somalia: a new approach

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Council Special Report No. 52

March 2010

Bronwyn E. Bruton

Somalia

A NewApproach


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Somalia

A New Approach


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Council Special Report No. 52

March 2010

Bronwyn E. Bruton

SomaliaA New Approach


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Foreword viiAcknowledgments ix

Map xiAcronyms xiii

Council Special Report 1Introduction 3Background 6U.S. Interests and Options 15Recommendations 23

Conclusion 35

Endnotes 36About the Author 38Advisory Committee 39CPA Advisory Committee 40CPA Mission Statement 41

Contents


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vii

Foreword

Even among ailed statesthose countries unable to exercise author-ity over their territory and provide the most basic services to their

peopleSomalia stands apart. A country o some nine million, it haslacked a central government since the all o Mohamed Siad Barresregime in 1991. Poverty and insecurity are endemic. Less than 40 per-cent o Somalis are literate, more than one in ten children dies beoreturning ve, and a person born in Somalia today cannot assume withany condence that he or she will reach the age o ty.

Failed states provide ertile ground or terrorism, drug trafcking,and a host o other ills that threaten to spill beyond their borders. Soma-

lia is thus a problem not just or Somalis but or the United States andthe world. In particular, the specter o Somalias providing a sanctuaryor al-Qaeda has become an important concern, and piracy o Somaliascoast, which aects vital international shipping lanes, remains a menace.

In this Council Special Report, Bronwyn E. Bruton proposes astrategy to combat terrorism and promote development and stabil-ity in Somalia. She rst outlines the recent political history involvingthe Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ormed in 2004 and its

Islamist opponents, chiey the Shabaab, which has declared allegianceto al-Qaeda. She then analyzes U.S. interests in the country, includingcounterterrorism, piracy, and humanitarian concerns, as well as theprospect o broader regional instability.

Bruton argues that the current U.S. policy o supporting the TFG isproving ineective and costly. The TFG is unable to improve security,deliver basic services, or move toward an agreement with Somaliasclans and opposition groups that would provide a stronger basis orgovernance. She also cites aws in two alternative policiesa rein-

orced international military intervention to bolster the TFG or anoshore approach that seeks to contain terrorist threats with missilesand drones.


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viii

Instead, Bruton advances a strategy o constructive disengage-ment. Notably, this calls or the United States to signal that it willaccept an Islamist authority in Somaliaincluding the Shabaabaslong as it does not impede international humanitarian activities andrerains rom both regional aggression and support or internationaljihad. As regards terrorism, the report recommends continued air-strikes to target al-Qaeda and other oreign terrorists while taking careto minimize civilian casualties. It argues or a decentralized approachto distributing U.S. oreign aid that works with existing local authori-ties and does not seek to build ormal institutions. And the report coun-sels against an aggressive military response to piracy, making the case

instead or initiatives to mobilize Somalis themselves against pirates.Somalia: A New Approach takes on one o todays most vexing or-

eign policy challenges, oering concise analysis and thoughtul recom-mendations grounded in a realistic assessment o U.S. and internationalinterests and capabilities. It is an important contribution to the debateover how to proceed in this most ailed o states.

Richard N. Haass

PresidentCouncil on Foreign RelationsMarch 2010

Foreword


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ix

I am tremendously grateul to Paul B. Stares and Princeton N. Lyman ortheir extensive dedication to this Special Report. It was made possible by

their patient stewardship and guidance. I am also thankul to CFR Presi-dent Richard N. Haass and to Director o Studies James M. Lindsay, bothor supporting the report and or extending my ellowship to allow orits completion. I thank CPA Research Associate Elise Vaughan or heradvocacy, rankness, and cheerul moral support, and Patricia Dor andLia Norton or their thoughtul advice and editorial contributions to sev-eral dierent drats. My sincere thanks also to Lisa Shields, Anya Schme-mann, and Melinda C. Brouwer or their eorts to promote the report.

I am extremely grateul to the reports advisory committee membersor their invaluable contributions. In particular, I thank Ambassador J.Anthony Holmes, then the Councils Cyrus R. Vance ellow in demo-cratic studies, or the enthusiastic support and counseling that he pro-vided throughout my tenure as a CFR international aairs ellow. ChrisAlbin-Lackey, Terrence Lyons, J. Peter Pham, and Michael Weinsteinmade particularly generous contributions o their time and expertise;their insights and amendments are reected throughout the report.

Kenneth Menkhaus and Ambassador David Shinn provided criticalinsights that greatly improved the recommendations.I also thank my many Somali colleagues or their anonymous but

critical support. Many o these colleagues have chosen to remain in thedevastated city o Mogadishu and have provided intelligence at greatpersonal risk.

Finally, I wish to thank my husband, Jason Friedman, who read andreread many drats o this report, and never ailed to provide his support.

This publication was made possible by a grant rom the Carnegie

Corporation o New York. The statements made and views expressedherein are solely my own.

Bronwyn E. Bruton

Acknowledgments


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Source: UN Cartographic Section.

Map


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AMISOM Arican Union Mission in Somalia

ARPCT Alliance or the Restoration o Peace and Counter-terrorism

ARS-Djibouti Djibouti Branch o the Alliance or the Reliberationo Somalia

ASWJ al-Sunna waal Jamaa

AU Arican Union

LDC local development council

SCIC Supreme Council o Islamic Courts

TFG Transitional Federal Government

UIC Union o Islamic Courts

UNDP United Nations Development Program

USAID United States Agency or International Development

Acronyms


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3

Introduction

Somalia has been a ailed state or the better part o two decades; bereto central government, cantonized into clan edoms, and wracked by

deadly spasms o violence. Repeated eorts to create a viable nationalgovernment have ailed. For the United States, the principal concern,especially since 9/11, has been the ear that Somalia might become asae haven or al-Qaeda to launch attacks in the region and even con-ceivably against the U.S. homeland. U.S. eorts to prevent that romhappening, however, have been counterproductive, alienating largeparts o the Somali population and polarizing Somalias diverseMuslim community into moderate and extremist camps. Several

indigenous militant Islamist groups have emerged and grown strongerin recent years. One coalition, headed by a radical youth militia knownas the Shabaab, now controls most o southern Somalia and threat-ens the survival o the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)thelatest UN-brokered eort to establish a unctioning authority in thecapital city o Mogadishu.

The Obama administration has chosen to adopt and expand its pre-decessors policy o providing limited, indirect diplomatic and military

support to the TFG, in hopes it will provide a bulwark against militantIslamist orces in Somalia. In August 2009, Secretary o State HillaryClinton met with the TFG president, Sheikh Shari Sheikh Ahmed,and promised continued shipments o ammunition and diplomatic sup-port, calling the government Somalias best hope or stability. But theodds o the TFG emerging as an eective body are extremely poor. Thegovernments writ extends to no more than a ew blocks o Mogadishu,and its survival depends entirely on the protection provided by a weakArican Union (AU) peacekeeping orce (AMISOM). Although the

TFG has the backing o some Somalis, it has ailed to attract a criticalmass o support. Indeed, the open blessing o the TFG by the UnitedStates and other Western countries has perversely served to isolate the


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4 Somalia: A New Approach

government and, at the same time, to propel cooperation among previ-ously ractured and quarrelsome extremist groups.

Given the promises that the United States has made to support theTFG, one last attempt should be made to help it survive by drawing inthe leaders o the principal Islamist groups, including even the Shabaab.Realistically, however, the TFGs prospects are dismal and thus theUnited States should concurrently review its policy options towardSomalia in the expectation that the TFG will either collapse orequally disastrous or the United Statesremain a marginal presencethat is undamentally incapable o countering the inuence o extremistgroups in Somalia.

Launching a new and, by denition, costly and prolonged nation-building/counterinsurgency campaign to destroy militant Islamistgroups in Somalia and prevent al-Qaeda rom establishing a sae havenis not the answer or the United States even i it were politically easible.Given U.S. priorities in Aghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, to say nothingo various pressing domestic initiatives, there is no appetite or anotherhugely expensive military mission abroad. More to the point, such aneort would likely make matters worse given the harsh anti-Western

sentiment permeating Somalia, and runs the real risk that greater U.S.involvement would only strengthen the position o the extremists andproduce the outcome that we ear most.

