sea power 2 session 3-france joins

Maritime Powersession iii

France Joins the War

VIEW OF THE ‘PONT-NEUF’ FROM THE CORNER OF THE ORDNANCE STORES by Joseph Vernet, 1755

This shows the ordnance stores of the Toulon dockyard. Lines of battleships are moored in the background, and in the foreground shot of every caliber are perfectly aligned. Some cannon are being cleaned while a group of officers and engineers hold a discussion.—sailingwarship.com

“In Maritime Supremacy, I suggested that we, the liberal western nations, are the heirs of [Sea Power]: …our beliefs and the present dominance of those beliefs throughout much of the world are the result of…the global distribution of sea and land masses which has conferred strategic advantage on powers able to use and dominate the seas….the first maritime power in the modern era was the 17th century Dutch Republic; the British superseded the Dutch in the 18th century and were in turn superseded by the Americans in the 20th century. “During their periods of dominance these three powers were fundamentally different from rivals whose power was based upon territorial dominion. The difference was merchant government. [emphasis added—jbp]

Peter Padfield, Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom.(2006), p. 1.

My grad school professor, Dean Joseph Holloway, had a four-point summary of the indispensable aid which tipped the scales against Britain:

• money • arms • troops • and the last (which made possible the delivery of points one through three)

sea power jbp

The French Contribution

America’s First Ally

The War at Sea, 1778-79

The First French Fleet

The West Indies

Indecision, 1780

Topics for Today’s Presentation

America’s First AllyJohn Paul Jones captains the first American warship to be

saluted by our new ally

Padfield, Maritime Supremacy., p. 238.

“AFTER CHOISEUL’S DISMISSAL in 1770, the splendid navy he had created was mishandled by his successor. Money was saved by running down essential stocks of timber and stores; the officer corps was alienated by administrative ‘reforms’ on army lines which bore no relation to naval necessities or tradition and proved unworkable. By 1774, when Louis XV died, the service had been crippled. It was rescued by a new Minister of Marine and the Colonies,• Antoine de Sartine, appointed in August that year by Louis XVI.• At first Sartine was restricted by lack of funds, but as British problems in America worsened, appearing to offer France opportunities of revenge for the last war, the balance of opinion in Louis’ innermost council of ministers moved from budgetary and diplomatic restraints towards adventure; the navy budget grew accordingly. “The new policy was signified by the defeat of the Comptroller General of Finance, Baron Anne Robert Jacques Turgot.• He was attempting to reduce Crown debt by strict economy, but his ultimate aim, like that of all his predecessors since the great Colbert, was a complete rationalization of the tax system in order to tap the wealth presently protected by privilege and provincial exemption;…”

13 The War of American Independence

and Chesapeake BayX X

op. cit., pp. 238-239.

“…provincial exemption; it was clearer than ever that without such radical reform France could never exert her full potential nor avoid the financial disasters that crippled her in every war. When a proposal to aid the American rebels in secret was raised in the King’s inner circle in Mar 1776, Turgot argued strongly against: intervention would probably lead to war, which he represented as ‘the greatest of evils since it would render impossible for a long time and perhaps forever a reform [of French finances] absolutely necessary to the prosperity of the state and the relief of its people.’ And he warned that a premature use of force risked making French weakness permanent. Perceptively, he suggested that a British victory in America would be the best result for France, since the colonists would have to be held down by force and this would be a constant drain on British resources. “Hitherto Turgot had received powerful support from the foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes,• a career diplomat of long experience who was dedicated to maintaining the peace of Europe by the balance of power….”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., p. 239.

“…of power. He believed this could best be accomplished through co-operation between Britain and France, the two principal powers with sufficient wealth from colonial trade to subsidize coalitions against Continental rulers attempting to upset the balance. However, he saw no sign of British willingness to co-operate. On the contrary, the old enemy appeared ‘a restless and greedy nation…powerfully armed and ready to strike at the moment she shall find it expedient,’ ‘with envious cupidity the prodigious treasure of our plantations in America [the WI] and our industry in Europe.’• “The analysis was entirely consistent with the history of recent Anglo-French wars and of course with the mercantilist system. Moreover, French trade had grown enormously since the end of the last war and once again rivaled and possibly exceeded that of Great Britain—just the situation in which the last two wars had erupted. The port of Bordeaux,• which re-exported colonial produce to the Baltic markets, importing in return Baltic grain, timber, naval stores and textiles, had enjoyed the most spectacular growth;….”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., pp. 239-240.

“ … [ B o r d e a u x ] . w a s n o w overwhelmingly the largest French port, handling over twice the freight of Marseilles,• practically three times that of Nantes or LeHavre/Rouen,• its traditional commerce in wines, brandies and manufactured goods overshadowed by WI sugar and coffee and commerce in slaves from W Africa. Nantes remained the slaving capital of France, but Bordeaux was second,…”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., pp. 239-240.

“…was second, followed by Le Havre, La Rochelle, Saint-Malo and Honfleur;• in all, France’s ships carried some 10,000 slaves annually to her WI islands [mostly to replace those who died].• This was considerably fewer than the British carried: in 1771 Liverpool alone had been responsible for transporting 28,000 slaves across the Atlantic, Bristol 9,000 and London 8,000. Nonetheless, French planters in the WI, who had to resort to buying slaves illegally from the British or Dutch, had overtaken their British rivals in sugar production inside five years of the end of the Seven Years War. “The whole of this trade on which French commercial growth depended was vulnerable in the Caribbean, the Channel and the North Sea to British naval power….”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., p. 240.

“…naval power. Although the British were preoccupied with the American colonies, and the French ambassador in London reported the government in no political or military condition to fight the Bourbons,• Vergennes was no doubt justified in harboring apprehensions about the designs of British merchants and admirals once the colonists had been brought back to obedience. “His immediate response to the proposal to aid the Americans in secret was positive, principally because of the opportunity offered for weakening Great Britain. His argument was based on the proposition that Britain’s trade with North America was basic to her wealth; if France could assist the colonies to break free, it would deprive her of this vital trade and the industries it supported, so reducing the funds—and trained manpower—available for her navy, curtailing her subsidies to Continental allies, diminishing her strength, and radically altering the European balance in France’s favor. Such were his stated reasons….”


and Chesapeake Bay

“…stated reasons. Benjamin Franklin, in Paris to enlist French support, did his best to encourage them.• Yet the French court was essentially military and dedicated to la gloire. The humiliations inflicted by Pitt in the Seven Years War were still felt bitterly; the desire for vengeance was strong.• In addition, sympathy with the American rebels was strong among intellectuals, who tended to see the British colonists attempting to put into practice their own ideals for a freer, juster society;….”


and Chesapeake Bay

Ibid.

“… juster society; indeed the author of the proposal to aid the Americans was the popular dramatist, creator of the valet-hero Figaro, propagandist and sometime secret agent Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais.• Vergennes, for all his long experience and cultured mind, must have been affected by the passions affecting French society. His arguments were surely rationalizations of the prevailing enthusiasms. “Whether he foresaw secret aid leading France into war with Britain, whether he expected merely to damage the British cause without direct involvement is not revealed in his papers….”


and Chesapeake Bay

Ibid.

op. cit., pp. 240-241.

“…his papers. He did not bring up the subject of war before the young king, but it is hard to believe that he had any doubts about Britain’s response when French shipments to the colonists were discovered, as they must be sooner rather than later. Nor could he have expected the colonists to break free on their own without armed French intervention. And since his argument depended on depriving Great Britain of her colonies and the monopoly rights in their trade, it inevitably implied war.…”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., pp. 240-241.

