBI Deputy Director (University employee),

(c) the EBI Associate Director (BP employee), (d) the EBI science program director(s) (as

of 2008 there were five UCB/LBNL/UIUC employees), and (e) one representative

appointed by BP.

Research proposal selection process

The research proposal selection process was administered roughly on an annual basis.

The proposals were prepared by researchers and reviewed by the predominantly

academic Executive Committee and the selected group of proposals was sent to the

Governance Board for approval as a group. As Mimura noted, “The EBI research

proposal selection process gave BP less control than is typically granted by universities

to companies in corporate Sponsored Research Agreements.”

Proprietary & Open development spaces

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One of the unique aspects of the agreement centered on the co-located proprietary and

open development spaces. The proprietary BP space was leased to BP and was

separated from the “open” space by card access. The vast majority of the space was for

open development, with the intent of creating a synergistic environment conducive to

breakthrough innovations. This was also a unique approach to focusing on the most

promising technology early-on and reducing the amount of translational research by

having easy access to upstream industrial knowledge. A researcher could make a

discovery on the bench and then quickly receive an on-site assessment of the

commercial scale-up viability. However, proposal critics expressed their concern that

corporate input could become corporate direction.

As the table below shows, the EBI would include both open and proprietary elements

funded by BP in its $50 million per year (on average) contribution.

Open Proprietary

Basic, academic research Commercial applications lab

Research performed by UCB, LBNL, UIUC

employees

Research performed by BP employees

Results all published Confidential

Results belong to UCB, LBNL, and/or UIUC Results belong to BP

At least $35 million allocated yearly for

open research

On average $15 million allocated yearly for

confidential applied research

Source: Mimura, EBI Forum presentation March 19, 20007 (adapted)

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An issue that plagued negotiations surrounding the open component was BPs request

for a global Non-disclosure Agreement (NDA). BP eventually withdrew its request after

Burnside and Mimura argued convincingly that this would compromise academic

freedom and be breached on the first day of any such agreement. The University

operates with a default that all information is open and publishable unless otherwise

stated. So BP and UCB opted to execute a pre-negotiated stand-alone, individual NDA

whenever a researcher would need to receive confidential information, despite the

administrative overhead that this would require.

IP

IP ownership was a combination of “Yours,” “Mine” and “Ours.”

“Yours” – Solely owned by BP – Inventions made solely by BP personnel in their

rented space.

“Mine” – Solely owned by UCB, LBNL, or UIUC – Inventions made solely by UCB,

LBNL, or UICU personnel in their own space.

“Ours” – Jointly owned – Inventions made by at least one inventor from BP and

at least one inventor from UCB, LBNL, or UIUC, following U.S. patent law.

BP would receive a non-exclusive, royalty-free (NERF) commercial license to inventions

funded by BP, through the EBI. This differed from standard UC practice at the time. BP

could also elect a royalty-bearing exclusive license. BP also had rights to license certain

background intellectual property (BIP)18 rights necessary to practice a given licensed

invention. This was a particularly sensitive issue for BP and one of the most challenging

issues to negotiate.

18 Background IP refers to IP that was owned by one or more UCB/LBNL/UIUC researchers and was created outside an EBI funded research project

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It was imperative that BP negotiators ensure that they had Freedom to Operate (FTO) by

being able to secure NERF licenses for any BIP. At the same time, it was crucial for UCB

negotiators to protect the BIP of researchers not funded by an EBI research project.

UC Community Input

During the negotiation phase, the UCB administration also tried to respond to the UCB community’s

need for transparency and oversight. In an effort to fulfill UCB administration’s commitment to shared

governance, an Academic Senate subcommittee comprised of the chairs of CAPRA, BIR, COR and the

Academic Freedom Committee (ACFR) was formed to provide input during the negotiation process. The

advisory committee did not include student representation. However, a group of students comprised of

undergraduates, graduates and postdocs was convened by Vice Chancellor Burnside and headed up by

UC Berkeley Law student Henry Stern, to provide student input and create a peer-informed

communication to the student body.

