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The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in BritishArmy Counterinsurgency in KenyaHuw Bennett a

a Defence Studies Department, King's College London at the Joint Services Command and StaffCollege, Shrivenham, UK

To cite this Article Bennett, Huw(2007) 'The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British ArmyCounterinsurgency in Kenya', Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18: 4, 638 — 664To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09592310701778514URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310701778514

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The Other Side of the COIN:Minimum and Exemplary Force

in British Army Counterinsurgencyin Kenya

HUW BENNETT

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command andStaff College, Shrivenham, UK

ABSTRACT This article argues that the British government’s deliberate exclusionof international law from colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army tosuppress opponents with little restraint. The oft-assumed national inhibitor,the principle of ‘minimum force’, was actually widely permissive. As a resultexemplary force was employed to coerce the Kikuyu civilian population in Kenyainto supporting the government rather than the insurgents. Apparently randomacts were thus strategic, and emerged in three forms: beatings and torture,murders, and forced population movement. The article argues that such harshmeasures were seen as necessary and effective; they were a form of indirect policyand did not arise from a disciplinary breakdown.

Introduction

The military stages of the Kenya Emergency, from October 1952 untilNovember 1956, represent an important example of a successful, large-scale and modern counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Alongsideother security forces, the British Army deployed nearly 10,000 troops inits efforts to defeat the Mau Mau insurgents who came from the Kikuyu,Embu and Meru populations of around 1.5 million people.1 In thecourse of the conflict, over 20,000 were killed and more than 150,000placed in detention.2 The campaign may be divided into four periods.The first phase began with the declaration of a state of Emergency on 20October 1952, and lasted until General Sir George Erskine assumedcommand on 7 June 1953. Due to a lack of intelligence and settlerdemands for harsh action, the Army participated in forced population

ISSN 0959-2318 Print/ISSN 1743-9558 Online/07/040638–27q 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09592310701778514

Correspondence Address: Huw Bennett, Defence Studies Department, King’s CollegeLondon, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Faringdon Road, Shrivenham,Swindon, SN6 8TS, UK. Email: [email protected]

Small Wars and InsurgenciesVol. 18, No. 4, 638–664, December 2007

Downloaded By: [Kings College London] At: 12:28 11 March 2010

movement, screening and the exemplary use of violence against civilians.The second phase, from June 1953 until April 1954, was characterised byErskine’s development of an operational plan. The third phase started inApril 1954 when the army directed the Emergency’s biggest screeningoperation, ANVIL, in Nairobi. The programme to villagise virtually theentire Kikuyu people was equally important in defeating Mau Mau in thisphase. The fourth phase lasted from January 1955 to November 1956,with operations directed against the remaining groups in the forests.In May 1955 General Sir Gerald Lathbury assumed command,developing special forces tactics. With Dedan Kimathi’s capture on17 November 1956, the military campaign effectively came to an end.

While the Kikuyu people continued to be targeted after June 1953,this article focuses on the types of violence evident in the first phase ofthe campaign, and the permissive legal framework that allowed it todominate. This is because there is new evidence to suggest that thearmy’s hands were not as clean as has previously been assumed.In addition, the indiscriminate violence of the first phase has beenportrayed as counter-productive and that subsequently more moderatepolicies led to military success. While the outcome of the conflict mustbe seen as deriving from all four phases, the analysis here argues that thefirst phase violence played an important role. This fits in with emergingtrends in the academic literature on counterinsurgency, offering are-evaluation of the normally-assumed basic humanity of the Britishapproach.3 Studies are beginning to question the notion that the conceptof minimum force was integral to the British tradition and largelyexplains its success.4 Some scholars employ models of organisationaladaptation to argue that exemplary, punitive force against wholepopulations resulted from incompetence and mistakes.5 But this articleagrees with what Mahnken labels the ‘revisionist view’ in questioningthe centrality of minimum force.6 As Jackson states, ‘. . . fear of the use ofstate force – played a large part in persuading many people in colonialcampaigns to cooperate with government’.7

The argument proceeds in four parts. In Part One, the contention thatBritain violated international law is examined, referring to the EuropeanConvention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Geneva Conventions. It isargued that the former applied in its entirety in Kenya from 23 October1953 until 24 May 1954, when the government lodged reservations.But the Convention was ineffective in restraining the army because theharshest repression happened before June 1953 and there is no evidencethat anyone countering the insurgency in Kenya knew it applied.The section then analyses whether the 1949 Geneva Conventionsrevolutionised COIN, as they promised to. The government ensuredGeneva’s impotence by obstruction at the negotiating table, adoptingthe view that insurgents were illegitimate opponents and delaying

British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya 639


ratification. But the British position was neither exceptional nor aperversion of international law. The secondary literature assumes thatthe replacement for international law in restraining the military wasnational and organisational culture, evident in the concept of minimumforce. This claim is re-assessed in Part Two, where it is argued that dueto being clearly laid out in doctrine, professional journals and StaffCollege syllabi, the concept was prevalent and influential. Conversely,minimum force clashed with draconian legislation introduced whenEmergencies were declared. Oversight looked more impressive in theorythan in reality, while the definition of ‘minimum’ stayed deliberatelyambiguous, and thus malleable. Part Three shows how the limitationsin law and doctrine translated into allowing repression in Kenya. In theopening phase, the army prioritised protecting white settlers frommassacre by insurgents. Fear was deployed as a strategic lever, emergingin three connected forms: beatings and torture, murder, and massevictions. The first was systematised in the ‘screening’ process, involvingclose army collaboration with the police and administration. Beatingsand torture arose from an urge to gain intelligence and as a means of‘dominating’ an area. Hundreds of people were ‘shot while attemptingto escape’, possibly a euphemism for murder. The statistics on thesekillings suggest something is amiss. On arriving in Kenya, Erskine foundwidespread indiscriminate shooting by the army. Beatings, torture andmurder further facilitated the evictions of tens of thousands fromthe Rift Valley, initiated by settlers but soon adopted as official policy. Thearmy helped punish the Kikuyu and remove them from settler inhabitedareas. The article’s concluding part argues that indiscriminate force didnot simply result from a collapse in military discipline. Rather, violenceagainst the Kikuyu was encouraged. From Cabinet level down, repressionwas believed to be the best way to deal with an insurgency.

Part One: International Law and British COIN

In her book on the Kenya Emergency, Elkins asserts that Britain violatedthe European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, the Forced Labour Convention and the GenevaConventions.8 Yet the moral outrage permeating her account is notsupported by an analysis of whether these agreements applied in thiscontext. When the objective is to understand how atrocities arise, theprevailing legal framework warrants scrutiny. It is argued here that,amongst a myriad of other causes, the perceived irrelevance of legallimitations on the use of force is a powerful facilitator of atrocity.

Although the British government resisted international law’sencroachment into counterinsurgencies in its own way, structuralflaws within international law itself allowed this. For example, the

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a binding agreement uponstates. Instead, it is a general statement of intent without the power of amandatory treaty.9 In addition, the British government was aware ofthe potential breach of the Forced Labour Convention, but legallycircumvented it by engaging detainees on works related to ending theEmergency.10 However, there is substance to Elkins’s accusationsregarding the European Convention and the Geneva Conventions.

The European Convention on Human Rights

In March 1951 Britain ratified the European Convention on HumanRights, extending it to Kenya on 23 October 1953, just over a year intothe Emergency. Simpson depicts an enthusiastic Foreign Office clashingwith a suspicious Colonial Office.11 Colonial Office mandarins viewedthe Convention as pointless for Britain, the mother of liberty whoinstinctively protected freedom.12 The Convention attracted virtually noattention in Britain at the time. It is completely absent from the Army’sEast Africa Command files and the likelihood of officers and soldiersbeing aware of its restrictions during the Emergency is virtually nil.In any case, as only inter-state complaints were allowed until 1966,nobody in Kenya could have effectively invoked the Convention.As other European powers also found themselves embroiled incounterinsurgencies during this period, they were disinclined to makecomplaints about Britain, and in fact did not.13 Derogations wereallowed during emergencies, and the government placed a latederogation on 24 May 1954. Certain things were still inviolable, suchas the right to life, and freedom from torture and slavery.14 Therefore,from 23 October 1953 until 24 May 1954 the army was restrained bythe European Convention, and to a lesser extent after this date.However, two important factors must be remembered. First, the armynever mentioned this restriction, so the Convention cannot haveconstrained the use of force in any conscious sense. And second, asargued below, the worst atrocities took place between October 1952and June 1953, when none of the legal protections applied.

