socrates on obediance (gary young)

8/6/2019 Socrates on Obediance (Gary Young)

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Socrates and Obedience

Author(s): Gary YoungSource: Phronesis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1974), pp. 1-29Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181923

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Socratesnd ObedienceGARY YOUNG

I. The problemStudents of Plato have long puzzledover whatseems o bea contra-diction in the views expressed by Socrates in Apology and Crito.In Apology,Socratesasserts:(I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commands me todoso. (Ap.29d)1But in Crito,Socratesassertsor implies:(II) Every citizen (including myself) should obey every commandof the city. (Cr. 50 a-53 a)2From these two claims, it follows fairly straightforwardly3 thatSocrates will give up philosophy and will not give up philosophy, ifthe city commandshim to give up philosophy.This contradiction4 has called forth two responses from commen-tators:

This reading rests upon the crucial phrase neia%,ut 8l sLaXXovrjci , 4l.....Oi) n O)vesLOt 9?0,oaoqP&v 9 d 3-5, which makes it clear (i) that Socrates isenvisioning a conflict between what the city says and what the god says,for otherwise he would not have to obey one rather than (aLFtXXov...3...) theother; (ii) that therefore Socrates must be supposing the city to have told himto do something that requires him to disobey the god, and this, as the contextmakes clear, is to cease doing philosophy - it is not, as 29 c 5-dl might otherwisesuggest, either to cease philosophy or to submit to death; (iii) that Socrates willobey or be persuaded by the god, hence will not be persuaded by (will disobey)the city - note the emphatic double negative. Of course the city never actuallycommands Socrates to give up philosophy.2 For evidence of this claim in Crito, see note 18.3 The derivation requires two further assumptions: Roughly, that Socrateswill do what he says in (I) he will do, and that Socrates will do what he should do.' It is not strictly speaking a contradiction, for it has the form 'If P, then Qand not-Q.' But since it is possible that P, it follows that it is also possiblethat Q and not-Q, and this follows whether or not the city ever actually com-mands Socrates to give up philosophy. So Socrates seems at least committedto the position that it is possible that both Q and not-Q, even though he maynever be confronted with the problem of both giving up and not giving upphilosophy, both at the same time. Even if Socrates is not guilty of believinga contradiction, he surely seems to hold that an inconsistent proposition (Qand not-Q) is consistent, which is bad enough. To simplify matters, I shalltalk throughout this paper as though we were dealing with a contradiction.

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(1) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is merely verbal or ap-parent; that is, Socrates is not really contradicting himself inasserting (I) and (HI),because he has in mind a qualification ofeither (I) or (II) [usually (II) is picked for this role], whichhas the effect of limiting the applicability of (I) to one set ofcases, and the applicability of (II) to a wholly different set ofcases, so that (I) and (II) could never both apply to the samesituation.5

(2) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is not merely apparent;it is ineluctable. No reconciliationbetween (I) and (II) is possible,and Socrates holds contradictory views.6But neither (1) nor (2) is satisfactory. (1) is unsatisfactory becausenone of the distinctions purported to resolve the contradiction be-tween (I) and (II) can be found in either of the dialogues, at leastin such a way as to indicate that Socrates would use them to resolvethe contradiction.7 All the variants of view (1) thus far suggested,to my knowledge, impose upon Socrates a position he did not hold,so far as our evidence shows. Unfortunately, to reject (1) seems to beto embrace (2), and (2) has decidedly unpleasant consequences.

For (2) ascribes to Plato - or at least to Socrates - an inconsistencyso obvious and bothersome that it is hard to believe that Plato and/orSocrates could have overlooked it, or, if they did not overlook it,could have left it standing.Now (1) and (2) agree on one crucial assumption: That the twodialogues are meant to be literal expressions of the views of Platoand/or Socrates. Both views restrict themselves to consideringwhatSocrates says in the dialogues - his very words - and both viewsassume that when Socrates says something in either dialogue, he (orPlato) means it, i.e. he (or Plato) believes that it is true - with theexception of a few obvious jokes and ironies, such as his statement,at the start of Apology, that his accusers spoke so persuasively thatthey almost persuadedhim. In other words, both (1) and (2) agree intaking (I) and (II) to be assertions that Socrates regards as true;5 Thus A. D. Woozley, 'Socrates on Disobeying the Law,' in Gregory Vlastos,ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971),pp. 299-318, esp. 306-308.6 Thus Howard Zinn, in Disobedience and Democracy (New York: Vintage Books,1968), p. 28: 'We forget that Plato was not a democrat, and that Socratesviolates in the Crito that spirit he showed in the Apology, at his trial.'7 See note 19 for an illustration of this difficulty as it arises in Woozley's account.2


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view (1) then attempts to find meaningsfor (I) and (II) such that thetwo propositions are not inconsistent, and view (2) denies that thiscan be done.Both (1) and (2), by proceeding in this way, ignore the dramaticsetting of the dialogues. They focus on Socrates' very words, andignore the fact that Socrates addresses those words to two differentaudiences with two presumably different purposes in mind. Thisconsideration opens up the possibility that Socratesdoes not believeboth(I) and (II), that his uttering of (I) and/or (II) is to be explainedat least in part in terms of the audiences and purposes he has inthe two dialogues, and not merely in terms of a desire or intentionto speak what he believes to whomever he is addressing.8In order toS There is a fourth approach to our problem, besides (1), (2), and the one pro-posed here, but I think it too should be rejected. On this interpretation, whichGrote seems to have held, (I) and (II) are regarded (correctly) as inconsistent;but instead of letting the inconsistency stand as an implicit indictment ofSocrates and/or Plato, as does position (2), or explaining the inconsistency as afunction of Socrates' different audiences and purposes in the two dialogues,as does my interpretation, this fourth approach explains the inconsistency asthe result of Plato's different purposes in writing the dialogues. Accordingto Grote, Crito "appears intended by Plato - as far as I can pretend to guess-athis purpose - to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokratesin a light different from that which they present in the Apology. In defendinghimself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position whichwould undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defianceto the city and its institutions ... In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts,Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirmingthe charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some ofhis public remarks... Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impressionas prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what hethinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and suchI imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton" (Plato [London, 1875],I, 300-302).It is not clear whether Grote would go so far as to say that the question ofwhether Socrates believed (I) and (II) is irrelevant, on the ground that theSocrates of Apology is a different character than the Socrates of Crito, so thatthere is no one Socrates of whom the question could be asked. If Grote wouldgo that far - and I think this would be the most consistent development of hisposition - then he has an interpretation of the two dialogues that is a competitorto (1), (2), and my own. These three interpretations all assume that there issufficient dramatic or historical continuity between the Socrates of the Apologyand the Socrates of the Crito that this question is intelligible.

If Grote too assumed this, however, he would have to take a stand on thequestion of whether Socrates believed (I) and (II), which means, since hethinks (I) and (II) are inconsistent, that he has to take a stand on whether3


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show that this is the case - that, as I wish to argue, Socratesdoes notbelieve (II) - we cannot, of course, dependmerely upon the possibilitythat he would speak differently to differentaudiences and with differ-ent purposes. We must explain in detail what it is about Socrates'audiences and purposes in the two dialogues that might reasonablylead him to misrepresent his beliefs in one dialogue or the other.The following is an attempt to analyze the dramatic and argumenta-tive structureof Crito n such a way as to explain this.

