sk b3 policy recommendations fdr- entire contents- 6-8-04 memo-summary-outline and 6-1-04 musharraf...

8/14/2019 SK B3 Policy Recommendations Fdr- Entire Contents- 6-8-04 Memo-Summary-Outline and 6-1-04 Musharraf OpEd

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEMEMORANDUMJune 8, 2004To: CommissionersFrom: Philip ZelikowSubj: Draft Outline of Policy Recommendations and Our Meeting Tomorrow

Attached is a draft outline of policy recomm endations, prepared at Tom and Lee's requestfor your benefit. We have not made it a classified document. It is more sensitive tha nthat.Tom and Lee have reviewed the outline repeatedly and directed various changes to get itinto a condition they felt was ready for your review. While they asked us to say they arenot wedded to every word, it captures the recommendations they propose fo r yourconsideration.The agenda for the meeting tom orrow, with notional times, is:1. Initial Discussion of Policy Recommendations (9-1230)2. Discussion of Report - Draft Chapters One - Four (1230-3)3. Next Week's Agenda ~ Special Concerns about NORAD-FAA Prior Statements(3-330)

(a memo on this subject will be distributed to you later today from me and fromJohn Farmer)4. Other Business (330-4)Tomorrow we also plan to give you, in person: (1) Staff Statement 15 (al Qaeda); (2)Staff Statement 16 (the plot); (3) Staff Statement 17 (improvising a homeland defense);(4) Draft Report Chapter Five; and (5) Draft Report Chapter Six

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Summary of Possible Policy RecommendationsDraf t of 8 June

OVERALL STRATEGY

1. Articulate a clear, comprehensive national strategy. The strategy shouldinclude:

A strategy to prevent Islamist terrorism by addressing crises in the Muslimworld.A strategy to stop terrorists; andA strategy to protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks

That strategy needs to encompass all the elements of national power, includingmilitary power, diplomacy, economic policy, financial assistance, intelligence,covert action, and public diplomacy. It therefore must be integrated andcoordinated by the White House.Recast the problem as:

a generational challenge, as the Muslim world adapts to modernity; anda challenge for governance, as the national security institutions built forWorld War II and the Cold War are transformed for a different kind ofworld.

2. The strategy should define the enemy, and the nature of the conflict."Terrorism" is a tactic. It is not the enemy. The enemy is violent Islamistextremism that offers revolution and mass murder as an answer, or outlet, fortroubled, f rus t ra ted societies.Islam is not the enemy. The United States and its allies are not engaged in a clashof civilizations. We are instead caught up in a clash within a civilization, a civila nd religious conflict across a Muslim world struggling with modernity andchange. We must take sides in that struggle, supporting those who are trying tobuild a better, peaceful fu ture.Violent Islamist extremists, organized by groups like al Qaeda, use religiousideas, language and imagery. But their agenda is essentially political. They feed



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upon social, economic and cultural dislocation. The forces of order can round upterrorists and seize their funds. But to defeat the extremists they must alsostrengthen the forces of hope.Our strategy has to reflect our goals as a nation. The United States and its alliesshould stand for encourage personal freedom, political participation, economicopportunity, educational opportunity, and religious tolerance. We cannot achievethese goals in the near future, but those in the Arab and Muslim world who sharethese goals need to know that we are on their side.

3. The strategy should set realistic, accountable objectives to measure success,such as:

No sanctuaries;Joint management of counterterrorism efforts across the foreign-domesticdivide with clear accountability about who is in charge; andNational security agencies networked to join the information revolutionan d guided on how to protect both privacy and security.

Terrorism everywhere should be condemned, but not every terrorist act threatensthe United States. A realistic, vital objective is to stop a repetition of 9/11 orworse attacks that can cause mass casualties an d catastrophic harm to theUnited States.