The Geneva Conventions

At first sight, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventionspromised to revolutionise counterinsurgency campaigns, extendingbasic protections to non-combatants in internal wars. This sub-sectionshows how the government participated in the negotiations leading tothe Conventions with reticence, displayed hostility towards CommonArticle 3, and delayed ratification until 1957. As a result, soldiers knewvirtually nothing about the international legal restraints on their actions,largely because the government deliberately marginalised them.



While praising the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)for its work in World War II, the government distrusted its interferencein national security, fearing State sovereignty would be undermined.15

The Foreign Office contemplated attending the conference for thebenefit of other countries:

. . . the horrors of the war in Europe showed that much needs to be done touphold decent and humane standards and as the Power with far and away thebest record of all the belligerents I think we ought to be ready to speak at allthese meetings.16

Despite these intentions, the British missed the preparatory meetings inStockholm. Diplomats only arrived in Geneva after a last-minutedecision.17 Under Sir Robert Craigie’s leadership, the delegationconstantly proposed amendments and achieved unpopularity for its‘obsessive and niggling’ attitude.18 These problems largely stemmed frommisgivings about the consequences for internal security and counter-insurgency in the colonies. Even two years before signing, the governmentanticipated the impact of an internal war clause, such as on the campaignthen underway in Palestine.19 The government attempted to limit theapplicability of Common Article 3 in the colonies by delegitimising theiropponents. A report for the Army Staff College course of 1947 decried the‘campaign of violence, terror, sabotage and murder’ waged by ‘illegalarmed organisations’ in Palestine.20 The Security Service was ‘. . .concerned to ensure that we were not handicapped in dealing with such asituation as existed in Palestine’.21 Whitehall viewed the insurgency inPalestine as: ‘ . . .terrorists campaigning against law and order’.22 It wasthus assumed that international law would not apply in the colonies evenbefore Britain signed at Geneva.

While Palestine influenced thinking beforehand, Malaya loomed largeduring the talks themselves. Common Article 3 provoked lengthy andsometimesacerbicdiscussion.23 Craigie reported that ‘. . . the desirability ofapplying the Conventions tocivil war is acceptedbyall countries except theUnited Kingdom’.24 After much obstruction and argument, constructiveengagement finally ensued.25 The Cabinet found Common Article 3acceptable provided the sovereign power decided whether the clauseapplied to a conflict.26 Despite the absence of this formula from the finaltext, Craigie predicted that in practice the sovereign power would have thelast word.27 This interpretation conveniently prevented ‘subversivemovements’ gleaning encouragement from the article.28 Several monthsafter the signing ceremony, the Army Council expressed concern though:

. . .we may come under pressure to apply Article 3 of the Conventions in Malayaand would find the application of the Article in full extremely objectionable andpossibly restrictive to the operations.30

642 H. Bennett


However, this concern was mitigated by the Foreign Secretary’sinterpretation that ‘. . . the Article was not meant to apply in the case ofephemeral revolts or disturbances of the bandit type’.31 Thus, thegovernment easily dismissed its counterinsurgency campaigns fromGeneva’s orbit.

Delaying ratification until 1957 consolidated the Conventions’irrelevance. To be sure, there were other reasons for postponement.For example, clauses on prohibiting the death penalty, extendingleniency in trials of foreign nationals, and incorporating penal sanctionsinto domestic law proved troublesome.32 Protracted inter-departmentaldeliberations resulted whenever another country ratified with reser-vations.33 The War Office, Foreign Office and Lord Chancellor’sDepartment all blamed the Home Office, responsible for ratification, forthe delay.34 The Home and War Offices found difficulties in converting atreaty into domestic law.35 According to Best, the requirement toincorporate into domestic law was not appreciated until very late in theday.36 However, technical problems were expected, with an inter-departmental committee meeting several times prior to the signing, witha draft Bill ready in 1952.37 Best also points out that the legislativetimetable was busy and the Geneva Conventions Bill was a low prioritygiven the demands of post-war reconstruction.38 In 1952, for example,the Housing Bill assumed greater importance.39 Although Best offers avalid explanation, delaying ratification also conformed to concernsabout the ramifications for national security. There were voices ingovernment calling for ratification, such as the Lord Chancellor, andsections of the Foreign and War Offices.40 But these voices never provedloud enough to expedite ratification.

Was the British government’s position unreasonable and exceptional?In fact, the international legal regime allowed for such an interpretation.Before Common Article 3, the laws of war did not apply to internalconflicts. In international law, internal conflict exists in three escalatingcategories: rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. Only under belliger-ency do the laws of war apply.41 Crucially, belligerency must be formallyrecognised by either a third state or the official government.42

This requirement, obviously detrimental to insurgents, resulted fromthe relationship between the emergence of modern international law andthe rise of the state.43 States could thus crush revolts in any manner theychose.44 Recognition of belligerent status was seldom bestowed inpractice, last happening in 1902.45 When the Conventions were draftedmany states expressed concern over the ramifications of Common Article3 for sovereignty.46 Therefore, the compromise term ‘non-internationalarmed conflicts’ was adopted. The meaning of the phrase was deliberatelyambiguous, an official definition not emerging until 1997.47 Further-more, delegates differed on the level of violence necessary to trigger the



article, although they agreed that the insurgents should possess a degreeof organisation, including a coherent command structure, and be able toadhere to the article themselves.48 Even the article’s supporters admit ithas not fared well and is easily avoided.49

The evidence presented shows that a considerable weight of legalopinion thinks Common Article 3 inapplicable during the KenyaEmergency, and even if it had been, the article affords quite limitedprotections. The Army therefore retained the legal freedom to employexemplary repression in Kenya against the whole Kikuyu population.

Part Two: Minimum Force

Besides international law, moderating influences on the use of forceemanate from national culture.50 In the British case, such an influenceresided in the army’s organisational culture, in the concept of minimumforce.51 While the concept is found in international law in the principlesof proportionality and discrimination, the British army developed adistinctive view of it.52

The Prevalence of the Minimum Force Concept

Minimum force originated in English common law, and allowed theexecutive to restore the peace with no more force than strictlynecessary.53 The common law obliged citizens, including soldiers(technically citizens in uniform), to help enforce order when required.54

During disturbances, it was a commander’s duty to open fire if he couldnot otherwise halt the violence, and he had to use enough force to beeffective.55 During insurrections, the duty to stop violence by forceapplied most strongly.56 Thornton argues that the concept derived fromnational culture, mainly from two sources: pragmatism and ‘Victorianvalues’.57 These values were translated ‘via a quartet of socializingmedia: the ideal of empire, the class and public school systems, andpopular culture’.58 Rather than developing a complicated doctrine thearmy extolled individual decision making, with minimum force as asimple rule to follow in all situations.59

The army thought the concept produced results. Whereas masscasualties alienated the population, avoiding them helped win theirsupport.60 The Staff College course thought reprisals against thepopulation ‘. . . patently unjust and uncivilised’.61 ‘Respect . . . isnecessary: respect is achieved by law and order applied fairly andpromptly’; and would mean that the ‘. . . inhabitants will gradually driftapart from guerrillas’.62 However, the course recognised the difficulty inassessing the appropriate degree of force:

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Generally speaking, success in battle depends upon the use of overwhelming forceat the correct time and place. For internal security operations the reverse applies,since the most important single principle is that of minimum force.63

This position is reflected in the key 1949 booklet Imperial Policing andDuties in Aid of the Civil Power (IPDACP):

There is . . . one principle that must be observed in all types of action taken by thetroops: no more force shall be applied than the situation demands.64

At the Staff College the principle was often iterated, for example in1947: ‘To enforce law and order no one is allowed to use more forcethan is necessary’.65 A January 1949 article in the British Army Reviewencouraged ‘discipline and behaviour [that was] absolutely correct’,‘fair play’, and ‘the minimum force necessary to achieve your object’.66