Mimura with Burnside met with the Academic Senate subcommittee five times during the negotiations

phase. The November 2, 2007 Academic Senate Committee Chairs’ EBI Report describes their

assessment and stated that:

“Throughout the process, we were granted full access (in confidence) to the documents as they were

developed. We were invited to, and did, comment across the full range of issues in the contract, and our

23

interventions appeared to have been the basis for a number of changes in the substance and wording of

the contract.”19

Critics still complained that no open Academic Senate meetings were held prior to the February

announcement of Berkeley’s selection to be BP’s partner for the EBI initiative. A number of public

forums, teach-ins, and debates were organized after the February announcement to discuss a range of

critics’ concerns.

Concerns were raised that BP was using Berkeley to project a green image (a.k.a. corporate “green

washing”20). Miguel Altieri, UCB Environmental Science, Policy & Management (ESPM) Professor and

major critic of the project, commented that “when the faculty becomes skewed, we won't have other

ideas and lose breadth. Basic, open, alternative, precautionary and not for-profit research are all at risk.”

Altieri further claimed that UC administrators ignored the company's track record and cited BP’s alleged

poor environmental record -- legal trouble in Texas and Alaska and human rights violations towards

indigenous people. As far as he was concerned, “this was blood money.”

Fellow ESPM professor Ignacio Chapela pointed out that BP could be using the University to escape the

liability tied to the research and get protection from the UC system. Altieri, Chapela and another ESPM

professor Andrew Paul Gutierrez, warned that biofuels will displace food crops and “place the

unconstrained energy ‘needs’ of First World consumers into direct competition with cash-poor

countries’ food supplies and conservation of rare and important ecosystems.” Altieri contended that the

19 November 2, 2007 Academic Senate Committee Chairs’ EBI Report

24

amount of land required, combined with using herbicides and pesticides, would cause huge

environmental damage, including deforestation. Tad Patzek, former UCB geo-engineering professor and

now chair of the Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering Department at The University of Texas at

Austin, also disputed the sustainability of biofuels and questioned whether fuels might actually produce

more carbon dioxide emissions than they eliminated. Exhibit 10 contains further information on the

unanticipated consequences of biofuels, especially their potential impacts on the poor.

The debate continued with critics challenging that the mere size of the EBI deal would cause undue

influence over faculty and create a power shift. Critics cited Derek Bok’s point that universities could

“take technology transfer activities into account in appointing and promoting faculty members” and that

“policies to tenure professors of modest scientific talents who demonstrate a capacity to raise

substantial funds from patents or industrial connections”21 would compromise academic values of

research excellence. Altieri concurred, in his opinion, faculty who bring in lots of money become

powerful. He said they become respected members of the Chancellor's committees (e.g. budget

committees), and he claimed that anti-biotech faculty like Altieri are not invited to join these

committees. Other potential issues cited by critics included the increasing reliance of public universities

on corporate funding and its impacts on the shaping of the curriculum, the availability of funds for

research programs, the relative pay of faculty across departments who receive substantial industry

support vs. those who don’t, and the impacts on students.

20 Green-washing is a term used to describe the perception of consumers that they are being misled by a company regarding the environmental practices of the company or overstating their value as a contributor to the environment – wiki

21 Derek Box, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2003), p 205.

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The issues of academic freedom and the desire for faculty oversight in industry-sponsored research

reached a pivotal moment at the April 19, 2007 Special meeting of the Academic Senate on the EBI. A

two-part compromise resolution crafted by Brian Staskawicz, John Taylor and Randy Schekman, with

advice from Academic Senate parliamentarian Ron Gronsky (Exhibit 11), was overwhelmingly approved

by voice vote from the nearly 300 professors present; one of the best attended Senate meetings since

the days of the Free Speech Movement. The first motion focused on academic freedom and stated that

“no unit of the University, whether by faculty vote or administrative decision, has the authority to

prevent a faculty member from accepting external research funding based solely on the source of

funds.” PMB Professor John Taylor who proposed the amended motions recalled “Many of the

professors who were first opposed to the project changed their opinion after taking into consideration

how they might feel if restrictions were placed on their sources of funding.”

