security council report monthly m ay 2007forecast

�

FORECAST SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org

OVERVIEW FOR MAY

ImportantmatterspendingbeforetheCoun-cilinclude:

n Theformationofthetribunal of international character to prosecute the suspects in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Haririisstillpending.On6February,LebanonandtheUN,withapprovalfromtheSecurity Council, signed an agreement forthe establishment of the tribunal. But the ratification process is blocked by political factionsinBeirut.

n Thedraftresolutiononsmall armscirculatedbyArgentinainMarch2006seemstohavelapsed.SouthAfricacirculatedadraftpresi-dentialstatementinMarch2007.TheissuewasincludedasafootnoteontheCouncil’scalendarinMarchandAprilbutithasnotyetbeen taken up. The absence of a Council decisiononthismatterleavesfutureperiodicSecretary-General’sreportsinabeyance.

n Implementation of the phased approach forDarfurasagreedinAbujainNovember2006islagging.AmoredetailedAU-UNagreementonthehybridoperationasendorsedbytheCouncilon19Decemberwasstillpendingatpresstime.

n Noaction,asenvisagedinresolution 1706

on Darfur,hasbeentakentoimpose”strongeffectivemeasures,suchasassetsfreezeortravelban,againstany individualorgroupthatviolatesorattemptstoblocktheimple-mentationofthe[DarfurPeace]Agreementorcommitshumanrightsviolations.”Anum-berofproposalsarebeingconsideredbutdivisionsremain.

n ActionontheSecretary-General’srecommen-dations for a peacekeeping force in Chad and the Central African Republic is stillawaited,becauseofChad’shesitationaboutboththeproposedrobustmilitarycomponentandacrediblepoliticalreconciliationprocess.

n OntheDRC,theCouncilisstilltoconsiderimposingindividualsanctionsunderresolution1698againstarmedgroupsthatrecruitchildren.

n OnWest Africa,theCouncilheldconsultationsontheSecretary-General’sreportoncross-borderissueson16Marchbutnofollow-uphasbeenconsidered,whichmayputfuturereportsinthatregardinabeyance.

n TheCouncilisstillwaitingfortheSecretary-General’srecommendationsonthestatusoftheSheb’a Farms.Inhislastreportonimple-mentationofresolution1701(issuedon14

March), the Secretary-General mentionedgoodprogressonthecartographicanalysisofthestatusofthefarms,andsaidthatthetechnicalworkwouldbecompletedby thenextreportingperiodinmid-June.

n TheDecember2004reportbytheSecretary-GeneralonhumanrightsviolationsinCôte d’Ivoire,requestedbyapresidentialstatement,hasstillnotbeenmadepublic.AlsoonCôted’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by theSecretary-General’sSpecialAdviseron the PreventionofGenocidehasnotbeenpublished.

n Sincethebeginningoftheyear,theCouncilhashaddifficultyagreeingontheplansforitsvisiting missions. Under discussion weretripstoWestAfrica(includingCôted’Ivoire),Timor-Leste, Central Africa and the MiddleEast.Sofar,onlyonemission,toKosovo,wasagreedbyallmembers,andit isunderwayat press time. A Council mission to meet with AU leadership (in Addis Ababa andAccra)isanotherpossibility.

n The2005WorldSummitrequestedreformsrelatingtotheMilitary Staff Committee.Thishasyettobeaddressed.

Aide-Memoire

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org

TheUnitedStateswillhavetheCouncilpres-idency in May. At this stage, no thematicdebatesareplanned.ThenewUSPerma-nentRepresentative,ZalmayKhalilzad,whocomestotheUNwithrecentexperienceasan ambassador in two countries on theCouncilagenda,willbethechair.

OpenmeetingsoftheCouncilexpectedinMayinclude:n a debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina willincludeabriefingbytheHighRepre- sentative for the Implementation of the PeaceAgreement;n therewillbeanopenbriefingbythechairs of the three committees dealing with terroristissues,theAl-QaidaandTaliban (1267),theCounter-terrorism(1373)and

theWeaponsofMassDestruction(1540) Committees;n adoption of a resolution extending the mandateof theoperation in theDemo- cratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC (the only mandate renewal envisaged forMay);andn the regular monthly briefing on the MiddleEast.

Additional open meetings are likely to beaddedtotheprogrammeofworkasvarioussituationsevolve.TheCouncilisalsolikelytobebriefedinMayonthehumanitariansitua-tionintheGreatLakesregionofAfricaandSomalia by Under Secretary-General for

>>page 2

MAy 2007Monthly

27 April 2007

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUEStatus Update since our April Forecast...............................................3Kosovo......................................................2Lebanon....................................................4Darfur/Sudan...........................................5Iran.............................................................7Nepal.........................................................9Somalia...................................................�0Timor-Leste............................................��Children and Armed Conflict................�2Security Council Elections...................�3Chad/Central African Republic............�3Côte d’Ivoire...........................................�5Democratic Republic of the Congo.....�6Ethiopia/Eritrea......................................�7Sierra Leone...........................................�8Upcoming Issues in Sanctions Committees........................................20Notable Dates for May...........................24Important Dates over the Horizon.......24

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org2

OVERVIEW FOR MAY (continued)

HumanitarianAffairsJohnHolmesfollowinghistripstothoseareas.

Consultationsareexpectedon:n Lebanon (on the establishment of an international tribunal; on the mission to the Syrian-Lebanese border; and on resolution1559,respectively);n Kosovo;n Nepal;n Ethiopia/Eritrea;n SierraLeone;n Burundi(possiblyjustabriefingbythehead ofBINUB,theUNpoliticalofficethere);n Sudan;n Côted’Ivoire;andn Haiti.

Somalia, Timor-Leste and Children andArmedConflictcouldpossiblyalsobeaddedtothelist.

Kosovo TheUSandtheEuropeanmemberswillbeeagertoproceedwithdraftingandtheadop-tionofaresolutionthatwouldimplementtheproposals for Kosovo, recommended bySpecial Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. In the firstdaysofthemonth,theCouncilwillhearanoralreportfromtheCouncilmission,ledbyBelgium,tobefollowedbyawrittenreport.Butitisunlikelythateventswillunfoldquickly.Russiahasbeenunwilling toendorse theplanandhasrepeatedlysignalleditsdesirefor a more deliberate process and moreattentiontowhetherCouncilresolution1244ofJune1999hasbeenfullyimplemented.SouthAfricaandIndonesiahavealsosignalledmisgivings.Prior to themission itseemedthatamajorityoftheCouncilwasnotper-suadedofthecaseforindependence.Itmaybethat,initiallyatleast,substantivediscus-sionswillbecentredintheContactGroup.

Sudan TheissueofsanctionswillcontinuetohoverovertheCouncilasmemberswatchclosely

forrapidprogresswithKhartoum’scompli-ance on its commitments regarding thehybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission inDarfur.Anotherissuethatwillbescrutinisedclosely,inlightofrecentreports,willbetheimplementationofSudanesecommitmentsregardinghumanitarianaccessanddeliveryofaid.

IranAsthisissuewenttoprinttherewerehintsemergingfromameetingbetweenthechiefnegotiatorsfromtheEU(JavierSolana)andIran(AliLarijani)thatawaymaybefoundto resolve the impasse over re-openingnegotiations, due to the preconditionsestablishedbybothsides.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthisopeningwillbearfruit.Itseemsunlikely thatamajorbreakthroughwilloccurbefore23May(theduedateforthenextIAEAreport).Anadversereportisthereforeexpected.However,iftheSolana/Larijani process is continuing this willincrease the probability that Iran will notbeontheCouncil’sactiveagendainMay.

SomaliaAlthoughCouncilactiononSomaliaseemsunlikely in May, it will be very much onCouncilmembers’minds.EthiopiaandtheUS(andtoalesserextenttheAUmemberson theCouncil)willbeadvocatingbehindthescenes foraUNoperationas theexitstrategyforbothEthiopiaandthecurrentlyhighlyexposedUgandanpeacekeepers.Intheabsenceofarealpoliticalreconciliationprocess and while the prospect of majorarmedconflictremains,othermembersoftheCouncil,rememberingtheUNdisasterinSomaliain1993/94,arebecomingincreas-inglyworried.

LebanonSeveralissueswillconvergeinMay.EarlyinthemonthCouncilattentionwillbefocusedontheestablishmentofatribunaltoprose-cute thesuspects in themurderof former

Kosovo

Expected Council ActionInearlyMaytheCouncilisexpectedtocon-sider the report from its April mission toKosovoandmoveclosertodecidinghowtohandlethereportreleasedinMarchbyMar-ttiAhtisaari,theSecretary-General’sSpecialEnvoy for the Future Status Process forKosovo.Ahtisaarirecommendedindepen-dence for Kosovo supervised by theinternationalcommunity.

There isstillgreatuncertaintyonhowfarCouncildiscussionswillprogressinMayonanewresolutiontoreplace1244,whichin1999authorisedNATOtoenforcethewithdrawalofYugoslavforcesfromKosovoandestab-lishedthelegalframeworkforUNadminis-trationbytheUNMissioninKosovo(UNMIK).

Key Recent DevelopmentsKosovowasconsidered in theCouncil inAprilduringproceduraldiscussionsontheprogrammeofwork.Ittookhourstorecon-cile the various positions regarding the

format for the presentation of Ahtisaari’sreportandstatuspackage.Russiawantedan open debate, while the US and UKwanted closed informal consultations.Eventually, the Council agreed to have aclosedformalmeeting,whichallowedSer-bian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica toparticipate. To allow Kosovo’s President,Fatmir Sejdiu, to speak, an Arria formulameetingwasheldimmediatelyafterwards.The Council members then moved toclosedinformalconsultationsonAhtisaari’s

Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. AnagreementbetweenthegovernmentandtheUNwassignedinFebruarybutthematterhasstalledduetothepoliticalcrisisinLeba-non. The Council will likely hear from theUnderSecretary-GeneralforLegalAffairsontherecentmeetingsinLebanonandperhapsnewproposalsonhowtomovetheissuefor-ward.Thereisalsogoingtobeadiscussionon the implementationof resolution1559.Perhaps theSecretary-Generalwillpartici-pate.Apresidentialstatementseemslikely.ItwillbeinterestingtoseewhethertheCounciltakesup theunderlying issuesofpoliticalreconciliation.Finally,therecouldbeareportfromtheassessmentmissiononLebanese-Syrianbordermonitoringandadiscussiononthereinforcementofmonitoringthebor-derforillegalarmsshipments.

NepalTheCouncilisexpectingabriefingfromtheSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal. While several positivedevelopments took place in the recentmonthstherehasbeenagrowingconcernaboutthefeasibilityofholdingtheelectionsbytheJunedeadline,somethingthebriefingislikelytohighlight.TheCouncilwillnotneedtotakeanyformalactionatthisstage,thoughtheinitial12-monthdurationofthemissioninNepalwillmostlikelyneedtobeextendedand discussion on this may start in May,alongwithpossiblerevisionofthemandate.

HaitiThoughthereisnoformalrequirement,suchasamandaterenewaloranupcomingreport,theCouncilislikelytoholdconsultationsonHaiti. A briefing from Under Secretary-GeneralforPeacekeepingOperations,Jean-MarieGuehenno,whocouldvisitthecountryinMay,isapossiblefocus.Inthepastseveralmonths,theUNoperationthere,MINUSTAH,hasachievedseveralsuccessesinaddress-ing the problem of gang violence and abriefingmaybedesirable.n

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org 3

Status Update since our April Forecast Recent developments on the situations

coveredinourAprilForecastarecoveredintherelevantbriefsinthisissue.However,otherinterestingCouncildevelopmentsinAprilincluded:

n Threats to International Peace and Secu-rity: On 12 and 13 April the CouncilcondemnedtherecentterroristattacksinAlgeria (S/PRST/2007/10) and Iraq (S/PRST/2007/11).

n Georgia:On13ApriltheCounciladoptedresolution 1752 extending UNOMIG’s mandateuntil15Octoberandencouragingtheresumptionofdialogueandtheimple-mentationofconfidence-buildingmeasuresasrecommendedintheSecretary-Gener-al’smostrecentreport(S/2007/182).

n North Korea: On 16 April, AmbassadorMarcello Spatafora of Italy, chair of the1718SanctionsCommittee,reportedtothe

Council that the implementationofsanc-tions on North Korea was proceedingsmoothly.

n Energy, Security and Climate:On17ApriltheCouncilheldaministerial-leveldebateontherelationshipbetweenenergy,secu-rity and climate, initiated by the Aprilpresidency of the UK and chaired by itsForeignSecretary(S/PV.5663andRes.1).ItwasthefirsttimetheCounciladdressedthepotentialimpactofclimatechangeonsecurity. There was no formal outcome(SC/9000). Both NAM (S/2007/203) andtheG77+China (S/2007/211)sent letterstotheSecurityCouncilexpressingconcernaboutCouncilencroachmentonpreroga-tives of the General Assembly andECOSOC. (Please see our 12 AprilUpdate.)

n Liberia:TheCouncilreviewedtheLiberiandiamondsanctionson18April.On27ApriltheCounciladoptedresolution1753end-ingthesix-yearbanandcallingforareviewofitsdecisioninninetydaystoensurethatLiberiacontinuestomeettherequirementsof the Kimberley Process CertificationScheme.(Pleaseseeour26AprilUpdate.)

n Western Sahara: In April both Morocco(S/2007/206) and the Polisario Front(S/2007/210) transmitted their respectiveproposals to the Security Council for asolutionforWesternSahara.Atpresstime,theCouncilwasexpectedtorenewMIN-URSO’s mandate, which expires on 30April,forafurthersixmonthsandpossiblysupport negotiations between the twosidesasrecommendedbytheSecretary-General inhis latest report (S/2007/202).(Pleaseseeour18AprilUpdate.)

statuspackageandRussia’sproposalforaCouncilmissiontoKosovoandSerbia.

On13ApriltheCouncilagreedtoRussia’sproposaltosendamissiontoKosovoandSerbia. Themission, ledbyAmbassadorJohanVerbekeofBelgium,tookplacefrom25–29AprilvisitingBelgrade,PristinaandMitrovica,withstopsenroute inBrusselsandVienna.ThemembersmetwithEUandNATO representatives, senior officials inSerbiaandKosovoaswellaswithcivilsoci-etyandreligiousleaders.Theobjectivesofthemissionweretoobtainfirst-handinfor-mationonprogressinKosovoandreceiveinformationdirectlyfromlocalactorsinBel-gradeandKosovo.

ThroughoutApriltherewasaflurryofdiplo-maticactivity.TheChinesedeputypremierandRussia’sforeignministermadesepa-rate visits to Serbia in mid-April. Serbiabeganitsowndiplomaticoffensivewithvis-itstoSouthAfrica,IndonesiaandQatartocourtthenon-permanentmembersoftheCouncil.TheEUandmembersoftheCon-tact Group on Kosovo (the US, the UK,France,Italy,RussiaandGermany)metinMoscowon20Aprilandheldseveralmeet-ingsatdifferentlevelsattheendofApril.