An article from 1950 stressed the importance of restraint.67 In riots theuse of firearms was the last resort, for example, in self-defence. Whenused, a specified number of single shots were directed at ring-leaders andintended to wound.68 The Staff College course also enjoined ‘rigiddiscipline’ when conducting searches.69

There is therefore clear evidence that the concept was specifically laiddown, taughtat theStaffCollegeanddiscussed in theprofessional journals.Furthermore, employing excessive force was criminalised.70 Enforcementcame through the courts, which could scrutinise military activity after theevent.71 This position was taught at the Staff College, where officers weretold that self-discipline and the soldier’s ‘high code’safeguarded them fromprosecution.72 Raghaven argues that supervision by the civil power andfear of punishment ensured the concept became a reality.73

Mockaitis posits the expanding role of minimum force in doctrine.Initially, the Manual of Military Law distinguished between riots, wherethe concept applied, and insurrections, where it did not, but thedistinction became increasingly blurred.74 Moreman concurs, pointingout how ‘colonial warfare’ transformed into ‘imperial policing’ afterWorld War I.75 In Mockaitis’s view the turning point came in the 1934publication Notes on Imperial Policing, where the War Office stipulatedthat when fighting rebels away from civilian areas the principle wasirrelevant, but when dealing with riots or other situations where theinnocent were inseparable from the guilty, minimum force applied.76

Mockaitis argues that final consolidation occurred in 1949 with thepublication of IPDACP, cited above.77

Conceptual Problems with Minimum Force

The common law basis of minimum force is undeniable. However, incounterinsurgency situations it came into effect alongside emergency



laws, originating in Ireland in the nineteenth century. These suspendedincompatible laws, including basic liberties such as habeas corpus, sothe impression that minimum force worked within a liberal frameworkis disingenuous.78 Carruthers thus criticises the Emergency legislation inKenya as ‘sham legalism’.79

‘Victorian values’ should be treated with scepticism. As Ellis argues,colonial warfare hardly conformed to ideas about ‘fair play’, considering:‘. . . Africans were not quite human, and therefore beyond the pale ofImperialist morality’.80 Indeed, Thornton’s argument about nationalcharacteristics relies too heavily on rose-tinted, anecdotal evidence. Theassertion that they remain static over centuries is flawed, ignoring alteringsocial norms driven by technology, immigration and other factors.81

Rather, the Empire and British society were highly pluralistic, bringinginto question the notion of a monolithic ‘imperial culture’.82

Mockaitis’s case for the concept’s ubiquity is supported by the StaffCollege evidence. However, he exaggerates the extent to which minimumforce always applied. Official thinking supported greater latitude in theuse of force in dealing with insurrections than riots; and insurgencies wereinsurrections and not riots. Even by 1958 the Manual of Military Lawstated that: ‘The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the useof any degree of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with theinsurrection’.83 Both doctrine and practice allowed a far greater degree offorce in the colonies than in Britain. IPDACP noted how: ‘The degree offorce necessary and the methods of applying it will obviously differ verygreatly as between the United Kingdom and places overseas’.84

Mockaitis contradicts himself by admitting that two textbooks taughtat Sandhurst and the Staff College advocated harsh early action to niptrouble in the bud, in contrast to minimum force.85 In 1949 the ColonialOffice admitted the concept clashed with practice in the colonies:

. . .a number of Colonies (notably in Africa) have on their Statute Book collectivepunishment Ordinances which provide that this form of punishment may be usedto deal with offences such as cattle stealing and the like . . . There are, however, themore difficult cases of the present disturbances in Malaya, and (to quote the mostobvious example) the use of punitive bombing in the Aden Protectorate. . . . whatmight be described as ‘collective punishment’ has been used [in Malaya] – e.g., theburning of villages, and so on – and may well be used again.86

IPDACP recognised that collective punishment contravened minimumforce, but regarded this as ‘inevitable’ and ‘a necessity’.87 The conceptwas further limited by who decided exactly what the term meant: thecommander present at the time. As only soldiers knew the power of theirweapons, and the commander was present, he alone decided the degreeof force appropriate.88 In this sense, the concept’s meaning wasuncertain and arbitrary, which was considered inevitable.89 In addition,

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although soldiers remained answerable to the courts, in practice theywere hardly ever called to account after putting down insurrections.90

The 1947 Staff College course taught that so long as commandersbelieved their actions to be correct, they need not fear an enquiry.91

In order to protect soldiers, the government usually passed an Act ofIndemnity afterwards. This was ‘. . . a statute intended to maketransactions legal which were illegal when they took place, and to freethe individuals concerned from legal liability’.92 Therefore, the idea thatthe military were subject to rigorous civilian oversight and dreadedprosecution is misleading.

This section has shown how the concept of minimum force somewhatreplaced the lack of concern with international law within the army.The concept derived from common law, found clear doctrinal andeducational expression and was theoretically enforced by civilianoversight. However, the concept’s importance is generally over-emphasised. Furthermore, common practices such as collective punish-ment were contradictory, and the commander could use almost anydegree of force on condition that he justified it as necessary andminimum after the event to a civil power that hardly ever disagreed.Combined with the disregard for international law, the flexibilityinherent in minimum force meant that the army could deem necessary aconsiderably greater degree of force than is normally acknowledged.The use of harsh exemplary force in the first phase of the KenyaEmergency highlights this argument.

Part Three: Exemplary Force

This section examines three types of behaviour towards civilians duringthe Emergency’s opening months: beatings and torture, murder, andforced evictions. At this time the army prioritised protecting theminority white settler population. Almost the entire Kikuyu populationwere considered troublemakers, with the government estimating inAugust 1952 that 90 per cent were Mau Mau members. The armycharacterised the tribe’s attitude as ‘sullen and unco-operative’.93

In consequence, the military means for combating the perceived threatwere static defence of settler property, mobile patrols to kill Mau Maugroups, and measures to intimidate the population into moving awayfrom vulnerable settler areas and shifting their support to thegovernment. Fear became a strategic lever for combating the insurgency.

Beatings and Torture

From October 1952, the security forces were known to flog Mau Maususpects.94 This occurred in the context of a dire lack of intelligence about



who supported the insurgency, and a mindset that deemed physical forcelegitimate. While there is no evidence of a direct order authorising abuse,one observer described it as ‘almost a routine measure’.95 Assumingcommand in June 1953, General Erskine discovered a ‘tendency to takeprisoners and interrogate them with a view to extracting information byforce’.96 Writing to the War Office, he observed: ‘I am quite certainprisoners were beaten to extract information’.97

The typically combined screening operations were notorious for theirviolence. 98 Army doctrine stipulated that soldiers surround an area,move those inside the cordon into cages, and mount guard whilst thecivil authorities screened people for their political sympathies.99

The District Administration arranged screening teams, which included‘hooded men’ – disguised informants whose opinions supplementedofficial sources.100 The teams assumed everyone guilty until proveninnocent. All Kikuyu over the age of about 14 were screened at somestage.101 Elkins shows that the process commonly involved beatings andtorture.102 Confirmatory evidence from Branch and Evans suggests theexperience often proved brutal.103 The proportion of people beaten ortortured during screening will likely remain unknown. However,Governor Baring described how ‘. . . numbers of Africans weremanhandled and the sympathies of loyal Kikuyu alienated’.104

The operational reports for the first months are incomplete, socomprehensively cataloguing the army’s activities is impossible.105

However, the army clearly played an important part in screening. During1952 the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, various battalions of the King’s AfricanRifles (KAR) and the Kenya Regiment rounded up at least 5,892people.106 A precise figure is elusive because reports sometimes record a‘large number [of] arrests’.107 The experience must have been frustratingfor soldiers as, despite rounding up large numbers, few arrests were made.After taking 3,800 prisoners during a raid in Nanyuki in November, only87 were arrested.108 Sometimes no arrests were made.109 Nairobi notedhow ‘. . . info restricts arrests on many occasions’.110

