sources of islamist strategic thought...on six “pillars”: the religious or “legalistic”...

Research Monographs on the Muslim World

Series No 2, Paper No 1 August, 2008

HUD S ON I N S T I T U T E

Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

Sources of IslamistStrategic Thought

SHMUEL BAR

The views, opinions, and/ or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be

construed as an official Department of Defense pos ition, policy, or decision.

Center on Islam,Democracy, andthe Future of theMuslim World

© 2008 by Hudson Institute, Inc.All rights reserved.

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Sources of IslamistStrategic Thought

Shmuel Bar

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Sources of Islamist Strategic ThoughtThe “Pillars” of Islamist Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Religious Pillar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Apocalyptic Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 The Political Pillar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The Military Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14The Pillare of Jihad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Pillar of Martyrdom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Key Movements and ThinkersSunni Ideologues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Shiite Ideologues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Identification of the Enemy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Sunni Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Shiite Radicalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Strategic Visions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22The Mainstream Muslim Brotherhood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24The Caliphate Camp–Hizb ut-Tahrir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24The Salafi-Jihadi Caliphate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25The Shiite Velayat-e Faqih. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Islamist Nationalist Movements in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Operational Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27The Gradualist Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27The Salafi-Jihadi Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Iranian Revolutionary Pragmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Acquisition and Use of WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Because of three factors—the close affinitybetween the religious and the political inIslam, the religious motivation of Islamist

movements, and the prevalence of apocalyptic rhet-oric—it is difficult to distinguish the political andmilitary strategies of such movements from theirreligious convictions. There is no doubt, however,that Islamist organizations do act on the basis ofperceived strategic priorities. This study attempts toglean from these movements’ writings a coherentpicture of their strategic thought on key issues relat-ing to the conflict with the West.

The strategic writings of the different movementsreveal three levels of agreement and diversity:

1. The sources of their strategic vision are basicallycommon to all radical Islamist movements—Sunniand Shiite alike. All use Islamic sources to provideguidelines in social, political and strategic matters.

2. The strategies for implementing their goals differfrom one movement to another and from one the-ater to another.

3. Tactical local responses demonstrate that specificcircumstances often have the upper hand in dictat-ing modes of action and thinking.

In this literature, Islamist strategic thinking is basedon six “pillars”: the religious or “legalistic” pillarthat focuses on Allah’s commandments to Muslimsregarding “infidels” and jihad; the apocalyptic pillarthat addresses the belief in the link between jihad

and the impending “end of days”; the political pillarthat analyzes, in quasi-secular terms, the politicalbalance of power between Muslims and their ene-mies, and provides the basis for setting strategic andoperative priorities; the military pillar that assessestargets and opportunities; the pillar of ji had; and thepillar of martyrdom.The religious pillar is predomi-nant in Islamist strategic writings. The strategies ofthe Islamist movements have a broad common den -ominator in the unambiguous insistence that alldecisions—religious, political and military—be di -rect ly derived from the Quran, the Hadith andsharia rulings. This shared assumption that everymodern situation can be judged by analogy to therulings and behavior of the Prophet creates a basisfor debate among all the different Islamist move-ments—a debate that can be found, either overtly orbetween the lines, in their writings.

The apocalyptic pillar of Islamist strategy plays agrowing role and, while not discounting the empha-sis on the shifting tactical situation, recognizes thatIslam may suffer setbacks. Since September 11,2001, apocalyptic interpretations of current worldevents have exploded. The “glorious raids” of Sep -tember 11 and the American occupation of Afgha -nistan and Iraq have been subsequently viewed as“signs” of the imminent apocalypse (ashrat al-sa’a).In this context, the jihadi movement identifies itselfwith the elected group that merits the grace of Allah(al-ta’ifa al-mansura). According to Muslim escha-tology, this group is destined to achieve military vic-tory over its enemies and implement the ideal ofIslam on earth. Statements and actions by the

Executive Summary

HUDSON INSTITUTE [1]

incumbent president of Iran, Mahmud Ahma dine -jad, indicate that at least he and his close affiliatesare motivated by a Mahdivist vision of the worldbeing on the threshold of the “end of days”—andby a desire to expedite the reappearance of the Hid -den Imam. Guided by this vision, such people maynot be deterred from actions that might even precip-itate a nuclear war. This strand of thought, howev-er, is the exception rather than the rule in Shiite reli-gious history and is actually foreign to theKhomeini doctrine that currently rules Iran.

The political pillar of Islamist strategy is evidentin both Sunni and Shiite writings, which show astrong sense of realpolitik and an understanding ofthe current balance of power. Sunni and Shiite(mainly Iranian) strategists offer detailed analyses ofthe “enemy” and the enemy’s alliances, strengthsand weaknesses. These analyses form the basis forthe Islamist discussion concerning appropriate tar-gets for attack, terrorism, and overall policy towarddifferent parties. The military pillar is evident in thefact that Islamist writings are replete with assess-ments and debate over the pros and cons of variousmilitary courses of action.

The pillar of jihad is a key element of consensusin the strategic discourse of the different Islamistmovements. Ideologues of all camps distinguish be -tween a “defensive jihad” (jihad al-difa’i) for liberat-ing Muslims from the threat or occupation of infi-dels, and an “initiated jihad” (jihad al-talab wa-al-ibtida’i) that may operate “until religion [in theworld] is Allah’s.” The existing Sunni consensus isthat the former is now in effect, whereas the lattercan be revived only after the re-establishment of anIslamic regime (a Caliphate), which will lead theMuslims in jihad. Jihad is not viewed as a “necessaryevil,” however, but as an aim in itself. Because thedefinition of defense has been extended in Is lam istthought to include, not only actual military occupa-tion of a Muslim land, but also “spiritual” or eco-nomic occupation—in the form of Western cloth ing,businesses, media and so on—the concept of the

defensive jihad is also expanding. It no longer seemsrestricted to a war that comes to an end once the“infidel” military occupation comes to an end.

In Shiite doctrine, as manifested in Iran and itsproxies (Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shiitemovements), jihad is not simply a means of obtain-ing a political objective. It is a pillar of faith, ameans of testing the belief of a Muslim by puttinghim through trials and tribulations that emulatethose of the imams Ali and Hussein. It is the pathtoward achieving unity with Allah’s will; it servesthe interests of the believers and, in doing so, fulfillsthe Islamic obligation to serve the community (overand above the individual); and it “pays,” as it willbe rewarded in this world by Allah, who will givethe believers victory. Because Shiite thought holdsthat “initiated jihad” must await the reappearanceof the Hidden Imam, any current military jihad isdefined as defensive and seen as a duty for allMuslims when they face aggression. This defensivejihad is not spontaneous, however, but the result ofa decision that can only be made by the “ruler-jurisprudent” (vali faqih). He alone has the abilityto weigh all considerations and the authority todecide whether or not the jihad should proceed. Thevali faqih may also “suspend” jihad (for example,Iran’s jihad against Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war)on the basis of realpolitik and the “public interest”(maslaha) of the (Iranian) people.

Finally, the salafi-jihadi movement has inheritedfrom the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) the pillar ofmartyrdom (shahada), not as a necessary evil but as“a consummation devoutly to be wished.” Thisbelief, a key development in Islamist strategy, un -dermines the classic military obligation of a com-mander to restrict his own casualties. Shiite ideolog-ical texts also stress the essence of jihad as a “doc-trine and a program of action” through which aMuslim may “sacrifice his life for the sake of Allahand attain paradise.” The greatest reward accordedto a mujahidin is “martyrdom for Allah’s sake.”Hez bollah’s role models are the imams Ali and

[2] Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

Hussein, who went into battle knowing they wereheavily outnumbered and that they were going tobecome martyred.

The perception and definition of “the enemy,”the laws governing war against the enemy, and

the rationale—be it defensive, deterrent or initiat-ed—for that war are pivotal components of Islamiststrategy. The growing salafi-jihadi tendency toinclude Shiites in the category of “enemy,” in boththeory and operational behavior, make it difficult todraw a common picture for Sunni and Shiite move-ments. In general, however, all Islamist movementshold that the enemy is comprised of both local andexternal entities that are either overtly or secretlyallied with one another.

In Sunni jihadist thought, there are two concentricand interrelated enemy circles. The local, inner circleconsists of the Arab and Islamic regimes, “the apos-tates who have abandoned Islam” (murtaddun), andthe Shiites (the “turncoats” or rafidi). The outer cir-cle is the domain of the “infidels” (kuffar), the “Cru -saders” (i.e., the West) and the Jews (Zionists).

Like Sunni radicalism, the Shiite brand definesthe enemy first and foremost by its link to the West.The United States, Britain and Israel form an “axisof evil” intent on toppling Iran’s Islamic regime—incollaboration with many of its Arab neighbors. TheIranian regime sees this struggle as an existentialManichean clash between forces of light and forcesof darkness.

The Islamist movements’ differing strategicvisions can be discerned in the different para-

digms they present for the structure of a future Is -lamic order. Five main paradigms are evident: (1)that of the “mainstream” Muslim Brotherhood, (2)that of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, (3) theCaliphate idea advocated by salafi-jihadi groupsand by Hizb ut-Tahrir, (4) the model of the Iranianrevolution, and (5) that of nationalist Islamic move-ments in Central Asia.

The strategic vision of the mainstream of theMuslim Brotherhood represents a “lowest commondenominator” to which most of the other move-ments would agree, though they would add ele-ments of their own. The Islamic regime of theMuslim Brotherhood clearly incorporates sharia,however, and is not fundamentally different fromthat proposed by the salafi-jihadi groups. The onlysignificant exception to this vision comes from theSyrian Muslim Brotherhood, which emphasizes the“intentions” of sharia and the need to adapt it to“human experience.” It speaks as well of pluralismbeing the intention of Allah.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has for decades declared that theCaliphate concept is the goal of its struggle. It offersa comprehensive view of the Caliphate that wouldrule the Muslim world—and, ultimately, the entireworld. After the re-establishment of the Caliphate,all non-Muslims would be obliged to render tribute(jizya) to the Caliphate and, in exchange, wouldenjoy its protection. But a refusal to pay jizya wouldwarrant a jihad.

The Caliphate model has now become a centraltenet of al-Qaeda’s ideology as well, and it is beingincreasingly accepted by other “mainstream” Islam -ist movements. This is noteworthy because, untilrecently, these movements made no serious attemptto define any paradigmatic concept of leadership.They preferred to avoid the pitfalls inherent in theCaliphate model—i.e., who would be the Caliph,appropriate attitudes vis-à-vis non-Muslims, theduty of offensive jihad—and to focus instead on theprinciples of Islamic governance rather than on thespecific forms such rule might take (sultanate, king-ship, tribal inheritance, etc.). While the restorationof the Caliphate is not yet the common goal of allthese movements, it is no longer the idiosyncrasy ofone marginal group. And any sense of potential vic-tory leads the various organizations to considermore seriously the question of the Caliphate.

The Iranian paradigm stands alone. The doctrineof velayat-e faqih (the rule or the guardianship of



the Islamic jurists) was never meant to be restrictedto the Shiite world. Uniting this concept of govern-ment by the jurists with religious and nationalistprinciples, Khomeini established a regime that hada manifest destiny to promote the national interestsof Iran—which he saw as being identical to those ofthe Muslim Umma—and to liberate Muslims fromthe yoke of Western imperialism. At the core of thisoutlook is the idea that pan-Islamism will destroythe existing international system and be, inKhomeini’s oft-repeated words, “neither East [theSoviet Union and communist ideology] nor West[the United States and capitalism].”

Finally, the nationalist movements of the formerSoviet Union can be seen more as “Islamist nation-alism” than “national Islamist” movements. Theirgoals tend to emphasize the local and the national-istic, and while some of them have gone through aprocess of “globalization” due to the preponder-ance of Arab mujahidin in their ranks, for the mostpart they remain vague regarding the “pan-Islamic”facet of their ideology.

Most Islamist movements tend to focus on the“here and now” in their day-to-day strategic

writings. This can be attributed to the fact that,except for the jihad in Iraq, none see themselves ason the verge of taking power, and they are em -broiled in a daily struggle with incumbent regimes.Areas of operational tactics widely discussed inIslamist writings include:

1. Priority of targets: i.e., which Western powers aremore susceptible to pressure and, if hit by terror,will withdraw from Islamic lands.

2. Classification of targets: i.e., the Islamic legality ofattacking the economic infrastructure of Muslimcountries (particularly oil). This was widely consid-ered a red line that Islamist organizations did notcross, even in the bloody jihad in Algeria. They have,however, recently crossed it in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Another actively discussed issue involves attackingIraqi Shiites.

