Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1974, Vol. 30, No. 4, 526-537

SELF-MONITORING OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR1

MARK SNYDER2

University of Minnesota

A social psychological construct of self-monitoring (self-observation andself-control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness) of expressivebehavior and self-presentation was proposed. An internally consistent, tempo-rally stable self-report measure of individual differences in self-monitoring wasconstructed. Four converging laboratory and field studies of peer perceptionratings, criterion group membership, self-control of facial and vocal emotionalexpressive behavior, and attention to normative social comparison informationwere conducted to demonstrate the convergent and discriminant validity ofthe Self-Monitoring Scale (SM). The use of SM to investigate hypothesesconcerning consistency in expression across situations and between channels ofexpressive behavior was discussed.

A common observation in literature andcultural folklore has been that certain non-language behaviors, such as voice quality,body motion, touch, and the use of personalspace appear to play a prominent role incommunication. Furthermore, laboratory andfield research clearly indicates that much in-formation about a person's affective states,status and attitude, cooperative and competi-tive nature of social interaction, and inter-personal intimacy is expressed and accuratelycommunicated to others in nonverbal expres-sive behavior (e.g., Ekman, 1971; Hall, 1966;Mehrabian, 1969; Sommer, 1969).

Much interest in nonverbal expressive be-havior stems from a belief that it may not beunder voluntary control and might function

1 This report is based on a doctoral dissertationsubmitted to Stanford University. The research wassupported in part by National Institute of MentalHealth Training Grant MH-12283 in Social Psy-chology and in part by a Canada Council DoctoralFellowship. The author thanks Daryl J. Bern, chair-man of the dissertation committee, for his encour-agement and intelligent counsel throughout the con-ceptual, empirical, and literary phases of the disser-tation; and J. Merrill Carlsmith, Lee D. Ross, andPhilip G. Zimbardo, members of the committee, fortheir interest, attention, and suggestions at variousstages of the research. John Grether, Tom Price,Chris Ryan, Anne Coffey, Sheridan Crawford, Jul'.eSteinmetz, Mike Cochran, Kris Keller, RichardQuan, and Mike Boyle provided valuable andcreative assistance in conducting the experiments andcontributed their insights into self-monitoring.

2 Requests for reprints should be sent to MarkSnyder, Laboratory for Research in Social Relations,Department of Psychology, University of Minne-sota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455.

as a pipeline or radarscope to one's true inner"self" (e.g., Freud, 1959). Although non-verbal behavior may often escape voluntaryattempts at censorship (Ekman & Friesen,1969), there have been numerous demonstra-tions that individuals can voluntarily expressvarious emotions with their vocal and/orfacial expressive behavior in such a way thattheir expressive behavior can be accuratelyinterpreted by observers (e.g., Davitz, 1964).In fact, some social observers have proposedthat the ability to manage and control ex-pressive presentation is a prerequisite to ef-fective social and interpersonal functioning.Thus Goffman (1955) has likened social in-teraction to a theatrical performance or"line" of verbal and nonverbal self-expressiveacts which are managed to keep one's lineappropriate to the current situation. Suchself-management requires a repertoire offace-saving devices, an awareness of the in-terpretations which others place on one's acts,a desire to maintain social approval, and thewillingness to use this repertoire of impres-sion management tactics. Within the morerestricted domain of facial expressions ofemotional affect, Ekman (1971) has suggestedthat individuals typically exercise controlover their facial expressions to intensify, de-intensify, neutralize, or mask the expressionof a felt affect, according to various norms ofsocial performance.

There are, however, striking and importantindividual differences in the extent to whichindividuals can and do monitor their self-presentation, expressive behavior, and non-

526

SELF-MONITORING OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 527

verbal affective display. Clearly, professionalstage actors can do what I cannot. Politicianshave long known how important it is to wearthe right face for the right constituency. La-Guardia learned the expressive repertoires ofseveral different cultures in New York andbecame "chameleon-like" the son of what-ever people he was facing. Yet little researchhas directly concerned such individual dif-ferences in the self-control of expressive be-havior. At best, some dispositional correlatesof spontaneous and natural expression of emo-tion have been reported (e.g., Buck, Savin,Miller, & Caul, 1972; Davitz, 1964).

A Concept of Self-Monitoring ofExpressive Behavior

How might individual differences in theself-control of expressive behavior arise? Whatmight be the developmental, historical, andcurrent motivational origins of self-controlability and performance? Perhaps some indi-viduals have learned that their affective ex-perience and expression are either sociallyinappropriate or lacking. Such people maymonitor (observe and control) their self-presentation and expressive behavior. Thegoals of self-monitoring may be (a) to com-municate accurately one's true emotional stateby means of an intensified expressive presen-tation; (b) to communicate accurately anarbitrary emotional state which need not becongruent with actual emotional experience;(c) to conceal adaptively an inappropriateemotional state and appear unresponsive andunexpressive; (d) to conceal adaptively aninappropriate emotional state and appear tobe experiencing an appropriate one; (e) toappear to be experiencing some emotion whenone experiences nothing and a nonresponse isinappropriate.