“…implied war. “Aligned with Vergennes in support of the proposal were the navy minister Sartine,• and the senior minister on whom the young king depended most, the seventy-five-year old Comte de Maurepas.• Turgot was isolated. He had already raised aristocratic and ecclesiastical fury over his proposed reforms of the tax system, and great rage by attempting to abolish the corvée which peasants paid their their seigneur, whether aristocratic, ecclesiastical or bourgeois, in lieu of the feudal requirement to provide labor. It is not surprising that Louis who was not yet twenty-two and lacked self-confidence, decided in favor of…”


and Chesapeake Bay

“…favor of Maurepas, Vergennes and secret aid to the Americans, and the same month, May 1776, discarded Turgot.• The two decisions which appear so inevitable—Turgot’s predecessors under Louis XV having all been dropped after attempting tax reforms—were to determine the success of the American Revolution and lead directly to revolution in France and the end [for twenty-two years] of the Bourbon monarchy. This is clear in retrospect; it is clear Turgot was correct to warn that war would damage French finances irreparably. At the time, the young Louis XVI, his advisors and French society saw only the glorious prospect of humbling the old enemy. “As the King released arms to be sent to America through a fictitious company headed by Beaumarchais, he gave orders to ready twenty of the line in case of British reaction. By August, Sartine had considerably overspent his budget and requested a supplementary grant. • Meanwhile Sandwich responded to his spies’ reports of activity at Brest and Toulon by increasing the number of ‘guardships’ manned with three-fifths crews—as a nucleus to counter France’s ability to mobilize more rapidly—and ordered a press to bring their complements up to full strength.…”


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., p. 241.

op. cit., pp. 241-242.

“…full strength. “In America a Naval Committee appointed by the Continental Congress had established the beginnings of a Continental Navy…. “The smaller vessels acquired by purchase were a sounder investment. Their commanders, instructed to intercept enemy supply vessels and avoid engaging warships, were rewarded with a third of the prize money from captures, to be divided among officers and crews in specific shares. They and numerous privateers operating from creeks and rivers brought in scores of British storeships and victualers to provide valuable supplies for Washington’s army. However the main source of arms in this period were Dutch merchants, via their WI depots, principally St. Eustatius.• Apart from desire for profit, feeling in the United Provinces was running strongly in favor of the Americans as in France, and for largely similar reasons. In Feb 1777 the British ambassador at The Hague demanded from the States General immediate action to stop the flow of munitions, failing which the British navy would adopt an unrestricted policy of boarding and seizure….


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., pp. 242-243.

“…and seizure. The ultimatum further inflamed opinion against Britain’s ‘arrogance and tyranny,’ and the young stadtholder, William V, despite pro-British sympathies, authorized a naval program for the defense of Dutch shipping. “In March the first four of Beaumarchais’ munitions ships sailed for America. It was now clear that war between Britain and France could not long be delayed and might be sparked by any incident. The British government was particularly incensed that American privateers were using French ports as bases from which to prey on trade around the British Isles and French vessels with French crews were being prepared to join the war under American commanders. Intelligence from spies indicated other French ships loading in Biscay ports with muskets, swords, ammunition and uniforms for America and other manufactured goods and commodities the rebels could no longer obtain from Britain. British cruisers haunted the French coast on the lookout for these munitions ships and privateers, and seized suspect vessels; French ships of the line patrolled in pairs to protect their merchantmen.• “In Jan that year, 1777, Vergennes had asked the Spanish government to submit plans for combined ops in case of war with Great Britain….


and Chesapeake Bay

“…Great Britain. In July he sent a similar, more detailed request. The Spanish, anxious as ever about the safe return of their Mexican treasure fleet, refused to commit themselves. Whether Louis’ inner council had already made a definite decision for war, as seems most probable, events had acquired an irresistible momentum. Vergennes could scarcely turn back. Apart from the imminent likelihood of incidents at sea leading to conflict,• Sartine had spent more than 100 million livres (£4 million) above normal expenditures readying the fleet and laying in stocks of timber and naval stores. And it was more than ever apparent that the Americans could not win independence without direct assistance; this remained true even after news arrived in early Dec of an American victory…at Saratoga….On the other hand, Sartine’s efforts had opened the prospect that a battle fleet almost equal in numbers to the British fleet in commission could be got to sea in the following spring, 1778. Britain had greater reserves and more ships under construction, but these would take months to bring forward and man. In the meantime France could take the initiative at sea.….


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., p. 243.

“…at sea. “Franklin and the American commissioners [Silas Deane and Dr. Arthur Lee] in Paris had been offering trade in return for a military alliance that would bring France into the war. After the news of Saratoga, they tried to force the issue by suggesting that Congress might patch up a compromise peace with the British.• Vergennes was not deceived; yet he was committed to his policy and, despite another rebuff from Spain, on 6 Feb 1778 France signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce and entered into a defensive alliance with the Americans. Vergennes was so focused on the naval war this must provoke, and like Choiseul earlier so mindful of France’s repeated failures against Great Britain, that he ignored a dispute that had broken out between Austria and Prussia over the control of Bavaria, whose Elector had died that Jan without heir. The outcome could alter the balance of power within Germany, yet he averted his eyes, concentrating on his goal, the removal of Britain’s grip on North America, so much had the explosive growth in Atlantic trade and Great Britain’s rise to maritime dominance affected France’s fundamental drives as a Continental power….


and Chesapeake Bay

Ibid.

op. cit., pp. 243-244.

“…Continental power. “In London the response to the Bourbon threat had been as muddled as the attempts to subdue the American colonists. This was due in large measure to the system of government. Each minister was responsible to the king—the executive—and ran his own departmental policy with little regard to other departments, often in conflict with them. The First Lord of the Treasury, who headed the government and managed the House of Commons, acted in Cabinet discussions as chairman rather than prime minister and had no power to enforce collective policy. If he lacked the qualities of decision and ruthlessness necessary above all in war, the results were inevitably muddle and drift.• North recognized this and his own temperamental inadequacy, and suggested the King replace him with ‘one directing minister, who should plan the whole of the operation of government, & controul [sic] all the other departments of administration so far as to make them co-operate zealously & actively.’ His advice was not heeded. ‘Government by departments,’ as North described it, continued.• “The minister with responsibility for the war in America was the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord George Germain.…”


and Chesapeake Bay

“…George Germain. His dealings with Sandwich at the Admiralty were crucial, since the warships of the North American squadron were playing a vital role in support of army ops in addition to (and detracting from) their basic duties of blockading the coast and protecting essential supply shipping from the American gun vessels and privateers. Relations between the two were difficult, not least because Sandwich was more concerned with the Bourbon naval build-up than with events in the colonies; he had long concluded that France and Spain were ‘at bottom our inveterate enemies…only waiting for the favorite moment to strike the blow.’ Misunderstanding was compounded by Germain’s ambitious and devious nature; his warped handling of his officials and officers had led to a chain of military blunders in America, most recently the disaster at Saratoga. “Directly news of the French-American treaty reached London, in March 1778, the entire complexion of affairs altered: imminent war with France—perhaps joined by Spain—became the overriding concern; America was reduced to a ‘secondary consideration.’…


and Chesapeake Bay

op. cit., p. 244.

The War at Sea, 1778-79Engraving based on the painting “Action Between the Serapis and Bonhomme Richard”

by Richard Paton, published 1780

4:The War of the American Revolution, I

France Enters the War

“Since the beginning of the Revolution, the French had supplied some indirect and secret aid….The entry of France into the war completely altered its character. From a sort of civil war, in which British opinion had been divide, it was transformed into an international war, soon to involve Spain and Holland, in which all Englishmen rallied…against the traditional enemies. “In the American theater the center of military ops was to shift from the colonies to the WI, and in the colonies themselves the fighting was to shift to the S. In practical military terms, Britain now found herself committed to an overseas op without secure control of the seas.• Washington, who had been frustrated when sea power enabled the British to escape him at Boston, and who had exhausted his army in an attempt to anticipate Howe’s movements by sea in the summer of 1777, at last had the prospect of the support of a first-class navy. From this point on, the history of the Revolution from the American point of view becomes…”

Sea Power, p. 75.