3. Classification of weapons: i.e., analysis of rulingsthat concern types of weapons and tactics—such assuicide bombing, hijacking of aircraft (e.g., do therules relating to prisoners of war in jihad apply alsoto the passengers?), and weapons of mass destruction(WMD). Very little has been written on this last issue.

In contrast to the “gradualist” and relatively prag-matic strategy of the MB and its affiliates and to theIranian regime’s need to consider its national inter-ests, salafi-jihadi groups espouse a more ag gres siveand opportunistic strategy. Their guiding principles,compiled from various texts, are:

• All the Western countries are defined as bilad al-harb (enemy lands)—a category that sanctions com-plete freedom of action and justifies the use of anypossible means to inflict damage. The enemy’s “peo-ple, blood, money and women’s honor (a’raduhum)are permitted to Muslims, as they were to the Pro -ph et Mohammed in his wars against his enemies.”

• Striking against the enemy’s centers of economicand military power and symbols, not only attacksthe enemy’s arrogance, but also inflicts tremendousmaterial damage and hastens collapse. The obliga-tion is to bring about change by using force, ratherthan relying solely on political influence.

• Extending military actions to the heart of enemyterritory advances the goal of bringing about the en -emy’s collapse. Al-Qaeda’s aim is to attack Ameri -can targets throughout the world, and it has execut-ed actions on several continents, thus demonstrat-ing its commitment to engaging the enemy on itsown territory.

• Using propaganda and psychological warfare as acomplement to military action.


• Threatening force can be effective, as when BinLaden asserted his right to acquire weapons ofmass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Hisplans’ focus, however, is on the actual use of weap -ons against his enemies. Armed violence and mili-tary force—the “life of killing and battle”—are theprincipal, and almost only, means of influence thathe considers worthwhile.

• Decentralization is the way that al-Qaeda and itsallies conduct and execute jihad. Each acts inde-pendently in its own theater and in accordance withprevailing circumstances.

A compilation of different salafi-jihadi discussionsregarding the stages of the jihad reveals the follow-ing phases:

• Awakening the masses began in earnest onSeptember 11, 2001 and continues with the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq. The goal is to broaden theranks of the jihadi movement and generate localopposition to the “apostate regimes.”

• Attrition focuses on bleeding the West economical-ly, militarily, and politically until it disengages fromMuslim lands altogether and severs its alliances withthe “apostate regimes.” (In this context, some textsmention the abandonment of South Vietnam and theoverthrow of the Shah’s regime as cases in point.)

• Control of Iraq or the battle for Iraq is perceivedby the salafi-jihadi thinkers as a historic, not-to-be-missed opportunity to establish a stepping-stonethat can be used to expand jihad to adjacent the-aters, to occupy those theaters, and to unify themunder an Islamic Caliphate.

• Toppling “apostate regimes” focuses first on the“inner circle” of susceptible regimes, such as Egypt,Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Therevolutionary nature of the jihadi strategy—in con-

trast with the more gradualist Muslim Brotherhoodapproach—is based on the conviction that it isimpossible to adequately reform a “Muslim” coun-try led by “apostate rulers” or to adapt it to theIslamist model. What is needed is a general revolu-tion and the reestablishment of the Islamic state,from top to bottom.

• Taking control of the formerly “apostate” lands isconsidered to be one of the most sensitive stages, asthe breakdown of the old regimes will probablyresult in a breakdown of law and order.

• Establishing sharia law as the basis of the newregimes is crucial, though initially these regimesmay not be identical in form. Only at a later stagewill unity be achieved.

• Purging all Western influences from the Muslimworld requires the total liberation of all Muslimlands—including Palestine, Kashmir, and al-Anda -lus (Spain)—ruled by “infidels.”

• Reestablishment of the Caliphate is viewed as thelast phase in organizing the Muslim world. Thiswill then allow for the final confrontation with theWest.

• Final conflict is the stage that, in many jihaditexts, is intertwined with eschatological allusions.

Since its inception, Iran’s Islamic regime has beencommitted to jihad and to the “export of revolu-tion” (sudur inqilab) or the “propagation of Islam”(tablighi eslami). Iran’s support of terrorist organi-zations serves a number of its goals:

1. To maintain its commitment to Khomeini’s doc-trine of jihad and the “export of revolution.”

2. To pose a threat to Israel, both for ideologicalreasons and to deter Israel from acting against it.


3. To further Iran’s national objectives of hegemonyin the Gulf and the Sunni Arab world by promotingIslamist opposition to the pro-Western regimes inthose countries.

4. To serve as a strategic deterrent against the UnitedStates, as long as Iran lacks a nuclear deterrent, byposing the threat of widespread terrorism in retalia-tion for any hostile acts toward Iran. The militaryasymmetry that exists between Iran and its en emies,combined with the regime’s conviction that theseenemies remain committed to toppling its govern-ment, have led it to conclude that Iran must rely on“sub-conventional” warfare—i.e., terrorism. Thisincludes attacking Israel from Lebanon, taking Israelihos tages, supporting Palestinian terrorism, and occa-sionally using international terror to demonstrate a“long-arm” capability commensurate (mutatis mut -an dis) with that of its enemies to hit Iran.

5. To enhance Iran’s standing in the eyes of radicalSunni Islamist organizations as the only state will-ing to challenge Israel and the United States, andthus to draw them into its orbit and accord it afoothold in the heart of the Arab Middle East.

6. To serve as a bargaining chip that can eventuallybe traded for concessions on other issues importantto its interests. This helps explain Iran’s links withal-Qaeda, despite that organization’s Wahhabi andanti-Shiite ideology.

A small number of salafi-jihadi intellectuals haveaddressed the question of weapons of mass destruc-tion, focusing on whether their use is legally permit-ted (given that they may kill Muslims as well as infi-dels, etc.). The Saudi Sunni scholar Sheikh Nasserbin Hamad al-Fahd issued a fatwa justifying the per-missibility of WMD primarily on the basis of reci-procity—that is, the behavior of the United Statesagainst Muslims warrants the use of WMD. Argu -ments favoring the acquisition of nuclear weap onsare not unique to the radical margins of the Islamistmovement, however. Many more mainstream Mus -lim voices express the view that, as long as nuclearweapons are held by the enemies of the Muslims (theUnited States, Israel, or any other nation), it is theIslamic duty of all Muslim countries to acquire suchweapons. A Muslim regime that does not fulfill thisduty is a sinner and may be guilty of “corruption(fasad) on earth.”

The close affinity between the religious andthe political in Islam, combined with thereligious motivation that drives radical

Islamic organizations, makes it difficult to discernthe lines between these organizations’ political andmilitary strategies and their religious convictions.The leaders’ use of apocalyptic rhetoric to motivatetheir followers also tends to obscure their real expec-tations and practical plans. There is no doubt, how-ever, that these organizations do act on the basis per-ceived strategic priorities. In other words, “t’is mad-ness but there is a method in it.”

This study focuses on the main radical Islamistmovements and ideological trends—both Sunni andShiite. The strategic thinking of Islamist movementsis revealed in numerous essays and books, many ofwhich are distributed over the Internet. These move -ments do not form a monolithic ideological church,and there is a degree of diversity even within thosethat avow the same final goals. It is frequently dif-ficult to define the borders between them, however.One clear division does exist: the Sunni movementsare non-state movements, while radical Shiite ideol-ogy and strategy is essentially an extension of theIranian state and must be examined within the con-text of Iranian national strategy.

Much of the underlying ideology of the moreradical Sunni movements can be traced to the tenetsof such “political Islamist” movements as the Mus -lim Brotherhood (MB). The inherent logic of MBliterature leads almost inexorably, in fact, to theconclusions drawn by these radical movements. Buttheir ideology and strategy are not static; theychange with the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the

struggle they represent. Different currents divergeand converge with the emergence of new ideas thattake root in both their intended and actual con-stituencies.

The questions posed in this study relate to a widespectrum of strategic, operational and tactical issuesconnected to Islamist thought and planning: Arethere long-term strategies that transcend the goal of“defending Muslim lands” and aim at the Islami za -tion of the world? Are there comprehensive con-cepts of a future Islamic order? If so, what would bethe status of minority Muslim sects and non-Mus -lims in such an order? What will be the relationsbetween Islam and the West after the triumph of theformer? How do these movements view the stagestoward strategic goals and interim goals? Is thereevidence of operational thinking for managing theconflict with the “infidel” West that draws on stra -tegic perceptions? How does such thinking affectthe prioritization of theaters and targets, the will-ingness to enter into coalitions, and the choice ofweapons (particularly WMD)? Finally, is there evi-dence that these various strategies are converginginto a common Islamist strategy accepted by a widerange of the radical movements?

This project involved a large number of experts inIsrael and the United States who participated in aseries of round tables and discussions (see AppendixA). This summary—which is, of necessity, limited inits scope and the material it deals with—draws onthese discussions and the papers that were submit-ted. It does not, however, necessarily reflect the viewsof all the participants, and the final conclusions arethe responsibility of the project leader alone.


Introduction

Radical Islamist literature discusses impor-tant strategic issues and plays a key role incrystallizing the strategies of radical organ-

izations that share its ideology. Strategic thought isnot easy to identify, however, as it is often embed-ded in religious and philosophical discourse thatseems to have little to do with practical strategicplanning. Given that the texts, both Sunni and Shi -ite, are written by senior religious authorities ratherthan by military strategists, it is not surprising thatseparating the theological and political sources ofIslamist strategy is nearly impossible. In the eyes ofthe Islamist, of course, such a distinction is artificialin any case, as political action merely reflects thewill of Allah and provides divinely sanctioned“tests” for His believers.

In the strategic writings of the different move-ments, one may distinguish three levels of agree-ment and diversity:

1. The sources of their strategic vision are basicallycommon to all Islamist movements—Sunni andShiite alike. All (including the “mainstream” Mus -lim Brotherhood movements) rely exclusively onIslamic sources to provide guidelines in social, polit-ical and strategic matters; all reject Western valuesand cultural innovations; and all view the West as acontaminating force that must be opposed.

2. The strategies for implementing their goals dif-fer greatly. Despite the consensus regarding the pri-macy of Islamic sources in determining politicalmatters, the interpretation of those sources varies.

Thus the Muslim Brotherhood has turned to politi-cal activism, Hizb ut-Tahrir focuses on the restora-tion of the Caliphate, and traditional Salafi-Wah -habi groups emphasize the back-channel influenceof clerics over the regime. Meanwhile, the samevision of political Islamization led Khomeini toinvent a system based on handing over total tempo-ral power to Shiite clerics.

3. Tactical local responses demonstrate that specif-ic circumstances often have the upper hand in dic-tating modes of action and thinking. Such diversitybecomes even more pronounced among differentgeographic regions.

The common ideological Weltanschauung does notreduce the political flexibility of the Islamist move-ments in different theaters. While the shared Islamictradition gives rise to similar phenomena in differ-ent countries and regions, other factors—leader-ship, local traditions and collective identities, theidentity and strength of the enemy, means availablefor the Islamists, and targets—foster variations instrategy. This diversity hampers organizational uni-formity. Islamist organizations have not yet beenable to form an “Islamist International,” do noteven aspire to do so, and do not debate the issueseriously. Even the International Organization ofthe Muslim Brotherhood, the MB’s long-standingforum that purports to represent the “world move-ment” of the Brotherhood, has little or no influenceon the policies of the national MB movements.

One conclusion from reading the texts of the var-


Sources of Islamist Strategic ThoughtThe “Pillars” of Islamist Strategy

ious movements is that the more “conservative” andless “radical” a movement is, the greater diversitythere is among its branches and ideologues. The rad-ical worldview tends, conversely, to be much moreuniform and less adaptable. The diversity that char-acterizes the MB and its offshoots, for instance,seems to derive primarily from its core self-image:The Brotherhood views itself as a political-socialmovement with a strong survival instinct; this dic-tates that each branch adopt a realpolitik attitudeand adapt to its particular social and political envi-ronment. The salafi-jihadi movements, on the otherhand, tend to be more similar to one another in theirreading of the strategic situation and their practicalconclusions regarding the struggle. This may be at -tri buted to the powerful influence of a limited num-ber of strategic thinkers—most coming, either bybirth or education, from Saudi Arabia or Egypt—onthe rank and file of the jihadi movement.