The second motion increased the Academic Senate subcommittee’s function to include a permanent

oversight role of the EBI. The passage led to Burnside’s commitment that “the EBI Director (or a

designate) will present an annual report of the EBI to DIVCO [Divisional Council] and that the EBI will

otherwise be subject to ORU-type [Organized Research Unit] review (including a five year review).”22 The

Academic Senate subcommittee report concluded that “these reporting mechanisms will help to display

and ensure the consonance of EBI with academic principles and values.”23

BP Negotiations Background

BP chose to allow UCB to manage all campus communications, and BP refrained from public comment

on the EBI program itself or on UCB community reaction. And while there was extensive media

22 November 2, 2007 Academic Senate Committee Chairs’ EBI Report

23 November 2, 2007 Academic Senate Committee Chairs’ EBI Report

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coverage and multiple workshops or review sessions, Breson was surprised by the lack of knowledge

about the structure of the EBI on the part of its critics. He recalled how proposal opponents objected to

industry participation and wanted instead an arms-length relationship, that in his mind would have

quashed any collaborative efforts. As an example, he shared that BP had extensive expertise in fuel

technologies and laboratory data on combustion efficiency, emissions, and blending characteristics -- all

of which they would be willing to share with the investigators to help develop even better fuels.

At the same time, Breson and Koonin realized that this was an opportunity for the EBI initiative to be

thoroughly vetted and avoid future ramifications. “We wanted to shake out the bugs early on, for we

wanted this to be a 10 year initiative that worked,” recalled Koonin. Breson, Koonin and Willems had

their own public relations campaign to address – how to convince BP line management and senior

executives that EBI was not mere corporate charity, and how to attract the staff needed away from

careers in the main part of BP to execute the vision.

Getting Ready for the News Conference

As Burnside prepared for the noon-time news conference, she marveled at how far Berkeley had come

in working to develop the EBI initiative. Not only was this the largest corporate agreement of its kind, it

also involved working closely with another university in another state. Not only were extensive

resources involved, but Berkeley would be leasing land to a private company on the Berkeley campus.

There were critics who doubted that this was in Berkeley’s best interests, or that of society. As the

university entered this unchartered territory, Berkeley had an unprecedented opportunity to prove its

critics wrong. The stakes were high, and she hoped that the model that had been negotiated would be

able to advance Berkeley’s mission as one of the world’s leading research institutions.

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Exhibit 1

December 16, 2007

PING

Corporate Labs Disappear. Academia Steps In. By G. PASCAL ZACHARY

Correction Appended

PAY me now, and pay me later.

That’s the new mind-set at some leading research universities in dealing with business — and the essence of an

emerging model for how corporations can tap big brains on campus without having to pay their salaries.

Corporations have long been able to license intellectual property from universities, but these deals are

cumbersome to negotiate and tend to work best when corporate researchers know exactly what they need to

create.

They don’t always. Often, they explore scientific and technological frontiers without a map. After blue-sky thinking

and random experimentation, they build new products without relying on neatly defined patents or published

scientific papers — the bread-and-butter of academic knowledge production.

In the bygone days of innovation, large corporations — like RCA, Xerox and the old AT&T — maintained internal

laboratories like Bell Labs. These corporate labs were essentially research universities embedded in private

companies, and their employees published academic papers, spoke at conferences and even gave away valuable

breakthroughs. Bell Labs, for instance, created the world’s first transistor after World War II — and never earned a

dollar from the innovation.

Almost no corporate labs based on the Bell or Xerox model remain, victims of cost-cutting and a new appreciation

by corporate leaders that commercial innovations may flow best when scientists and engineers stick to business

problems.

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The obsession with marrying research and markets, while generally a strength of American capitalism, leaves some

needs unmet. To fill them, “companies need boots on the ground at universities,” says Henry Chesbrough, a

business professor who studies innovation at the University of California, Berkeley.