II. Critoand themanyTo test our interpretation,we must arrive at some reasonableopinionabout Socrates' audience and purpose(s) in Crito: in other words, wemust find out who Crito is (or, what I shall take to be the same, whoSocrates thinks Critois), and what Socrates is trying to do in speakingwith Crito as he does. I shall ignore evidence concerning Crito to befound outside Crito and Apology.Just before the middle of the dialogue, Socrates states the questionhe and Crito are to answer: Is it dikaion (48 b) for Socrates to tryto get away without the permissionof the Athenians? Socrates, butnot Crito, thinks it is not, and the rest of the dialogue is devoted tohis presentation of arguments purporting to establish this opinion.How did this question arise? Earlier in the dialogue Crito hadmy interpretation or (2) is correct. In this case, his interpretation (that theinconsistency is a result of Plato's purposes in writing the dialogues) is not acompetitor, but complementary, to either (2) or my position.But whether or not Grote makes this assumption, his account of Plato'spurpose in writing Crito is unacceptable. Only the speeches of "the laws"support Grote's claim that the purpose of Crito is that Socrates "be broughtback within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from thecharge of incivism" (Grote, p. 303). Grote recognizes that the first half of thedialogue is at odds with this account: "It is thus that the dialogue Kritonembodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements - constitutionalallegiance, and Sokratic individuality" (Grote, p. 304). But what Grote calls"Sokratic individuality" (and astonishingly enough identifies as the Protagoreandoctrine of homo mensura, p. 305), is just the familiar contrast that Socratesdraws between himself and the many, to the detriment of the many. Grotesays that Plato wrote Crito to exculpate Socrates from the charge of incivism,and thus Plato must have addressed the dialogue to those most likely to makesuch a charge, namely the many. What Grote fails to explain is why Platoshould then make Socrates begin the dialogue with an all-out attack upon theopinions of the many. (Cf. Paul Friedlander, Plato [New York, 1964], II, 172.)4


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bombarded Socrates with a series of considerationsdesigned to showthat Socrates should flee (44 b-46 a). In those arguments Critoappeals twice to what is dikaion: At 44 e-45 a he says that Socratesshould not worry about the punishment Critomight receive if caughthelping Socrates to flee - that all they should be concerned with isthat Crito do what is dikaion. And at 45 c, Crito says that it isn'tdikaion for Socrates to betray himself, i.e. to do exactly what hisenemies want. But Critonever explains why it is dikaion for Socratesto flee, or for Crito to help him flee. The closest he comes to explainingthis is in his disturbing suggestion that what one's enemies want oneto do is the opposite of to dikaion: we are reminded of the view ofdikaion advanced by Polemarchus in Republic I. When Socrateslater states the basic question in terms of what is dikaion, he is ap-pealing to a concept for which Critohas some liking, but concerningwhich Crito is clearly confused, at least from a Socratic viewpoint.This confusion is expressed more clearly in several of Crito'sotherstatements. At 44 b-c he points out that if Socrates doesn't flee,peoplewill think that Crito wouldn't take the trouble to save Socrates.To this, Socrates replies that what the many (hoi polloi) think isirrelevant; we should heed only what the most reasonable people(epieikestatoi) hink. Crito rejoins that the many can do the greatestof evils to one, if one has a bad reputation with them. But Socratesobjects that the many cannot make a person wise or foolish - that is,they can do neither the greatest good nor the greatest evil. One mightthink that Socrates, in saying this, had made his point clearly enough.But later (45 d-46 a) Crito appeals to courage (the only virtue hementions other than todikaion)to prove that Socrates shouldflee - ar-guing not that only a coward wouldn't try to escape, but rather thatpeople wiU think Socrates a coward if he doesn't try to escape, andthink Crito a cowardif he fails to help Socrates.9At 48 c, Socrates brushes aside these arguments, as well as severalothers advanced by Crito (that Crito has enough money, 45 a-b,and that Socrates is abandoning his children, 45 c-d), as argumentsof the many. Rather than consider these arguments, Socrates says,we should consider only whether or not it is dikaion to flee (cf. Ap.29 d-e).What does this tell us about Crito?Accordingto Socrates,most if notall of the considerations Crito has advanced are considerations typical9 It is odd that people wouldn't think Socrates more of a coward for fleeing death,but Crito's instinct on this matter strikes me as right.

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of the many. Centralamong the considerationspersuasiveto the manyare those concerningreputation, i.e. concerningwhat the many thinkof one. Thus Crito is concerned not with courage, but with the rep-utation of courage; he wants others to regard him and Socratesas brave. There is, furthermore, a suggestion that Crito identifiesthe virtues he wishes others to ascribeto him - the virtues themselvesas opposed to the reputation or appearanceof having the virtues -with the opposite of what his enemies wish for him. Here again wefind Crito's thought stated in terms of the opinions of others. Hewishes others to have a certain opinion of him, and the opinion hewishes them to have of him is a function of still other opinions othershave. Finally, and perhaps the cornerstoneof these attitudes of themany (cf. Glaucon's decription of the social contract, RepublicII),is the fear of what the many can do to a personof whom they have abad opinion: they can do the very worst thing, viz. put one to death.Crito is one of the many. The dialogue Crito makes this clear.For this reason, there is an abyss between Crito'sopinions and thoseof Socrates, as Socrates hints at one point in the dialogue. There,speaking of the Socraticprinciplethat one ought never to do wrongtoanyone, Socrates says:Take care, Cnrto, est in agreeing to this you agree contrary toyour opinion. For I know that only a few think and will thinkthis. Those who think this and those 1who on't have no commoncounsel, but must think little of each other, seeing each other'sopinions. (49 d, my emphasis)Despite the evidence the context of this passage might seem to giveto the contrary assertion (I shall discuss this in the next section),it is clear that Crito is not one of the few, but one of the many, andthat therefore he will not be able to understand,or at least to under-stand properlyand fully, the Socratic principles.Insofar as such prin-ciples are decisive for Socrates' decision not to flee Athens, Critowill be unable to understand the reasons for that decision. And ifSocrates wishes to persuade Crito that it is not dikaion for Socratesto flee Athens, he will not be able to rely upon Socratic principlesasa means of persuasion: the Socratic principles, at least by themsel-ves, will leave Crito unmoved.

III. Critoand SocratesThe question Crito and Socrates are to discuss is whether it is dikaion6


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for Socrates to flee - where to dikaion is not tied to the opinions ordeeds of the many. To get the question posed in this way, Socrateshas had to strugglewith Crito. Crito has repeatedly raised the questionof what the many will say and think and do (44 b-c, 44 d, 45 c,45 d-46 a, and 48 b, where Socrates baits Crito). Nonetheless, Critofinally agrees with Socrates concerning the question to be discussed,agrees that the views of the many are not relevant to Socrates'decision. This seems to be evidence that Crito is not merely or evenone of the many, that he is something more or other than one of themany.

Critois Socrates' fnrend.He is of the same age and deme as Socrates(Ap. 33 d-e), and he and Socrates have often discussed in the pastsuch matters as they discuss in Crito (46 b-47 a, 48 b, 49 a-b). Oftenin the past Crito has heard, and agreed to, the Socratic principlesthat Socrates will once more invoke in Crito:even the incrediblepara-dox that wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer (49 d). How couldCritobe one of the many?But notice that, so far as Crito'sparticipation in the discussion isconcerned,Crito alls into threeparts:1) 43 a46 a: Crito presents to Socrates a series of arguments hehopes will persuade Socrates to flee Athens to avoid his death; So-crates characterizes these as argumentsof the many and rejects them.2) 46 b49 e: Crito is reminded by Socrates of certain things thathe and Socrateshad in many earlierdiscussionsagreedupon, but whichCrito has forgotten, at least in 43 a-46 a; these reminders contradictthe views of the many.3) 50 a-end: Crito makes but five speeches, each a single shortsentence in length, for, as Crito says (50 a), he doesn't understand

what Socrates is talking about; Crito's place as the interrogated istaken by Socrates, who introduces the fictional "laws"to interrogatehimself.From this brief review of the dialogue, we can see that insofaras Crito takes an active part in initiating the discussion (43 a46 a),he takes the position of the many. But he is capable of beingremindedof certain Socratic principles that are at odds with the views of themany (46b49 e), even though he cannotapply those principleshimself(and hence drops out from 50 a to the end). To show that Crito isnot one of the many, we must show that he grasps the Socraticprinciplesheld only by the few. But all the evidence points to the con-clusion that Crito's grasp of those principles is tenuous. He can be7