An analysis of the literature leads to the identifi-cation of six “pillars” of strategic thinking that ap -pear, to some degree, in most Islamist writing: thereligious-“legalistic” pillar that focuses on Allah’scommandments to Muslims regarding “infidels”and jihad; the apocalyptic pillar that addresses thebelief in the link between jihad and the impending“end of days”; the political pillar that analyzes, inquasi-secular terms, the political balance of powerbetween Muslims and their enemies, and providesthe basis for setting strategic and operative priori-ties; the military pillar that assesses targets andopportunities; the pillar of jihad; and the pillar ofmartyrdom.

The Religious Pillar

The strategies of the Islamist movements have abroad common denominator in the unambigu-

ous insistence that all decisions—religious, politicaland military—be directly derived from the sourcesof the Quran, the Hadith and sharia rulings. This

shared assumption that every modern situation canbe judged by analogy to the rulings and behavior ofthe Prophet creates a basis for debate among all thedifferent Islamist movements—a debate that can befound, either overtly or between the lines, in theirwritings.

These writings reflect identical concerns with theconditions under which a defensive jihad is in forceand the implications regarding the duty of Muslimsto take part in it. Most never question the legitima-cy or relevance of the foundational Islamic texts tothe modern struggle; rather, they focus on the her -meneutics of those texts and the courses of actionthat should be derived from them. Sunni and ShiiteIslamists alike subordinate their strategic planningto the legal rulings of the scholars/clerics who eitherlead the organizations or support the leaders. Theissues brought before these scholars for final judg-ment include, among others: the very definition,current implementation, and area of application ofthe state of jihad; who must participate in jihad,and how; the jihad’s rules of engagement; how jihadshould be funded; and the behavior of a Muslimtoward the kuffar (infidel).

All Sunni and Shiite Islamist movements holdthat, because of the divine nature of their sources ofthought, the room for independent interpretationand adaptation to modern reality is narrow andmar ginal. Where it does exist, moreover, it must bederived from the way of life and customs of theIslamic patriarchs (al-salaf al-salih). The Sunnis alsoturn to the Prophet’s “companions” (al-Sahaba) forguidance, while the Shiites (who reject some of thecompanions) look to the imams descended from Aliibn Abu-Talib. By basing all ideas, concepts andreligious rulings on citations from the Quran or theHadith, this literature contends that its judgmentsare sanctified—in essence the word of the livingGod —and therefore binding in individual, socialand political spheres. Applying its rulings is a sacredduty, and deviating from them may bring about adeclaration that the deviate individual or regime is



apostate, having abandoned the Muslim communi-ty, and is therefore deserving of death. This inflexi-ble and uncompromising religious approach haswon many adherents, totally loyal people who obeyany order or religious ruling, especially one callingfor jihad and self-sacrifice in the service of jihad.

Sunni Movements

The Sunni movements are all inspired by the samereligious commentators: medieval auth orities, suchas Ibn Taymiyya, and more recent intellectuals andleaders who have written since the early 1980s.Their principles are, in essence, well expressed bythe original slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood—“Al-Islam huwa al-hall” (“Islam is the solution”).This slogan was first formulated to help mobilizethe masses for revolution within Arab countries, butit broadened into a concept that included the polit-ical struggle with the West, both within and outsideof Muslim lands.

The struggle of the “Afghan Arabs” to liberatetheir country from Soviet occupation in the 1980s,for instance, was not seen as merely a military strug-gle. It was viewed as a divinely ordained crucible inwhich the Muslim mujahidin forged the jihadmove ment and enriched the doctrine of jihad. God’sapparent hand in the victory had wide-rangingimplications for Islamists. The strategy that devel-oped in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal fromAfghanistan was based first and foremost on reli-gious grounds.

The same outlook continues today in the battleover the fate of Iraq, which fuels jihad strategy. Thetheater of the Iraqi jihad has even greater signifi-cance, however, because—in the parlance of thejihadist movements—it takes place in the “heart ofthe Muslim world,” in the land of the Caliphs, andin close proximity to the holy land of the Hijaz.This location means that the jihad is nearing thefulfillment of its primary objective: liberation of theholy land from infidel control. This fires the imag-

ination of potential mujahidin and reinforces thereligious dimension of the struggle.

Shiite Radicalism

The forging of the strategy of modern Shiite radical-ism bears some similarities to the evolution of Sunnistrategy. The crucible of Shiite radicalism was notAfghanistan and the USSR, however, but rather theIslamic revolution that overthrew the Shah’sregime —and, by extension, achieved victory overthe United States as well. The sense of intoxicationfelt by the Afghani mujahidin when they defeatedthe Soviets is analogous to the sense of immunitythat Khomeini expressed when he said, after therevolution, “America cannot do a damn thing.” InIran, though, this sense of immunity was temperedby the burden of preserving the nation’s interestsand by the suffering incurred during the Iran-Iraqwar.

The differences in religious principles betweenSunnis and Shiites affected the development of thetwo movements. Whereas Sunni doctrines draw ona tradition of supremacy, Shiite doctrines reflect thestatus of the Shiites as the “oppressed upon earth”and an ingrained need to incorporate realistic andpragmatic considerations of “public interest”(maslaha) in their political and strategic thought.The guiding principles of the radical Shiite move-ments are also much clearer than those of theirSunni counterparts because they all stem from thework of Ayatollah Khomeini and accept his doc-trine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamicjurists). The national strategic interests of Iran areprojected, by extension, into the strategic thoughtof almost all Shiite radical movements—fromHezbollah in Lebanon to the Mahdi Army in Iraq.

The Iranian ideology of sudur inqilab (export ofrevolution) promotes pan-Islamism. The Iranianrev ol ution did not portray itself to the Muslimworld as a “Shiite” revolution, but as an Islamicrevolution for Muslims throughout the world. This

inclusive attitude was a feature of Khomeini’sthought even before the revolution and was evidentin countless documents and speeches. Khomeinidid not restrict his revolutionary vision to a re-Is -lamiz ation of the Muslim Umma, but saw in Iran’sIslamic regime a means of spearheading the spreadof Islam to the “oppressed peoples” around theworld.

The regime’s general Islamic frame of referenceunderscores its belief in the universalism of its revo-lutionary mission. This ideology has motivated var-ious arms of the state to forge alliances against the“world arrogance” of the United States, not onlywith groups and states most ideologically compati-ble with Iran, but also with any entity that consid-ers the United States to be a nemesis. The “Islam”that the Iranian regime markets to Sunnis in CentralAsia, Southeast Asia and Africa, consequently, is a“neo-Shiite,” ecumenical Islam (‘Shia-lite’) designedto be palatable to all Muslims—Arabs and non-Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites—and through which evensuch heterodox sects as the Alawites are to bebrought back into the fold. This Islamic model high-lights the Shiite self-image as being the “faith of theoppressed” as opposed to the corrupted Islam of theGulf Arabs who are linked to the “oppressor.”

The Apocalyptic Pillar

Sunni Movements

Since September 11, apocalyptic interpretationsof current world events have exploded. The

“glorious raids” of September 11 and the subse-quent American occupation of Afghanistan andIraq have been subsequently viewed as “signs” ofthe imminent apocalypse (ashrat al-sa’a). These joinother omens that had previously foretold—such asthe spread and increase of licentiousness, prostitu-tion, alcohol consumption and killing. According tothis view, the world is now in the last of a series of

stages that the Umma had to endure and aboutwhich the Prophet spoke. Though Muslims current-ly live in conspicuous inferiority to the infidels, thetriumph of Islam is ultimately assured. Islam willtriumph both through spiritual ascendancy over allthat is “un-Islam” and through military victory (byjihad) over the entire world, which will then becomedar al-Islam (land of Islam). Because the “end ofdays” is conditional on these victories, jihad cannotbe open to any compromise and will continue untilthe “day of judgment.”

According to jihadi writings, the clash betweenIslam and the “crusading West” is not limited to thepresent dimension; it began between the two sideswith the birth of Islam and is destined to continueuntil the eschatological events at the “end of days.”This apocalyptic pillar of Islamist strategy is not asevident or prevalent as the religious-juristic pillar,but it has played a major role in Islamic movementsas far back as the nineteenth-century campaign ofthe self-proclaimed Mahdi (the “rightly guidedone,” the Muslim savior) in Sudan. It was also aprominent feature of the 1979 attack on the greatmosque in Mecca by Juhayman al-Utaybi and theself-styled Mahdi Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani. More recently, jihadi doctrines have tend-ed to incorporate eschatological elements by citingsigns relating to the “last day” (al-yawm al-akhir oryawm al-qiyama) and linking them to contempo-rary events.

In this context, the jihadi movement identifiesitself with the elected group that merits the grace ofAllah (al-ta’ifa al-mansura). The extensive literatureon al-ta’ifa al-mansura creates a mystical auraaround it: this group begins with the Sahaba andcontinues to exist—explicitly at times, implicitly atothers—until the “day of resurrection” (yawm al-qiyama). It possesses superior qualities and isimmune to evil. The fact that this vanguard has nowsurfaced and is being identified with jihadi andmujahidin groups indicates that we are now livingin a period of omens presaging the “day of judg-


ment” at the “end of days.” Al-ta’ifa al-mansura isexpected, according to eschatological predictions,to achieve military victory over its enemies andimplement the ideal of Islam on earth. The maintheater in which al-ta’ifa al-mansura will operate isal-Sham (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and theSinai), later moving on to the Arabian Peninsulaand continuing to operate until it fulfills its role.The Mahdi will join forces with al-ta’ifa al-mansurato conquer the land of Sham (Syria-Lebanon-Pales -tine) and then, together with Jesus, will fight theanti-Christ (al-masih al-dajjal). In some writings,this stage of the apocalypse is followed by a cata-clysm—which resembles a nuclear holocaust insome descriptions—after which chaos will prevailand usher in the era of the Quran’s cosmic verses(Sura 41). Cosmic phenomena will occur. On thesame day the “beast” (al-dabba) will depart fromthe land (Sura 27:82) and the “day of resurrection”will soon follow.

This apocalyptic vision might appear to be insome tension with the strategic emphasis on thecon stant shifts and temporary setbacks in Islam’stactical situation. In fact, however, the two ap -proach es complement each other. The salafi-jihadiintellectuals are clearly interested in focusing on thecurrent dimension of the clash, both to reinforce theranks of their followers and to encourage theirattacks on the West. At the same time, the apocalyp-tic message plays an important role in bolstering themorale of the mujahidin by assuring them that, ulti-mately, victory is guaranteed.

While apocalyptic ideas are more prevalent in thejihadi literature, they can also be found in “main-stream” Islamist movements such as the MB. SheikhYusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, wrote that “thesigns of salvation are absolute, numerous, and asplain as day, indicating that the future belongs toIslam and that Allah’s religion will defeat all otherreligions… the conquest of Rome and the spread ofIslam till it includes all that is in night and day… prel-ude to the return of the Caliphate.”1 The West, the


While apocalyptic ideas are

more prevalent in the jihadi

literature, they can also be

found in “mainstream”

Islamist movements such

as the MB. Sheikh Yusuf

al-Qaradawi, for example,

wrote that “the signs of

salvation are absolute,

numerous, and as plain as

day, indicating that the

future belongs to Islam and

that Allah’s religion will

defeat all other religions.”

United States, and Israel are likened to the ancienttribes of Ad and Thamud, which rejected Moham -med’s message and were therefore annihilated, andto Pharaoh’s Egypt, to which Allah sent a series ofplagues, finally drowning its troops in the sea.2

Shiite Radicalism

Much attention has lately focused on the apocalyp-tic dimension of Shiite radicalism. Since Khomeini’sdeath, Iran has witnessed a revival of interest in,and an eagerness for the return of, the Mahdi.Statements and actions by the incumbent presidentof Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, indicate that atleast he and his close affiliates are motivated by aMahdivist vision of the world as being on thethreshold of the “end of days”—and by a desire toexpedite the reappearance of the Hidden Imam.Guided by this vision, such people may not bedeterred from actions that might even precipitate anuclear war.