Screening continued into 1953.111 In the first three months, at least2,059 people were collected by the Kenya Regiment, Lancashires, 4thKAR, 6th KAR, 23rd KAR, 26th KAR and East Africa Training Centretroops in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces, while securing arrestsremained problematic.112 Besides identifying Mau Mau, the processaimed at displaying government power. A series of sweeps in North Nyeriand Embu in late June/early July stated the object: ‘. . . to obtain info,screen labour and generally dominate the area’.113 At this point the armydeployed around 10,000 men in the Emergency areas, not all of whomwere operational.114 Dominating the whole area continuously in aphysical sense was impossible.115 The police were notorious for usingtheir rifles first and asking questions later.116 A 1954 parliamentary

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report noted their ongoing ‘brutality and malpractice’.117 Clayton viewsthe Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) as the worst offenders.118 By 19 June1953, the army and police in combined operations had screened at leastanother 11,933 people.119 The KPR frequently worked with the military;knowing precisely how often is impossible because the units involved areoften unspecified.120 As mentioned, according to doctrine the army didnot conduct the screening itself. There are four grounds for questioningthe assumption that this vindicates the army. First, rounding up may haveinvolved as much violence as screening, especially as time passed andpeople realised what being caught in the net entailed. Secondly, somearmy officers conducted questioning, via their integration in the JointArmy-Police Operational Intelligence (JAPOIT) system. A directive from28 May 1953 banned the running of screening teams or the conducting ofinterrogations ‘. . . which are at present being carried out, in some cases,by JAPOIT officers’.121 Erskine noted how some of the screening teamsused methods of torture.122 Thirdly, screening could not have happenedwithout military help. Fourthly, the army directed the Emergency’slargest screening effort: Operation ANVIL.123 Even when abstainingfrom mistreating people themselves, soldiers sometimes turned a blindeye to the excesses of the administration and the police, although theextent of this is obscure. The analysis of beatings and torture offered heresuggests that this type of violence fell into a pattern and fulfilled astrategic purpose: showing the population what happened to thosesuspected of supporting the insurgency.

Murder

The civilian population also suffered from terrorisation by murder.On 27 April 1953 a detachment of 7th KAR, who had repeatedly beatenand robbed labourers on a farm near Nyeri, killed four men who ranwhen fired on. Their infuriated employer explained that running awaywas natural after recent Mau Mau attacks in the area.124 The armyexpressed regret and said the Provincial Commissioner was investi-gating, a curious decision as this should have been within the remit ofthe military police.125 On 20 April 1953, Governor Baring informed hissuperiors in Whitehall that:

430 Mau Mau terrorists or suspects have been shot while attempting to escape orwhile resisting arrest during the past six months. A number of these have beenpositively identified as wanted for murders and other criminal offences.126

This came in response to a Colonial Office query, expressing an‘unpleasant feeling’ about the number of reports mentioning Africansthus shot. Whitehall wondered whether this was a euphemism forunnecessary, indiscriminate shooting.127 Leonard Gill, a settler with



wide experience in the KPR, the Kenya Regiment and the KAR, recallsthe phrase as slang for a suspect having been murdered.128 Rawcliffesuggests soldiers preferred killing suspects rather than risk them beingliberated by a judicial system considered too lenient.129 In any case, thefigures supplied by Baring do not add up. The available reports statethat by 20 April 1953 the security forces had shot whilst attempting toescape or resisting arrest a total of 77 persons. Of these the army killedseven, wounded three and shot four with unspecified consequences. Thepolice and other civil forces figures were, respectively, 17, 1 and 5. Inthe same period, a further 40 were shot by unspecified security forces(24 shot dead, nine wounded and seven shot with unrecordedresults).130 Clearly, this is a major discrepancy with the figure providedby Baring on 20 April, but the killings continued after this date.131 Thearchives give no indication as to how he arrived at the 430 figure. In thenext few days Baring provided the Colonial Office with additionalstatistics. They were just as confusing. The Home Guard had killed ‘47Mau Mau terrorists’ while resisting arrest or attempting to escape, andanother 12 were killed by the Home Guard and police together.132

Three days later Baring presented Whitehall with further information.The security forces killed 29 people who failed to halt after beingchallenged in the Prohibited Areas, created at the start of 1953. In theSpecial Areas, extant since 3 January, the position was that:

. . . 335 persons have been shot under the provisions of Emergency Regulation No.22B while resisting arrest or attempting to escape, 270 of them in native land unitsand forest reserves, and 65 in settled areas. Of this total of 364 persons shot [sic],224 have been identified subsequently as persons wanted for murder or otherserious Mau Mau crimes.133

These figures do not conform to the number initially declared. Thestatistics in Erskine’s final report state that from 21 October 1952 until 18April 1953, the security forces killed 522 and captured wounded 125.134

Could 430 of these have been shot attempting to escape? On the whole, thereports imply either confusion or concealment. Baring possibly issued the430 figure in order to show he had the situation under control, or becausethe real figure was higher and he wished to down-play the extent of thekillings. Evidence submitted to the McLean Inquiry further suggests illegalshootings.135 In a directive issued by Baring on 25 February, he noted thatdespite an increased number of kills inflicted in recent weeks, details ‘. . .have not, however, been reported as promptly as they should have been’.He required all kills to be notified to thenearestpolice station,whichwouldpass the information up the chain of command.136 The wording isambiguous, but could mean kills were not being recorded in some cases.

Another explanation for the shootings was that they happened due topanic or misunderstandings. It was one thing for Regulations to require

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people to stand still when ordered, but when many Kikuyu rightly fearedrough treatment or prolonged detention (potentially without trial), it isnot surprising that some ran away. For example, in late March 1953 aKenya Regiment patrol shot dead a man carrying a panga who ran whenchallenged; a note from the authorities permitting him to carry the itemwas found on his body.137 In another incident, a man in the Thomson’sFalls area was shot dead leaving the forest. The patrol subsequentlydiscovered he worked for the Forestry Department.138 Thus, theassumption that running away always implied guilt was flawed.Compounding the problem, hardly any soldiers spoke Kikuyu. Thelingua franca of the KAR was Swahili, and information forarriving British battalions gave some key phrases in the language,including ‘simama’ for stop.139 In a raid in Kipipiri in December 1952a Kenya Regiment soldier with a Lancashire’s patrol shot dead a man who‘. . . ran away despite 3 orders to stop in Swahili’.140 The fact that BritishArmy units were instructed to call people to halt in a language foreign tothem, without teaching soldiers any basic Kikuyu, is telling.

While the number of these shootings will probably never be known,General Erskine soon realised the extent of the problem. His arrival inKenya marked the end of the first phase, and he was in a good positionto assess events in that period. After arriving in Kenya, he undertook asystematic tour of the troubled areas, meeting officials, settlers andKikuyu chiefs in the Rift Valley Province, Central Province andNairobi.141 These meetings caused him to issue an order on 23 Junecalling for tight discipline, according to a letter to his wife. In the sameletter, Erskine stated that: ‘There had been a lot of indiscriminateshooting before I arrived and one of the first things I did was to stopthe casualty competition which was going on’.142 Both the police andthe army were implicated – in contrast to assertions by Clayton that theKPR were the sole culprits. In a letter to the Secretary of State for War inDecember 1953, Erskine was so concerned about the prospect of theimpending McLean Inquiry examining army conduct in the earlymonths that he thought ‘. . . the revelation would be shattering’. Theletter continued: ‘There is no doubt that in the early days, i.e. from Oct1952 until last June there was a great deal of indiscriminate shooting byArmy and Police’.143 As with beatings and torture, a central reason forsuch action stemmed from the urge to intimidate the entire Kikuyupeople. However, accidents, unclear rules of engagement, poorsupervision and competition for kills were also factors.