“…the story of Washington’s attempts to secure the cooperation of the French fleet for a decisive action, for he saw clearly that in a combined op lay the best hope for an American victory. “In Europe, Britain found herself on the defensive, for in this war France’s position differed in one significant respect from the position she usually held in fighting Britain. This time France had no enemy on the Continent, no land warfare to tax her resources, no threat to her own frontiers to distract her attention. This time she was free to concentrate on Britain. She intended to exploit this freedom by seizing control of the Channel and invading the British Isles. A successful invasion would even old scores, regain her lost WI possessions, and free America at a single stroke. Her own naval resources appeared sufficient for the task, and if Spain should join her she would have a superfluity of power. “The French navy of 1778 was probably the world’s best, equal to the British in most respects and superior to it in many, for the renaissance begun by Choiseul had been continued by his successors in the Ministry of Marine. The Marine was superior to the RN in numbers of ships ready for action, in quality of ships, in gunnery, and in tactical skill. By 1778 France had 63 ships of 64 guns or more.…” Ibid.



“…or more. While the British lists showed a larger number, those actually fit for sea were considerably fewer. Hence the French with about 45 ships ready for action, had the advantage, and this superiority was increased, at least on paper, by the entry of Spain into the war the following year. “French ships, scientifically designed, still had cleaner lines and were faster and heavier rate for rate [rate is determined by the number of guns in the main armament, e.g., a 38-gun frigate] The British soon offset much of the French superiority in design by copper-sheathing the underwater hulls of more and more of there vessels, a practice the French were slow to follow. coppering conferred a speed advantage that increased during a campaign as marine growth fouled wooden hulls. This consideration was especially important in the WI, where the climate and sea organisms were particularly destructive to wood and where there were few facilities for cleaning and repair. “At the outbreak of the American Revolution, the French corps of seaman gunners were probably the most accurate marksmen in the world, clearly outshooting the British at long ranges.…”

Ibid.



“…long ranges. This French advantage the RN at last offset in the final year of the war, partly by gunnery reforms and partly by the introduction of the carronade4 to supplement the regular battery. Short and light, the carronade threw a heavy ball with terrific smashing effect at short range , and it could be worked by fewer men than the long guns. The British thus belatedly acquired greater fire power with little increase in weight.…”

Ibid.

______ 4 So called because this type of gun was cast by Scotland’s Carron Iron Works.


and Chesapeake Bay

Padfield, Maritime Supremacy., pp. 250-251.

“.… Another invention…was the carronade, a very short but large-bored gun manufactured by the Carron Ironworks of Falkirk, Scotland. The secret of the piece was more accurate engineering, which allowed the ball to fit more snugly in the bore without jamming; since less of the explosion gasses could escape around the ball, a smaller charge was used, hence the containing metalwork was lighter. A carronade throwing a 32 pound ball, as thrown from the main battery of a first rate, was only four feet in length and weighed 17 hundredweight as against some 65 hundredweight for a 32-pounder cannon. Consequently the pieces could be mounted on the upper decks in place of small bore cannon, increasing the weight of shot fourfold. They were ineffective at long range, but in the close actions the British strove to achieve they were to prove murderously efficient, especially when firing grapeshot or the jagged pieces of metal to cut rigging and kill men known as langridge. The controller wrote to Sandwich that September, 1779, suggesting that 40-gun ships could be brought into the line [as 5th rates] by equipping them with 32-pounder carronades….”



“…in weight. “Lastly, the French led the British in the theory and practice of naval tactics. Bigot de Morogues’ famous Tactique Navale, published in 1763, not only expounded the various methods of achieving tactical concentration but also spurred the development of a practical signal system, toward which the French Marine had been groping for nearly a century. Both theory and signals were put into practice in ‘Squadrons of Evolution,’ in which most of the French naval leaders of the war had been trained. The British, on the other hand, had only the Permanent Fighting Instructions. ‘That we have no regular system of tactics you know’ wrote British Adm Richard Kempenfelt • in 1779.5 But officers like Kempenfelt and Howe were interested in the subject, and one of the significant developments of the American Revolution was their creation for the British Navy of an efficient system of signals and of flexible tactics, for which they borrowed heavily from the French. Signals and tactics were inseparable, for so long as an admiral could signal only to execute a given article from the Fighting Instructions, it was obviously impossible to escape the Instructions. ”

op. cit., pp. 75-76.

______ 5 Kempenfelt , quoted in Sir Julian S. Corbett, ed., Signals and Instructions 1776-1794, (Navy Records Society,1908), Introduction, 2-3.



“…the Instructions. “Although the Permanent Fighting Instructions remained the only order authorized for general use until 1793, it had been customary for admirals to issue Additional Instructions applicable to their specific commands. It was this practice that made possible some progress and reform, and Lord Howe • exploited it to the fullest. In July, 1778, as he was about to transfer his brother’s army from NY to the Chesapeake for the march on Philadelphia, he issued a set of Additional Instructions that entirely superseded the Permanent Fighting Instructions within his command and to which was attached a complete signal book of his own.”

op. cit., p. 76.

Bataille d'Ouessant. 1778 by Théodore Gudin, c. 1848—Wikipedia


The [First] Battle of Ushant, July 27, 1778

“One of the first acts of the French on forming an alliance with the colonies was to ready a fleet at Toulon for use in American waters. After many delays a fleet of twelve ships of the line sailed in April 1778 under the command of VAdm the Comte d’Estaing,• a former BGen in the army. The English were aware of the French preparations and recognized the absolute necessity of getting prompt reinforcements to Adm Lord Howe if the British position in America was to be preserved, but they experienced the greatest difficulty in assembling a suitable force. It was only by taking men and supplies from Adm Augustus Keppel’s • Channel fleet and thus delaying its sailing that the Admiralty was able to provide 13 of the line for VAdm John Byron,• who sailed in early June. “Furnishing Byron’s needs delayed full-scale ops in the Channel. At length, however, after a brief sortie perilously under strength, Keppel put to sea on 9 July with 30 of the line. It so happened that Adm the comte d’Orvilliers • had sailed with the Brest fleet of 29 ships the preceding day on what was intended as a training cruise.…”

Sea Power, p. 76



“…training cruise. In the afternoon of 23 July the two sighted each other 100 mi W of Ushant , • an island off the tip of Brittany. Keppel was the more ardent for battle, for if he could remove the Brest fleet from the board, England would be saved from the danger of invasion, and the chances of losing her American colonies would be considerably lessened. D’Orvilliers, less interested in combat than in getting his fleet safely back to Brest, for three days eluded Keppel’s every attempt to engage. In the course of these maneuvers, d’Orvilliers’ fleet dwindled through separations to 27 ships Keppel retained his 30. “At length on 27 July, Keppel saw his opportunity and signaled General Chase, sacrificing an orderly line for an opportunity to mass on d’Orvilliers’ rear. But d’Orvilliers suddenly wore his fleet together and headed toward the pursuing British for a passing engagement on opposite courses. Such an action was rarely decisive, but in this instance d’Orvilliers hoped to take advantage of British disorder to mass fire on a few enemy ships while remaining out of range of the others. “Keppel, perceiving d’Orvilliers’ intention, had the option of falling off and reforming his line.…”

Ibid.