This strand of thought is the exception ratherthan the rule in Shiite religious history, however, andis foreign to the Khomeini doctrine that rules Iran.This doctrine holds that the Hidden Imam (who has,according to tradition, been in occultation since 873)will not return until the end of history, which effec-tively neutralizes apocalyptic Mahdivism. Histor -ically, Shiite leaders have been among the most anti-messianic of Muslims and have consistently ostra-cized messianic movements. From the burning ofmedieval gullets to the execution of nineteenth-cen-tury Babis and the persecution of the Bahais, Shiiteorthodoxy has been extremely effective in puttingdown Mahdist movements. It should be noted, how-ever, that all these cases concerned those claiming tobe intermediaries between the community and theImam—and thus also claiming the mantle ofProphecy. Unaffected by such purges has been anabiding undercurrent of belief that the Imam is nottotally incommunicado and that it might be possiblefor his devotees to “hasten” his reappearance. Today

this belief surfaces in writings associated with theIranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG), though it is un -clear to what extent or in what ways it informs IRGstrategy.

Acting as a countervailing force, the jurists ofShiite Islam continue to play a pivotal role in dis-couraging messianic enthusiasm, which they havedone since becoming an anchor of religious stabili-ty in the Middle Ages. This Shiite clerical establish-ment based its authority on the occultation of theImam and the absence of any person who couldclaim to serve as a conduit for communication withhim. Over the centuries these clerics (ulama) suc-ceeded in suppressing any who dared call for “has-tening” the reappearance of the Imam or claimeddirect communication with him. Traditional Shiitedoctrine based itself, not on direct revelation, buton inferences drawn about the will of the Imamthrough erudite readings and regulated exegesis ofsacred texts by only highly initiated mujahidin.Even Khomeini himself did not claim to have directcommunication with the Hidden Imam. The powerof the ulama eventually paved the way for the 1979Islamic revolution, and at least its “old guard” be -lieves that the revolution’s future is contingent onkeeping the Imam in total occultation. In this light,Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on the imminent reappear-ance of the Mahdi is quite foreign, even to the rad-ical doctrines of revolutionary Iran.

All in all, it is not clear how strong the Mahdivistdoctrine that Ahmadinejad represents is and partic-ularly what hold it has over the RevolutionaryGuard or the most influential schools in Qom. Buteven without an apocalyptic component, the“romance” of martyrdom may threaten Iranianpragmatism. In Shiite lore, martyrdom tends to beidentified with the Imam Hussein, the “prince ofmartyrs.” His death is perceived as the antithesis ofrealpolitik and the triumph of moral values over theegotistic wish for life. This belief, in addition to thebelief in Mahdivism, has a real destabilizing poten-tial in case of a nuclear impasse.


The Political Pillar

The political pillar of Islamist strategy is evidentin both Sunni and Shiite writings, which show

a strong sense of realpolitik and an understandingof the current balance of power. Sunni and Shiite(mainly Iranian) strategists offer detailed analyses ofthe “enemy” and the enemy’s alliances, strengthsand weaknesses. These analyses form the basis forthe Islamist discussion of appropriate targets forattack, terrorism and general policy toward differ-ent parties.

The priority given to concentrating the militaryand cultural effort against one enemy or anothervaries according to global circumstances and exist-ing opportunities, and results from both strategiccalculations and existing opportunities. The Sept -ember 11 terror attacks against the World TradeCenter, for example, were carried out after opera-tional difficulties in waging war against the “inter-nal enemy” i.e., (…) forced a shift in focus to the“external enemy,” i.e., (…) which was perceived asan attractive and unprepared target. At the sametime, evidence suggests another contributing fac-tor—the assessment that such an attack would helpprecipitate wide support for the jihad movementwithin the Muslim world.

The Military Pillar

Islamist writings are replete with military analy-ses of the pros and cons of various courses of

action. This can be clearly seen in discussions aboutthe acquisition of WMD and the advantages anddisadvantages of suicide attacks. (This aspect is ad -dressed in the subsequent section on operationalthinking.)

The distinction between the “gradualist” MBmovements and the salafi-jihadi groups is particu-larly apparent in their attitudes toward the military

pillar. The debate about the religious legitimacy andpolitical wisdom of suicide attacks, which tookplace some time before and after 9/11, was won bythose who favored them. But the different move-ments, and even elements within each movement,continue to debate three main issues: the legitimacyof killing other Muslims in the course of a jihad(tatarrus); the legitimacy of killing non-Muslims inMuslim countries outside of the theater of jihad (theissue of a “protected alien” or musta’min) and jus-tification of terrorist attacks in the West proper.While much of the debate over these issues iscouched in juristic terms, pragmatic military calcu-lation deeply informs religious arguments.

The Pillar of Jihad

A key element of consensus in the strategic dis-course of the different Islamist movements is

the role of jihad, which is similar in both its Sunniand Shiite manifestations. The casus belli and lead-ership of jihad, however, are different.

Sunni Movements

The salafi-jihadi strategic thinking that focuses onjihad and martyrdom as the primary means ofachieving Islamist goals can be found in the ideol-ogy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ideologues of allcamps distinguish between a “defensive jihad”(jihad al-daf’ or jihad al-difa’) for liberating Mus -lims from the threat or occupation of infidels, andan “initiated jihad” (jihad al-talab wa-al-ibtida)“until religion [in the world] is Allah’s” (Sura2:193). The former is incumbent on every ableMus lim man, woman and even child of the coun-try under occupation, and it has precedence overother duties (fara’id). The latter, on the other hand,is deferred until the Muslim Umma is unified undera leader and is, in essence, a collective rather thanindividual duty. It is noteworthy that there is no


clear reference to this distinction in classicalsources, and its modern usage is generally attributedto the writings of Sheikh Abdallah Azzam in light ofthe Afghan jihad. Even classical Wahhabi ideologydoes not distinguish between these two forms ofjihad, and today’s jihadists clearly deviate from theoriginal Wahhabi doctrine, which gives the imam(the king) rather than religious clerics the power tocall for jihad. All Islamist movements—Sunni andShiite alike—agree that, under the current circum-stances, the defensive military jihad (jihad for thesake of Allah or jihad fi sabil Allah) is a personalduty (fard ‘ayn).

Few movements, however, have dealt with theissue of offensive jihad in depth. Azzam, the proph -et of the jihad doctrine, and intellectuals that fol-lowed him have pointed out that jihad will ultimate-ly continue until the rule of Islam is achieved overdar al-harb, the Islamic Caliphate is reestablished,and the word of Allah is supreme throughout theworld. Lately, some al-Qaeda-oriented books havereiterated that the final goal is the Isl am ization ofthe entire world. Most Islamist movements, how-ever, shy away from this subject—though a sense ofvictory in Iraq might fuel a desire to widen the scopeof the goals to include an initiated or offensivejihad.

The current MB position is that, while defensivejihad to liberate occupied Muslim lands is an indi-vidual religious duty, offensive jihad is not current-ly in effect. Sheikh al-Qaradawi stated clearly after9/11 that “we” are not in the stage of jihad al-talab,but in a defensive jihad. Jihad al-talab, he said, cantake place only when there is an Islamic Caliphate.Similarly, the eminent Tunisian Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannushi has asserted that jihad is designed onlyto repulse aggression against the Umma and not, atthis stage, as a means of forcing Islam on mankind.Ghannushi also rejects the legal argument used byal-Qaeda to justify attacks on civilians in Westerncountries—namely, the principle of reciprocity (al-mu’amala bi-al-mithl) for what Western govern-


Lately, some al-Qaeda-

oriented books have

reiterated that the final

goal is the Isl am ization

of the entire world. Most

Islamist movements, how-

ever, shy away from this

subject—though a sense of

victory in Iraq might fuel

a desire to widen the scope

of the goals to include an

initiated or offensive jihad.

ments do to Muslim peoples. He argues that thiscontradicts the Islamic principles of punishment,which forbid punishing a person for a wrong com-mitted by another.

In the parlance of the jihadist movement, then,jihad at the present stage of the conflict is primarilya means of defense against the enemies of Islam, butit will eventually evolve into a strategy for attack.Jihad is not merely a “necessary evil,” however; it isalso an aim in itself. Prominent in Islamist literatureis the elevation of jihad to the status of an obliga-tion, with only the principle of faith in God held asbeing loftier.

The ideological and practical debate among thedifferent Islamist movements on this subject seemsto be over what conditions “trigger” jihad andwhether or not conditions exist that may bring it toan end (or to a “ceasefire” or hudna). Because thedefinition of defense has been extended in Islamistthought (as far back as Sayyid Qutb) to include, notonly actual military occupation of a Muslim land(e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Palestine),but also “spiritual” or economic occupation—inthe form of Western clothing, businesses, media andso on—the concept of defensive jihad is also ex -panding. It no longer seems restricted to a war thatcomes to an end once the “infidel” military occupa-tion comes to an end. Many salafi-jihadi groupsconsider such Muslim regimes as Egypt, SaudiArabia and Jordan to be “apostate” or “here tic”(takfir) and, therefore, equivalent to being “occu-pied”—a state that necessitates defensive jihad inthose countries. This is where salafi-jihadi groupsostensibly part company with the Muslim Brother -hood, which does not accept the ruling of takfiragainst incumbent regimes (and therefore does notconsider them as a legitimate target of jihad). TheMB does, however, accept the principle that jihad isan individual duty when Muslims come under at -tack, which is a guiding concept in salafi-jihadistrategic thinking. However, by accepting the prin-ciple that Muslims under attack or occupation

causes the jihad to become an individual duty forMuslims, the MB endorses the underlying princi-ples that guide the strategic view of the salafi-jihadimovement. Since the Muslims of the above-men-tioned “occupied” lands (not to mention the occu-pation of Spain—“Andalus”) have not repelled the“infidel occupiers,” the MB interpretation leads tothe same conclusion of al-Qaeda: that jihad has be -come a personal obligation for all Muslims throug -hout the world.

Distinctions between defensive and initiatedjihad within Islamist strategic thinking are furtherblurred by the fact that both types employ the sameweapons and means. The texts dealing with defen-sive jihad debate whether to regard all citizens ofthe “occupying power” as “combatants” (ahl al-qital) and whether attacks (“raids” or ghazawat)outside the borders of the “invaded” Muslim coun-try are religiously justified. The Egyptian MB’s dif-fering positions on the terrorist attacks in Sinai areillustrative, as the attacks could be seen as directedagainst Israel, Westerners, or the Egyptian regimeand were carried out by the takfiri group Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad. The MB did not condemn theattack on Taba (October 2004). Noting that it wasdirected against Israelis (“tourist occupiers”), theMB called it a defensive jihad because it was res -ponding to the “atrocities” of Israel in Palestine andof the United States in Iraq. In his reaction to thenext attack, on Sharm al-Sheikh (July 23, 2005),the Egyptian MB General Guide, Muham madMahdi Akif, remarked that the aggression and warsperpetrated by global imperialism against theworld’s peoples gave birth to the culture of violenceand terrorism, but he also condemned the attack,saying that it contradicted religion and religiouslaw. Akif’s response to the April 24, 2006 attack onDhahab repeated this condemnation but withoutany expression of sympathy for the terrorists’ moti-vation, probably because most of the victims wereEgyptians and it was clearly directed at the state.Unlike Taba, the Sharm al-Sheikh and Dhahab


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bombings were called “terrorist operations”(‘amaliat irhabiyya) in MB publications.

Shiite Radicalism

The Shiite concept of jihad differs from the Sunnisalafi-jihadi concept in two main areas: the causesand goals of jihad—the “threats” toward Islam thatwarrant jihad—and the leadership of jihad.

In Shiite doctrine, as manifested in Iran and itsproxies (Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shiitemovements), jihad is not simply a means of obtain-ing a political objective. It is a pillar of faith, ameans of testing the belief of a Muslim by puttinghim through trials and tribulations similar to thoseendured by the imams Ali and Hussein. It is thepath toward achieving unity with Allah’s will; itserves the interests of the believers and, in doing so,fulfills the Islamic obligation to serve the communi-ty (over and above the individual); and it “pays,” asit will be rewarded in this world by Allah, who willgive the believers victory.3 Because Shiite thoughtholds that initiated jihad must await the reappear-ance of the Hidden Imam, any current militaryjihad is defined as defensive and seen as a duty. Onthis last point, the Shiite concept corresponds to theSunni salafi-jihadi one.

