sotomayor 2003 uruguay peace soldiers from praetorianism to unchecked peacekeeping
TRANSCRIPT
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THEPEACE SOLDIER FROM THE SOUTH: FROM PRAETORIANISM TO PEACEKEEPING?
CHAPTER III
Uruguays Peace Soldiers: From Praetorianism to Unchecked Peacekeeping
Arturo C. Sotomayor VelzquezDepartment of Political Science
Columbia UniversityPh.D. candidate
(Draft)
Please do not cite without permission. Comments welcome.
November, 2003.
This paper was supported by two generous travel grants from the Institute of Latin AmericanStudies (ILAS) and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
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In 1992 Uruguay sent its first peacekeeping battalion to Asia as part of the United
Nations Transition Authority to Cambodia (UNTAC). In total, 1,330 men from the Navy and the
Army (about 5.5% of the countrys total armed forces) were deployed in four military companies
across Cambodias provinces. Uruguays contribution to peacekeeping (PK) missions was not
new, since several officers participated as military observers in peace operations in places as far
as the Middle East and South Asia. (Ejrcito de la Repblica Oriental del Uruguay 1999, 20-38).
However, the 1992 decision to participate in UNTAC was significant for two main reasons. First,
because by sending its first military, large-scale, and unified contingent abroad, the country
reflected a new approach towards United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO) that
prioritized the deployment of military units rather than just observers. Second, this event
symbolized Uruguays redirection of the armed forces as well as a radical departure from the
militarys traditional focus. The deployment took place only 6 years after the return to
democracy, when the military finally went back to the barracks following 13 years of
bureaucratic -authoritarian rule. The military dictatorship that ruled Uruguay from 1973 to 1985
was not as brutal as Pinochets regime or the Argentine military junta, but guerrilla and labor
repression and the percentage of people detained for questioning by the military was higher than
in any other country of the Southern Cone. (Stepan 1985, 325; Gillespie 1991, 50-76; Perelli
1990, 39-54; Barahona de Brito 1997, 38-66). Hence, it was somehow paradoxical that thousands
of Uruguayan military officers, who were once responsible for state repression, were now being
sent abroad to protect human rights in countries facing civil wars.
Within a decade of the 1992 deployment, Uruguay became the worlds largest per capita
contributor to UN PKO, with a consistent participation of 1,000 troops per year. Uruguay is
officially one of the top five UN troop contributors, surpassed only by countries such as India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ghana. To date, more than 50% of the Army officers and 34% of all
non-commissioned officers have some kind of peacekeeping experience. Similarly, more than
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10% of Uruguays total armed forces are positioned somewhere in the world in an established UN
PK mission. 1 Uruguayan peace soldiers can be located in places far away from Montevideo,
ranging from Kashmir in Asia to Congo in Africa and Georgia en Central Europe.
Uruguay then provides a critical case to test hypotheses about the effects of PK
participation. This is so because, as argued in the introduction of this study, the potential effects
of participation in peace missions should be evident among democratizing states that have
traditionally contributed troops to the UN. Uruguay is a case that has substantial PK exposure,
experienced a dictatorial regime and went through a transition to democracy in less than two
decades. Has PK participation affected the armed forces? Have radical changes in civil-military
relations occurred as a result of Uruguays participation in UN peace missions? Has PK training
and exposure made military officers less likely to violate basic democratic norms at home?
The chapter assesses the implications of UN involvement for civil-military relations in
Uruguay. As will be discussed, the orientation, training and doctrine of the Uruguayan armed
forces have been radically changed as a result of a decade of PK participation. Nevertheless, such
international engagement has not allowed civilian intervention in doctrinal and defense matters.
PK policies have failed to expand civilian defense communities, while there are no clear signs of
increased civilian defense expertise. Military and civilian authorities tend to approach PK
participation from very different perspectives, assessing them from somewhat distinct agendas.
Civilians in general and political authorities in particular have little interest in UN affairs or in
developing mechanisms to monitor PK participation. By contrast, the military views peace
missions as yet another military mission rather than a multidimensional operation with civilian
components. Civilian and military preferences have not fully converged, while military views
about PK dominate the process of decision-making. Therefore, this case raises questions about
the beneficial effects of PK on civil-military relations.
1Personal interview with General Hctor R. Islas, Director General of the School of the Arms and Servicesand Lt. Colonel Pablo Pintos, Director of the School of Peacekeeping Operations at the School of the Armsand Services, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 8, 2003.
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This chapter will be divided in three sections. The first section will provide a brief
description of Uruguays transition to democracy and how this event motivated an increased
interest in United Nations involvement. The second part of this chapter analyzes the countrys
engagement in PKO by focusing on the largest deployments. Finally, the third section analyses
the effects of PK participation on Uruguays civil-military relations.
I. The Uruguayan Re-democratization Process: Legacies and their Effects
On March 1, 1985, Julio Maria Sanguinetti was sworn as the democratically elected
president of Uruguay. Fifteen years after the establishment of an authoritarian-bureaucratic
regime and after five years of intensive negotiations with the military collegiate, the inhabitants
of the north-east side of the River Plate renewed contact with liberal democracy and the rule of
law. Unlike Argentinas transition to democracy, which took place as a result of the militarys
collapse in the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas war; the re-democratization of Uruguay was caused by
domestic and international pressures that forced the military government to withdraw from direct
rule and hold extrication elections. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 59) Similar to the Chilean case (to be
analyzed in chapter 5), the military tried to impose conditions for their exit from politics by
imposing reserve domains and tutelary powers; however, the strength of democratic forces
(unified political parties and increased pressures from civil society) greatly eroded the bargaining
leverage of the collegial military dictatorship. Pacts and agreements were indeed negotiated
between democratic and military elites; but unlike the pacted transitions to democracy in Brazil
and Chile, the Uruguayan transition was mostly led by civilians who intensely pressured a deeply
divided and unorganized military institution. This enabled the newly elected civilian
government to implement changes in Uruguayan civil-military relations by reforming norms,
rules and organic laws that regulated interactions between the armed forces and society. This
section focuses on the re-democratization of Uruguay and how that political process influenced
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the armed forces mission and role ; which in turn has had consequences on the countrys PK
policies.
