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TRANSCRIPT
Seminar on Bank Resolution
Crisis Management and Extraordinary Measures
Luis Cortavarria-CheckleyOctober 26-27, 2009
How a systemic banking crisis can be defined?
Loss of confidence by creditors in quality and/or stability
in a substantial portion of a banking system
An event, serious enough to generate significant
negative effects on the real economy
Disruptions affects payments system, credit flows,
economic growth and destruction of asset values
§ 2
How does a non-systemic banking problem
differ from a systemic crisis?
Non-systemic events do not create generalized panic
Problems are concentrated in a small group of banks
No significant risk arising from imposing losses on depositors
Broadly the system is solvent, liquid and well-run
Bank resolution does not need public support
The bank supervisor may lead bank resolution
However, mismanagement of non-systemic banking problem may become systemic
Are banking crises old fashion events?
§ 4
Crises Come in Waves and Are Costly
Cost of Banking Crises in Advanced and EM Countries(Size of bubble represents gross fiscal cost as percent of GDP)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Starting date of crisis
Change in O
utp
ut
1/
Japan 1997
(fiscal cost: 14%)
Finland 1991
(fiscal cost: 13%)
Sw eden 1991
(f iscal cost: 4%)
US 1988
(fiscal cost: 4%)
Korea 1997
(fiscal cost: 31%)
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Note: 1/ Minimum real GDP grow th during crisis (percent of GDP)
Norw ay 1991
(fiscal cost: 3%)
Israel 1977
(fiscal cost: 30%)
Spain 1977
(fiscal cost:
6%)
Tequila
crises
ERM
crises
Debt crises Asian
crises
CAUSES OF BANKING PROBLEMS
§ 6
Banking Problems: Causes
Macroeconomic, political, or microeconomic…
or a combination of the three
§ 7
Macroeconomic Causes:
Macroeconomic imbalances build up strains in the banking system
Rapid credit expansion, asset price inflation
Large capital inflows
Inflexible exchange rate regimes; incentives for unhedged forex borrowing
Short-term forex debt vulnerable to capital outflows and depreciation
§ 8
Microeconomic Causes:
Poor banking practices
Unquantified risk taking
Lax lending practices
Inflated collateral values
Connected, insider, lending
Maturity and currency mismatches
High corporate leveraging
Weak risk control systems
Lead to balance sheet deficiencies (mismatches, poor credit risk assets, etc)
Banks with such deficiencies are vulnerable to any shock§ 9
Lax lending practices
§ 10
Lax lending practices
Microeconomic Causes:
Weak Supervisory Framework:
Weak prudential rules
Weak supervision and enforcement
Government authorized forbearance
Room for supervisory arbitrage
Lack of coordination among supervisors
Supervisory bodies not independent from political and industry pressures
Lack or insufficient resolution tools
Poor banking practices in combination with weak regulatory framework= TIME BOMB
§ 11
What to do in case problems are found
in a banking system?
Experiences in several countries have shown
that:
If detected and addressed early, most problem banks
do not fail, however, experiences have shown that most
failed banks were classified as problem banks well
before their resolution
§ 13
Deferring Action Costs Money
Action
Taken
Elapsed Time
Res
olu
tion
Co
st
Problem
Discovered
Options
Reviewed
• Fix the Underlying Problems
But, bank assets deteriorate rapidly
A major repair may be necessary
If a crisis is imminent, it is wise to seek to
manage it in an orderly fashion Destruction of value (banks)
Collapse of confidence:
Individual bank
Banking system
Currency
Economic disruption:
Payment system
Borrowers/customer relationship
RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES
§ 19
―For every complex problem, there is a solution
which is simple, neat, and wrong.‖
H. L. Mencken
§ 20
Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises:
Banking crises are chaotic events:
They may build up gradually, but commonly emerge suddenly
They are interlaced with political and social problems
Crisis management in this environment is complex:
There is no time
Conditions of banks are unknown
There are legal and institutional limitations
§ 21
Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises:
Challenge:
Design a comprehensive strategy within limited time
and information
Treatment of systemic crises differ from treatment of
individual bank failures in stable periods
Tools appropriate for one may aggravate the other
§ 22
Systemic Crisis Management
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
Phase 2 – Restructure Banks
Phase 3 – Manage Impaired Assets
Phase 4 – Exit from Crisis Mode
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
Irrespective of origin, a crisis first emerges as a
liquidity problem in one, or some, or all banks
Liquidity problems and deposit withdrawals are
symptoms of underlying problems
Liquidity is rarely the driven factor
§ 24
Indonesia
