1. THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY vs THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAOCITY

FACTS:The GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties located in Matina and Ulas, Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 totaling Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty One Pesos and Sixty One Centavos (P295,721.61). The GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus And/Or Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Davao City. It also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The RTC rendered the Decision concluding that notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated such exemption.The RTC conceded that the tax exempting statute, P.D. No. 1146, was enacted prior to the Local Government Code. However, it noted that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in order that the tax exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future enactments, namely: (1) that Section 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund. The RTC concluded that both conditions had not been satisfied by the Local Government Code and that Section 33 was not repealed by the Local Government Code.Petitioners argue that the exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 , as amended, was effectively withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 193 and 294 thereof . These provisions made the GSIS, along with all other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes. Petitioners point out that under Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code, even special laws, such as PD No. 1146, which are inconsistent with the Local Government Code, are repealed or modified accordingly.The matter was elevated to this Court directly from the trial court on a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 has been repealed by the Local Government Code.

RULING:Petition is granted.As it stood then, Section 33 merely provided a general rule exempting the GSIS from all taxes. However, Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 was amended in 1985 by President Marcos, again in the exercise of his legislative powers,

through P.D. No. 1981. It was through this latter decree that a second paragraph was added to Section 33 delineating the requisites for repeal of the tax exemption enjoyed by the GSIS.It bears noting though, and it is perhaps key to understanding the necessity of the addendum provided under P.D. No. 1981, that a presidential decree enacted a year earlier, P.D. No. 1931, effectively withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted to GOCCs.There is no doubt that the GSIS which was established way back in 1937 is a GOCC. It is thus clear that Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 expressly withdrew those exemptions granted to the GSIS. Presidential Decree No. 1931 did allow the exemption to be restored in special cases through an application for restoration with the Secretary of Finance, but otherwise, the exemptions granted to the GSIS prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 1931 were withdrawn.Notably, P.D. No. 1931 was also an exercise of legislative powers then accorded to President Marcos by virtue of Amendment No. 6 to the 1973 Constitution. Whether he was aware of the effect of P.D. No. 1931 on the GSISs tax-exempt status or the ramifications of the decree thereon is unknown; but apparently, he immediately reconsidered the withdrawal of the exemptions on the GSIS. Thus, P.D. No. 1981 was enacted, expressly stating that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 remained in place, notwithstanding the passage of P.D. No. 1931.

However, P.D. No. 1981 did not stop there, serving merely as it should to restore the previous exemptions on the GSIS. It also attempted to proscribe future attempts to alter the tax-exempt status of the GSIS by imposing unorthodox conditions for its future repeal. Thus, as intimated earlier, a second paragraph was added to Section 33, containing the restrictions relied upon by the RTC and presently invoked by the GSIS before this Court.

Reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or judicial persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule , viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938 , non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the

properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for consideration or otherwise.

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Sections 232 and 234.

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.

It is evident that we cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of Section 33 as the RTC did, for by doing so, we would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a particular mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local Government Code removed the tax-exempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code, applies without impediment to the present case.There are other reasons that guide us to construe the Local Government Code in favor of the City of Davao's position. Section 5 of the Local

Government Code provides the guidelines on how to construe the Codes provisions in cases of doubt, and they are self-explanatory, thus:

Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it; (Emphasis supplied.)

Also worthy of note is that the Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court.

The act of one legislature is not binding upon and does not tie the hands of future legislatures.

The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao.

2. Gsis vs city treasurer or manila

In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the “beneficial use” rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila

has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property.

Facts: Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive, Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property).Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease. The controversy started when the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter dated September 13, 2002 to GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002.The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes remain unsettled before that date.GSIS, through its legal counsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS’ exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA) 8291.

Issue: whether or not section 39 of R.A 8291 limits the legislative authority to amend?

Ruling: In 1977, PD 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, was issued, providing for an expanded insurance system for government employees. Sec. 33 of PD 1146 provided for a new tax treatment for GSIS, thus:

Section 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.Then came the enactment in 1991 of the LGC or RA 7160, providing the exercise of local government units (LGUs) of their power to tax, the scope and limitations thereof, and the exemptions from taxations. RA 7160 lifted GSIS tax exemption.

Indeed, almost 20 years to the day after the issuance of the GSIS charter, i.e., PD 1146, it was further amended and expanded by RA 8291 which took effect on June 24, 1997. Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication of the earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that

contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government to secure such solvency or liability.The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other construction but that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it is to be noted that prominently added in GSIS’ present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption benefits granted the GSIS, unless the following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must expressly, specifically, and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund. These restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of the GSIS fund.

In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the "beneficial use" rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of

non-payment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property.

