5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

1/18

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into alease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice toterminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectmentproceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the

expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue:

Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the takingshould not be reckoned as of 1947, and thatjust compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property asof that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) theentry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color ofauthorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informallyappropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public usemust be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of theproperty.

Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensationis to be determined asof the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when thetaking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement ofthe expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaintfor eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of thefiling of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed

in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. Thetakingof the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensationto be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint foreminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that alease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since byexpress provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi landin the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669,New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New CivilCode for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflationbecause in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent ofcontract.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

2/18

Republic v. Sarabia; G.R. No. 157847; 25 August 2005.

Facts:Sometime in 1956, the petitioner took possession and control of the substantialportion of the lot owned by the private respondents. The occupied portion was used asan airport parking area and in time, several structures were erected on it.

In 1998, petitioner filed an action for the expropriation of the entire lot. However,expropriation and writ of possession was granted only as to the actual portion occupiedand not on its entirety. Through the court-appointed commissioners reports, the trialcourt fixed the just compensation for the occupied portion at its current market value in1999. The trial court fixed the just compensation based on the current market value notat the time of the taking which was in 1956, but at the time of the issuance of the writ ofpossession in 1999. To the trial court, the date of the issuance of the writ has to beconsidered in fixing the just compensation because the same signified petitioners properacquisition and taking of the property which involves not only physical possession butalso the legal right to possess and own the same.CA affirmed the trial courts order.

Issue:The precise time at which just compensation should be fixed: whether as of thetime of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity, as insisted by petitioner,or at the issuance of the writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings, asmaintained by the respondents and sustained by both the trial court and the Court of

Appeals.

Held: Compensation for property expropriated must be determined as of the time theexpropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the institution of theproceedings.

The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken andnot the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of thefiling of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the publicpurpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may havedepreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of

the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to generaleconomic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only forwhat he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond hisloss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it istaken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just" notonly to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

3/18

EPZA VS. DULAY[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan ExportProcessing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San

Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands areregistered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without

them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay thenissued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the justcompensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antoniowould be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending thatunder PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fairmarket value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by theassessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion forReconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of thecommissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamusenjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation inPD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachmentto judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under theConstitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may

only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation,but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awardedand how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicialfunction. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinationbut when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the privateparty may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, orexecutive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courtsfindings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of thedecreed compensation.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

4/18

Sumulong vs Guerrero

Facts:On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint forexpropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project toprovide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximatelytwenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners LorenzoSumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought tobe expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adoptingthe market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential

decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representingthe total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P. D. No. 1224 whichdefines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing uponpayment of just compensation.

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ ofpossession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of theirproperty without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition

challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D.No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of publicuse, just compensation, and due process.

Issues:(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purposeof condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful ofpeople, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power ofeminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties tobe expropriated.

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixedby government assessors.

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land wereimmediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by therespondent judge.

Held:(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the

middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of thesupporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a validexercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced bychanging conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as thepurpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It isaccurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for thegeneral welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing fallswithin the confines of public use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate theparticular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how muchthereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse

of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight toand leave undisturbed the NHAs choice andthe size of the site for the project. The rightto use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to thedemands of the common good.

(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224,1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

5/18

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means afair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannotbe absolute substitute for just compensation.

(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violatesprocedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control anddisposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judgeordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing

De Knecht v. Bautista

Eminent Domain> Genuine Necessity

Facts:

The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to theCavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of propertiesalong Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.

Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make theproposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.

Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on HumanSettlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministryargued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The governmentfiled expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and DelPan streets, among whom was petitioner De Knecht

Petitioners contention:

The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason.The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature hasdelegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking aparticular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the granteepower subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross

abuse of discretion. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith,arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process determination as to whether ornot the proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests. Even theclaim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there would be a saving ofP2 million under his new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to the siteof the proposed EDSA extension As envisioned by the government, the EDSAextension would be linked to the Cavite Expressway. Logically then, theproposed extension must point to the south and not detour to the north.

Respondents counter-argument:

There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the EDSA

Extension to Roxas Blvd. When the Ministry of Public Highways decided to change the site of EDSAExtension to Roxas Boulevard from Cuneta Avenue to the Del Pan - FernandoStreets, the residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein Streets who were to beadversely affected by the construction of EDSA Extension to Roxas Boulevardalong Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposedproject. Petitioner herein was one of those notified.

It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward (fromthe city center while the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line follows northwardand inward direction. It must be stated that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and DelPan - Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and designcriteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting the Del Pan - FernandoRein Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted to save themotel located along Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the socialimpact factor or problem involved

Issue: WON there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knechtand others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to beexpropriated seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

6/18

Ruling:

NO. The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should notreceive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the costfactor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines.The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and DelPan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on theresidents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choicebetween people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be

remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order ofJune 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon thepossession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondentJudge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P,entitled"Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, etc."except to dismiss said case.

Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990]

First Division, Gancayco (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First

Instance (CFI) of Rizalin Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of

the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them Cristina De

Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some 15 other defendants (Civil Case

7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of

jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of

complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.

On 29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial

court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking ofimmediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June

1979, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property

to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with the

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the

complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession

authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be

condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for

the lands involved in the proceedings.

