sk b9 team monograph outlines fdr- draft monograph outlines 9-9-03 incl 2 withdrawal notice

8/14/2019 SK B9 Team Monograph Outlines Fdr- Draft Monograph Outlines 9-9-03 Incl 2 Withdrawal Notice

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Commission SensitiveT E A M 1A M O N O G R A P H O U T L I N E

The September 11 ConspiracyI . O verview of ConspiracyI I . Formation of the Conspiracy

A. Context of Al-Qaeda's Plans to Use Civil Aircraft as W eapons1. Manila Air(Bojinka) - 1994-952. Murad debriefing byPhilippine National Police - 19953. AirFrance Hijacking byGIA Terrorists - Dec. 19944. OtherB. Hatching of 9/11 Plot1. Conception and Approval of Operation -1996-1998

2. Kuala Lum pur meeting - Jan. 20003. Detailing of Nawaf Al-Hazm i (NAH) and Khalid A l-Mihdhar (KAM) to US4. Recruiting of Hamburg Cell in Germany, Pakistan & Afghanistan5. Selection ofAtta asEmir - 1999-2000I I I . P reliminary P hase of O peration

A. Hamburg Cell Pilots' Preparation1. Researching Flight Schools - early 20002. Preparing forTravel to US - spring 20003. Arrival ofAl-Shehhi, Atta, Jarrah in US - 5/00-6/004. Financial Support from Operatives in UA E5. Flight Training - 6/00-12/00

B. Arrival of NAH and KAM in US-1/15/001. Activities in LA [to be investigated]2. Meet Al-Bayoumi andMove to SD - 2/003. Activities inSD - 2/00-12/00a. Move into Parkwood Apartmentsb. Open BO A accountc. Buy Card. Move to Lemon Grovee. Departure of KA Mf. NAH's Activities - 6/00-12/00 [to be investigated]

C. Substitution ofHanjour forNAH as 4th Pilot - Dec. 20001. Ha njour 's Prior Flight Training andLicensing - mid-1990s2. Hanjour's Arrival in SD-12/003. Hanjour and NAH travel to Arizona

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IV. Deployment PhaseA. Involvement of Bin Al-Shibh asLiaison between Al-Qaeda Leadership andAtta - Jan.-

June 20011. Meeting with A tta, Berlin, Ja n. 20012. Meetings w ith UB L, KSM, Abu Hafs Al-Masri in Afghanistan3. Meeting with KSM in Karachi - June 2001B. Travels of Pilot H ijackers After Flight Training1. Atta, Al-Shehhi &Jarrah in Georgia, Virginia & NJ - late Jan.-early April 2001 - thenback in Florida2. Jarrah's 5 Trips to Germany andLebanon - Oct. 2000-July 2001C. Travel of Non -Pilot Hijackers to US1. Selection of Operatives in Afghanistan

2. Arrangements to Travel to US3. Arrival of Operatives in US4. Infusion of Additional FinancingD. Transcontinental T est Flights by theFour P ilots - May-Aug. 20011. Information Pilots Obtained2. Las Vegas RendezvousE. Bin Al-Shibh's Coordination Role1. Spain Meeting and in Phone Contacts with Atta - Summer 20012. Contact with andMo ney Transfer to Moussaoui - July-Aug. 2001

3. Receipt of 9/11 Date from Atta an d Communication thereof to KSMF. Planning Delays an d Al-Qaeda's Preparations in Afghanistan fo r Post-OperationCounterattack - Summer 2001G. Hijackers' Acquisition of Tickets fo r 9/11 Flights -- Aug. 2001

V. Execution PhaseA. Assembly of F light Teams1. AA #11: Atta, Al-Suqami, Waleed & Wail Al-Shehri, Al-Umari

2. UA #175: Al-Shehhi, Banihamm ad, Ahmed & Hamza Al-Ghamdi, Mohand Al-Shehri3. AA #77: Hanjour, NAS, KAM, Moqed, Salim Al-Hazm i4. UA #93: Jarrah, Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Al-Haznawi, Al-NamiB. Return of Excess Funds to Operatives in UAEC. September 11 Hijackings and Crashes



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VI. Sidebars to Address Loose Ends, Alternative Theories and Popular MisconceptionsA. DSMB. "Holy Tuesday"C. Second Wave of AttacksD. Other

VII. Glossary of Who's Who in Conspiracy



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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00004 Folder: 0009 Document: 7Series: Stephanie Kaplan FilesCopies: 1 Pages: 4

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Team Monograph OutlinesDocument Date:Document Type: Miscellaneous (o^-\\eSpecial Media:From:To:

Subject: Intelligence: Management, Analysis, Collection

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefo r examination.