3. Consitutional Law Review: B. LEGISLATURESocial Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

Facts: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

Issue: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Ruling:On the issue of violation of right to privacy:Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,

sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.On the issue of violation against the right against unreasonable searches and seizure:As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to inVernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.On the issue of violation of equal protection clause: For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to

"random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.On the issue of undue delegation of legislative power:The provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be

conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)36 (f) and (g) unconstitutional; 36(c) and 36(d) constitutional Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs BoardNOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)

Facts:In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in

addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

4. AQUINO III, petitioners vs. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondentFACTS:The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.” Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.RULING:It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were

valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.With regards to the dissenting opinions, it was stated by Justice Carpio that R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise standards prescribed in Section 5, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.On the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio-Morlaes expressed dissent and concurred with the ponencia’s discussion on the preocedural issue.

5. Aldaba vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos[1] and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,[2]by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.[3] Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement].

Issue:Whether RA 9591 unconstitutional

Ruling:

RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied) A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[13] Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.[14] Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts.

6. BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: R.A. No. 9371 increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo asked for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit.

The respondents argued that: R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

ISSUES: WON R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

RULING: Reapportionment – No plebiscite needed. Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.x x x(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof. The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected. Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature

undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. No division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts. WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.7. G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009BANAT vs. COMELECFacts: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295). In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list election which was held in May 2007.In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or

the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. It also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.Issues:1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.2. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?5. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Ruling: 1. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.2. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.

Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”3. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. 4. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against

major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.5. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

B.8. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll body’s “denial” to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded

the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list electionswill encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system ofelections.If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.The party-list system, according to the DecisionQuoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is “not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.” The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out “non-sectoral parties” in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.“The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system… In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.“There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for

sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties,” the Decision read.To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sectorAgain, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the same.Previous rulings reversed by Atong PaglaumAs earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v. Comelec.In Ang Bagong Bayani’s parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states that “while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors… to be elected to the House of Representatives.'”However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that there was an “inherent inconsistency” in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties should represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors essentially “automatically disqualified” these major parties from the party-list system.As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling “merely formalized the prevailing practice” when it prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if through their allied sectoral organizations.

9. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELECG.R. No. 190529Ponente: Justice Brion

Facts:The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.

PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – MINERO (Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy.

One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT (Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.

Held:According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.

Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.

The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Court to state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).

The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.

Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.

9. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary General George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:x  x  x  x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.  Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.ISSUES:Political Law(1)  Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2)  Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)(1)  Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:Political Law(1)  No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2)  No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution].  The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.  The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x  x  x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.Civil Law (Statutory Construction)(1)  No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.  It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court.  That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.  The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general.  Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling.  Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

10. .R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner, vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents.FactsPetitioner filed a Quo Warranto proceeding before the HRET challenging the assumption of private respondent Joel Villanueva as the representative of the CIBAC partylist. She alleged that private respondent was disqualified to be a

representative since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941. Further there was no formal proclamation when he assumed office. Failing to file an answer, the private respondent was deemed to have entered a general denial. However the said petition was dismissed by respondent finding that the partylist won a seat in the elections and is therefore entitled to one seat. With respect to the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under RA 7941 the same only applied to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not. In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.Her MR having been denied, hence this petition for certiorariIssue: whether private respondent is qualified to be the partylist representative under sec 9 and 15 of RA 7941Contentions: Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.Ruling: The Court held in the negative. The court held that sections 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply to the qualification of the private respondent. It held that Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged The Court further held since section 9 of the aforementioned law explicitlty stated that the nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not more

than 30 on the day of the election, a violation of the said provision would disqualify the candidate. It is a rule on in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no room for interpretation only application. Hence the ratiocination of HRET does not find textual support since the law is clear and does not distinguish as to the period of its applicationWith regard to section 15 of RA 7941, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections, Again since the law is clear, it must be given its literal meaning. In the case at bar, The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.SO ORDERED.

11. Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC

Fact: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC but again denied.

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.

The Parties ArgumentsAng Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Issue: WON Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation

We grant the petition.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.

We find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of

the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Other issues:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Rulings: Also, our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

12. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xG.R. No. 206982COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court. One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s incumbent representative in the House of Representatives referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization’s erstwhile third nominee referred to as the Datol Group. The COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list which participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. In accordance with the procedure set forth in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives. Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant which contained the following relevant provision when an election result has been reached:Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the Office of Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the

proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013;In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.In Fine:If only one (1) seat is wonNo. 1 nominee = 2 yearsNo. 2 nominee = 1 year

If two (2) seats are wonNo. 1 nominee = 3 yearsNo. 2 nominee = 1½ yearsNo. 3 nominee = 1½ years If three (3) seats are won:

No. 1 nominee = 3 yearsNo. 2 nominee = 2 yearsNo. 3 nominee = 2 yearsNo. 4 nominee = 1 yearNo. 5 nominee = 1 year

All beginning July 1, 2010After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents." Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.11Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.

Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.A petition was filed with the COMELEC by Rep. Arquiza in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS praying that the "confirmation and approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of her assumption into the office."A resolution was issued by the COMELEC disallowing the filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups.Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The COMELEC issued Resolution ordering the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. In the process of resolving the issues of said case, the Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Kho’s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must be rejected. Failure to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366 is a ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941

ISSUE:Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees -- a legal ground to cancel Senior Citizens’ Certificate of Registration?