Evictions

Government support for evicting ‘squatters’ from the Rift Valleyaccelerated the brutality of the campaign. For many years, hundreds of



thousands of Africans worked on white settler farms in the Rift Valley inreturn for small leaseholds. Many Africans regarded the Europeans astemporary residents, and unrest increased in the years before theEmergency.144 Not all settlers ejected the Kikuyu, but a substantial factiontook advantage of the Emergency to remove large numbers, whom theyconsidered a serious threat.145 Mau Mau were thought to frighten offother sources of labour, and evicting all Kikuyu was the answer.146 Evansargues that in addition to settler leader Michael Blundell’s advice to get ridof the Kikuyu, the police expedited the process.147 Today, this is termedethnic cleansing and, as Valentino notes, it often occurs in reaction to areal, though exaggerated, perception of threat.148 In Kenya the clamourfor action against the Kikuyu increased with every well-publicised,gruesome settler murder. For example, after Commander Meiklejohn wasmurdered in November 1952, the Lancashires helped remove 2,950suspects from the area.149 Forcing people from their homes can requireconsiderable coercion.150 In this respect, the widespread beatings, tortureand shootings served not only to intimidate the Kikuyu generally, but toencourage their departure to the Reserves, mainly from the Rift Valley.Therefore, labelling the opening months as a ‘phoney war’, as Heather andPercox have done, is inaccurate.151 The situation reports show that in theother two provinces under Emergency Regulations, Central and Nairobi,troops carried out patrols, screening and static duties, but were notoffensively active as in the Rift Valley. According to Rawcliffe, settleractions became government policy in late November 1952.152 Forexample, in late November 4,324 Kikuyu were removed from theThomson’s Falls District after Mau Mau murdered a European inLeshau.153 Screening and evictions shared a reputation for brutality.On 15 December, it became official policy to evict Kikuyu from areaswhere suspected Mau Mau offences had occurred.154 One observerdecried the ‘frequent brutality with which the agents of law and orderenforced the evictions’. This experience, exacerbated by the wretchedconditions in the transit camps some Kikuyu passed through, swelledsupport for the insurgents.155 The overcrowded Reserves offered littlerelief at the end of the ordeal.156 By the end of April 1953 70,000–100,000 people had left the Rift Valley and Central Provinces for theReserves, either through forcible eviction or voluntarily.157 Consideringthe general terrorisation of the population at the time, however, the word‘voluntarily’ acquires a rather novel meaning.

The literature generally refrains from distinguishing between thevarious security forces in analysing the evictions. Apart from acontemporary reference to the ‘thousands of unwanted people’ carriedaway in ‘army lorries’, there is scant mention of the army.158 A reportfrom Nairobi confirms the army assisted in ‘escorting Kikuyu expelledto Reserve from [the] Thomson Falls area’.159 This continued through

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1952 and into 1953.160 In February 1953 the Lancashires started to‘evacuate’ Kikuyu from around Ol Kalou in the Rift Valley.161

The operation lasted for several days, with hundreds moved.162 By themiddle of the month commanders noted the deleterious effect of the‘continued forcible evac[uation]’, promoting increased Mau Maurecruitment and outbreaks of lawlessness.163 Yet the movement to theReserves continued nonetheless.164 A communication from Baringsuggests the government refused to stop the flow in order to appeasesettler opinion, despite knowing it bolstered the insurgents and divertedefforts from offensive operations. Perversely, Baring argued that in orderto avoid mass dismissals by farmers, the government would move theminstead.165 A report by Major-General Hinde suggests the governmentfeared the usurpation of state power.166 The Commissioner for the RiftValley documented the ‘additional impetus’ given by ‘certain KenyaPolice Reserve officers’ in the process.167 These were the men the armycooperated with so closely; such as in the combined removal of 500people from Kariakor in Nairobi.168 As noted above, militaryintelligence officers participated in screening; in some cases they alsoundertook administrative tasks supporting evictions.169 Not untilSeptember 1953 did the government end mass ‘repatriation’ of people toover-crowded areas many had never seen before.170 By then the settlersfelt more protected in their homes and the government had succeeded inisolating the ‘disease’ of Mau Mau from other tribes.171 GeneralErskine, who loathed the settlers, nevertheless thought that in purgingthe Rift Valley, the army’s job had been made easier.172

This section has argued that for the Kikuyu, the first phase ofthe Emergency was far from a ‘phoney war’. The security forcesprioritised protecting the settlers and viewed the entire Kikuyupopulation as suspect. Beatings were rife and carried out both toimprove the poor intelligence situation and to intimidate people.Although we cannot be sure of the extent of illegal killings, the figures onpeople ‘shot trying to escape’ are suspect and support Erskine’sacknowledgement that indiscriminate shooting was widespread.The mass evictions, mainly in the Rift Valley, were catalysed by theEmergency, and the army participated in the process. It seems highlylikely that the prevalent beatings, torture and killings were intendedto speed up evictions. The next section will consider the argumentsagainst viewing this opening phase as simply a breakdown in commandand control.

Part Four: Understanding Exemplary Force – Beyond Poor Command

A common explanation in the secondary literature for the army’sbrutality during the opening months blames a weak command and



control system.173 For example, Elkins describes the security forces as‘a splintered group’ who each acted according to their own desires.174

Here Elkins exaggerates as the emphasis on combined operations inthis article has thus far shown. However, Colonel G.A. Rimbault,appointed Personal Staff Officer to Baring at the end of December1952, lacked the seniority and staff fully to coordinate operations.Rimbault’s appointment came after Baring’s request for a Director ofOperations was turned down by the Colonial Secretary and the Chiefsof Staff, who did not think the situation warranted it.175 Baringrecognised Rimbault’s ineffectiveness and next time went straight tothe top, appealing to Churchill for a more senior commander.176

Major-General W.R.N. Hinde, appointed Chief Staff Officer to theGovernor on 1 February 1953 and promoted Director of Operationson 11 April, similarly failed to coordinate effectively.177 Hindeinitiated some major policies, and influenced Erskine’s understandingof the campaign. But he lacked both authority and a large, efficientstaff organisation. Senior army commanders recognised the problemwithout making any quick remedial moves. For example, on 12January 1953, General Sir Brian Robertson, responsible for East Africaas part of his larger Middle Eastern command, said lack of leadershipand coordination were major problems.178 The Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff concurred after seeing the situation in Kenya for himself:

. . . one Brigadier with an attenuated staff and no signals cannot exercise effectivecommand over five equivalent battalions deployed on a Company or Platoon basisover an area about 130 miles long and 120 miles wide.179

A striking feature in the archival record is the almost complete absenceof reference from, or about, either General Robertson at MELF orGeneral Cameron at East Africa Command. Neither of these men tookany responsibility for events in Kenya, instead leaving a militarilyinexperienced Governor to make decisions.180 Following Cameron’sreport on 30 April and Nicholson’s on 16 May, the War Office decidedupon Erskine’s appointment with increased powers.181 At the battalionlevel, the problem was worse in King’s African Rifles units, which wereunder-strength, including officers. The governments of East Africaslowly started increasing unit strengths after some prompting from theColonial Office.182 When Erskine assumed command in June 1953 hecriticised the normal practice of attaching small army units to the policeand administration, on the grounds that it removed soldiers from thecontrol of senior officers, with ‘evil results’.183

This raises the question of whether military discipline effectivelycollapsed during the first phase of the Emergency. In the NationalArchives, the detailed records on discipline cover the problems

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experienced in ‘B’ Company, 5th KAR.184 No other courts martialproceedings that took place during the Emergency are available, nor areany records relating to the Special Investigations Branch of the militarypolice. However, three other sources permit a limited appreciation of thenumber and type of courts martial held during the first phase. The firstof these is a report produced by the Judge Advocate General’s Office inresponse to a question asked in the House of Commons on the numberof courts martial in Kenya since January 1952.185 The file givesthe names of those tried, their units, the date and place of the trial, thecharges and the sentence. Unfortunately, the date and place ofthe offence is not included. More importantly, many of the chargesare vague, stating for example, ‘Section 40’, referring to the Army Act1881. The report lists 37 court martials held between 20 October 1952and 1 July 1953, summarised in Figure 1 below.