NND: 301Withdrawn: 06-20-2008 by:RETRIEVAL #: 301 00004 0009 7System DocID: 2869

|/U3XACVvja-'i'


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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00004 Folder: 0009 Document: 8Series: Stephanie Kaplan FilesCopies: 1 Pages: 9

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Team Monograph OutlinesDocument Date:Document Type: MiscellaneousSpecial Media:From:To:

Subject: Team 3 Outline

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefo r examination.

NND: 301Withdrawn: 06-20-2008 by:RETRIEVAL #: 301 00004 0009 8System DocID: 2870


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Commission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensit iveM O N O G R A P H O U T L I N E

T E A M 4: T E R R O R I S T F I N A N C I N GI . How did A l-Qaeda as an institution (as opposed to the hijackers) raise andmove funds to support itself? W hat were A l-Qaeda's expenditures?

A . W ho were th e facilitators/ fundraisers?1. How important is fundraising to Al-Qaedaa. Discuss UB L's personal we alth2. Who were th e individuals enlisted to raise moneya. AQ operativesb. Donorsc. Religious figuresd. Repre sentatives of other terrorist groups3. W hat methods did they usea. Meetingsb. Zakatc. Barter

B. What were th e sources of A l-Qaeda's funds?1. Individual donorsa. Wh ere locatedb. Size of donationsc . Com mitment to AQ versus other organizations2. State support of terrorisma. Saudi Arabia and associated entitiesb. Other countries

c. Quasi state support - government funding of NGOs3. Charitiesa. Generallyb. Description of specific charities pre 9/11 suspected of raising moneyc. U.S. sources4. Micro financinga. General description of the financing of terrorist groups throug h petty ororganized crimin al activityb. Description of specific inve stiga tions prior to 9/115. Drug traffickinga. To wha t extent has al-Qaeda financed itself through drug trafficking(particularly A fghanis tan opium production), or taxing drug traffickers

b. To wha t exten t have terrorist cells, particu larly dom estic terrorist cells,financed themselves through drug traffickingC . What methods were used to move money destined for terrorist groups orterrorist acts?

1. Money movement through financial ins ti tutionsCommission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensitive


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Commission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensi t ivea. Poorly regulated and offshore financial centersb. Other financial institutionsc. MSBs/ hawalas other money remitters

2. Money movement and storage throu gh non-finan cial institutions and otherinformal methodsa. Precious metals and stonesb. Trade-based movem entsc. Bulk cash/courier mov ementD. What were Al-Qaeda's expenditures?1. How much money was involveda. How much did al-Qaeda spend to sustain itself and run its variousactivitiesb. Did this budget change over time pre-9/112 . W hat w ere specific expendituresa. Talibanb. Training campsc. Terrorist operationsd. Other terrorist group se. Other

II . Prior to 9/11, what did the U.S. do to identify an d stop th e raising an dmovement of money in support of terrorist groups?A. What did the USG do to gather an d analyze intelligence on the raising an dmovement of money in support of terrorist groups?

1. Description and assessment of the government's ability to gather and analyzeintelligence domestically on al-Qaeda related fundraisers and moneytransmittersa. FB Ii. Description and analysis of the FBI structure involve d in terroristfinance; institutionally, did the FBI see a need for a separate effortfocused on the money trailsii . Description an d analysis of the amount of collection an d level ofunderstanding of the means and methods of fund raising and moneymovementi i i. Description and analysis of the methods used to coordinate thevarious FBI Field Offices

b. Treasuryi. FinCEN's efforts to analyze intelligence(a ) Office fo r Intelligence(i ) Why/how set up

(ii) Description of how it operates (includin g chain ofCommission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensitive


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Commission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensitivecommand, information f lows, funding)(iii) How did FinCEN u se this inform ation(b ) Office of Strategic Analysis(i ) Funct ion and structure

(ii) Studies or typologies on terrorist financ e or alternativemethods of moving value(c) General description and analysis of the level of coordinationbetween FinCEN and other USG intelligence efforts(i ) Domestic agencies(ii) Foreign intelligence agenciesii . Other Treasury efforts

c. De scription of the roles and efforts of other agencies (e.g. , State, NSA )involved in the gathering or analysis of intelligence regarding terroristfinancingd. Desc ription of the level of cooperation and intelligence sha ring among the

relevant agencies. Did agencies with a need get information in a timelymanner?2. Description and assessment of the government ' s ability to gather and analyzeintelligence on al-Qaeda related fu ndraisers and money transmitters overseas

a. CIAi. Description and assessment of the CIA structure involved interrorism generally and terrorist financing specifically(a ) CTC efforts

(i ) Creation of UBL station(ii) Intelligence gathering re:a. Al-Qaeda financing, efforts, successb. Cou ntries supporting terrorismc. Ab ilities of foreig n entities to identify, track and disrup t TF(iii) Sources of information(iv) Level of interest in financial activities vs . other activities(b ) Non-CTC efforts(i ) Regional/country desks(ii) Use of foreign intelligence servicesii. Ins titu tion ally, did the CIA see a need for a separate effort focusedon the money trailsiii. Description and assessment of the amount of collection and levelof un derstan ding about terrorist financing prior to 9/11

b. General description and assessment of the State Departm ent's role ingathering and analyzing financial intelligence related to terrorist grou psCommission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensitive


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Comm ission Sensi t iveLaw Enforcement Sensi tivei. President's authority under War Powers Act and IEEPA,delegated to OFAC(a ) History and nature of Presiden t 's authority(b ) Description of how designations w ork w ithin OFAC (includin gchain of command, information flows, funding)(c) Level of follow throughii. Secretary of State 's autho rity to designate Foreign TerroristOrganizations(a ) Natu re and history of Secretary's authority(b ) Description of how designations occur (inc luding chain ofcommand, information flows, funding)(i) EB, S/CT, IN L(c ) Level of follow throughiii. Level of interagency coordination among agencies involved in the

EEPA and FTO processb. Desc riptions of the various designations made between 1996 and 2001i. W hat was designated and by wh om, and a description and analysisof assets frozen/blocked as a result of designations(a) Taliban(b ) Bin Laden(c ) Al-Qaedaii. Desig nations considered but not made, particularly w ith respect toth e five terrorist funding organizations identified in our documentrequest(a ) Description and analysis of the barriers (ins titutio nal or otherwise)present prior to 9/11 that prevented the naming of theseorganizationsiii. Attempts m ade by U S to gather informa tion in support ofdesignations, blocking and freezing(a ) Bin Laden family interviews(i ) Purpose an d goals(ii) Level of cooperation w/family

(iii) Results: Informa tion/conclusions(b) OFAC Trips to SA, UAE, Kuwai t , Bah rain, etc. to enlistcooperation(i ) Purpose and goals of the trip(ii) Level of cooperation(iii) Results

(c) FTAT center(i) Rationale and purpose of FTAT center(ii) Description and assessment of the pre-9/11 efforts to getth e center staffed and operationalc. Discussion and analysis of the effect of the freezing and blockingi. Any internal/external studies to show that blocking is effective

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Commission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensitiveii . Any evidence of disruption to plans

4. Regulation of financial institutions to deter or disrupt terrorist financin g (t oth e extent not covered in discussion of the 9/11 hijackers)a. General description of enforcement efforts against regulated financia linstitutions regarding money laundering and terrorist financei. Relationship between m oney laundering and terrorist finance; doA M L controls assist in stopping TFb. Regulation of money service businesses and non-bank f inancialinstitutionsi. Cong ress required Treasu ry to regulate MS Bs in 1994, but noregulations were issued un til post 9/11c. Regulation of non-f inancial ins ti tutions an d non-traditional methods ofmoving valued. Attempts to increase regulation of f inancial f lowsi. "Know your customer" and privacy issues generallyii . Legislative attemptsC. What did the USG do to generate international cooperation on identifying/disrupting terrorist financing?

1. What were U S efforts to garner international support fo r efforts to block andfreeze assetsa. Description of the general internationa l attitude regarding counter-terroristfinancingi. Support of multilateral institutions fo r blocking and freezing(a ) U N actions against Taliban UNSCR 1267 Oct. 99(b ) Other examples of support(c ) U SG response to independent foreign efforts(i ) D id they overlap U SG efforts(ii) Were they seen as effective(iii) Interaction with private sectorsii . Foreign entities' views of the terrorism problem and the util i ty ofblocking and freezing(a ) Definitions of terrorism(b ) Charities(c ) "Legitimate struggles"(d ) Emphasis on sources of terrorism(e ) Human rights issues(f ) Link between terrorism and other issues (drugs/guns/etc.)(g ) Interface between UNSC CTC and Sanctions Committee(h ) State terrorismb. Level of foreign cooperationi. Assets claimed frozen vs. actually frozenii . Closing/sanctioning financial institution s (formal/inform al)iii. D id mu ltilateral organizations put pressure on members



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Commission SensitiveLaw E nforcement Sensit iveiv . Intelligence provided

2. Description and assessment of USG efforts to increase foreign political willa. What were efforts made in conjunct ion with countries not involved insupporting terrorismi. Meetings and conferences in which th e subject of terroristfinancing was on the agenda,ii . Efforts in multilateral contextb . What efforts were made against (wi th? ) countries considered to besupporters of terrorismi. Sticks: What sanctions were considered or leviedii. Carrots: W hat benefits were considered for those who wo uldrenoun ce support of terrorismiii. Multilateral efforts and sanctions3. Description and assessment of USG efforts to increase the technical capacityof foreign entities to identify and disrupt terrorist financinga. Description of technical capacity of certain strategic countries (and relatedprivate sectors)i. Legal authoritiesii . Intelligenceiii. FIUsiv . Private sector sophisticationb. Description and assessment of USG efforts to improve these abilitiesi. Assessmentsii . Trainingiii. Fundingiv . Role of various agencies (coordination, etc.)