A. The extrication of the military and the re-democratization of Uruguay
In 1977, at the peak of the dictatorial regime, the military announced that they would call
for a plebiscite for a new constitution. The announcement was made after the regime faced
increased criticism from President Jimmy Carters administration regarding human rights
violations. As part of Washingtons human rights policy, the US government suspended all
military aid to Uruguay in 1976, a move that irritated military leaders and forced them to justify
their domestic policies. (Caetano and Rilla 1987, 65-75) The military thereupon announced a
timetable to have the Council of the Nation (a non-elected body) write a new constitution to be
submitted to a plebiscite in 1980. The newly drafted constitution handwritten by the military
offered a grim array of restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms. Such restrictions
involved, among other things, the exclusion of Socialist and Communist parties from elections;
the nomination of a single presidential candidate among political parties authorized by the
military; limited political rights for labor unions; the establishment of a permanent National
Security Council, staffed by members of the armed forces; and the legalization of the national
security doctrine embedded in the establishment of the Political Control Commission, which
would have had the authority to dismiss any civilian official, including the president. (Caetano
and Rilla 1987; Gillespe 1991, 70; Nahum 1995, 332-335)
The Uruguayan democratic transition began when, to the surprise of the military, the
opposition won the 1980 plebiscite to reform the national constitution. The armed forces attempt
to portray the vote for the new constitution as a vote for democracy utterly failed. According to
Luis E. Gonzlez, the No campaign won with 57.2% of all votes, while the Yes got 42.8%,
on a turnout of 85.2%. (Gonzlez 1984) The regime sought to restore limited elections because it
perceived it would easily win the referendum, due to the level of political control that the military
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had achieved. At the time, there were few social movements, no authorized labor unions, little
church activity, and restricted political participation. Therefore, the 1980 victory of the No
campaign had a shocking effect on the military. (Achard 1992, 14-24) As Linz and Stepan
argue, elections refute or reinforce legitimacy claims of power contestants. For some prominent
military officers, the results of the plebiscite weakened their belief in the right to rule. (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 152)
A power struggle between the junta took place after the referendum, leading to the
inauguration of General Gregorio Alvrez as the new president of the country in 1981. General
Alvrez announced that traditional parties would be allowed to choose new leaders by means of
primaries in 1982 and these representatives would in turn negotiate with the armed forces the
design of a new constitution. However, the primaries further eroded the legitimacy of the
military, since voters elected left-wing politicians who had opposing views and demanded the
immediate withdrawal of the military from politics. Parties, particularly in the left, were
unwilling to accept the negotiating conditions of the military, because they feared accusations of
sellout in future elections. So instead of bargaining with the armed forces, they denounced the
restricted conditions imposed by the exiting regime. The civilian opposition from the left and the
right organized and forged alliances that led to massive street demonstrations against the
dictatorial regime. One of such demonstrations took place on the last Sunday of November of
1983, when approximately half a million people (almost 17% of Uruguays total population)
manifested themselves in Montevideos Obelisk, demanding once again that the military returned
to the barracks. This historical event further eroded the legitimacy of the dictatorship and
diminished the militarys chances of achieving a transition by transaction (or pacted transition), of
the kind we witnessed in Brazil and Chile . (Gillespie 1992, 186)
After the massive demonstrations of 1983, the armed forces reconsidered their conditions
and engaged in negotiations once again with the civilian opposition. The military was willing to
allow the celebration of democratic elections in 1984. A verbal commitment was made to release
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some political prisoners from the left, while some Socialist parties were allowed to participate in
presidential elections. Yet, the military insisted on certain political guarantees for their
extrication from politics and so they demanded the exclusion of the Blanco party (a historically
dominant political institution in Uruguay) and the elimination of trials for human rights
violations. (Gillespie 1986, 181-192; Lpez Chirico 2000, 185-190) The negotiations were
known as the Naval Club Accord, but as Gillespie and Gonzlez explain, the transition was not
really a pact but a partial settlement for free elections that was not likely to last long. (Gillespie
1991, 128-238; Gonzlez 1993, 88-128)
Indeed, after the 1984 election of Sanguinetti, the new democratic Parliament legalized
all parties (including the Blanco party) and abolished all institutional acts that imposed
restrictions on democracy. Soon after, the National Security Council was eliminated, military
judges were no longer incorporated into the judiciary, policies regarding military promotions
were reviewed and put under the presidents control, and military budgets began to decrease.
While the first Minister of Defense appointed by Sanguinetti was a member of the armed forces
(General Medina), the policy of appointing civilians as heads of the defense cabinet was re-
instituted after the second presidential election, in 1989. (Lpez Chirico 1999, 285)
The only component of the pact that was left untouched was the issue of human rights
and trials against the military. Civil society organizations and human rights lobbyists voiced
concerns about the quality of democracy in the absence of military trials; while the military
defended itself arguing that an amnesty had been negotiated with the opposition and thus the
Naval Club Accord had to be respected. As a direct result of these tensions in civil-military
relations, the Uruguayan government called for yet another referendum in 1989 on the decision
by the Congress to not prosecute the military for violations of human rights. The result of such
plebiscite was that a narrow majority of Uruguayans (55.4%) voted in favor of the law that
granted the armed forces immunity from prosecution for past violations. A similar law was
granted to the Tupamarus, an urban guerrilla movement that fought against the military in the
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1970s. (Barahona de Brito 1997, 125-151) Uruguay remains as the only case in the Southern
Cone where citizens have been asked to state an opinion on trials against the military.
Consequently, the military attempted to impose prerogatives and reserve domains, but
aborted such strategy in the presence of increased pressures from democratic forces from civil
society and political parties. The transition ultimately remained in the hands of civilians, which
in turn imposed the pace and the conditions of Uruguays democratization process. Due in part to
the strength of political parties and the relative weakness of the military, Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan classified Uruguay as the only consolidated democracy in the Southern Cone of Latin
America. In their view, Uruguay returned to thestatus quo anteof civil-military relations, by
which they meant that the country went back to the 1967 constitutionalrule. As Linz and Stepan
argue:
In 1990, they (Uruguayan military) had fewer prerogatives than themilitary had in Chile, Argentina, or Brazil. One of the reasons that themilitary was not very powerful in Uruguayan politics after free electionswas that they had virtually no allies. In poll after poll, business elites,
politicians, and mass publics alike rejected military involvement inpolitics In no country in our thirteen-country sample, with the possible
exception of Greece, did democracy start with such a complete rejectionof the political role of the military. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 158-59)
Indeed, in 1995, the consulting firm Latinobarmetro, a group that measures public opinion in
Latin America, conducted a cross-regional poll and asked citizens their opinions about
democracy. In the survey, Uruguay ranked the highest for levels of trust in the democratic
system. According to the poll, 80% of all Uruguayans thought that democracy was preferable to
any other sort of government, while 8% thought authoritarianism was better than democracy, 6%
perceived there was no difference, and 6% expressed no opinion. (Latinobarmetro 1995)
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Nevertheless, Linz and Stepan were cautious in their analysis and asserted that the
Uruguayan democracy had a risk-prone configuration. 2 In their view, the new civilian
government had merely excluded the military from politics without providing it with a role
compatible with an emerging democracy. Civilians failed to re-structure military organizations
and reincorporate the armed forces socially and politically into the democratic system. According
to the authors, there were still civil-military problems, since there was no serious analysis by the
president, Parliament, or the minister of defense as to what type of armed forces Uruguay really
wants. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 160) This created resentment among soldiers and made the
democratic system risky because if a political crisis arose, the armed forces could easily find
allies among disloyal political actors. These allies, in turn, could provide the sources of future
political mobilization for the military; thus generating risk for democratic stability. (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 164) Indeed, students of Uruguayan politics believe that a mix of disloyal political
behavior among politicians with a politically unsatisfied military led to the 1973 coup dtat.
(Lpez Chirico 1985, Rial 1986, Lessa 2003, Lessa 2003b) Consequently, while democracy had
returned to Uruguay by 1990, the sources of military insurgence had not been fully eliminated,
but merely mitigated by the democratization process.
B. The legacies of the democratization process: crisis of identity and tense civil-military relations
In terms of civil-military relations, the extrication of the military from Uruguayan politics
had important consequences on the armed forces missions and military budgets. The restoration
of the democraticstatus quoprompted an unprecedented debate over the question of the
militarys purpose in a democratizing environment. The armed forces faced an identity crisis thataffected their morale and salaries, as budgets and political support plunged.
2A similar analysis is made by Claudio Fuentes. See Claudio Fuentes 1997.
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In the lines above, I argued that the military lacked the latitude and prerogatives to design
policies and assign missions independently from the purview of elected officials. The
democratization process did not grant effective autonomy to the armed forces nor did it provide
extra-military areas within state apparatus. Uruguayan police forces were demilitarized and the
internal security focus that once prevailed among the armed forces eroded as the military returned
to the barracks. Likewise, the military was unable to allocate constitutional responsibilities for
maintaining law and order, as they had originally envisioned in their 1980 constitutional proposal.
The National Security Council had disappeared and so did the Commission for Political Affairs,
which was in charge of intelligence and under military command. (Stepan 1988, 93-127)
In terms of military services, the Air Force and the Navy were far more successful in
maintaining certain internal activities or roles. For instance, the Air Force was given control over
the nationalair space, while the Navy was in charge of safeguarding Uruguays waters; entailing
mostly the patrolling of rivers (such as the River Plate), lakes and the sea. (Lpez Chirico 1999,
273.) But the Army had been deprived from any internal mission and this raise questions related
to the purpose and role of the military.