An acute sensitivity to the cues in a situ-ation which indicate what expression or self-presentation is appropriate and what is notis a corollary ability to self-monitoring. Onesuch set of cues for guiding self-monitoringis the emotional expressive behavior of othersimilar comparison persons in the same situ-ation.

There is some evidence of an acute versionof this process. When persons are made un-

certain of their emotional reactions, they lookto the behavior of others for cues to definetheir emotional states and model the emo-tional expressive behavior of others in thesame situation who appear to be behavingappropriately (Schachter & Singer, 1962).

On the other hand, persons who have notlearned a concern for appropriateness of theirself-presentation would not have such well-developed self-monitoring skills and would notbe so vigilant to social comparison informa-tion about appropriate patterns of expressionand experience. This is not to say that theyare not emotionally expressive or even thatthey are less so than those who monitor theirpresentation. Rather, their self-presentationand expressive behavior seem, in a functionalsense, to be controlled from within by theiraffective states (they express it as they feelit) rather than monitored, controlled, andmolded to fit the situation.

Self-Monitoring and Consistency inExpression: Between Modalities andacross Situations

Do people, as Freud (1959) believed, sayone thing with their lips and another withtheir fingertips? More specifically, what gov-erns the consistency between expression indifferent channels of expression, such as vocaland facial, and the consistency between non-verbal and verbal expression? The self-moni-toring approach provides one perspective ondifferences and consistencies across channelsof expression, including verbal self-presenta-tion.

It is likely that when one is monitoring,various channels are monitored differentially,and perhaps some forgotten. Thus, what maybe communicated by one channel may differfrom what is communicated by another. Forexample, I may cover my sadness by puttingon a happy face but forget to use a happyvoice.

Ekman and Friesen (1969, 1972) havedemonstrated with psychiatric patients andstudent nurses that in deception situationspeople are more likely to monitor their facialthan body presentation, with the result thatthe deception is more likely to be detectedfrom an examination of body cues than fa-

528 MARK SNYDER

cial cues. Thus, the information encoded inmonitored channels should differ from thatencoded in nonmonitored channels. However,it is likely that great consistency character-izes that set of channels of expressive (verbalor nonverbal) behaviors which are simul-taneously monitored according to the samecriteria. Furthermore, self-monitored expres-sive behavior should vary more from situa-tion to situation than nonmonitored expres-sive behavior. Self-monitoring individualsshould be most likely to monitor and controltheir expression in situations which containreliable cues to social appropriateness. Thus,such a person would be more likely to laughat a comedy when watching it with amusedpeers than when watching it alone. The laugh-ing behavior of the non-self-monitoring per-son should be more invariant across those twosituations and more related to how affectivelyamused he himself actually is. The expressivebehavior of self-monitoring individuals shouldbe more reflective of an internal affect statewhen it is generated in a situation with mini-mal incentives for, and cues to, self-monitor-ing.

The cross-situational variability of the self-monitoring versus the consistency of the non-self-monitoring individuals is similar to the"traits versus situations" issue: Is behaviorcontrolled by situational factors and hencepredictable from characteristics of the sur-rounding situation, or is it controlled byinternal states and dispositions which producecross-situational consistency and facilitateprediction from characteristics of the person,measures of internal states, or dispositions(Mischel, 1968; Moos, 1968, 1969)? Bern(1972) has proposed that the issue be redi-rected from an "either traits or situations forall behavior of all people" debate to a searchfor moderating variables which would allowthe specification for an individual of equiva-lence classes of situations and responses acrosswhich he monitors his behavior with respectto a particularly central self-concept. In theseareas he would show trait-like cross-situa-tional and interresponse mode consistency; inothers he would not. In the domain of ex-pressive behavior, individual differences inself-monitoring are a moderating variablewhich identifies individuals who demonstrate

or fail to demonstrate consistency acrosschannels of expression and between situationsdiffering in monitoring properties.

In Search of a Measure of IndividualDifferences in Self-Monitoring

How can we capture individual differencesin self-monitoring? A review of the literaturesuggests at least one currently available mea-sure which might serve to identify individualswho differ in self-monitoring.

The self-monitoring individual is one who,out of a concern for social appropriateness, isparticularly sensitive to the expression andself-presentation of others in social situationsand uses these cues as guidelines for moni-toring his own self-presentation. Is there thenany difference between this person and theindividual with a high "need for approval"as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne SocialDesirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe,1964)? In a wide variety of situations, indi-viduals who have a high need for approvalgive socially desirable responses. They con-form more than low-need-for-approval indi-viduals in an Asch situation; they verballycondition better; they do not show overthostility toward one who has insulted anddouble-crossed them; and they are less likelyto report dirty words in a perceptual defensetask (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). All of thiswould suggest that the high-need-for-approvalperson is one who modifies his behavior fromsituation to situation. However, other evidencesuggests that this ability to alter behaviormay be severely limited to contingencies ofsocial approval (Bern, 1972).

