secure routing in wireless sensor network soumyajit manna kent state university 5/11/2015kent state...

Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Network

Soumyajit MannaKent State University

04/18/23Kent State University1

Outline

Overview and background

Statement of routing security problem

Attacks on sensor network routing

Attack on specific sensor network protocol

Countermeasure04/18/23Kent State University2

Overview and Background Current Routing Protocol Goal:

Low Energy

Robust

Scalable

Low Latency

Small Footprint

So for Wireless Sensor Network:

Current routing protocol not designed for security & be insecure

Unlike traditional network, they can’t depend on many available resources for security

Goal: to design sensor routing protocol with security in mind


Problem Statement Assumption about underlying network

Radio link, sensor node and MAC layer are not secured and easily tampered

Base stations and aggregation points can be trusted to some extend

Different threat models Mote class Vs Laptop class Inside Vs Outside

Security goals in this settings Reliable delivery of messenger in conventional network

Sensor network need in-network processing Graceful degradation Confidentiality Protection against Reply of data packet should be handle by higher level


Attack model

Spoofed, altered or replay routing information May be used for loop construction, attracting or repelling traffic, extend or shorten source route

Selective forwarding Refuse to forward certain messengers, selective forwarding packets or simply drop them by trying to follow the path of least resistance and attempt to include itself on the actual data path flow

Sinkhole attacks Attracting nearly all traffic from a particular area through a specific compromised node


Attack model Sybil attacks

Forging of multiple identities – having a set of faulty entities representing through a large set of identities. It undermines assumed mapping between identity to entity

Wormhole attacks Tunneling of messages over alternative low – latency links like confuse the routing protocol, creates sinkhole

Hello flood attacks An attacker sends or replays a routing protocol’s hello packets with more energy

Acknowledgement spoofing Spoof link layer acknowledgement to trick other nodes to believe that link or node is either dead or alive


General sensor routing protocol type

Flooding

Gradient

Clustering

Geographic

Energy Aware


Protocols used in sensor network

TinyOS beaconing Directed diffusion Geographic routing Minimal cost forwarding Cluster – head – LEACH Rumor routing Energy conserving topology maintenance


Attacks on specific protocols TinyOS beaconing: It constructs a breath first spanning tree rooted at base station. Periodically the base station broadcasts a route updates and mark the base station as parents and

broadcast it .

Relevant Attack mode: Bogus routing information Selective forwarding Sinkhole Wormholes Hello floods


TinyOS beacon

Spoof information

Bogus and replayed routing

information (such as “I am

base station”) send by an

adversary can easily pollute

the entire network.


TinyOS beacon Wormhole & Sinkhole Combination

Tunnel packets received in one place of the network and replay them in another place

The attacker can have no key material. All it requires is two transceivers and one high quality out-of-bound channel


TinyOS beacon Wormhole & Sinkhole Combination

Most packet will be routed to the wormhole

The wormhole can drop packet directly (sinkhole)

Or more subtly selectively forward packets to avoid detection


TinyOS beacon Hello flood attack

A Laptop class adversary that can retransmit a routing updates with enough power to be received by the entire network


Direct Diffusion Relevant attack

Suppression – by spoof negative reinforcement Cloning – by replay information with malicious listed as base station (send both)

Path influence – by spoof positive or negative reinforcements and bogus data events

Selective forwarding and data tampering – by above attack method to put the malicious node in the data flow

Wormholes attack Sybil attack


Geographic routing

GEAR & GPSR Cost function depends on destination location and the neighbor nodes used to determine next hop

It uses greedy geographic query routing technique

Better than Directed Diffusion (e.g. flooding technique)

It restrict broadcast within sampling region


Geographic routing

Possible attack

Sybil attack Bogus routing information Selective forwarding No wormhole and sinkhole attack

An adversary may present multiple identitiesto other nodes. The Sybil attack can disrupt geographic and multi-path

routing protocols by being in more than one place at once and reducing

diversity. From B-> C, now will go through B-> A3 ->C04/18/23Kent State University16

Geographic routing example 2

From B -> D, A forge a wrong information to claim B is in (2, 1), so C will send packets back to B which cause loop at last.


Minimum cost forwarding It is an backoff – based cost field algorithm for efficiently forwarding packets from sensor nodes to base station

Once the field is established the message, carrying dynamic cost information, flows along the minimum cost path in the cost field. Each intermediate node forwards the message only if it finds itself on the optimal path A = 110, will select B

for this message.04/18/23Kent State University18

Minimum cost forwarding Possible attacks

Sinkhole attack Mote – class adversary advertising cost zero anywhere in network

Hello flood attack

Bogus routing information

Selective forwarding

Wormholes


LEACH It is termed as Low – Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy. Randomized and self – configuration Low energy media access control Cluster-head collect data and perform processing then transmit to base station.

Possible attack Hello floods: Cluster – head selection based on signal strength what means a powerful advertisement can make the malicious attack be cluster – head.

Selective forwarding Sybil attack: Combined with hello floods if nodes try to randomly select cluster – head instead of strongest signal strength.


Rumor Routing Designed for query/event ratios between query and event flooding

Lower the energy cost of flooding


Rumor routing Possible attack

Bogus routing information Create tendrils by FWD copies of agent Send them as long as possible (TTL)

Selective forwarding Sinkholes Sybil Wormholes


Energy conserving topology maintenanceGAF SPAN Physical space is divided into equal virtual size squares, where nodes know its location and nodes with a square are equivalent

Identifies nodes for routing based on location information

Dense node deployment hence turn off unnecessary nodes ( like sleep, discovery or active state)

Each grid square has one active node

Nodes are ranked with respect to current state & expected lifetime

An energy – efficient coordination algorism for topology maintenance

Backbone for routing fidelity is build by coordinators

A node become eligible to be coordinate if two of its neighbors can’t reach other directly or via one or two coordinators

Traffic only routed by coordinator

Random back off for delay coordinator announcement

Hello messenger being broadcasted periodically


Energy conserving topology maintenanceGAF SPAN

Possible attack Bogus routing: Broadcasting high ranking discovery messages , then they can use some selective forwarding attack

Sybil & Hello flood: Target individual grids by a high ranking discovery messages with a non – existent node, frequently advertisements can disable the whole network by making most node sleep

Possible attack Hello floods: Broadcast n Hello messages with fake coordinator and neighbors which will prevent nodes from becoming coordinators when they should, then they can use some selective forwarding attack


Summary of attacks


Countermeasures Selective Forwarding can be limited by implementing multipath and probabilistic routing.

Outsider attack like Bogus routing information, Sybil, Sinkholes can be prevented by implementing key management at the link layer.

Insider attack like HELLO floods can be prevented by establishing link keys with the trusted base station which will verifies bidirectional.

Authenticated broadcast and flooding are important primitives.

Cluster-based protocols and overlays can reduce attack for the nodes closer to base station


Attacks difficult to defend

Wormhole are difficult to defend. This type of attack is done by mainly laptop-class both from inside and outside. To some extend geographic and clustering based protocol defend against this attack.


Conclusion

Link layer encryption and authentication, multipath routing, identity verification, bidirectional link verifies and authenticated broadcast is important.

Cryptography is not enough for insider and laptop-class adversaries, careful protocol design is needed as well


secure routing in wireless sensor network soumyajit manna kent state university 5/11/2015kent state...

Documents

sensor network routing

kent state university9

kent state university5

kent state university8

kent state university1

kent state university6

kent state university2

kent state university3