The Army was simply incapable of politically constructing a mission of its own. One of
the factors that contributed to the crisis of identity was the absence of leftist guerrilla movements,
which rendered obsolete the Communist threat that the military had devoted years to combating
and defeating. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the emergence of the Tupamaru movement, an urban,
Communist guerrilla, prompted the intervention of the armed forces in internal security missions,
which ultimately led to the implementation of the national security doctrine in 1973. (Rial 1986,Rilla and Caetano 1987, Lpez Chirico 1985) But by the time the re-democratization of Uruguay
took place, the guerrillas had been defeated, so the military had no explicit domestic threats to
fight, combat and justify its existence. The Armys internal crisis was intensified with the Soviet
Unions collapse and the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Carina Perelli argues, the events in Eastern
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Europe and the end of the Cold War profoundly shocked the armed forces in Latin America, since
the internationalCommunist enemy vanished while the countries democratized. (Perelli 1993)
A second factor that worsened the crisis was the resolution of regional rivalries in the
Southern Cone that eroded the militarys main external mission; namely, the defense of the nation
in case of an external invasion. In particular, Brazil and Argentina reached a nuclear agreement
in the early 1990s and engaged in a project of economic integration, known as MERCOSUR.
Threat environments between Argentine and Brazilian security communities were reassessed,
cooperative attitudes became dominant, and military institutions were reformed. These events
questioned the identity of the Uruguayan armed forces, since the raison dtreof the military was
to protect the country (a buffer state) in case of an armed dispute between neighboring Argentina
and Brazil. Uruguay did not only join MERCOSUR, but its capital, Montevideo, became the
headquarters of the organization, symbolizing a new era of regional integration. In the wake of
these developments, civilians in Uruguay began to seriously question the need for armed forces.
A third dynamic that contributed to the crisis was the militarys public reputation and
national prestige. While an amnesty for human rights violations was granted and trials were
halted, civil society in general continued to view the armed forces as a praetorian institution. In
polls conducted by Latinobarmetro in 1995, Uruguayans perceived the armed forces as an
eroding institution. To the question posed by Latinobarmetro who do you think has more
power in the country, Uruguayans answered that the government (45%) and business
corporations (36%) were more influential than the armed forces (22%). (Latinobarmetro 1995)
So, analogous to neighboring Argentina (studied in chapter 1), the Uruguayan military lackedpublic recognition and was in a desperate search for a mission to assure its institutional survival.
Unlike Brazil and Chile (to be analyzed in chapters 4 and 5), the Uruguayan military found itself
in a defensive position, where it had to continuously justify its existence to citizens that were
traditionally critical of its role.
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The crisis eventually affected the financial resources of the armed forces. Politicians and
soldiers clashed over the size of military budget shares in Uruguays new democracy. Defense
spending proved to be a very low priority for most politicians. Uruguay was widely known and
acknowledged for its strong welfare system during its pre-authoritarian era. So in convergence
with Wendy Hunters electoral dynamic, when the country returned to democracy, legislators had
very strong incentives to use federal funds for socioeconomic programs that ultimately re-
established the welfare system. (Hunter 1997, 5-25) Year after year, politicians diverted funds
from the military to other categories that were highly valued by their constituents. However, as it
will be analyzed in the forthcoming chapters, this dynamic does not apply to Brazil and Chile,
where prerogatives and reserve domains enabled the military to maintain high or constant
expenditure levels with relative political autonomy.
Uruguays military expenditures measured in terms of percentage of the gross national
product (ME/GNP %) decreased between 1985 and 1999, with the exception of 1994, when an
overvaluation of the peso led to general increases in public expenditures. Since Uruguay returned
to democracy in 1985, defense expenditures have decreased from 2.7% to 1.3% of the gross
national product (GNP). According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency records,
the militarys share of the central governments expenditure (CGE) has undergone a steady
contraction. For instance, in 1981, at the peak of the dictatorial regime, the central government
was spending 15.4% of its budget in the military, representing 4.0% of the GNP. By 1989, at the
end of the first democratic administration, military expenditures were reduced to 8.7% of the total
governments expenditures, corresponding to 2.3% of the GNP. To date, the government spends
less than 4.1% of its national expenditures on the military, representing only 1.3% of the GNP.
Similar statistics are reported by theMilitary Balance, published by the Institute of International
Strategic Studies in England. (See tables 1 and 2 below)
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These budgetary shifts affected procurement and military equipment. A country report
by Janes Military stated that the Uruguayan armed forces are all, to varying degrees, equipped
with elderly and in extreme cases inappropriate equipment. (Janes Military Review 2003)
Projects for modernization of the Army were continuously halted; the Navy was using ageing
frigates to accomplish its tasks, while the Air Force did not even have flying conditions in 1991
(with a fleet of only 11 aircrafts).
Because the military had no political supporters, it was unable to build alliances among
legislators across the political spectrum to lobby in favor of increased military budgets. Not even
the most conservative politicians within the rightist Colorado party supported military
expenditures after the democratization. Therefore, the militarys power began to erode even more
as politicians cut military budgets and reduced the resources available to the armed forces.
Table 1: Military expenditures in US constant dollars
316
420
326
482
296282 279
272
200
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
US Dollars
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2002
Year
Military expenditures in US constant dollars
Series1
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-2001(OxfordUniversity Press.)
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Table 2: Military expenditures
Military expenditures as % of Gross National Product (GNP) and Central Government
Expenditure (CGE)
Year Military
expenditures
(in millionsof dollars)
Military
expenditure/GNP
%
Military
expenditure/CGE
%
Total
armed
forces (inthousands)
1974 2.9 11.8 25
1975 2.8 11.6 25
1976 2.3 8.9 28
1977 2.5 9.7 28
1978 2.4 9.7 28
1979 2.4 11.2 28
1980 3 13.1 28
1981 4.0 15.4 28
1982 4.1 13.2 29
1983 3.6 12.4 30
Militarydictatorship
1984 232 2.9 10.9 30
1985 230 2.7 10.6 30
1986 245 2.0 10.1 30
1987 202 2.2 7.7 2
1988 236 2.3 8.1 29
Firstdemocraticgovernment(President
Julio MaraSanguinetti)
1989 268 2.3 8.7 27
1990 277 2.2 9.1 25Seconddemocratic
1991 268 2.0 7.8 25
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1992 322 2.1 8.0 25
1993 277 1.7 5.6 25
government(PresidentJos AlbertoLacalle)
1994 416 2.4 7.3 25
1995 304 1.7 5.9 25
1996 262 1.4 4.6 25
1997 263 1.3 4.2 25
1998 267 1.3 4.0 25
Thirddemocraticgovernment
(PresidentJulio MaraSanguinetti)
1999 275 1.3 4.1 25
Source:U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, issues of 1996 and 1999-2000, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureauof Verification and Compliance 1997, 2000).
Paradoxically, the total number of armed forces did not substantially change since the
election of the first democratic government in 1985. In 2002, Uruguay had 23,900 armed forces,
only 7,000 less than in 1981, when the military was still in power. In 1995, due to a general
increase in the nations budget, the number of soldiers slightly increased from 24,700 to 25, 600.
(See table 2 above and 3 below) Unlike Brazil and Chile, Uruguay has professional military
forces and does not rely on a system of conscription to recruit new soldiers. Nevertheless, the
country has one of the highest ratios of armed forces per citizen in the Southern Cone. According
to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, there are 7.3 soldiers for every 1,000 people;
this is 6 times higher than in Argentina (2.0) and Brazil (1.8), although similar to Chile (7.3).
(See table 4 below)
In interviews conducted by the author, legislative members of the Committee of National
Defense acknowledged that the ratio was high, but substantial reductions had not been introduced
because the armed forces continue to provide public jobs that are needed, especially when the
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country is facing a profound economic crisis, with shortage of employment. 3 Hence, decreasing
the number of soldiers would translate into higher unemployment rates, which can affect the
politicians image. This again confirms Wendy Hunters electoral dynamic hypothesis that
politicians will cut back provisions that threaten their own political agenda. (Hunter 1997, 3, 95-
115) However, the consequence (perhaps unintended) of such policy is that while the military
provides opportunities for public employment, they do so at the expense of their salaries, since
they need to run the institution with decreasing budgets and resources. Ultimately, falling salaries
contributed to the general perception that the military faced an institutional crisis, while it also
affected its ability to lure young men and women into the armed forces.