An alternative option is to adopt a minimalist counterterrorist pos-ture to deny al-Qaedas potential use o Somalia as a training base andstaging area to launch attacks in the region and beyond. That would beprincipally carried out by stando military attacks using armed drones,cruise missiles, and, i required, occasional ground operations involving

special orces. Other measures to isolate Somalia rom outside supportor terrorist operations and contain the growth o the Shabaab wouldalso be employed. Putting aside whether such an option is operationallysustainable without accurate targeting intelligence that usually comesrom nurturing local sources o inormation, such attacks would riskinciting urther anti-American sentiment and increasing the supportor al-Qaeda in Somalia and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Such anapproach would also do nothing to improve the dire humanitarian situ-ation in Somalia and could conceivably compromise ongoing Western-

backed relie operations.The United States needs to chart a dierent courseone that delib-

erately lessens American involvement in Somalia without giving up


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5Introduction

on the objective o undermining the Shabaab and denying al-Qaedaa sanctuary. What can be termed constructive disengagement mayappear to be a counterintuitive approach, but doing less is better thandoing harm, and there are good reasons to believe that the results willbe more successul. The Shabaab is an alliance o convenience and itshold over territory is weaker than it appears. Under the right condi-tions, it will ragment. Somali undamentalistswhose ambitions aremostly localare likely to break ranks with al-Qaeda and other oreignoperatives as the utility o cooperation diminishes. The United Statesand its allies must encourage these ssures to expand. They can do thatmost quickly and easily by disengaging rom any eort to pick a winner

in Somalia, and by signaling a willingness to coexist with any Islamistgroup or government that emerges, as long as it rerains rom acts oregional aggression, rejects global jihadi ambitions, and agrees to toler-ate the eorts o Western humanitarian relie agencies in Somalia.

Over the long term, Somalia is likely to slowly return to its pre-2006conguration o clan territories. As anti-Western sentiment subsides,the United States and its allies can then reengage to help resolve thedeeper causes o state ailure in Somalia. Rather than pursue central-

ized state-building and governance eorts, localized economic devel-opment initiatives should be encouraged. Simultaneously, regional andinternational partners should be enlisted to reduce simmering regionalanimosities, undermine the support or extremist groups, and addressthe piracy problem that has worsened on the margins o the largerSomalia conict.

A strategy o constructive disengagement entails risk, but the alter-natives are ar more dangerous. Unless there is a decisive change in U.S.,

UN, and regional policy, ineective external meddling threatens to pro-long and worsen the conict, urther radicalize the population, andincrease the odds that al-Qaeda and other extremist groups will eventu-ally nd a sae haven in Somalia.


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Background

Somalia has been without a central government since the collapse o adecades-old military dictatorship in 1991. The bloody civil war that ol-

lowed utterly destroyed what national governance structures remained,dividing Somalia into a patchwork o clan edoms. Yet, contrary to thegeneral perception o Somalia existing in a chronic state o violent anar-chy, a number o loosely unctional democratic administrative struc-tures developedmostly in the north, but also in pockets o the south.Certain economic ventures also began to ourish within the edoms,particularly telecommunications and livestock export industries. Bythe early 2000s, many o Somalias economic development indica-

tors were actually comparable to or better than those o neighboringcountries. Repeated attempts by the international community to uniteSomalia under a viable national government nevertheless ailed misera-bly, largely because o a persistent lack o political consensus in Somaliaabout the orm that a national government should take, and about howto equitably manage the distribution o political power and resourcesamong the countrys ractious clans.

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLIY I N SOMALIA

For almost a decade ollowing the disastrous Black Hawk Down incidento 1993, U.S. policymakers eectively ignored Somalia. But ater the1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and then 9/11, concernsthat Somalia could become a sae haven or al-Qaeda quickly eclipsedany lingering humanitarian imperative. Since 2004, U.S. preoccupationwith this terror threat has motivated broader international eorts to

reconstruct a central government. Local resistance to these eorts has inturn sparked the reemergence and rise o indigenous jihadist groups inSomalia, potentially providing a new oothold or al-Qaeda.


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7Background

The Transitional Federal Government was created in 2004 ater twoyears o sputtering, internationally sponsored national reconciliationtalks in Nairobi. Consisting o a loose coalition o Somali leaders whointended to lay the oundation or a national government over a ve-year period, the TFG has never gained widespread local support andinitially received only tepid backing rom the international community,including the United States. For the rst two years o its existence, theTFG eectively remained a government in exile, rst in Nairobi, andthen in the Somali city o Baidoa.

Despite its apparent stillbirth, the TFGs creation produced a violentcounterreaction in Mogadishu, where a radical youth militia group

the Shabaabdeveloped and began assassinating TFG members andsupporters. The emergence o an indigenous extremist group ateryears o dormancy alarmed U.S. intelligence operatives, who attemptedto counter the increased threat by mobilizing a coalition o Somalimilitia leaders to capture suspected al-Qaeda operatives believed tobe hiding in Somalia. In February 2006, these militia leaders ormed adisastrously public partnership called the Alliance or the Restorationo Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The Central Intelligence

Agencys involvement was hard to hide, and ARPCTs creation causeda popular revolt. With broad support rom the public, clan leaders,Mogadishus business community, and a preexisting network o shariacourts (known collectively as the Union o Islamic Courts, or UIC)banded together and, ater a our-month battle in Mogadishu, hand-ily deeated the ARPCT on June 5, 2006. The governing coalition thatemerged rom this victory named itsel the Supreme Council o IslamicCourts (SCIC).

The SCICs rise to power owed more to happenstance than to strat-egy. It depended on a rare conuence o actors: the growing inuenceo the sharia courts as a rudimentary source o law and order, the busi-ness communitys willingness to invest in public security, and the clan-based backlash against international counterterror and state-buildingeorts. But the SCIC ably capitalized on its military advantage andon the populations eagerness or peace to expel the warlords that hadbalkanized Mogadishu or more than a decade. The subsequent resto-ration o order generated nationwide enthusiasm, and the UIC gover-

nance model was rapidly duplicated across southern Somalia.Though bewildered by the rise o an apparently eective grassroots

governance movement in Somalia, U.S. policymakers were, to their


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credit, quick to recognize the popular legitimacy o the SCIC and ini-tially pushed or a power-sharing arrangement with the TFG. But theSCIC, convinced o its political and military advantage, was reluctantto concede to such an arrangement with the dysunctional and politi-cally isolated TFG, and the TFG, condent o Western backing, wasequally unwilling to negotiate. Over the next ew months, the rapid riseo extremist elements within the broad SCIC umbrella movement putadditional strains on negotiations. It quickly appeared that the radicalShabaab militia, then acting as the military arm o the SCIC, had seizedcontrol o policy. A series o unpopular, harsh pronouncements bannedoreign lms, music, political gatherings, and use o the popular stimu-

lant qat, while markedly increasing taxes on the business community.Worse still, the SCICs vocal revival o irredentist claims on neighbor-ing Kenya and Ethiopia posed a potential threat to regional stability.

The extent to which the broad SCIC leadership actually condonedthese measures is unclear, but the actions certainly exacerbated U.S.ears and sent shock waves through the Somali public. Dissatisactiongrew and the SCIC movement began to appear vulnerable to collapse.At the same time, SCIC aggression toward the TFG accelerated and

urther alarmed U.S. ofcials. In December 2006, just as the SCICadvanced on the seat o the ederal government itsel, Ethiopia invadedSomalia with the tacit support o and, most likely, operational help romthe United States. Ethiopian orces quickly overwhelmed the SCIC,killing hundreds o Somali youth in a single battle on the open groundoutside the town o Baidoa. Abandoned by the public, the SCIC sur-rendered Mogadishu to the Ethiopian army and its leaders ed acrossSomalia. The TFG subsequently relocated to the capital and a new,

more brutal phase in the Somali conict began.

ETH IOPIAN OUPATI ON

The presence o the TFG and especially o Ethiopian troops sparkeda complex insurgency in Mogadishu. The Shabaab militia started togain popular backing as a resistance movement. Foreign jihadists,including al-Qaeda, sensed an unprecedented opportunity to globalize

Somalias conict and quickly unneled support to the Shabaab. Sev-eral dozen oreign jihadists also entered Somalia, importing al-Qaedatactics. Remote-controlled detonations and suicide bombings became


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9Background

relatively common, and over the course o two years, the Shabaab cap-tured most o southern Somalia.