In addition, it may be only the social ap-proval of adult experimenters which is rein-forcing and sought after. In a sociometricstudy, fraternity members with a high needfor approval were described by their peers asindividuals who spend most of their timealone rather than with other people, do notgo out of their way to make friends, are notvery conversational, and do not act friendlytoward other fraternity members (study byStephen C. Bank, reported in Crowne & Mar-lowe, 1964, pp. 162-163).

In another study on verbal conditioning,high- and low-need-for-approval subjects didnot differ in the extent to which they mod-

SELF-MONITORING OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 529

eled the behavior of a peer (actually a con-federate) they had previously observed per-form the experimental task appropriately(Crowne & Marlowe, 1964, pp. 61-72).Furthermore, and particularly relevant to theself-monitoring of expressive behavior, thisself-control ability may not extend into thedomain of expressive behavior. Zaidel andMehrabian (1969) reported that individualswho scored high on the Need for ApprovalScale were actually less able to communicateeither positive or negative affect facially orvocally than were low-need-for-approval sub-jects. In this experimental situation, the so-cially desirable response and the one whichwould gain the approval of the experimenterwould clearly be the accurate expression andcommunication of affect. Thus, although high-need-for-approval individuals may be moti-vated to modify their expressive self-presenta-tion in order to gain approval, they may lackthe necessary self-control abilities and skills.

Self-monitoring would probably best bemeasured by an instrument specifically de-signed to discriminate individual differencesin concern for social appropriateness, sensi-tivity to the expression and self-presentationof others in social situations as cues to socialappropriateness of self-expression, and use ofthese cues as guidelines for monitoring andmanaging self-presentation and expressive be-havior. Accordingly, an attempt was made totranspose the self-monitoring concept into aself-report scale which reliably and validlymeasures it.

The convergence between diverse methodsof measuring self-monitoring was examinedaccording to the strategy of construct valida-tion (Cronbach & Meehl, 19SS). To demon-strate discriminant validity (Campbell &Fiske, 1959), comparisons were made betweenself-monitoring and need for approval in theprediction of each external criterion in thevalidation strategy. Need for approval waschosen for these critical comparisons for tworeasons. Its conceptual relationship to self-monitoring has already been discussed.Naturally, this procedure also further indi-viduates the type of person identified by theNeed for Approval Scale. In addition, Camp-bell (1960) has recommended that in view ofthe general response tendency of some indi-

viduals to describe themselves in a favorablemanner, and the close relationship betweenprobability of endorsement of personalitystatements and their social desirability, alltests of the voluntary self-descriptive sortshould be demonstrated to predict their cri-terion measures better than a measure of thegeneral social desirability factor.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF-MONITORINGSCALE

Forty-one true-false self-descriptive state-ments were administered to 192 StanfordUniversity undergraduates. The set includeditems which describe (a) concern with thesocial appropriateness of one's self-presenta-tion (e.g., "At parties and social gatherings,I do not attempt to do or say things thatothers will like"); (£) attention to socialcomparison information as cues to appropriateself-expression (e.g., "When I am uncertainhow to act in social situations, I look to thebehavior of others for cues"); (c) the abilityto control and modify one's self-presentationand expressive behavior (e.g., "I can lookanyone in the eye and tell a lie with astraight face [if for a right end]"); (d) theuse of this ability in particular situations(e.g., "I may deceive people by being friendlywhen I really dislike them"); and (e) theextent to which the respondent's expressivebehavior and self-presentation is cross-situa-tionally consistent or variable (e.g., "In dif-ferent situations and with different people, Ioften act like very different persons").

The individual items were scored in thedirection of high self-monitoring. For ap-proximately half the items, agreement waskeyed as high SM; for the remainder, dis-agreement was keyed as high SM.

An item analysis was performed to selectitems to maximize internal consistency. Inthis procedure, the top and bottom thirds intotal test scores of persons were found. Thenthe percentages of persons in each group whoresponded in the manner keyed as high SMwere determined. Finally, the percentage inthe bottom group was subtracted from thepercentage in the top group. This difference(D) served as an index of item validity todiscriminate total test scores (Anastasi, 1968).D is directly proportional to the difference

530 MARK SNYDEE

between the number of "correct" and "incor-rect" total score discriminations made by anitem. D values are not independent of itemdifficulty and are biased in favor of items ofintermediate difficulty level. D is, then, anappropriate criterion for selecting items ac-cording to both discriminative power andintermediate difficulty level (Nunnally, 1967).

Items were discarded on the basis of low Dscores until a set of 25 items remained whichmaximized the internal consistency of thescale (Nunnally, 1967, pp. 263-265). TheSelf-Monitoring Scale has a Kuder-Richard-son 20 reliability of .70, and a test-retestreliability of .83 (dj = 51, p < .001, one-month time interval). Cross-validation on anindependent sample of 146 University of Min-nesota undergraduates yielded a Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient of .63.