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PREVENT CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM AND ADDRESS THECRISIS IN THE M USLIM WO RLD4. Bring foreign policy back into the struggle to contain deadly instability in the

Muslim world.4a. The strategy must include international approaches to those territories thatare effectively ungoverned, to help prevent the creation of new terroristsanctuaries in countries, or parts of countries.4b. M ilitary and intelligence elements are vital. B ut the United States cannotstop terrorism in the absence of a foreign policy and diplomatic strategythat can win w ide international support, and win support within theIslamic world.4c. Part of that strategy is communication of themessage - andpart of it is themessage itself. The message must be a reflection of America's values personal freedom, political participation, economic opportunity,educational opportunity, and religious tolerance. The message to thepeople of the M iddle East and the Islamic world must be a message ofhope.4d. American foreign policy has consequences for how A merica's message isreceived in the Arab and Muslim world. An Israeli-Palestinian peacesettlement and a successful transfer of power to a stable and securegovernment in Iraq must remain high priorities for the United States.4e. The U.S. should welcome initiatives by Mu slim states to develop aninstitution where keyM uslim states can discuss critical policy issues withthe major Western powers involved in the Muslim world. Americansshould listen to Muslim voices of reform. They and their allies m ust thenhave an agenda for action to help reformers succeed, given the internalstruggles within the M uslim world.

Part of that agenda for action must include educational opportunity fortens of millions of young men and women preparing to cope w ith themodern world.4f. The U.S. should improve its public diplomacy, with serious levels ofspending appropriate to the task. The U.S. should help broadcastprograms that exemplify openness, tolerance, and regard for truth aimed atlarge audiences among the general population. The U.S. should restore, orcreate, scholarship and exchange programs that reach out to young peoplein the Arab and M uslim world, and restore, or create, accessible libraries



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEand cultural understanding. This approach wasvital to America's successin the Cold War; it is vital now.

5. Sustain agenuine coalition against violent Islamist extremism through acontact group of coalition governments.5a. Counterterrorism should be part of the agenda of every multilateral

organization andbilateral agreement in which the U.S. participatesspanning law enforcement, travel, and finance as well as military andintelligence cooperation.

5b. The comprehensive U.S. strategy against Islamist terrorism should becomea coalition strategy. Policies should be coordinated through a multilateralcontact group of coalition governments. This contact group mayeventually complement whatever multilateral institution is proposed forEast-West dialogue by leading Muslim countries. These new internationalefforts can create long-term habits of visible cooperation, as states willingto accept significant responsibilities join positively to direct assistance andcoordinate action.

5c. New U.S. protective standards, like those discussed in our otherrecommendations for travel documents, should become coalition standardsfor global protection.

5d. New U.S. principles for the detention and humane treatment of capturedterrorists should become coalition principles. These principles can buildon the example of common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, whichguarantee that fundamental human rights are respected even where the fullprotections of the Conventions are not available.

6. Enlarge opportunity for the Muslim world by drawing these countries intothe world economic system, targeting assistance and pursuing the goal of abroad Middle East Free Trade Area.6a. The U.S. should encourage the people of the Muslim world to live to

create, not die to destroy. This means economic opportunity. The U.S.should help countries that support peace and are willing to embraceeconomic opportunity and the rule of law to join the World TradeOrganization. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, and Lebanon might be goodcandidates.

6b. The U.S. can negotiate agreements to create economic opportunity, usingthe General System of Preferences, Trade and Investment FrameworkAgreements, and Bilateral Investment Treaties leading to full bilateralFree Trade Agreements, like the one already concluded with Jordan andthose signed with Morocco and Bahrain. Congress should ratify the



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agreements with Morocco and Bahrain and support the vision of buildinga Middle East Free Trade Area.

6c. Singling out countries that arewilling to allow free enterprise, the rule oflaw, and control corruption, the U.S. should reciprocate with substantial,targeted assistance. In order to do this, Congress will need to join with theExecutive Branch in a new partnership that achieves this targeting andfrees assistance from earmarks.

6d. Economic opportunity will grow in the Muslim world, as in much of thedeveloping world, if the United States will join with Europe and otherdeveloped nations to reduce farm subsidies and allow freer competition foragricultural products in world markets.