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reminded of them, and can be led to assent to them, at least bySocrates, after some discussion. But Crito has not made those prin-ciples his own: he does not act upon them, or even rememberthem,when faced with the crisis of Socrates' death-sentence; he cannotapply them by himself. No doubt Crito has been touched and to anextent changed by his friendshipwith Socrates; but the change fallsfar short of a conversion to Socratic principles, or even of an activeunderstandingof those pnnciples. Critois notmerely one of the many,he is also a friendof Socrates;but nonethelessCrito s one of the many.In 43a46a the Socratic principles are driven from Crito's mindby his sorrow over Socrates' approaching death. Unlike Socrates,who at the start of the dialogue is just waking from sound sleep,Critois sleeplessand sorrowful(43b); Socratesis interestedin discuss-ing his curiousdream,but Crito cannot hearwhat the dream has to sayand immediately plunges into his exhortation to Socrates. LaterSocrates appeals to Crito, with irony Crito seems to miss, saying:"You, in human probability, are not going to die tomorrow, andthereforeyour judgmentwill not be distortedby presentcircumstance"(46 e-47 a). But of course it is Crito,not Socrates, who is beside him-self over Socrates' imminent death; he has forgotten, if he ever knew,that "it is not living which we should consider most important, butliving well" (48 b). In precisely the sort of situation to which Socraticprinciplesapply most strikingly, Critohas forgotten them completely.Nevertheless Socratesand Critoare friends,perhapsas close as twopeople could be, given the huge gap between their opinions. Thereseems to be no reasonto doubt Socrates'sincerity when he says (48 e)that he wants to act with Crito'sapproval.

IV. WhySocratesspeakswith Critoas he doesCritoand Socratesare friends. Crito will grieve Socrates'death deeply,and Socrates is concernedto ease Crito'ssorrowas much as possible.Yet Crito is one of the many. As such, he will not be moved by theconsiderationsthat are decisive for Socrates. For Socrates to reconcileCrito to his (Socrates') death, Socrates must thereforeuse argumentsdifferent from those he himself regards as decisive. What Socratessays in Crito therefore cannot be taken, without further argument,to be a statement of his own or Plato's own beliefs.It is possible, indeed likely, that Crito could be fully reconciledtoSocrates' death only on Socratic principles, i.e. only by accepting the8


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view that "it is not living which we should considermost important,but living well," where 'living well' is given Socratic content (44 d,48 b). Therefore Socrates will presumably present Crito with as closean approximation to the Socratic position as will succeed in easingCrito'ssorrow,for that will most ease his sorrow.We have now reached a position from which we can profitablyreturn to our initial problem, the inconsistency between Apology andCrito. The foregoing considerations show, I believe, that to provethat Socrates regards (II) as true, it is not enough to point to the factthat he asserts (II) in his talk with Crito. This is not enough, becauseSocrates' intent in talking with Crito is not to explain to Critowhy he(Socrates) is not going to flee, but to move Crito to accept Socrates'decision not to flee. And to do this, Socrates will have to use at leastsome arguments that he himself does not find compelling. To showthat Socrates regards (II) as true, therefore, we would have to showthat (II) is not one of the considerationsaimed merelyat persuadingCrito, not one of the considerations directed to the many. Later (inSection XII) I shall argue that (II) is introduced by Socrates forno other reasonthan to persuade Crito.

One might object that on the one hand we have said that Socratesinvokes Socratic principles to persuade Crito, yet we have also saidthat Crito, one of the many, does not understand those principlessufficiently to be persuadedby them. On this reading of the dialogue,it seems, Socrates'attempt to persuade Critoshould be an ill-conceivedfailure. But though Socrates does invoke the Socratic principles inCrito, those principles play much less of a role in the arguments ofCritothan a readingof 49 a-e might lead one to suspect. I shall attemptto show this below by an analysis of the argumentsgiven by the laws.The Socratic principlesare less important as premisses n the argumentsof the laws than as touchstones for the quality of Crito's soul.Now let us turn to the second half of Crito,where we expect to findan attempt to answerthe question of whether it is dikaion for Socratesto flee.V. Thetwoprinciples concerning to dikaion (49 a-e)

The question, Crito agrees with Socrates, is whether it is dikaion forSocrates to try to escape from prison and Athens without the per-mission of the Athenians (48 b-d). Socrates immediately asks Critoto consider the archi (principle or beginning) of the inquiry, and laysdown a pair of propositionsto which Crito gives quick assent.

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The first of these preliminarypropositions is presented n two forms.The first version is:(a) One must not do wrong (adikein)even when wronged. (49a-c).This is derived from the prior assertion that one must in no way dowrong, which in turn is derived from the assertion that to do wrong isin every way bad and shameful for the wrongdoer (cf. 47 d-48 a).(Socratesapparently assumes that one must in no way do that whichis in every way bad and shameful to oneself - hardly a controversialassumption.) A second version of this propositionis derived from (a)by substituting 'doing harm' (xocxW 7tOLe-V or xoxoupy?-v) for 'doingwrong' (adikein) (and similarly 'harmed' for 'wronged'); Socratessays there is no difference between doing wrong and doing harm.Thus we have:(a') One must not do harm, even when harmedoneself. (49c)The secondproposition,presentedvery briefly, is:(b) A personought to do what he/she has agreedto do, if what he/she has agreed to do is dikaion. (49 e)The expression translated 'if what he/she has agreed to do is dikaion'- viz. 'dikaia onta' - could mean either "if it is permitted by justice"or "if it is requiredby justice." Presumablyit means the former,how-ever; if it meant the latter, therewould be no need for the agreement:One should do what is required, whether one has agreed to do it ornot.10This readingis sufficient for the purposesto which the principleis later put, moreover.Indeed, throughoutmost of Crito,"permissible"seems to catch the sense of 'dikaion'best.Socratespresentsboth these propositionsas principlesof the inquiry(Iq axkicoq 'vv &pxiv 8e; &pX608c e'wi3,t5v 49d; ex 'TOu(ov &*pzL49e).But as starting-points they suffer from two flaws. They are put for-ward dogmatically,with little pretenseat proof.The claim upon which(a) and (a') rest, that wrongdoingis bad for the wrongdoer,cries outfor proof, as the most superficialreader of Republicwil have learned;and the discussion at 47 d-48 a is woefully inadequate. AccordingtoSocrates, (a) and (a'), though perhapsnot (b), are taken over from olddiscussionsbetween Crito and himself, without any new examination.10 Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato (London, 1929), p. 171, note 1; also Paul Shorey,"Notes on Plato, Crito 49 e-50 a," Classical Journal, vol. II (1906), p. 80.I would deny the last assertion Taylor makes here, that "we see in the sequelthat the tacit 'compact' by which Socrates is pledged to the v6[LOLor xoLv6vof Athens involves nothing but what is strictly licitum." See the last paragraphof Section X.10


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Perhapswe shouldcharitablyregardthem as hypotheses, in somethinglike the sense(s) of the middle dialogues.Second, although the 'adikein' of (a) and the 'dikaia onta' of (b)appear to make these principles relevant to the question of whetherit would be dikaionfor Socrates to escape, this appearanceis mislead-ing. For in posing the question as he has - whetherit is dikaionforhimto escape - Socrateshas explicitly supposed (and Crito with him) thatif it turns out not to be dikaion for Socrates to escape, then Socratesshould not try to escape (see48 c-d). Thus the question that they mustresolve is whether it is dikaion for Socrates to escape, not whetherSocrates and Crito should do what is dikaion. But principles (a),(a') and (b) tell us nothing about what counts as dikaion, and there-foreseem to be of no help in answeringthe question Socrateshas posed.(b) seems the most promisingof the three, in this respect, for onemight suppose that it says it is dikaion to keep one's promises, andcontrary to to dikaion to break them. But it says no such thing:It only says that promises are to be kept (7roLiov), if they are prom-ises to do something dikaion, i.e. permissible.So far we have no hintwhy it is not dikaionfor Socrates to flee.