RULING:

We find merit in the petitioners’ contentions.1âwphi1The Prohibition on Term-sharingThe Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the organization’s registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No.

12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013 elections.

13. LOKIN VS COMELEC

FACTS: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes.Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the

signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje.On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 approving the withdrawal of lokin and other nominees.Thus, In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act

RULING: As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to

make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law.There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated

in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.

14. SENERES VS. COMELEC, G.R. 178678, APRIL 16, 2009Facts: In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of Buhay, a party-list group duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007 elections. Earlier, however, or on March 27, 2007, petitioner Hans Christian Señeres, holding himself up as acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of Nomination with the COMELEC.Consequently, on April 17, 2007, Señeres filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates of Nomination. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Pushing the point, Señeres would claim that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president.On May 10, 2007, the National Council of BUHAY adopted a resolution expelling Señeres as party member for his act of submitting a Certificate of Nomination for the party.

On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats.14This was followed by the issuance on July 19, 2007 by the en banc COMELEC of Resolution E.M. No. 07-043 recognizing and declaring Robles as the president of BUHAY and, as such, was the one "duly authorized to sign documents in behalf of the party particularly the Manifestation to participate in the party-list system of representation and the Certification of Nomination of its nominees."15 Explaining its action, COMELEC stated that since no party election was held to replace Robles as party president, then he was holding the position in a hold-over capacity.161aIssue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June 19, 2007, which declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant petition.Ruling:The petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding.21 It is the "proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."22 For certiorari to prosper, however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.In the present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to Señeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Its Article VI, Section 17 states:Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. x x xThis constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:RULE 14. Jurisdiction.—The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, the Court elucidated on the import of the word "sole" in Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, thus:The use of the word ‘sole’ emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as ‘intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the

legislature.’ Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ‘full, clear and complete.’ Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.Then came Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta, in which the Court again stressed that "the word ‘sole’ in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members."The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives "begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives." Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Without a doubt, at the time Señeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this Court.30Since Señeres failed to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles’ Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already become final and executory. Thus, this petition has now become moot and can be dismissed outright. And even if we entertain the instant special civil action, still, petitioner’s postulations are bereft of merit.Hold-over principlePetitioner Señeres further maintains that at the time the Certificate of Nomination was submitted, Robles’ term as President of BUHAY had already expired, thus effectively nullifying the Certificate of Nomination and the nomination process.Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code contains a provision to this effect, thus:Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such

corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified.The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders. This is the analogical situation obtaining in the present case. The voting members of BUHAY duly elected Robles as party President in October 1999. And although his regular term as such President expired in October 2002, no election was held to replace him and the other original set of officers. Further, the constitution and by-laws of BUHAY do not expressly or impliedly prohibit a hold-over situation. As such, since no successor was ever elected or qualified, Robles remained the President of BUHAY in a "hold-over" capacity.Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues with the discharge of the functions of an office after the expiration of his or her legal term––no successor having, in the meantime, been appointed or chosen––is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even where no provision is made by law for his holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary. By fiction of law, the acts of such de facto officer are considered valid and effective So it must be for the acts of Robles while serving as a hold-over Buhay President. Among these acts was the submission of the nomination certificate for the May 14, 2007 elections.As a final consideration, it bears to state that petitioner is estopped from questioning the authority of Robles as President of BUHAY. As a principle of equity rooted on natural justice, the bar of estoppel precludes a person from going back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of another whom he has led to rely upon them.Again, it cannot be denied that Robles, as BUHAY President, signed all manifestations of the party’s desire to participate in the 2001 and 2004 elections, as well as all Certificates of Nomination. In fact, the corresponding certificate for the 2004 elections included petitioner as one of the nominees. During this time, Robles’ term as President had already expired, and yet, petitioner never questioned Robles’ authority to sign the Certificate of Nomination. As a matter of fact, petitioner even benefited from the nomination, because he earned a seat in the House of Representatives as a result of the party’s success.41 Clearly, petitioner cannot now be heard to argue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY has long since expired, and that his act of submitting the Certificate of Nomination and the manifestation to participate in the 2007 elections is null and void. He is already precluded from doing so.

15. G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), CITIZENS’ BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION PARTY LIST represented by VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-GONZALES, Respondents,

FACTS:On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due course to CIBAC’s Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE …TO the determination which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination,which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as "acting secretary-general" of CIBAC.Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as "acting secretary-general," when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents’ faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division’s findings. In a per curiam Resolution dated 31 August 2010, the Commission reiterated that Pia Derla was unable to prove her authority to file the said Certificate, whereas respondents presented overwhelming evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC Secretary General Virginia Jose to submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to CIBAC’s Constitution and bylaws.ISSUES: (1) WON the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to file the part’s Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; (2) WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.HELD:

(1) The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of party-list representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government.” Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. (2) No error because it is indicated clearly in the law that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with COMELEC. 