In contrast to the Sunni salafi-jihadi view, how-ever, Shiite Islamists do not sanction jihad that is aspontaneous defense of the homeland. Defensivejihad requires a decision that can be made only bythe “ruler-jurisprudent”(vali faqih). He alone hasthe ability to weigh all the considerations and theauthority to decide whether or not the jihad shouldproceed. The vali faqih may also “suspend” jihad(for example, Iran’s jihad against Iraq during theIraq-Iran war) on the basis of realpolitik and the“public interest” (maslaha) of the (Iranian) people.The leaders of Iran’s proxy organizations, more-over, are subordinate to the vali faqih, who is Iran’sSupreme Leader Ali Khamenei; they must turn toand defer to him, as they do not have the authority

themselves to determine the public good.4 Kha men -ei’s understanding of the public interest is not, ofcourse, necessarily congruent with the interests ofLebanon, or Iraq in general, or the Shiites of Leb -anon or Iraq, or even of Hezbollah or the Mah di’sArmy as organizations. He takes into account thewider context of the conflict between Islam (or atleast Shiite Islam) and the West—and implicitlygives primacy to Iran’s interests over all others.5 Theproxy movements are expected to be willing to risklosses of their own for the greater good as definedby Iran. This principle may be relevant at a timewhen Hezbollah sees itself as waging a war in theframework of a larger confrontation between theUnited States and Israel on one side and Iran andMuslims on the other.

The fact that the Shiite jihad requires state lead-ership does not prevent maneuvers that mightencourage a declaration of jihad, nor does it preventpreparations for future jihad while actual fighting isin abeyance. Such preparations include “patienceand steadfastness” (sabr wa-sumud), training (tad -rib), self-education and the “jihad of construction”(jihad al-binaa’)—building the infrastructure neces-sary for the future jihad. Jihad is also described asplaying a societal role because its very nature—i.e.,the willingness of the individual to sacrifice him-self—demonstrates dedication to the preeminentneeds of society: religious piety, independence andprotection of the homeland against the avarice ofthe infidel imperialists, and the struggle to abolishoppression.6

The Pillar of Martyrdom

Sunni Movements

Salafi-jihadi beliefs sanctify self-sacrifice for Allah(istishhad) and perceive it as deriving from the

duty of jihad. Such self-sacrifice brings with it a sig-nificant reward: the assurance of reaching the next

{18] Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

world, or paradise. Only the Islamic faith itself isloftier than jihad and self-sacrifice, and fulfillingthese two commandments earns the greatest rewardpossible. Though state-run Muslim religious estab-lishments refute al-Qaeda’s idea of istishhad, al-Qaeda is nonetheless attempting to globalize its ver-sion. Today this idea has become al-Qaeda’s princi-pal weapon in the battle for Iraq, and more recent-ly it began using it in the Maghreb.

The salafi-jihadi movement has inherited fromthe MB the ideal of martyrdom (shahada), not as anecessary evil but as “a consummation devoutly tobe wished.” Hassan al-Banna even argued thatjihad was the second pillar of faith after the testimo-ny of faith that “there is no God but Allah andMohammed is His messenger.” Banna also quotedthe Hadith, “He who dies and has not fought, andwas not resolved to fight, has died a jahiliyya (igno-rant) death.”7 Martyrdom is central to jihad. Allahgrants a “noble life” only to a nation that “knowshow to die a noble death.”8 Death is an art (al-mawt fann), and Muslims are obliged to prefer itover life if they desire victory.9 This tenet of the MBmakes it difficult to draw a sharp distinctionbetween it and salafi-jihadi beliefs regarding suchissues as suicide attacks.

Shiite Radicalism

Radical Shiite ideological texts (mainly Hezbollahtexts written in Iran) attest to the centrality of jihadas a “doctrine and a program of action” throughwhich a Muslim may “sacrifice his life for the sakeof Allah and attain paradise.” Martyrdom “forAllah’s sake” (shahada) is not a necessary evil butthe greatest reward accorded to a mujahid and isthe pinnacle of jihad. Hezbollah documents quote asaying attributed to Imam Ali (the fourth Caliphand founder of the Shi’a): “Jihad is one of the gate-ways to paradise, which Allah has opened unto Hismost loyal believers [only].” Hezbollah’s role mod-els are the imams Ali and Hussein, who went into

battle knowing they were heavily outnumbered andthat they were going to become martyred. Hez -bollah itself is dedicated to that principle, therefore,and portrays itself as embodying self-sacrifice and awillingness to ignore all “pragmatic” considerationsout of commitment to Allah.10 The mujahid deriveshis power from his “revolutionary sentiment”; hechallenges rather than succumbs to deprivation.This is the secret of Islam’s victories throughout theages.11 Hezbollah’s slogan—“For verily Hezbollah[the Party of Allah] will overcome”12—relates spec -ifically to the organization’s dauntlessness in itswaging of jihad.

Key Movements andThinkers

Sunni Ideologues

The Sunni Islamist movements all base their ide-ology on that of the Muslim Brotherhood

and/or the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Pen -insula. This ideology interprets Muslim history as aprocess of deterioration, particularly since thebeginning of the twentieth century and after theabolition of the Caliphate. The infiltration of West -ern mores and culture is largely to blame for this sit-uation.

The literary sources of Islamist strategic thinkingare readily available on the Internet and in book-stores across the Muslim world. The discussion ofstrategic issues is most evident in the writings of“mainstream” Islamist movements, which have “re -search centers” that perform strategic research(such as those affiliated with the Muslim Brother -hood in Egypt). The Muslim Brotherhood is an ide-ological movement that encompasses a number oforganizations in different Arab countries (mainlyEgypt, Jordan, Syria, Sudan and Palestine, where itis known as Hamas) with offshoots in other coun-


tries, including ones in the West. The principal auth -ors of these strategic writings are such prominentclerics as Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt/Qatar),Hasan al-Turabi (Sudan), Sheikh Rashid Ghannushi(Tunisia/London) and Tariq Ramadan.

The world jihad movement led by al-Qaeda hasbeen particularly prolific in developing a corpus ofstrategic thinking. While this corpus is not con-tained in any one consensual document, remaininghidden instead in different treatises, it advancesmany common ideas. The literature focuses on thedefinition and nature of the enemy, the relationsbetween Islam and the outside world, the move-ment’s ultimate aims, and the ways and means ofattaining those aims. It also discusses apocalypticideas, implying or even explicitly stating that thepresent era is approaching the end of days—the pre-ordained time of redemption and victory overIslam’s enemies. In any event, it calls on Muslims tospurn indifference and take the destiny of theUmma into their own hands by fulfilling the divinemission of local and global jihad in which Allah haspromised victory.

Some of the prominent strategists in this arenaare Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Suri, AbuMusab al-Najdi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abu Mu -ham mad al-Maqdisi, Fares Ahmad al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani (Abu Jandal al-Azdi), Nasser bin Hamadal-Fahd, Ali al-Hamid, and the late Yusuf al-Ayiri.Their writing focuses on methods for re-Islamizingthe Muslim world (the jihad against “apostate”regimes), the milestones toward victory over the“infidel” West, and the strategic goals of theIslamist movement—including the model for thefuture order of the Islamic world after this victory(e.g., the Caliphate model). Other authors affiliatedwith al-Qaeda in Iraq (such as Abu AbdallahAhmad al-Imran al-Najdi and Abu Muhammad al-Hilali) deal directly with the strategy in Iraq.Arguably the most authoritative, if not the best-for-mulated strategy can be found in the writings of al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Another Sunni movement with prolific writingson strategic goals, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in CentralAsia, adds another element to the Muslim Brother -hood and salafi-jihadi strains of thought. HT strate-gic writing is far more detailed and elaborate thanthat produced by either MB or salafi-jihadi thinkersin its description of the envisioned Islamic regime.The movement’s founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani,created a “constitution” for the Caliphate as farback as the 1950s, and the party continues to pres-ent a comprehensive world view and strategy.13

Shiite Ideologues

As noted above, Shiite strategy—the Iranian doc-trine of “export of the revolution”—stems primari-ly from the writings and statements of the AyatollahRouhollah Khomeini. Many years before the estab-lishment of the Islamic Republic in Tehran, Kho -meini expounded his main views in his book Huk -umat-I Islami va Velayat-i Faqih (Islamic Gov -ernance). This book called on the clergy to takeupon themselves, not only spiritual authority, butalso political power—the basis of the principle ofvelayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurists).

The “Mahdist” doctrine can be found in much-less-definitive texts: sermons of certain clerics, somewritings of a scattering of ayatollahs, and the ram-blings of the present Iranian president, MahmudAhmadinejad, who is neither an ideologue nor ascholar. Some apocalyptic writings that focus onhastening the reappearance of the Hidden Imam areassociated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Identification of the Enemy

The perception and definition of the enemy, thelaws governing war against the enemy, and the

rationale—be it defensive, deterrent or initiated—for that war are pivotal components of Islamiststrategy. The growing salafi-jihadi tendency to


include Shiites in the category of “enemy,” in boththeory and operational behavior, makes it difficultto draw a common picture for Sunni and Shiitemovements. In general, however, all Islamist move-ments hold that the enemy is comprised of bothlocal and external entities that are either overtly orsecretly allied with one another.

Sunni Movements

In Sunni jihadist thought, there are two concentricand interrelated enemy circles. The local, inner cir-cle consists of the Arab and Islamic regimes, “theapostates who have abandoned Islam” (murtad-dun), and the Shiites (the “turncoats” or rafidi). Theouter circle is the domain of the “infidels”(kuffar)—the “Crusaders” (i.e., the West) and theJews (Zionists).

The two circles are, as noted, inexorably linked.The former are the “agents” of the latter in theMuslim Umma, and the latter are the strategic hin-terland of the former. The enemy is assessed in reli-gious terms and presented as analogous to theenemy fought by the Prophet Mohammed. The ene-mies are not new, therefore, but the same as thosethe Prophet confronted since the inception of Islam:the infidels without and the apostate traitors with-in. These latter may be “natural apostates” (mur-tadd fitri, a born Muslim who has left Islam) or“local apostates” (murtadd milli, a Muslim convertwho has recanted and abandoned Islam). Theenemy is amorphous but persistent—in its world-view, its nature as “corrupter of the faith,” itshatred of true Islam that follows the path of al-salafal-salih, and its cohesion into a single camp.

In the jihadist worldview, Islam’s war againstthese internal and external enemies is an ancient oneand central to Islamic military history. This con-frontation was at the root of the Prophet’s warsagainst the original apostates and the tribes thatabandoned Islam (the “ridda” wars). However, theconflict is not restricted to the purge of Islam from

these “apostates” who are perceived as a “fifth col-umn,” in the body politic of the Ummah; it arisesfrom a concept of the clash of civilizations that willcontinue until the end of days. This concept grantsno recognition to a world order built on interna-tional bodies, treaties, agreements and conventions.All these are worthless because civilizations are, bytheir very existence, doomed to constant warfareuntil Islam is ultimately victorious. Success in thisexistential war will uphold, not only the physicalexistence of Muslims, but also belief in the unity ofGod and its rule in the world. This Weltanschauungis tied to yet another concept: al-wala’ wa-al-bara’a,which weds an absolute belief in God with a dis-avowal of anything representing apostasy—be itidolatry or such concepts as nationalism, democra-cy and socialism that have been assimilated into Is -lam ic society from the outside world. Hence, Islam’swar is not only directed against a physical, concreteenemy, but against an ideological enemy in the formof apostasy and imported ideas.

The “enemy” in the eyes of all Sunni Islamistmovements is composed of four main groups: (1)the West, led by the United States, which embodiesand spreads an anti-Muslim Judeo-Christian politi-cal culture; (2) the Jews, Zionists and Israel, whichpromote Western concepts, anti-Muslim/anti-Arabattitudes, and conflicts initiated by the “Crusaders”;(3) “apostate” Muslim regimes and rulers; and (4)heterodox and secular or “atheistic” Muslims ingeneral. This last group includes Shiites (al-Murji’aand al-Rafida), Alawites and Kurds, and hasbecome more central in salafi-jihadi strategy discus-sions since the war in Iraq. The strategic writings ofthe different Sunni movements deal with the differ-ent goals toward each of these “enemy” groups.

The goal as regards the West is an integrated mil-itary-economic defeat. Numerous jihadi texts at -tribute the power of the West, and particularly ofthe United States, to its economic domination. Theway to end this domination is to execute attacksdesigned to severely damage the Western economy,


to drain the West’s resources by compelling it tocontinue its war on terror, and to drag the UnitedStates into a series of military “quagmires.” Suchquagmires will generate stronger anti-Americansentiment in the Muslim world and increase recruit-ment for the jihad and opposition to pro-Americanregimes. Within the jihadi camp, however, there isdebate about the legitimacy and practical benefits ofterrorist attacks in Western countries. Some think -ers, such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi, consider such at -tacks to be both illegal and ill-conceived, while oth-ers see them as an essential component of the strat-egy of jihad.