Options TheCouncilhasarangeofoptionsspan-ningaspectrumfromdecidingtobegintodraft a resolution implementing the Ahti-saari recommendations, to deciding tore-startnegotiationswithanewmediator.Atthis stage, neither of these looks likely.Otherpossibilitiesmayinclude:

n waitingwhileeffortsaremadeintheCon- tactGrouptoreachagreementbetween theUS,EuropeansandRussians;n seeking to find an accomodation with Russiabasedongreaterprotection for theSerbianminority(ineffectpickingup Russia’spointaboutbetterimplementa- tionofresolution1244);n a group of members preparing a draft resolutionwithaview to formally intro- ducingitwithco-sponsorsandpressing foravote;n decidingtorequestabriefingonalterna- tive models other than independence, includingthewiderUNexperienceinthis context;orn adoptingan“interim”resolutionthatdoes notdecideonfinalstatusandspecifically reservesthatforalaterdatebutputsin place the bulk of the legislative and administrativemachineryrecommended byAhtisaari.

Key IssuesAkeyissuewillbewhethertheCouncilmis-sion to the region changes members’positionsorreinforcestheirpreviousviews.WhilethediscussionsinAprilwereessen-tiallyonlyproceduraltheyrevealedthatnotenoughmemberswereconvincedthatAhti-saari’soption is theonlysolution leavingthe Council without the necessary ninevotestoadoptaresolution.

Iftherecontinuestobesignificantopposi-tion, a related key issue will be how tominimise the risk of violence while theCouncil decides how to proceed. If itappearsthattheissueislosingmomentum

intheCouncil,thoseeagertocreateinsta-bilityineitherKosovoorSerbiacouldtriggeractsofviolenceastimepasses.Inthiscon-text there is also the issue of a possibleunilateraldeclarationofindependence.

Another issue is public perceptions ofCouncilunity.Thereseem tobegrowingconcernsabout legitimacy if anyCouncildecisiononKosovo’sstatusistakenbyanarrowmajority.

Thekeysubstantiveissues,whichareattheheartofthedivisionsintheCouncil,areget-tinglittlediscussion.ThefirstisthequestionoftheCouncil’slegalauthoritytoimposeasolutiononKosovoandthepotentialprec-edentindoingso.Theotheriswhetherthenegotiations are really exhausted andwhether all alternatives have been suffi-ciently addressed. Related to both theseissuesisthequestionofwhetheralittletimespentontheseaspectsmaymakeiteasier,intheend,foralargernumberofelectedmembers to justifyvoting insupportofaresolution.

A possible issue that could impact theCouncil isEUunity. InitiallyEUmembershadarelativelyfirmcommonposition.How-ever, there are recent signs of possibledifferentiation.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthiswillhaveanymeaningfulimpact.

Council DynamicsCouncilunityonthisissueisunderstrain.EuropeanmembersandtheUSadvocatemoving quickly towards a decision onKosovo’s status.TheUSand theUKare

>>page 4


declareditwastimetobeginthepoliticalprocesstodeterminethefuturestatusofKosovo.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/Letters

• S/2007/168andAdd.1(26March2007)wasthelettertransmittingAhtisaari’sreportonKosovo’sfuturestatusandtheComprehensiveProposalfortheKosovoStatusSettlement.

• S/2007/134(9March2007)wasthelatestreportoftheSecretary-GeneralonUNMIK.

• S/2007/130(6March2007)wastheletterreportingontheoperationsoftheKosovoForcefrom1to31December2006.

Other Relevant Facts

Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process

MarttiAhtisaari(Finland)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

JoachimRucker(Germany)

UNMIK

• SizeofUNMIKmission:36militaryobservers,1,984police,506interna-tionalstaff,2,001localstaff,143UNvolunteersasof30September2006

• SizeofOSCEmission:1020(Pillar3)and461(Pillar4),252internationalstaff,768localstaff

• SizeofEUmission:125internationalstaff,336localstaff

Cost

US$2.218billionforfiscalyear2006/2007(notincludingOSCE,EUandNATOexpenditures)

KFOR (NATO FORCE)

GeneralRolandKather(Germany)

Size and Composition of Mission

• Size:16,000troops• NATOcountries:Belgium,Bulgaria,

CzechRepublic,Denmark,Estonia,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portu-gal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Turkey,UK,US

• Non-NATOcountries:Argentina,Armenia,Austria,Azerbaijan,Finland,Georgia,Ireland,Morocco,Sweden,Switzerland,Ukraine

Lebanon

Expected Council ActionThefifthsemi-annualreportontheimple-mentationofresolution1559,due19April,was postponed because the Secretary-General’sPersonalEnvoyTerjeRøed-Larsenwas in Syria with the Secretary-General.Consultationspreviouslyscheduledfor30Aprilweredelayed.ThesearelikelytotakeplaceinearlyMay.Apresidentialstatementislikely.

TheCouncilisalsolikelyinMaytoconsiderrecommendationsbytheUnderSecretary-GeneralforLegalAffairs,NicolasMichel,onthenextstepsfortheestablishmentofthespecialtribunalfortheallegedmurderersofformerLebanesePrimeMinisterRafiqHaririandothers.

TheCouncilalsoexpectsareportfromtheSecretary-General following the indepen-dentmission toassessmonitoringof theSyrian-Lebanese border. This could leadthe Council to consider further steps toimplementthearmsembargo.

Key Recent DevelopmentsThe Arab League Summit of 28 and 29MarchinRiyadhdidnotproduceprogressonpoliticalreconciliationashadbeenhoped.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visitedLebanonon29Marchandsaid thatdia-logueandcompromiseremainedthekeytonationalunity.

On4April,BanKi-moonreceivedamemo-randum from seventy Lebaneseparliamentarianscalling for aChapterVIIresolution toestablish the tribunal for theallegedHaririmurderers,sinceitsratifica-tion by the parliament was still beingblockedbytheopposition.Thiswassup-portedbyPrimeMinisterFouadSiniora.

On17April, theCounciladoptedapresi-dentialstatementsponsoredbyFrance,theUK,andtheUS:n reiteratingconcernatIsraeliviolationsof Lebaneseairspaceand“mountinginfor- mationbyIsrael”ofillegalmovementof armsacrosstheSyrian-Lebaneseborder;n supporting an independent mission to assessthemonitoringoftheborderand reportbacktotheCouncilbeforethenext 1701reportduemid-June,andexpress- ing its intention to consider reinforcing thearmsembargo;andn expressing concern at statements by Hezbollahofvariousarmedactivities.

the principal champions for a speedyresolution.EuropeanmembersarearguingthatthisisapriorityissueforEuropeandthattheissueisbeingdrivenbythefactsontheground.Russiaisagainstanimposedsolutionandisadvocatingfurthernegotia-tionswiththeparties.

ThereisasenseamongsttheEuropeansthatRussiawasaccommodatedovertwoimportantissues,proceduralrightsforSer-biatoaddresstheCouncilandthemissionto the region,and that in return itshouldnow begin negotiations on a resolution.Russiaishinting,however,thatthereremainunfulfilled elements of resolution 1244whichjustifyfurtherdelay.

Manyofthenon-permanentmembersfeelamorethoroughassessmentofthesubstan-tiveissuesisrequiredbeforeadecisionismade.Russia’sproposal foramission toKosovoprovidedmanywithaconvenientwayoutintheshort-term.Butitremainstobeseenwhether thepicture lookseasierupontheirreturn.Itseemsmanyofthenon-permanentmembershavestillnotdecidedif they would endorse Ahtisaari’s recom-mendationifitwereputtoavote.AlthoughsupportersofAhtisaari’srecommendationarguethatKosovoisauniquecase,manymembersfindithardtobelievethatitwillnotbecomeaprecedent.

ForIndonesia,territorialintegrityisafunda-mental principle based in its ownconstitution. South Africa feels that theCouncilwouldbeoverreachingifitweretoimplementAhtisaari’spackage.

Latin American members Panama andPeru,whomaybetheswingvotesneces-sary to secure a majority, will play animportantroleinMayandtheirimpressionsafterthevisittotheregionseemlikelytobeinfluential.

Council dynamics are also likely to beimpactedbythefactthatsignificantdiscus-sionswillbegoingon,bilaterally,incapitalsandnodoubtatprogressivelyhigherlevels.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

• S/RES/1244(10June1999)autho-risedNATOtosecureandenforcethewithdrawalofYugoslav(FRY)forcesfromKosovoandestablishedUNMIK.

Selected Presidential Statement

• S/PRST/2005/51(24October2005)


MonthlyFORECAST SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

MAy 2007

Thestatementtoucheduponallother1701issues,buttheissueofpoliticalreconcilia-tionreceivedrelativelylimitedspace.

Followinga requestbyopposition leaderNabih Berri, the Secretary-General sentNicolasMichel toLebanonon17April toofferlegalassistanceforthetribunal.Rus-sian Deputy Foreign Minister AlexanderSultanov,whoalsometwithSyrianPresi-dentBasharAl-Assad,wasinSyriaatthesametime.Michelstatedthatitmaybecomenecessary for the Council to move to aChapterVIIresolution.

TheSecretary-GeneralmetwithPresidentAl-Assadon24April.TheSyrianpresidentassuredBanofhiscooperationinallmattersrelatingtopeaceandsecurityintheMiddleEast,includingonborderdelineationwithLebanon.TheSecretary-GeneralnotedthatthebasisforcomprehensivepeaceintheMiddleEastinvolvedanendtotheoccupa-tionofArabterritory.Healsosaidthatitwasimportanttoestablishthetribunalbasedonanationalconsensus,andthatSyriacouldpromotesuchconsensus.

OptionsTheCouncilhasthefollowingoptions:n takeuptheoutstandingpoliticalrecon- ciliationissues(perhapsfollowingupon the1559report),orwaituntilthenext 1701 reporting period and combine relevantelements;n initiateaChapterVIIresolutionestablish- ingthetribunal,orwaituntilthenextUN International Independent Investigation Commission(UNIIIC)reportingperiod(in June) to provide a last chance for a domesticparliamentarysolution;orn afterreceivingthereportontheborder assessmentmission,consideroptionsfor reinforcementofmonitoringassistance.

Key IssuesThefirst issue iswhether the1559report(andtheSecretary-General’sobservationsfollowing his visit to Syria) will suggestencouragingopeningsforCouncilactiontoreinforce the political negotiation track.TherearesomeexpectationsthatthereportwillclarifythekeysignificanceofthecurrentpoliticalcrisisinLebanonformakingprog-ressonthedisarmamentprocess.

Anotherissueiswhethertoestablishthetri-bunalunderChapterVIInow,orwhetherthereisstillachanceforadomesticpoliticalsolution.TheCouncil’scredibilityisatrisk,alongwithruleoflawinLebanon.Aresolu-tioncouldprovidethenecessaryimpetusforendingthecurrentstandoff.However,a

ChapterVIIresolutioncouldalsoupsetthealreadyfragilepoliticalbalance.

Council DynamicsLengthynegotiationsprecededtheadop-tionoftheAprilpresidentialstatement.Thedraft was challenged by Russia, Congo,SouthAfrica,IndonesiaandQatar.ItseemsthatRussiawasinitiallyopposedtothebor-der assessment mission, saying it wasprematureandcouldopenaPandora’sboxof sanctions.TheSecretary-General, inaletter,reassuredCouncilmembersthattheLebanesegovernmentwelcomedtheideaandthatthemissionwouldbesmallandcom-pleteitsworkwithinalimitedperiodoftime.

Therewasmuchredrafting,especiallyontheissueofarmssmuggling,toensureanappropriatelybalancedtext.

ItseemsunlikelythattheCouncilisreadyatthispointtosupportasignificantreinforce-ment of the arms embargo through anenhancedsanctionsregime.Many,includingRussiaandIndonesia,wouldpreferanin-creaseintechnicalassistanceasafirststep.

WhileFrance,theUKandtheUSmaybeready to consider giving the tribunal aChapterVIImandate,itisnotclearwhetherRussiaand Indonesiawouldsupport thisoption.They,andothers,thinkitwouldfur-therpolarisethepoliticalcrisisinLebanon.Theystillhopethecurrentstandoffcanberesolvedthroughdialogue.

ThenewUSAmbassador,ZalmayKhalil-zad,hasidentifiedLebanonasoneofhisprioritiesandthisislikelytoinfluenceCoun-cil dynamics to some extent, especiallyduringtheUSpresidencyinMay.

Most Recent UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1748(27March2007)extendedthemandateofUNIIICuntil15June2008.

Presidential Statements

• S/PRST/2007/12(17April2007)welcomedthereportoftheSecretary-Generalonresolution1701andwelcomedhisintentiontodispatchaborderassessmentmission.

Secretary-General’s Reports

• S/2007/147(14March2007)wasthelatestreportonresolution1701.

• S/2006/832(19October2006)wasthelatestreportonresolution1559.

Letters

• S/2007/207(13April2007)wasthe

letteroftheSecretary-Generalwithdetailsontheborderassessmentmission.

• S/2007/199(11April2007)wastheletterfromIsraelrespondingtothelatest1701report.

• S/2007/159(20March2007)wastheletterfromLebanonrequestingaoneyearrenewaloftheUNIIICmandate.

Forotherrelevantfacts,pleaserefertoourApril Forecast.

Useful Additional Sourcesn The Shi’a in the Arab World,MiddleEast Report,Spring2007,No.242n Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, International Crisis Group, Middle East ReportNo.63,10April2007

Darfur/Sudan

Expected Council ActionInMay,Councilmemberswillturnincreasedattention to securing Khartoum’s compli-ancewith itscommitmentson thehybridAU-UNpeacekeepingmissioninDarfur.ItremainstobeseenwhethertheCouncilwillalsoputweightbehindthepoliticalprocess,includingaLibya-sponsoredinitiativeonre-establishing a peace process in DarfurinvolvingrepresentativesofSudan,Chad,Libya,Eritrea,theUnitedNations,theUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,theEuropeanUnionandtheAfricanUnion.Itseemslikelythatthesanctionsproposalwillcontinuetohoverinthewingsasacounterweighttofur-therstalling.

Atpresstime,memberswerenegotiatingaUSdraftrenewingUNMISforthreemonthsbutalsoaddressingDarfurandexpressingthe Council’s intention to establish thehybridoperationandrequestingtheSecre-tary-Generalto:n ensurethatthefuturehybridforcearrange- ments allow for robust protection, and provideforUNcommandandcontrolin accordancewiththeAddisAbabaagree- mentaswellasUNfinancialmanagement andoversightmechanisms;andn concludethearrangementsandsubmit recommendationstotheCouncilonthe hybridforcepromptly.


Russia,China,QatarandIndonesiainitiallyexpressedsomeconcernwiththeinclusionoflanguageonDarfurintheUNMISdraft.Atpresstime,itseemsthatmembersarekeenon finding compromise language on theDarfurissueandadoptingtheresolutionby30April,whenUNMISexpires.