Of these, only 14 offences, those covered by Sections 18(5) andSection 40, might relate to violent crimes against civilians. They werecommitted by only ten individuals. Section 18(5) reads: ‘. . . any otheroffence of a fraudulent nature not before in this Act particularlyspecified, or of any other disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent, orunnatural kind’.186 Section 40 offences were ‘. . .any act, conduct,disorder, or neglect, to the prejudice of good order and militarydiscipline’.187 There is no knowing from the information availablewhether these 14 offences were committed against Africans, Europeansettlers or members of the security forces. The report is problematic foranother reason: it only records charges brought against two members ofEast African units, despite the fact that by 1 July 1953, six battalions ofthe KAR had been on operations since the start of the Emergency, inaddition to the Kenya Regiment, the East Africa Training Centre, theEast Africa Armoured Car Squadron and the 156th (East African)Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery. Surely this is an underestimation of thelevel of crime in these units. On 11 December 1952, Sergeant G. Skinnerwas convicted in Nairobi of a Section 40 offence, and punished with asevere reprimand and forfeiture of seniority.188 Sergeant W. Quaylesuffered a reprimand and pay stoppages on 16 December in Gilgil forinfringing Section 40.189 Another source, a list submitted to the McLeanInquiry, shows two further cases where soldiers were punished,although not in court, this time definitely for crimes against civilians.The commander of 70 Brigade reprimanded Second-Lieutenant Greenof the Kenya Regiment, attached to 7th KAR, for assaulting apostmaster at Mweiga, on an unknown date. Major Sinclair Scott, 23rdKAR, was ‘. . . under investigation on a charge of bodily harm to anAfrican on 29 Jan 53’. Interestingly:



The evidence was not sufficient to support the charge as there had been no cleardirective from Higher Authority concerning disposal of prisoners. The C-in-Cquashed the charge but saw the officer and impressed on him the importance ofa correct attitude.190

In other words, the officer escaped punishment not because he wasinnocent, but because there existed at the time no order prohibiting himfrom mistreating prisoners. This attitude is remarkable, and could wellexplain why there were so few courts martial in the opening phase. Theavailable evidence, though incomplete, suggests that while the militaryauthorities wished to preserve discipline in general, for example bycharging men with insubordination, drunkenness and the like,mistreating the Kikuyu population was considered permissible. There-fore, the army was not out of control, but rather permitted

Figure 1. Court martials in Kenya, 20 October 1952 to 1 July 1953

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indiscriminate, terrorising violence against the Kikuyu population.Policies such as screening and evictions impressed upon soldiers the ideathat the Kikuyu should be coerced into dropping their support for MauMau. Often this required beatings, and sometimes torture and murder.The lack of a strong command system was seen as problematic becauseit hindered efficient repression, not because the army had got out ofcontrol and suffered from poor discipline. This interpretation issupported by the notes of the Cabinet Secretary on remarks made byColonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton in May 1953: ‘Opposn. casethat repressive measures are driving loyal K. [Kikuyu] to M.M. [MauMau] – proved to be opposite of truth’.191 The direction of policy fromthe highest level therefore supported the exemplary use of repressionagainst the whole Kikuyu population. The restraints imposed byinternational law and minimum force had little place in the army’scounterinsurgency in Kenya.

Conclusion

The argument presented in this article posits that it is time for a re-evaluation of the significance of minimum force in British counter-insurgency, as illustrated by the Kenya Emergency case. The armyprofited from the concept’s marked ambiguity and ineffective civilianenforcement mechanisms. Minimum force meant something quitedifferent in insurrections and in the colonies. The army preferred to ‘niptrouble in the bud’, immediately crushing the insurgency with a heavyhand. Doctrine stated that ‘no more force shall be applied than thesituation demands’.192 In Kenya, soldiers thought the situationdemanded a great deal of force, and commanders were permitted toreach their own interpretations of the concept. Manifested in beatings,torture and murder, the pattern of violence suggests a deliberatelyindiscriminate targeting policy despite the absence of a direct order fromthe historical record. These two types of force were designed tointimidate, garner intelligence in an environment where the Mau Mauwere not well understood, and speed up the eviction process, thusprotecting the settlers. Top-level commanders in the first phase exerciseda loose grip on the campaign compared to Erskine’s style later on. Butthis should not be mistaken for degeneration into unauthorised, randomviolence by soldiers gone wild. Soldiers were punished for mundaneoffences, but seldom for those against Kikuyu persons. Perhaps then, itis appropriate to regard the period from October 1952 to June 1953 asone where an unofficial policy of brutality emerged. Even ifindiscriminate violence was not ordered – and it may be that suchorders were destroyed or only given orally – the persistent failure topunish soldiers constituted a policy by default.



Contrary to some ahistorical assertions, these actions were notagainst international law as it stood in the 1950s. The calculatedrelegation of the European and Geneva Conventions precisely indicatesthe disdain the government held for insurgents and their determinationto fight them with limited restraint. Yet such an attitude was hardlyunusual, nor did it demand a complicated manipulation of internationallaw. Without descending to genocide, the security forces, including thearmy, relied upon broadly indiscriminate repression to produce results.Today, minimum force has come to be seen as a guarantee of success incounterinsurgency operations. In Kenya in the early 1950s, exemplaryforce against the whole population from which the insurgency aroseseemed the desirable course of action. Ultimately though, this coursecould not be sustained, and the question of whether decolonisationbecame a necessity as a result is still as pressing today as 50 years ago.The research results offered in this article highlight the need to dissolveany residual complacency about the dominance of minimum force andthe requirement to evaluate its very meaning in the post-war period. Butthis should not lead to the outright rejection of minimum force as auseful analytical category, or the impression that British methods wereas brutal as possible, even genocidal. In all four phases of the Emergencythe army could quite easily have employed massive force and killed amuch larger number of people had it wished to. The campaign was notone of annihilation, but of coercion against a whole population wherethe insurgents could not easily be identified. As the campaignprogressed, and Mau Mau were driven away from the population intothe forest areas, more discriminate force could be used. Without theearly brutality though, this may never have come about.

NOTES

1. As the Kikuyu were by far the largest group and operations were directed mainly againstthem, the term ‘Kikuyu’ is used in this article to refer to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru peoples.

2. David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End ofEmpire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005) pp.4–5.

3. Beatrice Heuser, ‘The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of StrategicStudies Vol.30, No.1 (2007) p.157.

4. Ashley Jackson, ‘British Counter-insurgency in History: A Useful Precedent?’ British ArmyReview Vol.139 (2006) p.15.

5. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malayaand Vietnam (London: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Rod Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong:The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment toNorthern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)’, Journal of Strategic Studies Vol.30, No.1(2007) p.74.

6. Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: An American View’,Defense and Security Analysis Vol.23, No.2 (2007) p.228.

7. Jackson, ‘British Counter-insurgency in History’ p.17.

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8. Elkins, Caroline. Britain’s Gulag. The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London: JonathanCape, 2005) pp.96–7, 117, 129–30, 135, 304, 315.

9. A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire. Britain and the Genesis of theEuropean Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.11.

10. On the Forced Labour Convention in Kenya, see: National Archives, Kew, Surrey, UK[hereafter NA] LAB 13/2714 and NA: CAB 128/27. Elkins disagrees with this interpretation,viewing circumvention as illegitimate. Elkins, Britain’s Gulag p.304.

11. Simpson, Human Rights pp.2–6, 808, 838.12. Ibid. pp.17, 22.13. Ibid. pp.4, 809, 824.14. Ibid. pp.874–81.15. Geoffrey Best, ‘Making the Geneva Conventions of 1949: The View from Whitehall’. In:

Christophe Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and RedCross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (Geneva/The Hague: ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff,1984) pp.6, 8–10.

16. Foreign Office minute, 3 July 1946, cited in Best, ‘Making the Conventions’ p.8.17. Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp.81, 170.18. Ibid. pp.89, 100.19. NA: WO 32/12524: Memo by Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on the

Revision of the Geneva Conventions [hereafter ICRGC], 24 Sept. 1947 p.2.20. Joint Services Command and Staff College Archive [hereafter JSCSC]: Army Staff College

syllabus, 1947.21. NA: WO 32/12526: Extract from minutes of ICRGC meeting, 17 Sept. 1947 p.3.22. Ibid. p.2.23. Best, War and Law p.96; NA: LO 2/674: Extracts from Sir Robert Craigie’s Report, 1949

para. 41.24. NA: LO 2/674: Letter from Sir Robert Craigie to H.A. Caccia, Foreign Office, 9 May 1949.25. Best, War and Law pp.171–74.26. NA: LO 2/674: Letter from Sir Robert Craigie to H.A. Caccia, 9 May 1949.27. NA: CAB 130/46: Letter from Craigie to Caccia, 9 May 1949.28. NA: LO 2/674: Extracts from Sir Robert Craigie’s Report related to points raised in the

Cabinet, 1949, para. 43.30. NA: WO 32/13616: Army Council Secretariat brief for Secretary of State for War, 1 Dec.