Table 3: Total armed forces
1988 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002
Total 24,400 24,400 24,700 25,600 25,600 23,900Army 17,200 17,200 17,200 17,600 17,600 15,200Navy 4,200 500 4,500 5,000 5,000 5,700
Air Force 400 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-2001(OxfordUniversity Press, several issues from 1988-2001).
Table 4: Armed forces per citizen
Armed forces Population Population/Armed
forces
Armed forces
per 1000people
Uruguay 23,900 3,163,763 132 7.3
Argentina 69,000 36,260,130 525 2.0Brazil 305,000 169,799,170 557 1.8Chile 83,000 15,116,435 182 7.3Sources: Janes Information Group,Janes Military Review2003; and U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000 , (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance 2000).
3Personal interview with Senator Eleutario Fernndez Huidobro, national senator and member of theLegislative National Commission for Defense, Frente Amplio, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.
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It is safe to assert that the Uruguayan military was caught in a severe crisis of identity.
The absence of purpose, low salaries and decreasing budgetary allocations led to a downward
spiral of morale within the armed forces. While democratic rule had been reestablished, a crisis
in civil-military relations was rapidly emerging in Uruguay. In particular, the armed forces crisis
was aggravated by military officers perception that civilians were very little aware of the
importance of the armed forces. Civilian governments overwhelmed their military rivals with a
set of prolonged and punitive measures. These actions eroded the militarys influence, but they
also left the armed forces in a professionally moribund state, causing resentment. For politicians,
economic constraints would themselves compel the military to implement reforms. Analogous to
Argentina, civilian leaders reasoned that faced with scarcity, the armed forces would react
rationally by cutting endeavors that would make the need for reorganization and restructuring.
(Pion-Berlin 1991, 555) As Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, former Minister of Defense between
1990-1993, stated: there was a degree of inconformity among some retired military officers
regarding economic compensation and retirement pensions. But we had to rationalize our budget
and we reduced expenditures within the rule of law, with norms, and compensations.4
For military officers, however, the economic constraints translated into operational and
professional decay. In their view, civilians were not following a rational policy sequence, since
reorganization could not come prior to the development of a military mission and doctrine. As a
senior military officer argued, it was difficult for us to commit to changes, since we did not
understand what longer purpose we were supposed to fulfill.5 Fortunately, the crisis did not
translate into insubordination, like in Argentina; but it did greatly affect civil-military relations in
the sense that there was a huge perception gap between Uruguayan society and its armed forces.
4Personal interview with Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, Rector of the Universidad de Montevideo and formerMinister of Defense between 1990-1993, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 27, 2003.5Personal interview with a senior military officer who requested anonymity, Montevideo, Uruguay, August21, 2003.
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II. The Expansion of Peacekeeping Participation: From Cambodia to Africa
The years between 1985 and 1991 were defined by a crisis that damaged the militarys
morale and eroded civil-military relations in Uruguay. The salary crisis, the lack of modern
equipment, and the absence of proposals for reorienting functions of the armed forces caused
uncertainty and concern in the military services. In this context, PK became a means to respond
to demands for reorganization and a window of opportunities to cope with the challenges posed
by increasing budget cuts.
Uruguay had previous PK experiences in the 50s and 80s, when military observers were
sent to participate in peace missions in Kashmir and Sinai. Yet, the scale of PK participation was
small compared to what would come in the early nineties. In 1991, Venezuela accepted an
invitation by the United Nations to participate in Cambodia by sending ships and a contingent
consisting of more than 1,000 peacekeepers. The following year, a failed military coup organized
by Hugo Chvez impeded Venezuela from deploying its troops to UNCTAC. This provided
Uruguay with an opportunity to occupy the vacant position and assume Venezuelas international
commitment. In 1992 Uruguay deployedBatalln Uruguay I, an infantry battalion of 850 Amy
officers, including 88 military observers, and 480 Navy officers, totaling 1,330 men. Within the
battalion, there were four companies deployed in four Cambodian provinces, each occupying six
border-patrol positions. (Ejrcito de la Repblica de Uruguay 1994; Comando General del
Ejrcito 2003, 68) This represented one the nations largest PK contributions in Uruguays
history, both for the number of officers deployed as well as for the logistics required for the
mission. The operation entailed transporting armed forces, vehicles, ships, hospitals, and aircraft
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sorties from Montevideo, via Bangkok, to Boung Long, in the providence of Ratanakiri, in the
northeast side of Cambodia.6
The decision to allow the armed forces to participate within UNTAC was taken by
President Jos Alberto Lacalle in consultation with the Ministry of Defense. The government
was prompted by economic and political considerations. In the presence of vocal military
resentment due to budget cuts, decision-makers in Uruguay reasoned that UN PKO was a
relatively inexpensive mission that could also divert the attention of the military from domestic
politics towards external roles. The expectation was that the UN would pay the salaries of all
participating officers plus the depreciation of equipment. Indeed, the UN pays troop contributors
a monthly stipend of $1,000 per officer and it also reimburses countries for the expenditures
incurred during the deployment. Hence, the government assumed benefits by providing
additional funding to an unsatisfied military at the expense of the UN.
The military motivations for participation in PK were similar from those of the
government, but they were also triggered by professional and political interests. With decreasing
budgets and an intensified identity crisis, institutional survival appeared as the primary
motivation for increased participation. PK provided an ongoing role that was more likely to be
funded by some sort of international assistance. UN peace missions promised an alternative
mission to face the identity crisis and guaranteed resources for salaries and for future defense
procurement. Similarly, PK provided a field exercise and a professional experience, in which
young officers could be trained on military tactics, logistics, and other functions performed while
in a mission abroad. Finally, this large deployment offered the Army and the Navy theopportunity to improve their domestic and international images. The expectation was that
6Personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader, General Director for Political Affairs and formerDeputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93, Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.
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domestic criticisms regarding their past mistakes would cease once the armed forces engaged in
missions involving the protection of citizens in other countries.
UNTAC proved to be a very educational experience for both the government and the
military. The expectations about the automatic economic benefits of PK participation were
unrealistic. The government did not realize that UN payments were slow and could take up to
two years for full reimbursement. As Dr. Brito, the former Minister of Defense, revealed in an
interview, we prepared the material, including vehicles, and we even painted the equipment; but
the UN paid with some delay.7 Furthermore, since this was the first contribution that involved
the deployment of military units, the Ministry of Defense lacked expertise on UN reimbursement
policies. The UN outlines minimum requirements from contributing states in what is known as
the Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum specifies what the world organization
expects from contributor countries, including the number of operational vehicles, man/hours for
observation duties, and quality of the equipment being deployed. The Uruguayan Ministry of
Defense made the decision to send outdated and aged equipment that was practically unusable for
the conditions in UNTAC, but with the expectation that the UN would pay regardless of the state
of the gear. The UN, however, bases its reimbursement policy on the quality of the equipment
and the level of deterioration incurred during the mission. The UN assessment determined that
the Uruguayan equipment was depreciated and was not used sufficiently in the mission; hence, it
did not cover the actual costs of deployment, but offer partial reimbursement.8
Uruguayans learned their lesson and became far more rational in future deployments.
After the 1992 participation in Cambodia, peace soldiers were deployed to Mozambique andAngola. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was Uruguays first major
7Personal interview with Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, Rector of the Universidad de Montevideo and formerMinister of Defense between 1990-1993, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 27, 2003.8Interview with an Uruguayan military officer who requested anonymity, Genera l Staff Office of theUruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 5, 2003.