Key Recent DevelopmentsThehumanitariansituationinDarfurremainsdire,withregularattacksagainstcivilians,humanitarianworkersandtroopsoftheAUMissionintheSudan(AMIS).

UnderSecretary-GeneralforHumanitarianAffairsJohnHolmesbriefedtheCouncilon4Aprilonhisvisittotheregion,stressingthat,despitesomeimprovement,“[if]thingsdonotgetbetter…the[humanitarian]oper-ationcouldstarttounravel”.

SevenAMIStroopswerekilledinApril.On5April the AU Peace and Security Councildemanded an investigation, stressed theneed for robust peacekeeping in Darfur,includingthedeploymentofsixadditionalAMISbattalionsasauthorisedlastSeptem-ber, and urged lifting restrictions on thefreedomofmovementofAMIS.

OnthepoliticalfronttheAUandUNenvoysonDarfur,SalimA.SalimandJanEliassonrespectively,continueddevelopingregionalcontacts to build momentum for peacetalks. Some encouraging developmentswereseenbutunprecedentedfragmenta-tionseemstobedevelopingamongrebelgroups, communities and government-sponsoredJanjaweedmilitias.

In lateMarch,meetingswereheldonthesidelinesof theArabLeague’ssummit inRiyadhtoencourageSudantoagreetotheheavy support package. The meetingsincluded UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,SudanesePresidentOmaral-Bashir,AUChairmanAlphaKonaré,ArabLeagueheadAmrMoussa,KenyanPresidentMwaiKibakiandSaudiKingAbdullah.

PressureonSudanincreasedinearlyApril,including repeated threats of sanctionsfrom the US, the UK and Germany andunprecedentedstrongsignalsfromChina.SouthAfricanPresidentThaboMbekivis-itedSudaninearlyApril.

TheUSandtheUKhadbegunpreparingadraftresolutionstrengtheningsanctions.

Following theRiyadhmeetings,however,theSecretary-GeneralurgeddelaytoallowformoreconsultationswithSudan.Thesewereheldon9April inAddisAbaba,and

OptionsThesanctionsoptionhasnotbeentakenoffthe table, but in light of recent develop-mentsislikelytobeputonholdpendingfurtherdevelopmentsonthehybridmission.

ThemostlikelyoptionsforCouncilactionareto:n pressforthespeedyconclusionofAU- UNarrangementsonthehybridforce;n encourageconstructiveengagementof regionalactorssuchasLibya;n advocate provision of increased resourcesforthepeaceprocess,andan enlargedsupportteamforEliassonand Salim;andn endorse the reactivation of the Darfur peaceprocess,perhapswithadeadline foranimmediateceasefireandincreases inhumanitarianaccesstobeverifiedby thePanelofExperts.

Key Issues Thekeyissueisensuringthat:n thephasedapproachalreadyagreedby allpartiesisimplementedandthatSudan honoursitscommitmentswithoutraising newimpediments;n a peace process in Darfur is re-established;n humanitarianaccessimproves;andn AMIS has sufficient resources until the UNassumesresponsibilityforoperations andfundingwiththehybridoperation.

Timeisalsoanissue.Progresswithpeacetalksmaybeprotracted,particularlygivenfragmentationamongrebels.Furthermore,thedeploymentoftheheavypackageislikelytotakesixmonthsandthehybridoperationaboutten.Keyissuesarisinghereare:n thehybridoperation’smandate,sizeand commandandcontrol;n ensuringthatUNaccountability,procure- ment and managerial standards are in place;n securing fundingcommitment fromthe GeneralAssembly’sFifthCommittee;n generatingtroopsfortheheavysupport (2,250 troops and 675 police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 military and 5,000police).Thepackagealsodepends onthedeploymentoftwoadditionalAMIS battalions, which AU commissioner Konaréreportedlysaidwoulddependon funding;andn thecontinuingdelaysinappointinganew SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary- GeneralandheadofUNMIS.

Khartoum confirmed acceptance of thepackageina16Aprilletter.

Follow-upinformalmeetingsinvolvingCouncilmembers,theSecretary-General,Konaré,Salim and Eliasson took place on 16-17April.TheSecretary-Generalsaidthat thenextstepswouldinvolvethepreparationofaroadmapforthepoliticalprocessandadevelopmentpact;andmovingonwithtroopgenerationandfinancingforpeacekeeping.

Ina17April letter, theCouncilconfirmedendorsementoftheheavypackageandtheprovision of existing and additional UNresourcesforthispurpose.

EffortstogainregionalsupportforrobustpeacekeepingalsocontinuedinApril,withavisitbyUSDeputySecretaryofStateJohnNegropontetoSudan,ChadandLibya.

TheSecretariatmetprospectivetroopandpolicecontributorsfortheheavypackagedeploymenton19April.InitialpledgeswereapparentlymadebyEthiopia,Egypt,Ban-gladesh,Pakistan,Jordan,Bolivia,Thailand,SwedenandNorway.Thereseemtobeaswellsomeinitialpledgesforthehybridoper-ation,buttroopcontributorsseemtopreferwaitingforaCouncilresolutionsettingthetermsoftheoperationbeforecomingforward.

Onthesanctionsfront,thelatestreportofthe Panel of Experts was leaked to thepress.ThePanelapparentlyfoundcontinu-ing violations of the arms embargo andevidencethatSudaneseaircrafthadbeenpaintedwhitetoresembleUNequipment.TheUSrequestedthatthereportbeissuedas a document, but it seems that China,RussiaandQatarobjected.Thecommitteeoperatesbyconsensus.

Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

After lengthy negotiations, the HumanRightsCounciladoptedbyconsensuson30MarcharesolutiononthehumanrightssituationinDarfur.

Theresolution,acompromisebetweentheEUandtheAfricanGroup,establishedaseven-persongrouptobechairedbythespecialrapporteuronhumanrightsin Sudan to work with Khartoum and theAUto“fostertheimplementationofresolutions and recommendations onDarfur”,andto“contributetomonitoringthe human rights situation on theground”.ThegroupisexpectedtoreportbythetimetheHumanRightsCouncilmeetson11-18June.



MAy 2007

Council and Wider DynamicsWide international pressure, includingsanctionsloominginthebackground,andincreased Chinese and regional involve-ment seem to have been instrumental insecuringSudan’sagreement.Khartoum’sprevarication seems to have encouragedsome coordination between the US andChinaonpressuringSudan.

Despiteapparentrecentprogress,however,thepossibilitythatKhartoummaycontinuetofloutitscommitmentsremains.

The US and the UK in particular havestressedtheimportanceofthehybridforce.USPresidentGeorgeW.Bushsignalledon19AprilthatsanctionshadbeenputoffforthemomentbutwouldbepursuedagainshouldSudancontinuetoprevaricate.

China, Russia, South Africa, Qatar andIndonesiaarelikelytocontinuetoopposesanctionsandpreferallowingmoretimefordialogue.Chinahasnonethelesscomeundersomepressure,includingmostrecentlyaproposedboycottofthe2008BeijingOlym-pics,ifthecrisisinSudanisnotaddressed.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1714(6October2006)extendedUNMISuntil30April2007.

• S/RES/1706(31August2006)setamandateforUNMISinDarfur.

• S/RES/1591(29March2005)and1556(30July2004)imposedsanctionsinDarfur.

• S/RES/1590(24March2005)establishedUNMIS.


• S/PRST/2006/55(19December2006)endorsedthephasedapproach.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

• S/2007/213(17April2007)wasthelatestquarterlyreportonSudan.

• S/2007/104(23February2007)wasthelatestmonthlyreportonDarfuratpresstime.

• S/2006/591(28July2006)andAdd.1(28August2006)andS/2006/645(10August2006)maderecommenda-tionsfortheUNMISmandateinDarfurandforUNassistancetoAMIS.

Other

• S/2007/212(17April2007)wasaCouncilletterinresponsetoSudan’sagreement.

• A/HRC/4/L.7/Rev.2(30March2007)wastherecentHumanRightsCouncilresolutiononDarfur.

• S/PV.5655(4April2007)wastherecordofUnderSecretary-GeneralHolmes’briefing.

• A/HRC/4/80(7March2007)wasthereportoftheHumanRightsCouncil’shigh-levelmissiontoDarfur.


UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Vacant

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

JanEliasson(Sweden)

UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

• Maximumauthorisedstrength:upto27,300militaryand6,015police

• Strengthasof31March2007:9,365militaryand662police

• Keytroopcontributors:India,Paki-stan,Bangladesh,Kenya,EgyptandChina

• Cost:1July2006-30June2007$1,126.30million(excludesDarfur)

UNMIS: Duration

24March2005topresent;mandateexpires30April2007atpresstime.

AU Special Envoy

SalimA.Salim

AMIS: Size and Composition

• Totalauthorisedstrength:about10,000militaryand1,500police

• Strengthasof1September2006:5,703militaryand1,425police

• Keytroopcontributors:Nigeria,RwandaandSenegal

AMIS: Duration

25May2004topresent;mandateexpires1July2007

Iran

Expected Council ActionBy23MaytheCouncilexpectstoreceivethe report of the Director-General of theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),Mohammed ElBaradei, on Iran’s compli-ancewithresolution1747,whichinMarchimposedadditionalmeasuresagainstIran.AnegativereportfromtheIAEAisexpected.However,CouncilactionisunlikelyinMay,especiallyiftheinitialsignsofprogressintalksbetweenEUforeignpolicychiefJavierSolanaand IraniannuclearnegotiatorAliLarijani,beingreportedaswewenttopress,continuetobearfruit.

Key Recent DevelopmentsOn22February,ElBaradeiconfirmedthatIranhadnotcompliedwithresolution1737,which in December imposed measuresagainst IranunderChapterVIIof theUNCharter.Henotedthat,instead,Iranseemedtobeexpandingitsenrichmentactivities.

In response, on 24 March the Counciladopted resolution 1747 unanimously. Itrepresented a relatively small escalationbeyondearliermeasuresby:n toughening language on travel restrictions(butdidnotestablishatravelban);n establishing a ban on Iran’s export of armsandcalleduponstatestoexercise restraintinthesupplyofheavyconven- tionalweaponstoIran;n tighteningfinancialmeasuresbycalling uponstatesnottoenterintonewcommit- mentsforfinancialassistancetoIranand by adding new names to the list of individualsandentitiessubjecttoasset freeze;andn reaffirming that all measures would be suspended if Iran suspends uranium enrichment and would be terminated whenIranfullycomplieswithitsobliga- tions. In case of non-compliance, the Council would adopt further measures underarticle41ofChapterVII.

TheEU3+3—consistingofFrance,Germanyand the UK, plus China, Russia and theUS—seemtohaveagreedthattradingsub-stance for speed would be preferable,producingsmallerincrementsbutallowinganeasierandquickerconsensus.However,severalelectedCouncilmembersproposedamendmentstotheEU3+3draftresolution.n South AfricaproposedtoreviveMoham- medElBaradei’s“timeout”offerofmid- January involving a simultaneous suspensionofbothIraniannuclearwork and UN sanctions to allow space for discussions.However, inSouthAfrica’s proposal,theCouncilwouldunilaterally decidetosuspendallmeasuresagainst Iran for a period of ninety days, which amountedtoasequentialtimeout.South Africa also suggested deletion of the weaponsbanandnamesincludedinthe annex(inparticular,Iran’sRevolutionary GuardsandBankSepah).


n Indonesia and Qatarproposedrecalling thegoalofaMiddleEastfreefromweap- onsofmassdestruction.n Indonesiasuggestedlanguagerelating tonucleardisarmamentbynuclear-weapon states,inconformitywitharticle6ofthe NuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT).

Someoftheseamendmentswereaccepted.LanguagewasincludedrelatingtotheMid-dle East free of weapons of massdestruction,explanationsforeachindivid-ualandentitysubject tosanctionsandanewannexcontainingtheEU3+3’sincen-tivesforalong-termsolution.

IranrespondedwithfurtherrestrictionsonitscooperationwiththeIAEA.On10April,Iranannouncedthatithadcompletedthenuclearfuelcycleandthatithadplanstoinstall50,000centrifuges.

TheEUhasrecentlyagreedtoimposebilat-eral sanctions beyond the scope ofresolution 1747: a total arms embargo,additionalnamesofindividualsandentitiessubjecttoassetsfreezeandatravelbantotheEU.

On 25 April, the EU’s Javier Solana andIran’sAliLarijaniheldtalksinAnkara,thefirstface-to-facemeetingsince11February.Larijanisaidthattheywereapproaching“aunited view”. Another round of talks isscheduledinmid-May.

OptionsOptionsinclude:n commencing negotiations on a further draft resolution following the logic of incrementalpressurewithinarticle41of theUNCharter;thiscouldincludetravel bans on individuals already subject to assets freeze, additional names, the replacementof“callsupon”with“decide” forseveralprovisions,etc.;n reconsidering the “timeout” proposal; andn discussing whether there is scope for adjusting the current preconditions for resumingnegotiations.

Key IssuesAtthisstagethemainissueiswhethertheprocessof incrementalpressurewillcon-tinue,orwhether theEU3+3willadoptadifferentpath.

A related issue is how much longer theincrementalpressureapproachwillbevia-ble.Asuccessionofsmallincrementsuntilallmeasuresunderarticle41ofChapterVII

areexhaustedcouldtakequitesometime.Meanwhile, Iran isdeveloping itsnuclearprogramme—apparentlyquiterapidly.Thequestionthereforeiswhether,orwhen,thecurrentstrategywillreachthepointofdimin-ishingreturns.

Afurtherissueiswhether,inlightoftheten-sions in the Council in March over theamendmentproposalsfromelectedmem-bers,adifferentapproachwillbefollowedintermsofsecuringthesupportofthewiderCouncilmembership.

Council DynamicsDespitetheapparentlypositivefirstroundoftalksbetweenSolanaandLarijani,thereareconcernsthatIranmayuseitsclaimsofrecenttechnologicaladvancestoraisethestakesatthenextroundoftalks.Becausethe NPT additional protocol is not beingimplementedbyIran,thuslimitingaccessbyIAEAinspectorstonuclearsites,itisdif-ficulttofullyverifyIran’sstatements.

Thereseemstobeawideassumption,notjustamongCouncilmembers,thatanewresolutionwillfollowintheeventofcontin-uedIranianobduracy.TheMarchprocesswouldlikelyrepeatitself,withtheUSandtheEuropeanspushingforsignificantaddi-tional measures and Russia and Chinapreferring small increments. A commonpositionwillhoweverbefound.

Indonesia,SouthAfricaandQatarallsharea concern with Iran’s increasing lack ofcooperation with the IAEA. This concernwassignificantenoughforthemtovoteinfavour of resolution 1747, even thoughtheir amendments were not all includedinthedraft.

ButtheyalsobelievethattheCouncilshouldlimit itself to measures strictly related tonon-proliferationandalwayssignalthatthedoor to negotiations is still open. In thatregard, South Africa may be reluctant tosupportfurtherfinancialmeasuresonindi-viduals and entities for which theproliferation-sensitive link is not clearlyestablished, or with obligatory measuresrelated toconventionalweapons.For theUSandtheEuropeans,thegoalwillbetoapplygenuinepressureon Iran toobtaincompliance,evenifthatmeansmeasuresgoingbeyondthenuclearindustry.