D. What did the United States Government do to coordinate th e disparateagencies involved in identifying, tracking and disrupting terrorist finances?1. Description and assessment of the structural mechanisms in place tocoordinate the US Governm ent activities and resolve disputesa. NSC/CSG description generallyb. PDD-39-June21, 1995i. Descriptionii . Response by relevant agenciesc. Were there shortcomings in efforts to :

i. Prevent th e abuse of charitiesii . Regulate informal m oney transmittersiii. Identify illegal trade-based money movements2. Description and assessment of structural mechanism s in place to sharefinancial information

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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sensit ive3. Description and assessment of barriers to effective interagency coordinationand inform ation sharing

III. Based on what we know about th e 9/11 conspiracy, were there any keyopportunities to detect them as a result of their financial transactions? W hatother lessons can be drawn from these financial transactions?

A. What do these transactions say about how organized, planned terroristoperations operate within the US?1. How sophisticated w ere the 19 hijackers in disguising their financialtransactions? Do the t ransactions of other known terrorist cells or groups

differ from wh at we had seen w ith the 9/11 hijackers? W hat does thatdifference tell us?2. Were there patterns within th e transactions that we can look to in identifyingor disrupting future terrorist attacks?B. Were th e anti-money laundering controls in place sufficient to detect th etypes of movement of money involved here?

1. General description of anti-money laundering controls prior to 9/11 [withcross-reference to detailed discussion contained elsewhere]a. Financial inst i tut ion controlsb. No n-financ ial inst i tut ion controls2. W hat was the role of foreign regulatory environ me nts in facilitating fundingi . UAE: The UA E is has a notoriously la x regulatory environm ent.W hat is that environm ent, and did i t contribute to the ease ofmovem ent of terrorist money? W ould i t have made any difference?ii . Germaniii. Saudi Arabiaiv . Pakistan3. How did the financing evade detection?a. Were transactions lawful (were false SSAN s used; any o ther i l legal i ty)b. Did t ransactions generate SA Rs (must address persistent reports SAR swere generated, but never t imely investigated)i. If yes, which transactions; why no fol lo w-u p; was there break-down in system

ii. If no, should any have been fi led, did any transac tions meet criteriac. Any other relevant reporting (CTRs etc.)d. Any other facts that should have raised red flags under then-e xistingregime

4. Was the existing system simply not designed to detect th e type of transactionsengaged in by the 9/11 terrorists, or was there some specific individual,Commission SensitiveLaw Enforcement Sensit ive


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Com mission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sensit ivecorporate, or government failure?

C. Was there any concerted, contemporaneous effort to track known terroristscells through their financial transactions?1. Discuss and assess the government's technical ability to engage in real timemonitoring and tracking

a. Des cription and assessment of the government 's ability to engage in realtime monitoringb. Factors inhibiting efforts to develop capabilityi. Priva cy/civ il liberty issues (were there relevant legislative orregulatory efforts halted as a result)ii . Technological deficienciesiii. Resource issuesiv . Interagency coordination/cooperationc. Compare th e private sector and governmen t capability to engage in realtime transaction monitoring2. Two 9/11 hijackers with know n extensive UBL links were not located for overtwo weeks after the realization that they were in the U.S ., despite h olding U.S.bank accounts in their ow n namesa. Why was no effort made to track them throu gh financial transactions?b. Had efforts been m ade, could the two kn ow n hijackers have been timelyfound (i.e . , were their specific ba nk accou nts and/or other transactionsdiscoverable)c. Address JI findings3. Moussaoui financial transactionsa. In the pre 9/11 w orld, wo uld a timely analysis of Moussao ui's financialtransactions been able to allow the intelligence or law enforcementcommunities to expose the conspiracy?

IV . What has al-Qaeda done since 9/11 to continue to support terroristoperations and move money?

A. How have their methods of fundraising changed?B. W hat are the sources of Al-Qaeda 's funds?1. Individual donors

a. Reluctant to give2. States3. Charities4. Micro-financing5. Other



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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcem ent SensitiveC. How does Al-Qaeda move money?

1. Increased use of couriers versus financial inst i tut ionsD. W ha t are al-Qaeda's expendi tures?

1. No longer have expenses of Taliban2 . What are training expenses now3. Suppor t of other terrorist grou ps4. Terrorist operationsE. To what extent are these changes in reaction to USG policies discussed in SectionV below

V. What are we currently doing, and have these efforts eliminated thedeficiencies present before 9/11?A . What is the current approach to gathering and analyzing intelligence on theraising and movement of money in support of terrorist groups?