On 16 July 1979, de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition

(GR No. L-51078) and directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979praying that the Republic be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the

expropriation action and from implementing said order. On 30 October 1980, the

Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition

and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista

On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and

Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the

dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which had become

final and in order to avoid further damage to latter who were denied possession of their

properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among

others, that it had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance withthe aforestated decision. However, on 2 September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to

dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340 expropriating the

same properties and for the same purpose.

The lower court in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the

enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

7/18

order of the lower court dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht appealed from said order

to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on 28 December

1988, setting aside the order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation

proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of

the Supreme Courtmay be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject

becomes the law of thecase between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the

Republic to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just

compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation

proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with

the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the

very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears

that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme

Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the

Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court toconsider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have

been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA

extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this

project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize

the traffic bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative

arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the

circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the

properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in

this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the

anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.

MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of thetrial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating asground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his businesstransactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after duehearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari

and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders datedMarch 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as thecommunication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leaveto travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commandingthe Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither thecourts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which hasno jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right totravel.

Issue:

Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The conditionimposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

8/18

requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if theaccused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may beplaced beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for histravel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot beundertaken by any other person in his behalf.

ANOTHER MANOTOC DIGESTFACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-InsularManagement Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was inUS for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of amanagement committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pendingdisposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner ofImmigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effectwas issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc whichwas suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against thepetitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa andwas allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country statinghis desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such wasopposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition forcertiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication requestdenying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither thecourts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, couldprevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE:WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD:NO.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country becausethis is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Thecondition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times wheneverthe court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on hisconstitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country withoutsufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel,duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not

able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other personin his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impairedexcept upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court inreleasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by theprovision on right to travel.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

9/18

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]

First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the

Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or

Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the

Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park

cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers andhave been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall

immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months

from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7

years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution

requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction

of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the

required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City

Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First

Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief,

prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002)

seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the

Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised

Administrative Code.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City

Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the

pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64

null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government

and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for

charity burial grounds ofdeceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property

without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the

total area of all privatecemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and

the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.

The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private

cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of

building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to

private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered

by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which

empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of

population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the

provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local

Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a

Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in

such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide

its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public

cemeteries.

This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present.

Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned

ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

10/18

aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the

land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and

convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the

development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The

beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer

when individual lots are sold to homeowners

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA v.MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY G.R.No. 156273, 9 August 2005, Second Division (Callejo, Sr, J.)

When the State reconveys land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations in

land values. Any increase or decrease in market value due to the proposed

improvement may not be considered in determining the market value. Thus,

reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he was paid by the

government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the

lands highest and best use when the sale to the State occurred.

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of hereinrespondent sought to acquire Lot No. 916 and Lot No. 920 for the proposed expansion

of the Lahug Airport. The two parcels of land located in Lahug, Cebu City were owned by

the spouses Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea. The spouses refused to sell their

properties because the proposed price was unacceptably way below the market value of

the lands at that time. As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining

the then existing Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the

right to repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the

event that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some

landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their

properties became defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of thePhilippines before the CFI of Cebu. Lot Nos. 916 and 920 were among those included in

the expropriation case.

The trial court declared Lot Nos. 916 and 920, along with the other adjoininglands, condemned for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject landswere transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently turnedover to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990. Subsequently, when the Lahug Airportwas abandoned and all its functions and operations were transferred to the Mactan

Airport, the heirs of Moreno wrote then President Ramos and the MCIAA GeneralManager, requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot. Written andverbal demands were ignored by the respondent.

Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with the RTC of

Cebu City against the respondent asserting their right to reacquire the subject

properties. During the pendency of the case, one Richard E. Unchuan filed a Motion for

Transfer of Interest, alleging that some of the petitioners had already assigned to him

their respective rights, interests, participation, and ownership over the subject properties.

On April 12, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, granting

them the right to repurchase the properties at the amount originally paid by the

respondent in Civil Case No. R-1881, including consequential damages.

The CA reversed the trial courts decision on the premise that the judgmentaffirming the states right to exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional.The SC reversed the decision of the CA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

Additionally, it also filed a Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration by theHonorable Court En Banc dated November 11, 2003, alleging that the present caseinvolves novel questions of law. The petitioners filed an Opposition to the respondentsMotion for Reconsideration stating that no new arguments have been proffered by therespondent to warrant the reversal of the Courts decision.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

11/18

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to reconveyance or repurchase of the lotsin question when the public purpose for which the eminent domain was exercised nolongersubsists

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

The Supreme Court reiterated what was said in the former decision: It has been

declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of landas may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. If land is expropriated

for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or

abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the

purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so

expropriated. Also, if land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is

granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, it returns to the

former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. And if, upon the

contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then,

of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the

State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect

of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. When land has beenacquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent

domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use

may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any

impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there

should foremost be an expresscondition in the dispositive portion of the decision before

the condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the purpose for its

taking has been abandoned or ended. The indisputable certainty in the present case is

that there was a prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the

expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners once the airport istransferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots

were already reconveyed to their previous owners. This belated news further bolsters

the fact that the purpose for which the properties were condemned has been

abandoned.