ThepotentialforagreementamongtheP5remains high. Consensus was quicklyachievedinMarchonthesubstanceofres-olution1747,andtheamendmentproposals

fromelectedmembersdidnotunravelthatagreement.RussiaseemstobeadoptingasteadilymorecautiousstanceaboutIran’sintentions. Also, as Iran becomes lessresponsivetoIAEAinspectors,Chinaandtheelectedmembersbecomemoreopentoarticle41measures.

By4April,61countrieshadreportedtotheSanctions Committee on steps taken tocomplywithresolution1737.

Underlying ProblemsIran’sreducedcooperationwiththeIAEAisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic.Trans-parency on Iran’s nuclear programme isdiminishing.

TheunderlyingproblemaboutIran’srealin-ten-tionsregardingitsnuclearprogrammeremains:whetheritaimsatacquiringciviliannuclearenergyornuclearweapons,orwhetheritisplayingupsupposedtechnicalprogresstoraisethestakesinfuturenegotiations.

WiderUSconcernsaboutIraniansupportforShi’amilitiasfighting theMultinationalForce in Iraq, as well as Taliban fightersfightingNATOinAfghanistananditsinvolve-mentinLebanonarealsomajorunderlyingcomplications.

Selected Documents


• S/RES/1747(24March2007)imposedadditionalmeasuresagainstIranandreinforcedtheexistingones.

• S/RES/1737(23December2006)imposedmeasuresagainstIranunderChapterVII,article41,oftheUNChar-terandexpresseditsintentiontoadoptfurthermeasuresunderarticle41incaseofIraniannon-compliance.

• S/RES/1696(31July2006)demandedthatIransuspendallenrichment-relatedandreprocessingactivitiesandexpresseditsintentiontoadoptmeasuresunderarticle41incaseofIraniannon-compliance.

Latest IAEA Board Resolution

• GOV/2006/14(4February2006)underlinedthenecessarystepsthatIranshouldtaketore-establishconfi-denceinthepeacefulnatureofitsnuclearprogrammeandreportedtheissuetotheSecurityCouncil.

Latest IAEA Reports

• GOV/2007/8(22February2007)wasonIran’scompliancewithresolution1737.



MAy 2007

• GOV/2007/7(9February2007)wasoncooperationbetweenIranandtheIAEAinlightofresolution1737.

Selected Letters

• S/2007/180(29March2007)wastheletterfromIranclaimingtheviolationofIranianterritorialwatersbytwoBritishnavalvessels.

Useful Additional Sourcesn The Security Council and Iran: Further Escalation and Isolation, Commentary on Resolution 1747 (2007) on IranbyMichael Spies, Center for International Political Studies,3April2007

Nepal

Expected Council ActionTheCouncilisexpectedtodiscussthefirstreportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheUNMissioninNepal(UNMIN)andbebriefedbyIanMartin,theSecretary-General’sSpe-cialRepresentativeforNepal.Thereportisexpectedtofocusonpreparationsforandfeasibilityoftheconstituentassemblyelec-tionsinmid-JuneandupdatetheCouncilonprogressmadesinceUNMINwassetupinJanuaryfor12months.

Itseemslikelythatthegrowinggapbetweenrealitiesontheground(intermsofmeetingtheJunedeadlineforelections)andCoun-cilexpectationswillbediscusseddelicately.However,theywillpossiblynotbethesub-jectofformalCouncilactionatthisstage.

Key Recent DevelopmentsTheestablishmentofaninterimgovernmenton1Aprilmadeupofeightpoliticalparties,includingtheMaoists,markedasignificantstep in the consolidation of the peaceprocessinNepal.TheinterimconstitutionestablishingaframeworkforconstitutionalchangewasapprovedinJanuary.

Pre-election preparation has been slow.Therehasbeendifficultyregisteringvotersparticularly in the south given continuingunrest. On 13 April the National ElectionCommissionsaiditwouldnotbereadytoholdelectionsinJune.Ithasaskedformoretime to draft electoral legislation and willneed110daystoprepareforthepollsafterthe laws are enacted. Some observersbelieve that practical realities mean thatelectionsmayneedtobepostponedforfivetosixmonths.

Also likely toaffect theelectionsarepro-tests,transportstoppagesandstrikesinthesouth.Ethnicminoritygroupsdemandinggreater representation ingovernmentarebehindthesedisturbances.Althoughpar-liament recently amended the interimconstitution to give more seats to ethnicminorities, protests have continued. ThemaingroupsinvolvedaretheMadeshiPeo-ple’sRightsForumandtheTeraiPeople’sLiberationFront (JTLF). InApril the JTLFcalledforageneralstrikeinJunetodisrupttheelections.

On20ApriltheOfficeoftheUNHighCom-missioner forHumanRightssaid that thedeathsof27peopleinclashesbetweentheMaoistsandanotherpoliticalpartyduringarallyincentralNepalinMarchcouldhavebeenpreventedbystrongerlawenforcement.

UNMINcompletedregisteringandstoringtheweaponsofMaoistforceson7MarchandNepalesearmyweaponson12April,concluding the registration phase. Some3,500 weapons have been stored and31,000guerrillasconfined incamps.Thenext phase will be verification of Maoistscombatants.

TheMaoiststookoneofthefinalstepsintransformingfromrebelarmytomainstreampoliticalpartybyregisteringtheCommunistPartyofNepalasapoliticalpartyinApril.

OptionsTheCouncilhasthefollowingoptions.n Issueapressstatement,whichispossible if the Council chooses not to formally addressat thisstagewhether theelec- tionscanbeheldinJuneasscheduled.n Adoptapresidentialstatementcallingon allpartiestofindasolutiontotheproblems inthesouthandtoworktowardsholding electionsinmid-June—whichispossible ifCouncilmembersdecidetoputweight behindhavingelectionsasscheduled.n Takenoformalactionatthisstageand simplyrequesttheSecretary-Generalto provide updated briefings on progress regardingtheleaduptotheelections.n DecidetoreviewUNMIN’smandatelater intheyearinlightofdevelopments.

Key IssuesThekeyissueiswhethertheelectionsfortheconstituentassemblycanbeheldon20June,andwhethertherisksofaflawedandpossiblycontroversialelectionexceedtherisksofanunravellingofthepeaceprocessduetodelay.

TheelectiondatewasnotsetbytheCouncilandthereforetheCouncildoesnotneedtoapproveanychange.However, thereareimmediate implications for wider issueswithintheCouncil’sresponsibilityandalsothe12-monthtermsetforUNMIN’sexistence.

Another issue iswhether the interimgov-ernment will be able to come to anagreement with the ethnic groups in thesouth.TheCouncilwillbeconcernedabouttheconsequencesofprolongedunrest inthe south for thepeaceprocessand theemergenceofpeace-spoilers.

Relatedtothat istheissueof fragiletrustbetweentheotherpartiesandtheMaoists.Somemembersoftheinterimgovernmentbelieve Maoists who still have weaponsshouldbearrested,whileothersarecallingonthemtorenounceviolence.

ThelargestpracticalissuefortheCouncilisthatUNMINwassetupasafocusedmis-sion of limited duration to provide armsmonitoringandverification,electoralassis-tance, and human rights monitoring andassistance inmonitoringtheComprehen-sive Peace Accord. But if it becomesnecessarytoextendtheelectionschedule,UNMINmayfinditselfalsodrawnintowiderissuesofdisarmament,demobilisationandreintegration(DDR).

Finally,theCouncilinMaywillbelookingatrecommendationsfromtheWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflictonthesitu-ation of children and armed conflict inNepal.ApossiblerecommendationcouldbeforUNMINtoplayaroleintheDDRofchildrenwhohavebeeninvolvedinarmedconflict.

Council and Wider DynamicsFrom the outset, Council members havesharedawidelevelofagreementonUNMIN.InJanuarytherewasstrongconsensusfora focused mission limited to 12 months.With this inmindmanymembersarestillkeenthattheelectionsbeheldinmid-June.Someareconcernedaboutthesecuritysit-uationandwouldliketoseemoreregularupdatesinthenextfewmonths.Indiaalsoseemstoprefer thatelectionsproceedinmid-Juneifpossible.

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org�0

wasnotamenabletoaUNpeacekeepingmissionatthistime).

Meanwhile,Ethiopia’sforeignministerhadalsoaskedtobrieftheCouncilinformallyonSomalia.AnArria-stylemeetingtoaccom-modate this is possible. In addition, theUnderSecretary-GeneralforHumanitarianAffairs may visit the country in May and,shouldthisvisittakeplace,heisalsolikelytobrieftheCouncilabouthistrip.

Key Recent DevelopmentsFighting in Mogadishu seems to involveclanmilitia,remnantsoftheUnionofIslamicCourts (UIC) and foreign fighters rangedagainstEthiopianandTransitionalFederalGovernment(TFG)forces.Insurgentshavealsotargetedtroopsof theunder-funded,under-staffedandpoorlyorganisedAMISOM.

Continuedheavyshellinghaskilledthou-sands and left about 320,000 displaced.Widespreadgrossviolationsofinternationallawaresuspectedonallsideswithconcernsaboutthelackofhumanitarianaccess.

Eritrea suspended its membership in theIntergovernmental Authority on Develop-ment(IGAD)comprisingEthiopia,Somalia,Uganda,Sudan,DjiboutiandKenya,overtheEthiopianmilitarypresenceinSomaliaand,specifically,a13AprilIGADcommuni-quéexpressingappreciationforEthiopia’sactions.Anallianceofgroupsopposedtothe TFG, including a UIC leader, waslaunchedinAsmarainmid-April.

TheSecretary-GeneralunveiledhisSoma-liareporton13April.Notingthevolatilityofthesecuritysituationandthelackofclearsupport from major Somali stakeholders,heindicatedthatSomaliawasnoplaceforaUNpeacekeepingoperationatthistimewhentherewasnopeacetokeep.

Onnationalreconciliationandstability,thereportnotedthatsignificantopenquestionsremain,including:n uncertaintyregardingthe levelof inclu- sivenessandthemodalitiesofparticipa- tionintheplannednationalcongress,in particularformoderateformermembers of the UIC (the conference has been delayed until 14 June due to lack of security);n uncertainty on security arrangements, logistics and the independence of the congress’preparatoryteam;n lackofclarityonthecongress’desired outcome;and

n theneedforreinforcementsandsupport forAMISOMandforanegotiatedcessa- tionofhostilitiestoimprovesecurityand allow for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.

Thereportofferedtwofuturescenarios:n hostilitiescease:inthiscase,conditions formulti-dimensionalUNpeacekeeping wouldexist,albeitwithsignificantsecurity risksandlogisticalchallenges;andn hostilities continue and the political process is faltering or has collapsed altogether:therewouldbenoenvironment forpeacekeeping.Inthesecircumstances, enforcement action through a Council authorisationfora“coalitionofthewilling” wouldbetheonlyviableoption.

ThereportrecommendedthattheCouncil:n revisittheissueoffeasibilityofUNpeace keeping inSomaliaagainbymid-June 2007,subjecttoprogresswithreconcilia- tionanddevelopmentson theground; andn authorisetheSecretariattobegincontin- gencyplanningonafutureoperationto reduce the lead timeaheadofdeploy- ment.Planningwouldincludeallocation of fundsand initial contactswith troop andpolicecontributors.

Council DynamicsAt a briefing by the Secretariat and theAU on Somalia on 24 April, membersgenerally agreed with the Secretary-General’s findings and supported hisrecommendations.Thereseemstobeonlya shaky consensus at present. Most areextremely worried about a transition to aUNoperation.Somearemoreinclinedtodownplay the security situation. Otherswantmorefocusonnationalreconciliation.There seems to be a strong underlyinginterest by the US (and perhaps someAfricanmembers)inauthorisingthetransi-tionassoonaspossible.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1744(20February2007)authorisedAMISOM.

• S/RES/733(23January1992)imposedthearmsembargo.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

• S/2007/204(13April2007)

Latest Monitoring Group’s Report

• S/2006/913(21November2006)

UN Documents

Resolution

• S/RES/1740(23January2007)wastheresolutionestablishingUNMINfortwelvemonths.


• S/2007/7(9January2007)wasthereportcontainingrecommendationsonthemandateoftheproposedUNmissioninNepal.

• S/2006/1007(20December2006)wastheSecretary-General’sreportonchil-drenandarmedconflictinNepal.

Selected Letter

• S/2006/920(22November2006)containedNepal’s9August2006requestforUNassistanceinthepeaceprocess.

Presidential Statement

• S/PRST/2006/49(1December2006)expressedsupportfortheSecretary-General’sintentiontosendatechnicalassessmentteamtoNepalandnotedthattheCouncilwouldawaitformalproposals.


Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

IanMartin(UnitedKingdom)

Size and Composition

271internationalstaff,389nationalstaff,258UNVolunteers,155militaryobserv-ersandsevenpoliceadvisers.

Duration

23January2007to23January2008.

Cost

$88.8million

Somalia

Expected Council ActionAtpresstime,Councilmemberswerenego-tiating a possible presidential statementexpressing grave concern about thehumanitariansituationandcallingforsup-port for the AU Mission in Somalia(AMISOM). It was unclear if or when thestatementwillbeadopted.Thestatementmayalsorequestcontingencyplanningfora possible UN operation in the future(essentiallyacceptingtheSecretary-Gener-al’s recommendation that, in light of theopenwarfare inMogadishu, thesituation

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org ��


MAy 2007



FrançoisLonsenyFall(Guinea)

Chairman of the Sanctions Committee

DumisaniS.Kumalo(SouthAfrica)

Timor-Leste

Expected Council ActionThe Council will pay close attention todevelopments as the runoff elections inTimor-Leste,scheduledfor8May,approach.AreportoftheSecretary-GeneraloraSec-retariat briefing is possible after thepresidential run-off elections. A Councilstatementisalsopossible,particularlyifthesecuritysituationdeteriorates.ThemandateoftheUNIntegratedMissioninTimor-Leste(UNMIT)expireson26February2008.

Key Recent DevelopmentsTimor-Lesteremainsfragile,withanestimated100,000(about12percentof thepopula-tion)internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)stillliving in camps. The Secretary-General’sreporton1FebruarynotedthattheIDPcri-sisisunlikelytobesolvedintheshortrun,especially “until theunderlyingcausesofthe situation of insecurity and politicalcrisisareresolved,thepotentialfordurablesolutionswillremainuncertain.”WeaponsbelongingtoTimoresesecurityforcesarestill missing, and frequent outbursts ofviolence continue, including amongsupportersofpresidentialcandidates.

Thefirstroundofpresidentialelectionswasheldon9April,observedbyinternationalmonitors.Therewerecomplaintsofirregu-larities,includingonebytheindependentNationalElectoralCommissionagainstthegovernment’stechnicalelectoralsecretariatforlargediscrepanciesbetweenthenum-ber of votes cast and registered voters.ParliamentleaderFranciscoLu’oloGuterresandPrimeMinisterJoséRamos-Horta,whoobtainedrespectively28and22percentofthevotes,will faceeachother intheMayrunoff.