16Alcantara vs. COMELECFacts:The party name Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers, was amended and changed to Abakada Guro Party list as approved by the COMELEC. In the May 2007 elections, where ABAKADA participated and won a seat, Jonathan de la Cruz (De la Cruz), its first nominee, became the party’s sole representative in Congress.In several occasions bet. October and December 2009, De la Cruz requested Alcantara in writing to convene the Supreme Assembly. He informed Alcantara, too, of the nationwide party caucuses being held and of the common sentiment among members that a party meeting should be called.

Under ABAKADA’s CBL, a Supreme Assembly meeting should be held at least once every three years; since 2004, no Supreme Assembly had been called and held.Alcantara explained that the Supreme Assembly cannot be held as requested. Instead, Alcantara replied that it would be more "feasible to hold the Supreme Assembly early next year, as may be determined by the National Executive Board."On December 15, 2009, an All Leaders Assembly was convened. While Alcantara failed to attend the meeting, he sent Noel Tiampong in his stead. The convening of a Supreme Assembly was proposed at the meeting, with the agenda of amending the ABAKADA CBL, the election of new officers, and the discussion of other election related matters. The proposal was to hold the meeting sometime in February 2010. the party’s chapters and members were notified with regard to the first Supreme Assembly on February 6, 2010. As scheduled, the respondents proceeded to hold a Supreme Assembly that resulted in the approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL; the ouster of Alcantara et. al from their positions; the expulsion of the petitioners from the party; and the election of De la Cruz and Albano as new President and Secretary-General, respectively.This prompted the petitioners to file a petition with the COMELEC to (i) declare the meeting held on February 6, 2010 void and (ii) restrain the respondents from falsely representing themselves as the duly elected officers of ABAKADA.The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition. It ruled that the holding of an assembly for purposes of electing party officers and the amendment of the party’s CBL have long been overdue.The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the ruling, mainly questioning the COMELEC Second Division’s failure to address the issue of validity of the Supreme Assembly based on the non-membership status of several meeting participants. The COMELEC En Banc denied the petitioners’ motion.Issue:Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did not consider Alcantara’s affidavit, the submitted list of party members, and the attached individual applications for membership.Ruling:Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties.12 More specifically, as part of its power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of an election, the COMELEC possesses the power to register national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions for purposes of the party-list system of elections.13 It is the party-list group’s registration under the party-list system that confers juridical personality on the party-list group for election related purposes.14As a juridical entity, a party-list group can only validly act through its duly authorized representative/s. In the exercise of its power to register parties, the COMELEC necessarily possesses the power to pass upon the question of who, among the legitimate officers of the party-list group, are entitled to

exercise the rights and privileges granted to a party-list group under the law. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction on this point is well settled and is not here disputed.While ABAKADA is registered as a sectoral party, the general principles applicable to political parties as a voluntary association apply to it. Political parties constitute a basic element of our democratic institutional apparatus.20 Among others, political parties help stimulate public participation in the political arena and translate the results of this participation into meaningful policies and programs of government offered to the electorate. Once in government, they are able to significantly contribute in forging linkages between the government and the society by adjusting these policies with the varying and often conflicting interests of the different segments of society. Should they belong to the minority, they also provide a check to counterbalance those who are in power.For these reasons, particularly, for the role they play in the general political process, political parties are generally free to conduct its internal affairs pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association.21This includes the determination of the individuals who shall constitute the association and the officials who shall lead the party in attaining its goals.22 The political parties, through their members, are free to adopt their own constitution and by-laws that contain the terms governing the group in pursuing its goals. These terms, include the terms in choosing its leaders and members, among others. To the group belongs the power to adopt a constitution; to them likewise belongs the power to amend, modify or altogether scrap it.

17. ABAYON v. HRET

This is about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress. Facts: Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, filed a petition for quo warranto with HRET against Aangat Tayo and Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector.

Abayon pointed out that HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since the matter fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same.

Issue: WON HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner Abayon as nominee of Aangat Tayo party-list organization who took the seat at the House of Representatives that such organization won in the 2007 elections.

Ruling: Yes.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

18. G.R. No. 193256 March 22, 2011ABC PARTY LIST vs. COMELEC and MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,

Facts: On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of RA 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan, ABC was organized, established and is being run by Ang Dating Daan not as a party-list organization for political purposes but as a religious sect for religious purposes. Private respondent also alleged that ABC made an untruthful statement in its petition for accreditation, as it stated that it does not possess any of the disqualifications provided by the Party-List System Act when it is disqualified for being, in reality, a religious organization. In addition, he alleged that ABC is receiving support from third parties abroad. The COMELEC has approved petitioner’s registration and accreditation as a party-list group, and petitioner had participated and was voted upon in the 2007 elections. Petitioner stated that as a political party of national constituency, it was founded and headed by Mr. James Marty Lim, who held the position of National President of the Association of Barangay Chairmen for 11 years. Its stature as a party-list organization with national constituency that could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society should remove any doubt that it was established for religious purposes.COMELEC, dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from registration. COMELEC en banc reviewed the case, and stated that Mauricio was not given chance to present evidence. ABC counters stating that COMELEC has no more jurisdiction since ABC was already proclaimed winner and COMELEC committing grave abuse of discretion upon their holding of hearing/recognizing Mauricio's petition. Hence, ABC filed a petition for certiorari. ABC filed this petition raising that the Commission en banc has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation since ABC was already proclaimed as winner. Petitioner avers that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." Hence, once a candidate for House of Representatives is proclaimed, the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to pass upon its qualification and the same is vested with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioner states that in this case, there is no dispute that ABC Party-List has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010; therefore, any question as to its qualification should be resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over ABC when it was already proclaimed a winner of the May 2010 election.Ruling: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which states: The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. The Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Sec 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides: Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The Comelec may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List. In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives. [P]arty-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,

organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941. In fine, the COMELEC en banc did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

19. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITAFACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; andSuch other officers as may be determined by the President.SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in CongressHELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxxThe requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless

a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereofCertainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted xxxAbsent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxxUpon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination xxxThe claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such

official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.

20.

21. Duenas vs HRETFacts: Petitioner Henry Duenas and private respondent Angelito Reyes were candidates for Congressman for the second legislative district. After the elections, petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed before the HRET an election protest ad cautelam praying for recount of 170 of 730 precincts of the second legislative district. He averred that he was cheated in the aforementioned precincts. Petitioner countered by counter protesting 560 precincts saying that his votes were systematically reduced in favour of private respondent. In the preliminary conference, it was agreed by both parties that since the protested precincts were less than 50% of the total number of precincts, all of the protested precincts were revised and a pilot of 25% of counter protested precincts. However after such process and the case being submitted for resolution, the HRET still went on to revise and recount the remaining 75% of the counter protested precincts, contending that they cannot determine the true will of the electorate. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the HRET resolution which was denied. Thereafter he filed an urgent motion to withdraw the remaining 75% of the counter protested precincts. This was denied by respondent citing rule 88 of their rules that states that when: [i]t appearing that the [HRET] cannot determine the true will of the electorate from the initial revision and appreciation of the 100% protested precincts and 25% counter-

protested precincts and in view of the discovery of fake/spurious ballots in some of the protested and counter-protested precincts. Hence this petition. Issue: whether or not therewas abuse of discretion on the part of HRET when it continued with the revision of the counterorotested precincts despite motion to withdraw of petitionerContentions: Petitioner argues mainly that private respondent as protestant in the election protest at the HRET had the burden of proving his cause. Failing to do so, the protest should have been dismissed promptly and not unduly prolonged. For petitioner, the HRET’s declaration of its failure to ascertain the true will of the electorate after the complete revision of all protested precincts demonstrated private respondent’s failure to discharge his burden. Thus, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining unrevised precincts as its acts amounted to giving private respondent the undeserved chance to prevail by assisting him in his search for evidence to support his case. The HRET in effect took the cudgels for him and thereby compromised its impartiality and independence. On the other hand, HRET contends that there was a sufficient and legitimate reason to proceed with the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. The discovery of fake/spurious ballots created serious doubts about the sanctity of the ballots subject matter of the protest and counter-protest. Thus, the HRET had no other choice but to open the ballot boxes in the counter-protested precincts and continue with its revision in order to ascertain and determine the true will of the electorate.Ruling: The court held in the negative. It held that the Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. The court based its decision on the constitutional authority of HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"36 of its members but also on the limitation of the Court’s power of judicial review. It respected the power of the HRET to have exclusive control direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation in accordance to Rule 7 of its rules. In conjunction with Rule 88 of the HRET Rules which empowers it to continue or discontinue the revision proceedings ex propio motu, that is, of its own accord. The only basis of the application of rule 88 was its own determination that the evidence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. Furthermore, as settled in prior jurisprudence, the court is limited to checking that the HRET does not exceed to its constitutional mandate. The Court acknowledged that it could not restrict, diminish or affect the HRET’s authority with respect to the latter’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Overturning the HRET’s exercise of its

power under Rule 88 will not only emasculate its authority but will also arrogate unto this Court that body’s purely discretionary function.

22Pobre v. Santiago

Facts: In his sworn letter/complaint, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Issue:Was the speech of Sen. Santiago a privilege speech?

Ruling: Yes. Although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

The Court, however, wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

23. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners, vs.SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Respondents.

FACTS:Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" where he called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706 directing the committee on ethics and privileges to investigate the conduct of senate president manuel b. villar, jr. for using his position of power to influence public officials in relocating the c-5 road extension project to deliberately pass thru his properties, and to negotiate the overpriced purchase of road rights of way

thru several properties also owned by his corporations redounding in huge personal financial benefits for him to the detriment of the Filipino people.P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members: Sen. Pia S. Cayetano – Chairperson; Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal; Sen. Joker Arroyo – Member; Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member; Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member; Sen. Gregorio Honasan – Member; Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo BiazonOn 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee. After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules). Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.Petitioners came to this Court for relief.The Issues

1. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;2. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;3. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

4. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.RULING:We GRANT the petition in part.1. Respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled that it may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people." Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers." The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.2. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse

report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. We do not agree with petitioners. Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges." However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.

3. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process. We do not agree. Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. The

only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.4. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.29Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.

24. LIBAN VS GORDON 2009 CASE

FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.Respondent insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution

RULING: in 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise known as the Philippine National Red Cross (“PNRC”) Charter. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Red Cross Convention.

The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This

leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.1avvphi1The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year.A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation

Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

LIBAN VS GORDON 2011 CASE

FACTS: Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

Issue: whether or not the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution provides: SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now. Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

25. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERMITA, G.R. NO. 169777, APRIL 20, 2006

Facts: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to some AFP officials , for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security.On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; andSuch other officers as may be determined by the President.SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to

the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."Issue: Whether or not E.O464 is unconstitutional.Ruling:Issues:1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.Essential requisites for judicial reviewBefore proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.StandingWith regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464,

the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.Actual case or controversyPetitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials. These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance. Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.Constitutionality of E.O.464Sec. 2(b) & 3 are void; Sec. 1 & 2(a) are valid.E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.Executive privilegeIn this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.Validity of Section 1Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a

collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S. declares:The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous

because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.Right to informationE.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publicationWhile E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

26. G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs.SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.FACTS:In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs

and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.ISSUE:Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

RULING:

IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations --

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.

Is there recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of E.O. 464? At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. Thisauthority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need: xxx presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted.

EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: “Demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” (US v. Nixon) does not apply --

In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the US Court was quick to “limit the scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality xxx and congressional demands for information.” Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not

in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.

Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. The provision (Section 7, Article III) itself provides the limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Sec. 7, RA 6713, Art. 229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec. 24(e), Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.

Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern: More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information. xxx

The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.SEPARATE OPINION, JUSTICE CARPIO

In his separate opinion, Justice Carpio held that the Senate is not a continuing body under the 1987 Constitution because only half of its members continue to the next Congress, hence, it does not have a quorum to do business, thus:

The Constitution requires that the Legislature publish its rules of procedure on the conduct of legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. There is no dispute that the last publication of theRules of Procedure of the Senate Governing the Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was on 1 December 2006 in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the 13th Congress. There is also no dispute that the Rules of Procedure have not been published in newspapers of general circulation during the current 14th Congress. However, the Rules of Procedure have been published continuously in the website of the Senate since at least the 13th Congress. In addition, the Senate makes the Rules of Procedure available to the public in pamphlet form. In Arnault v. Nazareno, decided under the 1935 Constitution, this Court ruled that the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. To act as a legislative body, the Senate must have a quorum, which is a majority of its membership. Since the Senate under the 1935 Constitution always had two-thirds of its membership filled up except for vacancies arising from death or resignation, the Senate always maintained a quorum to act as a legislative body. Thus, the Senate under the 1935 Constitution continued to act as a legislative body even after the expiry of the term of one-third of its members. This is the rationale in holding that the Senate under the 1935 Constitution was a continuing legislative body. The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to constitute a quorum to do business. Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators. The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedureput a persons liberty at

risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate. Due process requires that fair notice be given to citizens before rules that put their liberty at risk take effect. The failure of the Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure as required in Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution renders the Rules of Procedure void. Thus, the Senate cannot enforce its Rules of Procedure.[59]

27. G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded. In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

28. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v.SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES

Facts: In 2005, Senator Enrile, the Vice Chairperson of Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate denouncing Standard

Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced a Resolution “directing the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the illegal sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank, which resulted in billions of pesos of losses to the investing public.”

The Committee thereafter conducted hearings and invited the petitioners, among others, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners submitted a letter stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues. In the petition that reached the SC, petitioners argue, among others, that the Senate has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of pending cases (three cases with the Court of Appeals, a civil case with the Regional Trial Court, two criminal cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court, and a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor). Citing Bengzon, they claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

ISSUE: WON the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies had jurisdiction to conduct inquiry against SCB despite criminal and civil cases pending against the SCB in courts

RULING: Yes.

The SC ruled that Bengzon does not apply squarely to the case. It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.

To the extent that there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.

Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon — that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative

investigation — was the Court’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. (See also the Primer on Separation of Powers, Inquiry in Aid of Legislation). The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in their case. The Resolution filed by Senator Enrile is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee.

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.”

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

29. G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009REGHIS M. ROMERO II, vs. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA

Facts: On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary. The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions. In his letter-reply petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. He predicated his request on grounds he would later substantially reiterate in this petition for prohibition.Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being unmeritorious, was denied. Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum on petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas to other petitioners, albeit for a different hearing date. Petitioners filed the instant petition, seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued. Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, Romero II appeared at the Committee investigation. Two days after, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO alleging, among others, that: (1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWA’s original investment had already been paid; (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority, none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation.Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with Resolution that ordered them to submit a comment on the original plea for a TRO, interposed an opposition, observing that the Senate’s motives in calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question. They also averred that the pendency of Chavez "is not sufficient ground to divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition." In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners’ criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G.R. No. 164527.

