Service delivery and citizen security in Bogota (1995-2003).

Gerard MartinGeorgetown University

Colombia Program (USAID funded)gm@georgetown.edu

What made rapid and profound change possible?

• Paul Bromberg: “When you work hard, you will get results”.

• Hard work can still lead to policy failure; how did they proceed to overcome obstacles and implement radical reforms?

On crisis and Sputniks

1) No Olympics (no Sputniks)

2) Post local governance crisis:

3) (Post)-violence crisis: city perceived by all as in urgent need of change

4) Demo: 6% (1964-73) versus 2,5% (1995-2003)

5) Age: 15-29 yrs = 34% in early 1980s, versus 28% in 2000s

1958-73 1970 -82 1982-86 1986-91 1992-03 Since 2004

Av 3 yrs Av 2 yrs Av 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02

Colombia (S/B) Bogotá

City Development plans

• Coherent, integral (N)• Precise goals and objectives (N)• Ambitious – city wide (N)• Hammered down and mainstreamed (N) • Constant benchmark (N)• Institutional engineering: administrative and legal

reforms: Plan Maestro Seguridad, Codigo de Policia; Sub-Sec Seguridad, POT etc. (N)

• New vocabulary

RESULT: leadership > credibility

Thematic areas and objectives of the three administrations (Bogotá, 1995-2003)

“FORMAR CIUDAD”(Mockus 1: 1995-1998)

“POR LA BOGOTÁ QUE QUEREMOS”(Peñalosa: 1998-2001)

“PARA VIVIR TODOS DEL MISMO LADO”(Mockus 2: 2001-2004)

Thematic Areas Plan Objectives

(I) Citizen cultura - Citizen cultura (values)

- Egalitarian model of the city

- Citizen culture (rules)

(II) Security and co-existence

- Security and co-existence

(III) Public space -Environment-Public space

-City at a human scale-“Demarginalization”

- Environment

(IV) Social progress - Social progress - Social interaction -Social justice-Education-Family and children

(V) Urban planning and productivity

- Urban productivity -Urban planning and services-Mobility (transportation)

- Productivity

(VI) Legitimacy and institutional effectiveness

- Institutional legitimacy

-Institutional efficiency

- Admirable public management

Source: Gerard Martin y Miguel Ceballos, Bogota: Anotomia de una transformacion, 2004.

Institutional and management reform to improve services

• Enlightened technocratic elites.

• Professional bureaucracy: redefining functions + responsabilities

• Example: Sub-Sec Citizen Security; Consejo de Seguridad; Consejo ampliado de Seguridad; Consejos locales de seguridad

Transparent allocation of resources

• Ley 80 taken seriously • E.g. Fondo de Seguridad y Vigilancia• General restructuring of contracting• Goals, rules, requirements and evaluation

methods widely published

RESULT: direct impact on quality of service; public works prove that money is well spend: improved credibility / no corruption charges

Citizenship and legitimacy

• Public officer as educator (M)

• Public space = citizenship (M) + inclusion/equity (P)

• Norms, values, rules = producing civic society + SC

RESULT: reformulation of social contract

Actors: NGO free model?

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

Habs Calle 1,000 1,500 1,300 1,500 1,838

Indigentes 600 1,400 1,200 1,278 1,527

Pandilleros 500 1,933 1,700 3,468

Madres jóv hab c 300 300 373

Ex callejeros 100 70 661 677 954

Proyecto Empleo 50 70 661 677 954

TOTAL 1,750 3,529 5,516 5,577 8,252

1) Strengthening of Centros IDIPRON

2) ZONAS SEGURAS PROGRAM of Chamber of Commerce

Demand driven quality services

• Less mini-police stations, but better build, on more strategic locations and user friendly

• Additional in service training for police officers

RESULT: credibility with clients + agency

Community driven dimension

- Frentes de Seguridad Local

- Community controlled parks

- Community Policing

• Increased offer of services: increases choice

RESULT: people know who is responsible.

Shorter routes + stronger oversight

E.g.: (i) introduction of Consejos Locales de Seguridad + Local Security Plans + Consejo Distrital Ampliado

• Easy to scale up

• Robust checks and balances

RESULT: voice + perception of voice

Continous M&E

Strengthening knowledge and oversight:

• Crime Observatory -SUIVD• Parks Observatory• Other observatories:

integrated transportation (movilidad)

RESULT: city administration knows city > leadership; shared knowledge > credibility increased

Innovative forms of information

• City TV + Canal Bogota• Communication

strategies • M + P talking etc • “Bogota como vamos” +

public accountability• Publications

RESULT: voice / change in political incentives

Ex-post

• Bogota model + language part of political agendas

• Mayors for president

• Other cities are following

• Renewed belief in public institutions

• Improved image of public good + public office

• Practical turn in academia

Can it be repeated?

Bogota:- Mayor Garzon

Other cities:- Manizales, Pereira, Monteria…

But:- Superficial copy cat does not work- Beyond charisma: professional bureaucracy,

deep leadership, integrated long and short circuits of poor oriented service delivery