On 22 February, the Council renewedUNMIT for 12 months and increased itspolicesizeby140aheadofthepresidentialelections,afterarequestbytheTimoreseleadership and recommendations of theSecretary-General.Therenewalfolloweda12Februaryopendebate,whenmembers

stressed the need for long-term interna-tionalcommitmenttosupportTimor-Lesteand highlighted key issues of concern,includingcompletionoftheelectiontime-tableandaccountability.

Accountability issues continue to loomlarge.Judicialproceedings into theApril-May2006violenceledtotheconvictionofformer InteriorMinisterRogérioLobato inearlyMarch.RebelleaderAlfredoReinadoremains at large and there are concernswith the slow pace of implementing therecommendations of the IndependentSpecialCommissionofInquiry(ICI)onthe2006violence.

TheTimor-IndonesiaTruthandFriendshipCommissionresumedhearings inMarch,including, inter alia,of former IndonesianPresidentB.J.Habibie,BishopCarlosBeloandmilitialeaderEuricoGuterres.However,concerns with the potential for impunitycontinuedespite theCommission’swork.The formerSpecialRepresentativeof theSecretary-GeneralforTimor-Leste,IanMar-tin,may testifybefore theCommission inearlyMay.

Key IssuesThe immediate issue for the Council isensuringapeaceful, freeandfairconclu-sionofthepresidentialelectionprocess.

Longer-termissuesinclude:n completing the election timetable and containing the potential for violence, especially during the parliamentary elections,whichhaveyettobescheduled;n addressing the futureof theAustralian- ledmilitarypresenceandUNMITafterthe elections (The Secretary-General says about600UNMITpolicecouldbephased outfollowingtheelections,butthepace woulddependonapost-electionassess- mentincludingprogresswithreconstitut- ingtheTimoresepolice);n reformingtheTimoresepolice(byFebru- ary, only 409 out of about 3,200 had completedUNMIT’sscreeningandtrain- ingprocess,fullreconstitutionmaytake threetofiveyears);n makingprogresswithdraftingthecom- prehensivereviewofthesecuritysector, especially the relationship between policeandmilitary,andthedevelopment compactforTimor-Lesteasenvisagedin resolution1704,whichcreatedUNMIT;n addressingshortfalls inUNMIT’spolice and civilian component, particularly investigatorsonseriouscrimescommit- tedin1999;and

n balancing the interplaybetweenrecon- ciliationandaccountabilityforthe1999 andApril-May2006violence.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1745(22February2007)extendedUNMITuntil26February2008andincreaseditssizebyupto140policepersonnel.

• S/RES/1704(25August2006)createdUNMIT.

Selected Report of the Secretary-General

• S/2007/50(1February2007)wasthelatestSecretary-General’sreport.

Other

• SC/8994(4April2007)wasaCouncilpressstatementexpressingsupportfortheelections.

• S/PV.5628(12February2007)wastheCouncilopendebateonTimor-Leste.

• S/2006/822(17October2006)wastheICIreport.

For more details, please see our May,August and October 2006 as well asFebruary2007Forecasts.



AtulKhare(India)

Size, Composition and Cost

• Maximumauthorisedstrength:upto1,748policeand34militaryliaisonandstaffofficers

• Sizeasof31March2006:1,555policeand33militaryobservers

• Keypolicecontributors:Malaysia,Por-tugal,PakistanandBangladesh

• Cost:1July2006–1June2007:US$170.2million(commitmentauthorityfor25August2006to31March2007)

Duration

25August2006topresent;mandateexpires26February2008.


Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council ActionTheCouncilisexpectedtoreceiverecom-mendations from its Working Group onChildrenandArmedConflictregardingchil-drenaffectedbyconflict inSriLankaandNepal.ThechairmanoftheWorkingGroupisexpectedtoconveytheWorkingGroup’srecommendations, including suggestionsforpossibleCouncilaction,andtobrieftheCouncil in informal consultations. As SriLankaisnotontheCouncil’sformalagenda,thiswilllikelybeunder“othermatters”.

Key Recent DevelopmentsOver the lastyear theWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflict,setupunderresolution1612,hasconsideredtheSecre-tary-General’s reports on the DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Sudan,Côted’Ivoire,Burundi,NepalandSriLanka.IthasmaderecommendationstotheCouncilonthefirstfour.On10MaytheWorkingGroupisduetodiscussreportsonSomaliaandUganda.RecommendationsforSomaliaandUgandaarelikelytobemadetotheCouncilonlyinJulyastheWorkingGroupusuallytakestwomonthstoagreeonwhatshouldbedone.

On 9 February the Working Group dis-cussedthereportsonNepalandSriLanka,which were released in December. ThereportonSriLankawasthefirstsituationinAnnex2(whichliststhepartiesthatrecruitor use children in situations not on theCouncil’sagenda)tobeconsideredbytheWorkingGroup.Thereportrecommendedtargetedmeasuresagainst theLiberationTamilTigersofEelam’s(LTTE)politicalandmilitary leadership and highlighted SriLankanmilitaryinvolvementintherecruit-mentofchildrenforarmedconflictbytheKarunagroup.

InFebruarytheWorkingGroupagreedonaworkplanwhichwilltaketheGroupthroughtoFebruary2008.Itwillconsidertheremain-ingsituationsinAnnex2—Chad,Philippines,MyanmarandColombia—andreviewprog-ressinsituationsalreadycovered.

OptionsOneoption, if theWorkingGrouprecom-mendspossibletargetedsanctionsagainstthe LTTE, is for the Council, having dis-cusseditininformalconsultations,totaskexperts with preparing a draft resolutionbearinginmindthenovelsituationofapply-ingsanctionsbasedonathematicsituationinacountrynotonitsformalagenda.

cess from the beginning. Having theWorkingGroupchairedbyamemberoftheP5appears tohavegiven impetus to theprocess.

Differencescontinueoverprocedure.PastconcernsthatissuesnotontheCouncil’sagendaareslippingthroughthebackdoorremain.However,membersoftheWorkingGrouphavebeenabletofindenoughcom-mongroundtokeeptheprocessgoing.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1612(26July2005)setuptheCouncil’sWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflict.

Selected Presidential Statements

• S/PRST/2006/48(28November2006)welcomedtheprogressintheWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflict.

• S/PRST/2006/33(24July2006)reiter-atedtheCouncil’scommitmenttotheissueofchildrenandarmedconflict.


• S/2006/1007(20December2006)wastheSecretary-General’sreportonchil-drenandarmedconflictinNepal.

• S/2006/1006(20December2006)wastheSecretary-General’sreportonchil-drenandarmedconflictinSriLanka.

• S/2006/851(27October2006)wastheSecretary-General’sreportonchildrenandarmedconflictinBurundi.

• S/2006/835(25October2006)wastheSecretary-General’sreportonchildrenandarmedconflictinCôted’Ivoire.

• S/2006/826(26October2006)andCorr.1(5December2006)

Selected Letters

• S/2007/189(9April2007)wastheletterfromthePermanentRepresentativesofMyanmar,Nepal,thePhilippines,theSudanandUgandaurgingtheSecretary-Generaltoensurethemonitoringandreportingmechanismonchildrenandarmedconflictabidedbytheprovisionsofresolution1612.

• S/2007/93(15February2007)con-tainedtheconclusionstothereportoftheSecretary-GeneralonchildrenandarmedconflictinCôted’Ivoire.

• S/2007/92(15February2007)con-tainedtheconclusionstothereportoftheSecretary-GeneralonchildrenandarmedconflictinBurundi.

If theCouncilwishes tomovemorecau-tiously there are several options for aphasedapproach.n Councilmemberscouldagreetoholdoff adecisionforadefinedperiodandask,in the interim, the chair of the Working Grouptocommunicateawarningtothe LTTE that unless progress was made Councilactionwouldfollow.n Awarningcouldbeissuedbywayofa Councilpressstatement.n Ifastrongerwarningisdesired,members could agree to open a formal agenda item,perhapsusingthedeviceofaletter fromthechairoftheWorkingGroupas the title. They could couple that with communicationofawarningby: issuingapresidentialstatement;or holdingapublicmeetingoftheCouncil atwhichthechairoftheWorkingGroup could give an introduction of the recommendations.

Key IssuesTheimmediateissueisprocedural:howtohandlerecommendationsfromtheWorkingGroupthatallowtheCounciltodiscussamatterwhichcomeswithinathematicitemonitsagenda,butisnotcoveredbyacoun-try-specificsituationagendaitem.

Although Sri Lanka is unlikely to opposeCouncilactiondirectedattheLTTE,asec-ondissueiswhethertheunusualnatureofthe situation—combined with the reluc-tance of some members to supportsanctions—mayleadtoadesiretoproceedinaphasedway.

Anotherissueishighlightedbyajointletterdated9AprilinwhichMyanmar,Nepal,thePhilippines,SriLanka,SudanandUgandastressedthatanydialoguebetweentheUNandnon-statearmedgroupsonthisissueneededtobewithinthecontextofpeaceprocesses.

Alongertermissueisensuringthatrecom-mendationshavebeen implementedandtheireffectivenessmeasured.There isnosystem to monitor follow-up action. Arelatedissueiswhatsortof“carrot”shouldbeofferedifthereisprogress.

Council and Wider DynamicsThechangeincompositionoftheCouncilinJanuaryproducednewdynamics.Africa,whichusedtohaveaunitedpositiononthisissue, is now more divided, with SouthAfricaurgingcaution.

Europeanmemberscontinuetobeactive,particularlyFrancewhichhasledthepro-

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org �3


MAy 2007

However,evenwhenseatsareuncontestedformalballotingisrequiredwithtwo-thirdsof the present members of the GeneralAssemblyvotinginfavour.

CostaRica,theCzechRepublic,LibyaandBurkinaFasohaveallservedontheCouncilpreviously.However,VietnamandCroatiaare running for the first time. AssumingVietnam is elected, the Council for thefirst time would have two members ofASEANatthesametime.

Background Tenofthe15seatsontheCouncilareheldby elected members that serve two-yeartermswithfiveseatsupforelectioneachyear.Thefivenewmemberswill joinBel-gium,Indonesia,Italy,PanamaandSouthAfrica,whichserveuntiltheendof2008.

Theregionalgroupsaregovernedbyafor-mulasetoutinGeneralAssemblyresolution1991A (XVII)of17December1963.Thenumberofseatsisasfollows:n five from the African and Asian States (whichwassubsequentlysubdividedin practiceintotwofromAsianGroupand threefromtheAfricanGroup);n oneforEasternEuropeanStates;n twofromLatinAmericanStates(includes theCaribbean);andn twofromWesternEuropeanStatesand OtherStates(includesAustralia,Canada andNewZealand).

WhilethenumberofseatsforeachgroupandthevotingprocessesareregulatedbytheRulesofProcedureanddecisionsoftheGeneralAssembly,someregionalgroupshavedevelopeddistinctpractices.TheAfri-canGroupgenerallyfollowsapracticeofstrictrotationbetweenNorth,WestandEastAfrica.LibyawilloccupytheNorthAfricanseatandBurkinaFasotheWestAfricanone.Thisallowsfora“cleanslate”(i.e.,endorse-mentbytheregionalgrouping).IntheAsianGroup there is an understanding that acountry from the Arab members of theGroupwillbeelectedeveryfouryearsandthatASEANcountriesdonot runagainsteachother.

UN Documents

Selected General Assembly Documents

• A/60/PV.29(10October2005)wastheplenaryrecordofthemostrecentelec-tionsofnon-permanentmembers.

• A/RES1991A(XVIII)(17December1963)wastheresolutionadoptingamendmentstotheCharteronthecompositionoftheCounciland

• S/2007/79(9February2007)wastheletterfromRwandaobjectingtothelatereceiptofaletterbytheCouncilpresidentontheWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflictconcern-ingthemovementsofCongoleserebelleaderGeneralLaurentNkunda.

• S/2006/971(13December2006)con-tainedtheconclusionstothereportoftheSecretary-GeneralonchildrenandarmedconflictinSudan.

• S/2006/724(8September2006)wastheletterfromthechairoftheWorkingGrouptransmittingitsrecommenda-tionsontheDRC.

ForhistoricalbackgroundandacompletelistofdocumentspleaserefertoourNovem-ber 2006 Forecast, 12 September 2006Updateand12July2006Profileonchildrenandarmedconflict.

Security Council Elections

InOctobertheGeneralAssemblywillholdelections for five seats on the SecurityCouncil to replace Congo, Ghana, Peru,QatarandSlovakia.Please see our 2006 SpecialResearchReport (14 August 2006) for a detailed description of Council election procedures and processes.

Currentlyitappearsthatthreeseats—twoforAfricaandoneforAsia—willbeuncon-tested, with candidates having obtainedregional endorsement. Only two seatsseemlikelytoinvolvecontestedelections:one for Latin America and the other forEasternEurope.Theelectionsseemunlikelyto be as dramatic as last year when thebattle for the Latin American seat sawVenezuela and Guatemala contesting 47ballots, the thirdhighest in thehistoryofCouncilelections,beforePanamaemergedasacompromisecandidate.

IntheGroupofLatinAmericanandCarib-beanStates(GRULAC),CostaRicaandtheDominicanRepublicbothseektheregionalseat.CroatiaandtheCzechRepublicwillcontesttheEasternEuropeanseat.

In the African Group, Burkina Faso andLibyaarerunningfortwoseats.BothwereendorsedattheAfricanUnionSummitlastJuneandarethereforevirtuallyassuredofbeingintheCouncilnextyear.

IntheAsianGroup,Vietnamisthesolecan-didate and at this stage seems virtuallyassuredofelection.

establishingtheallocationofseatstovariousregions.

Other

• UNCharter• A/520/Rev.15andAmendment1

andAmendment2aretheRulesofProcedureoftheGeneralAssemblyincludingamendmentsandadditions.

Please see our 14 August 2006 Special Research Report and the October 2006Forecast formoredetailsabouttheback-ground and history of Security Councilelections.

Useful Additional Sourcen Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Non- permanent Seats on the UN Security CouncilbyDavidMalone,GlobalGover- nance,Vol.6,No.1,January-March2000

Chad/Central AfricanRepublic

Expected Council ActionTheCouncilislikelytomaintainawait-and-see approach while the Secretariat andsomeCouncilmemberstrytoengageChadaboutconsentfortheproposedUNpeace-keepingoperation.ASecretariatteammayvisitChadinMay.However,themomentumseems to have waned and agreement isunlikelyanytimesoon.

ItisunclearifandwhentheSecretariatwillproposemoredetailedmodalities for themandateoftheadvancemissionauthorisedinJanuary.

Itisunclearwhethermemberswillwanttoconsider the possibility of authorisingdeploymentintheCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR)aheadofChad.