A vanguard group of universities is giving corporations greater access to ivory-tower laboratories — for a price.

Stanford has paired with Exxon Mobil in a deal worth $100 million over 10 years. The University of California,

Davis, is getting $25 million from Chevron. And Intel has opened collaborative laboratories with Berkeley, the

University of Washington and Carnegie Mellon.

The appeal of these arrangements is that “we get broad engagement with universities,” says Andrew A. Chien,

Intel’s director of research. “Their researchers work on frontiers, in unexplored territory. We want explorers.”

Intel hopes to learn more about scientific and technical developments that might influence its business, even

decades from now. The company says it benefits from having its own employees rub shoulders with professors,

while gaining the chance to observe younger talent in Ph.D. programs.

“You can view this as a pure pipeline,” says Mr. Chien, himself a former professor.

Jean Stéphenne, president of the vaccine division of GlaxoSmithKline, the pharmaceutical company, says university

partnerships with corporations will grow “because technology is changing so rapidly.” Even if companies have the

resources to finance their own research and identify the right academic problems to tackle, they usually don’t have

the time to assemble a staff to pursue these problems. Without help from university professors, Mr. Stéphenne

asks, “How can we cope?”

Some people doubt that formal partnerships between corporations and universities can deliver real benefits.

“Universities don’t innovate,” says Curtis R. Carlson, chief executive of SRI International, a nonprofit research

institute in Menlo Park, Calif., that bought what remained of RCA’s lab. “Innovation means you get it out so people

can use it. The university is not going to take t to the world.”

But corporations hope that universities can help them take innovations to the world faster and more efficiently.

Last month, BP pledged to spend $500 million over 10 years on alternative-energy research to be carried out by a

new Energy Biosciences Institute at Berkeley, which will manage work done at a nearby Department of Energy lab

and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

“This is a new model we’re working through in real time,” says Robert J. Birgeneau, the chancellor of Berkeley.

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CRITICS of corporate-university partnerships fear limits on academic freedom or, worse, that companies might

censor results that go against their interests. The risk of such interference seems small, however. Despite the large

amount being offered by BP, the money will be divided three ways; of Berkeley’s annual research budget of $500

million (nearly all from the federal government), BP will be contributing less than 3 percent.

Under the terms of the partnership, meanwhile, Berkeley professors are free to publish results of BP-funded

research. The university also will own the rights to any resulting intellectual property. BP would even have to

license that intellectual property, though payments are capped and the company would get the first look at

promising results.

The alternative to corporate funds is for universities to rely even more on government funds. And that raises

parallel issues in the minds of some academics. The idea that government funding plays no role in prioritizing

research “is completely at odds with reality,” says Michael Crow, the president of Arizona State University.

The marriage of corporations and university researchers is still in its early days. “In the decades ahead, we will see

more differentiation among universities in how they go about doing this,” Mr. Crow says.

For universities, no matter what models emerge, the key is to deliver benefits to society and business.

“Will these partnerships produce products you won’t get from two people in a garage?” Mr. Birgeneau asks. “We

don’t know that yet. It is an important question.”

G. Pascal Zachary teaches journalism at Stanford and writes about technology and economic development. E-mail:

gzach@nytimes.com.

Correction: December 23, 2007

A headline last Sunday with the Ping column, about research partnerships between universities and corporations,

referred incorrectly to the status of Bell Labs. Although it is no longer part of AT&T, it has not been discontinued; it

is now the research arm of Alcatel-Lucent. The column also misspelled the surname of the president of Arizona

State University, who said that universities’ roles in such partnerships would evolve in coming decades. He is

Michael Crow, not Crowe.

