RENATOCONSTANTINOA HISTORY OF THEPHILIPPINES193future. In the diary of Colonel Simeon Villa who accompanied Aguinaldo in hislong march to Palanan,there appeartwo entries which describe Aguinaldoswishful thoughts aboutthe future. Inhis entry dated December 7,1899, Villawrites:One moonlit night the President, Sityar,Jeciel, Barcelona and Villa, thetwo Leyba sisters and the Presidents sisters agreed that once theindependence of the country was declared we would travel leisurely throughEurope with a budget of 1,000,000pesos expenses.cdiThe plans for the future were somewhat more specific in the entry dateMarch 16, 1900.After dinner at 6:30 oclock, President Aguinaldo, in a conversation withBarcelona, Villa and Lieutenant Carasco,said thatonce the independence ofour country is declared he would give each one of them, including himself,2,000 quiones [about 3,346 hectares] of land for the future of theirfamilies. This would be the reward for their work. These haciendas will beadjacent to each other so that they will all be located in the same province,probably in San Jose Valley in the province of Nueva Ecija, and theirprincipal products will be coffee, cacao, sugar, palay and cattle.cdiiSurcease atPalananOn September 6, 1900,Aguinaldo reached Palanan, Isabelawhere heremained for more than six months. Its mountainous terrain made it an idealhide-out.There, life was easier,even allowing the group such pleasures asa NewYears ball. Col. Villa described the festivities in the diary. Aguinaldo invitedall the principales of Palanan, the young ladies of the town, and hisofficers.The party began with the traditionalrigodon. At the stroke of midnight themusicians played the national anthem and then everyone partook of amedianoche. Guests danced until four in the morning.cdiiiThe ContrastWhile Aguinaldo was retreating, guerrilla warfare was proving to be veryeffective. The people supported their fighters wholeheartedly contributingarms,money, food and other supplies and, most important ofall, informationabout the enemy and same sanctuary in their midst. This is attested to byGeneral Arthur MacArthur who succeeded Otis asMilitary Governor of thePhilippines. MacArthur reported:Wherever throughout the Archipelago there is a group of the insurgentarmy, it is afact beyond dispute that all the contiguous towns contribute tothe maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns regardless of the fact ofAmerican occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for allinsurgent military activities, and not only so in the sense of furnishing

RENATOCONSTANTINOA HISTORY OF THEPHILIPPINES194supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, butas affordingsecure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important maxim ofFilipino tactics to disband when closely pressed, and seek safety in thenearest barrioa maneuver quickly accomplished by reasonof theassistance of the people, and the ease with which the Filipino soldier istransformed into the appearance of a peaceful native. The success of thisunique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of theentire native population. That such unity is afact is too obvious to admit ofdiscussion; how it is brought about and maintained is not so plain.Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as theonly motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparentlyspontaneous action of several millions of people.cdivGeneral MacArthuralso communicated to his superiors his finding thatmost of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipalgovernments and that in many cases these were manned by the same peoplewho were running the local government under the Americans.cdvAguinaldo was in communication with some of the guerrilla commanderswho were still keeping up the resistance. One of his messages fell into thehands of General Frederick Funston who then devised a plan forcapturingAguinaldo. This involved a ruse by which pro-American Macabebe scoutsdressed inrayadillouniforms were to pretend to be reinforcements bringingfive American prisoners to Palanan. The trick worked; Aguinaldo was capturedon March 23, 1901.The Second BetrayalOn April 1st he took his oath of allegiance to the United States and onApril 19 issued a proclamation which said in part:The Philippines decidedly wishes peace: be it so. Let the stream of bloodcease to flow; let there be an end to tears and desolation. These hopes mustalso inevitably be shared by those still in arms and who have no otherpurpose but to serve their people who have so clearly manifested theirdesire.I thus obey that will now that I know it exists and,resolutely, aftermaturedeliberation, I proclaim before all the world that Icannot remain deaf to thevoice a people yearning for peace nor to the lamentations of thousands offamilies who long for the freedom of their loved ones, which is promisedthem through the magnanimity of the great American nation.cdviThe Americans had the manifesto printed in English and Spanish and inseveral dialects. They distributed itthroughout the islands.Exile Among His People

195Jacob Could Schurmans appraisal of Aguinaldo as the animating andalso moderating spirit of insurrection was ashrewd reading of the man. ForAguinaldos attitude was in fact ambivalent. He wasat hearta Filipino whowanted to see his country free and independent. But he was also a member ofthe principalia whose ideologues were the ilustrados. Moreover,his realizationof his own inadequacy made him defer to them all the more. And, as historyhas demonstrated, the tenacity with which the people pursued their goal offreedom was in directcontrastto the ilustrados vacillation and propensity tonegotiate. Their concepts of freedom were different, too. For the masses,independence was a clear-cut goal which simply meant driving the colonizeraway. The elite, on the other hand were willing to consider variouspossibilities short of real independence. For them, the constant in the array ofvariables was that they should be collectively in control under any resultingarrangement, orfailing this, thattheir individual interests would be protected.This was clearly demonstrated atBiak-na-bato.Vis-a-vis the Americans, Aguinaldo and his advisers ran true to form.Although they had their suspicions about American intentions, they containedtheir misgivings, hoping against hope that negotiations, conciliatory moves,appeals to the libertarian sentiments of the American people, would obviate thenecessity of fighting for freedom against a second invader. And because in thebacks of their minds, aprotectorate or even annexation was alreadyacceptable, the will to fight was thatmuch weaker.Although he led the people and urged them to fight on, Aguinaldo waswilling to negotiate with the Spaniards as well as with the Americans. With hisvacillations and capitulations he blunted the conflict between the colonizersand the people. His public characterization of the United States as theprotector of Philippine independence was a disservice in that it delayed thepeoples recognition of the new threat to their freedom. He ended his resistanceto the Americans as he had done with the Spaniardsby praising his formerfoes and declaring his faith in their good intentions. Once again, he expressedhis capitulationist sentiments as being those of the people.cdviiThe determination and ferocity with which the Filipino massesspontaneously and atgreat odds continued the resistance for almost a decadeafter Aguinaldo had sworn allegiance to the United States proved that he hadmisread his countrymen. What he was really expressing were the sentiments ofthe classes that were eager to compromise in order to protect and enhance theirprivileged economic positions. And so, inevitably, he became more and moredivorced from the mainstream of the people until he ceased to have anyinfluence over them.