1. Description and assessment current domestic intelligence gathering andanalysisa. Structurali . FBI(a ) TFOS(i ) Structure and function(ii) Relationsh ip/function w ith field offices(b ) JTTFs and their focus on terrorist financingii . FinCENiii. Other agenciesb. Capabilityi. Capability to do real-time tracking of persons through financialtransactions(a) Given the same facts today, could kn ow n operatives in U.S. belocated in time to avert disaster(b ) Given th e Moussaoui facts today, could his financial t ransactionsbe tracked to unravel th e plot(c ) Impact of changes ( legal, technological, structural)(d ) Abil i ty to identify people thro ug h bank records(e) Other data that the USG can search to find people quickly and l inkthem to others

(f ) H ow fast can this information be accessed in emergency(g) What obstacles hinder U.S . efforts to enhan ce capabilities in thisarea(i) Legal obstacles(ii) Technolog ical obstacles(iii) Lack of cooperation/data sharing between and among USG(iv) Insufficient public-private partnerships (are ta lent ,Commission SensitiveL aw Enforcement Sensit ive


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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sen si t iveinitiative, and resources being optima lly uti l ized)(h ) How should privacy and civil liberties be assuredii . Other changes in capabilityc. Information sharing and coordination among the different agencies

2. Discuss and assess current foreign intelligence gathering and analysisa. Structurali. CIA(a) Creation of FINO(i) Rationale/ history, etc(ii) Description of duties, etc(iii) Assessment of effectivenessii . Stateiii. Other agenciesb. Capabilityi. Effect of detainee interview sii . Other changes in capabilityc. Coordination and information sharing with foreign intell igencei. Has this improvedii. US will ingness to share informationd. Coordination and information sharing within the USGi. Am ong intell igence agenciesii. With la w enforcement agenciesB . What is the current approach to disrupting terrorist funding?

1. Description and assessment of changes in law enforcement efforts to disruptterrorist financinga. Legal and structural changesb. Chang es in focus and aggressivenessc. Chang es in capab ilityd. Specific efforts against specific methods(a) Micro-financing(b) Charities(c) Financial institutions(d ) Haw ala and other informal methods(e) Bulk cash

(f ) Othere. Coordination and evidence sharing2. Description and assessment of the changes made, procedurally andsubstantively, in the US effort to name terrorist groupsa. General description of namings since 9/11i. General description of the post 9/11 process as compared to theprevious process(a ) Is there a significant difference as to the type/nature/number of

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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sensit ivedesignations compared to pre 9/11(b ) Description of specific namings(c) Analysis of specific namings, with an eye to answering thefollowing questions:(i) Is OF AC receiving inform ation from the FBI/CIA/Foreignpartners better and faster than before(ii) Could any of these entities been named prior to 9/11 if theprocesses had been w orking better(iii) How signific ant are these group s in the world of terroristfinance(iv) Will naming/blocking/freezing really make any differenceii . International cooperation in the naming process(a ) Description of international post-9/11 efforts( i ) UN efforts(ii) Bilateral efforts(b ) Assessm ent of level of cooperation and effec tivene ss(i ) Description of countries that have frozen assetsa. Claims vs . realityb. Private sector follow-throu gh an d enforcement(ii) Consequences for failing to comply(c ) Barriers to more effective cooperation(i ) Jurisdictional issues(ii) Inab ility to share sensitive inform ation interna tionallyiii. Future of OF AC naming efforts(a) The "second phase" allowing foreign partners to take th e lead infuture namings(i ) Rationale/background(ii) Effectiveness of second phase

(b ) Terrorist efforts to circumvent3. Desc ription and assessment of covert and other actions to disrupt terroristfinancing overseasa. Legal an d structuralb. Focus and aggressivenessc. Capabilityd. Ability and willingness to share information fo r covert operations withforeign la w enforcement or intelligence

C . What is the current regulatory environment?1. Description an d assessment of title HI of the U SA PATRIOT Acta. General descriptionb. Use of section 311 of USA PATRIOTi. Description/history of section 311 "special measures" fo rareas/institutions of money lau ndering concernii . Use so far: Uk raine (threaten) ; Narau (actual)

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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sensit iveiii. Why no broader requests(a ) Worry about diplomatic backlash(b ) Sufficiency of evidence/use of classified materials(c ) Political will/philosophical objectionc. Broader scope of AMLi. M SB sii . Other non-bank financial inst i tut ions, including hawala and othermethods of informal value transferiii. Non-financial inst i tut ionsd. Customer IDe. Correspondent bank restrictions/enhanced due diligencef. Patriot Act Communication System (PACS) systemi. Gen eral descriptionii . Workable?