From the beginning, the United States was viewed as a not-so-hid-den partner o Ethiopia. Besides its public support or the Ethiopianinvasion, the United States launched a series o missile attacks on ee-ing SCIC leaders in January 2007. The missiles ailed to hit their tar-gets, but caused scores o civilian casualties, and inextricably linked theUnited States to Ethiopias occupation and subsequent human rightsabuses by the TFG, Ethiopian, and Arican Union orces. These abusesincluded rape, kidnapping, mortar re on civilian hospitals and mediahouses, and indiscriminate shelling o civilian crowds in response to

insurgent attacks. During the two years o Ethiopias occupation, Mog-adishu was reduced to a level o human suering, violence, and disorderunknown since the civil war, and anti-American sentiment rose to anall-time high. Outrage over the Ethiopian occupation prompted mem-bers o the ar-ung Somali diaspora, including twenty youths romMinnesota, to return to their homeland to ght or the Shabaab. Oneo these individuals, Shirwa Ahmed, became the rst known Americansuicide bomber in October 2008. These incidents are isolated, but or

the rst time have raised the specter o a homegrown radicalizationproblem in the United States.

RENEWED INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its troops rom Mogadishu. Theutility o supporting the TFG had become evident, and the costs o

conronting the growing Islamist insurgency in Mogadishu had becomeunsustainable. Fearing a security vacuum, both the UN Political Ofcein Somalia and the U.S. Department o State actively pushed or thecreation o AMISOM, and then, when an adequate number o troopsailed to materialize, or the deployment o a UN peacekeeping orceto replace the departing Ethiopian troops. A global shortage o willingtroop contributors eventually led to a renewed ocus on diplomacy.

Fortunately, the removal o Ethiopian troops provided enhancedopportunities or negotiation with one action o the Islamist reorm

movement, the Djibouti branch o the Alliance or the Reliberation oSomalia (ARS-Djibouti). The merger o the ARS-Djibouti with theall-but-deunct TFG on January 26, 2009, was hailed by the UN as the


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creation o a national unity government and crowds o Somalis demon-strated joyully in the streets o Mogadishu. The international commu-nity had little choice but to swallow its misgivings about the nominationo a ormer SCIC leader, Sheikh Shari Sheikh Ahmed, to the presi-dency and to throw its support behind the revamped TFG.

In the months immediately ollowing Sheikh Sharis election,there was widespread optimism that the TFG would draw radical ac-tions into the peace processbut those hopes rapidly proved illusory.Although Sheikh Shari has attempted to create an Islamist identity orthe TFG by promising to adopt sharia, he has been rejected as a West-ern proxy by the principal Islamist actions in Somalia. The TFG has

also ailed to generate a visible constituency o clan or business sup-porters in Mogadishu. Its survival now depends wholly on the presenceo AMISOM orces, which urther reinorces the perception that theTFG is a oreign implant.

THE ARMED ISLAMIST OPPOSIT ION

The Bush administrations characterization o the Somali conict as anew ront in the war on terror recast a local, decades-long conict as anideological battle between secular democracy and Islam, between mod-erates and extremists. These blunt categories blurred important di-erences in tactics and ideology, and severely undermined the capacityo U.S. and other international representatives to relate to the Somalipublic. Worse, it has allowed the Shabaab to uniy an otherwise diversearray o actors into an armed opposition.

The desire to expel the peacekeepers and unseat the TFG has pro-vided a powerul motive or cooperation between the Shabaab andits would-be rival, a undamentalist nationalist group called HizbulIslam (the Islamic Party). But the Shabaabs alliance with Hizbul Islamis riddled with disagreements over ideology and tactics. Itsel an alli-ance o convenience between our clan-based Islamist actions, HizbulIslam is ronted by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. He is high on the U.S.list o wanted terrorist suspects, but is perceived by many Somalis tohold a nationalist rather than a Wahabist ideology. Since his return

to Mogadishu in April 2009 ater a two-year exile in Eritrea, SheikhAweys has publicly criticized Osama bin Ladens intererence in Soma-lia, and though he has called or violent resistance to AMISOM, he has


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11Background

requently condemned intra-Somali violence, including attempts toassassinate members o the TFG. Aweys and his deputy, Sheikh HassanTurki, have sought to maintain Hizbul Islams tactical alliance with theShabaab, but the two groups have battled or control o the port town oKismayo (and its bountiul revenues) and or ascendancy within Soma-lias Islamist movement. An eventual conrontation to establish domi-nance over Mogadishu seems inevitableand is postponed only by amore urgent desire to expel AMISOM and to unseat the TFG.

Although the Shabaab has a greater military capacity than HizbulIslam or the TFG, its control o most southern Somali territory is tenu-ous. Beore capturing a territory, the Shabaab typically engages in

an extensive public relations eort, eaturing public rallies and radioannouncements, and ending in a voluntary reception o Shabaab lead-ers by clan elders, who retain signicant power. The Shabaab is alsoadept at exploiting long-standing clan conicts, usually by providingguns and ammunition to minority clan actions, rendering the majorityclan more vulnerable and less able to protest the Shabaabs occupation.Although that shows an impressive strategic capacity to capitalize onlocal conicts, the Shabaab has oten overplayed its hand and been met

with violent resistance on all sides.In the central Galguduud region, or example, shared resistance to

the Shabaab has resulted in an alliance o convenience between previ-ously rival clan and business actions. The alliance is requently char-acterized as a moderate Islamist movement because it has adopted thebanner o al-Sunna waal Jamaa (ASWJ), an umbrella organizationrepresenting the practice o Su Islam in Somalia. Formerly apoliticaland with no inherent military capability, ASWJ has nevertheless man-

aged to break the Shabaabs hold on the Galgaduud and Hiran regions,in large part by accepting nancial and logistical support rom theEthiopian army. ASWJ has ormed a orty-one-member parliamentand is attempting to position itsel as a successor to the TFG, but itsties to Ethiopia will likely undermine the groups capacity to generatea national political constituency. In the meantime, however, ASWJ hascapitalized on the widespread public disgust generated by the Shabaabsuse o intimidation tactics, including public beheading and stoning. Andresistance to the Shabaab has not been restricted to the central region.

Another moderate Islamist eort to orm a semiautonomous state insouthern Somalia is under way in the Gedo, Bay and Bakol, Lower andMiddle Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions.


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The Shabaab, thereore, aces signicant and growing resistancerom clan and moderate Islamist groups. The movement is also inter-nally ractured along both ideological and clan lines. The Shabaabsradical leadership is believed to be concentrated along the southerncoast, primarily in the port city o Kismayo. These leadersAbdiGodane (Sheikh Mokhar Abu-Zubeyr), Ibrahim Haji Jama (al-Aghani), and Fuad Mohamed Khala (Fuad Shangole)haveknown connections to international jihadist groups and are committedto the Sala-Wahabist strand o Islam. Access to extensive resourcesand support rom the Middle East (and allegedly Eritrea, though theseclaims have been poorly substantiated) has allowed these Shabaab lead-

ers to develop an unusual degree o centralized control over severalmixed-clan militia groups. The size o these militias is probably only inthe hundreds, but their capacity has been enhanced by the presence ooreign experts who provide training in insurgent tactics, including theuse o explosive devices and the Wahabi ideology.

The mixed-clan militias, with their disciplined, indoctrinated ght-erssome o them oreigners rom the United States, Australia, Den-mark, Yemen, and Aghanistan, among other countriesrepresent

only a raction o the Shabaab orces. Most Shabaab ghters are illiter-ate neighborhood youths, some o them recruited at gunpoint, proneto deection, and possessed o little military training. Many more othe recruits have been opportunistically drawn to the Shabaab romSomalias many clan and bandit militia actions. A Shabaab-heldneighborhood in Mogadishu, or example, may host as many as sevenseparate militia actions, all o whom identiy themselves as Shabaab,but nevertheless compete violently against one another or taxes and

territory. The ability o the central Shabaab leadership to exercisecommand and control o these actions is limited. Indeed, rather thanrejecting all Western inuence in Somalia, the majority o Shabaabactions have actively cooperated with Western humanitarian relieeorts (i only or a ee). Likewise, a number o Shabaab actions havepublicly denied any involvement in terrorist activities or banditry. Amajor Shabaab leader and U.S.-designated terror suspect, MuktarRobow (also known as Abu Mansoor), has publicly dissented romthe Shabaabs strategy o imposing a harsh sharia law on Somalia. He

has called instead or the adoption o pragmatic, nationalist strategiesthat are more in keeping with Somali social custom. Other ghtersand militia leaders have been alienated by the Shabaabs deerence to


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13Background

oreign tactics and leaders, particularly in the wake o the December3, 2009, suicide attack, which killed twenty-our people and destroyedthe rst medical graduation to be held in Somalia in two decades. Theattack provoked unprecedented outrage among Somalis, and it wasblamed on oreigners within the Shabaab.