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deployment in Africa. In February of 1993, one year after the Cambodian deployment, Uruguay
sent an infantry battalion consisting of 800 officers to the southern region of Mozambique. The
most modern equipment available, including a logistics section of the Army, tanks, vehicles and
planes, accompanied Uruguayan soldiers. In total, 2,518 Uruguayan peace officers were
deployed in four different rotations. By January of 1995, when UNOMOZ accomplished its
mandate and the mission was finally dismantled, 10% of all the armed forces had been exposed to
the UN mission in Mozambique, making this operation Uruguays largest PK contribution in
history. Unlike Cambodia, the equipment was in better conditions and the UN reimbursed all
costs, including materials, such as gasoline and other resources used during the operation. 9
While the forces in Mozambique undoubtedly composed Uruguays largest contingent
abroad, President Julio Mara Sanguinetti (now in his second term as president) followed his
predecessor's policy line and signaled the governments receptivity to other United Nations
requests for troops. In January of 1996, one year after UNOMOZ, Uruguay sent another infantry
battalion to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II and III (UNAVEM II and III). In
total, 96 military observers and 2,389 officers and non-commissioned officers from the Army
were sent to Angola to help verify a cease-fire agreement and an electoral process. However, the
peace process in Angola failed and by February of 1999 the peacekeepers began to withdraw.
(Ejrcito de la Repblica de Uruguay 1999, 52-55)
Uruguay had not fully recovered from UNAVEM III, when in February of 2000 the UN
Security Council expanded the mandate and objective of the United Nations Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Given Uruguays previous PK experience, KofiAnnan, the UN Secretary General, requested Uruguayan peace soldiers to form part of a mission
consisting originally of 5,537 military personnel. After domestic deliberations, Jorge Battle, the
9Personal Interview with retired Lt. Col. Denis P. Lacassy, former peacekeeper in Mozambique,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 21, 2003.
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newly elected president of Uruguay, accepted the invitation and the country prepared itself to
deploy its fourth major PKO. As of today, Uruguay has deployed 1,733 commissioned and non-
commissioned officers from the three military services. The South American country is the
leading troop contributor in Congo, providing 21.32% of all peace soldiers. (United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003) Uruguay maintains three battalions in Africa, all
of which are currently responsible for three sectors in the country, including airports and river
transportation. In total, 11% of the Army is currently deployed in Congo.10
Table 5:
Participation in peacekeeping operations by service and by mission, as of May of 2003
PKO Army Navy Air
Force
Total
Guatemala (MINUGUA) 4 obs. 4Honduras-Nicaragua 3 obs. 3Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 215obs.,
23032518
Rwanda (UNAMIR) 46obs. 46Liberia (UNOMIL) 44obs. 44Angola (UNAVEM III) 96obs., 2389 2485Tajikistan (UNMOT) 37 obs. 37Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) 37obs. 37Cambodia (UNTAC) 88obs.
742500 1330
Missionsaccomplished
Cyprus (UNFYCYP) 18obs. 18
West Sahara (MINURSO) 91obs. 91Congo (MONUC) 1454 250 29 1733Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL)
11obs. 11
Cote dIvoire(MINUCI)
2 obs. 2
Ethiopa-Eritrea (UNMEE) 41obs. 41India-Pakistan(UNMOGIP) 76obs. 76Timor (UNMISET) 25 obs. 25
Afghanistan (UNAMA) 1obs. 1Georgia (UNOMIG) 19 obs. 19
Missions inprogress
Sinai (MFO) 1853 obs. 1853Total 2,703 obs.
6,888750 29
10,370
10Personal interview with Col. Ral Gloodtdofsky, Military Attach at the Permanent Mission of Uruguayto the United Nations, New York, July 3, 2003. Personal interview with Col. Picabea, General StaffsOffice, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 5, 2003.
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(9,591 total)Obs.= military observerSources: Ejrcito de la Repblica Oriental del Uruguay,El Ejrcito uruguayo en misiones de paz,Montevideo, Uruguay: Imprenta Militar 1999; Comando General del Ejrcito, Ejrcito Nacional:
Desde 1811 al Servicio de la Patria, Desde 1935 al Servicio de la Paz, Montevideo, Uruguay,Ejrcito, 2003; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), MonthlySummary of Contributors, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml.
In 1982, when the dictatorship was still in power, Uruguay had participated in 2 PKO,
including India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and the Multinational Force Operation in Sinai (MFO).
From 1985 to 2003 the country expanded its participation from 2 to 18 PKO. The number of
Uruguayans deployed with the UN increased from roughly a 100 officers in 1982 to 1,802 in
2003, an increase of over 1000%. While the missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola and
Congo constitute Uruguays largest PK deployments, the country has participated in 16 other UN
PKO, including the MFO in Sinai (not under the UN umbrella). The armed forces have now the
capacity to deploy officers in multiple missions around the world. For instance, the Army is
currently serving in 9 PKO, in addition to MONUC in Africa. To date, about 11,000
commissioned and non-commissioned officers have participated in peace missions, making of
Uruguay the worlds largest per capita contributor to UN PKO, with a consistent participation of
1,000 troops per year. The country is officially one of the top five UN troop contributors,
surpassed only by three South Asian countries (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) and one African
state (Ghana).
III. Peacekeeping and its effects
In one decade, from 1992 to 2003, there was a massive expansion of Uruguays PK
contributions. Has the increasing involvement in international missions provided the military
with a more appropriate role within democracy? Did PK participation affect civilian politicians?
Is there more serious analysis by the president, Parliament, and other political institutions as to
what type of armed forces Uruguay has? Have individual officers and soldiers who have been
exposed to PK missions changed their views and become more civilianized? This section will
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analyze how engagement in UN peace missions affected military institutions, civilians, and
individual officers.
A. Peacekeeping and the armed forces: From identity crisis to peacekeeping as a modus
vivendi
In the early 1990s, PK became the primary activity for the Uruguayan armed forces. To
what extent did the expansion of UN involvement change the military? This section addresses
this question by analyzing how PK changed (or did not change) the mission, purpose and focus
the armed forces. Missions are the raison dtreof military institutions and in order for them to
be credible, they must be founded on functions for which the military is uniquely organized,
equipped, and trained, and from which they can develop esprit de corpsand high morale.
(Marcella 1994, 4) PK has been, traditionally, a secondary or tertiary mission for most Latin
American militaries and its effects are assumed to be small. However, the expansive deployment
of soldiers for peace operations in the nineties calls for reevaluating the ways in which external
roles, such as PKO, affect military institutions.
In the theoretical framework of this study (in chapter 1), it was argued that the effects of
PK participation are linked to the democratization process. In particular, the less bargaining
power retained by the military at the time of the transition, the more likely that PK participation
will influence the armed forces. Indeed, the first section of this chapter described how the
military emerged from the democratization process weakened and challenged by the lack of
purpose and mission. Consequently, PK was embraced for institutional self-preservation and for
the protection of special privileges, such as size and budget. But engagement in PKO does not
resuscitate institutions automatically, since adopting new missions also entails adjusting new
functions and standards. In order for the military to keep up with the challenges posed by
democratization, military institutions developed new organizational procedures and changed
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standards as they adopted PKO. Specifically, the expansion of UN missions changed the military
institution in three dimensions; namely missions, organization and resources.
First, involvement in several international peace operations changed the orientation of the
armed forces from domestic politics to external roles. The military transited from inward-
oriented missions (mostly anti-guerrilla tactics) in the seventies, to a crisis of identity in the mid-
eighties and early nineties, to PK in the mid-nineties. In other words, PK provided the mission
that the military so desperately needed at the end of the democratic transition. In interviews
conducted in 2003, several Uruguayan military officers rejected the idea that PK had become
their main mission. As Colonel Roberto Urrutice explains, we continue to value our traditional
mission, entailing the defense of sovereignty, as described by the Constitution.11
Certainly, if
the attention is focused exclusively on formal institutions and written documents, there seems to
be very little evidence that PK has become so important. In Uruguay, there is no white book on
national defense, there are no PK manuals published nor is there an official PK doctrine stipulated
within the national defense policy. For instance, the official website of the Army specifies that its
mission is to guarantee, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression, the security and
integrity of the nation, its institutions and its inhabitants. The website does have a link for PKO,
but it appears as part of what the Army calls solidarity missions, involving assistance for local
communities and for international peace missions. (Uruguayan Army 2003,
http://www.ejercito.mil.uy/conozca.htm)
However, with more than 11% of the Army currently deployed in Congo, 2,000
officers presently training for Congos third rotation, and with more than 5,000 soldiers (25% of
all armed forces) who have sign up their names as volunteers for future deployments, it is
difficult to dispute the claim that PK has become a significant mission for the armed forces and
the raison dtreof the Army. A substantial number of officers from the three services has been
11Personal interview with Col. Roberto Urrutice, Sub-Director of the School of Peacekeeping Operations atthe School of the Arms and Services, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, August, 8, 2003.