2. Other regulatory agenciesa. Fedb. OCC3. Regulation of charities within the US4. Private sector effortsa. Private initiativesb. Public-Private Cooperation

D. What are the current efforts to generate international cooperation?1. Description and assessment of structural changes w ithin the USGa. Description an d roles of various agencies involvedb. Methods and effectiveness of interag ency coordination2. Description and assessment of changes made to increase the capacity offoreign entities to identify and disrupt terrorist financinga. Participation in multilateral effortsi. UN

ii. World Bank/IMFiii. FATFiv . Relationship between USG policy and policies/efforts ofmultilateralsb. Bilateral efforts

3. Description and assessment of changes made to increase the political w ill offoreign entities or to gain consensus on the issue of terrorist fina ncin ga. Multilateral effortsb. Bilateral effortsc. Overcoming differencesCommission SensitiveLaw Enforcem ent Sensit ive


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Commission Sensit iveLaw Enforcement Sensit ivei. Diplomatic pressureii . Sticksiii. Carrotsiv. Use of multi la tera ls

E. What are the current mechanisms to coordinate government agencies?1. Description and assessment of structural mechanisms in place to coordinateUS governm ent policies and actionsa . Policy Coordinating Committeei. General description(a ) History, etc(b ) Description of structure(c) Issues raised at PCC/ method by which it worksb. Groups above the PCC - Principals andDeputi tes Comm itteesc. Other informal senior-level coordinating mechanisms2. Operational coordination issuesa. Structure for interagency coordination and inform ation sharin gb . Specific issues3. Assessmenta. Does the fact that no single entity/person has au tho rity over counter-terrorist financing as issue impair it s effectiveness4. Does th e ad-hoc nature of the PCC (why the GC of Treasury?) ul t ima tely havean impact on the ability of the USG to focus long-term on the problem

VI. W hat specific, actionable policy recommendations can be made to improveth e current efforts in light of the lessons of 9/11?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVET E A M 5 M O N O G R A P H O U T L IN E

Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas and Border Control

I . Principles and Goals of the US Border Security System Prior to Sept. 11, 2001A. What were the principal broad purposes of the U S immigration system before theSept. 11 attack? What border security issues were recognized over time and howdid the system address them? How did immigration laws and policies addressIslamic and other terrorism?B. What agencies directed our border security system, and what were their mandatesand activities? How well did the agencies involved in the system work to fulfilltheir mission as they understood it? To what extent was counterterrorism a realelement of border security policy and programs?

1. Department of State2. Department of Justice3. Immigration and Naturalization Service4. FBI5. CIA and other intelligence agencies6. Department of Defense and military7. Congress8. State and local authorities9. Coast GuardI I . T he Encounter Between the A l Qaeda Plotters and the U S Border Security

SystemA. Intelligence about terrorist mobility and access to the US

1. Al Qaeda's view of entry into the US as understood today2. Intelligence agency knowledge before Sept. 113. Law enforcement agency knowledge before Sept. 114. Intelligence and information disseminated to border security authorities5. Border security agencies' ow n intelligence capabilities and knowledgeB. Intelligence about individual terrorists: watchlisting

1. Intelligence and law enforcement agency identification of terroristsa. CIA, NSA, DIA terrorist identification informationb. FBI informationc. Foreign participation in terrorist identification2. The development of terrorist watchlisting by the Dept. of State

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COMM ISSION SEN SITIVEa. Islamic fund am entalist terrorists w atchlisted prior to Sept. 11b. The Sept. 11 plot and watchlisting3. Lookouts by federal inspection services (INS, APHIS, and Customs)4. FAA and airline company listings (with Team 7)5. Assessment and accountability

C. Terrorist acquisition of international travel docum ents1. Al Qaeda's view of the role of travel documents2. Terrorist travel document practices know n prior to the S ept. 11 plot3. US policy and security practices concerning travel and supportingdocuments.a. International and US standards for documentationb. Enforcement policy, programs, and resources prior to Sept. 114. Characteristics of the Sept. 11 hijackers' international travel documents

D. The visa process1. The US visa process encountered by al Qaeda in the Sept. 11 plot

a. Statutory authorityb. Policy directionc. Budget, personnel, trainingd. Consular access to terrorist intelligencee. Applications, other forms, interviews, and technology toolsf. Adjudication clearances and advisory opinionsg. Internal controls and evaluations of posts2. Visas issued to the Sept. 11 hijackers

a. Saudi Arabiai. Visa Express and interview policyii. the 15 Saudi hijackersiii. Saud i runner-up hijackersb. United Arab Em iratesi. AlShehhiii. Banihammadc. Germany - Berlini. interview policyii. Attaiii. Jarrahd. Yemeni. Binalshibhii. Essabar

3. Visas issued to terrorists prior to the Sept. 11 plot



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4. Visas issued to U.S. associates of the hijackers5. Assessment and accountability

E. Federal inspections upon entry1. The federal inspection process encountered by al Qaeda

a. Statutory authorityb. Policy directionc. Watchlist/lookout informationd. Primary inspectioni. inspections of the 19 hijackersii. inspections of other plotterse. Secondary inspectioni. inspections of certain hijackersii. inspections of plotters and associates2. Border crossing by previous Islamic terrorists3. Assessment and accountability