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Exhibit 2 BP Group Income Statement

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Exhibit 3 BP Balance Sheet

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Exhibit 4 BP Cash Flow Statement

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Exhibit 5

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Exhibit 6

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Exhibit 7 - MSU Excerpts

1. Avoid industry agreements that involve complete academic units or large groups of researchers.

The UCB-N agreement’s coverage by one firm of numerous faculty members in one department was

outside the mainstream for research contracts with industry. While an intriguing experiment, there

appears little rationale for repeating the approach. Standard agreements or templates can serve to

streamline negotiations with industry without the complexity of unit-wide decision making. With general

terms agreed upon, individual research projects may be defined around specific researchers and the

specific scope, scale, duration, and matching funds involved.

7. Strive to educate the public on the specific nature of intellectual property, technology transfer, and the

nature of institutional accountability.

Much has been made of the public’s general lack of scientific knowledge. It is also true that there is

considerable misunderstanding regarding the patenting system and university licensing. The latter lack

of understanding may lead to the belief that patented technology developed at and licensed by the UC

carries a de facto endorsement by the University. The absence of institutional liabilities should be more

actively communicated. On campus, faculty, students, and administrators should have a better

grounding in the specifics of IP management and policy.

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Exhibit 8- LBNL Chu’s EBI Timeline

Source: Chu, EBI Forum presentation March 19, 20007

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Exhibit 9

How Academic Freedom and Academic Principles are Preserved in Sponsored Research Agreements with Industry

March 19, 2007

University sponsored research agreements with industry safeguard academic freedom and the mission of the University (which is teaching, research, dissemination of information, and public service). The University’s principles for contracting with outside entities are well promulgated at: http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/principles.html

In individual corporate sponsored research agreements, academic freedom is preserved in the following ways:

• Researchers (PIs, postdoctoral fellows and students) decide for themselves whether or not they will participate in a given sponsored research project, regardless of the funding source.

• When Berkeley researchers choose to seek research funding from a company under a sponsored research agreement, they draft a proposed work plan, often called a “scope of work.” Scopes of work describe research that is academically appropriate for University researchers to perform and that will published. The researcher and the sponsor then mutually agree on a budget that will fund the direct research costs of the work.

• Under master research agreements with companies when all scopes of work are not arranged in advance, individual scopes of work are funded under the terms of the master agreement, but the scopes of work are still drafted by the researchers, not by the company sponsor. Under a master agreement the scopes of work are typically drafted and submitted in response to a request for proposals to be funded under the master agreement; thus, the researchers are aware of the terms of the agreement at the time the work is proposed.

• The University owns intellectual property (IP) developed by its employees in our facilities, even if that IP arises from corporate funded research.

• As the owner of the IP, even when the University licenses IP rights to the sponsor (or to any entity) the University always reserves certain rights for itself. These include the right to practice the IP rights on our own behalf and to allow others in the nonprofit sector to use them for their own education and research purposes.

• Publication at the University is a fundamental right. In the typical corporate sponsored research agreement, sponsors receive the right to review publications (and public presentations) before they are disseminated. This is called a publication preview right. However, that preview period is typically limited to just 30 days. The publication preview period allows the company sponsor to:

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1) protect any of its confidential information that may have been inadvertently incorporated into the intended disclosure. If such information has been incorporated, the sponsor may ask us to remove it, but does not have direct editorial control; and/or

2) request that the University file a patent application on any of the funded results

If the sponsor requests that the University file a patent application, then typically up to an additional 60 day publication delay may be allowed. The 30 day and 60 day time limits are standard at most research universities. A publication delay may be stopped by the University's filing of a patent application, so the actual delay is the shorter of the two; the patent filing preparation time or 60 days, whichever occurs first.

• Typical corporate sponsored research agreements also describe how IP developed under the agreement may be licensed by the corporate sponsor. The primary objective of University IP licensing programs is to benefit the public by enabling commercialization of basic research. Nearly all University-generated research outcomes are far from being a true commercial product and require large amounts of investment by the private sector to bring to the point of practical application. Corporate sponsored research agreements at Berkeley grant to the sponsor a time-limited, first right to negotiate a commercial license to IP developed in the funded project. Exclusive licenses to such IP always indemnify the University from commercial acts, and require that the licensee diligently commercialize the rights.