The capacity o relatively middle-ground Islamist leaders such as Ro-bow and Hassan Turki to inuence Shabaab policy is limited. Althoughthey oten represent strong local constituencies, they are neither radicalnor moderate enough to attract external nancial backing, and they areeasily held hostage to the demands o the Shabaabs better-unded radi-cal leadership. Robows recent promise to send troops to support the

Islamist insurgency in Yemen has been taken by many experts as a prooo his vulnerability. The ability o the Shabaabs most radical leaders todictate policy, however, may backre. The Shabaabs increasing relianceon oreigners, and its declared commitment to the global jihad, has alien-ated both its rank-and-le ghters and the broader Somali public.

THE MI LITARY STALEMATE

The TFGs capacity to attract and retain ghters in its ranks dependson its ability to pay troops as well as or better than the Shabaab. Theinternational community has been largely unable to assist the TFG inproviding stipends to troops. The TFG police and armed orces areessentially independent paramilitaries operating under the control ovarious warlords afliated with the government, and they have beenimplicated in rape, robbery, kidnapping, murder, and the indiscrimi-

nate killing o civilians during combat operations. These abuses, cou-pled with the widespread thet o international unds, orced the UnitedNations Development Program (UNDP) to halt the payment o policestipends in 2008, causing a rash o deections. Until these human rightsand accountability problems are resolved, the TFG will remain an ine-cient vehicle or international security assistance.

An international donors conerence in Brussels on April 26, 2009,resulted in pledges o $213 million to support the TFG and AMISOM.Less than a third o the unding has been delivered, and eorts to create

a unied army rom the remnants o the TFG and UIC militias havemade little progress. A recruitment eort in May 2009 drew in twentythousand potential troops, but teen thousand ailed to report, and


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the remaining ve thousand have mostly deserted. Credible estimatesnow place the total number o gunmen reliably on the government sideat only a ew thousand. U.S. eorts to supply TFG orces with ammu-nition have been equally ruitless. Despite receiving approximatelyeighty tons o small arms and ammunition rom the United Statessince May 2009, the TFG has not managed to expand its territory inMogadishu. The price o AK-47 bullets in Mogadishus main armsmarket has also dropped sharply, rom sixty-seven cents to thirty centsa bullet. That suggests that at least some o the U.S.-supplied ammu-nition has, as eared, ound its way onto the black market. Reports oTFG and peacekeeping troops selling their weapons to the Shabaab

are rampant. And in July 2009, a pair o French security advisers sentto train the TFG orces were kidnapped and handed over to extrem-istsapparently by renegade members o the TFG police. The lacko loyalty and accountability among TFG orces are likely to atallyundermine eorts to build a national army or Somalia.


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15

Since 9/11, U.S. interest in Somalia has been driven primarily by theear that it could become a sae haven or al-Qaeda and afliated orga-

nizations to plan and stage attacks against targets in the region andultimately the U.S. homeland. Related but secondary interests deriverom the potential or the conict in Somalia to destabilize adjoiningareas in the strategically important Horn o Arica region and to createan even larger humanitarian crisis. More recently, the threat posed bySomali pirates to the vital sea lanes o communication through the Gulo Aden has added a third dimension to U.S. concerns about Somalia.

SOMALIA AS TERROR IST SAFE HAVEN

As recently as early 2007, U.S. intelligence assessed Somalias cultureand unpredictable operating environment to be undamentally inhos-pitable to oreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. But ollowing theEthiopian invasion and the rise o the Shabaab, there is growing evi-dence that al-Qaeda operatives have made new inroads in Somalia. A

string o ve near-simultaneous suicide bombings in the territories oSomaliland and Puntlandtwo semiautonomous regions o Soma-liain October 2008 were likely the result o al-Qaeda providing tacti-cal advice to the Shabaab. Somalia is now suspected o hosting severalhundred oreign jihadists, including Fazul Abdullah, al-Qaedas topEast Arican operative, and a handul o American Somalis recruitedrom the Minnesota and Seattle diasporas. The Shabaabs recruitmento diaspora youth has raised concern that these individuals could usetheir oreign citizenship to orm al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the United

States, Australia, and Europe. In August 2009, Melbourne authoritiesarrested a group o terrorists, including two members o the Somali

U.S. Interests and Options


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diaspora, in the midst o preparations or what might have been a dev-astating suicide attack on Australian military personnel. More recently,similarities between a ailed airline bombing attempt on November 11,2009, at Mogadishus airport and the Christmas Day attack on North-west Flight 253 to Detroit have raised new concerns about the potentialor collaboration between al-Qaeda afliates in Yemen, Nigeria, andSomalia. The Shabaabs ormal declaration o allegiance to al-Qaedaon February 2, 2010, will urther heighten ears that the group may lendits ghters and its territory to urther the global jihad.

To date, however, there is no clear evidence o Somalia being used byal-Qaeda or other transnational terrorist groups as an operational plat-

orm to carry out attacks beyond its borders. And while the Shabaabhas expressed a rhetorical commitment to al-Qaeda, and has been des-ignated a oreign terrorist organization by the United States, thereslittle to indicate that the group shares al-Qaedas larger transnationalgoals. The Shabaabs promises to send ghters to Yemen and to launchretaliatory attacks on Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia are, itaken at ace value, worrying indications o its willingness to extendits jihad beyond Somalias borders. But the threats have so ar proven

empty, and it is equally plausible that the Shabaabs cooperation withal-Qaeda is a short-term tactical arrangement that will be abandonedas its utility decreases. The presence o oreign jihadists will ultimatelyimpede the Shabaabs ambition to govern Somalia. As noted earlier,the Shabaab has already been condemned by many Somalis as an alienmovement promoting unwelcome oreign interests. Previous attemptsby jihadist groups to govern Somalia have oundered against the Soma-lis hostility to restrictive, non-Somali religious edicts and the inability

o oreigners to operate within the clan system. During the 1990s, an al-Qaeda-linked group called al-Ittihad controlled a signicant portion osouthern Somalia, but quickly aced resistance and became deunctwithout any intervention by the United States.

PREVENT ING REGIONAL INSTABILIT Y

The potential or the Somali conict to ignite a wider regional conict

is real but should not be exaggerated. The greatest danger stems rom apotential escalation o the long-standing conict between Ethiopia and


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17U.S. Interests and Options

Eritrea. Their border dispute in the late 1990s exploded into a ull-scalewar that killed tens o thousands. A cease-re has held since 2000, butboth sides have continued their dispute through proxy warare. Ethio-pia has supported Eritrean insurgents in their eorts to undermine theAsmara regime, and Eritrea has supported secessionists in EthiopiasOgaden region. Eritrea is also widely suspected o supplying weaponsand unding to the Shabaabthough Eritrea has loudly denied theseclaims. Eritrea has consistently condemned the international commu-nitys ailure to enorce the ruling o an independent border commis-sion on the demarcation o its border with Ethiopia. Until the borderdispute is eectively resolved, eorts to disrupt the ow o arms to radi-

cal groups in Somalia will be stalemated.The northern Somali territories o Somaliland and Puntland are

another potential source o instability. Somalilanders crave interna-tional recognition o the territory as an independent nation, but itappears that a substantial majority o southern Somalis desire reuni-cation, or at least the perpetuation o a conederal system. TheSomalilanders commitment to independence is a stumbling block tointernational eorts to establish a central government or Somalia,

and in consequence, the Somalilanders have been continually excludedrom internationally led reconciliation eorts. The TFG, though theo-retically ederal, has no authority over Somaliland or the neighboringnorthern territory o Puntland. The border between Somaliland andPuntland is disputed, and the territories are engaged in a low-levelconict that could escalate unpredictably.

U.S. policy on Somaliland and Puntland has been inconsistent.Both territories have established semi-unctional governments, but the

United States has emphatically reused to grant them ormal diplomaticrecognition. Both regimes have nevertheless received some capacity-building support rom U.S. development agencies. Western navalorces have handed pirates over to the custody o Puntland authorities,and Somaliland police orces have received counterterror training romAmerican specialists.

Somaliland and Puntland are bulwarks against the spread o radi-cal ideologies, but both territories are under increasing threat rom theShabaab. A coherent policy or protecting Somaliland and Puntland

rom Shabaab attacks, or engaging the territories as partners in stabili-zation and counterradicalization eorts, is urgently required.