VI. Crito and thelaws of Athens ( 49e- 50a)Socrates now asks the obvious question, "What bearing do theseprinciples have upon the question of whether I should run away?"Observe in the light of these whether, if we go away from herewithout persuadingthe city, we are doing harm (kakdspoioumen),and doing it to those to whom we least ought to do it, or not;and whether we are standing by the things we agreed to do,

things which are dikaia. (49 e-50 a)Upon hearing this, Crito drops out of the conversation. He pleadsthat he doesn't understand these questions and therefore cannotanswer them. Socrates thereupon introduces the laws of Athens(oL v4pLt xoclT6 xmov6vrr 7t46Xew50 a), and after that point Crito hasbut four one-sentence speeches in the remainingfive Stephanus pages.Crito's difficulty is obvious enough: He has no idea to what harm andwhat agreement Socrates could be referring. The laws are ideallysuited to explain this to Crito,for it is the laws which, Socrates seemsto think, will be harmed by his flight, and it is the laws with whomhe seems to think he made an agreementwhichhe will breakif he flees.The laws enter the dialogue at the point at which Crito becomes

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silent. But they do not take his place. Rather, Socrates takes Crito'splace and opinions, and the laws take Socrates' place. Instead ofSocrates questioning Crito, now the iaws question Socrates. Butof course this is a misleading way to describe what goes on: in fact,Socrates, playing the laws, questions Socrates, pretendinghe is aboutto flee Athens.The entry of the laws has at least a double effect upon Crito. First,Crito,never a strong dialectician,is no longer pitted against Socrates inthe discussion; he is taken off the hook. Socrates, not Crito, willdefend Crito's opinion, insofar as it gets a defense at all (in fact, itgets very little defense, for Socrates merely sets himself up as a targetfor the laws' arguments, and never seriously attempts to respond tothose arguments). Second, the laws and the city are presumably moreawesomein Crito'seyes, endowedwith a moreimpersonaland a higherauthority, than Socrates. That the laws object to Crito's proposalwill seem to him a much weightier reason to give it up, than thatSocratesdisagreeswith it.For both these reasons,Socrates' introductionof the laws is a clevermove. But we might suspect still a third motive at work. "Thelaws"are Socrates' creatures; they say what he makes them say. This istrue even though it is easy while reading the dialogue to imaginethat one is really listening to the laws of Athens talk. Why doesn'tSocrates say in his own personwhat he makes "the laws"say? Perhapsmerely because of the effect "the laws" have upon Crito.But perhapshe puts these speeches into the mouths of the laws also becauseSocrates himself does not hold all the opinions they express. In anyevent, it would seem to require some evidence to show that whatSocrates imagines the laws to say is what Socrates himself believes.(One might suppose that Socrates' speech at 54 d (in his own person)provides the needed evidence; I shall consider it in Section XII).

VII. The argumentsof the lawsThe laws present four distinct arguments to show Socrates that heshould not carry out his supposed intention to flee Athens. That is,Socrates presents Crito with four distinct arguments against Crito'sproposal that Socrates flee Athens:(A) By running away Socrates intends to destroy the city and itslaws (50 a-c).(B) Socrates stands to the city and laws as slave to master and as12


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child to parent, and therefore he must submit to them (50 c-51 c).(C) Socrates has made an agreement with the laws, an agreementwhose terms require that Socrates stay to meet his death (51 c-53 a).(D) Socrates' flight will have bad effects upon his friends, himself,and his children (53 a-54 b).At or near the end of each of these arguments but the first, Critoagrees, in response to a question from Socrates, that the laws haveestablished their point. However, when the laws have presented theirfirst argument, Socratessuggests that one might rebut them by point-ing out that "the city wrongedme and did not judge the case rightly";Critoseizes upon this objection.From the way the dialogue has developed to this point, we mightexpect that these arguments will all turn upon (a), (a') and (b).(D) is wholly independent of (a), (a') and (b). (A) relies upon (a'),(B) upon (a), and (C) upon (b). But in none of these arguments are(a), (a') or (b) stated explicitly. "Thelaws" seem interested in playingdown these principles, and turning Crito's attention elsewhere. Letus now turn to these arguments, to see what indications, if any, wecan find of Socrates' intent in giving them.

VIII. Argument A): Destructiono/ thecity (50 a-c)The laws say:Are you not intending, by this thing you are trying to do, todestroy us, the laws, and the entire city, so far as in you lies?Or do you think that that city can exist and not be overturned,in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force butare disregardedand underminedby private persons? (50 a-b)Filling in several more or less obvious unstated steps, the argumentseems to proceed as follows:1. If the decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,then the city and its laws will be destroyed.2. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey the decision made by thecourtsof Athens that he should die.3. From 1 and 2: If Socrates runs away, he will be destroyingAthens and its laws, so far as he is able (t4 a&6 uepos).(a'). One must not do harm, even when harmedoneself.4. To destroy something is to harm it.5. From 3, (a'), and 4: Socrates must not run away.

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Only 1 and 3 are stated in the text. On this analysis, the conclusionfollows from 1, 2, (a'), and 4. Step 2 is unobjectionable. Thus anycriticism of the argument must turn on the question of its validityand on the question of whether 1, (a'), and 4 are acceptable.11(A) is the only argument of the laws to which Socrates and Critoobject in any way. The objection, suggested by Socrates and quicklyaccepted by Crito, is that "The city wronged (+&xet)me and did notjudge the case rightly (6pXio) (50 b-c). (Crito at this point uttersone of the two oaths he makes in the dialogue, Tauta ne Dia, 50 c, cf.43 b.) But what does this objection mean?To what step in the argu-ment is it directed?The objection can be taken in either of two ways, against either(a') or 1. Taken as an objection to (a'), it says: Because the citywrongedor harmed Socrates,Socrateshas therightto returnharmto thecity. Taken as an objection to 1, it says: Because the city wrongedor harmed Socrates, his failure to followthe commando/ the city willnot tend to destroy the city. The text favors neither interpretation;the objection is dropped as soon as it is made, and Socrates moveson to argument (B). If Socrates were to accept this objection (it isunclear whether or not he does), he would have to regard it as anobjection to step 1; his commitment to (a') is too strong for him toreject it. But we might suspect that Crito seizes on it so eagerly be-cause he regards it as an objection to (a'); we recall that Crito'sacceptanceof (a') is shaky.If we take the objection to be directed against (a'), we encounter aproblem that runs throughout the last half of Crito: understandingwhat (or who) "the laws" are. Later in the dialogue, Socrates has11 I pointed out earlier that (a') gives no content to the notion of to dikaion,and therefore is no help in determining whether it is dikaion for Socrates toflee, which is the question we wish to answer. In argument (A), content is givento the notion of dikaion by step 4. (Compare step 3 of argument (B), and 7in (C).) For (a') is just another way to say(a) One must not do wrong (adikein), even when wronged;and similarly, then, it would seem that 4 is equivalent to4'. To destroy something is to do wrong (adikein),from which we get4". To destroy something is not dikaion.From 3 and 4" it follows that it is not dikaion for Socrates to flee, which with(a) gives 5. But step 4 is unargued; we are not given any reason to supposethat destruction is never dikaion, and such a claim seems absurd on the faceof it. Do we - and does Socrates - wish to accept:4"'. From 4": To destroy something bad to make something good is not dikaion.14


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the laws say to him that "you will go away wronged (i&xqkiuvo4),if you do go away, not by us, but by men" (54 b-c). If this is correct,then in running away Socrates would not fall afoul of (a') by doingharm to thosewho harmedhim (i.e. retaliating), but merely by doingharm: He has been harmed by the citizens, and he intends to harmthe laws and the city, which are not the same as the citizens. Andthen the objection that "the city wronged or harmed Socrates"is either false (if by 'city' we do not mean the citizens of Athens)or irrelevantto the claim that one should not retaliate (if by 'city'we mean the citizens of Athens).