7. Combine the coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism with a parallelnational and coalition strategy to prevent the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction.7a . Strengthen international enforcementof common rules against the trade of

suspect items, building on the measures suggested in the government'sProliferation Security Initiative.

7b. Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency and close loopholesthat allow continued trade in the tools of nuclear weapons-building,cutting of f sales of uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology tocountries, like Iran, that do not already possess a full nuclear fuel cycle oftheir own. In return, sell these countries the nuclear fuel they say theyneed in order to power their reactors. The U.S. needs to do all it can bothto detect unauthorized efforts to produce or acquire plutonium and detectsecret efforts to produce highly enriched uranium, using both humanintelligence and better technical means.

7c. Expand the G-8 and Nunn-Lugar initiatives to contain and secure WMDand exceptionally dangerous materials in the countries of the formerSoviet Union. A Nunn-Lugareffort that doubles or triples the current U.S.financial commitment would be a sound investment, accelerating targetsfor containing the danger from stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weaponsmaterial.



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STOPPING TERRORISTS8. No sanctuaries

Integrate diplomacy, foreign aid, intelligence, law enforcement and militarymeasures to deny terrorists the sanctuaries they need to organize, recruit, train,indoctrinate, plan and move money and people.In particular, develop regional and country strategies to deny terrorists sanctuaryin:

Pakistan and AfghanistanSaudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Horn of AfricaSoutheast AsiaEuropean citiesWest Africa

9. Establish a National Counterterrorism CenterThis newjoint Center will expand upon the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. Itwill lead government-wide, foreign and domestic, analysis and action against theterrorist threat. The head of the new NCTC should be appointed by the President,equivalent in rank to a Deputy DCI or Deputy Secretary of Defense. The NCTCwill:

Lead strategic analysis; bringing together and maintaining the knowledgebank of all-source intelligence on transnational terrorist organizations withglobal reach;Develop government-wide requirements and strategies for collectingneeded intelligence;Provide warnings and net assessments;Plan joint Counterterrorism operations; andCoordinate daily efforts by the CIA, FBI, State, Defense, and HomelandSecurity and guidance for cooperation with relevant state, regional, andlocal authorities.

9a. The FBI's Counterterrorism Division and its local Joint Terrorism TaskForces will have the lead responsibility for conduct of intelligence and lawenforcement operations inside the United States, as coordinated andguided by the analytical and planning efforts of the NationalCounterterrorism Center. The FBI should strengthen its efforts to build a



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEdistinct career service for intelligence work, including Field IntelligenceGroups that - working with CIA and theNational Counterterrorism Center- should guide local FBIagents in how to adapt their skills to gatheringintelligence.In short, Director Mueller's reforms are moving the Bureau in the rightdirection. The question is whether they go far enough, and whether theFB I can do even more, working with the Intelligence Community, to buildthe skills of intelligence collection in the field. The FBI must have adistinct career track and management structure to support and reward thedevelopment and application of these skills.

9b. The current DCI Counterterrorist Center should become a CIACounterterrorist Center. With local CIA stations and bases andCounterterrorism Information Centers organized with foreign liaisonservices overseas, will have lead responsibility with State and Defense forconduct of intelligence collection and disruption operations overseas, alsoas coordinated and guided by the analytical and planning efforts of theNational Counterterrorism Center.

9c. The analytical and planning efforts of the National CounterterrorismCenter will coordinate and guide the work of the Defense Department'sprincipal unified commands combating terrorism - the Special OperationsCommand, Central Command, and Northern Command - to achievemaximum unity of national effort.The capacities for paramilitary clandestine and covert action should bereorganized to better combine the authorities and capabilities of the CIAwith the authorities and capabilities of the military's Special OperationsCommand.