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HUMANI TAR IAN ONERNS

The Ethiopian invasion, the insurgency, and a persistent drought haveaggravated the humanitarian crisis, pushing Somalia to the edge oamine. Some 3.8 million Somalis require ood assistance (one-third toone-hal o the total population), approximately 1.6 million are inter-nally displaced, and some ve hundred thousand are reugees. Thedelivery o humanitarian relie is threatened not only by piracy, but alsoby the escalating violence on land. Southern Somalia presents one o themost dangerous environments in the world to deliver aid, with thirty-ve humanitarian relie workers killed in 2008 alone. Humanitarian

eorts have been urther endangered by a local tendency to conate therelie eort with unpopular international counterterror operations andsupport to the TFG.

THE PI RAY THREAT

The emergence o strong pirate networks in the central and northeast

regions o Somalia has become a signicant threat to the internationalshipping industry and potentially to local stability. The InternationalMaritime Bureau reports that the number and range o pirate attackshave escalated rapidly, rom ten in 2006 to thirty-one in 2007 to 111 in2008, albeit still a tiny raction o the twenty-two thousand vessels thattrafc the Gul every year. A well-coordinated international navalresponse has done little to deter the attacks, which rose to 214 in 2009.The U.S. Naval Forces Central Commands Combined Task Force 151,

the European Unions Operation Atalanta, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganizations Operation Allied Protector, and independent nationalnavies currently have some thirty ships patrolling the Gul o Aden. Theonly good news is that, though the rate o attacks has accelerated, recentmeasures taken by the shipping industry to bee up on-board securitymeasures have been rewarded with a decrease in the capture rate.

U.S. POLIY OPTIONS

U.S. policy options or Somalia are typically reduced to three alterna-tive courses o action: continuation o current policy, increased military


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intervention or stabilization and reconstruction, and an oshore coun-terterrorist containment strategy. Each o these options, however, su-ers rom signicant shortcomings. A better course o action or theUnited States is to pursue a policy o constructive disengagement.

Continue Current oliCy

The current policy o providing military and diplomatic supportto the TFG is, or the reasons discussed earlier, not bearing ruit. Itis also extremely costly. The military stalemate that has held sinceMay 7, 2009, has displaced more than two hundred thousand people

rom Mogadishuprolonging a cycle o suering and radicalizationand adding to an already horrendous reugee problem on the Kenyanborder. That is a terribly high price to pay or protecting a governmentthat commands little support on the ground, administers no terri-tory, and has, despite the eorts o the international community overthe past ve years, developed no institutional or military capacity togovern the country. Without supportive political momentum on theground, the current peacekeeping mission is likely to be as utile as the

Ethiopian invasion, and may end in the same way, with an embarrass-ing withdrawal o troops.

The United States and its allies continue to hope that Sheikh Shariwill be able to cobble together a grassroots clan and religious constitu-ency or the TFG, but the window o opportunity is closing ast i ithasnt already closed. TFG eorts to improve the security situation inMogadishu, provide services to the population, and engage an inclusivearray o clan actorseorts that are vital to promoting the TFGs legiti-

macyhave been abandoned in the ace o escalating Shabaab assaults.Sheikh Shari has increasingly devoted his eorts to lobbying the inter-national community or increased military assistance.

In the months ollowing his appointment to the presidency, SheikhShari made sincere eorts to draw the armed Islamist opposition intodialogue. His eorts were roundly rejected by the Shabaab. SheikhHassan Dahir Aweyss decision to ally Hizbul Islam to the Shabaab hasurther undermined the likelihood o a political settlement. NeitherHizbul Islam nor the Shabaab has any evident incentive to cut a deal

with the TFG, whose eorts to govern can be indenitely spoiled bymortar and suicide attacks. The longer the TFG remains ineective,the more public dissatisaction with the institution will rise; and the


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ongoing conict and displacement will assist in urther radicalizingthe public.

In the worst-case scenario, an increasing number o casualties mayultimately compel AMISOM to withdraw its orces. In the wake othe September 14, 2009, U.S. counterterror strike that killed al-Qaedaoperative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the Shabaab managed to launcha retaliatory suicide attack in the heart o the AMISOM compound,killing more than twenty people, including the Burundian orce com-mander. Though AMISOM appears committed to remaining in Soma-lia, the incident resulted in orceul demands by Burundis politicalopposition to immediately repatriate the Burundian troop contingent

rom AMISOM, which they called a suicide mission. Worse, Aricancommentators have loudly noted the hypocrisy o elding Aricansoldiers into a theater that is considered too hopeless and ormidableor Western orces. Unless a more supportive political rameworkemergeswhich currently looks unlikelyAMISOM will be ineec-tive and ultimately unsustainable.

inCreased ilitary intervention

The United States could pressure the Arican Union and the UN to aug-ment the current AMISOM orce to prevent the all o the TFG andprovide it with more time to garner wider political support in Somalia.Judging rom recent experience, however, the increase in troop strengthwould need to be signicant to have any impact. At the height o itsoccupation o Mogadishu in 2008, the Ethiopian army controlled six toeight battalions o highly trained troops and as many as ten battalions

o Somali troops trained in Ethiopia. It also unded approximately -teen hundred militiamen belonging to various Somali warlords. Alongwith the Arican Union peacekeeping troops, the total number o sol-diers and paramilitaries on the government side was in the neighbor-hood o teen thousand men. The Ethiopian battalions were also osignicantly higher caliber than the current AMISOM orce, and theystill ailed to stem the Shabaab insurgency. Given that the Shabaabsmilitary capability is stronger, not weaker, than it was in 2008, a March2009 estimate by the UNs Department o Peacekeeping Operations

that 22,500 troops would be required is probably correct.Even i the AU or the UN were to assemble and deploy such a orce,

which is highly doubtul given other peacekeeping commitments and


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general capacity shortalls, recent experience also suggests that the pres-ence o a large contingent o oreign troops would be resented by theSomali population and, moreover, ercely resisted by the various armedclans and actions. Rather than helping the TFG broaden its supportbase, the eect could be to marginalize it even urther.

A much larger stabilization orce capable o suppressing resistance,holding territory, and providing security or a more ambitious recon-struction eort is imaginable but even more unrealistic. The rule othumb or the number o troops required or stability operations in anenvironment where the population is largely acquiescent is between veto ten soldiers per thousand people; in a nonpermissive environment

the requirement jumps to twenty soldiers per thousand. Somalias pop-ulation is not reliably known but is believed to be around nine million,which suggests a total occupying orce o at least one hundred thousandto account or varying security conditions. For the United States, notto mention other potential partners, the deployment o such a orce atthis time given ongoing commitments in the Middle East and Aghani-stan would be extremely challenging. More to the point, domestic U.S.politics precludes even trying. Public sentiment is already souring on

comparable eorts in Aghanistan, and with memories o earlier ailedU.S. interventions in Somalia still much alive, there will be little or nosupport or undertaking such a venture. The situation is no dierent inother potential troop supplying countries.

offshore Containent

Rather than try to support a political process in Somalia, the United

States could narrow its policy objective to simply containing the ter-rorist threat rom outside its borders. That goal could be pursued inseveral complementary ways. One would be to orceully suppress anysigns o an al-Qaeda operational presence in Somalia through the use oarmed drones, cruise missiles, and airpower. Known leaders and opera-tives would be selectively attacked as occurred in September 2009 withthe alleged perpetrators o the 1998 al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassiesin Kenya and Tanzania. Increased eorts would also be taken to inter-dict the supply o money and arms in and out o Somalia. Collectively,

the goal o this campaign would be to make Somalia as inhospitable aspossible to al-Qaeda. In addition, the United States could use similarmilitary tactics to counter the threat posed by the Shabaab and other


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militant groups. Arms and other military assistance could be suppliedto competing groups inside Somalia to prevent the Shabaab rom get-ting the upper hand.

A similar oshore containment strategy has been proposed orAghanistan, and it oers the prospect o minimal U.S. military engage-ment to satisy core security objectives. That approach, however, issubject to some o the criticisms that have been leveled in the Aghancontext. First, discriminating military attacks are difcult to accom-plish without good inormation rom local sources, which is difcultto obtain without sympathetic inormants that usually come only withsome presence on the ground. Second, countering the inuence o the

Shabaab with its highly decentralized command system is likely to bedifcult with selective attacks. The likelihood o collateral damage,moreover, also risks inaming anti-American sentiment and drivingeven more recruits into the arms o the Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Third,such a strategy would do little to improve the humanitarian situationinside Somalia and could conceivably worsen it by compromising West-ern-backed relie operations.


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23

The Obama administration is ocused on the threat o Somalia becom-ing a sae haven or al-Qaeda. Preoccupation with the terror threat will

continue to trump all other concerns and will continue to limit the rangeo policy options under consideration.