The 25 items of the SM, proportions ofrespondents answering the item in the low-SM-scored direction, their D values, and item-total point-biserial correlations calculated forthe University of Minnesota sample are pre-sented in Table 1.

Correlations with Other Scales

Correlations between the SM and relatedbut conceptually distinct individual differ-ences measures provide some evidence for itsdiscriminant validity. There is a slight nega-tive relationship (r = -.1874, dj = 190, p <.01) between the SM and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS,Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). Individuals whoreport that they observe, monitor, and man-age their self-presentation are unlikely to re-port that they engage in rare but sociallydesirable behaviors.

There is a similarly low negative relation-ship (r=-.2002, d(=19Q, p < .01) be-tween the SM and the Minnesota MultiphasicPersonality Inventory Psychopathic Deviatescale. High-SM subjects are unlikely to reportdeviant psychopathological behaviors or his-tories of maladjustment.

There is a small and nonsignificant nega-tive relationship (r — —.25, df = 24, ns) be-tween the SM and the c scale of the Perform-ance Style Test, (e.g., Ring & Wallston,1968). The c scale was designed to identify aperson who is knowledgeable about the kind

of social performance required in a widerange of situations and who seeks social ap-proval by becoming whatever kind of personthe situation requires. He is literally a cha-meleon. Clearly the SM and c do not identifythe same individuals.

The SM was also found to be unrelated toChristie and Geis's (1970) Machiavellianism(r=-.0931, d f = 5 l , ns), Alpert-Haber(1960) Achievement Anxiety Test (r —+ .1437, df = 51, ns), and Kassarjian's(1962) inner-other directedness (r = —.1944,df = 54, ns).

It thus appears that SM is relatively inde-pendent of the other variables measured.

VALIDATION: SELF-MONITORING ANDPEER RATINGS

As a first source of validity evidence forthe SM, a sociometric study of peer ratingswas conducted. In choosing this method, itwas assumed that a person who has good con-trol of his self-presentation and expressive be-havior and who is sensitive to social appro-priateness cues should be seen as such a per-son by others who have had the opportunityfor repeated observation of his self-presenta-tion in a wide variety of social situations.

MethodSubjects

The subjects in this study were 16 members of amale fraternity living group at Stanford Universitywho agreed to participate in an investigation ofperson perception.

Procedure

Each subject completed the SM and the M-C SDSand then participated in a sociometric person per-ception task.

Each subject indicated for each of six other mem-bers of the fraternity specified for him by the ex-perimenter whether the following self-monitoringattributes were very true, mostly true, somewhattrue, or not at all true:

(1) Concerned about acting appropriately in socialsituations;

(2) Openly expresses his true inner feelings, atti-tudes, and beliefs;

(3) Has good self-control of his behavior. Canplay many roles;

(4) Is good at learning what is socially appropri-ate in new situations;

(5) Often appears to lack deep emotions; and

SELF-MONITORING OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 531

TABLE 1INSTRUCTIONS, ITEMS, SCORING KEY, DIFFICULTY, AND DISCRIMINATION

INDEXES TOR THE SELF-MONITORING SCALE"

Item and scoring keyb

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (F)2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings,

attitudes, and beliefs. (F)3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or

say things that others will like. (F)4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. (F)5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which

I have almost no information. (T)6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people. (T)7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look

to the behavior of others for cues. (T)8. I would probably make a good actor. (T)9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies,

books, or music. (F)10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper

emotions than I actually am. (T)11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when

alone. (T)12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. (F)13. In different situations and with different people, I often act

like very different persons. (T)14. I am not particularly good at making other people like

me. (F)IS. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be

having a good time. (T)16. I'm not always the person I appear to be. (T)17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in

order to please someone else or win their favor. (F)18. I have considered being an entertainer. (T)19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people

expect me to be rather than anything else. (T)20. I have never been good at games like charades or impro-

visational acting. (F)21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people

and different situations. (F)22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. (F)23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite

so well as I should. (F)24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight

face (if for a right end). (T)25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike

them. (T)

Discrimination

Difficulty"

.63

.67

.17

.43

.69

.65

.20

.69

.64

.57

.33

.64

.40

.30

.61

.26

.61

.79

.79

.52

.36

.65

.54

.58

.46

D'l

.50

.23

.21

.29

.21

.44

.19

.36

.24

.20

.23

.32

.22

.27

.21

.23

.34

.28

.25

.45

.38

.24

.21

.38

.35

X2c

32.07

7.26

8.298.91

6.4126.5

6.5517.8

6.78

4.78

6.5113.09

5.54

10.12

5.677.17

15.512.64

9.96

25.96

19.356.80

11.05

19.25

15.07

P

.0005

.01

.005

.005

.025

.0005

.025

.0005

.01

.05

.025

.0005

.025

.005

.025

.01

.0005

.0005

.005

.0005

.0005

.01

.001

.0005

.0005

rpb'

.33

.13

.34

.22

.32

.45

.24

.43

.15

.39

.29

.40

.40

.22

.24

.33

.34

.46

.29

.31

.45

.36

.32

.33

.32

Note. T = true; F = false; SM = Self-Monitoring Scale.a Directions for Personal Reaction Inventory were: The statements on the following pages concern your personal reactions to anumber of different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. If astatement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken the space marked T on the answer sheet. If a statement isFALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken the space marked F. Do not put your answers on this test bookletitself.