F. Detection and interior imm igration enforcement of terrorists1. Statutory authority2. Policy direction3. Enforcement agencies, missions, and resources4. 1996 mand ated student tracking system5. 1996 mandated exit-entry system6. Biometrics7. Identification document standards8. Technology9. Assessment and accountability

I I I . Terrorism, US Immigration and Border S ecurity After S ept. 11A. How did border security authorities respond on Sept. 11 and in the immediateaftermath? (duration of "immediate aftermath " tbd)

1. Consulates2. Airports3. Land borders4. Sea borders5. Foreigners in the US

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEB. How do we now assess the terrorist threat? Since Sept. 11, 2001, how havethose involved in our immigration and border security system redefined its goalsto address Islamic and other terrorism?

1. Borders and the terrorist threata. Vulnerabilities exposed by al Qaeda and othersb. Terrorist m obility's relationship w ith other transborder crimesc. Access to the US as a dimension of national policy

2. Redefined goals of the immigration and bo rder security systema. Immigration and border security frameworkb. Intelligence and watchlistingc. Identity documentsd. Screening prior to entrye. Screening at entryf. Border enforcement - north, south, seag. Internal regulation, compliance, and enforcementh. International cooperation

C. Key participants and their contributions to the redefined mission. How has theUS immigration and border security system changed to address Islamic andother terrorism?1. The White Housea. Imm ediate response and its impactb. C urrent role

c. Recommendations2. The CIA and other intelligence agenciesa. Immediate response and its impactb. Terrorist identity intelligencec. Terrorist mobility intelligenced. Watchlisting and terrorist tracking

e. Recommendations3. Department of Statea. Immediate response and its impact

b. C urrent rolec. Opportunities and vulnerabilitiesd. Recommendations4. Department of Justicea. Immediate response and its impactb. C urrent role



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c. Opportunities and vulnerabilitiesd. Recommendations5. Department of Homeland Securitya. Immediate response and its impactb. Transformation at the nation's bordersc. Key achievementsd. Key weaknessese. Recommendations6. Department of Defense and other military [tbd]

a. Immediate responseb. Current rolec. Recommendations

7. State and local authoritiesa. Immediate responseb. Current rolec. Recommendations

8. Private sector and citizensa. Immediate responseb. Current rolec. Recommendations

IV . Conclusion



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Commission SensitiveT E A M 6 M O N O G R A P H O U T L IN E

Law Enforcement an d Domestic IntelligenceI. The Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community Prior to the September 11 Attacks

A. The Members of the Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community and theirRespective Roles Prior to September 111. The legal framework governing intelligence collection and counterterrorismactivity within the United States2. The actual roles assumed by the various agencies acting within the UnitedStates

B. The FBI's Approach to Combating International Terrorist Activity in the UnitedStates prior to September 11.1. Th e FBI's collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence regardingforeign terrorist activity within the United States

a. Collecting the "dots"b. Connecting the "dots"c. Sharing the picture with others

2. The FBI's structure, traditions, andpriorities and their impact oncounterterrorism strategya. The law enforcement mentalityb. The field office structurec. The oppression of tradition

3. The impact of external forces on the FBI's counterterrorism strategya. Legal constraints - real and imagined - on theFBI's operationsb. The role of other agencies or institutions on FBI operationsi. The White House's influence

ii. Congress and the power of the purse



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Commission Sensitiveiii. Th e Department of Justice's directivesiv. The influence of fellow community members

C. TheOther Participants in the Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts - WhoThey Wereand What They Were Doing1. The CIA's NR Division2. The Department of Defense and Protection of the Hom eland3. The NSA and the Issue of U.S. Persons

II. The E xtent to W hich the Structure and Operations of the Dom estic Intelligence Com munityWas a Factor in the Failure of the Dom estic Intelligence C omm unity to Protect theHomeland on September 11A. The lack of a search for Hazmi and Mihdhar w hen they entered the United States andestablished residence in early 2000.B. New attention on Hazmi and Mihdhar but ultimately a failed search over Summer2001.C. Hijackers' stumbles and other possible missed opportunities.D. The Phoenix E C: missed opportunity or distraction?E. The failed pre-9/11 investigation into Moussaoui.