“…his line. This he rejected, since it might mean no battle at all and might even permit the French to escape. Without hesitation he hoisted the signal to engage, not taking time to order his line. The result was as d’Orvilliers had foreseen. Firing on the upward roll,.…”

op. cit., pp. 76-77.

weather gage lee gage

firing on the up rollfiring on the down roll

damages sails and riggingdamages hull and kills men

wind



“…his line. This he rejected, since it might mean no battle at all and might even permit the French to escape. Without hesitation he hoisted the signal to engage, not taking time to order his line. The result was as d’Orvilliers had foreseen. Firing on the upward roll, he dismasted several ships of the British van and center before the others could come to their support. But Sir Hugh Palliser’s • British rear division, having had time to attain some order before coming under attack, took the fire of the entire French line and was heavily damaged in the rigging. “That one inconclusive pass ended the battle. D’Orvilliers, coming about again, desired to pass between Keppel’s main body and several damaged British ships, but the French van commander either misunderstood or disregarded his intention. Keppel tried to reform his line and cover his cripples, but Palliser remained to windward and would not rejoin with his rear division. At length when neither signals nor a message sent by frigate produced action from Palliser, Keppel by-passed his subordinate and ordered the rear ships by individual signal to rejoin the line. By then night had fallen and Keppel reluctantly postponed further action till morning. But d’Orvilliers, considering that he had done well enough, took advantage of the darkness to shape course for Brest.…”

op. cit., pp. 76-77.



“…for Brest. Although the French had suffered the greater number of casualties, they had clearly outmaneuvered the British. Moreover, they enjoyed the unusual experience of bringing home all their ships from an engagement with the RN. For the underdogs of the Seven Years War, that was no small victory.• “In the subsequent court-martial, Keppel was charged on a number of counts that amounted to two mutually contradictory accusations: 1) that he had engaged in the first place without waiting to order his line, and 2) that, delaying in order to re-form his line, he had failed to resume the engagement and thus had failed to ‘do his utmost.’ For the first offense, it will be recalled, Adm Matthews had been cashiered after the Battle of Toulon in 1744. Time lost by Adm Byng in ordering his line twelve years later had cost Britain Minorca and Bing his life before a firing squad. Now Keppel was being charged simultaneously with the offenses of Matthews and Byng. having sat on Byng’s court-martial, Keppel felt he was fighting for his life. But by this time both the Permanent Fighting Instructions and the Line had lost their sacrosanct character, and common sense sat in judgment. Keppel was exonerated with immense popular acclaim. For the officers of the RN the inference was clear—an admiral could now conduct a battle according to his own best judgment.”

op. cit., p. 77.


and Chesapeake Bay

Padfield, Maritime Supremacy., p. 246.

“.… It could be argued that Vergennes had been fortunate: Sandwich,• who had been keenly aware that Brest was the hinge of strategy for both sides and had written to Keppel • that “defeating the Brest fleet…would have most amazing consequences to this country,’ might have retained all ships at home instead of sending the powerful detachment to America; in which case Keppel would have had an overwhelming superiority off Ushant. However it would have been a bold decision to abandon America for the chance of a decisive fleet action, and it is certain that d’Orvilliers would not have been sent out against such odds. Nor would a closer blockage of Brest have achieved much more than Keppel did achieve.

The First French FleetThe Fleet’s commander, Charles-Hector, comte d’Estaing

Jean-Baptiste LeBrun, 1769


The First French Fleet: D’Estaing

“Philadelphia, as George Washington remarked on learning of the French alliance, had become ‘an ineligible situation’ for the British army in America.• Gen Clinton, who had succeeded to over-all command, was ordered to evacuate the position forthwith and return to NY. Aware that a French fleet was probably on the way to America, he marched his army overland, leaving his supplies and artillery for Lord Howe to bring by sea.• Howe cleared the Delaware with his little fleet on 28 June, reached NYC the next day, and immediately stationed frigates to warn of the approach of French naval forces. “D’Estaing,• who had proclaimed, ‘Speed is the foremost of military virtues; to surprise is almost to have conquered,’ honored his own precept in the breach rather than the observance. With a prompt crossing of the Atlantic, he could have caught Howe’s fleet still in the Delaware and destroyed it along with Clinton’s artillery. As it was, he spent 85 days getting from Toulon to the Capes of the Delaware, where he arrived on 6 July. He was lucky that ‘Foul Weather Jack’ Byron’s • reinforcements, having been completely scattered by a storm, did no better. Howe was thus left to face a French fleet mounting nearly twice as many guns as his own.…”

Ibid.



“…his own. “Howe prepared with great gallantry for what promised to be a fight against hopeless odds. He placed his ships in a close line across the main channel into New York harbor, while Clinton mounted a battery at the end of Sandy Hook…”

op. cit., pp. 77-78.

“…Sandy Hook. D’Estaing arrived on 11 July and anchored about four miles distant.• Washington sent him a member of his staff with an offer of full cooperation in an attack on New York but American pilots did not arrive on board till the 16th. The pilots, on learning that the larger French ships drew 23 to 25 feet, refused to assume responsibility for taking them across the bar, over which there was only 22 feet of water. After vainly offering a reward of 50,000 crowns to any pilot who would take his ships across, d’Estaing abandoned the enterprise.6 .…”

op. cit., pp. 77-78.

______ 6 D’Estaing has been criticized for this abandonment. The disappointment of the Americans is understandable. There is no doubt however that the heavier ships could not cross the bar. When Hood was being sent to the American coast in 1781 to the pursuit of de Grasse, Rodney decided against sending the Gibraltar because ‘her great draught of water, which was 27 feet, prevented her being sent to NY, as she could not cross the bar of Sandy Hook.’ (MGen Godfrey Basil Mundy, The Life and Correspondence of the late Adm Lord Rodney. [London, 1830], II, 144.) Similarly, when Hood arrived, Graves sent him a note: ‘The Princess, I understand, draws twenty-six feet water; it is too much to come over the bar. Therefore I have sent down two transports to come down for her guns.’(Sir John Knox Laughton, ed., Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham 1758-1813,[Navy Records Society, 1907-11]. I, 122.



“…the enterprise.6 On the 22nd, when the French made sail, the British fully expected attack. The tide was high and the wind right for crossing the bar, but as they watched, the French fleet moved off to sea and disappeared.• “Washington accepted d’Estaing’s decision with good grace. Although he preferred NY as the object of a coordinated land and sea attack, he was willing to accept any other theater where decisive results could be achieved. When d’Estaing decided to shift his attack to Newport, RI, Washington fully concurred.• “Newport, with a harbor second only to that of NYC in strategic value, had been occupied by the British since the end of 1776. Although the American Gen Sullivan,• who was watching the British there had been providently reinforced by Washington, he was not ready to move until a week after d’Estaing arrived off Narragansett Bay.…”

op. cit., p. 78.



The Squadron Forces Entry to the Bay of RI Through Battery Fire by Peter Ozanne, 1778—Wikipedia

Campaign of Vice Admiral C. d’Estaing in America, Commander of a Squadron of 12 Ships-of-the-Line and of 4 Frigates, Sortied from Toulon the 13th of April 1778

Shaded Relief Map of RI Narragansett Bay Outlined in Red—Wikipedia

Newport

“…Narragansett Bay. The delay was to prove fatal to the enterprise, for just when the position of the British, besieged by an immensely superior force and blockaded by a strong fleet, seemed hopeless,• Adm Howe appeared off Newport on 9 Aug. It was a bold move, since even the four reinforcements which had recently arrived gave him only eight of the line to oppose d’Estaing’s twelve, but it saved RI for the British. Had d’Estaing kept his position in the Bay, the British could hardly have dislodged him, and Newport’s fate would have been sealed. Moreover the local fishermen could have told him that all signs indicated the approach of an ‘August gale’—a hurricane from the WI. But d’Estaing accepted the British challenge, took aboard the troops already landed, and sailed forth to fight. D’Estaing had the advantage of the wind, but it was not till evening of the following day that the superior sailing qualities of the French ships enabled him to come up to Howe, who quite sensibly preferred to avoid a decisive action. By then light was waning, visibility was further reduced by rain squalls, and the wind was freshening dangerously. That night the hurricane scattered the two fleets. All thoughts of battle vanished in the struggle for survival.…”



Ibid.