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Military innovation began in 1995 when, after Uruguays participation in the UN mission
in Cambodia, a PK training center was established within the School of Arms and Services.
Commanders at the school envisioned an ad hoctraining center that would function temporarily,
while soldiers and officers were being prepared for the missions in Mozambique and Angola. In
1998, the center became the Uruguayan Peacekeeping Operations School and was then given an
expansive mandate that included qualifying officers, troops and personnel from military and
police services for the execution of peace missions abroad. The school now provides training and
courses for military observers, junior officers, contingents, military police forces and
commanding officers. Depending on the military rank, all Army personnel drafted for
participation in PKO spends from 3 to 6 weeks in the school, attending seminars and courses on
several issues. The training is organized via modules, consisting mostly of PK doctrine, as stated
in UN documents, operative techniques, history of the mission and the country where deployment
is being targeted, specific training skills (such as demining), and security measures.13
The School was not only established to justify the Armys new mission, but to help the
military institution to change and adjust to demands posed by the UN. In compliance with UN
regulations, peacekeepers from Uruguay are voluntarily recruited within the three military
branches. However, unlike countries such as Canada, France or Great Britain, Uruguay does not
have a specialized PK unit or a single pre-existing battalion that it can deploy regularly
throughout the world. Instead, an Uruguayan PK infantry unit can be comprised with officers and
soldiers from each of the four national military divisions within the country. So peace soldiers
can come from different services and different national divisions, a challenge for military
13Personal visit to Major Juan Sosa Machado Peacekeeping Operations School in the Armys School ofArms and Services, Camino Maldonado, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 8, 2003. I am grateful to thedirecting staff for providing me access to the School of Arms and Services. In particular, I thank GeneralHctor R. Islas, director of the School of Arms and Services, Col. Pablo Pintos, Director of thePeacekeeping Operations School, Col. Roberto Urrutice, Under-director of the Peacekeeping OperationsSchool, Lt. Col. Tullio Felici, Instructor, and Maj. Ronal Garca, assistant and instructor, for the time thespent with me during my visit.
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cohesiveness. The training center allows enlisted volunteers to know each other and to acquire
new skills, while they develop esprit de corps for the mission.
Compared to Argentinas Center for Peacekeeping Operations (CAECOPAZ), the
Uruguayan school is still underdeveloped. The curriculum is not stated in manuals, there is no
debriefing, and there are virtually no civilian components. The school directors have been
hesitant in generating a national PK doctrine. As Col. Pablo Pintos, the director of the school,
explains, structured knowledge is not very useful at tactical and field levels. There are useful at
a theoretical level, but useless at a tactical level. Training is better if it relies on real field
experience.14 Training in the school takes place at a very inter-personal level, where the
instructor gives information to beginners by sharing his/her personal experiences in previous
PKO. Although many of these benefits appear primarily personal, the military institution
realizes some gains. The expectation is that professional learning from PKO will occur from the
individual to the institution by means of sharing personal anecdotes. Officers can then bring their
newly acquired knowledge and experiences back to their home unit, allowing others to be
exposed to peace missions. Despite the lack of formality and institutionalization, the school
reveals that there is some degree of change and adjustment. Changes in military education did
not take place before expansive PK participation, so a certain degree of internal transformation
within the armed forces can be attributed to the increasing involvement in UN missions.
Another organizationalchange that has occurred as a result of PK participation is intra-
service cooperation. Uruguay, like many other developing countries, faced problems regarding
lack of integration between military services, which often translated into rivalry among Army and
Navy officers. Even during the dictatorial regime, services struggled with each other for
resources and autonomy. After the transition to democracy, the Navy and the Air Force jealously
guarded its centers and resources, while preventing attempts to merge or reassign assets with the
14Personal interview with Col. Pablo Pintos, Director of the Peacekeeping Operations School, CaminoMaldonado, Uruguay, August 8, 2003.
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Army, which was suffering the most from atrophy. Demands for expansive PK participation
changed the willingness of the three forces to adopt new patterns of interaction. As General
Hebert J. Figoli argues, PK helps our three forces to operate jointly.15
Cambodia, in particular, forced the Army and the Navy to work together in ways that
they had not done before. In UNTAC, Navy officers, frigates, and a hospital assisted 1,000 Army
peacekeepers in transporting equipment and patrolling rivers. In fact, Uruguayans marines
interviewed for this study claim that Cambodias Navy actually emulates Uruguays Armada,
since marines were primarily in charge of reconstituting and training a new Navy for the Asian
country.16 In total, about 1,500 Navy officers have participated in peace missions, while 10% of
all current active officers have had some kind of PK experience. The Navy has not participated
as massively in PKO as the Army, but each deployment has increased the linkages between the
two services. As Captain Ricardo J. Shunk explains, there is a natural rivalry between services.
We rarely work together on a regular basis, so it is difficult to operate jointly . PK is one of the
few instances where we have to cooperate. In fact, we now depend on the Army for the success
of the mission in Congo.17 In MONUC the three services are working together for the first time,
as the Air Force is currently responsible for Congos airports, while river transportation is being
provided by almost 250 Navy officers.
An enduring rivalry prevails regarding the School of Peacekeeping Operations, since the
training facility is still in the hands of the Army. An integrated school has been suggested,
following the Argentine example of CAECOPAZ, but internal disputes have complicated the
quest for unification. Training center assets are still jealously guarded by the Army.
Nevertheless, while full reorganization has not been speedy, PK has forced the military to
15Personal interview with General Hebert F. Figoli, General Director of the Center of High NationalStudies (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales), CALEN, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 11, 2003.16Personal interview with Cap. Fernando Franzini, Director of Public Relations, Uruguays Navy,Montevideo, August 20, 2003.17Personal interview with Cap. Ricardo J. Schunk, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Uruguays Navy,Montevideo, August 20, 2003.
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rationalize certain military functions and to embrace different patterns of interaction. Army
commanders are now more likely to delegate river, maritime, and air patrolling duties to the other
services; thus showing willingness to share not only responsibilities, but benefits derived from
international participation in peace missions. PK has also offered an opportunity to adjust
officers to new and cooperative inter-service patterns of behavior.
New SOPs have been introduced as a direct consequence of inter-service collaboration
with the United Nations. The Uruguayan infantry battalion for Cambodia was deployed at a fast
pace, within 10 days, thanks to the assistance of private transportation companies from Canada
and Russia hired by the UN. But the contingent was supposed to be ready for the mission within
less than a week, revealing the need for better planning and coordination. (Ejrcito de la
Repblica Oriental delUruguay 1994) Demands to ensure rapid deployment were also increased
when Uruguay committed itself to the United Nations Rapid Deployment Stand-by System
(UNSAS), which attempts to pledge state members to send forces and resources within the agreed
response times for UN PKO. Consequently, in order to reduce deployment time considerably the
presidency of Uruguay decreed the creation of the National System for Support of Peacekeeping
Operations (SINOMAPA in Spanish), in 1994. SINOMAPA resides within the Ministry of
Defense, coordinating PK policies among military organizations and government agencies.