But are the city and laws differentfromthe citizens?Moreprecisely,are the laws and the city sufficientlydifferentfromthe citizens that thefact that the citizens, using valid legal procedures,wronged Socrates,does not entail that the city and laws wrongedSocrates?And is it truethat the city and laws are not harming Socrates?At 51a, the laws sug-gest that they are attempting to destroy Socrates, because they thinkit dikaion (which here should perhapsbe understood as "required");and (A)4 tells us that this is to harm Socrates, which by (a') is some-thing one should not do. At 54 c, the laws say that if Socrates runsaway, he will returnwrong for wrong and harm for harm (&vt8LxTJaOCLC xocl &vTLxxxoupy), which implies that either the laws havewronged and harmed Socrates (and he is retaliating against them),or that in fleeing Socrates will wrong and harm thecitizens,who havewronged and harmed him (and hence that he may not be harming orwronging the laws). Finally, notice that although the question posedby Socrates was whether it is dikaion for him to flee "without thepermission of the Athenians" (48 c, 48 e), the question is changed at49 e-50 a to whether they are harming anyone or breaking anyagreements if Socrates flees without permission of the city (polis),and the arguments of the laws from that point on refer only to thecity and laws, not to the Atheniancitizens. Either there is no differencebetween the two, or else Socrates' original question is never answeredby the laws. None of these indications is decisive, of course; yet theevidence in the dialogue is far from showing that the laws are notharming Socrates, and there is even some question as to the differencebetween the citizens, i.e. the many, and the laws and city.To returnto the objectionto argument (A), if we take it to be direct-ed against step 1, it has the point that 1 should be reread as follows:1'. If the right decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,then the city and its laws will be destroyed; but if the wrong

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decisions are disobeyed, the city and its laws won't be destroyed.Then, to reach 3, we must change 2 to:2'. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey a right decision made bythe court of Athens, viz. the decision that he should die.In this form the argument can be stopped by the objection that thecourt's decision was wrong. But if 1 is true, it will be irrelevant thatthe court's decision was wrong.12

IX. Argument B): Citizenas child and slave (50 c-51 c)The argument is roughly this:1. The laws gave birth to Socrates, nurtured him and educatedhim.2. From 1: Socratesis the offspring (Zxyovo~)nd bornslave (goUo~)of the city and its laws.3. What is dikaion for the father (inocp) or master is not the sameas (iEtaouetvcL)what is dikaionfor a child or slave.4. From 2 and 3: What is dikaion for the laws and city is not thesame as what is dikaionfor Socrates.5. From 4: If the laws and Socrates' fatherland (7rocrpEq,layingon 7ccr'p) undertake to destroy Socrates, thinking it dikaion,

it is not dikaion for Socrates to retaliate (0v6nroteZv) by tryingto destroy the laws and his fatherland.6. If Socrates runs away, he will be destroying the laws and hisfatherland,so far as he is able.7. From 5 and 6: It is not dikaionfor Socrates to run away.(a) One must not do wrong (adikein),even when wronged.8. From 7 and (a): Socratesmust not runaway.1I Is 1 true? I think not. As Howard Zinn says, in a recent discussion of civildisobedience: "A common argument is that disobedience even of bad laws iswrong because that fosters a general disrespect for all laws, including good ones,which we need. But this is like arguing that children should be made to eatrotten fruit along with the good, lest they get the idea all fruit should be thrownaway. Isn't it likely that someone forced to eat the rotten fruit may becauseof that develop a distaste for all fruit?" (Zinn, p. 13). This is not the only weakpoint in the argument, even if we accept (a'). Surely the inference from 3,(a'), and 4 is dubious: To destroy something so far as one is able may not beto harm that thing, if one's powers are negligible, compared to the powers of thething.16


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All the steps are explicitly stated except for 6, 7, (a) and 8, which areneeded to finish the argument.'3For ourpurposes,two points shouldbe made. First, (B)3 is unarguedin the dialogue. As stated, it leaves open the question of preciselywhat dikaia are referred to. Do the laws (i.e. Socrates) mean that theslave-child(-citizen) has no rights? Or do they mean only that wecannotin/er from the fact that the master-parent -city) has a certainright, that the slave-child (-citizen) also has it? On the latter inter-pretation, 3 would not help the argument, for it could not be used todeterminewhether the case of Socratesis one of those in which Socrateslacks a right the city has. But step 5 makes it clear that the lawshave no doubt that in the present case the city has a right Socrateslacks, and they derive 5 from (inter alia) 3. Thus it seems we mustinterpret 3 in the first way, i.e. so that it means:3'. Children and slaves have no rights vis a vis their parents ormasters.or in terms of dikaion:3". Nothing is dikaion for children or slaves vis 'avis their parentsor masters that is not permittedthem by their parents or masters.That this is the correct interpretation of 3 is further suggested by theextreme nature of Socrates'case: if it is not dikaionfor Socrates to tryto avoid death from the city, then it is unlikely that anything elseSocrates might wish to do vis it vis a city without its permissionwouldbe dikaion. Death is the greatest evil the city can do to a person,although it may not be the greatest evil a personcan suffer.From 3' or 3" it follows that:4". Nothing is dikaion for Socrates vis i vis the city that is notpermitted him by the city.1 Notice that step 6, which in argument (B) is unstated and unargued, is thesame as step 3 in argument (A), which is explicitly stated and derived from(A)1 and (A)2. Now if Crito's objection to argument (A) had really beenagainst (A)1, upon which (A)3 = (B)6 rests, Crito should also object to (B)6.(For if Crito accepts (B)6= (A)3, then the objection to (A)1 is irrelevant:The laws need only begin argument (A) with step 3, which Crito ex hypothesiaccepts, and forget about step (A)1.) But Crito says nothing against (B)6.Either he doesn't realize that argument (B) assumes something to which hehad earlier objected (viz. (B)6 = (A)3), or else his objection was not to (A)1,but to (a'). In any event, there is no doubt that Crito is persuaded by argument(B), as he himself indicates at 51 c. Neither he nor Socrates offers the leastobjection to this second argument of the laws, although Socrates refrainsfrom endorsing the argument.

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What is dikaionfor Socratesthe citizen is what the city says.What the many are in Crito'sarguments,the city is in the argumentsof the laws. For Crito, the standard of to dikaion is what people likehim call dikaion; for the laws, the standard of to dikaion is what thelaws say is dikaion. Neither the many nor the city can do the greatestgood or the greatest harm to one, and yet Socrates has warned us tobe alert for that, and nothing less (44 d, 48 b, 49 b). If to dikaionis concerned with the greatest good, as Socrates claims (48 b), it ishard to see how the city or laws couldprovidea standard for todikaion,

any more than the many could.The second point to be made concerning argument (B) is this.In (B) Socrates is analogized to or identified as a child or slave;yet elsewhere in the dialogue children and slaves are spoken of ascontemptible. Childrenare frightened by goblins, just as the manymight try to frighten Socrateswith death (46 c). If all the conclusionsreached earlier by Socrates and Crito are now to be overturned, thetwo men are no better than children (49 b). If Socrates flees, thelaws say, he will be doing what the meanest slave (doulosphaulotatos)would do (52 d). And if he flees to a place like Thessaly, they say,

Socrates will have to live as an inferior and slave to everyone (53e).These passages all exemplify the argument: If you do such-and-such,you will be like a child or slave; but since you cannot wish to be likea child or slave, you should not do such-and-such. But the implicationof argument (B) is that it is not so bad to be a child or slave (or likethem) that Socrates should rebel against that status: he should acceptit, with its limitations. This tension, if not outright inconsistency,might make us wonderif (B) is meant to be as acceptableas we mightat first suppose it is.