• The University is an open, academic institution with limited mechanisms to safeguard confidential information. The need for a company to provide researchers at the University with confidential information is likely to be low. When researchers DO choose, however, to receive company confidential information in order to advance a research project, the University and company confer on the appropriate agreement to govern the disclosure. Such agreements describe how confidential information will be managed by the recipient. They include standard clauses that describe when the duty ends, and when the information is no longer confidential. The University does not accept confidential information that is controlled by export laws.

Academic freedom is also safeguarded in corporate sponsored research agreements by research compliance procedures, such as standard conflict of interest procedures. Moreover, all contracts with unusual clauses are vetted by legal and policy experts. The most robust enforcer of academic freedom in place on campus is the academic tradition itself, that all principal investigators are familiar with, and have a strong motivation to preserve.

Carol Mimura

Assistant Vice Chancellor for Intellectual Property and Industry Research Alliances

Beth Burnside

Vice Chancellor for Research

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Exhibits 10

The Biofuel Myths

International Herald Tribune

By Eric Holt-Giménez, Executive Director of FoodFirst/Institute for Food and Development Policy

Published: July 10, 2007

The term "biofuels" suggests renewable abundance: clean, green, sustainable assurance about

technology and progress. This pure image allows industry, politicians, the World Bank, the United

Nations and even the International Panel on Climate Change to present fuels made from corn,

sugarcane, soy and other crops as the next step in a smooth transition from peak oil to a yet-to-be-

defined renewable fuel economy.

But in reality, biofuel draws its power from cornucopian myths and directs our attention away from

economic interests that would benefit from the transition, while avoiding discussion of the growing

North-South food and energy imbalance.

They obscure the political-economic relationships between land, people, resources and food, and fail to

help us understand the profound consequences of the industrial transformation of our food and fuel

systems. "Agro-fuels" better describes the industrial interests behind the transformation, and is the

term most widely used in the global South

Industrialized countries started the biofuels boom by demanding ambitious renewable-fuel targets.

These fuels are to provide 5.75 percent of Europe's transport power by 2010 and 10 percent by 2020.

The United States wants 35 billion gallons a year.

These targets far exceed the agricultural capacities of the industrial North. Europe would need to plant

70 percent of its farmland with fuel crops. The entire corn and soy harvest of the United States would

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need to be processed as ethanol and biodiesel. Converting most arable land to fuel crops would destroy

the food systems of the North, so the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

countries are looking to the South to meet demand.

The rapid capitalization and concentration of power within the biofuels industry is extreme. Over the

past three years, venture capital investment in biofuels has increased by 800 percent. Private

investment is swamping public research institutions.

Behind the scenes, under the noses of most national antitrust laws, giant oil, grain, auto and genetic

engineering corporations are forming partnerships, and they are consolidating the research, production,

processing and distribution chains of food and fuel systems under one industrial roof.

Biofuel champions assure us that because fuel crops are renewable, they are environment-friendly, can

reduce global warming and will foster rural development. But the tremendous market power of biofuel

corporations, coupled with the poor political will of governments to regulate their activities, make this

unlikely. We need a public enquiry into the myths:

Biofuels are clean and green.

Because photosynthesis performed by fuel crops removes greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and

can reduce fossil fuel consumption, we are told they are green. But when the full lifecycle of biofuels is

considered, from land clearing to consumption, the moderate emission savings are outweighed by far

greater emissions from deforestation, burning, peat drainage, cultivation and soil-carbon losses.

Every ton of palm oil generates 33 tons of carbon dioxide emissions - 10 times more than petroleum.

Tropical forests cleared for sugar cane ethanol emit 50 percent more greenhouse gases than the

production and use of the same amount of gasoline.

Biofuels will not result in deforestation.

Proponents of biofuels argue that fuel crops planted on ecologically degraded lands will improve rather

than destroy the environment. Perhaps the government of Brazil had this in mind when it reclassified

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some 200 million hectares of dry-tropical forests, grassland and marshes as degraded and apt for

cultivation.