“…for survival. “The battered British sailed for Sandy Hook, while d’Estaing, his dismasted flagship in tow, fulfilled his promise to return to Narragansett Bay.• On the way he sighted the Princess Royal, Byron’s flagship, just arriving after her stormy crossing of the Atlantic.• During the fleet’s absence Sullivan • had made excellent progress in his siege of Newport and wanted only the French to take up the right flank. D’Estaing however would have nothing further to do with the Newport op. He now knew of Byron’s arrival and, fearful of finding himself blockaded by the combined British forces, insisted on withdrawing to Boston to refit.• “His retirement ended the Newport enterprise. The departure of the French, Gen Nathaniel Greene • wrote Washington, ‘struck such panic among the militia and volunteers that they began to desert by shoals…’7 Indeed, Sullivan was fortunate to effect his withdrawal before the indefatigable Howe reappeared with 13 of the line and 5,000 troops under Gen Clinton.…”

Ibid.



______ 7 Letter of 28-31 Aug, John C. Kirkpatrick, ed.,, Writings of Geo Washington,(Washington, 1931-44) XII, 368 n.

“…Gen Clinton. On learning of d’Estaing’s departure, Howe made a vigorous effort to overtake him, but he was too late to catch the French at sea, and he did not dare to attempt to force Boston harbor. Having done all he could he returned to NYC, where he surrendered command of his squadron, declaring that he could serve no more ‘so long as the present Ministers remain in office.’• “Washington was severely disappointed at the French withdrawal. He understood the strategy of victory and had done everything within his power to put it into effect. As he no doubt suspected, it would be a long time before he would have another such opportunity, but he at once turned his efforts to healing the rift between the French and Americans, to preserving the alliance, and to protecting the French fleet in Boston.• “Early in Nov d’Estaing sailed for the WI. The British at the same time sent 5.000 troops thither, and early in Jan 79 the main British fleet left Newport to follow. The winter season was about to begin.”

op. cit., pp. 78-79.



The West IndiesThe Battle of Grenada

Jean-François Hue


The West Indies, 1779

“Although the French had made the invasion of England the principal objective in their strategy, they could not resist the temptation to disperse their fleet by sending squadrons to various areas of interest. The most important of these was the WI, which accounted for about one-third of all French trade….”

Sea Power, p. 79

“Although the French had made the invasion of England the principal objective in their strategy, they could not resist the temptation to disperse their fleet by sending squadrons to various areas of interest. The most important of these was the WI, which accounted for about one-third of all French trade.• France now possessed only St. Lucia, Martinique and Guadeloupe among the Windward Isles, and • Haiti in the Leewards.• Spain owned Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo and Cuba, all to leeward. The British controlled a chain of Windward Islands running from St. Kitts to Tobago,• including Dominica, St. Vincent, and Grenada,• Barbados still further to the E, and • Jamaica to the W. The distinction between windward and leeward was important. With the prevailing easterly wind, a windward position at Martinique or St. Lucia conferred initiative. From Jamaica a sailing ship had to beat a thousand miles into the wind to reach the Windward Islands. (See map page 61)….”

Sea Power, p. 79



“…page 61.) “The hurricane season in the WI lasted from Jul to Oct. During that period major forces in that area usually cleared for home or for the North American

Ibid.

theater. Similarly, convoys from Europe ordinarily arrived in the spring and returned in May or Jun, or sometimes in Nov. These convoys, necessary for the inhabitants of the islands, vital for the military forces, and economically important to the home countries, were the objects of much of the naval action in the WI….”

“…page 61.) “The hurricane season in the WI lasted from Jul to Oct. During that period major forces in that area usually cleared for home or for the North American

Ibid.

theater. Similarly, convoys from Europe ordinarily arrived in the spring and returned in May or Jun, or sometimes in Nov. These convoys, necessary for the inhabitants of the islands, vital for the military forces, and economically important to the home countries, were the objects of much of the naval action in the WI. “Before the end of 1778 the French and British in the WI made an exchange of territory which was not to be reversed during the war. in early Sept the Marquis de Bouillé, Governor of Martinique, captured lightly garrisoned Dominica,• while British RAdm Samuel Barrington sat at Barbados with two ships of the line awaiting orders. When reinforcements arrived in Dec from NY, the British at once attacked St. Lucia.• D’Estaing, who had left Boston at about the same time the British forces had left NY, came to its relief;….”



“…its relief; but his fleet, though much superior, failed to break the line of British ships anchored across the Grand Cul de Sac, the troops he landed were repulsed with heavy casualties, and the island fell. It was a significant event, for the British thus acquired an excellent harbor only 30 miles from Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal French base.• “At the beginning of 1779 both Britain and France increased their forces in the WI.• Byron’s arrival from NY in Jan brought the British WI fleet up to 21 of the line. But in Feb the • Comte de Grasse arrived from France with four of the line for d’Estaing; • in Apr de Vaudreuil, fresh from retaking Senegal for France, arrived with two of the line and two frigates;• and in Jun La Motte-Picquet brought a convoy of 45 transports escorted by four of the line and three frigates. While Byron was out in a vain attempt to intercept La Motte-Picquet’s convoy, d’Estaing sent out a small force which took St. Vincent, just S of St. Lucia, in mid-Jun….”

Ibid.



“…mid-Jun. “D’Estaing, now well supplied with troops and with 24 of the line, sailed on 30 Jun, scarcely giving La Motte-Picquet’s vessels time to land their sick and reprovision. His intention was to take Barbados, to the E,• which with Martinique and St. Vincent would effectively box in the British at St. Lucia, but a persistent contrary wind forced him to transfer his attack to Grenada, which he easily took on 4 Jul.• On the afternoon of the next day a fleet was reported approaching Grenada.• It was Byron, who had learned of the French attack and was belatedly coming to the relief of the island with several transports of troops and 21 ships of the line.• The resulting Battle of Grenada, like the Battle of Ushant, demonstrates the danger of falling into the disarray of a General Chase upon a competently handled force that intends to stand and fight….”

op. cit., pp. 79-80.



Battle of Grenada by Jean-François Hue (1751-1823)

“…and fight. “Long before dawn on the 6th, d’Estaing ordered his fleet to get under way from St. George’s harbor, but he was frustrated by the morning calm. The French van was scarcely clear and not yet in formation when first light disclosed the British formation bearing down. Byron, eager to catch the French in disorder as they straggled from the harbor, ordered General Chase. His faster sailers drew ahead and, rushing pell-mell upon the French, suffered severe damage from the combined fire of shore batteries and of the French van, which had formed into line just in time to receive them. The quickening breeze enabled the rest of the French to fall into line of battle, whereupon Byron was forced to order his ships to wear into a parallel line. At this point two of the British ships which had been to windward with the transports came down and fell upon the French van, which handled them both roughly. Altogether six of the British ships were disabled….”

op. cit., p. 80.



“…were disabled. “The battle moved to the westward with the fleets in parallel lines, but d’Estaing did not forget his strategic purpose of covering Grenada, and with that in view he tacked his fleet about 3 PM and headed for the island and the British cripples. Byron followed, so that d’Estaing, instead of taking the cripples, was content to cannonade them in passing. During the night the French slipped back into St. George’s harbor, and the next day the battered British withdrew to St. Kitts. “Although the French as usual suffered greater casualties than the British, they had won not only a strategic victory in preserving their hold on Grenada but a neat tactical victory as well. All in all, they had not badly in the WI. While the British possession of St. Lucia would continue to plague them, the French could congratulate themselves on the conquest of Dominica, St. Vincent, and Grenada.”