SINOMAPAs goals are to ensure that the units are prepared to start the mission, to make sure
that deployment is as rapid as is possible, and to guarantee economic, political and technical
support for the success of the mission, once participation has been decided by the President and
the Ministry of Defense.18
Criticism has been voiced regarding the system, per se, since there is very little civilian
control or intervention in this body. The SINOMAPA is chaired by the President, but its regular
18Personal interview with Col. Ral Gloodtdofsky , Military Attach at the Permanent Mission of Uruguayto the United Nations, New York, July 3, 2003; and personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader,General Director for Political Affairs and former Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93,Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.
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attendees are the chief commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The statutory director of
this body is the Chief of Staff of the Army, who reports directly to the Armys Commander in
Chief. The heads of other executive departments and agencies (such as the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Economics), as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend
meetings of the SINOMAPA when appropriate. (Comando General del Ejrcito 2003, 153-154)
The subsequent section will address the issue of lack of civilian control and how it poses
challenges for the system. However, the existence of SINOMAPA illustrates how the armed
forces have been adopting new procedures to coordinate their action and adjust their behavior to
UN demands.
Third, involvement in UN peace missions has changed the material incentives for
recruiting soldiers and officers and the rules for purchasing new equipment. In 1991 the armed
forces were facing a serious challenge regarding low salaries and poor gear. While PK
participation has not increased military budgets (quite the opposite, see table 1 and 2), the
stipends derived from UN contributions have afforded an alternative source of income to improve
salaries and buy material. The expectation of the Uruguayan government was that the UN would
pay for all incurred costs, including transportation, equipment and salaries. The assumption
turned out to be unrealistic, because as UNTAC proved, the UN partially paid the costs of the
mission. But, PK did provide the armed forces with a valuable justification to impede larger cuts
and even obtain some extra treats.
The UN pays contributor states a monthly stipend of $1,000 for each member of a unit
deployed within a contingent. This payment is given directly to the government, which in turn
distributes it among its armed forces. Conversely, officers assigned on UN observer mission
(without a contingent) receive a direct per-diem rate from the UN that varies from $85 (US) to
$120(US) , depending on the country and the mission. In other words, the government does not
profit from military observers, since payment does not goes through any governmental
bureaucracy.
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Interestingly enough, the hard cash that comes from the UN has often been used by the
armed forces to obtain governmentaleconomic supplements. The claim often made by the
military is that participation in PK provides resources that bring prosperity and wealth to
Uruguay. For instance, in July of 2003, Dr. Yamand Fau, the Minister of Defense, declared that
the deployment of 1,807 peacekeepers in 2002 had generated wealth for the country in the
amount of approximately $20 million dollars, just for UN viaticum. (Instituto de Ciencia
Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica 2003) This is a significant amount considering that
Uruguays major export product is beef and sales overseas for this item represented $16 million
dollars in 2002. In fact, PK has made military labor services Uruguays most important export
product.
However, while a certain degree of prosperity has been created as a direct consequence of
internationalism, the government has also incurred in major expenditures. In addition to the
payment provided by the UN, peacekeepers from Uruguay receive an additional 50% pay hike
from the government, increasing individual salaries substantially. The argument is that peace
missions are risky and separate officers from their families for a 6-month period. So, the state
provides extra sources to compensate for the alleged costs. This means that a significant amount
of the national defense budget goes into paying salaries, rather than supplying or moderniz ing the
armed forces. For instance, in 2002, the budget for the Ministry of Defense was of $200 (US)
million, of which $140 million (US), more than 70%, covered expenditures for salaries. (see table
6 and 7) The outcome is that the average salary for an active officer that is deployed in a PK
mission has more than tripled vis--vis regular military wages. For example, a lieutenant colonel
is paid roughly $700 (US) a month. While on a UN mission, the same lieutenant colonel can
make up to $6,000 (US) a month; this is more than quadruple his/her normal salary because of all
the extra incentives the state provides. Likewise, a Navy non-commissioned officer makes $100
(US) a month, while on a UN mission, the same soldier can make up to $1,000 (US) a month.
(see table 8) Consequently, PK has alleviated the ailments caused by defense cuts and low
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salaries by providing additional payment. This has been done at the expense of the UN and the
national budget.
Table 6: Distribution ofmilitary budget in 2002
Military budget 2002
70%
13%
8%
9%
salaries
maintenance
supplies
procurement
Source: Instituto de Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica, Informe SemanalUruguay No. 98. Observatorio Cono Sur de Defensa y Fuerzas, August, 2-8, 2003; Congreso
Nacional de la Repblica de Uruguay. Comisin de Presupuestos, Integrada con la de Hacienda.Montevideo, Uruguay, July 30, 2003.Table 7:Representative figures for individual salaries
Army
Normal salaryusd/month
Salary aspeacekeeperwithincontingentusd/month
Salary asmilitary observer(Mozambique)
Salary ascommander of aPKO
Lt. Col. $700usd./month $3,000usd./month $4,000usd/month $6,000usd/month
Navy
Normal Salaryusd/month
Governmentalsupplement
UN stipendusd/month
Total salaryUsd/month
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(50% increase ofthe salary)
Non-commissionedofficer
$100 usd ($300U pesos)
$50 $850 $1,000
Marine officer Normal salary 50% $1000-1,400 $2,200Commander Normal salary 50% $1000-1,400 $3,000
UN reimbursements for operational costs incurred in the missions have also enabled the
armed forces to purchase some equipment. The data available on reimbursements is not fully
accessible or public , but recent declarations by the Minister of Defense reveal that Uruguay
received approximately $129 (US) million dollars in the past 11 years for its contribution in UN
PKO. (Instituto de Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica, Informe no. 96 2003) The
money that has returned to the country has enabled the military to acquire military equipment
from Eastern Europe. A recent report by Janes Military revealed that: Following Uruguays
rejection of US military aid during the Carter administration, the country turned elsewhere,
notably to Belgium and Spain, for its requirements. Argentina also provided some second-hand
material. Recent acquisitions of Eastern European equipment may indicate a new trend in
acquisition policies. (Janes Military, 2003)
Indeed, using the justification that new material was required to fulfill PK duties, the
Army and the Navy have been shopping for battle tanks, vessels, minesweepers and frigates from
NATO excess stocks and from former Warsaw Pact countries. Eastern Europe has been a natural
supplier for Uruguay, since prices are low and the equipment can be delivered from Germany or
Poland directly to the missions in Africa. The Navy has also expressed interest in procuring
second-hand frigates from the United Kingdom to replace its old craft. The choice is the result
of an interest in deploying helicopters at sea. This is not possible with the Commandant Riviere
Class frigates, which lack both flight deck and hangar. (Janes Military, 2003) As Captain
Ricardo J. Schunk explains, We need operative equipment in Congo; otherwise the UN will not
reimburse us. I cannot send aged equipment because my personnel needs good resources and
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they cannot be put under risk for being poorly equipped. Yes, PK requires initial investment so
that the gear can last for at least 2 years. The most up-to-date equipment was purchased for and
while in the mission.19
To some analysts, the idea of purchasing equipment for PK missions is troubling because
the most modern Uruguayan gear is now overseas. As Professor Julian Gonzlez argues, we
have sent our best helicopters abroad, when some of this equipment could be used at home. What
will happen if there is a national security crisis and our best gear is miles away?20 Similarly,
critics of this policy, like Juan Rial, argue that most recent acquisitions have been bought with
international loans and debt, with the expectation that the UN will reimburse the operational costs
of Congo in the future.21
However, payment is slow and most of the time the UN does not
reimburse the full amount.
In any case, PK has served as an escape valve to deal with the financial crisis that
affected the armed forces at the end of the democratic transition. PK has not only provided a
survival mission, but a modus vivendi, in which higher salaries and military acquisitions are
justified in terms of peace contributions. The armed forces have changed their suppliers, adjusted
their budgets, created new SOPs, founded institutions, and introduced new training programs
based on UN needs and demands. To a certain extent, PK participation has appeased the armed
forces, since they can no longer blame the government for maintaining an ill-equipped and
underpaid military. The state of the military has slightly improved, especially compared to 1991,
when it was facing simultaneous financial and identity crises. However, the question is whether
these transformations have strengthened civilian control and increased civilian expertise on
defense matters. This is the main issue to be discussed in the following section.