III. The Dom estic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Com munity Since the September 11 AttacksA. The Changing Roles Within the Comm unity and the Altered Legal Framew orkB. The Reinvention of the FBI Since the September 11 Attacks

1. The FBI's new collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligenceregarding foreign terrorist activity within the United Statesa. Collecting the "dots"b. Connecting the "dots"c. Sharing the picture w ith others

2. The FB I's new structure, and priorities and their impact on counterterrorism

Commission Sensitive ^


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Commission Sensitivestrategya. Prevention as the new mottob. Centralization of the counterterrorism effortc. Changing technology, incentives, and ways of thinkingd. Thechanging operational landscape - JTTFs, TTIC,

3. The im pact of external forces on the FB I's counterterrorism strategya. The newlegal landscape - its impact on effectivenessb. The changing role of other agencies or institutions on FBI operationsi. The White House's influence

ii. Congress and the power of the purseiii. TheDepartment of Justice's directivesiv. The impact of competition for the FBI's job

4. How Far the FBI Has Come and Whether It Has Come Far Enougha. Intentions versus reality - how far has the FBIcome along its intended

trajectoryb. How much further the FBI must go to meet the needs of our primarydom estic counterterrorism agency

C. The De partment of Home land Security and its intended role in the IntelligenceCommunityD. TheOther Participants in theDomestic Counterterrorism Efforts - WhoThey AreNow and What They Are Doing

1. The CIA's NR Division2. The Department of Defense and Protection of the Homeland3. The NSA and the Con tinuing Issue of U.S. Persons



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Commission SensitiveIV . Defining the Future of the Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community

A. Information Sharing - Analysis oftheWay ForwardB. The Foreign/D omestic dichotomy and resolving artificial barriers to an effectiveintelligence program.C. Mapping vulnerabilities - whose job?D . The best way to close the remaining gaps between the existing dom estic intelligencefunction and the ideal



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COMMISSION SENSITIVET E A M 7 M O N O G R A P H O U T L IN E

Civil Aviation and Transportation Security: 9/11/01 and Beyond

PART O N E : CIVIL A VIA TIO N SECURITY A N D TH E 9/11/01 HIJACKINGSI. Creation and Evolution of the Aviation Security System prior to Pan Am 103a. Threats to Commercial Aviation prior to Pan Am 1031. Domestic threats2. International threats3. Commercial aviation as terrorism target4. Hijackings

b. FAA's "Dual Mandate" and reactive naturec. International Conventionsd. Role of federal government, airlines and airports

II. Destruction of Pan Am 103 (1988) and Responsea. Change in perceived threatb. President's Commissionon Aviation Security and Terrorism (1990)III. Destruction of TWA 800 (1996) and Responsea. Change in perceived threatb. White House Commissionon Aviation Safety and Security (1997)c. Change and continuityIV. The Institutions of Civil Aviation Security on September 11, 2001: Prioritiesand Approaches

a. Congress1. Authorizing legislation2. Appropriations and funding3. Oversight (including GAO)b. Federal Aviation Administration1. Culture2. Authorities3. Organizationc. Air Carriers1. FA R 108 and Air Carrier Standard Security Program

2. Screening3. Other security responsibilitiesd. Airports1. FAR 107 and Airport Security Program2. Facility security (including workforce)3. Access control4. Law enforcement



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEPART TWO: TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001XI. Transportation Security Today: Organization

a. DHSb. TSAc. DOTd. Congresse. State and local governmentf. Private sector

XII. Transportation Security Today: Key Issuesa. Leadership and accountabilityb. Implementation ways andmeansc. Priority-setting and risk managementd. Consequence management: economic and psychological

XIII. Recommendations



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PART TWO: On-Site Response to the AttacksI. Emergency Readiness on September 10thA) General Principles1. Public sector entities: The relationship and interaction betweenFBI and ATF, NYPD and FDNY2. Building owners of WTC3. Tenants of WTC

4. PentagonB) Response upon Impact1. Tower 12. Tower 2C) Critical Choices: Command and control, Communication, and Evacuation

(8:46 prior to towers failing)1. NYPD2. FDNY3. Private sector4. NY OEM5. FEMA6. Port AuthorityD) Collapse1. NIST structural assessment of why the towers fell2. Th e command and control response3. The emergency responder perspectiveII. PentagonA) What happened (damage, fire, casualties)

B) Critical choicesIII. Consequence ManagementA) RescueB) SecurityIV . The Remains of the DayA) NY responseB) Pentagon responseC) Recovery and initial lessons learned (NY and Pentagon)PART THREE: The Response of National LeadershipI.. Crisis Management for National RecoveryA) Agenda at Cabinet level September 11B) Critical Choices:1. Continuity of Operations2. Continuity of Government



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3. Reassuring the Publica. Closing and reopening the financial marketsb. Resuming normal air trafficc. Air quality at Ground Zerod. Law enforcement measurese. The 9/20 AddressC) Process for taking decisionsD) Reflections (what worked and didn't work)

PART FOUR: Lessons Learned and Best PracticesI. Emergency response best practicesA) Command and ControlB) Evacuation strategiesC) Continuity of business/governmentII. Creating Incentives for Emergency Preparedness

A) Interagency relations: Overcoming bureaucratic rivalry1. FAA/NORAD today2. NYPD/FDNY today3. FBI/ATF todayB) Private Sector Incentives for Preparedness


sk b9 team monograph outlines fdr- draft monograph outlines 9-9-03 incl 2 withdrawal notice

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