In reality, these are the biodiverse ecosystems of the Atlantic Forest, the Cerrado and the Pantanal,

occupied by indigenous people, subsistence farmers and extensive cattle ranches. The introduction of

agrofuel plantations will push these communities to the agricultural frontier of the Amazon where the

devastating patterns of deforestation are well known.

Soybeans supply 40 percent of Brazil's biofuels. NASA has correlated their market price with the

destruction of the Amazon rainforest - currently at nearly 325,000 hectares a year.

Biofuels will bring rural development.

In the tropics, 100 hectares dedicated to family farming generates 35 jobs. Oil-palm and sugarcane

provide 10 jobs, eucalyptus two, and soybeans a scant half-job per 100 hectares, all poorly paid.

Until recently, biofuels supplied primarily local and subregional markets. Even in the United States, most

ethanol plants were small and farmer-owned. With the boom, big industry is moving in, centralizing

operations and creating gargantuan economies of scale.

Biofuels producers will be dependent on a cabal of companies for their seed, inputs, services, processing

and sale. They are not likely to receive many benefits. Small holders will be forced out of the market and

off the land. Hundreds of thousands have already been displaced by the soybean plantations in the

"Republic of Soy," a 50-million hectare area in southern Brazil, northern Argentina, Paraguay and

eastern Bolivia.

Biofuels will not cause hunger.

Hunger results not from scarcity, but poverty. The world's poorest already spend 50 to 80 percent of

household income on food. They suffer when high fuel prices push up food prices. Now, because food

and fuel crops compete for land and resources, both increase the price of land and water.

The International Food Policy Research Institute has estimated that the price of basic staples will

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increase 20 to 33 percent by 2010 and 26 to 135 percent by 2020. Caloric consumption declines as price

rises by a ratio of 1:2.

Limits must be placed on the biofuels industry. The North cannot shift the burden of overconsumption

to the South because the tropics have more sunlight, rain and arable land. If biofuels are to be forest-

and food-friendly, the grain, cane and palm oil industries need to be regulated, and not piecemeal.

Strong, enforceable standards based on limiting land planted for biofuels are urgently needed, as are

antitrust laws powerful enough to prevent the corporate concentration of market power in the industry.

Sustainable benefits to the countryside will only accrue if biofuels are a complement to plans for

sustainable rural development, not the centerpiece.

A global moratorium on the expansion of biofuels is needed to develop regulatory structures and foster

conservation and development alternatives to the transition. We need the time to make a better

transition to food and fuel sovereignty.

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Exhibit 11

44

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Exhibit 12 Acronym List

Term Definition

ACFR Academic Freedom Committee

BIP Background IP, background inventions

BIR Budget and Interdepartmental Relations

BP BP Corporation formerly British Petroleum

Cal Tech California Institute of Technology

CAPRA Committee of Academic Planning and Resource Allocation

COI Conflict of Interest

COR Committee on Research

Corporate green washing A term used to describe the perception of consumers that they are being misled by a company regarding the environmental practices of the company or overstating their value as a contributor to the environment

DIVCO Divisional Council

DOE Department of Energy

EBI Energy Biosciences Institute

ESPM Environmental Science, Policy & Management

FTE Full-time Equivalent

FTO Freedom-to-Operate

IP Intellectual Property

IPIRA Office of Intellectual Property and Industry Research Alliances

JBEI Joint BioEnergy Institute

LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories

LGU Land Grant University

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MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MSU Michigan State University

NDA Non-disclosure Agreement

NERF Non-exclusive, royalty-free

ORU Organized Research Unit

PMB Plant and Microbial Biology

QB3 California Institute for Quantitative Biomedical Research

R&D Research and Development

RFP Request for Proposal

SRA Sponsored Research Agreement

TTL Technology Transfer & Licensing

UCB University of California, Berkeley or UC Berkeley

UCB-N UC Berkeley-Novartis partnership

UC Davis University of California, Davis

UIUC University of Illinois – Urbana Champaign

VCR Vice Chancellor for Research