10. Design agovernment-wide information architecture that empowers nationalsecurity agencies in common networks while guiding them toprotect civilliberties.1Oa. The priority should be the sharing of information. The governmentalready has access to abundant information. It has a weak system forprocessing and using it. The system that required a demonstrable "need toknow" before sharing assumed it was possible to know in advance who

would need to use the information. It assumed that the risk of inadvertentdisclosure outweighed the benefit of wider sharing. Those Cold Warassumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of "owning"information must be replaced by a duty to the information, to get it tothose who may need it.



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1Ob. The distinguishing line between intelligence gathered about transnationalterrorism overseas and information gathered at home is increasinglydifficult to sustain. The government must define new rules that alsoensure that agencies do not infringe on traditional civil liberties.

1Oc. Most information is gathered and used in the field. Handling ofinformation should be decentralized and should take place directly amongusers according to a network model, not an outdated mainframe or hub-and-spoke model. The network should be guided by principles about whatcan be gathered, shared, and analyzed that simultaneously empower andconstrain officials, making clear what is permissible and what isprohibited to protect both security and privacy.

1Od. The President must take the lead to develop national guidelines on howdata can be shared and analyzed, including the relationships with state andlocal governments and with private firms. Only the White House canaddress the legal and policy obstacles that transcend individual agenciesand prevent the creation of a new architecture for 21st century systems.

lOe. Most of the collection and sharing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Actshould be renewed, especially those that ease the sharing of informationbetween those involved in criminal and intelligence investigations ofterrorism.

I Of. The renewed act should strongly emphasize the importance of protectingcivil liberties, defining a newbalance to gather more information - e.g.,for reliable identification - while adding newsafeguards aswell.

11. Restructure the Intelligence Community to create joint mission centers, givethe Director of Central Intelligence more authority, and create a Chairmanof National Intelligence to oversee stronger analysis.I1a. Work on key subjects should be organized around joint mission centers.

The traditional intelligence agencies should organize, train, and equip theofficials and capabilities for these joint mission centers. Those agenciesneed to develop more and better human intelligence, language skills, anddeeper analytic expertise. Much money has been spent on acquiringinformation, too little on building the capacity to analyze and use it.

lib. The Director of Central Intelligence should be able to appoint the leadersand control the budgets of the national agencies of the IntelligenceCommunity. He must help set meaningful priorities for allocating scarceresources among a host of intelligence requirements. He should have theability to reprogram funds across the national foreign intelligenceprogram. He should be responsible for integration of information



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technology, security policies, and personnel policies. He should beaccountable for the results.

lie. A Chairman of National Intelligence should be designated by statute as theprincipal intelligence adviser to the President, reporting to the DCI. ThatChairman would oversee a small joint staff coordinating and supportingthe activities of the joint intelligence mission centers. The Chairmanshould be appointed for terms of office out of cycle with the term of thePresident. His role would be to provide professional intelligence advice.The President should be briefed daily by the Chairman of NationalIntelligence, his analyst-in-chief. The President should consider acomplete redesign of the President's Daily Briefing into a broader nationalsecurity briefing.

12. The President and the National Security Council should avoidmicromanaging the details of day-to-day program implementation, and focusupon their comparative advantage setting national objectives, developingpolicy, managing the national security legislative agenda, and resolvinginteragency disputes.12a. The National Security Council and the NSC staff should advise the

President on overall policy, integrating policy among the three mainagendas: preventing terrorism in the long-term; stopping terrorists now;and protecting and preparing the country. The President is responsible forsetting or proposing priorities for allocating limited staff and resources.He must define an integrated national strategy that sets realistic,operational objectives. Priorities, strategy, and objectives must beapparent to the public, Congress, and the officials of the Executive Branchso that accountability for performance is clear. He must lead in continuingto transform the Executive Branch's institutions to adapt to this new era,building capacities like those we have described. The NationalCounterterrorism Center, not the White House, should carry the burden ofdaily joint work.

12b. The Homeland Security Council should be absorbed into the NationalSecurity Council system once the National Counterterrorism Center andthe Department of Homeland Security are able to take the lead on the day-to-day implementation of policy.