It is important that you answer as frankly and as honestly as you can. Your answers will be kept in the strictest confidence,b Items keyed in the direction of high SM.o Difficulty = proportion of individuals not responding in SM-keyed direction.d Discrimination = difference between proportions of individuals in upper and lower thirds of total scores responding in hlgh-SM

direction.8 xa calculated from the contingency table relating frequencies of T, F for each item and upper third, lower third for total SM

score (including that item).f Point-biserial correlations between individual items and total scores with that item excluded.

(6) Has good self-control of his emotional ex-pression. Can use it to create the impression hewants.

In addition, two other judgments were required:"Is ingratiating. Attempts to do or say things de-signed to make others like him more" (same 4-pointscale as above) and "How much do you like this

person?" (very much, moderately, somewhat, not atall).

Results and Discussion

Each subject in the experiment served as ajudge of six others and was in turn judged

532 MARK SNYDER

by six other members of his living group.For each person as a stimulus, ratings of himwere summed across his six judges to form asingle score on each dimension which couldrange from 0 (six ratings of not at all true)to 18 (six ratings of very true). For eachperson, a single "peer rating of self-monitor-ing" score was computed by summing acrossthe six self-monitoring dimensions.

The group of 16 subjects was then dichoto-mized at the median to form a high-SM group(n = 8) and a low-SM group (n = 8).

Self-monitoring characteristics were seen asmore true of high-SM (M = SO.S) than oflow-SM (M = 40.2) individuals (* = 2.69,df=14, p<.02, two-tailed test). No dif-ferences were observed between high-SM andlow-SM individuals on ingratiation or liking(t = .49 and .20, respectively, df = 14, ns).

Mean peer rating of self-monitoring, in-gratiation, and liking for high M-C SDS(above the median, n = 8) and low M-C SDS(below the median, n = 8) were also calcu-lated. In contrast to SM scores, M-C SDSscores were unrelated to peer rating of self-monitoring (high M-C SDS M = S4.0, lowM-C SDS M = 56.7, t - .59, df = 14, ns).

The relationship between the SM, M-CSDS, and peer rating of self-monitoring maybe examined in terms of product-moment cor-relations. There is a significant relationshipbetween the SM and peer rating of self-moni-toring (r=A5, «/ /=14, p<.05). Thehigher an individual's score on the SM, themore frequently self-monitoring character-istics were attributed to him. The M-C SDSand peer rating of self-monitoring are notrelated (r = —.14, df = 14, ns).

An image emerges of the high-SM indi-vidual as perceived by his peers. He is a per-son who, out of a concern for acting appro-priately in social situations, has become par-ticularly skilled at controlling and modifyinghis social behavior and emotional expressionto suit his surroundings on the basis of cuesin the situation which indicate what attitudesand emotions are appropriate. The low-SMindividual, as perceived by his peers, is lessable and/or less likely to control and modifyhis self-presentation and expressive behaviorto keep it in line with situational specifica-

tions of appropriateness. He is also less vigi-lant to such cues.

High and low scorers on the M-C SDS, bycontrast, do not differ in these characteristics.In fact, the evidence suggests that if in factthe M-C SDS is a measure of need for ap-proval, this need is not related to the ability(as perceived by one's peers) to control andmonitor one's self-presentation and emotionalexpressive behavior on the basis of situation-to-situation variation in contingencies of so-cial appropriateness.

VALIDATION: SELF-MONITORING, STAGEACTORS, AND PSYCHIATRIC

WARD PATIENTS

Another means of establishing the validityof an instrument is by predicting how pre-determined groups of individuals would scorewhen the instrument is administered to them.According to this strategy, SM scores of cri-terion groups chosen to represent extremes inself-monitoring were compared with the unse-lected sample of Stanford University under-graduates.

Professional Stage Actors

Groups of individuals known to be particu-larly skilled at controlling their expressivebehavior (e.g., actors, mime artists, and poli-ticians) should score higher on the SM thanan unselected sample. The SM was admin-istered to a group of 24 male and female dra-matic actors who were appearing in profes-sional productions at Stanford and in SanFrancisco.

Their average score on the SM was 18.41with a standard deviation of 3.38. This is sig-nificantly higher than the mean SM score forthe Stanford sample (f = 8.27, df - 555, p< .001).