Japan
§ 25
§ Uruguay
§ 26
Argentina
§ 27
UK
§ 28
USA
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
There is need of preserve/restore market confidence
Avoiding panic individual
bank/widespread
decisive action
clear public statements
§ 31
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
Establish credible macroeconomic policies
Announce extraordinary measuresProvide needed liquidity
All countries have done this
Short maturity, collateral, penalty rates but need for flexibility
Open market operations successful in sterilizing injections
Protect depositors Most countries have done this
Blanket guarantees successful but may be costly
Depends on size of financial hole and restructuring alternatives
Cover all liabilities except subordinated debt and equity
Announce medium-term restructuring program
Phase 1 – Contain Crisis
Extraordinary Administrative measures—third line of defense
Better to avoid due to disruptions and long-lasting damage to depositor confidence
But, may be needed when other options not available/have not worked
Bank holidays
Restrictions on deposit withdrawals
Rescheduling of time deposits
Capital controls
Phase 2 – Restructuring
Phase 2 – Restructure Banks
Diagnosis, focus on medium-term viability
Recognize losses upfront
Preserve viable, undercapitalized banks:
request time-bound recap/restructuring plans
close oversight and prompt corrective actions
Resolve insolvent, unviable banks:
not all institutions have franchise value
intervene & close or find merger partner
Phase 2 – Restructure Banks
Strategies: Public Sector Solutions
Deposits in resolved banks could be transferred to
remaining sound banks (public or private)
Other forms of public sector assistance are:
• Joint recapitalization schemes
• Nationalization (which should be temporary)
§ 36
Use of Public Money for Recap
Rationale: To encourage private sector contributions
(investor of last resort)
Principles and safeguards: All losses recognized/absorbed by existing shareholders
Match private injections with government funds
Government shares could have preferred status
Government representation in Board
Require operational restructuring/asset workouts
Sweeteners (option to buy back government shares)
Allow convertibility of state contribution: from Tier 2 capital to
Tier 1 capital, if CAR falls below given ratio
Phase 3 – Manage Impaired Assets
Phase 3 – Manage Impaired Assets
Resolution of debt overhang needed to restart
supply and demand of credit
Corporate debt restructuring often neglected
Issues in institutional framework
speed versus value
centralized versus decentralized
legal reforms (bankruptcy/foreclosure)
out-of-court debt restructuring (London approach)
Phase 4 – Exit from Crisis Mode
Exit from blanket guarantee if applied
Exit from government ownership of banks
Sale of assets taken over
Overhaul of regulations to not repeat mistakes
Continue corporate restructuring to avoid ―second-wave crisis‖
Lessons
I. Crisis ResolutionAbout strategy
II. Crisis ManagementAbout approach
I. Lessons—Crisis Response
1. Adopt comprehensive response
2. Secure confidence of creditors/depositors
3. Ensure upfront loss recognition
4. Facilitate recapitalization
5. Remove nonviable institutions
6. Do not ignore debt restructuring
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Deposit freeze/Bank holiday
Blanket guarantee
Extensive liquidity support
Regulatory forbearanceBank closures/Mergers
Nationalizations/State
recapitalization
Bank restructuring agency
Asset management company
1980-1993
1994-2006Source: 40 past systemic banking crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Resolution Instruments in Past Crisis Episodes
(Proportion used per systemic banking crisis)
Historically, evolution toward more
centralized/comprehensive approaches
II. Lessons—Crisis Management
A. Confront key questions early on
B. Ensure adequate communication policy
C. Generate political support
D. Plan for uncertainty
E. Plan for failure
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Blanket
guarantee
Extensive liquidity
support
Regulatory
forbearance
Bank
closures/Mergers
State recap AMC
1980-1993
1994-2006
Source: 40 past systemic banking crises reported by Laeven and Valencia
(2008)
Extraordinary Measures in Past Crisis Episodes
(Proportion used per systemic banking crisis)
Selected Banking Crises Costs
(In Percent Of GDP)
Crisis Period Gross Outlay Recovery Net Cost Assets 1
Chile 1981-83 52.7 19.2 33.5 56.1
Ecuador 1998-2001 21.7 0.0 21.7 41.3
Finland 1991-93 12.8 1.5 11.2 109.4
Indonesia 1997-2002 56.8 4.6 52.3 95.1
Korea 1997-2000 31.2 8.0 23.1 72.4
Malaysia 1997-2000 7.2 3.2 4.0 130.6
Mexico 1994-95 ... ... 19.3 40.0
Norway 1987-89 2.5 ... ... 91.9
Russia 1998-99 ... ... 0.0 24.9
Sweden 1991-93 4.4 4.4 0.0 102.4
Thailand 1997-2000 43.8 9.0 34.8 117.1
Turkey 2000-2002 29.7 1.3 30.5 71.0
United States 1984-91 3.7 1.6 2.1 51.4
Venezuela 1994-95 15.0 2.5 12.4 28.3
Source: IMF.