13. Transitions between Administrations must be more efficient, particularly fornational security officials.13a. All Presidential candidates should be able to submit lists of prospective

candidates for national security positions for security clearance by a date



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certain before the election, so that their background investigations can becompleted before January 20th.

13b. A single federal agency should have responsibility for providing andmaintaining security clearances, ensuring uniform standards andmaintaining a single database. This agency can also be responsible foradministering polygraphs on behalf of those organizations that requiresuch tests.

13c. Congress should adopt a law calling on the Executive to submit his entireproposed National Security Team, through the level of Undersecretary inCabinet Departments, not later than January 20th. The Senate should inturn adopt special rules at the start of an Administration, calling forhearings and votes to confirm (or reject) national security nominees within30 days of their submission. The Senate should drop the ability ofindividual Senators to place "holds" on nominees.

13d. The Executive and Legislativebranches should adopt one uniform set ofethics rules and financial disclosure forms for all individuals enteringgovernment.

13e. Congress should reduce the number of Presidential appointees; the sheervolume slows the transition process.

13f. The presidential transition process should a classified, compartmented listto be provided to the President-elect, as soon aspossible after election day,explicitly cataloguing serious threats, major operations, and pendingdecisions on major assessments or operations that might involve the use offorce, overt or covert.

14. Congress must make structural changes to improve its management andoversight of counterterrorism.14a. The Intelligence Committees should become permanent standing

committees. They should each have permanent subcommittees foroversight.Jurisdiction over the National Foreign Intelligence Program andintelligence programs for the armed services should be divided betweenthe Intelligence and Armed Services Committees.There should be a separate Appropriations subcommittee for intelligence,with an unclassified topline intelligence budget allocated to the DCI.

14b. Both chambers of Congress should reduce the number of committeeassignments per member, reduce the number of members per committee,

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and - as ageneral rule - provide sole jurisdiction over departmentalauthorizations to particular committees. In short, there should beaccountability for the proper performance of congressional oversight.

14c. Congress should adopt the practice of appropriating two year budgets, andconsider unifying authorization and appropriations committees.

15. Roles and missions of the Department ofDefense15a. The President needsmore military options for fighting terrorism that go

beyond those presented in the World War II and Cold War era.Significant changes are underway in the role of the Special OperationsCommand. The Congress and the Executive Branch should endorse agreater role for that Command, and support more flexible armed forces ina transformed defense establishment.Asmentioned above, the nation must appropriately combine itscapabilities for clandestine and covert military and paramilitary action.

15b. The Congress and the Executive Branch should clarify the appropriate roleof the Defense Department for operations inside the United States and onits territorial border. These should include:

the role of Northern Command and the National Guard inprotecting the American homeland;the role of defense intelligence, in coordinating with civilianagencies; andthe role of the Defense Department working with the Departmentof Homeland Security and state and local agencies in emergencypreparedness and response to terrorist attack.

16. Terrorist financingFinancial disruption (blocking or seizure of funds) is important. It punishes thosewho support terrorism. But it is not likely to starve terrorist organizationsorprevent terrorist attacks. Primary emphasis should instead be placed on financialtracking, apowerful tool that can provide vital intelligence on the activities ofterrorists.



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEPROTECT AND PREPARE

17. Develop an integrated architecture for screening individuals of concernworldwide.17a. The U.S. government, other U.S. authorities, and allied governments need

systems to distinguish law-abiding citizens from individuals properlysought by authorities for investigation or arrest. These systems mustextend to identify individuals who apply for visas, cross borders, boardairplanes, or enter other vulnerable facilities. An integrated architecturewill include choices about what reference databases to develop using thisinformation, and what portals will check people against which databases.It will specify needs to: Develop standards fo r biometric identification, and decide what level

of scrutiny and procedures for positive matches to apply at each pointin the process; and

Develop international support fo r common standards, especiallyincluding underlying biometric and electronic data support forinternational travel documents and records of international travel.