Thus, stage actors do score higher thannonactors on the SM. Actors probably dohave particularly good self-control of theirexpressive behavior and self-presentationwhile on stage. It is not clear that actors areany more concerned about monitoring theirexpressive presentation in other situations.

Hospitalized Psychiatric Ward Patients

The behavior of hospitalized psychiatricpatients is less variable across situations than

SELF-MONITORING OP EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 533

that of "normals." Moos (1968) investigatedthe reactions of patients and staff in a repre-sentative sample of daily settings in a psychi-atric inpatient ward in order to assess therelative amount of variance accounted forby settings and individual differences. Theresults indicated that for patients, individualdifferences accounted for more variance thansetting differences; whereas for staff, indi-vidual differences generally accounted for lessvariance than setting differences. One inter-pretation of this finding is that psychiatricward patients are unable or unwilling tomonitor their social behavior and self-presen-tation to conform to variations in contingen-cies of social appropriateness between situa-tions. In fact, diagnoses of "normal" and"psychopathological" may be closely relatedto cross-situational plasticity or rigidity(Cameron, 1950). Moos (1969) has reportedthat situational factors play an increasinglypotent role in the behavior of institutionalizedindividuals as therapy progresses.

Accordingly, it was expected that a sampleof hospitalized psychiatric ward patientsshould score lower on the SM than nonhos-pitalized normals.

The SM was administered to 31 male hos-pitalized psychiatric patients at the MenloPark Veterans Administration Hospital. Theirpsychiatric diagnoses varied, and most hadbeen previously institutionalized. Each pa-tient's cumulative length of hospitalizationvaried from several months to several years.

The average SM score for this group was10.19 with a standard deviation of 3.63. Thisis significantly lower than the mean SM scorefor the Stanford sample (t = 3.44, dj = 562,p< .001).

VALIDATION: SELF-MONITORING AND THEEXPRESSION OF EMOTION

If the SM discriminates individual differ-ences in the self-control of expressive be-havior, this should be reflected behaviorally.In a situation in which individuals are giventhe opportunity to communicate an arbitraryaffective state by means of nonverbal expres-sive behavior, a high-SM individual should beable to perform this task more accurately,easily, and fluently than a low SM.

Method

Subjects: Expression of Emotion

Male and female students whose SM scores wereabove the 75th percentile (SM > IS) or below the25th percentile (SM < 9) were recruited by tele-phone from the pool of pretested introductory psy-chology students. In all, 30 high-SM and 23 low-SM subjects participated in the study and receivedeither course credit or $1.50.

Procedure: Expression of Emotion

Each subject was instructed to read aloud anemotionally neutral three-sentence paragraph (e.g.,"I am going out now. I won't be back all after-noon. If anyone calls, just tell him I'm not here.")in such a way as to express each of the seven emo-tions anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust,fear, and guilt or remorse using their vocal andfacial expressive behavior. The order of expressionwas determined randomly for each subject. Thesubject's facial and upper-body expressive behaviorwas filmed and his voice tape-recorded. It wassuggested that he imagine he was trying out for apart in a play and wanted to give an accurate,convincing, natural, and sincere expression of eachemotion—one that someone listening to the tape orwatching the film would be able to understand asthe emotion the subject had been instructed to ex-press. The procedure is similar to one used byLevitt (1964).

These filmed and taped samples of expressivebehavior were scored by judges who indicatedwhich of the seven emotions the stimulus personwas expressing. Accuracy of the judges was used asa measure of the expressive self-control ability ofthe stimulus subjects.

Judgments of Expressive Behavior: Subjects

The films and tapes of expressive behavior werescored by a group of 20 high-SM (SM > 15, ortop 25%) and 13 low-SM (SM < 9, or bottom25%) naive judges who were paid $2.00 an hour.

Judgments of Emotional ExpressiveBehavior: Procedure

Judges participated in small groups of both high-and low-SM judges who watched films for approxi-mately one fourth of the subjects in the expressionexperiment and listened to the tapes of approxi-mately another one fourth of the subjects. For eachstimulus segment, judges indicated which of theseven emotions had been expressed.

Results and Discussion

Accuracy of Expression and SM Scores

Accuracy of the judges in decoding thefilmed and taped expressive behavior for eachstimulus person was used as a measure of his

534 MARK SNYDER

self-control of expressive behavior ability. Foreach of the 53 subjects in the expressiontask, the average accuracy of his judges wascomputed separately for films and tapes andhigh- and low-SM judges. Table 2 representsthese accuracy scores as a function of stimu-lus (expresser) SM scores, facial or vocalchannel of expression, and judge SM scorefor naive judges. Each stimulus person ex-pressed seven emotions. Therefore, mean ac-curacy scores can range from 0 to 7.

The average accuracy scores for each stimu-lus person's facial and vocal expressive be-havior, as judged by high-SM and low-SMjudges, were entered into an analysis of vari-ance. Expresser SM score (high SM or lowSM) was a between-stimulus-persons factor;channel of expression (face or voice) andjudge SM score (high SM or low SM) werewithin-stimulus-persons factors.