Key Recent DevelopmentsInChad,therearenow140,000internallydisplacedpersonsplus235,000Darfurianand46,000CARrefugees.Across-borderassaultbyJanjaweedandChadianmilitiainlateMarchkilled400civilians.FormerChad-ianPresidentGoukouniWeddeye,currentlyliving inLibya, isexpected to leadanewpeace initiative between N’Djamena andChadianrebels.


IntheCAR,therearenow300,000civiliansdisplacedbyconflict.Whilethepresenceofhumanitarian organisations is steadilyincreasing,apparentlynocampshaveyetbeensetupforthedisplacedatpresstime.Both rebelsandgovernment forceshavebeenaccusedofabusesagainstcivilians.

TheCARgovernmentandtherebelfactionUnion des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) signed a peacedealon13Aprilincludingaceasefireandamnesty for the UFDR faction. However,conflictcontinueswithotherfactions.

On4AprilUnderSecretary-GeneralJohnHolmesbriefedtheCouncilonthehumani-tarian situation in the region. Underliningtheneedtoimprovesecurityandhumani-tarian access, Holmes suggested that,givenChad’sreluctance,alternativeoptionswouldbedeployingaUNmissionsolelyintheCARforthetimebeing,orstrengtheningoftheCentralAfricanEconomicandMone-tary Community’s (CEMAC) militaryoperationdeployedintheCAR(FOMUC).

Holmes further underscored that various“representativeshavecommentedon…theregional nature of the conflict and howresolvingtheconflictinDarfuristhekey…but…thereareineachcasenationalcon-flicts and national political issues whichneed to be resolved independently ofwhetherthereisaresolutioninDarfur.Wemustnotlosesightofthatandtheneedtotacklethoseissuesaswell.”

RelationsbetweenChadandSudanseemto have soured further. Chadian armedforcescarriedoutanoperationintoSuda-neseterritoryinearlyApril,arguingtherighttorepelcross-borderrebelattacks.Sudandenouncedtheoperationand,inan11AprillettertotheCouncilpresident,requestedanimmediateinvestigationand“thenecessarymeasures within the framework of [theCouncil’s]responsibilities”.

However, during a visit by South AfricanPresidentThaboMbekion11April,Suda-nesePresidentOmaral-BashirreportedlytookamoreconciliatorytonebysayingthatKhartoumhopedbothcountrieswillreachanunderstanding.

LibyasubsequentlyannouncedthatLibyanandEritreanobserverswoulddeployalongtheborder,andthatajointregionalmilitarycommitteehadbeencreated.Thecommit-teeisduetomeetforthefirsttimeinearlyMayinTripoli.

Internationaleffortstogainregionalsupportfor robust peacekeeping included a visitby US Deputy Secretary of State JohnNegropontetoSudan,ChadandLibyainmid-April.

OptionsThelikelyoptioniscontinuingwiththewait-and-see approach. This could perhapsincludeadoptingastatement:n supporting the effort by key players, especiallysomeoftheP5andtheSecre- tariattoengagewithChad;n encouragingChadtoallowthedeploy- mentoftheadvancemission;n callingonregionalneighbourstosupport theproposedUNdeployment;n becomingmoreactivelyinvolvedperhaps throughavisitingmissionbyoneortwo Councilmembers;andn taking up more actively the political reconciliationissues.

AnotheroptionistotakeonHolmes’sug-gestion that an operation in the CAR beauthorisedfirst,forwhichthereseemstobesupportfromBangui.

Key IssuesThekeyissueishowbesttoproceedtowardaUNoperationinChadandtheCAR,whichin turn raises a number of related ques-tions:n howtoaddressChad’sreluctance;n whether concessions on the military component’ssizeanddeploymentcan beconsidered,andhowfartheCouncil is prepared to go without putting UN personnelatunnecessaryrisk;n whethertoauthorisedeploymentinthe CARfirst;n whether constructive support from regionalplayersforUNpeacekeepingin ChadandDarfur,particularlyfromLibya, SudanandEritreacanbegarnered;andn thewiderquestionsthattheprecedents inDarfurandChadmaycreateforfuture UNpeacekeeping.

Onekeyissuethatseemstohavebecomesidelinedishowtomaintainmomentumforfirmlyencouragingadomesticpoliticalpro-cessinChad.

Council and Wider Dynamics Council activism in deploying robust UNpeacekeepinginChadandtheCARseemstohavedecreased inAprilwithmembersadoptingawait-and-seeapproach.Observ-ersnote that inparticularFrance,with itspresidentialelections,maypreferalow-keyapproachfornow.

TheUSseemstobemoreinvolvedonthegroundbysupportingefforts toconvinceN’Djamenatoaccepttheproposedoperation.

DevelopmentsinDarfuralsoseemtohaveconsumedmuchoftheCouncil’sattentioninApril.Thismaybepartiallyduetopercep-tions that one of the keys to solving thesituationsinChadandtheCARissolvingtheDarfurissue.Membersarenonethelessconsciousthatthereareimportantdomes-ticdimensions inChadandtheCARthatalsoneedtobeaddressed.

Itisunclearwhethermemberswouldsup-port alternatives such as authorising theCARoperationfirstormakingcompromisesonrobustness.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

• S/RES/1706(31August2006)mandatedamultidimensionalUNpresenceinChadandtheCARandrequestedrecommendations.

Selected Presidential Statements

• S/PRST/2007/2(16January2007)requestedfurtherrecommendationsonpeacekeepinginChadandtheCARandanadvancemission.

• S/PRST/2006/47(22November2006)renewedtheUNPeacebuildingOfficeintheCAR(BONUCA).


• S/2007/97(23February2007)wasthereportonUNpeacekeepinginChadandtheCAR.

• S/2006/1034(28December2006)wasthelatestreportonBONUCA.

• S/2006/1019(22December2006)wasthefirstreportonUNpeacekeepinginChadandtheCAR.

Other

• S/2007/201(11April2007)wastheSudaneseletteronrecentcross-bor-derattacks.

• S/PV.5655(4April2007)wastherecordofUnderSecretary-GeneralJohnHolmes’briefing.

• S/2007/135(7March2007)wasaletterfromLibyaforwardingtheChad-Sudanstatementonre-energisingtheTripoliAgreement.

• S/2006/103(14February2006)wastheChad-SudanTripoliAgreement.



MAy 2007

RallyofRepublicansofAlassaneOuattara,andtheDemocraticPartyofCôted’IvoireofHenriBédié).

On 11 April, the Defence and SecurityForcesofCôted’Ivoire(FDS-CI),theArmedForcesoftheForces Nouvelles(FAFN)andthe commanders of UNOCI and the ofFrenchLicorneforcessignedaquadripar-titeagreementtoeliminatethebufferzoneknown as the zone of confidence as of16April.

From10to20April,aUNtechnicalassess-ment mission visited Côte d’Ivoire todetermineexpectationsof theUN role inimplementingtheOuagadougouagreement,howtheUNcouldrespondtothoseexpec-tations,anddeveloprecommendationsforapossiblenewconceptofoperationsandfuturedrawdownofUNOCI.

On13April,theInternationalWorkingGroup(IWG)metinAbidjanandexpressedreadi-ness to support the Ouagadougouagreement.ItalsocalledforconsultationsonitsfuturestatuswithECOWASandtheAfricanUnionwithaviewtomakingrecom-mendationstotheSecurityCouncil.

On 16 April, Medecins Sans Frontieres reportedalmostdailyattacksagainstcivil-iansintheformer“zoneofconfidence”andseriousconcernthatciviliansarenowleftdefenceless by the redeployment of theimpartialforces.

OptionsTheCouncilhasthefollowingoptions:n initiatingdiscussionsinMayonthefuture international presence in Côte d’Ivoire inviewoftheSecretary-General’srecommendations and assessment of the situation;n combiningintooneresolutionatechnical adjustmentofpreviousCouncildecisions for conformity with the Ouagadougou agreement and a new mandate for UNOCI;orn decidingtoadoptinMayaresolutionwith the technicaladjustment(changingthe dateoftheelectionandthenameofthe primeminister)butdeferringwiderissues untilJune.

Key IssuesTheCouncilfacesadifficulttaskbalancingtwo conflicting requirements: PresidentGbagbo’spreferenceforverylimitedinter-nationalinvolvementinCôted’Ivoireandamuchmore significantdegreeof interna-tionaloversightovertheelectoralprocesspreferredbySoro.

The Ouagadougou agreement foreseesonlythreeareaswhererolesremainfortheinternationalcommunity:n supervisionbytheimpartialforcesofthe NationalDisarmament,Demobilisation andReintegration(DDR)Programme;n placementofimpartialforces’observation postsalongthe“greenline”;andn obligation for theEvaluationandMoni- toringCommittee(setupbytheIvorian parties)tokeeptheSpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General informed of progress in implementation of the agreement.

However,theinternationalcommunityuntilnow has been broadly involved and theCouncilwillhavetodecide:n whethertheimpartialforceswillonlyhave an observer role or whether they will providemilitarysupporttothejointunits to be deployed within the zone of confidence;n UNOCI’srole insecuringthe identification process, as the Ouagadougou agreementspecifiesthatsecurityforthe mobile courts, identification operations andtheelectoralprocessshouldnowbe providedbytheIvorianpartiesjointly;n whetherandwhenaUNOCIdrawdown shouldbegin;andn thefutureoftheIWGandtheHighRepre- sentativeforElections(notmentionedin theOuagadougouagreement).

Arelatedissueiswhetherthereisaneedforanewmandatefortheimpartialforcesthatarebeingredeployedfromthezoneofconfidencetootherpartsofthecountry.

Stilloutstandingistheparties’demandtoaddAfricantroopstoparticipateinpeace-keeping operations. Since this seems tostem fromSoro’sdesire toobtain troopsfromBurkinaFasotoensurehisownsecu-rity,theissueiswhetherthosetroopsshouldbe incorporated into UNOCI, or whethertheyshouldbeindependent.Andthereisstill an issue of underlying uncertainty,whether theCouncilshouldwaitandseeand takesubstantivedecisionsonlyaftertheimplicationsoftheSecretary-General’sreport havebeenabsorbedandperhapsafterithassentamissiontogetfirst-handimpressions.


CAR: Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General

LamineCissé(Senegal)

BONUCA: Size and Composition

Strengthasof30September2006:19internationals,fivemilitary,sixpolice

BONUCA: Duration

15February2000topresent;mandateexpires31December2007

FOMUC: Size and Composition

• Currentstrength:380troops• Contributors:Gabon,Republicof

CongoandChad

FOMUC: Duration

October2002topresent;mandateexpires30June2007

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council ActionBy15MaytheCouncilwillreceiverecom-mendationsfromtheSecretary-GeneralontheUN’sroleinsupportingthepeacepro-cess in Côte d’Ivoire. Discussions areexpected to focusonhow tohelp imple-ment the recent Ouagadougou peaceagreement and, more broadly, on thedegreeof international involvementintheprocessleadingtotheelections.

ItseemslikelythattheCouncilwillwaituntilJuneforanyformalaction,whenthecurrentmandate of the UN Operation in Côted’Ivoire(UNOCI)expires.

Key Recent DevelopmentsInourAprilUpdate,wedescribedaninitia-tive, ledbyFrance, toadopta resolutionamendingthetermsofresolution1721inline with the Ouagadougou agreementendorsedbytheCouncil inapresidentialstatement on 28 March. Eventually, theideaofaresolutionwasdeferredbecauseof increasing scepticism about underpin-ning the Ouagadougou agreement witha Council resolution before any initialassessmentoftheprospectsforitsgenuineimplementation.

Early in April new Ivorian Prime MinisterGuillaumeSoroformedagovernmentcom-prisingthirty-oneministers,includingelevenministersfromPresidentLaurentGbagbo’sIvorianPopularFront(FPI),sevenfromtherebelForces Nouvellesandfivefromeachof thetwoleadingoppositionparties(the



The Zone of Confidence Patrols within the Zone before 16 April

Two-thirdsofUNOCItroopsarebasedeitherwithintheZone(atcheck-points)orwithincloseproximityoftheZone.TheyconductdailypatrolswithintheZone.Thiswillcontinueuntilallobservationpostsaredismantled.

Ouagadougou Agreement (4 March 2007)

• Inordertoallowthefreemovementofpeopleandgoods,theimpartialforceswilldismantlethezone.

• A“greenline”goingfromeasttowestalongthemedianlineofthezoneofconfidencewillbetemporarilyestab-lishedandpunctuatedbyobservationpostsoccupiedbytheimpartialforces.

• Thenumberofimpartialforcesoccupyingthesepostswillbereducedbyhalfeverytwomonthsuntilallofthemareremoved.Thosenotintheobservationpostswillberedeployedelsewhereonnationalterritory.

• JointunitsofequalnumbersofFAFNandFDS-CImembersandwithresponsibilityforconductingpoliceandsecuritymissionswillbedeployedinthezoneofconfidence.

Quadripartite Agreement (11 April 2007)

• Thedismantlementwillstart16AprilandlastuntilDecember2007(whenallobservationpostswillhavebeendismantled).

• The“greenline”willbedelineatedby32pointscorrespondingtovillagesandtownsintheregion.

• Theimpartialforces(UNOCIonly)willbetemporarilyinstalledin17observationpostsacrossthisgreenline.Thosepostswillstarttobedismantledaftertwomonths.Atpresstime,onlyoneIvorianmixedunithasbeendeployedintheZone.

UN and Impartial Forces


Tobeappointed

Principal Deputy Special Representative

AbouMoussa(Chad)

High Representative for Elections

GérardStoudmann(Switzerland)

Size and Composition of UNOCI (55 countries)

• Authorisedstrengthasof2June2006:

Council DynamicsThere is agreement on the necessity toadjust the international framework for thepeaceprocessinCôted’IvoiretotheOua-gadougouagreement.However,actionwaspostponed as most members thought itwasnecessarytoreceiveanassessmentofthesituation.

On the one hand, there is a feeling thatthewillof thepartiesasembodied in theOuagadougou agreement cannot beopposed.Ontheotherhand,manyseetheneed forclosemonitoringof theprocessleadingtotheelectionstopreventtheriskofrenewedconflict.

Thereseemstobeverylimitedsupportforanimmediateliftingoftargetedsanctionsorapartialliftingofthearmsembargotoallowtheentryof lightweapons.Atpress timethereisnoinitiativefromthesanctionscom-mittee to consider those issues. Manybelievethatitwouldbetooriskybeforetheelections.Also,intheabsenceofanofficialrequestfromthepartiesorarecommenda-tionbytheSecretary-General,itseemsthatsanctionswillnotbeontheagenda.

Selected UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1739(10January2007)extendedtheUNOCImandateuntil30June2007withincreasedtrooplevels.

• S/RES/1721(1November2006)pro-longedbyoneyearthetransitionalperiodinCôted’Ivoireandreinforcedthepowersoftheprimeminister.

Latest Presidential Statement

• S/PRST/2007/8(28March2007)endorsedtheOuagadougouagreement,supportedtheappointmentofSoroasprimeministerandrequestedareportfromtheSecretary-GeneralontheUN’sfutureroleinthepeaceprocess.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

• S/2007/133(9March2007)

Other UN Documents

• S/2007/216(17April2007)wastheletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralontheextensionofthemandateoftheGroupofExperts.