Ibid.


Savannah, 1779

“The Allied cause had fared less well in the colonies, where the British had transferred their activity to the S.• In May 1779 Clinton had sent 1,800 men with a strong naval escort to VA. This force plundered and burned Portsmouth and Norfolk, seized considerable naval stores and shipping, and forced the Americans to burn an almost completed frigate on the ways to prevent her capture. “The British had been in possession of Savannah since the end of 1778, and Governor Rutledge of GA had requested d’Estaing to come there when the hurricane season put an end to ops in the WI.• Accordingly d’Estaing arrived off Savannah on 1 Sept with 20 ships of the line and 3,000 troops in transports. This op had not been concerted with Washington, who did not hear of d’Estaing’s arrival on the American coast until two weeks later.• Washington at once wrote the French admiral proposing a combined op against NYC, where VAdm Mariot Arbuthnot, Lord Howe’s successor, currently had only five of the line. Gen Clinton, at NYC, also heard of d’Estaing’s arrival, and fearing precisely what Washington's urging, ordered the hasty evacuation of RI in Oct in favor of a concentration at NYC….”

op. cit., p. 81.


Savannah, 1779

“…at NYC. “But there was no real occasion for Washington’s hope or Clinton’s fears.• D’Estaing, who had generously undertaken the GA expedition after receiving orders to return to France, was anxious to get it over. At his urging, the French and Americans launched an assault on Savannah on 9 Oct. The French suffered severely, d’Estaing himself was badly wounded and the attack failed. D’Estaing then sailed for France leaving bitterness and disappointment in his wake.•”

op. cit., p. 81.

European Waters, 1779-1780

“France had from the first expected to be joined in the war by Spain, her sister Bourbon power and sister-sufferer in the Seven Years War. At the beginning of Jun 1779, d’Orvilliers • put to sea from Brest with 28 of the line, a little too late to interfere with an immense British convoy bearing supplies and reinforcements to Clinton in NY.…”


Ibid.

European Waters, 1779-1780

“…in NY. He then moved southward toward a rendezvous with the Spanish fleet, while the Spanish ambassador in London delivered a list of complaints that provoked a British declaration of war. “Franco-Spanish plans, already drawn up, had set the summer of 1779 for a great invasion of England at the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth.• The prospects for success were excellent, for the French could muster 62 and the Spanish 40 of the line, against a maximum British strength of 80. In this crisis the dearth of leadership in Britain became evident….”

Hitler’s OperationSealion

Ibid.

“…became evident. Howe and Keppel had resigned in disgust.• To take command of the vital Channel fleet the Ministry could find only Sir Charles Hardy,• the 63-year-old Governor of the Veterans’ Home at Greenwich. Kempenfelt,• the signal expert, who was fleet captain (chief of staff), wrote in despair to a friend, ‘Does the people at home think the nation is in no danger? Where is Lord Howe at this alarming period?’8 “The English were hurrying preparations to meet the expected invasion, but there was no need for their haste….”______ 8 Quoted in Capt. W.M. James RN, , The British Navy in Adversity, (London, 1926), 174.

Ibid.

“…their haste. Because d’Orvilliers had to wait a month for the Spaniards to join him, the huge armada of 67 ships was not assembled till late Jul. By mid-Aug it lay becalmed off Plymouth. Hardy with his 35 ships had been in and out of port without offering any real challenge, but aboard the French and Spanish vessels water and provisions were running short and sickness was reaching serious proportions. It was obvious that the Allies must act promptly if the op was to succeed. Then d’Orvilliers received word that his government had altered its plans and contemplated a landing on the rocky coast of Cornwall, a change that doomed the enterprise. While his government hesitated, d’Orvilliers sighted Hardy and pursued him briefly. Finally, with his supplies exhausted, he returned exasperated to Brest in mid-Sept and took no further part in the war.• Thus the Franco-Spanish fleet had held command of the Channel for an entire summer, and England had only the incompetence of the French high command to thank for her escape from invasion. “After their fiasco of 1779 the French and Spanish ‘provisionally abandoned’[‘suspended’ their campaign? ;-)] any plan for invading England in 1780.…”

op. cit., pp. 81-82.

“…in 1780. Rather they would continue their blockade of Gibraltar, which Spain was eager to recover, check the British in America, and launch a major offensive in the WI. “Gibraltar had been under siege since Spain’s entry into the war in Jun. Its relief was entrusted to Adm George Bridges Rodney,• who, by borrowing heavily from the Channel fleet, was able to sail with 22 of the line, 14 frigates, and a large convoy at the end of Dec 1779. Rodney had risen to the rank of RAdm during the Seven Years War. An inveterate gambler, he was in Paris to escape his creditors when the new war broke out. He was 60 years old and plagued by bad health, but he belonged to the right political party [can you guess?] and hence was pressed into service.…”

op. cit., pp. 81-82.

“…into service. “The relief expedition had passed Cape St. Vincent • when, on 16 Jan, the British sighted a Spanish fleet of eleven ships commanded by Adm Don Juan de Lángara.• Crowding on sail before a westerly wind, Rodney ordered General Chase. The newly-coppered British ships slowly overhauled the Spaniards and by evening, as the wind freshened into a half-gale, began action with the rearmost.…”

The Moonlight Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 16 Jan 1780 by Francis Holman, 1780

shows the Santo Domingo exploding, with Rodney's flagship Sandwich in the foreground.—Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Brydges_Rodney,_1st_Baron_Rodney

op. cit., p. 82.

“…the rearmost. The fighting continued throughout the night—the famous’Moonlight Battle.’ One Spanish ship blew up, but six others, including de Lángara’s flagship, were taken.• With the Straits thus cleared, Rodney had no difficulty relieving Gibraltar.• “In view of what was subsequently learned of Spanish incompetence at sea, there was perhaps no great glory in Rodney’s defeating a Spanish fleet of half his strength.9 But it was the first British success of the war, won by an admiral who belonged to the ministerial party. And the government made the most of it. ‘You have taken more line of battle ships than had been captured in any one action in either of the last preceding wars,’ the First Lord wrote to him.10…”______ 9 Because Rodney was confined to his cabin with gout during this action, it appears that a considerable share of the credit belongs to his fleet captain, Walter Young. In a letter of 24 Jul 80 (Barham Papers, I, 64-66), Capt Young says that he urged Rodney to order General Chase earlier in the action, but that Rodney refused. Young continues: ‘I am perfectly of your opinion that it is a dangerous practice to make the signal for a general chase after an enemy equal or superior to you, particularly if they are formed in line of battle or are near each other…’ This observation has particular relevance to the battles of Ushant, Grenada, and the Virginia Capes.

10 Quoted in James, British Navy in Adversity, 1941.

Ibid.

“…to him.10 “From Gibraltar Rodney sailed in mid-Feb for the WI, detaching on the way those vessels which were to return to the Channel fleet. Although the French and Spanish occasionally combined to put to sea a fleet considerably outmatching anything the British could muster, naval actions in European waters were confined to guerre de course for the rest of 1780.”

Ibid.

“…to him.10 “From Gibraltar Rodney sailed in mid-Feb for the WI, detaching on the way those vessels which were to return to the Channel fleet. Although the French and Spanish occasionally combined to put to sea a fleet considerably outmatching anything the British could muster, naval actions in European waters were confined to guerre de course for the rest of 1780.”