The following pattern of results emerges.Individuals who scored high on the SM werebetter able to communicate accurately anarbitrarily chosen emotion to naive judgesthan were individuals who scored low on theSM. That is, judges were more often accuratein judging both the facial and vocal expres-sive behavior generated in this emotion com-munication task by high-SM stimuli than bylow-SM stimuli (F - 11.72, df = 1/51, p <.01). For both high- and low-SM stimuli,accuracy was greater in the vocal than thefacial channel (F = 19.12, df = 1/153, p <.001). Finally, there was a tendency for high-

TABLE 2

SM AND ACCURACY OF EXPRESSION 'OP EMOTION :NAIVE JUDGES

Stimulus

High SM(n = 30)

M"Variance

Low SM(*• = 23)

MVariance

High-SM judge

Face

3.353.718

2.5181.348

Voice

4.047.636

2.957.982

Low-SM judge

Face

3.1961.117

2.4931.479

Voice

3.5641.769

3.0942.102

Note. SM = Self-Monitoring Scale.Q Average accuracy computed for each stimulus across alljudges who rated him and then averaged across « stimuluspersons; range = 0-7.

SM judges to be better judges of emotionthan low-SM judges (F - 1.69, df = 1/153,p< .25). In addition, high-SM judges mayhave been more differentially sensitive to theexpressive behavior of high- and low-SMstimuli. That is, the difference in accuracyfor judging high-SM and low-SM stimuli forhigh-SM judges was greater than the corre-sponding difference for low-SM judges. How-ever, once again the differences are not sig-nificant (F = 2.41, df = 1/153, p < .25).

Discriminant Validation: SM versus M-CSDS

In the sample of 192 from which the sub-jects for the expression task were selected,scores on the SM and M-C SDS were veryslightly correlated (r = — .1874). However,in the sample of 53 subjects chosen for thisexperiment, the correlation was —.3876 (df= 51, p < .01). Furthermore, individualswho scored below the median on the M-CSDS were better able than those who scoredabove the median to voluntarily communicateemotion in this experimental task (F = 4.426,df=l/5l, / > < .05). These differences pre-sent a rival explanation of the differences ob-served in self-control of expressive behaviorbetween high-SM and low-SM groups.

To discriminate between the SM and M-CSDS as predictors of self-control of expres-sion ability, two analyses of covariance wereperformed. In the first, accuracy scores fornaive judges collapsed across judge SM scoreand channel were examined as a function ofstimulus SM scores as the independent varia-ble and stimulus M-C SDS scores as the co-variate. After removing the effects of thecovariate (M-C SDS), there is still a highlysignificant treatment (SM) effect (F = 7.13,df = 1/50, p < .01). That is, individuals whoscored high on the SM were better able thanlow-SM scorers to accurately express andcommunicate arbitrary emotions independentof their M-C SDS scores.

In the second analysis of covariance, accu-racy scores for naive judges collapsed acrossjudge SM score and channel were examinedas a function of stimulus M-C SDS as theindependent variable and stimulus SM scoresas the covariate. The results of this analysis

SELF-MONITORING OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 535

are quite conclusive. After removing the ef-fects of the covariate (SM), there is no re-maining relationship between the independentvariable (M-C SDS) and expression accuracy(F=..7S, d/=l/SO, ns). That is, what-ever relationship exists between M-C SDSscores and self-control of expression ability isentirely accounted for by the slight negativecorrelation between the M-C SDS and SM.

Thus, the results of this experiment clearlyindicate that scores on the SM are related tothe self-control of expressive behavior. High-SM individuals were better able than low-SM individuals to express arbitrary emo-tional states in facial and vocal behavior.

VALIDATION: SELF-MONITORING ANDATTENTION TO SOCIAL COMPARISON

INFORMATION

It has been proposed that out of a concernfor social appropriateness of his behavior, ahigh-SM individual is particularly attentiveto social comparison information and usesthis information as guidelines to monitor andmanage his self-presentation and expressivebehavior.

Consistent with this formulation, high-SMindividuals are seen by their peers as betterable to learn what is socially appropriate innew situations than are low-SM. Two SMitems which best predict performance in theemotion expression task are: "When I amuncertain how to act in a social situation, Ilook to the behavior of others for cues," and"I laugh more when I watch a comedy withothers than when alone."

All of this suggests that, given the oppor-tunity in a self-presentation situation, a high-SM individual should be more likely to seekout relevant social comparison information.

MethodSubjects

Subjects were recruited from the pretested intro-ductory psychology subject pool on the basis of high-SM scores (SM > IS) or low-SM scores (SM<9).A total of 14 high-SM and 13 low-SM subjectsparticipated in the experiment and were paid $1.00.