• S/2007/181(31March2007)wastheletterfromGhanatransmittingacommuniquébytheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncil.

• S/2007/144(13March2007)wastheletterfromtheSecretary-GeneraltransmittingtheOuagadougouAgreement.

upto8,115militarypersonnelandupto1,200police

• Strengthasof31March2007:9,241totaluniformedpersonnel,including7,854troops,200militaryobserversand1,187police

• Keytroop-contributingcountries:Bangladesh,Pakistan,Jordan,Morocco,Ghana

Cost

• 1July2006-30June2007$472.89million

French Licorne Force

Currentlybeingreducedfrom3,400to2,900troops.

Useful Additional Sourcesn www.onuci.org(officialUNOCIwebsite)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action The Council is expected to renew themandateof theUNMission intheDemo-cratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)by15May.

Key Recent DevelopmentsHeavyfightingbetweensupportersofPres-identJosephKabilaandoppositionleaderandSenatorJean-PierreBembaeruptedinlate March after a government ultimatumthatBemba’ssupportersdisarm.MONUCintervenedandquelledthefighting.Therewerestronginternationalcallsforanegoti-atedsolution.About200ofBemba’sfightersreportedly agreed to lay down arms andintegrateintothearmy.

Inmid-April,BembaflewtoPortugalandtheCongolese public prosecutor reportedlyrequestedthesenatetoliftBemba’simmu-nity.Thisincidentseemstohaveintensifiedconcerns about the future of democraticinstitutionsintheDRC.

The security situation continues to beextremely volatile in the east. Fighting inAprilleftabout65,000displacedintheprov-ince of North Kivu alone, and is largelyattributedtotheactivitiesofCongolesemili-tiaandtheForces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda(FDLR).

On sanctions, the Council on 29 Marchsanctionedtwoindividualsandfiveentitiesfound to have either violated the armsembargoorrefusedtodisarm.



MAy 2007

government in establishing effective andtransparentcontroloverthoseresources.

ThedraftresolutionrequeststheheadsofUNMissionsintheDRC,SudanandBurundito:n sharemilitaryinformation;n poollogisticandadministrativeresources toensureefficiencyandcost-effectiveness; andn coordinateimplementationofdisarmament, demobilisation,repatriation,reintegration andresettlementprogrammes.

ItrequeststheSecretary-GeneraltoreporttotheCouncilby15Novemberonbench-marksandatimetableforMONUC’sgradualdrawdown.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1751(13April2007)renewedMONUCuntil15May.

• S/RES/1596(3May2005),1649(21December2005)and1698(31July2006)strengthenedsanctions.


• S/PRST/2007/9(3April2007)deploredtheMarchviolenceandcalledonthegovernmenttorespecttheroleconferredonpoliticalpartiesbytheCongoleseconstitution.


• S/2007/156(22March2007)wasthelatestMONUCreport.

Other Relevant FactsSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

WilliamLacySwing(US)

MONUC: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission

• Authorisedstrength:about18,000militaryand1,316police

• Strengthasof31March2007:17,307militaryand1,029police

• Maintroopcontributors:India,Pakistan,BangladeshandUruguay

• Cost:1July2006–30June2007$1.138billion

MONUC: Duration

• 30November1999topresent,mandateexpireson15May2007

On 15 April, the Council rolled overMONUC’smandateforonemonth.Mem-bersseemtohaveagreedthatadditionaltime was needed to finalise technicalaspectsof thedraft,withnomajordiffer-encesofopiniononMONUC’sfuturesizeormandate.TheUSalso requested timeto allow for congressional approval, arequiredstepunderUSlaw.

ThecurrentdraftextendsMONUC’sman-dateuntil31December2007.Agreementhasbeensecuredon17,030 troops,760observers, 391 police trainers and 750police.MONUC’s futuremandate is likelyto maintain current key tasks, includingdeterringtheuseofforcebyarmedgroups,with some additions such as providingbasic training for the Congolese armedforces.Themandateasenvisaged in thedraftincludes:n protectionofcivilians,andhumanitarian andUNpersonnel;n monitoringtheimplementationofthe armsembargoandseizingarmsfoundin theDRCinviolationoftheembargo;n deterring the use of force by armed groups;n providing operational and logistical support,andshort-termbasictrainingto Congolese armed forces to forcibly disarm irregular armed groups and prevent support to militia including throughillegaleconomicactivities;n contributingtotheimplementationofthe national programme for disarmament, demobilisationandreintegration;n providingcapacity-buildingforthepolice;n assistingwithinitialplanningforsecurity sectorreform;n providingadviceonstrengtheningdemo- cratic institutions,promotingtheruleof lawandhumanrights;n assisting Congolese authorities with preliminary arrangements for the local elections;andn assisting in establishing a peaceful environmentfortheelections.

The draft requests the government todevelop a plan to ensure security in theeast,particularlybycarryingoutdisarma-ment, demobilisation and repatriation orresettlement of Congolese and foreigncombatants.Italsourgesregionalstatestotakeappropriatestepstoendtheillicittradeinnaturalresourcesand,wherenecessary,toreporttotheCouncil.Itcallsuponinter-national financial institutions toassist the

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council ActionInMaytheCouncilisexpectedtoconsidertheregularreportoftheSecretary-Generalon Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is due by30April.

ItisunclearwhethermemberswillpursueafurtherdrawdownofUNMissioninEthiopiaandEritrea(UNMEE)troopsatthisstageorwaituntilthemandate’sexpirydateon31July. At press time, substantive CouncilactionseemsunlikelyinMay.

Key Recent DevelopmentsTherehasbeennoapparentprogresswithborder demarcation, nor has there beenanyopening fromEthiopiaon that issue.Eritrea’srestrictionsonUNMEE’sfreedomof movement and operations haveincreased.ThemissionhasbeenunabletomonitorasignificantportionoftheTempo-rary Security Zone (TSZ, a buffer areabetween both countries). Asmara hasrefusedtoacceptAzouzEnnifarofTunisiaas Acting Special Representative of theSecretary-General,andithascriticisedtheSecretariatandtheCouncil fornottakingintoconsiderationitsconcernsandappoint-inganewSpecialRepresentative.

Routinetroopmovementsneartheborderonbothsideshaveheightened tensions.Therehavealsobeenexchangesofaccu-sations.

Developments in Somalia have alsoincreased regional tensions. EritreadenouncedEthiopia’sinterventioninSoma-liaand thedeploymentofanAUmission(AMISOM).Italsosuspendeditsmember-shipintheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment,aregionalblocalsocompris-ing Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan,DjiboutiandKenya.Anallianceofgroupsopposed to theTransitionalFederalGov-ernment, including a Union of IslamicCourts (UIC) leader, was launched inAsmarainmid-April.

On 30 January, the Council renewedUNMEEbutreducedtheforcesizeby600military personnel. Resolution 1741 alsoreiterated Council demands, in particularthat:


n Ethiopia accepts fully and without pre conditionsthe2002delimitationdecision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Com mission(EEBC)andtakestepstoallow thedemarcationoftheborder;andn Eritreaimmediatelywithdrawsitstroops fromtheTSZandreversesallrestrictions on UNMEE, including vis-à-vis the Secretary-General’s Acting Special Representative.

TheresolutionalsocalledupontheSecre-tary-General and the internationalcommunity to help the parties normaliserelations.This is linkedparticularly to theEEBC’s deadline of November 2007 foragreement on the border issue, in theabsenceofwhichtheCommissionwoulddetermine theborderdemarcatedby theboundarypointslistedinitsNovember2006decision.

Itseemsthat, inresponsetothiscall,theSecretariat has contacted a number ofmembers on suitable and desirableresponsestothestalemate.MeetingswithasimilarobjectivewerealsoorganisedbytheUS.

OptionsOptions bearing on UNMEE’s size andstructuredonotseemlikely tobeon thetableatthispoint.Givenincreasingbilateralandregional tensions,otheroptionsmayinclude:n providingpositivefeedbackandsugges- tions to theSecretariaton itsefforts to relievetensions;andn takingtheleadinrestartingadiplomatic process,byperhaps revivinga role for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

Key IssuesThekeyissueishowbesttonormaliserela-tionsbetweenEthiopiaandEritrea,mindfuloftheNovember2007EEBCdeadlineandtherelationshipbetweenbilateraltensionsandinstabilityinSomalia.

Relatedsignificantissuesincludethelackof alternatives to the deadlock and anacceptablemediator.AnotherrelatedissueistheneedtoavoiddangerousprecedentsinrestrictingthefreedomofmovementandoperationsofUNmissionswhilemaintain-ing a force capable of diminishing theprospectsofrenewedconflict.

• S/2006/1036(28December2006)containedEritrea’spositionontheappointmentofaSpecialRepresentative.

• S/2006/890(15November2006)and905(20November2006)containedrespectivelyEthiopia’sandEritrea’spositionontheEEBC’sintentiontoconveneameetingonoptionsformovingthedemarcationprocessforward.


• S/2007/33(22January2007)wasthelatestreport,whichincludedastrongresponsefromtheEEBCtocriticismsmadebyEthiopiainitsNovember2006letter.

• S/2006/992(15December2006)containedoptionsforUNMEEandtheNovemberEEBCdecision.


Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission

Vacant,pendingappointment

Size and Composition of Mission

• Authorisedmaximumstrength:2,300militarypersonnel

• Strengthasof31March2007:1,796militarypersonnel

• Keytroopcontributors:India,JordanandKenya

Cost

Approvedbudget:1July2006-30June2007:$182.24million(gross)

Duration

31July2000topresent;mandateexpires31July2007

Sierra Leone

Expected Council ActionInMaytheCouncilisexpectedtodiscussthefirstperiodicreportontheUNIntegratedOffice in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) andreceive a briefing from the Secretary-General’sExecutiveRepresentative,VictorAngelo.Thereportisexpectedtofocusonrecentdevelopmentsandprogressmadeonelectionpreparations.UNIOSIL’smandateexpireson31December.

Key Recent DevelopmentsPreparationsforthepresidentialandparlia-mentaryelectionson28Julyareprogressing

Council DynamicsHavingchosen inJanuaryanoption thatdecreasesUNMEE’snumberswhilemain-tainingitspresenceandmandate,membersnow seem focused on how best to nor-malise relations between the countrieswithinthatframework.

However,membersseemdividedonwhatthisactuallymeans.TheUS,havingopenlysupportedEthiopia’sinterventioninSoma-liaandthedeploymentofAMISOM,seemslesswell-placedtoexerciseneutralleader-shiponthisissuethaninthepast.Russia,the UK and some African members whohave strong ties with Addis Ababa seemreluctant to openly pressure Ethiopia todemarcate the boundary. Possibly inresponse,Eritreanowappears topursuetiesof itsownwithotherplayerssuchasSudanandLibya.

Othermembersseemconvinced that thekey to solving the border and UNMEEissuesistopressureEthiopiatoabidebytheEEBCdecision.

Giventheperceptionthatmoresubstantivediplomatic initiativesmaybe ineffective ifnot counterproductive, most membersseemtopreferacautiousapproachfornowby keeping the parties engaged throughcallsforrestraintandexpressionsofcon-cernwithcurrenttensions.

Underlying ProblemsTherearerenewedconcernsthatUNMEEisnowoverstretchedtocarryoutitscurrentmandate.

FurtherUNMEEreductionsmayrequireasignificantmandatedowngradeandmayencourageEritreatodeploymoretroopsintheTSZ.Ethiopia,withitscommitmentsinSomalia, is likely tocontinue itshistoricaloppositiontodecreasesinUNMEE.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1741(30January2007)extendedUNMEEuntil31Julyandapprovedthedrawdown.

• S/RES/1312(31July2000)estab-lishedUNMEE.

Selected Letters

• S/2007/4(4January2007)containedEritrea’spositiononcertainpointsintheDecemberspecialreportoftheSecretary-General.



MAy 2007

ofUNIOSIL’smandatewith the incomingelectedgovernment.

Key IssuesThekey issueon theground isensuringsuccessful free and fair elections in Julywithin a stable security environment. Arelatedfutureissueisthetimelyestablishmentofamechanismforelectoraldisputes.

An emerging issue is the relationshipbetweentheCouncilandthePBC.IntheJanuary open debate on the PBC, theCouncil indicated that it was willing tobecomemoreinvolvedinthePBC’swork.AnyadjustmentinUNIOSIL’smandateaftertheelectioncoulddependonthelevelofCouncilconfidenceinprogressbythePBC.Possibilitiesincludeincreasedcooperationandinformationsharing.

Council DynamicsRelativestabilityhasledmostmemberstodevotelessattentiontoSierraLeoneinthepastsixmonths.However,somearebegin-ning to takemore interest in the role theCouncilneedstoplayincoordinatingwiththePBCinthelead-uptofuturedecisionsontheUNIOSILmandate.

Underlying ProblemsThegreatestthreatstosecuritynowincludeyouthunemploymentandmarginalisationandpoorlivingconditions.Thegovernmenthas launched a youth employment andempowerment scheme but lacks theresources and institutional capacity forproperimplementation.

UN Documents


• S/RES/1750(30March2007)notedthatUNMILshouldcontinuetoprovideadministrativeandrelatedsupportandsecurityforactivitiesinLiberiaoftheSpecialCourtofSierraLeone.

• S/RES/1734(22December2006)extendedthemandateofUNIOSILuntil31December2007.

• S/RES/1688(16June2006)requestedtheSecretary-GeneraltoassistinthetransferofformerLiberianPresidentCharlesTaylortotheSpecialCourt’sspecialoutpostintheNetherlands.

• S/RES/1626(19September2005)mandatedUNMILtoprovidesecurityfortheSpecialCourtofSierraLeone.

• S/RES/1620(31August2005)establishedUNIOSIL.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

• S/2006/922(28November)wasthethirdreportoftheSecretary-GeneralonUNIOSIL.

Selected Letter

S/2006/1050(26December2006)wastheletterfromthechairmanofthePBCtothepresidentoftheCouncilontheBurundiandSierraLeonecountry-specificmeetings.

Peacebuilding Commission

• PBC/SIL/2006SR.3andSR.4werethesummaryrecordsofthethirdandfourthmeetingsofthePBC.

• PBC/OC/1/2(21June2006)wasaletterfromtheCouncilpresidenttotheSecretary-GeneralreferringSierraLeonetothePBC.

well,withvoter registrationcompletedonschedule.AttheendofMarchtheNationalElectoralCommissionannouncedthat91percent of voters aged 18 and over hadregistered.Thishighlevelofparticipationisviewedasanencouragingsigngiventheimportanceofvoterregistrationtotheover-allcredibilityoftheelections.

Arecentgovernmentalproposaltoholdaparallelconstitutionalreferendumtoupdatethe1991constitutionhasraisedconcernsaboutpossibleconfusionwiththeelectionitself,aswellasquestionsaboutwhowillbearthecost.