17b. Integrate the intelligence and information from programs listed abovewith Homeland Security's US VISIT program and its entry-exit trackinginitiatives, continuing the integration of immigration enforcement intonational security policy.

17c. An effective and efficient US VISIT program is essential, not only tosecure our borders, but so that large numbers of students, scholars,businessmen, and tourists can enter the United States. Foreign visitors areimportant to our economic and cultural vitality, and in turn are anenormous source of U.S. influence around the world. The investment inUS VISIT can keep suspected terrorists out, and provide a great publicservice by restoring America's beneficial interaction with millions ofvisitors.

17d. It is appropriate to use every available legal instrument, includingimmigration laws, to stop and prevent terrorist attacks. Undifferentiatedand sweeping use of immigration laws against Arab-American andMuslim communities in the United States is not demonstrably effectiveand should be avoided, especially in light of the potential loss ofcooperation and the comprehensive alienation of these communites.

18. Set priorities and deploy resources for homeland security based upon riskassessment.



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Assign resources based on vulnerabilities, not pork barrel politics. The ExecutiveBranch, working with Congress, needs to develop an honest, objective, andpublished system for evaluating community needs forprotective resources.Congress will appropriate funds as it thinks best, but the evaluation system canprovide a benchmark for public examination of these choices.

19. Strengthen transportation security.19a. The federal government must do an honest risk assessment for all

transportation security systems, not just aviation. It should: Identify the highest resource and policy priorities for transportation

security over the next five years; and~ Articulate, in realistic andmeasurable terms, the capabilities the

country must acquire in order to achieve the highest priorityobjectives.

19b. Aviation security must rely on a truly "layered" security system. Thissystem should include a passenger screening system that is not a stand-alone, but is instead fully integrated into the screening architectureproposed above in Recommendation #17. The system's minimumobjective is to identify actual suspects already known to the U.S.government.

20. Strengthen national preparedness against the greatest dangers, likebioterrorism, establishing cases for planning and then developing neededcapabilities.20a. Adopt a unified concept of operations.20b. Build on the recent presidential directive on biodefense to develop

capabilities for detection, vaccines, decontamination, interdiction,intelligence, surveillance and diagnosis, simulation and modeling,counterproliferation, civilian preparation, and consequence management.

21. Integrate commands and build capabilities for management of catastrophicemergencies in major cities or other target areas of the United States.21a. Develop an integrated command system for major emergencies.21b. Develop comprehensive emergency communications among first

responders, with redundant systems that communicate across agencies,with adequate bandwidth.



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21c. Develop comprehensive emergency communications to provide criticalinformation to victims and the general public alike, through channels theyare most likely to use, including 911 numbers and broadcast messages.

22. Bring the private sector into emergency preparedness.22a. Every firm that is part of the nation's critical infrastructure or that is in a

vulnerable location should have:a practiced plan for evacuation;adequate communication capabilities; anda plan for continuity of operations.

22b. The federal government should encourage firms to adopt the voluntarystandards developed by the American National Standards Institute.

23. Creating a single principal point of oversight and review for homelandsecurity in Congress.The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88committees and subcommittees of Congress. The House is considering discardingthe select Committee on Homeland Security it created. The Senate does not haveeven that. While we think Congress is best able to judge what committee shouldhave lead jurisdiction over this critical subject, we think Congress does have theobligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that thiscommittee should be a permanent standing committee.



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Outline of Possible Policy Recomm endations (13 June)Overview: A generation's challenge, the nature of the conflict, the need to setpriorities, and the problem of defining realistic objectives

I. WHAT T O Do: A GLOB AL STR ATEGYA. Engage the M uslim W orld to Prevent Future Terrorism

No sanctuaries R ally willing countries behind a coalition strategy Draw M uslim states into theworld economy H elp Muslims understand America andtheir world Prevent theproliferation of catastrophic weapons

\' \J

B. Attack Terrorist Organizations~ \, ; \ , Confront the challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan

' : nC7*/i \ ^ Address dangers in S audi Arabia and other potential sanctuaries Target terrorist travel, as well as terrorist mon ey