X. Argument C):Socrates'agreementwith thelaws (51 c-53 a)This agreementis mentioned at the very start of the preceding section(50 c). There the laws ask Socrates, "Wasthat the agreement betweenyou and us, or wasit that you would stand by whateverjudgmentsthecity might make?"But this suggestionis not developeduntil 51 c-53 a.The argument seems to be this:1. Whoever among the Athenians remains in Athens, seeing howthe laws pass judgments and govern the city in other respects,has by his/her deed (gpyco)already agreed to do whatever the18


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laws command him/her to do, if he/she fails to persuade themthat they are wrong (i.e. in commanding it).142. Socrates has remained in Athens even though he has seen howthe laws pass judgments and govern the city in other respects.3. From 1 and 2: Socrates has agreed, by his deeds, to do whateverthe laws command him to do, if he fails to persuade them thatthey arewrong.4. The laws have commanded Socrates not to flee, but to drink thehemlock.5. From 3 and 4: If Socrates does what he has agreed to do, then,if he fails to persuade the laws that their command[that he drinkthe hemlock] is wrong, he will drink the hemlock and not flee.(b) A person ought to do what he or she has agreedto do, if what heor she has agreed to do is dikaion.6. From 5 and (b): If what Socrates has agreed to do is dikaion,then, if he fails to persuade the laws that their command iswrong, he ought to drink the hemlock and not flee.7. What Socrates has agreed to do [viz. whatever the lawscommandhim, if he fails to persuade them they are wrong] is dikaion.8. From 6 and 7: If Socrates fails to persuade the laws that theircommand [that he drink the hemlock] is wrong, then he ought todrink the hemlock and not flee.9. Socrates failed to persuade the laws that their command iswrong.10. From 8 and 9: Socratesought not to flee.

14The laws describe what Socrates has agreed to do in several ways.i) & aV0>elq xexeu,cev 7oLttaeLv -raO'a 51 e 4;ii) 0&itv 7eCE&WeaL 51 e 6;

iii) ~ 7reMcmv ?.Lm; 7roLeCv 52 a 2-3;iv) xmx&' CuasWoX-reeaOox 52 c 2, d 2-3, d 5.At 51 e-52 a the laws say that the opportunity to try to persuade them is builtinto the agreement. They make the same point in the course of argument (B)(51 b-c): if Socrates cannot persuade his fatherland that its command is wrong,he must obey it. This statement, with the reference to the agreement Socratesmade with the laws at 50 c, in the middle of argument (B), and the referenceto the laws as parents at 51 e, in the middle of argument (C), make it difficultto disentangle the two arguments. These three passages may indicate that "thelaws" did not regard the arguments as essentially different, which they are notin one respect: both arguments try to establish the existence of the same asym-metrical relation between city and citizen. But the arguments do differ in theways they go about establishing this. I discuss this later in the text.19


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(b), 6, 7, 8, and 9 are never stated explicitly by the laws, but all areneeded to finish the argument that the laws set in motion with steps1 through5.The laws give most of their attention to steps 1 and 2, and Crito,at least, is persuaded by their efforts, for at 52 d he agrees that thelaws speak the truth when they assert step 3. Socratessays only "&XXo

I' o,ioXoyca~Liv;" "What else can we do but agree?" (Disagree?)Step 1 gains whatever plausibility it has from the conditions thatthe laws say or imply must be satisfied before the citizen can trulybe said to have agreed, by his deeds, to obey the laws. At least fivesuch conditions are suggested in Crito, the last of which I have in-corporatedinto the terms of the agreement as stated in 1:(i) The citizen must not be led into the agreement by compulsion(Ov&yxn)r fraud (&nrocrje) (52 e).(ii) The citizen must not be forced to make up his mind in a shorttime (52e).(iii) The citizen must have an alternative to making the agreement,i.e. he must be able to go away, with his belongings, to an Atheniancolony orforeign place (51 d).

(iv) The city and laws must have given him good and also essentialthings; that is, they must have given birth to him, nurturedhim, andeducated him (51 c). (Note that here this provides the citizen with areason for making an agreementwith the laws, while in argument (B),as step 1, it was the basis for the claim that the citizen is of/springandslave of the laws. To both, contrast Rep. 520 a 9-b 4.)(v) The citizen must have the opportunity to try to persuade thelaws they arewrong (p.n ax?do1 e 7; cf. to dikaion 51 c 1); they do notroughly orderhim to do what they command (51e-52 a).Fulfillment of the first three conditions is necessary for there to bean agreement.15The laws place most emphasis on (iii), pointing outat length (52 b-53 a) that Socrates had preferred to stay in Athensabove all other cities. (iv) and (v) seem to be not conditions for theexistenceof an agreement (we can imagine agreementswithout them),but ratherreasons that the citizen might have forwishing to make theagreement. Note, however, that (iv) and (v) do not guarantee,as partof the agreement,that the laws will continue to providegood or essen-tial things to the citizen, or that the laws will do to the citizen onlywhat is dikaion. All that the laws promiseis that they will, for a time,15 Taylor makes this point with respect to (i) and (ii), p. 172 note.

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listen to the arguments of the citizen, if the citizen wishes to arguethat the laws have commandedhim to do somethingwrong.This might seem to soften the agreement, but of course there is noguarantee that the city will be persuaded by good arguments andunpersuadedby bad; in fact there may be good reason to suppose theopposite. In Socrates' case, the chance to try to persuade the lawspresumablywas his trial; it is the trial that shows the truth of step 9.At his trial, Socrates addressed the citizens; if by 'city' we mean thecitizens of Athens, then Socrates had a chance to persuade the city(one day, cf. Ap. 19 a), and he failed. Recalling that in Critothe lawsdistinguish themselves from the citizens, we might ask: When didSocrates have a chance to persuade these laws? The answer seemsto be that he never had such a chance; indeed, it is impossibleevento imagine what such a chance would be like. To make intelligiblethe notion of Socrates persuading the laws or city, we must identifythe city or laws with the citizens. And then we must note that Socra-tes had no hope that he could persuade the citizens: the time alot-ted was too short; and the citizens were the many, and could notunderstand what Socrates was doing (see, e.g., Ap. 37 e-38 b).

The agreement of which the laws speak institutes an asymmetricrelation between them and Socrates which is nearly indistinguishablefrom that of slavery. The only feature that distinguishes this relationfromslavery is the element of persuasionembodied in (v) and built intostep 1, and this feature hardly guarantees that the rights of the citizenwill be protected. Indeed, the agreement amounts to a giving up ofall rights, except the dubious (and in Socrates' case, not accidentally,futile) right to try to persuade the city it is wrong. It is not unfair tosay that the agreement is to enter voluntary servitude.Arguments (B) and (C) are alike in that the laws claim in both thatSocratesis their slave (thoughin (C)they don't use the word forslave).The differenceis that in (B) Socrates is bornthe city's slave, while in(C) he agreesto become its slave. But how can a born slave agree tobecome a slave? Such an "agreement"could only be a joke. The"agreement"of a born slave to be a slave fails to satisfy condition(iii) for the existence of the agreement: the born slave has no alter-native to being a slave."' (Note that this point does not essentiallydepend upon my characterizationof the agreement as one to (volun-16 After writing this I discovered that the same point is made by Rex Martin,in "Socrates on Disobedience to the Law," Review of Metaphysics, XXIV(1970), page 36.

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tary) servitude. It is impossible to conceive of the slave of (B) makingthe agreement of (C), whether or not that agreement is properlydescribed as one to servitude.) This shows that Socrates cannotconsistently give both arguments (B) and (C) - both of which aresupposed to apply to himself - and it is hard to see how Plato couldhave overlooked this fact. The contradiction between being a slavein (B) and being free in (C) is just as glaring as that between propo-sitions (I) and (II). Should we not considerthis to be furtherevidencethat the arguments of the laws are not meant to express Plato's orSocrates'beliefs?