De Guichen and Rodneyin the West Indies, 1780

“The principal action of 1780 took place in the WI, where the French planned their main offensive. In Mar the Comte de Guichen • arrived at Martinique from France with 16 ships. Added to the ships already in the WI, these gave the French a fleet of 23 of the line. Since the British had only 16, de Guichen and de Bouillé,• the able governor of Martinique, thought the time opportune for an attack on St. Lucia.• But discovery of the strength of British defenses on the island, together with the news of Rodney’s arrival from Gibraltar with 4 of the line, caused them to abandon the project.…”

Combat de la Dominique, 17 Avril 1780 by Auguste Louis de Rossel de Cercy, 1780

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Martinique_(1780)


Ibid.

“…the project. “De Guichen then decided on an expedition against Barbados, where d’Estaing had been frustrated the year before. In mid-Apr he sailed with his entire fleet with 3,000 troops aboard. British frigates reported the movement however,• and Rodney was soon in pursuit. By evening he had overtaken the French a few miles S of Dominica,• and the two fleets formed for action….”

De Guichen and Rodneyin the West Indies, 1780

20 of the line23 of the line

Ibid.

“…for action. “Although Rodney was no innovator, he had a sound understanding of tactics and an appreciation of the value of concentration. The form of massing he particularly favored was achieved by reducing the interval between ships,• thus bringing more firepower to bear on a given segment of the enemy line. The idea was of course by no means original; it was discussed in Morgue’s Tactique Naval and, as we have seen, it had been practiced earlier by British meleeists.• De Guichen, France’s ablest tactician and former commander of a ‘Squadron of Evolution,’ was a worthy opponent and spent the afternoon of the 17th in demonstrating his skill in maneuvers….”

WHAT RODNEY INTENDED

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED

RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN, APRIL 17, 1780

op. cit., pp. 82-83.

“…in maneuvers.The English however had the advantage of the wind and were able to retain it. Just before noon the two fleets found themselves on the starboard tack on parallel courses, with the French line somewhat more advanced and to leeward of the British, which was at reduced intervals, Rodney, seeing the opportunity for which he had been maneuvering all forenoon, gave the signal ‘for every ship to bear down, and steer for her opposite in the enemy’s line agreeable to the 21s t a r t i c l e o f t he add i t i ona l f i gh t ing instructions.”11

“Rodney’s intention • was for each ship to bear down on the French vessel actually opposite, which would have massed force on the French rear;….”__________ 11 Mundy, The Life and Correspondence of Rodney, I, 286.

WHAT RODNEY INTENDED

op. cit., pp. 82-83.

“…in maneuvers.The English however had the advantage of the wind and were able to retain it. Just before noon the two fleets found themselves on the starboard tack on parallel courses, with the French line somewhat more advanced and to leeward of the British, which was at reduced intervals, Rodney, seeing the opportunity for which he had been maneuvering all forenoon, gave the signal ‘for every ship to bear down, and steer for her opposite in the enemy’s line agreeable to the 21st article of the additional fighting instructions.”11

“Rodney’s intention • was for each ship to bear down on the French vessel actually opposite, which would have massed force on the French rear; but the captain of his van ship and several others steered instead for their numerical opposites, while still others hung back in confusion….”__________ 11 Mundy, The Life and Correspondence of Rodney, I, 286.

Ibid.

“…in confusion. The English line dissolved, and the ships attacked individually or in small groups. Seeing his van in disorder and roughly handled, Rodney brought his remaining ships into close action.• His flagship, the Sandwich, actually passed through the French line12 and was so badly damaged that Rodney had to transfer his flag. Soon after four o’clock the French fell off down-wind to reform, and Rodney made no attempt to follow. The French, although they had won a tactical victory, were forced to abandon their expedition against Barbados.• “Rodney complained bitterly of the failure of his captains to support him, but he had only himself to blame….”__________ 12 Capt Young’s letter (Barham Papers, I, 54-5) makes it clear that this was entirely accidental, occasioned by her opponent’s giving way. The point is important only because some historians have attempted to find in this incident a precedent for Rodney’s breaking the line at Saint’s Passage.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED

Ibid.

“…to blame. Haughty and aloof, he had made no effort to explain his tactical views or plans to his captains in advance, and the signal system was inadequate to convey them in action. Nor does it appear that Rodney had any interest in the attempt • Howe and Kempenfelt were making to provide adequate signals. In the summer of 1780, only about three months after this battle off Dominica, Rodney’s fleet captain who must have known his chief well, wrote Kempenfelt, ‘I have delivered the signal books to Sir George for his perusal, though I am apprehensive these are books he will pay little attention to.’13 Rodney was a tactical conservative, but tactical ideas had undergone such development in a generation that a conservative in the American Revolution would have been considered an innovator in the Seven Years War….”__________ 13 Barham Papers, I, 69.

op. cit., p. 84.

“…Years War. “In early May, the French again put to sea from Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe,• with the intention of attacking St. Lucia. Warned by a frigate,• Rodney set out at once to intercept. The fleets sighted each other on the 10th and remained in contact for the next twelve days. In the interval there were two indecisive engagements in which the French had clearly the better of it. On the 22nd the fleets parted, the British because of the poor condition of their ships, the French because their provisions were low. Although the French had outfought the British, their attempt on St. Lucia had been thwarted. “In Jun a Spanish fleet of 12 ships of the line commanded by Adm Don José Solano,• escorting a convoy of 83 ships with 11,400 men successfully evaded Rodney and arrived safely at Basse-Terre. The combined French and Spanish forces might very well have swept the British from the WI, but the Spaniards were suffering horribly from survey, and Solano showed no inclination to conduct joint ops….”

Ibid.

“…joint ops. Instead, de Guichen escorted the Spaniards toward Havana, then turned in to Cap Français, where he found letters from the Marquis de Lafayette • and from the French minister at Philadelphia, asking his aid in American waters. But de Guichen, with orders to return to France before the onset of the hurricane season, sailed in mid-Aug for Europe.• “Though the departure of de Guichen gave Rodney a free hand in the WI, he was unaware of it. Instead of taking the initiative, he anxiously anticipated a major attack by the combined French and Spanish forces. Then he learned that a French squadron had arrived in Narragansett Bay in mid-Jul and speculated that de Guichen might have gone N to join it. Concluding that the British position in N America was threatened and aware that the hurricane season was at hand, he set sail and arrived with ten of the line in NYC in mid-Sept.

Indecision, 1780The British Begin Their Southern Strategy

The West Point Atlas of the American Wars


Sea Power, p. 84

. “There was little to relieve the gloom that had descended upon the American leaders after d’Estaing’s failure at Savannah and his return to France in the fall of 1779. Washington’s army spent the winter of 1779-80 once more ay Morristown, where its hardships surpassed those of Valley Forge. “Confident that Washington was too weak to threaten NYC,• Clinton decided at the urging of Gen Lord Charles Cornwallis • to make the southern colonies the object of his principal effort in 1780….….”

The Colonies, 1780


Sea Power, p. 84

“…in 1780. British forces soon had substantial control of SC.• In mid-Aug Cornwallis beat Gates decisively at Camden, SC, and followed up this success by invading NC in Sept. Washington was powerless to interfere with this overrunning of the S….”

The Colonies, 1780

Camden 16 Aug 80

Sea Power, p. 84

“…the S. “There was but one bright spot in the picture. Early in 1779 • the Marquis de Lafayette had returned to France to advocate the cause of the Colonies. In Apr 1780 he arrived in America with the news that his government was sending • Gen Rochambeau with French troops—‘Dr. Franklin’s soldiers,’ Voltaire called them….”