C. Protect and Prepare S creen travelers m ore effectively around theworld Make tough decisions about priorities in spending and protection Beprepared for the greatest dangers, like bioterrorism or nuclear attack E ncourage private sector preparedness

II . How T O Do IT: A DIFFERENT KIND OF GOVERNMENTA. Unity of Effort across the Foreign/D omestic D ivide

E stablish a National Counterterrorism Center to pool analysis andcoordinate joint action combining intelligence, foreign policy, militarypower, and homeland security


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Restructure the Intelligence Comm unity around joint missions, w ith betteranalysis and stronger management Help the FBIplay itspart Integrate commands forbetter management of catastrophic emergencies

B. Bring the Government's Information Architecture into the 21stCentury Build networks across the foreign anddomestic agencies to shareinformation Set guidelines on how information can be shared to define what isallowed, and protect essential liberties

C. Strengthen Accountability and Oversight in Congress Strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence Clarify congressional responsibility forhomeland security

D. Strengthen Accountability in the Executive Branch Simplify theWhite House advisory system Clarify roles andmissions in the Department of Defense Improve thetransitions between administrations


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Pervez Musharraf1A Plea for Enlightened ModerationMusl ims m u s t raise themselves u p t h m u g i individual achievement-andsoaoecdnpriuc emancipation. 'ir. '

particularly my brethren in faiththe Mus-limsat the hands of militants, extremists

explosives, combinedTwifli high-tech remote-controlled devices, as wefl as aproliferation of'"*1force,suicide bombers, fias createdthat is all but impossible to counter. The tm-fortunatereaKtyisthathothlheperlietratorerf these crimes.and most of 8ej>e w hos u f f e r from them ate Muslims. This has.

carnageward slideIS yenedMafi-for bothworlds. It is athisknotis] _I think is a w in fo randnot tMusBm

of extremiamand militancyL _ .buB dHHWSVMPH9R

rute sense of+v*+jr*rm*tf*~?*t*jr** ."Tr"1"*y"e~ '~ r3E^*1*I*fe f lug fimutfieM letuatHEIs eaaly availablef O T the propagation of miUtancy an d the per-petration c tf extremist, terrorist acts. It iscan-nori odder* n a w ar o f terrorism; ;

ter projection can be found of tiwse deepervalues of Islam tha n the personal example ofour HotyI hrt(pB.U4 ),w ho personifiedjustice, compassion, toleiance of others, gen-fice, and a* burning deslreto make/a betterworld, MuslimW e hareKiEXOafuaiu w esheHandrefusedtoS.W e have reacheddency. W eahead on eCould thisglory w hile

T he time fo rW ay forward isconcentrateisourdi-

LJLnmJJL - ^vwv M V ~ W I ^ M mrougn con-W e must adopt a path of moder-democ-must be donejwjrldwelwe'in,' *" Conferences

is our coDecttoe body. W e need to in-fuse new life into h;Jt isno w m a state of nearimpotent Tb QIC must be restructured tomeet the challenges of th e 21st century, to f u l -fill the aspirations of the Muslim work! and totake us tow ard emancqiatidn. Forming a com-mittee of luminai to remim end a restruc-turing of the OJp is abig step m the right di-rection. W e hjfte to show resolve and riseibove setfmfcfest for oftr common goodinfee very spirit that Islam teaches us.' " : T he workl^t large and the powers that bemust realb^ that confrontation and force w f f lnever bring peace. Justice m ust be done andbe seen to Redone. Let it no t be said by futuregenerations that w e, the leaders of today, tookhumanity oward the apocalypse.^ * * ?G e n . M u s h a r r a f ispresident o f Pakistan.

thelawful, tolerant andhad faith in human... * UH M iimiii iEff* edgeandeiierance w ithin ourserves and _.._,,other faiths. The armies of Islammarch forward to convert people by -^sword, despite w hat the perceptions may be,hu t to deliver them from the darkness through

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