Any eective counterterror strategy must be guided by a realis-tic assessment o what the United States and the larger internationalcommunity can actually accomplish in the short term. A wide rangeo Islamist actors are now entrenched in a position o open hostilitytoward U.S. and UN eorts to inuence Somali political outcomes. Atthe same time, there are no indications that the TFG is capable o devel-

oping the administrative capacity, internal coherence, or broad politicalconstituency necessary to govern Somalia. The TFGs political isola-tion has also rendered it increasingly unable to provide political coveror AMISOM, which is now widely viewed as a combatant in the con-ict rather than as a neutral peacekeeping orce. And neither the TFGnor AMISOM is capable o containing either the Shabaabs expansionor the ormation o al-Qaeda cells in Somalia.

Secretary Clintons recent and strongly worded promises to the TFG,

coupled with the possibility that the TFGs collapse would unravel theUNs regional mediation eorts, make an immediate policy reversal onsupport or the TFG unlikely. Given the continued support or the TFGamong regional and European governments, U.S. abandonment o theTFG may not in any case be decisive. But any uture support should beexplicitly conditioned on progress.

In the absence o a decisive eventsuch as the involuntary with-drawal o AMISOM or the resignation o Sheikh Sharithe UnitedStates should work with the Arican Union and the UN to promote

reorm o the TFGs structures to allow it to become a more inclusivegoverning mechanism. By insisting that the TFG play the role o gate-keeper to any dialogue between the armed Islamist opposition and the

Recommendations


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international community, the UN has eectively drawn a line in thesand, but it is the TFG rather than the Shabaab that has been eec-tively isolated. A stalemate works to the radicals advantage, and seniorIslamist leaders have no incentive to enter into a negotiation rameworkthat requires them to bargain rom a position o weakness.

The Arican Union and the United Nations should attempt to removethat barrier to entry by reconguring the TFG. The use o a presiden-tial model in a country ractured along clan lines, and lacking any cred-ible national leaders over the past thirty years, should be abandoned.Instead, the TFG should be quickly reorganized under a technocraticprime minister, and should consist o a council o leaders, including

Sheikh Shari. The council o leaders should replace the TFG parlia-ment, which is not only based on an ethnic quota system (known as the4.5 ormula) that is undamentally undemocratic but also has becomeineective with a paralyzing 550 members, most o whom reside outsidethe country. Over the long termi it survivesthe council could workto provide Somali communities with the right to nominate their ownparliamentary representatives. In the short term, however, the TFGsincapacity to govern must be explicitly recognized. The TFG must be

perceived as a vehicle or dialogue, rather than as a threat to the exist-ing distribution o territorial control. To achieve that end, internationalmilitary support intended to increase the TFGs territoryincludingammunition and weapons supplymust also cease.

I undamentalist and radical actors are given the capacity to inter-act with the TFG and the international community directly and on anequal ooting, the likelihood o a political settlement will increase, andthe TFG may succeed in isolating transnational terrorists currently

hiding within the Shabaab. However, success would breed new chal-lenges: there is a strong possibility that undamentalists would suc-ceed in co-opting an inclusive TFG, as they succeeded in capturing theSupreme Council o Islamic Courts; and it is uncertain that regionalactors, particularly Ethiopia, would tolerate a Somali government com-posed mostly o reormed radicals. But any government that emerges inSomalia will ace these challenges.

Given the unlikelihood that even that approach will help build localsupport or the TFG, the United States should expect that eorts to

reorm the TFG will likely ail and should simultaneously prepare orits demise and the eventual withdrawal o AMISOM orces. Contraryto what might conceivably be imagined, that outcome is not likely to


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25Recommendations

make a substantial dierence. The TFG is already so weak that col-lapse would only marginally enhance the Shabaabs operational capac-ity. The Shabaabs sustained control o multiple port citiesincludingKismayo, Marka, Hobyo, and Haraardheerehas already allowed themovement to import unds and ghters, establish training camps, andcapture most o southern Somalias territory. A more serious concern isthat a Shabaab capture o Mogadishu could embarrass the internationalcommunity and the Obama administration in particular. Possessiono Mogadishus port could make it somewhat easier or the Shabaabto import ghters, unds, and weapons into Somalia, and, in a worst-case scenario, the international community might nd it necessary to

establish a naval blockade o the port to prevent the inow o oreignmaterials. The international community would also have to navigatethe continued delivery o humanitarian supplies through negotiationswith the Shabaab and with the Abgal clan businessmen who currentlycontrol the ports operations (and who might mount a local challengeto an attempted Shabaab seizure o the ports revenues). But the con-test between the Shabaab and more moderate Islamist and clan voicesis increasingly playing out in Somalias interior and border regions, and

the capture o the ew remaining blocks o Mogadishu will not dramati-cally increase the likelihood that al-Qaeda will be able to nd a ootholdin Somalia.

Beore the TFG collapses, the Obama administration must preparea new approach to Somalia, one that draws on the lessons o past ail-ures but also accepts the limited appetite that the United States andinternational community have or launching any major new under-taking. Given these realities, the United States should adopt a policy

o constructive disengagementa modied containment strategythat would involve a restrained counterterrorist military component,increased eorts to contain arms or other orms o outside support tothe Shabaab and minimize regional instability, and internal actions tohelp develop alternatives to Shabaab control.

ADOPT A P OPULATIO N-EN TERED APPROAH

TO OUNTERTERROR STRATEGY

The United States must be prepared to use military orce against al-Qaeda and other oreign operatives in Somalia. It is vital that these


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operations be conducted with restraint and sensitivity to the largerpolitical context. In keeping with the shit in U.S. counterterrorism doc-trine toward protecting local populations, uture operations in Somaliamust be conducted with extreme care to avoid the civilian casualtiesthat undermine other political and development objectives.

Under the Bush administration, the use o airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets resulted in heavy collateral damage and outraged thelocal population. The Obama administrations approach promises to bemore ruitul. The U.S. Navys September 14, 2009, strike against SalehAli Saleh Nabhan, a top East Arica al-Qaeda operative, could providea blueprint or uture military counterterror operations in Somalia.

In the precision strike, which was preceded by extensive surveillance,several navy helicopters swept in and attacked Nabhan while he was intransit through an isolated rural area, thus reducing the likelihood ocivilian casualties and a popular backlash against the attack. Indeed,in the absence o civilian casualties, the Somali public barely seemedto register the assault. I the Obama administration is careul to avoidcollateral damage, it might be able to eliminate oreign al-Qaeda targetswithout undermining important political objectives in Somalia.

The Shabaab has capitalized on the United States too-generic cat-egorization o Somali Islamists as extremists, and on the presence oArican Union troops in Somalia, to uniy an otherwise diverse array oactors on its side o the divide. At the same time, U.S. attempts to isolate

the Shabaab as a terrorist organization conict with the reality on theground, where humanitarian actors engage daily with Shabaab leadersin order to deliver vital relie to the suering Somali population. U.S.agencies have begun to ear prosecution or providing ood to Shabaab-controlled territories, and they have suspended unds or humanitarianrelie. The humanitarian pipeline has been broken, and the reduction inaid will both worsen the plight o the Somali public and serve to aggra-vate anti-Western sentiment in Somalia.

The United States and its partners can encourage the pragmatic,

nationalist, and opportunistic elements o the Shabaab to break withtheir radical partners by adopting a position o neutrality toward alllocal political groupings and by signaling a willingness to coexist withany Islamist authority that emerges, as long as it rerains rom acts o


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27Recommendations

regional aggression, rejects global jihadi ambitions, and tolerates theactivities o Western humanitarian relie agencies in Somalia. Thatapproach means abandoning all eorts to pick a winner in Somalia.

The Shabaab is a coalition o ortune. As such, it is susceptible torealignment under the right conditions. There are indications that anumber o militia leaderspossibly even including Muktar Robow,who publicly praised al-Qaeda during the period o UIC ascendancydissent rom the transnational jihadi goals o the Shabaabs radicalwing. Such ssures need to be actively exploited. To this end, the UnitedStates should indicate strong support or a UN or Arican Union dia-logue with any member o the armed Islamist opposition that is willing

to talk. Similar tactics are now being applied in Aghanistan, where theUnited States is attempting to boost security by integrating low- andmid-level elements o the Taliban back into the mainstream politicalprocess. Removing the Shabaab rom the U.S. governments list o ter-rorist organizations is probably not politically easible, but delisting spe-cic individualsincluding Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweysprovides apowerul incentive or compliance with international demands. As onenoted U.S. Somali expert has proposed, it should be possible to develop

a series o litmus tests or radicals, such as willingness to cooperate withUN and humanitarian workers and commitment to peace with Ethio-pia. The United States and its regional partners must demonstrate awillingness to tolerate the Shabaab i these conditions are met. Thatapproach requires that the United States and its partners not take allpro-Shabaab and, in the short term, all pro-al-Qaeda rhetoric at acevalue. U.S. ofcials must assume an inclusive posture toward local un-damentalists yet indicate a zero-tolerance policy toward transnational

actors attempting to exploit Somalias conict. Perhaps most challeng-ing, the United States must prepare to tolerate a period o uncertaintywhile the struggle or inuence between radical and moderate actorsplays out, town by town.