1949.31. NA: CAB 130/46: Memo from Foreign Secretary to the Cabinet, 25 Nov. 1949 p.11.32. NA: LCO 2/4312: Concluding notes of the ICRGC, 28 Sept. 1950; Minutes of ICRGC

meeting, 24 May 1951; Records of ICRGC for 1948–49 in: TS 46/103.33. See the inter-departmental correspondence in: NA: LCO 2/4313.34. NA: LCO 2/4312: Concluding notes of the ICRGC, 28 Sept. 1950; NA: PREM 11/2205:

Letter from Lord Woolton to Marquess of Salisbury blaming the Home Office, 12 March1957; NA: WO 32/18511: Material from 1957 on the Bill’s preparation.

35. NA: WO 32/18511: Army Council Secretariat extract from the conclusions of the 56th (51)meeting of the Cabinet, 30 July 1951; NA: LCO 2/4309: Undated commentary.

36. Best, ‘Making the Geneva Conventions’ pp.11, 15.37. For the details see: NA: WO 163/329; Draft Bill in: NA: HO 45/25944.38. Best, ‘Making the Geneva Conventions’ p.5.39. On the Conventions’ low priority see: NA: LCO 2/4313 for 1956–57; NA: WO 32/18511:

Army Council Secretariat extract from the conclusions of the 17th (52) meeting of theCabinet, 14 Feb. 1952.

40. NA: WO 32/18511: Army Council Secretariat extract from the conclusions of the 56th (51)meeting of the Cabinet, 30 July 1951; NA: LCO 2/4312: Letter from C.G. Kemball, ForeignOffice, to D.W. Dobson, Lord Chancellor’s Office, 26 Feb. 1952; NA: WO 32/18511: Letterfrom C.G. Kemball, Foreign Office, to S.S.J. Evans, War Office, 29 Oct. 1953; NA: WO32/18511: Letter from Evans to Kemball, 11 Dec. 1953.

41. Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002) p.4.

42. Anthony Cullen, ‘Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict inInternational Humanitarian Law’, Military Law Review Vol.183 (2005) p.66.



43. Martin van Creveld, ‘The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War’, Journal ofContemporary History Vol.26, Nos.3–4 (1991) p.412.

44. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict p.13.45. Ibid. p.19.46. Laura Lopez, ‘Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Humanitarian Law to

Internal Armed Conflicts’, New York University Law Review Vol.69, Nos.4–5 (1994) p.930.47. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict pp.25, 31, 34, 42.48. Steven R. Ratner, and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in

International Law: beyond the Nuremberg legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)p.96; Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict p.36.

49. Joseph B. Kelly, ‘Legal Aspects of Military Operations in Counterinsurgency’, Military LawReview Vol.21 (1963) p.100; Detter, The Law of War p.201.

50. van Creveld, ‘The Clausewitzian Universe’ p.424; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999) p.68.

51. Huw Bennett, ‘The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Army’s Post-War Counter-Insurgency Experience’, Defense and Security Analysis Vol.23, No.2 (2007) p.145.

52. Ian Clark, Waging War: a Philosophical Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)pp.35, 43.

53. Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century(London: Faber and Faber, 1986) p.19; Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency,1919–60 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990) p.18.

54. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.55. Ibid; Townshend, Civil Wars p.19.56. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1945.57. Rod Thornton, ‘Understanding the Cultural Bias of a Military Organization and its Effect on

the Process of Change: A Comparative Analysis of the Reaction of the British and UnitedStates Armies to the Demands of Post-Cold War Peace Support Operations in the Period,1989–1999’, PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2001 p.128.

58. Ibid. pp.74, 83, 89.59. Ibid. p.75.60. David A. Charters, ‘From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British Adaptation to Low-Intensity

Operations’. In: David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (eds.), Armies in Low-IntensityConflict: A Comparative Analysis (London: Brassey’s, 1989) p.223.

61. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.62. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1945.63. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1948.64. War Office. Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (London: Army Council,

1949) p.5.65. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabi, 1947 and 1948.66. Anonymous. ‘Hints on Internal Security’, British Army Review Vol.1 (1949) pp.54–61.67. C.J. Gittings, ‘The Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay, 1949’, The Army Quarterly LIX/2 (1950)

pp.161–77.68. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1948.69. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.70. War Office, Manual, 1929 Edition p.246. The 1958 edition altered this paragraph only for

clarity’s sake. War Office. Manual of Military Law, Part II, 8th Edition (London: HMSO,1958) Section V p.1.

71. Townshend, Civil Wars p.19.72. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.73. Srinath Raghaven, ‘Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security, c. 1919–39’

Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.16, No.3 (2005) pp.259–60.74. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency pp.18, 24.75. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947

(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) p.xvii.76. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency p.24.77. Ibid. p.25.78. Simpson, Human Rights pp.78, 84.

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79. Susan Carruthers, ‘Being Beastly to the Mau Mau’, Twentieth Century British HistoryVol.16, No.4 (2005) p.494.

80. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (London: Pimlico, 1993) p.106.81. Thornton, Understanding the Cultural Bias of a Military p.74.82. Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from

the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2005) p.xiv.83. War Office, Manual of Military Law Part II, 1958 Edition, Section V p.10.84. War Office, Imperial Policing and DACP p.5.85. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency p.26.86. NA: LCO 2/4309: Letter from Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, to C.G. Kemball, Foreign

Office, 25 June 1949. Emphasis in original.87. War Office, Imperial Policing and DACP p.35.88. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947, ‘Commander’ denotes anyone in command of

other soldiers.89. Ibid.90. Simpson, Human Rights p.61.91. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.92. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1949.93. IWMD: Erskine Papers 75/134/4: Booklet ‘Notes for British Units Coming to Kenya’, GHQ

East Africa, no date pp.5–6.94. D.H. Rawcliffe, The Struggle for Kenya (London: Victor Gollancz, 1954) p.67. This may

have resulted from the common settler practice of whipping disobedient employees. See:Kathryn Tidrick, Empire and the English Character (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990) p.140. Manythanks to John Lonsdale for bringing this point to my attention.

95. Ibid p.68. Corporal punishment was only abolished as a judicial instrument in Britain in1948. See Peter Hennessey Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Allen Lane,2006) p.86.

96. IWMD: Erskine Papers, Report to the Secretary of State for War, ‘The Kenya Emergency’,signed Erskine, 2 May 1955, para. 18.

97. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.98. Rawcliffe, Struggle for Kenya p.68.99. War Office, Imperial Policing and DACP pp.37–41.

100. Greet Kershaw, Mau Mau from Below (Oxford: James Currey, 1997) p.250.101. Ibid. p.325.102. Elkins, Britain’s Gulag pp.62–90.103. Daniel Branch, ‘Loyalism during the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, 1952–60’, D.Phil diss.,

University of Oxford, 2005 p.149; Evans, Peter. Law and Disorder, or Scenes of Life in Kenya(London: Secker and Warburg, 1956) p.205.

104. NA: CO 822/501: Note of a meeting held by Secretary of State, 15 Dec. 1952.105. Reports were compiled by Force Nairobi and Northern Area. Force Nairobi reports do not

exist for 9 Jan. to 3 Feb. 1953, and 24 April to 1 May 1953. There are no reports for NorthernArea before 1 Feb. 1953.

106. See reports in: NA: WO 276/466.107. For example: NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 23 Dec. 1952.108. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 2 Nov. 1952.109. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa. 24 Feb.

1953.110. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 18 Nov. 1952.111. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa. 15 Feb.