A more pressing discovery unearthed by this Court is that a significant portion ofthe subject properties had been purchased by the Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. for thedevelopment of a commercial complex. The respondent, in its answer, did not deny thisallegation in the petitioners complaint.

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemnedfor public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of

the land if the condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose;

however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose,

property reverts to the owner in fee simple. The governments taking of private property,

and then transferring it to private persons under the guise of public use or purpose is the

despotism found in the immense power of eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and

unconstitutional states power to oblige a landowner to renounce his productive and

invaluable possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for his own

private gain, is offensive to our laws.

There are historic and rational bases for affording the petitioners the right of

repurchase. The Court is cognizant of the incontestable fact that some landowners

immediately sold their properties upon the assurance that they could repurchase them at

the cessation of the Lahug Airports operations. And, indeed, these landowners who

chose to cede their properties were fortunate to have a stipulation in their contract of

sale vouching for their right of repurchase. Meanwhile, the landowners who found it

burdensomely difficult to part with their cherished lands underwent the costly

expropriation proceedings which lasted for a number of years. Inevitably, justice and

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

12/18

equity dictates the reconveyance of the expropriated lots to their previous

owners. One must never fail to overlook the reality that the power to condemnproperty

is an awesome power of the State and that to compel a citizen to forcibly surrender his

precious property to the enormous governmental power is too much a sacrifice which

deserves more consideration than those landowners, who, from the very beginning

voluntarily relinquished their ownership.

As to the amount of repurchase price, the Supreme Court maintains its stand.

When theState reconveys land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations inland values. Any increase or decrease in market value due to the proposed

improvement may not be considered in determining the market value. Thus,

reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he was paid by the

government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the

lands highest and best use when the sale to the State occurred.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

13/18

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October 1983]

En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 on leave

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu

City forthe expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and

Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by

condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes

indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for thedevelopment into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with

potential tourism value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts,

tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming

pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback

riding for the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria

Ardona)Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta

Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and

Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal,

Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and

Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E. Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas

and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno, Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by AlbertoCabuenas), Maximina Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In

Representation of Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao, Estrella

Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro, Josefina and Marites, All

Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar

and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio

Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino

Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of

Buenaventura Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C.

Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada (Represented by

Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking is

allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific

constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that

assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of

the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is

constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court

of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the

expropriation cases.The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National

Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take

immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs

of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports

complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for

public use.

Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of

the powerof eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for

public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of

national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership,

utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV

states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the

expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving

citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just

compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of

police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional

objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. The

restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of

government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public

lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

14/18

applies to the Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities

which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or

limited government resources. There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional

purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and

telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,

hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the

concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "publicuse" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The Philippine

Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would

give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons productive employment, higher

incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. The Courts

dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed

with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort

complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

15/18

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [GR 106440, 29 January 1996]

First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur

Facts:Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos

Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the

parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of

Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986,

pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical

landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,

Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the

legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the

affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-

General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and

in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an

order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property.

The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August

1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of

the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would

have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas

moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a

public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,

directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,

contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for

reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorariand prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed

the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court

on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of

the religioussect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes public use.

Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as

condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not

be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the

subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent

domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in

the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature

of a forced purchase by the State.

It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a

public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form

and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private

property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is

intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual

against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having

been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of

meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminentdomain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public

use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses.

The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been

discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive

contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to

commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

16/18

religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is

the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of

the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni

Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be

merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from

the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public

use.

Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-72126, 29 January1988]

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with theOffice of theMunicipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence aparcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's

heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoonpipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, largediameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the MunicipalCouncil of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258,Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land coveredby TCT 37879.

An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor,which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On 10March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacandisapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for theMunicipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.

On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council ofMeycauayan.

The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permitto fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council ofMeycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983,for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approvedthe aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civilaction for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value ofthe land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of

possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an orderdeclaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacanas court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for theproperty.

PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, theappellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration byPPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is nogenuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several otherroads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. Thecourt, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land ismore ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court onpetition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

Issue: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMCs property for the purpose of aconnectingroad, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

Held: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for publicuse upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

17/18

necessity therefor. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain isgenuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of privateproperty is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a publiccharacter. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality of the exercise ofthe right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. Thegovernment may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to betaken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, itis still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adverselyaffected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuinenecessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of thePhilippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road.

Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for salesituated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriatedwhich was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy

equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemnthe same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only causeunjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a publicroad to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the otheravailable roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishmentdoing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of thevacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion oftraffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken willonly accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve anddecongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area."

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed

road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the municipalities's attempt toexpropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.

MASIKIP VS CITY OF PASIGG.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by

statute

FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig

sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and recreational activities of

the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged

purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land

opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The

Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was

genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,

which dismissed petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

5/23/2018 Sec 8, 9 - digests

18/18

ISSUE:

W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the

public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of

providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its

instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and

inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to

the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional

limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when

expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,

exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the

poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

Constitution and pertinent laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been

previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;

(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation

proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value

of the property based on the current tax declaration; and

(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based

on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center atRainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the

expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council

which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation,

indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a

private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.