Eventually, as anti-Western sentiment subsides, the opportunity will

grow or the United States and its partners to reengage and addresssome o the undamental causes o state ailure in Somalia. Doing sowill require accepting that there is a crippling lack o consensus in Soma-lia over undamental questions about whether a Somali government


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should be unitary, ederal, or conederal; Islamist, or a mixture o secu-lar and Islamic law; and whether the northern territory o Somalilandshould be granted independence. These large issues only obscuremore undamental conicts over the distribution o land and resourcesamong various clans. Until there is a meaningul political reconciliationbetween the clans, attempts to construct governance arrangements willbe a recipe or conict. International eorts to catalyze a political rec-onciliation via internationally sponsored peace conerences and parlia-mentary ethnic quota systems will also continue to be utile. Ultimately,reconciliation and governance are in Somali hands.

New development initiatives, thereore, should be pursued in a

decentralized ashion that involves collaboration with the inormal andtraditional authorities that are already in place on the groundwith-out attempting to ormalize or empower them. That approach will alsoallow or more extensive development support o the Somaliland andPuntland territories, without requiring the United States to explicitlyrecognize either territory as a sovereign nation. Somaliland has a rel-atively impressive record o democratic governance, and it has held aseries o national democratic elections. But because it is not recognized

as a legitimate government, Somaliland is largely ineligible to receivemultilateral unding and development assistance. That is a source oincreasing rustration to Somalilanders eager or growth and develop-ment. An increase in donor assistance could help boost Somalilandseconomy, which may in turn help assuage Somalilanders impatienceor international recognition.

As it pursues a decentralized approach, the United States, in cooper-ation with its international partners, should be mindul o several exist-

ing community-based development models. For example, the UnitedStates could, via the U.S. Agency or International Development(USAID) and the UNDP, assist local communities to organize commu-nity meetings or even a local development council (LDC) o clan eldersand religious leaders responsible or identiying local development andinrastructure projects. Another model is provided by a local womensorganization called SAACID (meaning to help in Somali), which hassuccessully implemented a variety o programs ranging rom gar-bage collection to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in

Somalias dangerous capital city using a cross-clan community dialoguemodel. The international community should study and apply theselocally developed strategies to a broader eort to promote developmentand trade across Somalia.


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Somalias extensive humanitarian and development needs. Such dip-lomatic eorts are critical to ensure that various international eortsdo not work at cross-purposes. Direct U.S. diplomatic involvement inSomalia is unlikely to be constructive, and the UN should continue totake the lead in all local negotiations and programs. Persuading the UNand Europe to abandon state-building eorts may be difcult, but theEuropean consensus on supporting the TFG has already begun to ray,providing a window o opportunity or renewed, more constructiveU.S. leadership on international policy on Somalia.

engage the iddle east

Concentrated engagement with Middle Eastern partners would helpcombat any perception o American hostility to Islam. But simplebureaucratic hurdles, including the separation o Yemen and Somaliainto dierent regional bureaus, have so ar made it difcult to coordi-nate a regional strategy or the Horn o Arica that includes the MiddleEast. The UN special representative, Amedou Ould-Abdallah, hasalready made signicant progress in engaging Middle East countries,

both through energetic diplomatic eort and by shiting the site o peacenegotiations rom Nairobi to Djibouti. The Somali Contact Group metmost recently in Jedda, an encouraging sign that diplomatic eorts haveocused on enhancing Middle East engagement in the Somali crisis. U.S.diplomats should urther leverage that progress by reaching out directlyto the governments o Qatar and Saudi Arabia to assist in supportingspecic development and peace initiatives. Saudi Arabia, in particular,has an economic incentive to participate in antipiracy eorts. Qatar has

expressed strong support or the Djibouti peace process (which cre-ated the unity government) and currently chairs the Organization othe Islamic Conerences Contact Group on Somalia. Qatar could bemobilized to acilitate a dialogue between the opposing Islamist camps.

However, the United States should be extremely cautious in howit approaches Yemen to support its policy toward Somalia. ThoughYemen hosts a large population o Somali reugees and is a likely transitpoint or weapons and unding into Somalia, any eort by its govern-ment to engage in the Somali crisis is likely to do ar more harm than

good. The United States has good reason to ear Yemens role as anoperational sae haven to al-Qaeda. But theres no convincing evidenceo collaboration between al-Qaeda afliates in Yemen and Somalia, and


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sentiment in the Horn is closely linked to the perception o U.S. com-plicity with Ethiopian human rights abuses in Somalia and Ethiopianabuses against ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region. The United Statesability to successully pursue its counterterror objectives depends onresolving that dilemma.

ursue dialogue without ethioia

Governments in the region have orceully advocated or an air and seablockade o Somalia to prevent the importation o weapons and undsrom Eritrea. However, antipiracy eorts have proven the impossibility

o eectively patrolling the Somali coast. Further militarizing the inter-national response to the Somali crisis would likely accomplish little, putadditional strain on U.S. relations with Eritrea, and only aggravate theSomali perception that the country is under attack.

On December 23, 2009, the UN Security Council imposed sanc-tions on Eritrea. Though the sanctions were enthusiastically supportedby regional actors, the resulting arms embargo, asset reezes, and travelbans are unlikely to encourage President Isaias to halt the ow o arms

to the Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The U.S. Arica Command shouldcontinue to expand its eorts to monitor the ow o arms into Somaliaand to bolster the capacity o regional governments to police bordersand prevent terrorist attacks.

The State Department should also continue to pursue opportuni-ties or dialogue and negotiations with Asmara. These attempts areunlikely to succeed, but Asmara can exert considerable inuence overthe Shabaab, and the eort is worth making. The United States may

also increase its credibility among Islamists in the region by adopting amore neutral posture between Eritrea and Ethiopia. (Hizbul Islam, orexample, has vocally protested the hypocritical imposition o sanctionson Eritrea, arguing that Ethiopian military incursions into Somaliahave been ar more visible and destabilizing.)

signal u.s. will ingness to resist shabaab

oerations in soaliland and untland

As part o its broader containment strategy, the United States shouldprepare to receive Somaliland ofcials at a steadily higher level than theassistant secretary o state, establish a USAID or USAID contractor


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33Recommendations

ofce in Somalilands capital city o Hargeisa, and consider a U.S. Navyship visit to Puntland and Somalilands ports. These steps will signalthe United States willingness to resist any attempt by the Shabaab toattack or gain control o these territories.

RESIST POLI TII ZING T HE PIRAY PROBLEM

Whatever the pressures or temptations to adopt an aggressive responseto piracy, the United States should be sensitive to how such tactics canbackre. Overwhelming use o orce, such as the bombing o pirate

strongholds in Hobyo, Haraardheere, or Eyl, could politicize the piracyissue, which would likely increase public tolerance o pirate activities. Itcould also undermine broader U.S. security objectives by urther radi-calizing the population. Pirates currently have strong disincentives tocooperate with extremist elements, or ear o being branded terror-ists themselves. A disproportionate response could nudge pirates intoprot-seeking cooperation with extremist elements, acilitating theow o arms into the country. In the worst-case scenario, piracy could

evolve into maritime terrorism.The Somali pirates have successully invoked long-standing local

grievances over illegal shing and toxic waste dumping to create what iseectively an enabling environment or attacks on oreign vessels. TheSomali publics willingness to tolerate piracy appears, however, to belessening. Local public awareness campaigns have sought to highlightthe social, economic, and political costs o piracy, oten by engaginglocal clerics and clan elders as spokesmen. The work o Radio Daljir,

a Bossasso-based radio station, has been particularly eective. TheUnited States, potentially via USAID or UNDP, should support theselocal awareness campaigns, and it could greatly enhance their eec-tiveness through the creation o employment opportunities or at-riskyouth. Inrastructure projects, such as road construction, could provideimmediate opportunities.