1953.112. See: NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 9 Jan. 1953; NA: WO

276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa. 24 Feb. 1953.113. NA: WO 276/202: GHQ East Africa Operational Instruction No. 2, 18 June 1953; NA: WO

276/436: 39 Brigade Operational Instruction, 4 April 1953.114. NA: WO 276/55: Approximate distribution of forces in East Africa Command, 30 April

1953.115. Branch, ‘Loyalism during the Mau Mau rebellion’ p.96.



116. David Throup, ‘Crime, Politics and the Police in Colonial Kenya, 1939–63’. In: DavidM. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.) Policing and Decolonisation: politics, nationalismand the police, 1917–65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) p.147.

117. NA: PREM 11/696: Report to Secretary of State for the Colonies by the ParliamentaryDelegation to Kenya, Jan. 1954. Cmd. 9081.

118. Anthony Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya. A study of military operations against MauMau (Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1976) p.45.

119. Figure compiled from: NA: WO 276/337, NA: WO 276/466, NA: WO 276/467, and NA:WO 276/468.

120. For examples of Army–KPR operations, see: NA: WO 276/467: Sitrep from Force Nairobi toMideast, 24 March 1953; NA: WO 276/467: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Troopers andMideast, 24 April 1953; NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to ForceNairobi, circa. 27 Feb. 1953.

121. NA: WO 276/200: Emergency Directive No. 6, Operational Intelligence, 28 May 1953.122. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.123. See: Anderson, Histories of the Hanged pp.200–212.124. Oxford Development Records Project, Rhodes House, University of Oxford [hereafter

ODRP]: Sir William Robert Hinde papers, MSS. Afr.s.1580. Volume 1, Director ofOperations Department correspondence, Letter from H.T.D. Hickman to Hinde, 30 April1953.

125. ODRP: Hinde Papers, Vol.1, Letter from Hinde to Hickman, 26 May 1953.126. NA: CO 822/474: Telegram from Baring to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 April 1953.

Also cited in Edgerton, Robert, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (London: Collier Macmillan,1989) p.159.

127. NA: CO 822/474: Memo by P. Rogers, 10 April 1953.128. Leonard Gill, Military Musings (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford Publishing, 2003) pp.43, 47.129. Rawcliffe, Struggle for Kenya p.108.130. Figures from: NA: WO 276/466, NA: WO 276/467, NA: WO 276/337.131. For example: NA: WO 276/468: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Troopers and Mideast, 1 May

1953.132. NA: CO 822/474: Telegram from Baring to Colonial Office, 22 April 1953.133. NA: CO 822/474: Telegram from Baring to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 April 1953.134. IWMD: Erskine Papers 75/134/4, Report to Secretary of State for War, ‘The Kenya

Emergency’, 2 May 1955, Appendix B.135. The McLean Inquiry into Army misconduct happened in December 1953. See Huw

C. Bennett, ‘The British Army and Controlling Barbarization during the Kenya Emergency’.In: George Kassimeris (ed.) The Warrior’s Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture inModern Warfare (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) pp.59–80.

136. NA: WO 32/21721: Directive by the Governor: Reporting of Casualties, 25 Feb. 1953.137. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nyeri to Force Nairobi, 25 March 1953.

A panga is a machete-like agricultural tool.138. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa 4 Feb.

1953.139. IWMD: Erskine Papers 75/134/4: Booklet ‘Notes for British Units Coming to Kenya’, GHQ

East Africa, no date p.42.140. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 9 Dec. 1952. John Lonsdale has

pointed out to me that most Kikuyu would have understood basic Swahili, but nonethelessthe point about official complacency stands.

141. NA: CO 822/693: Letter from Erskine to Harding (CIGS), 14 June 1953.142. IWMD Erskine Papers, Letter from Erskine to wife, 28 Nov.1953.143. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.144. See: Kanogo, Tabitha. Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau 1905–63 (London: James

Currey, 1987).145. Randall W. Heather, ‘Counterinsurgency and intelligence in Kenya: 1952–56’. PhD diss.,

Cambridge University, 1993 p.41.146. Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau p.138.147. Evans, Law and Disorder p.157.

662 H. Bennett


148. Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century(London: Cornell University Press, 2004) p.5.

149. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged p.90.150. Valentino, Final Solutions p.5.151. Randall W. Heather, ‘Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56’ Intelligence

and National Security Vol.5, No.3 (1990) p.59; David A. Percox, ‘British Counter-Insurgencyin Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of Internal Security Policy or Prelude to Decolonisation?’Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.9, No.3 (1998) p.62.

152. Rawcliffe, Struggle for Kenya p.58.153. Frank Furedi, The Mau Mau War in Perspective (London: James Currey, 1989) pp.119–21.154. David A. Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and

Decolonisation (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004) p.53.155. Rawcliffe, Struggle for Kenya p.58.156. Furedi, Mau Mau War in Perspective p.8; Berman, Control and Crisis p.349.157. Percox, ‘British COIN’ p.69.158. T.F.C. Bewes, Kikuyu Conflict: Mau Mau and the Christian Witness (London: The Highway

Press, 1953) p.60.159. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 28 Nov. 1952.160. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 5 Dec. 1952.161. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa. 8 Feb.

1953.162. NA: WO 276/337: Northern area sitreps, Norbrig Nairobi to Force Nairobi, circa. 10 Feb.

1953.163. NA: WO 276/467: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 13 Feb. 1953.164. NA: WO 276/467: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 17 Feb. 1953.165. NA: CO 822/442: Savingram from Baring to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 Feb.

1953. John Lonsdale argues that this adoption of settler activities was common practice forthe Kenya Government. Email correspondence with the author, 8 Aug. 2007.

166. NA: WO 276/411: Appreciation by Major-General Hinde, 5 March 1953.167. NA: WO 276/411: Letter from Carruthers Johnston, Provincial Commissioner for the Rift

Valley, to Major-General Hinde, 28 March 1953.168. NA: WO 276/467: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Troopers and Mideast, 7 April 1953.169. At least until a directive forbade them from doing so: NA: WO 276/200: Emergency Directive

No. 6, Operational Intelligence, 28 May 1953.170. Heather, Counterinsurgency and Intelligence p.128.171. Rawcliffe, Struggle for Kenya p.63.172. NA: WO 216/855: Letter from Erskine to CIGS, 7 July 1953.173. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya p.81; Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya.

The Dialectic of Domination (London: James Currey, 1990) p.347; Randall W. Heather,‘Of Men and Plans: the Kenya Campaign as part of the British CounterinsurgencyExperience’ Conflict Quarterly XIII(1) (1993) p.18.

174. Elkins, Britain’s Gulag p.44.175. Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War pp.55–56.176. Ibid. p.56.177. Percox, ‘British COIN’ pp.70–71, 73.178. NA: CO 822/468: Letter from General Sir Brian Robertson, C-in-C Middle East Land Forces,

to CIGS, 12 Jan. 1953.179. NA: CO 822/422: Report by CIGS on his visit to Kenya, 19–24 Feb. 1953.180. See Charles Douglas-Home, Evelyn Baring: The Last Proconsul (London: Collins, 1978).181. Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War p.57.182. NA: CO 822/442: Extracts from Chiefs of Staff meeting, 10 April 1953.183. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.184. See Huw C. Bennett, ‘British Army Counterinsurgency and the use of Force in Kenya, 1952–

56’. PhD diss., University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2006 pp.234–52.185. NA: WO 93/56: Letter from [illegible], AG3(A) 2 to Registrar, Judge Advocate General’s

Office, 13 Jan. 1954.186. Army Act 1881.187. Ibid.



188. NA: WO 93/56: List of CMs in Kenya. He was very likely seconded to an East African unit, ashis given regiment, the Wiltshires, were not in Kenya at the time.

189. NA: WO 93/56: List of CMs in Kenya; Quayle was from the Lancashire Fusiliers, butspecified as ‘att. KAR’.

190. NA: WO 32/21721: McLean Inquiry Exhibit 22: List of cases where members of the MilitaryForces have been charged for offences against Africans, compiled by Assistant AdjutantGeneral, GHQ.

191. NA: CAB 195/11: Cabinet Minutes, C.C.33 (53), 21 May 1953.192. War Office, Imperial Policing and DACP p.5.

664 H. Bennett


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