Procedure

Each subject performed a self-presentation task ina situation designed to facilitate self-monitoring. He

was asked to respond to a series of true-false self-descriptive personality test items in preparation fora discussion of how test-takers decide how to re-spond to ambiguously worded questionnaire items,During the task he was given the opportunity toconsult a "majority response sheet" which listed themodal response of his introductory psychology classfor each item in order to consider possible alterna-tive interpretations of the items in preparation forthe discussion.

Pretesting had indicated that the task was inter-preted as neither social pressure to consult the in-formation nor a test of resistance to temptation tocheat. Rather it appears that a situation was cre-ated in which the subjects knew that normativesocial comparison information was available tothem and they could consult it or not as they wishedin preparation for a later discussion of their self-descriptions on the questionnaire items.

Unknown to the subject who performed this taskalone, an observer in the next room recorded thefrequency with which the subject consulted themajority response sheet and timed each look. Thesheet had been left by the experimenter at the farcorner of the subject's table so that consulting itrequired observable but not effortful behavior bythe subject. It was expected that a high-SM sub-ject would look more often, as measured by fre-quency and duration of looking, at this social com-parison information than would a low-SM subject.

Results and Discussion

Results on the dependent measures of seek-ing out of social comparison informationwere analyzed as a function of both SM andM-C SDS scores (rSM,M_0 SDS = -.067, dj =25, ns) in a 2 X 2 (High SM, Low SM XHigh M-C SDS, Low M-C SDS) unweightedmeans analysis of variance.

There were three measures of seeking outsocial comparison information during the self-presentation task: (a) frequency of lookingat the majority response sheet as recorded bythe observer; (b) frequency of looking at themajority response sheet as measured by thesubject's retrospective self-report; and (c)total duration of looking at the majority re-sponse sheet as timed by the observer. Thesethree measures are highly intercorrelated (r&= .92, r13 = .90, r2S = .83, df =25, p <.001). The means for each of these measuresare presented in Table 3.

For frequency of looking as recorded by anobserver, a high-SM subject looked more fre-quently than a low-SM at the majority re-sponse sheet (F = 4.70, df = 1/23, p < .05).

536 MARK SNYDER

TABLE 3

THREE MEASURES or LOOKING AT SOCIALCOMPARISON INFORMATION

Measure

High SM, lowM-C SDS

High SM, highM-C SDS

Low SM, lowM-C SDS

Low SM, highM-C SDS

n

6

8

7

6

Frequencyof looking*

14.67

12.25

5.14

4.83

Frequencyof looking1*

15.83

12.25

5.83

4.13

Totalduration oflooking (inseconds)

20.83

19.38

5.43

4.83

Note. SM = Self-Monitoring Scale; M-C SDSCrowne Social Desirability Scale.a Recorded by observer.b Subject's self-report.

= Marlowe-

Given the opportunity to consult social com-parison information in a self-presentationsituation in which they expected to justifytheir self-descriptions, high self-monitors didso more frequently than did low self-monitors.There was no systematic relationship be-tween M-C SDS and looking behavior (F —.122, dj = l/23,ns), nor was there any inter-action between SM and M-C SDS scores (F= .011, df = 1/23, ns). Thus, there was norelationship between the tendency to describeoneself in socially desirable fashion and con-sulting social comparison information in thisself-presentation situation.

Analyses of subjects' self-report of lookingbehavior and total time looking measured bythe observer result in identical conclusions.For either measure, high-SM subjects weremore likely than low-SM to seek out socialcomparison information.

CONCLUSIONS

Individuals differ in the extent to whichthey monitor (observe and control) their ex-pressive behavior and self-presentation. Outof a concern for social appropriateness, theself-monitoring individual is particularly sen-sitive to the expression and self-presentationof others in social situations and uses thesecues as guidelines for monitoring and manag-ing his own self-presentation and expressivebehavior. In contrast, the non-self-monitoringperson has little concern for the appropriate-ness of his presentation and expression, paysless attention to the expression of others, and

monitors and controls his presentation to alesser extent. His presentation and expressionappear to be controlled from within by hisexperience rather than by situational andinterpersonal specifications of appropriateness.

A self-report measure of individual differ-ences in self-monitoring was constructed. TheSelf-Monitoring Scale is internally consistent,temporally stable, and uncorrelated with self-report measure of related concepts.

Four studies were conducted to validate theSelf-Monitoring Scale. According to theirpeers, individuals with high SM scores aregood at learning what is socially appropriatein new situations, have good self-control oftheir emotional expression, and can effectivelyuse this ability to create the impressions theywant. Theater actors scored higher and hos-pitalized psychiatric ward patients scoredlower than university students. Individualswith high SM scores were better able thanthose with low SM scores to intentionallyexpress and communicate emotion in both thevocal and facial channels of expressive be-havior. In a self-presentation task, individualswith high SM scores were more likely thanthose with low scores to seek out and consultsocial comparison information about theirpeers. Self-monitoring and need for approvalwere compared as predictors of each externalcriterion to demonstrate the discriminantvalidity of the SM.

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(Received February 23, 1973)