Notice the implication this analysis has for step 7. What Socrateshas agreed to do is becomethe slave of the city; 7 thereforeclaims it isdikaion for Socrates to become a slave to the city. (ContrastEuthy-demus282 a-b).XI. Argument D): TheeffectsofSocrates' light (53a- 54b)

Finally the laws present three considerations that turn upon theeffects of Socrates' flight from Athens. There are no explicit appealsto to dikaion anywhere in this section (though the word 'dikaiosune'is used twice, 53 c 7, 54 a 1). Each of these considerations refersback to some argument earlier advanced by Crito. (1) At 44 e-45 a,Critohad urged Socrates not to be concerned over the fate his friendsmight meet if he fled; at 53 a-b, the laws remind Socrates that if heflees, his friends will be banishedor lose their property. (2) At 45 b-c,Crito had taken issue with Socrates' remark in court - in Crito'swords, that "he would not know what to do with himself" (cf. AP.37 c-d) - and reminded Socrates that Crito'sfriends in Thessalywouldwelcome and protect Sociates. At 53 b-e, the laws argue that if So-crates goes to well-governed cities like Thebes or Megara, he willgo as an enemy, while if he goes to Thessaly or some other disorderlycity, he will have to live as an inferior and a slave. (3) Finally, at45 c-d, Crito had charged Socrates with abandoniinghis childrenby dying; but at 54 a-b the laws point out that Socrates' childrenwould be no better off in Athens without Socrates, or with Socratesin Thessaly (or Thebes, presumably), than if Socrates were dead,and that even if Socrates were dead, his friends would care for thechildren.These three arguments are of unequal weight; the most importantis clearly (2). Not only do the laws spend more time on (2) than on22


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the others; Socrates himself, at 48 c, had ascribed such concern formoney and children to "those who lightly put men to death, and, ifthey could, would bring them to life again, without a thought: themany." In saying this, Socrates had seemed to rule out any furtherconsideration of (1) and (3); we might wonder why they are takenup again near the end of the dialogue. But first let us look moreclosely at (2).Critobelieves that Socrates, at his trial, had said that he would notknow what to do with himself if he left Athens. What Socrates reallysaid was this:

Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you wouldaccept that. I must indeed be possessed by a great love of life ifI am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellowcitizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, butfound them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are nowseeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endurethem. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life Ishould lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering fromcity to city and always being driven out! For well I know thatwherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as theydo here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuadetheir elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away,their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go awayfrom us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is thehardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say thatsuch conduct would be disobedienceto the god and that thereforeI cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will notbelieve me; and if again I say that to talk every day aboutvirtue and the other things about which you hear me talkingand examining myself and others is the greatest good to man,and that the unexamined ife is not worth living, you will believeme still less. These things are as I say, gentlemen,but to persuadeyou is not easy. (37 c-38 a)L7

In this passage Socrates gives two reasons for asserting (I): first, thegod has commanded Socrates to engage in philosophy (cf. 23 b,28 a-29 e, 30 e, 33 c), and, as he says earlier, "to do wrong and to17 Here (with one change) and subsequently I use H. N. Fowler's translationsof the Apology and Crito in the Loeb Classical Library.

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disobey my superior,whethergod or man, is wicked and dishonorable"(29 b). Second, life without philosophy is not worth living. It is notsurprising that Crito understands neither of these points, for he islike the gentlemen to whom Socrates says "to persuade you is noteasy."Although in Apology Socrates stresses obedience to the god as hisreason for asserting (I), this argument is dropped entirely in Crito,where the god is mentioned only at the end, 54 e. But the subsidiaryargument of Apology, that life without philosophyis not worth living,is repeated - by the laws! - in section (2) of argument (D):

Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the mostcivilized men? And if you do this will your life be worth living?Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on - whatkind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried onhere, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and thelaws are the most precious things to men? ... Or will you keepaway from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly?... And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you hadgone to Thessaly to attend a banquet?What will become of ourconversations about justice and virtue? (53 c-54 a)

The point here is the same as in Apology: wherever he goes, Socrateswill be unable to converse, to examine himself and othersaboutvirtue(thoughthe laws add that virtue is no moreimportant than the laws).The laws clearly imply that if he cannot converse elsewhere - cannotengage in philosophy elsewhere - he has no reason to flee Athens,even to avoid his death. Life without philosophy is not worth living.Crito'sunderstandingof this is that "if Socrates went away he wouldnot know what to do with himself" (45 b), and his cure is feasting inThessaly.XII. The contradictionbetweenApologyand Crito

In both Apology and Crito, Socrates states a doctrine of obedience.In Apology he says "to disobey my superior,whether god or man, iswicked and dishonorable,"and places obedience to god above obe-dience to humans. In Critohe makes the laws argue that Socrates shoulddo whatever they command.'8 In Apology one doctrine of obedience18 The laws never assert this or (II) baldly. But both follow from the premissesin each of (A) - (C), and it is reasonable to regard these three arguments as24


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is used to support (I), while in Critoanother doctrine of obedience isused to support (II). And in both ApologyandCritoa second argumentis given - that life without philosophy is not worth living - which inApology (38 a) is explicitly used to support (I), but which in Critois used to support not (I) but rather the proposition that Socratesshouldnot flee Athens.What conclusions can we drawfrom all this? Let us label our prop-ositions:(I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commandsme todo so.(II) Every citizen (includingmyself) should obey every command ofthe city.(III) Life without philosophy is not worth living.(IV) The god has commanded me to engage in philosophy, and Ishouldobey the god.(V) I shouldnot flee Athens.In the two dialogues,we have the following arguments:

Apology Crito(i) (III) therefore (I). (iii) (III) therefore (V). (Cf. (D), part (2).)(ii) (IV) therefore(I). (iv) (II) therefore(V). (Cf. (A), (B), (C).)(III) and (IV) are not persuasive to the many (Ap. 37 c-38 a). ThusSocrates' arguments in Apology fail to persuade his jury. Yet had heused any other arguments - arguments that would appeal to themany - he would have compromisedhimself and his ability to philos-ophizein Athens. He had no choice but to speakthetruth (Ap. 17b 4-6).Now argument (iii) will be no more persuasive to Crito than were (i)and (ii) to the jury. Because Socrates wishes to reconcile Crito to his(Socrates') death in Crito,Socrates will use not (iii) - or rather noteach establishing that citizens generally must obey laws and lawful commandsgenerally, and then particularizing this to Socrates and the command that hedie. In other words, we can regard each of the three arguments as proving (II),and then from (II) showing that Socrates should not flee. In (A), 1 and (a')and 4 together are supposed to imply that (IIA) one must obey the decisionsmade by the courts of the city; in (B), 1 and 3 (read as 3") and (a) together aresupposed to imply that (II B) one to whom the laws gave birth, etc., must notdo what is not permitted by the laws; and in (C), 1 and (b) and 7 together aresupposed to imply that (IIC) whoever among the Athenians remains in Athens,etc., ought to do whatever the laws command, if he/she cannot persuade thelaws that their command is wrong. (IIA) - (IIC) are all variants of (II); noneof them allow the exception asserted in (I).