In their Comment respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners raised at every possible turn. Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to protect OWWA funds in the future. They likewise raised the following main arguments: (1) the proposed resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners’ right against self-incrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when incriminating questions were propounded.Issue: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub judice.Ruling: The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice. Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration." For by an en banc Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save in certain exceptional instances, none of which, however, obtains under the premises. Thus, there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable––to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding. At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving

demandable rights. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the following reason: [T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be had to others who possess it. While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court. Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution and the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.21 Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked. Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

30. SABIO VS. GORDONFACTS: On February 20, 2006, Sen. M. Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation(POTC), Philippine Communications

Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."Said Resolution was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. It was then transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises upon motion of Sen.F.Pangilinan.On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator R.Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services for the deliberation of the Senate Resolution.On May 9, 2006, Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 that “ No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance."Sen. Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Resolution.Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings.Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. He sent a letter to Sen. Gordon invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors of Philcomstat Holdings raised the issues on the proper legislative inquiry.Another notice was sent to Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter but the same did not comply. Sabio again sent a letter reiterating his position. This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.Unconvinced with the Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate.Sabio was arrested. Hence, he filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.He together with Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate.

Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members.Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners alleged that:1. Respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1without any justifiable reason;2. The inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation;3. The inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and4. Respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged:1.Respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455;2.The same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;3. The subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for having been issued without authority;4.The conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and5.The subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.In their Comment, the respondents countered the petitioners’ arguments:1. the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which SC has no jurisdiction2.Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution;3. Respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power;4.Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published;5. Respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and6. The inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.ISSUES: WON Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter.HELD: Petition for Habeas Corpus has became moot because Sabio was allowed to go home.Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.Arnault vs. Nazareno :“The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it." The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that " the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."Considering these jurisprudential instructions, The Court find Section 4(b)directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."31.32. Sanchez vs COAIn 1991, RA 7180 or the GAA of 1992 was passed by the congress. The said appropriation set aside 75M for DILG capability development program. On November 11. 1991 the project director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy, proposed to create shamrock type task force to implement local autonomy under the LGC. The

purpose of the said task force was to design programs, strategize and prepare modules for an effective profram for local autonomy. Upon approval, the DILG secretary issued a memorandum to transfer of 300,000 taken from the DILG to the office of the President for the operational expenses of the task force. There were 2 cash advances taken from the fund and transferred to the cashier of the office of the President. There was a liquidation of the first cash advance but there was none in the second. Later on, upon post audit by respondent, the amounts were disallowed by Department auditor luminada M.V. Fabroa for the following reasons: 1. No legal basis for the created Task Force to claim payment thru DILG by way of cash advance.2. Previous cash advance granted to accountable officer has not yet been liquidated.3. Expenditures funded from capability building are subject to restrictions/conditions embodied in the Special Provisions of the DILG Appropriations of R.A. 7180 which should be met.4. Estimate of expenses covered by the cash advance not specified.6A Notice of Disallowance dated 29 March 1993 was then sent to Mr. Sarino, et al. holding the latter jointly and severally liable for the amount and directing them to immediately settle the disallowance. Consequently, Mr Sarino et al moved for reconsideration of the department auditor’s position but the same was denied by respondent and affirmed the findings of the COA department auditor. Hence this petition. Issue: whether or not the disallowance of the transfer of funds from DILG to Office of the President was proper. Contentions: , the OSG avers in its Memorandum18 dated 6 July 2005 that the transfer of funds from the DILG to the Office of the President has no legal basis and that COA’s disallowance of the transfer is valid. According to the OSG, the creation of a task force to implement local autonomy, if one was necessary, should have been done through the Local Government Academy with the approval of its board of trustees in accordance with R.A. No. 7180.Moreover, Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution authorizes the transfer of funds within the OP if made by the President for purposes of augmenting an item in the Office of the President. In this case, it was not the President but the Deputy Executive Secretary who caused the transfers and the latter was not shown to have been authorized by the President to do so.For their part, petitioners maintain in their Memorandum22 that the transfer of funds was never repudiated by the President and that operational control over the amount transferred remained with the DILG as evidenced by the fact that liquidation was done by the latter and not by the Office of the President. Petitioners also insist that the Fund is a regular item of appropriation and not a trust fund because after the end of the calendar year, any unexpended amount will be reverted to the General Fund.Ruling:

The Court held in th affirmative. The court recognized that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.23 It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended.Verily, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.27 It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretionIn order to know if the transfers are valid, the Court tested if it satisfies the conditions for transfer of funds under sec 25(5) of Art VI. It observed that the power to transfer savings pertains exclusively to the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions and no other. Furthermore, it gave the requisites for the transfer of appropriation withh the corresponding funds may legally be effected. First, there must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the transferring agency.Second, there must be an existing item, project or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred.Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The word "actual" denotes that something is real or substantial, or exists presently in fact as opposed to something which is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypotheticalHowever in the case at bar, the people who effected the transfer was the deputy executive secretary and the DILG secretary. Not being included in the persons who are authorized to make the transfer of savings. Further, the court found that there was no actual savings to begin with since the amount transferred was part of the Capability Development of DILG. As regards the requirement that there be an item to be augmented, which is also a sine qua non like the first requirement on the existence of savings, there was no item for augmentation in the appropriation for the Office of the President at the time of the transfers in question. Augmentation denotes that an appropriation was determined to be deficient after the implementation of the project or activity for which an appropriation was made, or after an evaluation of the needed resources. To say that the existing items in the appropriation for the Office of the President already needed augmentation as early as 31 January 1992 is putting the cart before the horseThe ad hoc62 nature of the task force whose operations the illegally transferred funds were supposed to finance precisely underscores the impermanence and transitoriness of the group and its activities. Hence, the ad hocbody itself is inconsistent with the notion that there was an existing item of appropriation which needed to be augmented.

33 Belgica v. Ochoa

FACTS: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.

As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

* ISSUES:A. Procedural Issues1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…1.) …separation of powers2.) …non-delegability of legislative power3.) …checks and balances4.) …accountability5.) …political dynasties6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”WON the phrases:(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural IssuesNo question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with

the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended

undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).

3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite

standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.

Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to

Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or

amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in

some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”

However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”

The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

34. Aurallo vs Aquino FACTS:On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services4

appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district"7 – excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas),8 on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.ISSUES:I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

RULINGS:2014 RULINGI. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the

Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.On the issue of what are “savings”These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has

funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith. February 3, 2015 RULINGOn their part, the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442 pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court thereby:Chy

FAILED TO DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL ALL MONEYS UNDER THE DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (DAP) USED FOR ALLEGED AUGMENTATION OF APPROPRIATION ITEMS THAT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL DEFICIENCIES10

They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.Ruling of the Court

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents, and DENIES the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442 for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the Decision promulgated on July 1, 2014 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA

The respondents posit that the Court has erroneously invalidated all the DAP-funded projects by overlooking the difference between an item and an allotment class, and by concluding that they do not have appropriation cover; and that such error may induce Congress and the Executive (through the DBM) to ensure that all items should have at least P1 funding in order to allow augmentation by the President.

To be sure, the Court recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the country’s economy, and acknowledged its laudable purposes, most especially those directed towards infrastructure development and efficient delivery of basic social services. It bears repeating that the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development.

Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that originally did not contain any appropriation for some of the expense categories (personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond with the program specified in the GAA.

The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President. c

After a careful reexamination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we find merit in the respondents’ argument.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper “item” which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill.” An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not only “general provisions” which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a “specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as “line-item” appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed.

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.

We clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.

Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require

factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.

Based on the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs, the respondents contend that each source of revenue in the budget proposal must exceed the respective target to authorize release of unprogrammed funds. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling thereon nullified the intention of the authors of the unprogrammed fund, and renders useless the special provisions in the relevant GAAs.

The respondents’ contentions are without merit.

To recall, the respondents justified the use of unprogrammed funds by submitting certifications from the Bureau of Treasury and the Department of Finance (DOF) regarding the dividends derived from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-owned and controlled corporations.37 In the decision, the Court has held that the requirement under the relevant GAAs should be construed in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were denominated as “standby appropriations.” Hence, revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. We have even cautioned that the release of unprogrammed funds based on the respondents’ position could be unsound fiscal management for disregarding the budget plan and fostering budget deficits, contrary to the Government’s surplus budget policy. While we maintain the position that aggregate revenue collection must first exceed aggregate revenue target as a pre-requisite to the use of unprogrammed funds, we clarify the respondents’ notion that the release of unprogrammed funds may only occur at the end of the fiscal year.

In fact, the eleventh special provision for unprogrammed funds in the 2011 GAA requires the DBM to submit quarterly reports stating the details of the use and releases from the unprogrammed funds, viz: 11. Reportorial Requirement. The DBM shall submit to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance separate quarterly reports stating the releases from the Unprogrammed Fund, the amounts released and purposes thereof, and the recipient departments, bureaus, agencies or offices, GOCCs and GFIs, including the authority under which the funds are released under Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund.

Similar provisions are contained in the 2012 and 2013 GAAs. However, the Court’s construction of the provision on unprogrammed funds is a statutory, not a constitutional, interpretation of an ambiguous phrase. Thus, the construction should be given prospective effect.35.

35. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9335 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.The BIR performs the following functions:Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:Concept and bases of congressional oversightBroadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.Categories of congressional oversight functionsThe acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.a. ScrutinyCongressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.xxx xxx xxxb. Congressional investigationWhile congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxxc. Legislative supervisionThe third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of

delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies.Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed bLegislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own lawsy the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.

In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.