19Personal interview with Captain Ricardo J. Schunk, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Navy,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 20, 2003.20Personal interview with Professor Juilian Gonzlez, Coordinator of the Southern Cone Observatory ofDefense Policies and Armed Forces, Universidad de la Repblica, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 11, 2003.21Personal interview with Juan Rial, Uruguayan expert and consultant to the United Nations DevelopmentProgram, New York, November 5, 2003.
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B. Soldiers and. Politicians: Enduring Gaps in Civil-Military Relations
Participation in peace operations changed the general orientation and focus of the armed
forces from domestic to external missions. However, these changes can reflect mere adjustments
without entailing real transformations in civil-military relations. To argue that PK exercises
profound effects on civil-military relations implies that civilians preferences and interests are
also being shaped and changed by the countrys engagement in peace operations. Has the
adoption of new international missions transformed interactions between civilians and soldiers?
Is there firm civilian control over the military as a result of Uruguays increasing participation in
PKO? Has the expansion of UN involvement increased civilian expertise on defense and security
policies?
Despite the large number of troops participating in PKO, relations between civilians and
the military remained without change throughout the nineties. In 1996, Linz and Stepan
concluded that the quality of Uruguayan civil-military relations was not high since there was no
serious analysis by political institutions as to what type of armed forces the country required.
(Linz and Stepan 1996, 160) Seven years have passed since the publication ofProblems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation; yet, the quality of Uruguayan civil-military relations
has not experienced a radical transformation, even if PK contributions have increased. Two set of
problems are present in todays Uruguay. First, civilians have continued to delegate authority to
military organizations, without actively involving diplomatic agencies and other political
institutions. Second, the absence of diplomatic intervention has halted a larger national debate
about the countrys PK policies, so defense communities have not expanded beyond the military
domain.
PK participation has not followed political imperatives. There has not been an explicit
attempt to incorporate the armed forces into foreign policy objectives. In fact, unlike India,
Canada, Sweden, Argentina or Brazil, countries that actively participate in UN negotiations,
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Uruguay has never been part of the UN Security Council and there are no plans to join the body
as a non-permanent member. As Ambassador Pablo Sader explains, we are a small country that
does not have strategic interests abroad. Being in the Security Council exposes state -members to
enormous international pressures.22 The consequence of this policy is that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs does not participate in the formulation of Security Council resolutions that
eventually determine the mandates of PKO. Since there is no active diplomatic or political
engagement, Uruguay does not have diplomats and civilian functionaries supporting the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Appointments at the UNDPKO
are politically determined according to national quotas that are often negotiated in the Security
Council. The Council and the UNDPKO are the most important bureaucracies within the UN
system, since authorization, mandate, logistics, command, budget and political affairs are
managed by these two bodies. Together they generate information and delegate authority that can
then be used by national organizations to influence the decision-making at home. Since the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is absent from both, the UNDPKO and the Council, Uruguay relies
on third parties to gather information about PK missions.
Uruguays diplomatic delegation at the UN headquarters in New York does have a
military attach within its bureaucracy. Following the new SOPs established by the
SINOMAPA, a colonel from the Army has been appointed by the president to help coordinate PK
policies in New York. The attach, however, does not report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
but to the Ministry of Defense. It is the attach who he gets to travel around the world obtaining
information about the mission from the field. His function also includes establishing contacts
with the UNDPKO and working as an informal liaon officer, developing links between the UN
command and the armed forces. The problem is that this system has actually encouraged
information asymmetries. The Ministry of Defense has informational advantages about PK
22Personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader, General Director for Political Affairs and formerDeputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93, Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.
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issues and the data collected by the attachs office is rarely shared, debriefed or diffused. The
attach has devoted more time to developing his contacts and expertise on PK matters than any
other diplomatic member within the Uruguayan embassy; thus increasing the influence of the
Ministry of Defense.
Similarly, the criterion to determine troop contributions is unrelated to the countrys
diplomacy. Uruguay has sent peacekeepers to more than 20 countries, but in only 6 of these
missions there has been a diplomatic representation. In Cambodia, a plenipotentiary ambassador
was appointed after the deployment of troops. Africa is by far the most preferred area for
deployment (8 out of 20 missions); yet, there are few embassies in the region, Congo and South
Africa being the exceptions. (See table 7) Trade interests or economic policies have not inspired
the countrys active involvement in peace missions in Africa. As Ambassador Felipe Paolillo,
Uruguayan Permanent Ambassador to the UN, explains There are countries who see Africa as an
important international market, we believe the continent has an economic potential, but that is not
our immediate goal. We are there for international solidarity and we are a neutral party.23 The
indirect consequence of this policy is that, yet again, the Foreign Ministry does not rely on its
network of diplomatic offices to obtain field information about the missions where soldiers are
being sent. The information is generated by military envoys who visit the countries and assess
the conditions for deployment without political input. Only the Ministry of Defense knows what
judgment was used to determine the various risks and political viability of PKO.
Table 8: Diplomatic missions where peacekeepers have been deployed.
Peacekeeping missions Diplomaticrepresentation1. Guatemala (MINUGUA) Yes2. Honduras-Nicaragua Yes3.Mozambique (ONUMOZ) No4. Rwanda (UNAMIR) No
23Personal interview with Ambassador Felipe Paolillo, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the UnitedNations, New York, June 1 7, 2003.
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5. Liberia (UNOMIL) No6. Angola (UNAVEM III) No7. Tajikistan (UNMOT) No8. Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) No9. Cambodia (UNTAC) Yes10.West Sahara (MINURSO) No11. Congo (MONUC) Yes12. Sierra Leona (UNAMSIL) No13. Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) No14. Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) No15.India-Pakistan(UNMOGIP) Yes16. Timor (UNMISET) No17. UNFYCYP (Cyprus) Yes18. Georgia (UNOMIG) No19. Cte dIvoire (MINUCI) No20. Afghanistan (UNAMA) No
Source: Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Part of the problem has to do with the fact that the presidency, where the key decisions
are made, has delegated authority to the Ministry of Defense, instead of empowering the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. It is in this area where differences between Argentina and Uruguay are the
most evident. In the former case, diplomatic bureaucracies were used to shift decision-making
processes from the militarys exclusive domain and toward diplomacy, where PK policies became
subject to international scrutiny and thus the responsibility of ambassadors rather than soldiers.
As established in the theoretical framework of this study (chapter 1), it is under these conditions
that PK is more likely to have an effect on civil-military relations. In the Argentine context, the
delegation of authority to the Foreign Ministry provided additional mechanisms for civilian
control, since military and diplomatic bureaucracies checked and controlled each other as they
coordinated common policies. Likewise, a minimum degree of civilian intervention occurred
when PK policies were delegated to diplomats, who in turn were more likely to think in political
terms and less influenced by military organizational biases. Such context provided fertile ground
for the expansion of defense communities and critical thinking from non-military organizations.
Conversely, in Uruguay, there has not been an attempt to policy handle; that is, to move
some decision-making about troop contribution out of the Ministry of Defense and towards the
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Foreign Ministry. Each major troop deployment did not progressively transfer power from one
bureaucracy into another. The presidency did not invite members of the diplomatic corps to play
a key role in assisting, designing, and implementing decisions made by the executive branch.
Each decision made about peace contributions did not trigger a thorough discussion or debate
about the consequences it would trigger for the countrys foreign policy. These decisions
generated a principal-agent problem, in which the control of the military bureaucracy has caused
greater challenges. As resources and engagement increased, so did the authority and autonomy of
the Ministry of Defense. This agency led by a civilian-appointed official, is mostly staffed by
retired and active service commanders.
Since there are no other political institutions monitoring or controlling PK policies, aside
from the presidency itself , supervision depends on the legislative branch. Unfortunately,
Congress plays a minor role in the PK decision-making process. Senat