1 Assets of deposit money banks in the year before the first crisis year.
§ 46
Extraordinary Measures in the
Current Crisis
Liquidity Recapitalization
No
Change
Establish,
Increase or
Expand
Wholesale
borrowing
Amount
Committed (bn
of US$)
Strengthened
Measures
Capital Plans
Established
Capital
Committed
(bn of US$)
Capital
Injected
(bn of US$)
Asset Purchase
Plans or
Guarantees Amount Committed (bn of US$)
Argentina √ √
Australia √ √ unannounced √ √ 16/
3
Brazil √ √
Canada √ 19/
√ 14/
unannounced √ √ 20/
115
China √ √ 1/ 19 19
France √ √ 425 √ 53 33
Germany √ √ 531 √ 11/
106 53 √ 10/
0
India √ √
Indonesia √ √
Italy √ /3
√ unannounced √ 4/
16
Japan √ √ √ 5/
124 1 √ 21/
217
Korea √ √ unannounced √ √ 15 3 √ 13/
30
Mexico √ √ unannounced √
Netherlands √ √ 266 √ 18/
30 28 √ 24/
32
Russia √ √ unannounced √ √ 25/
31 17
Saudi Arabia √ 22/
√
South Africa √
Spain √ √ 15/
218 √ 23/
√ 6/
132 √ 6/
0
Turkey √ √
United Kingdom √ √ 17/
379 √ √ 7/
138 56 √ 12/
62
United States √ √ 9/ 789 √ √
8/ 700 248 √ 2
104
Total 12 9 12 $2,608 16 10 $1,364 $458 9 $562
Deposit Insurance Debt Guarantees
Containment Resolution
Source: Various government announcements and information on official websites. Average exchange rates for September - June.
Asset Management Strategies
Table 1. Overview of Policy Measures for Banks—G-20 Countries
As of June 30, 2009
Figure 1. G-20 Financial Crisis Program
Status
0
5
10
15
20
25
Policy
Coordination
Depositor
Protection
Debt
Guarantee
Publicly
Announced
Diagnosis
Restructuring
and
Recapitalization
Asset
Management
Announced Underway Completed
Nu
mb
er
of
Co
untr
ies
Source: Stocktaking note of the G-20 responses to the Global Crisis, September 2009, IMF staff
Table 2. Cost of Public Sector Support
Source: Stocktaking note of the G-20 responses to the Global Crisis, September 2009, IMF staff
Injected Committed InjectedDebt
Guarantees
2/
Capital
1/
Asset
Protection Total Capital
(In billions of US dollars) (In percent of GDP)
Argentina
Australia 3 3 0.3
Brazil
Canada 115 115 2.1
China 19 19 19 0.2 0.2
France 425 53 478 33 18.7 1.3
Germany 531 106 638 53 19.9 1.6
India
Indonesia
Italy 16 16 0.8
Japan 124 217 341 1 1.7 0.0
Mexico 0
Netherlands 266 30 32 328 28 42.4 3.6
Russia 31 31 17 2.3 1.2
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea 15 30 45 3 5.8 0.4
Spain 218 132 349 24.3
Turkey
United Kingdom 379 138 62 579 56 26.7 2.6
United States 789 700 104 1,593 248 11.4 1.8
Total 2,608 1,364 562 4,534 458 6.8 0.7
Source: Table 1
Committed
Thank You