Regarding Israel, the goal is total eradication—which sometimes includes the eradication of allJews, because certain Quranic verses and Hadithssuggest that the Jews are servants of Satan (theDajjal or Anti-Christ) and their destruction wouldhasten the “last day” and the final victory of Islam.14

Most jihadi texts do not focus on the conflict withIsrael, however, and tend to see Iraq as more piv-otal. This lack of an Israeli focus is evident in theabsence of a real effort (except on the part of Ha -mas and other Palestinian and Lebanese move-ments) to attack Israeli targets. During the AfghanJihad in the 1980s, Abdallah Azzam himself wrotea justification for downgrading the strategic impor-tance of the Palestinian problem.

The strategy toward Muslim “apostate” rulers ismore contentious. On this subject, MB and salafi-jihadi thinkers are in true ideological disagreement.The former rejects the idea of declaring takfir onsuch rulers and sees conflict with strong incumbentregimes as counterproductive. But even within thesalafi camp, there are differences of opinion. Someof the salafi Sheikhs in Saudi Arabia denounced theattacks inside the Kingdom, for example, and AbuMusab al-Zarqawi’s 2005 attacks in Jordan gener-ated a heated debate and seem to have significantlysplit the Islamist camp. The MB in general (with theexception of the Syrian and Lebanese branches) dodeclare takfir against the Shiites and Alawites. And

Regarding Israel, the goal

is total eradication—which

sometimes includes the

eradication of all Jews,

because certain Quranic

verses and Hadiths suggest

that the Jews are servants

of Satan (the Dajjal or

Anti-Christ) and their

destruction would hasten

the “last day” and the

final victory of Islam.


many within the jihadi camp and al-Qaeda itselfquestion the wisdom of acting against the Shiites atthis juncture.

Shiite Radicalism

Like Sunni radicalism, the Shiite brand defines theenemy first and foremost by its link to the West. TheUnited States, Britain and Israel form an “axis ofevil” intent on toppling the Islamic regime—in col-laboration with many of its Arab neighbors. TheIranian regime sees this struggle as an existentialManichean clash between forces of light and forcesof darkness. It attributes the enmity of these coun-tries, not to Iran’s own political behavior, but totheir desire to prevent Iran from achieving its right-ful status as a regional power and to block the pathof the Islamic revolution. Ideology, rather than merepolitical or strategic concerns, motivates the UnitedStates to try to destroy the Islamic regime. TheUnited States is a demonic “Great Satan,” unham-pered by moral or international constraints, where-as Iran is the main challenger to its hegemony in theGulf and the Middle East and the foremost threat toIsrael. This situation makes Iran America’s primetarget, and no American administration would ac -cept a settlement that precluded actions against it.Any agreement with America’s European proxies(the U.K. or Germany) would, therefore, be adeception.

The Iranian (and radical Shiite) definition of the“internal enemy” is more complicated. The Iranianregime identifies this element with domestic opposi-tion and with the Mujahidin e-Khalq Organization(MKO), which has been branded as munafiqun(“hypocrites” who claimed to be Muslims in thetime of the Prophet but who then betrayed theMuslims and are hence damned to the lowest levelof hell). Iran’s tendency to downplay its Shiite iden-tity has become particularly significant in light ofthe Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq and the growinganti-Shiite sentiment in fundamentalist Sunni cir-

cles. Despite such burgeoning anti-Shiite attitudes(particularly in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia),Iran has not resorted to sectarian anti-Sunni rheto-ric. This was true as well during and after the Israel-Lebanon fighting in the summer of 2006, whichexacerbated—or at least exposed—the Sunni-Shiiterift. Rather than opening an anti-Sunni front, Iranhas instead launched a counterattack against thosewho are raising the anti-Shiite hysteria. This factunderscores both Iran’s ambition to play a leader-ship role for the entire Muslim world (includingSunnis and Arabs) and the overriding importanceits leaders accord to Iran’s national interests.15

Strategic Visions

The underlying worldview that informs mostIslamist strategic thought holds that the Umma

has been humiliated by a Western political, culturaland intellectual invasion. Its religion has been cor-rupted, its political body weakened and its socialstructure destroyed. The Umma must therefore berestored to true, pure Islam by defeating the West—the immediate enemy—both as a foreign entity andas an internal “fifth column” within Muslim lands.

This goal cannot be achieved merely by individ-ual or collective spiritual repentance. All Islamistmovements believe in the integral nature of Islam inwhich religion and the state are inseparable (din wa-dawla), and all have a vision of how to reinstateIslam in its rightful place.

Though it would seem likely that a paradigmaticconcept of leadership (Caliph, Imam) would accom-pany discussions of such long-term goals, this hasusually not been the case. One may speculate thatmodern Islamist movements have preferred to avoidthe political pitfalls inherent in the Caliphate model:Who would be the Caliph and how would he beelected and deposed? (Islamic traditions do not pro-vide a clear answer.) How would the Caliphate han-dle international relations? Would the Caliph be


obliged to support an automatic state of jihad?How would heterodox Muslims (including Shiites)and non-Muslims be treated? Would the former beconsidered apostates according to neo-Wahhabidoctrine and the latter dhimmi? What would be thepolicy toward absolute polytheists? These issues canbe treated with more latitude in a model that doesnot have a clear Islamic tradition to guide it. Thus,the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia opted forthe historic paradigm of a “Kingdom” and the Tal -iban in Afghanistan founded an “Emirate.” TheIslamic revolution in Iran never considered theCaliphate or the Emirate paradigm because Shiitedoctrine rejects usurpation of the functions of theImam, and velayat-e faqih represents an interimsubstitute until his return.

Most of the Islamist movements’ have refrained,therefore, from presenting one unique legitimateform of government for a future Islamic regime. Theyhave preferred to focus on the principles of Islamicgovernance, allowing for different forms of rule (sul-tanate, kingship, tribal inheritance, etc.) as long asthe rulers govern according to those principles.

The Islamist movements differing strategicvisions can be discerned in the different paradigmsthey present for the sturcture of the future Islamicorder. Five main paradigms are evident: (1) that ofthe “mainstream” Muslim Brotherhood, (2) that ofthe Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, (3) that of theCaliphate idea advocated by salafi-jihadi groupsand by Hibz ut-Tahrir, (4) that of the model of theIranian revolution, and (5) that of the nationalistIslamic movements in Central Asia.

The Mainstream MuslimBrotherhood

The vision of the Muslim Brotherhood was origi-nally put forth by its founder, Hassan al-Banna:“We want the Muslim individual, the Muslimhome, the Muslim people, the Muslim government

and the Muslim state which will lead the Islamicstates, to bring together the scattered Muslims andtheir ravished lands, then carry the banner of jihadand the flag of the call to Allah until the world willbe blessed by Islam’s teachings.”16 This statementcontinues to be posted today on the Egyptian MB’swebsite. All Islamist movements can easily sub-scribe to this strategic goal, but they develop practi-cal agendas as well to achieve their political aims.The writings of jihad movements include politicalanalysis that, within the general religious frame ofreference, indicates an acute awareness of practicalpolitical factors.

The vision of the mainstream of the MuslimBrotherhood represents a “lowest common denom-inator” to which most of the other movements canagree, though they would add elements of theirown. In its essence, MB doctrine is gradualist; so asnot “to put the cart before the horse,” it eschewsproposing a detailed prescription for a regime untilthe stage of dawa, or wide-spread ideological prop-agation and recruitment, has been achieved. Whilethe Brotherhood condemns the abolition of theCaliphate, it holds that the implementation ofsharia is what defines the Islamic order—not theestablishment of a Caliphate.17 The Islamic stateshould be bound by three principles. (1) Its funda-mental constitution is the Quran. In the Brother -hood’s vision, the Islamic regime reinterprets shariaand denies the “jurisprudents” (fuqaha) and their“legal rulings” (fiqh) any sanctity; rejects slavishworship of tradition, opens the door of ijtihad forMuslims to be able to meet their present-day needs,and adds to the traditional legal principles of “anal-ogy” (qiyas) and “consensus” (ijma) the power ofthe Muslim ruler to legislate for the general welfare.(2) Its government operates on the concept of “con-sultation” (shura) through the institution of ahl al-shura or ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd—though parties areto be abolished as they create disunity and areincompatible with Islam.18 (3) Its ruler is bound bythe teachings of Islam and by the will of the people


for whom he serves as a trustee or agent. The rulermust be a Muslim male, he has no hereditary rights,and—unless removed for legal, moral or physicalreasons—his tenure may be for life. He may becalled Caliph, Imam, King or any other term used inthe Quran to designate leadership.

As to a long-term plan of action, timetables andintermediary objectives, the branches and ideo-logues of the MB differ greatly in their assessmentsof their struggle—its circumstances, the identity ofthe enemy, and the current stage of the conflictwithin the different theaters. These disagreementsare particularly evident in the varying attitudestoward armed struggle. Both the Syrian MuslimBrotherhood in the 1980s and Hamas more recent-ly have used armed struggle against incumbentMuslim regimes, while the Egyptian and Jordanianmovements have totally rejected such action. TheSyrian MB and Hamas justified their approach byidentifying their enemies—the Syrian regime andIsrael respectively—as totally non-Muslim. Simil -arly, the movements disagree about whether to par-ticipate in elections organized by the regime, formalliances with other political forces, and accept theprinciples of liberal democracy. In respect to thequestion of armed struggle, however, there doesseem to have been an incremental shift in the atti-tude of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as aresult of its close affiliation with Hamas.

The Syrian MuslimBrotherhood

While the position of the Brotherhood’s mainstreamregarding modern principles of democracy remainsperhaps intentionally cloudy, in December 2004 theSyrian Muslim Brotherhood published a clear,detailed vision in Al-Mashru’ al-Hadhari li-Suriya alMustaqbal (“Cultural Project for Syria of theFuture”) that arguably presents the most “progres-sive” MB vision in the Arab world. Although this

document’s progressive embrace of democracy isundoubtedly shaped by the MB’s perception thatthe Syrian regime may indeed fall due to its allianceto non-Islamic forces, this document offers a striking departure from traditional MB ideology.Whether it represents a true evolution of thought—or, as skeptics suspect, a dissimulation in order togain power—is unknown. It emphasizes the inten-tions (maqasid) of sharia and the need to adapt it to“human experience” by taking into account the“jurisprudence of priorities” (fiqh al-awlawiyyat)and the “jurisprudence that balances advantagesand disadvantages” (fiqh al-muwazanat). In anapparent contradiction to the Brotherhood’s goal ofIslamizing the world, the Syrian document speaks ofpluralism (ta’addudiyya) as the intention of Allah.19

It accepts the idea of equality of all citizens, more-over, on the basis of the Medina Pact that theProphet made with the Jews and Christians of thatcity—a pact that traditional Islam sees as annulled.

The Caliphate Camp–Hizb ut-Tahrir

For decades Hizb ut-Tahrir has declared that theCaliphate concept is the goal of its struggle. Whilethe MB bemoans the traumatic abolition of theCaliphate, the emphasis on its restoration has untilrecently been identified mainly with the ideology ofHizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) and its offshoots (suchas the Muhajirun). HT offers a comprehensive viewof the Caliphate that would rule the Muslimworld—and, ultimately, the entire world. ThisCaliphate is based on the constitution formulated bythe movement’s founder, Taqiuddin al-Nabahani, inthe 1950s. HT is probably the only movement, otherthan Iran’s Islamic regime, that has prepared such adetailed outline of a future regime—though today itsspokesmen, mostly in Central Asia, tend to present avaguely utopian picture. They speak of the disap-pearance of such social problems as poverty and cor-


ruption in a Caliphate that applies Islamic law, butfail to address how this will be achieved or the prob-lems inherent in political Islam. They simply pointout that, after the establishment of the Caliphate, allnon-Muslims would be obliged to render tribute(jizya) to the Muslim Caliphate and, in exchange,would enjoy its protection. But a refusal to pay jizyawould warrant a jihad.

The Salafi-Jihadi Caliphate

Over the past few years, various salafi-jihadi schol-ars have also developed and proposed a Caliphateparadigm, apparently in anticipation of a victory inIraq that would soon force the jihadi movement todeal with the issue of governance on a practicallevel.20 The Iraq war has revived the idea of the ulti-mate restoration of the Caliphate, which wouldtake place after the post-victory “Emirate” estab-lished in Iraq would expand to include additionalcountries.