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merely (iii) - but also arguments that are capableof moving the many.This is why he uses (iv), i.e. uses arguments (A), (B), and (C), andalso why he has the laws reintroduce in sections (1) and (3) of argu-ment (D) considerations that he had earlierrejected as typical of themany. This interpretation has the merit of clearing Socrates of thechargeof inconsistencybetween (I) and (II) - the problemwith whichwe began - because we can now say that Socrates does not believe(II), that he uses (II) to reconcile Crito to his death.'9This is not thewhole story about (II), however; I shall suggest below that Socratesbelievessomethinglike (II).19Position (1), which claims to provide a resolution of this inconsistency,has not yet been worked out successfully, to my knowledge. Consider the mostrecent defence of (1), by A. D. Woozley, in "Socrates on Disobeying the Law."(See note 5). Woozley argues that there is no inconsistency between (I) and(II), because (II) has built into it a "permitted exception," viz. "attemptingto convince the state that it is wrong in the law or command" that it has givenone. And Woozley regards this permitted exception to (II) as identical withengaging in philosophy, so that when in (I) Socrates says he will never give upphilosophy even if the city commands him to do so, he is only saying in aslightly different way what (II) says when it (implicitly) allows people to tryto persuade the city that its laws or commands are wrong. (Vlastos, p. 307).Woozley's argument clearly turns upon (a) the identification of philosophywith the attempt to convince the state that some law or command is wrong,and (b) the supposition that in Crito the laws guarantee to the citizen the rightto try to persuade them that they have given an unjust command. It is hard toknow how to respond to (a), it is so surprising. But consider how few of the Pla-tonic dialogues would contain "philosophy" if philosophy were to be defined asWoozley suggests, and recall the various dialogues in which Socrates opposesphilosophy to persuasion (rhetoric) (Woozley himself refers to the rejectionof rhetoric in Gorgias, at Vlastos, p. 302). As to (b), it is clear that argument(C), and likely that (B) (see 51 b 3-4, b 9-c 1), give Socrates the alternativesof either obeying or (successfully) persuading the laws they are wrong. Butthis is surely not true of argument (A). Woozley at one point suggests that(A) also admits this option of persuasion, on the ground that if one disobeysthe laws by attempting to persuade them they are wrong, such disobediencewould not "do violence and injury to the law" (Vlastos, p. 307). But it is notobvious that such disobedience would have no harmful effect on the law - itdepends on what form the attempt at persuasion takes, on what the laws are,and on what the citizens are like.Woozley's account is not the only one that suffers from an erroneous notionof what Socratic philosophy is; indeed, this seems to be a major pitfall for thoseattracted to position (1). For instance, Alexander Meiklejohn, in his account ofthe relation between Crito and Apology, identifies the freedom to engage inphilosophy with the freedom of opinion (Political Freedom [New York, 1965],pp. 21-24).26


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There are several further reasons for accepting this account, besidesthe two just mentioned (viz., that it removes the inconsistency fromSocrates' beliefs, and that it is suggestedby who Crito s and Socrates'remarksabout (III) and (IV)). First, there is the glaring inconsistencywe noted between arguments (B) and (C). If we hold that Socrateshimself (or Plato) gives credence to both these arguments, we mustascribeto him an inconsistency as seriousas that between (I) and (II).Second, we noticed in discussing arguments (A) and (B) that So-crates' appeal to the laws and city as a standard of to dikaion seemslittle better than Crito's appeal to the many. The city seems to belittle more than a way to unify the many citizens, to produce (at leastfor the time being) a unity from the manifold opinions held by themany. In no way can the city avoid the shortcomingsof the opinionsof the many, unless the many do not make the laws.20The city cannotby itself be a standardfor to dikaion.Third, the laws nowhere in their arguments explicitly make use ofprinciples (a), (a'), or (b). Analysis shows that those principlesplay arole in the arguments,but it is a minorrole, well hidden, and a numberof other surprising and unargued propositionsare given more prom-inence. Does Socrates have the laws hide these principlesfrom Crito'sattention? This would be surprising, in light of the fact that Cnrtodropped out of the conversation because he couldn't see how thoseprinciples applied to Socrates' question. We would hope or expectthat Socrates would help Crito by stressing the role the principlesplay in the arguments of the laws; instead Socrates seems to havedecided that the principles were not useful for persuading Crito,that Critowould not understand them no matter how much Socratesstressed them.This leaves unanswered the question of why Socrates has the lawsgive arguments that even implicitly rely upon those principles.Isn't this because he thinks those principles should be used inanswering the question of whether he should flee?The shortcomingofthe arguments of the laws is that they make the city and its laws ameasure of to dikaion, not that they implicitly rely upon Socraticprinciples. The corrective we must apply to those arguments is tofind a better standard for to dikaion, not to throw out Socrates' prin-ciples.What might this better standard be? At 47 e-48 a, Socrates says20This leads directly to Republic 473 c-d and 499 b-c, as well as Seventh Letter327 a-b.

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that life is not worth living when that part is injuredwhich is injuredby to adikonand improvedby to dikaion.And to live well is to be well(or at least getting better) in this part, for to live well is to live kalosand dikaios (48 b). But in Crito we also find the suggestion that whatmakes life worth living is conversation about dikaiosune and theother virtues (53 c-e, cf. Ap. 38 a), i.e. that philosophy makes lifeworth living. The implicationis that philosophyimproves that part ofthe soul that is improved by to dikaion, that philosophy is the causeof living dikaios. Thus, although philosophy or the philosophermaynot be the standard of to dikaion, it seems to follow that only thephilosopher s in a position to perceivethat standard. The many cannotperceive or be that standard (Ap. 37 e-38 b, Cr. 49 d), nor can thecity so long as it is controlled by. the many (which here includes theoligarchicparty). Since arguments (A) - (C) teach that the city and itslaws are the standard of to dikaion, or at least that they always con-form to that standard, those arguments must be unacceptable toSocrates.21Socrates nowhere explicitly assents to the arguments of the laws.The closest he comes is at the end of the dialogue,54 d, where he says:

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this [viz. what thelaws have said] is what I seem to hear, as the corybants seem tohear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes withinme and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assuredthat, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words,you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can ac-complish anything, speak.Doubtless one's first impression of this passage is that it expressesSocrates' agreement with what he has made the laws say (see alsoPhaedo 98 e 5-99 a 4). But even supposing this impression correct,S2 One might ask where Socrates thinks arguments (A) - (C) go wrong, if,as I say, he himself doesn't accept them. Is there any evidence to show whichpremisses or inferences he would point to as the sources of the arguments'inadequacy? I think there is no such evidence in the arguments themselves,and this perhaps counts against my interpretation. Nonetheless we can indicatein a question-begging way which premisses he would rejct, by referring to note18 and supposing that he will reject at least one of any set of propositions thatleads to (II), though he will hold to (a), (a') and (b). This gives the result thatin (A) he would reject steps 1 and/or 4; in (B), steps 1 and/or 3 (read as 3");and in (C), steps 1 and/or 7. (Of course he could also avoid (II) by challengingthe inferences in these arguments; see note 12).28


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does the passage imply or requirethat Socrates agreewith all of whatthe laws have said? Couldn't Socrates make the above statement (andthe Phaedo statement) merely on the basis of agreement with theconclusion the laws have advanced, that Socrates should not flee,and agreement with argument (D)? The assertion that Crito willspeak in vain against what the laws have said (i.e. against what So-crates has said) can be taken ironically, to mean that Crito, arguingfrom the perspective of the many, could not conceivably persuadeSocrates to flee, because Socrates is unmoved by the concerns of themany.

The only command of the city that Socrates is preparedto disobey,it seems, is the command to give up philosophy. In all other respects- even unto the laws' commandthat he die - he is an obedient citizen;those of us who advocate disobedienceon other matters cannot claimSocrates as our authority or precursor.22The position Socrates makesthe laws present in Crito- that Socratesshouldneverdisobey the city -is therefore in a sense close to, though inconsistent with, Socrates'true position. When Socrates makes the laws say what he thinkswill persuade Crito, Socrates does not distort his position exceptin one respect: concerning philosophy, a matter of the highest im-portance, but one which Crito will not understand anyway.University of Wisconsin - Madison

22Here lurk two problems that could explode our discussion: First, whenSocrates refused to fetch Leon of Salamis for the Thirty, did he violate a lawfulcommand? Xenophon, among others, argues that the command the Thirtygave Socrates was unlawful( Memorabilia IV iv 3). But we might suspect hismotive for claiming this, because he is trying to prove that Socrates identifiedto dikaion and to nomimon, the just and the lawful. The problem is to specifywhen a command is lawful, and when what purports to be a law is a law, i.e.is to be obeyed. And although we have seen that if Socrates thought somethingwere a law or lawful command, he would obey it (with the exception indicatedin (I)), we have not seen what criteria he would use to characterize a law.Second, why is Socrates prepared to disobey precisely this one command, andno others? If the polis does not grasp the standard of justice, might it not giveother unjust but lawful commands, besides the command to give up philosophy?Would Socrates obey such commands? I shall not discuss either of these problems.

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socrates on obediance (gary young)

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