Development agencies should also seek to create a partnership withPuntlands legitimate business communityprobably the only socialsegment currently strong enough to challenge the pirate networks. The

international community could ocus on organizing the proessionalcommunity in Puntland into a proessional association, providingcapacity-building support and engaging the group in a discussion about


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what can be done to reduce piracy. A program that explicitly ties devel-opment incentives in the coastal zones to antipiracy eorts could eec-tively mobilize a population tiring o pirate promiscuity and excess.Such programs should be considered a relatively urgent priority. Piratenetworks have gained strength and operational capability, and withoutsome timely intervention, could develop into powerul criminal spoil-ers with an interest in sabotaging governance and rule-o-law eorts.

In the absence o an immediate solution to the piracy problem, theUnited States and its partners in the international community shouldtake advantage o the political opportunities that piracy oers. Wash-ington should look or ways to demonstrate its commitment to address-

ing local grievances. The United States should propose a UN SecurityCouncil resolution to mandate the protection o Somali waters romillegal incursions.


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35

As it seeks to govern Somalia, the Shabaab will ace near-insurmount-able challenges, ranging rom its own internal divisions to the Somali

populations proound distaste or restrictive oreign ideologies. His-tory suggests that these challenges will be atal.

But it will take time. The best-case scenario or Somalia is a gradualdiminishment in the intensity o the conict, with open warare givingway to stability and piecemeal improvements in the economy and therule o law. Though indigenous governance movements can emerge inSomalia with surprising speed, national governance is probably still adecade away, and i history is any guide, the Somali processes o rec-

onciliation and political compromise leading up to it will be largelyimperceptible to Western eyes. The United States should remain vigi-lantand realisticin assessing the terror threat, and should be poisedto support Somalias reconstruction in the years to come. At somepoint, the Somalis desire or peace will certainly reassert itsel, and newopportunities or development, governance, and growth will emerge.

Conclusion


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. Most sources indicate that there have been ourteen attempts to create a governmentin Somalia, but a study by Interpeace claims the number is an international urban

legend. See The Search or Peace: A History o Mediation in Somalia since 1988,Interpeace/Center or Research and Dialogue, July 1, 2009, www.interpeace.org.. Ken Menkhaus, Warlords and Landlords: Non-State Actors and Humanitarian

Norms in Somalia, drat paper presented at the Curbing Human Rights Violationsby Armed Groups Conerence, Liu Institute or Global Issues, University o BritishColumbia, Canada, November 1415, 2003; Alex de Waal, Class and Power in aStateless Somalia, Social Science Research Council, February 20, 2007, http://hornoarica.ssrc.org/dewaal/.

. Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh, Somalia Ater State Collapse:Chaos or Improvement?Journal o Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 67 (Sep-tember 2008), pp. 65770.

. Though the moderate Islamist Sheikh Shari Sheikh Hassan served as the diplomaticace o the UIC, the more obvious ideological orce behind the courts was the wantedterrorist suspect Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Two other prominent leaders o themovement were Aweyss protgs: Yusu Mohammed Siad (Indaadde) and HassanAbdullah Hersi al-Turki, both warlords with strong militias in southern Somalia. Aradical militia movement afliated with the UIC, the Shabaab, was suspected to con-tain several al-Qaeda operatives, including the high-value target, Aden Hashi Ayro.

. Intelligence reports place the number o oreign takri elements in Somalia at two hun-dred to three hundred, but estimates by closed local sources are much higher.

. Amnesty International report, Routinely Targeted: Attacks on Civilians in Soma-lia, May 6, 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/006/2008/

en/1162a792-186e-11dd-92b4-6b0c2e9d02/ar520062008eng.pd; Human RightsWatch report, So Much to Fear: War Crimes and the Devastation o Somalia,December 8, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/node/76419.

. Immediately ater the invasion, UIC leaders Sheikh Shari Sheikh Ahmed and SheikhHassan Dahir Aweys ed to Asmara, where they attempted to orm a single politicalopposition party in exile, the Alliance or the Reliberation o Somalia (ARS). Theparty rapidly split over the question o rapprochement with the TFG. Sheikh Hassanestablished himsel in Eritrea, and committed his wing o the party, the ARS-Asmara,to a violent insurgency against the Ethiopian-backed TFG regime. Sheikh Shari ad-opted a more conciliatory posture, and it is his wing o the ARS, based in Djibouti, thateventually merged with the Transitional Federal Government.

. The our clan-based Islamic actions that comprise Hizbul Islam are the Asmarabranch o the Alliance or the Reliberation o Somalia (ARS-Asmara), headed bySheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys; Jabhatul Islamiya (the Islamic Front), a grouping oarmed business interests in the Galgadud region; Muaskar Anole, a recently ormed,

Endnotes


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37Endnotes

clan-based grouping about which relatively little is known; and Muaskar Ras Kam-boni, a militia controlled by Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki.

. Michael Weinstein, Somalia: Nations Contending Islamic Ideologies, Garowe

Online, March 20, 2009.. The possession o trained, paid militias is a signicant advantage. Most Somali militia

members receive only a mandate to extort, rape, and loot in exchange or their services,and as a result, action leaders typically have little control over their orces and intra-actional disputes over resources are extremely common.

. Closed sources inside Mogadishu.. U.S. spokesmen initially put the gure at orty tons, but State Department ofcials

have subsequently increased the number to eighty tons.. Jerey Gettleman, Two Advisers Abducted in Somalia, New York Times, July 14,

2009.. U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, Al-Qaidas (mis)Adventures

in the Horn o Arica, West Point, New York, 2007, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS91834.

. United States Agency or International Development, Ofce o Foreign Disaster As-sistance, Situation Report #9, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, September 23, 2009.

. International Maritime Bureau, Brieng 48, March 2009.. Sheikh Aweys, or example, is considered by many to be senior to Shiekh Shari in

the clerical hierarchy, and he appears to command stronger support within his ownclan. Recognizing Shari as the president would require him not only to recognize theTFGs legitimacy, but to take a personal loss o ace.

. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: Too Big a Problem to Fail? Foreignpolicy.com, August 6,2009.

. Andre LeSage, Fragile Gains in Somalia, Realclearworld.com , October 31, 2009.. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia Ater the Ethiopian Occupation, Enough! Project, February

2009.. Puntland, although eectively autonomous, has not yet sought independence rom

southern Somalia, though it is perhaps likely to do so in the uture. Its status is there-ore not a point o contention at this time.

. Aid ofcials should, however, recognize that Somalilands democracy is more ragilethan it appears at rst glance. It is still essentially a traditional clan democracy, albeitwith some modern institutional trappings, and ull recognition too soon would runthe risk o disrupting a necessary sharing o power between clan elders, business, civilsociety, and the government. For that reason, increased international support to So-malilands governing authorities must be careully considered with increased supportto civil society and the private sector.

. Randolph Kent, Karin von Hippel, and Mark Bradbury, Social Facilitation, Develop-ment and the Diaspora: Support or Sustainable Health Services in Somalia, Interna-tional Policy Institute, Kings College, 2004.

. See, or example, a statement by Qatars ambassador to the UN, Nassir Abdulaziz AlNasser, to the UN Security Council on December 19, 2007.


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Bronwyn E. Bruton, a democracy and governance specialist withextensive experience in Arica, was a 20082009 international aairs

ellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations. She was bornin Swaziland and spent most o her childhood in Botswana. Prior toher ellowship appointment, Bronwyn spent three years at the NationalEndowment or Democracy, where she managed a $7 million portolioo grants to local and international nongovernmental organizations ineast and southern Arica (priority countries included Somalia, Ethio-pia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Sudan). Bruton has alsoserved as a program manager on the Arica team o the U.S. Agency or

International Developments Ofce o Transition Initiatives, and as apolicy analyst on the international aairs and trade team o the Govern-ment Accountability Ofce. She holds an MPP, with honors, rom theUniversity o Caliornia at Los Angeles.

About the Author


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Chris Albin-LackeyHuman Rights Watch

Robert ArnotNBC

Jim BishopInterAction

Anthony J. CarrollManchester Trade Ltd.

John L. HirschInternational Peace Institute

J. Anthony HolmesU.S. Department o State

Gerald A. LeMelleArica Action

Princeton N. Lyman, ex ocioCouncil on Foreign Relations

Terrence LyonsGeorge Mason University

Kenneth J. MenkhausDavidson College

John-Peter PhamJames Madison University

Marisa L. Porges, ex ocioCouncil on Foreign Relations

David H. ShinnGeorge Washington University

David R. SmockU.S. Institute o Peace

Paul B. Stares, ex ocioCouncil on Foreign Relations

Frederick S. TipsonUnited Nations Development Programme

somalia: a new approach

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