Landung einer Französischen Hülfs-Armee in America, zu Rhode Island, am 11ten Julius 1780. Landing of a French auxiliary army in America at Rhode Island, on July 11, 1780. Engraving shows the disembarkation of French troops, under the command of Comte de Rochambeau, at Newport, Rhode Island. CREATED/PUBLISHED: 1784. ARTIST: Daniel Chodowiecki. ENGRAVER: Daniel Berger. REPOSITORY: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA.—-Wikipedia

“…called them. Washington at once raised the question of the cooperation of de Guichen’s fleet from the WI, and at his insistence both Lafayette and the French Minister wrote letters to the admiral which, as we have seen, he received just before his departure for France.• “Meanwhile, considering thatRochambeau’s transports might be escorted by a naval force sufficiently strong to establish control of American waters, Washington drew up careful plans for a combined op against NY, with alternatives in case the french should prefer to act elsewhere. Then, upon learning of Rochambeau’s arrival at Newport, he dispatched Lafayette with his plan, the first article of which read:

“The French transports had in fact been escorted by seven ships of the line and three frigates, a force certainly adequate to deal with Arbuthnot’s four of the line at NY. But its departure from Brest had not passed unnoticed by the British, who had at once sent a warning to Clinton at Charleston and dispatched Adm Thomas Graves • with six of the line….”

1st. In any op, and under all circumstances a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.14

__________ 14 Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, XIX, 174.

op. cit., pp. 84-85.

op. cit., pp. 84-85.

“…the line. Clinton left Cornwallis in command in the S and hurried back to NY with part of his army.• His arrival in mid-Jun introduced an unwelcome factor in the plans Washington was formulating, but Graves arrival doomed the whole project, for the British fleet was now stronger than the French.• But Washington did not cease to hope. A second division of Rochambeau’s forces was to follow the first, and with it might come naval superiority. Washington did not know that the British had in the meantime blockaded Brest and that the second division was destined never to sail. “The superiority brought by Graves in fact turned the tables completely, and it was the British who went on the offensive. Their fleet arrived off Newport in late Jul to establish a blockade • while Clinton embarked troops to follow. Washington sent a warning to Rochambeau:

The strategy was successful….”

Had I any prospect of arriving in time I would march to your support, but as I think there is no possibility of this, the only way I can be useful to you is to menace NY, and even to attack it, if the force remaining there does not exceed what I have reason to believe. I am pressing my movements for this purpose with all the rapidity in our power.15

__________ 15 Ibid., XIX, 281.

op. cit., p. 85.

“…was successful. The threat to the British main base brought Clinton back from RI to NY at once, but Arbuthnot remained in off Narragansett Bay to continue his blockade.• “In Sept Washington at last met with Rochambeau at Hartford to plan a joint strategy. In response to questions posed by the French, Washington reiterated the views from which he never deviated:

“But even as Washington was conferring with his allies, news came of Rodney’s arrival at NY with ten ships of the line.• This put an end to any lingering hope of a Franco-American campaign. Rather, the Allies were fortunate that the British made no effective use of their naval superiority. True, it enabled Clinton to send 2,500 troops to VA to stage a diversion in favor of Cornwallis, but Arbuthnot resented Rodney’s assumption of command in NY, and the two men quarreled bitterly….”

1st. That there can be no decisive enterprise against the maritime establishments of the English in this country without a constant naval superiority. 2nd. That of all the enterprises which may be undertaken, the most important and decisive is the reduction of NY, which is the center and focus of all the British forces.16

__________ 16 Ibid., XX, 76-8.

“…quarreled bitterly. Clinton had no inclination to renew his attempt on RI, and Rodney, who was ill and little disposed to activity, did not urge the project. Finally in mid-Nov he sailed again for the WI without having accomplished anything.• “Thus the year 1780 closed on a bitter note for the Americans. The fine new French forces remained idle, blockaded in Newport ever since their arrival. In Sept Washington returned from the Hartford conference to be confronted with the treason of Benedict Arnold. At the end of the year he wrote Benjamin Franklin:

Disappointed of the second division of French troops, but more especially in the expected naval superiority, which was the pivot upon which everything turned, we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign after a flattering prospect at the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a decisive one on our part. Latterly we have been obliged to become spectators of a succession of detachments from the army at NY, in aid of Lord Cornwallis, while our naval weakness and the political dissolution of a large part of our army puts [sic] it out of our power to counteract them at the southward, or take advantage of them here.17__________

17 Letter of Dec 20, 1780, Ibid., XX, 507.Ibid.


“At the outbreak of the American Revolution, Britain’s unpreparedness permitted the Americans in 1775 to make several offensive moves. Their capture of Fort Ticonderoga brought temporary control of the Champlain-Hudson Valley invasion route; their attack on Quebec frightened the British into diverting forces to Canada the following year; and the siege of Boston obliged the British to withdraw to Halifax the following spring. “But in 1776 the British, having gathered their forces, seized the initiative, and they were to exercise it until the French entry into the war. Their control of the sea enabled them to seize almost any coastal point at will and to conduct harassing raids from New England to VA that very nearly destroyed both the American will and capacity to continue the war. But when they attempted to penetrate inland, they exposed their communications to the semi-guerrilla tactics of the Americans and courted disaster. “In the summer of 1776 Gen Howe took NY and made it his main base, while Carleton, after driving Arnold from Canada, undertook to penetrate the colonies by the Champlain-Hudson route. He was unable to use the lake however until he had spent the summer building a fleet to overmatch that of Arnold, so that not until was he ready to move up the lake. Although Arnold was defeated at Valor Island, he nonetheless scored the only significant American naval success of the war,…”

Summary

Sea Power, pp. 85-86.


“…the war, for he had delayed the British till too late in the season for them to proceed with the campaign. Next year when Burgoyne attempted to continue Carleton’s strategy, the Americans were better prepared and captured the British army at Saratoga. That victory was decisive, for it brought the French into the war, and it was French aid, and particularly French naval power, that ultimately made American victory possible. “Early in the war Washington realized that sea power was the key to the struggle in America, and the strategic aim to which he adhered firmly throughout was to secure a naval superiority that would make possible a combined sea and land op against one of the British lodgments on the coast. He preferred an attack on NY, as the center of British military ops, but was willing to act elsewhere if necessary. The arrival of d’Estaing in 1778 offered an opportunity to put this strategy into effect and did cause the British to abandon first Philadelphia and later RI in order to concentrate their forces. However, d’Estaing failed at NY, Newport, and Savannah, leaving Washington discouraged but with unwavering faith in his own strategy.…”

Summary

op. cit., p. 86.

“…own strategy, “The French exercised the initiative almost continuously from their entry, but the vacillation of the French government threw away the chance to end the war at a stroke by invading England in the summer of 1779, when the Franco-Spanish fleet held unchallenged control of the Channel. After that, French sea power was dissipated into various theaters, the most important of which was the WI, where the French made significant but indecisive gains. While they were thus occupied, the British regained the initiative on the American coast by taking Charleston in May 1780, after which Cornwallis undertook to conquer the Carolinas. “The Continental Navy was too weak to play a significant role, and except for the moral effect of the exploits of a few individuals, it had little influence on the war. After a minor raid on the Bahamas in 1776, it could do no more than harry British communications, principally by single cruisers.”

Ibid.

The French intervention which initially raised such hope in the patriot ranks seemed to have failed to turn the tide. Britain was not ready to admit defeat in her efforts to crush the rebellion. The military and naval superpower who had won the Seven Years War still hoped to return the thirteen colonies to her empire.

But no matter how many formal battles Britain won, no many how much territory she occupied, the Continental army would not lay down its arms. As Edmund Burke had warned in his Second Speech on Conciliation with America, 1775: “The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.”

Which side will finally sue for peace? And why? Could the key be sea power?

But that’s another story… jbp

sea power 2 session 3-france joins

Education