Though radical Islamic movements have tendednot to formulate political, economic and social pro-grams for the Islamic state or Islamic Caliphate,there are now some signs of increased thinkingabout the image and foundations of the Caliphate.This is due to the fact that al’Qaeda’s leaders nolonger see their organization as only a jihadist mili-tary group with terror as an objective in itself.Rather, they see it as having grown into a politicalmovement that is battling for the establishment ofan independent Islamic entity, which will ultimatelybe the core of the future Caliphate.

The Shiite Velayat-e Faqih

The Iranian paradigm stands alone. The doctrine ofvelayat-e faqih was never meant to be restricted tothe Shiite world. Uniting his concept of governanceby those learned in jurisprudence with religious and

Al’Qaeda’s leaders no longer

see their organ ization as

only a jihadist military

group with terror as an

objective in itself. Rather,

they see it as having grown

into a political movement

that is battling for the estab -

lishment of an independent

Islamic entity, which will

ultimately be the core of

the future Caliphate.


nationalist principles, Khomeini established aregime that had a “manifest destiny” to promotethe national interests of Iran—which he saw asbeing identical to those of the Muslim Umma—andto liberate Muslims from the yoke of Western impe-rialism. At the core of this outlook is the idea thatpan-Islamism will destroy the existing internationalsystem and be, in Khomeini’s oft-repeated words,“neither East [the Soviet Union and communist ide-ology] nor West [the United States and capitalism].”According to this view, the super-powers are illegit-imate players. Khomeini argued that true Islam hadbeen on the defensive for centuries, and that it mustnow defend itself through force and war and mustexpand its borders.

The opportunity to translate Khomeini’s ideasinto practice emerged following the Iranian revolu-tion of 1979. The doctrine of the “export of revo-lution” (sudur inqilab), which was adopted in Iranas official government policy, promotes a universalvision of revolution to all oppressed peoples, par-ticularly those in the Third World. It holds up theoverthrow of the Shah’s regime as a successful mo -del for changing human society as a whole and lib-erating it from enslavement and exploitation. Thispolicy emphasizes the social and political aspects ofrevolution more than the Shiite religious-ideologi-cal aspects—though it was, in theory, supposed toturn Islam in general and Iran in particular into thedominant force in the world. As a practical expres-sion of this outlook, revolutionary Iran developedlinks and even assisted non-Muslim guerillagroups, including separatist and Marxist organiza-tions in Greece, Northern Ireland, and Spain. Butsuch activities were tempered by realpolitik consid-erations. Accept ing its limitations, Tehran focusedits efforts on seizing opportunities and taking ad -vantage of circumstances in the Muslim world.Exporting the revolution to Shiite communitiesbecame its first goal.

To succeed in advancing its broader revolution-ary policy in the Muslim world, Iran had to bridge

two significant divisions. Regarding the Sunni-Shiite split, it had to appeal to Sunnis by obfuscat-ing the differences between the two groups to facil-itate its status as a leader acting on behalf of allMuslims. However, it also had to present itself as amodel for its Shiite brothers in suffering—the down-trodden (mostazifan) who had been dominated andop pressed by the Sunnis—and as the antithesis ofArab Sunni regimes that discriminated againstIslamic minorities. Regarding the Iranian-Arabdivision, revolutionary Iran sought to enhance itsself-sufficiency from foreign powers and expand itsregional influence—to fulfill its age-old belief in itsdestiny to become the region’s dominant power—while maintaining cordial relations with the Arabworld. Only such good relations would allow Iranto implement its “export of revolution” strategy.

Islamist Nationalist Movements

in Central Asia

The nationalist movements of the former SovietUnion can be seen more as expressions of “Islamistnationalism” or as “national-Islamist” movements.Their goals tend to emphasize the local and thenationalistic, and they remain vague regarding the“pan-Islamic” facet of their ideology. These move-ments generally do not even set clear mid-termgoals. They describe, instead, a vision in which they“free Muslim lands from Russian occupation andthen establish a Muslim state” in which “every per-son, who defines himself as a Muslim and wishes to… live by the laws of sharia in freedom and justice,may join.“21

They offer no description of what this statewould look like, however, except for the fact that itwill implement the sharia. And these Wah habi-ori-ented movements skirt the issue of how such a statewould be able to implement the laws of sharia on atraditionally Sufi-oriented population.


Operational Thinking

Most Islamist movements tend to focus on the“here and now” in their day-to-day strategic

writings. This can be attributed to the fact that,except for the jihad in Iraq, none see themselves ason the verge of taking power, and they are em -broiled in a daily struggle with the incumbentregimes. The diversity that exists in the differentmovements’ strategic goals, therefore, is greater inrespect to interim goals and tactics. On an opera-tional level, radical Islamic movements have provedto be quite pragmatic and adaptive.

Probably the most immediate and contentiousstrategic issue for the various Islamist movementsconcerns the appropriate methods to employ at thecurrent stage of the struggle—and what that stage is.This issue brings into play basic positions on takfir,religious principles that prohibit or permit the killingof other Muslims, religious-ideological questionsregarding the legitimacy of using various weapons,Islamic rulings about the treatment of prisoners andhostages, and other issues of Islamic law. This sub-ject also forces the organizations involved to assesshow far they can go in different theaters withoutincurring an unsustainable backlash.

Areas of operational tactics widely discussed inIslamist writings include:

1. Priority of targets: which Western powers aremore susceptible to pressure and, if hit by terror,will withdraw from Islamic lands. Such an assess-ment was developed and published, apparently bySheikh Yusuf al-Ayiri in early 2003, before theattacks in Madrid and seemed to indicate the wis-dom of hitting Spain.

2. Classification of targets: the Islamic legality ofattacking the economic infrastructure of Muslimcountries (particularly oil). This was widely consid-ered a red line that Islamist organizations did not

cross, even in the bloody jihad in Algeria. Theyhave, however, recently crossed it in Iraq and SaudiArabia. Another actively discussed issue involvesattacking Shiites in Iraq.

3. Classification of weapons: analysis of rulings thatconcern types of weapons and tactics—such as sui-cide bombing, hijacking of aircraft (for example, dothe rules relating to prisoners of war in jihad applyto the passengers as well?), and weapons of massdestruction (WMD). Very little has been written onthis last issue.

The Gradualist Strategy of the

Muslim Brotherhood

The most obviously pragmatic of the Islamistmovements is the Muslim Brotherhood. The

movement’s strategic gradualism is evident fromvarious historic and contemporary texts, whichdefine the MB as a “comprehensive Islamic bodyworking to establish Allah’s religion on earth; toconvey Islam’s call to all the people in general andto the Muslims in particular; to liberate the Muslimhomeland from any non-Islamic rule; to assistMuslim minorities everywhere; to seek to unite allMuslims in one nation; to erect the Islamic statewhich will implement Islam’s rules … to prepare thenation for jihad so that it stands as one front againstthe invaders and the enemies of Allah, facilitatingthe foundation of the Rightly Guided Islamicstate,”22 and spreading Islam, a universal religion,all over the world (“mastership of the world,” orustadhiyyat al-‘alam).23

According to its own strategy, the MuslimBrotherhood has reached only the first of the threestages of its struggle. In many countries it has suc-ceeded in “reforming” Muslims and in generating amovement that advocates a return to an Islamiclifestyle—for both individuals and society in general.


The Brotherhood has relegated jihad against regimeswithin the Muslim world to a later stage, largely forpractical reasons rather than from principle (e.g.,Islam’s prohibition against civil strife [fitna] or theduty to obey “he who Allah has placed above you”).Most MB movements simply do not consider thetime as ripe for taking over government. Sudan’sNational Islamic Front (NIF) has been chastened byits period in power during the 1990s and is cautiousnot to call for an imminent takeover.24 The experi-ence of unsuccessful jihad against the Tunisianregime also changed the position of the TunisianNahda, which had previously espoused violent jihadagainst the regime but now rejects it.25 The Jordanianmovement, influenced by more extreme voices andits close affiliation with Hamas, has radicalized itsagenda over the last decade but still does not see itselfas ready to take over the regime. Even Hamas, hav-ing won the Pal estinian elections in February 2006,is acutely aware of the opposition to its rule and didnot wish to assume full power immediately, seekinginstead to strike a power-sharing agreement with itssecular opponents. The Syrian Brotherhood is theonly MB movement that declares its immediate goalto be a takeover of the regime.

The Salafi-Jihadi Operational Strategy

Even the ostensibly more “ideological” and rad-ical Sunni salafi-jihadi movement has given

some theaters priority over others, and chosen tar-gets on the basis of practical considerations ratherthan dogma. This can be attributed to the fact thatmost Islamist groups are embroiled in day-to-dayconflict that focuses their attention on short andmedium-term tactics. As long as the political reali-ties of their countries do not come close to allowingan Islamist takeover, most do not develop a clearlong-term Islamic ideological strategy. In each coun-

try, the movements tend to display quite a widerange of opinion.

Terrorist acts outside of Muslim countries gener-ate much discussion. Some radical sheikhs, such asAbu Basir al-Tartusi, oppose these attacks. But mostradical Islamists are preoccupied with responding tothe West under the banner of “an eye for an eye, atooth for a tooth” (al-mu’amala bi-al-mithl), whichto them means that Muslims everywhere must helptheir brethren whenever and wherever the latter areattacked by American or Zionist “infidels.”

In contrast to the “gradualist” and relativelyprag matic strategy of the MB and its affiliates andto the Iranian regime’s need to consider its nationalinterests, salafi-jihadi groups espouse a more proac-tive and dynamic strategy. Its guiding principles,compiled from various texts, include:

• All Western countries are defined as bilad al-harb(enemy lands), which permit Muslims freedom ofaction in waging war and in the use of any possiblemeans to inflict damage and to spill the enemy’sblood (istihlal). The enemy’s “people, blood, moneyand women’s honor (a’raduham)” are permitted toMuslims, as they were to the Prophet Mohammedin his wars against Quraysh, Bani Uqayl, Bani Nasirand al-Ta’if.

• Striking against the enemy’s centers of economicand military power and symbols not only strikes atthe enemy’s arrogance, but also inflicts tremendousmaterial damage and causes collapse. The obliga-tion is to bring about change by using force ratherthan relying on political influence.

• Extending military actions into the heart of enemyterritory (‘aqr darihi) advances the goal of bringingabout the enemy’s collapse. Al-Qaeda’s aim is toattack American targets throughout the world, andit has executed actions on several continents, thusdem onstrating its commitment to engaging the en -emy on its own territory.


• Using propaganda and psychological warfarecomplements the use of military force.

• Threatening force can be effective, as when BinLaden asserted his right to acquire weapons of massdestruction, including nuclear weapons. His plans’focus, however, is on the actual use of weaponsagainst his enemies. Armed violence and militaryforce—the “life of killing and battle”—are the prin-cipal, and almost only, means of influence that heconsiders worthwhile.

• Decentralization is the way that al-Qaeda and itsallies conduct and execute jihad. Each acts inde-pendently in its own theater in accordance with pre-vailing circumstances.26

On the eve of the occupation of Iraq, Abu Umar al-Sayf used the following rationale in calling for jihadin the form of long-term guerilla warfare:27

• Prolonged guerilla warfare is the Achilles heel ofmodern armies and their weaponry. Israel sufferedheavy casualties in guerilla warfare in Palestine andLebanon.

• The U.S. entanglement in two simultaneous gueril-la wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, will accelerate itsdefeat.

• Iraq’s size and great quantity of weapons willfacilitate guerilla warfare, cause the enemy to disin-tegrate, and make it impossible for the enemy tocontrol the country.

• Defending Iraq is equivalent to defending theUmma and Muslim countries that the Americansare likely to target in the future. Also, fighting anddefeating Americans is the same as fighting anddefeating the Jews.

A compilation of different salafi-jihadi discussions

Terrorist acts outside of

Muslim countries generate

much discussion. Some

radical sheikhs, such as

Abu Basir al-Tartusi,

oppose these attacks. But

most radical Islamists are

preoccupied with respond-

ing to the West under the

banner of “an eye for an

eye, a tooth for a tooth.”


regarding the stages of the jihad reveals the follow-ing phases:

• Awakening the masses began in earnest on Sep -tember 11, 2001 and continues with the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq. The goal is to broaden theranks of the jihadi movement and generate localopposition to the “apostate regimes.”

• Attrition (harb istinzaf) focuses on bleeding theWest economically, militarily, and politically until itdisengages from Muslim lands altogether and seversits alliances with the “apostate regimes” (In this con-text, some texts mention the abandonment of SouthVietnam and the Shah’s regime as cases in point.)