Resolution1734,whichon22DecemberextendedthemandateofUNIOSIL,askedfor a comprehensive assessment, closeto the election date, on UNIOSIL’s roleincludinganexitstrategy.TheSecretariatbelieves, based on experience in othersimilarsituations,thatitwillbebetterplacedtoprovideanaccuratepictureofapossibleexitstrategyaftertheelections.

PBC Developments

ThefirstfieldmissionoftheUNPeace-buildingCommission(PBC)tookplacein Sierra Leone from 20 to 25 March2007.The12-memberdelegation,ledbythe Permanent Representative of theNetherlandstotheUN,discussedgapsinpriorityareas forpeacebuildingwithkey stakeholders. Agreed prioritiesincluded justice and security reform.DuringthemissionthePBCandthegov-ernment of Sierra Leone reached anunderstanding on the importance todevelopa frameworkor“compact” foran integrated peacebuilding strategy.TheframeworkisexpectedtobereadybyJune.Thisisenvisagedasanumbrellaframework under which partners canpledge their mutual commitment to takingaction.

ThePBCwillnextmeeton2Mayforadiscussiononyouthunemployment.On8MayitwillbriefNGOsbeforeits9Maycountry-specificmeetingonSierraLeone.

OptionsThe most likely option is that Councilmembers will want to issue a statementreinforcingprogresstodate,encouragingtheelectionprocess,perhapscommend-ing the PBC “compact” and lookingforwardtoworkingthroughthenextstage


Subsidiary Bodies Mandate Target(s)/Designated Lists Committees Forecast

Counter-Terrorism CommitteeS/RES/1373

ResolutionsS/RES/1373 (28 Sep 2001)S/RES/1377 (12 Nov 2001)S/RES/1456 (20 Jan 2003)S/RES/1535 (26 Mar 2004)S/RES/1566 (8 Oct 2004)S/RES/1624 (14 Sep 2005)

1540 CommitteeS/RES/1540

ResolutionsS/RES/1540 (28 Apr 2004)S/RES/1673 (27 Apr 2006)

Al-Qaida and TalibanS/RES/1267

ResolutionsS/RES/1267 (15 Oct 1999)S/RES/1333 (19 Dec 2000)S/RES/1390 (16 Jan 2002)S/RES/1455 (17 Jan 2003)S/RES/1526 (30 Jan 2004)S/RES/1617 (29 Jul 2005)S/RES/1735 (22 Dec 2006)

Upcoming Issues in Sanctions Committees

Resolution 1373 established obligations on all states to:• prevent and suppress international terrorism;• establish cooperation between states;• implement mutual legal assistance;• share intelligence;• assist in tracing and freezing of assets related to terrorists and terrorism;• implement border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and access to weapons;• deny safe haven to terrorists; and• become parties to the then 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and to implement them fully.

Resolution 1624 called on all states to prohibit and prevent incitement to terrorism. States are required to comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.

Resolution 1540 established obligations on all states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes.

Resolution 1673 called on all states to report to the Committee and decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation.

assets freeze; travel ban; arms embargo

The measures mandated by resolution 1373, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities.

While sanctions did not target individuals or specific entities, resolution 1540 required all states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, designated by the Committee on the Consolidated List. As of 12 December 2006, there were 362 individuals and 125 entities on the List.

The CTC/CTED is expected to follow-up with non-reporting states on implementation of resolution 1624, and continue assessing each state’s implementation of resolution 1373.

The mandate—created by resolution 1535—will expire 31 December 2007, unless extended by the Security Council.

Reports Review: The Committee with its Group of Experts will continue to evaluate states’ level of implementation of the resolution’s provisions and engage those states who fail to comply with the reporting requirements. The Committee’s mandate and the mandate of the Group of Experts will expire 27 April 2008.

Listing/De-listing: The Committee will continue the review it began at the end of March of all designated individuals and entities that have been on the Designated List for four years as required by paragraph 6(i) of the Committee Guidelines.

Resolution 1735 asked the Committee to continue to develop, adopt and apply guidelines regarding de-listing of individuals and entities on the List, and extended the Monitoring Team’s mandate for an additional 18 months.

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org 2�


Côte d’IvoireS/RES/1572

ResolutionsS/RES/1572 (15 Nov 2004)S/RES/1584 (1 Feb 2005)S/RES/1632 (18 Oct 2005)S/RES/1643 (15 Dec 2005)S/RES/1708 (14 Sep 2006)S/RES/1727 (15 Dec 2006)

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)S/RES/1718

ResolutionsS/RES/1718 (14 Oct 2006)

Democratic Republic of the CongoS/RES/1533

ResolutionsS/RES/1493 (28 Jul 2003)S/RES/1533 (12 Mar 2004)S/RES/1596 (18 Apr 2005)S/RES/1616 (29 Jul 2005)S/RES/1649 (21 Dec 2005)S/RES/1654 (31 Jan 2006)S/RES/1698 (31 Jul 2006)

arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds

Arms Embargo: supply, sale, transfer or transit of:• any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missile or missile systems or related materiel including spare parts;• items on designated lists determined by the Committee or the Council which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear- related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction programmes; and• technical training, service, etc., related to the embargoed items.

Luxury Goods: not defined by the resolution.

Assets Freeze: funds and other financial assets and economic resources of persons designated by the Committee or by the Council.

Travel Ban: persons designated by the Committee or the Council.

arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures

Designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list (last updated 18 December 2006).

The DPRK and persons named to a designated list.

Arms Embargo: any recipient in DRC territory; excludes DRC army and police under certain conditions.

Travel Ban and Assets Freeze: as designated by the Committee including individual violators of the arms embargo, political and military leaders of foreign armed groups, and political and military leaders of Congolese militias who are receiving support from outside the DRC. As of 29 March 2007, there were 17 individuals and six entities listed.

Aviation Restrictions: all aircraft entering and departing DRC territory.

Report: The Group of Experts is to report to the Council through the Committee before 15 June 2007. The Group’s mandate will expire on or about 8 August 2007.

Mandate: The sanctions, established by resolution 1572 and renewed and amended by resolutions 1643 and 1727, will expire 31 October 2007.

The measures imposed will be under constant review by the Security Council and may be strengthened, modified, suspended or lifted depending on the level of compliance by the DPRK with the provisions of the resolution.

Mandate: Resolution 1698 renewed the sanctions measures and the mandate of the Group of Experts to 31 July 2007.



Islamic Republic of IranS/RES/1737

ResolutionsS/RES/1696 (31 Jul 2006)S/RES/1737 (23 Dec 2006)S/RES/1747 (24 Mar 2007)

IraqS/RES/1518

ResolutionsS/RES/661 (6 Aug 1990)S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003)S/RES/1518 (24 Nov 2003)

LiberiaS/RES/1521

ResolutionsS/RES/1521 (22 Dec 2003)S/RES/1532 (12 Mar 2004)S/RES/1607 (21 Jun 2005)S/RES/1647 (20 Dec 2005)S/RES/1683 (13 Jun 2006)S/RES/1689 (20 Jun 2006)S/RES/1731 (20 Dec 2006)S/RES/1753 (27 Apr 2007)

RwandaS/RES/918

ResolutionsS/RES/918 (17 May 1994)S/RES/1011 (16 Aug 1995)S/RES/1161 (9 Apr 1998)S/RES/1749 (28 Mar 2007)

Sierra LeoneS/RES/1132

ResolutionsS/RES/1132 (8 Oct 1997)S/RES/1171 (5 Jun 1998)

Embargo: sale or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes -related materiels, equipment, goods and technology to or from Iran (listed in S/2006/814 and S/2006/815).

Travel Restrictions: individuals engaged in directly, or associated with Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.

Assets Freeze: individuals and entities listed in Annex I to resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Other Restrictions: on technical cooperation, except for humanitarian purposes; calls on states and international financial institutions not to enter into new financial commitments with Iran.

arms embargo; assets freeze

arms embargo; travel ban;assets freeze; export of rough diamonds

Resolution 1683 modified the arms embargo to exempt sale of certain arms to the government.

arms embargo

arms embargo; travel ban

Government of Iran; individuals and entities listed in annexes to resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Arms Embargo: Iraqi territory.

Assets Freeze: Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005 there were 89 individuals, and as of 12 May 2006 there were 208 entities listed.

Arms Embargo: any recipient in Liberian territory.

Travel Ban: peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee. As of 30 November 2005 there were 59 individuals listed.

Assets Freeze: Charles Taylor and designated associates. As of 30 November 2005 there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed.

Arms Embargo: non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states; restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Rwanda.Resolution 1749 removed the requirement that Rwanda marks and registers all weapons.

Arms Embargo: non-governmental forces and restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone.

Travel Ban: Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee.

Reports: Committee to report every ninety days to the Council; IAEA to report by 24 May 2007.

Review/Action: Council to review Iran’s actions in light of the IAEA’s report and decide whether to suspend or terminate measures or consider further measures.

No Committee action is expected.

Mandate Review: Arms embargo and travel ban in effect until December 2007.

Diamond Sanctions: The Council lifted the diamond sanctions but will review its decision in ninety days to see if Liberia continues to meet the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements.

Report: The next report of the Panel of Experts is due by 6 June 2007.





SomaliaS/RES/751

ResolutionsS/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992)S/RES/751 (24 Apr 1992)S/RES/1519 (16 Dec 2003)S/RES/1558 (17 Aug 2004)S/RES/1587 (15 Mar 2005)S/RES/1630 (14 Oct 2005)S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006)S/RES/1724 (29 Nov 2006)S/RES/1744 (20 Feb 2007)

SudanS/RES/1591

ResolutionsS/RES/1556 (30 Jul 2004)S/RES/1591 (29 Mar 2005)S/RES/1665 (29 Mar 2006)S/RES/1672 (25 Apr 2006)S/RES/1679 (16 May 2006)S/RES/1713 (29 Sep 2006)

SyriaS/RES/1636

ResolutionsS/RES/1636 (31 Oct 2005)

arms embargo

arms embargo; travel ban;assets freeze

travel ban; assets freeze

Any recipient in Somali territory, except for AMISOM and for states engaged in development of security sector institutions in Somalia.

Arms Embargo: all parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals.

Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. Four individuals were designated by resolution 1672.

Aviation Restrictions: ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region.

Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing).

Reports: The Monitoring Group is to provide monthly progress reports to the Committee and a final report no later than 15 days before end of its mandate on 15 June 2007.

Action Pending: The Council has not yet taken action as it said it would in resolution 1676, including on the recommendations made in the Group’s last report (S/2006/229 of 4 May) to strengthen the sanctions regime to prevent violations of the arms embargo. This included a recommendation for the Council to impose an integrated arms embargo that would serve to reduce the availability of funds for the violators.

Report: The final report by the Panel of Experts is due by 30 August 2007 and the Panel’s mandate will expire 29 September 2007.

Action Pending: Action by the Council is still pending on the recommendations made by the Panel in its last report (S/2006/250 of 19 April 2006).Resolution 1713 extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts.

No Committee action is expected prior to the next UNIIIC report.


Notable Dates for MayReports Due for Consideration in May Relevant Document

24April SG quarterly report on UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal) S/RES/1740lateApril SG semi-annual report on resolution 1559 (Lebanon/Syria),

delayed from 19 April S/PRST/2004/3630April SG regular report on UNMEE

(UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) S/RES/17419May SG regular report on BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) S/RES/171915May SG report on the UN’s new role in Côte d’Ivoire S/PRST/2007/823May IAEA report on Iran S/RES/1747lateMay SG report on UNIOSIL’s post-election role

(UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) S/RES/173431May SG monthly report on Darfur S/RES/1590

May 2007 Mandates Expire Relevant Document

15May MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC) S/RES/1751

May 2007 Other Important Dates

2-3May Launch of the International Compact for Iraq in Egypt, with participation of the Secretary-General

3-4May Egypt will host on international conference on the situation in Iraq attended by the P5, G8 and Iraq’s neighbours (possibly including Iran).

8May Run-off presidential elections in Timor-Leste9May PBC country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone14-26May The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, will be travelling

the Great Lakes region (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda)18May EU-Russia Summit

AlsoexpectedinMay:• TheCouncilisexpectedtoreceiveitssemi-annualbriefingfromthe1373(Counter-terrorism),

the1267(Al-Qaida/Taliban),andthe1540Committees.• HumanRightsCouncilelectionsarescheduledforMayanditsfifthsessionisscheduledfor

11-18June.• TheCouncilisexpectedtoreceiverecommendationsfromitsWorkingGrouponChildren

andArmedConflictregardingchildrenaffectedbyconflictinSriLankaandNepal.

n ACouncilopendebateonProtectionofCiviliansisexpectedinJune.

n TheSpecialCourtforSierraLeonehasreportedthatCharlesTaylor’strialatTheHaguewillbegininJune.

n ElectionofNepal’sconstituentassemblyisscheduledformid-Junebutmaypos-siblybedelayed.

n ASomalinationalreconciliationcongressinMogadishuisbeingplannedformid-June,postponedfrom16April.

n Presidential and legislative elections inSierraLeoneareexpected28July.

n Parliamentary elections in Timor-Lesteareyettobescheduledbuttheinaugu-rationofthegovernmentisexpectedbySeptember.

n TherearemediareportsthattheNabihBerriwillconvenetheLebaneseparliamenton25Septembertoelectanewpresident.

n TheSecretary-General’snextreportsonthethematicissuesofProtectionofCivil-iansinArmedConflictandWomen,Peace&SecurityareexpectedbyOctober.

n LocalelectionsintheDRCareexpectedinthesecondhalfof2007.

n Parliamentary elections in Kosovo areexpectedinlate2007.

n Aworkshoponsecuritysectorreform,ajointinitiativeofSlovakiaandSouthAfrica,isbeingplannedforlaterin2007inAfrica.

n PresidentialelectionsinCôted’Ivoirearenow expected by January 2008, post-ponedfrom31October.

Important Dates over theHorizon

Thematerialinthispublicationissubjecttocopyrightownership.Materialinthispublicationmaybefreelyusedasinthepublicdomain.Youarefreetocopy,distribute,ormakederivativeworksoftheworkunderthefollowingconditions:youmustattributetheworktoSecurityCouncilReport,Inc.;youmaynotusethisworkforcommercialpurposes;ifyoualter,transform,orbuilduponthiswork,youmaydistributetheresultingworkonlyunderalicenseidenticaltothisone.

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFFColin Keating,ExecutiveDirectorJoanna Weschler,DirectorofResearchCurtis A. Ward,SeniorResearchConsultantAnne-Gaëlle Claude,ResearchAnalystFernanda Rafaela Fernandes,ResearchAnalystAmanda Roberts,ProgrammeCoordinatorShamala Kandiah,ResearchConsultantBrian Lockstone,CommunicationsConsultantNicole Richards,AdministrativeAssistant

Security Council Report is published with the support of the Government of Canada, the Government of Norway, The Rockefeller Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacAr-thur Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorporated as a not for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the Center on International Organiza-tion in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York.