• Control of Iraq or the battle for Iraq is perceivedby the salafi-jihadi thinkers as a historic, not-to-be-missed opportunity to establish a stepping-stonethat can be used to expand jihad to adjacent the-aters, to occupy those theaters, and to unify themunder an Islamic Caliphate.

• Toppling “apostate regimes” focuses first on the“inner circle” of susceptible regimes, such as Egypt,Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Thisstage is sometimes referred to as tasfiyyat hisabat ”(settling accounts). The revolutionary nature of thejihadi strategy—in contrast with the more gradual-ist Muslim Brotherhood approach—is based on theconviction that it is impossible to adequately reforma “Muslim” country led by “apostate rulers” or toadapt it to the Islamist model. What is needed is ageneral revolution and the reestablishment of theIslamic state, from top to bottom.

• Taking control of the formerly “apostate” lands isconsidered to be one of the most sensitive stages, asthe breakdown of the old regimes will most result ina breakdown of law and order.28

• Establishing sharia law as the basis of the new

regimes is crucial, though these regimes may not beidentical in form initially. Only at a later stage willunity be achieved.

• Purging all Western influences from the Muslimworld requires the total liberation of all Muslimlands—including Palestine, Kashmir, and al-Anda -lus (Spain)—that are currently ruled by “infidels.”

• Reestablishment of the Caliphate is viewed as thelast phase in organizing the Muslim world. This willthen allow for the final confrontation with theWest.

• Final conflict is the stage that, in many jihaditexts, is intertwined with eschatological allusions. It would be difficult to overstate the importancethat salafi-jihadi thinkers have attached to the fateof Iraq. Although al-Qaeda’s declaration establish-ing the Islamic State of Iraq may seem premature, itsymbolizes the central role that Iraq plays in themovement’s larger plans. In the last year there hasbeen some initial thinking in jihadi circles regardingthe lessons that should be learned from their failuresin Iraq; these are occasionally attributed to lack ofleadership and to a gap between the mujahidin andthe population.

Iranian RevolutionaryPragmatism

While tactical pragmatism is a hallmark of theSunni movements, it is an even more pro-

nounced characteristic of Iran’s Islamic regime,which pursues its radical agenda by continually ad -apt ing to actual conditions on the ground. Since itsinception, the regime has been committed to jihadand to the “export of revolution” (sudur inqilab) orthe “propagation of Islam” (tablighi eslami). Thereg ime sees the former as a fundamental Is lamic dutyand the latter as a prime tenet of its own ideology,


enshrined in the constitution and the works of Kho -meini. Jihad must be waged against Israel and theWest, and the Iranian revolution must be exported tofellow Muslims.

Terrorism, as commonly defined in the West, hasplayed both a tactical and strategic role in this con-text. It has been used as a tactical weapon against theIranian opposition, against the American presence inthe Middle East and Israel, and as a means of increas-ing Iran’s influence in both the Arab world and thewider Muslim world. On the strategic level, it streng -th ens Iran’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis its enemies byenhancing Iran’s image as a state with a formidableterrorist capability that it is willing to employ. Iranfosters this image by justifying (while denying involve-ment in) acts of terrorism against Israel and the Uni -ted States, supporting Islamic terrorist organizationsin all parts of the globe, and “predicting” massiveMuslim reactions to American and Israeli policies.

Iran’s support of terrorist organizations serves anumber of its goals:

1. To maintain its commitment to Khomeini’s doc-trines of jihad and the “export of revolution.”

2. To pose a threat to Israel, both for ideologicalreasons and to deter Israel from acting against it.

3. To further Iran’s national objectives of hegemonyin the Gulf and the Sunni Arab world by promotingIslamist opposition to the pro-Western regimes inthose countries.

4. To serve as a strategic deterrent against the UnitedStates, as long as Iran lacks a nuclear deterrent, byposing the threat of widespread terrorism in retalia-tion for any hostile acts toward Iran. The militaryasymmetry that exists between Iran and its enemies,combined with the regime’s conviction that theseenemies remain committed to toppling its govern-ment, have led it to conclude that Iran must rely on

“sub-conventional” warfare—(i.e., terrorism). Thisincludes attacking Israel from Lebanon, taking Is -raeli hostages, supporting Palestinian terrorism, andoccasionally using international terror to demon-strate a “long-arm” capability commensurate (mu -ta tis mutandis) with that of its enemies to hit Iran.

5. To enhance Iran’s standing in the eyes of radicalSunni Islamist organizations as the only state will-ing to challenge Israel and the United States, andthus to draw them into its orbit and accord Iran afoothold in the heart of the Arab Middle East.

6. To serve as a bargaining chip that can eventuallybe traded for concessions on other issues importantto its interests. This helps explain Iran’s links withal-Qaeda, despite that organization’s Wahhabi andanti-Shiite ideology.

Acquisition and Use of WMD

A small number of salafi-jihadi intellectualshave addressed the question of weapons of

mass destruction (WMD), focusing on whethertheir use is legally permissible (given that they maykill Muslims as well as infidels, etc.). A key Sunnischolar who has published an elaborate treatise onthe subject is the Saudi Sheikh Nasser bin Hamadal-Fahd. In May 2003 Fahd issued a long fatwa jus-tifying the use of WMD even if it causes the deathof children and other Muslims, and reached theconclusion that using such weapons against theUnited States is obligatory. Fahd based his argu-ment on the notion of reciprocity—that is, thebehavior of the United States against Muslims war-rants the use of WMD.29

Typical MB reasoning on the subject of nuclearweapons takes its cue from the Islamic laws of al-mu’amala bi-al-mithl (lex talionis): “In case thesenuclear weapons are used against Muslims, it


becomes permissible for Muslims to defend them-selves using the same weapon, based on the Quran(Sura 16:126): ‘If you punish, then punish with thelike of that by which you were afflicted.’”30 Sheikhal-Qaradawi, on the other hand, went on record infavor of Muslims acquiring nuclear weapons butonly for the purpose of deterrence; he ruled thattheir actual use is haram (forbidden).31

A rare reference to the question can be found inHizb ut-Tahrir literature as well. Writing in the HTjournal Al-Wa’i, Imran Wahed, the leader of theLondon-based HT, stated:

According to the Shari’a, a Muslim is al lowed to

use all means and methods against the kuffar

(infidels) if he intends to destroy them. When a

Muslim blows himself up, this act is considered

as a Jihadic act in the name of Al lah. If a [non-

Muslim] woman is considered a fighter, a Mus -

lim has the right (ac cording to the Shari’a) to kill

her. If the enemy uses WMD as it happens nowa-

days in Palestine, we will definitely use these

kinds of weapons too.32

Imran Wahed indicates in the article that HT ulama(religious scholars) support the use of WMD in the-ory and, in the future, possibly in practice—thoughthey see no need to use them now.

Arguments favoring the acquisition of nuclearweapons are not confined to the radical margins ofthe Islamist movement, however. Even the FatwaCommittee of al-Azhar (an orthodox Egyptian statebody) maintains that, as long as nuclear weaponsare held by the enemies of the Muslims—the UnitedStates, Israel, or any other nation—it is the Islamicduty of all Muslim countries to acquire suchweapons. A Muslim regime that does not fulfill thisduty is a sinner and may be guilty of “corruption(fasad) on earth.” The aim of having these weaponsis, first and foremost, deterrence: to “make the ene-mies of the Umma tremble.”33 The Sheikh of al-Az -har, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, drew an analogy

from the ruling of the Caliph Abu Bakr “to fight theenemy with a sword if he fights with a sword and… with a spear if he fights with a spear.” Tantawicontended that, had Abu Bakr lived today, he wouldhave similarly declared that Muslims have a duty tofight the enemy with a nuclear bomb if the enemyuses a nuclear bomb.34

There does not, however, seem to be a seriousstrategic discussion of the implications of using suchweapons. And the discussion of WMD per se ismainly focused on nuclear weapons. Chemical andradiological weapons are generally perceived to belegitimate and not requiring a special dispensation,at least when they are used against infidels.

The Islamic legality of nuclear weapons becamean issue in Shiite Iran as far back as the early1980s.35 When he acceded to power in 1979, Kho -meini ordered the suspension of the Shah’s nuclearprogram and is said to have issued a fatwa declar-ing that nuclear weapons are “from Satan.” Whilethere is no indication that Khomeini issued a subse-quent fatwa rescinding his decision, the nuclear pro-gram was nonetheless revived while he was stillalive. But Khomeini’s 1979 position remains in forceamong many of the traditional “quietist” clerics,who claim that there is a consensus (ijma’) amongthe senior clerics that the prohibition on nuclearweapons (or WMD in general) is “self-evident inIslam” and an “eternal law” that cannot be reversedbecause a basic function of these weapons is to killinnocent people.36 This principle was behind Iran’sdecision not to use chemical weapons against Iraqduring the Iran-Iraq war.37 In September 2003 thescholars of Qom issued an addition fatwa statingthat “nuclear weapons are un-Islamic because theyare inhumane.”38 During the negotiations betweenIran and the three European nations (the U.K.,France, and Germany) over Iran’s nuclear program,the Iranians also claimed that the Supreme LeaderAyatollah Ali Khamenei had issued a fatwa prohibit-ing nuclear weapons—though, in fact, no suchfatwa had been issued. ■


Appendix A

Participants in Round Tables and studies:

Dr. Muhammad al-Atawna (BGU)

Mr. Shmuel Bachar (IPS Herzliya)

Dr. Shmuel Bar (IPS Herzliya)

Mr. Eric Brown (Hudson Institute)

Mr. Glenn Carle (Deputy NIO for Trans-national threats/ DNI/NIC)

Ms. Moria Cohen (IPS, Herzliya)

Col. (rtd) Ron Cohen (IPS Herzliya)

Mr. Tomer Dror (PMO)

Dr. Israel Elad-Altman (IPS, Herzliya)

Dr. Giora Eliraz (HUJ)

Mr. Shammai Fishman (HUJI)

Dr. Hillel Fradkin (Hudson Institute)

Prof. Moshe Gammer (TAU)

Prof. Isaac Hasson (HUJ)

Mr. Pinchas Inbari (JCPA)

Mr. Michael Kahanov (TAU)

Dr. Mordechai Kedar (BIU)

Dr. Yoram Kehati (CSS)

Prof. Martin Kramer (TAU)

Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron (HUJ)

Prof. Bernard Lewis (Princeton U)

Ms. Dina Lisnyansky (HUJ)

Dr. Liora Lukits (Truman Institute)

Ms. Rachel Machtiger (IPS Herzliya)

Dr. Ze’ev Maghen (BIU)

Mr. Aiman Mansour (INSS/NSC)

Mr. Yair Minzili (IPS Herzliya)

Mr. Yaniv Ofek (IPS, Herzliya)

Dr. Eldad Pardo (Truman Institute)

Mr. Jonathan Paris (Hudson Institute)

Dr. Reuven Paz (PRISM)

Dr. Uzi Rabbi (TAU)

Dr. Shimon Shapira (IPS, Herzliya)

Dr. Israel Schrenzel (TAU)

Prof. Haim Shaked (Miami U)

Dr. Josh Teitelbaum (TAU)

Kenneth Weinstein (Hudson Institute)

Mr. James Woolsey (Former DCI)

Mr. David Wurmser (Advisor OVP)

Mrs. Meyrav Wurmser (Hudson Institute)


1. Fatwa: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Muesharat fi Intisar al-Islam” (“Portents for the Victory of Islam”), 1 April 2002,http://www.islomonline.net/fatwa/arabit/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=2042.

2. Fatwa: Sheikh al-Khudhayr, 21 September 2001, quoted in MEMRI, Special Report 25 (2004),http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR2504#_edn12; http://saaid.net/Warathah/khudier/k5.htm.

3. See Na’im Qassem, Hizbullah, The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005), pp. 34–39.4. Ibid., p. 39.5. This is not seen as a capricious or cynical preference. Khomeini himself ruled that the continued existence of the Islamic

regime in Iran takes precedence over all other duties and considerations. This is because it is the only regime that can protectIslam, and its destruction would threaten Islam in general.

6. Various pamphlets found in south Lebanon.7. “Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-‘Awdat al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah” (“The Muslim Brotherhood and the Reawakening of

Islam”), www.ikhwanonline.com, 10 July 2005.8. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 206-207. 9. Ibid.10. Al-Jihad (pamphlet found in south Lebanon), Imam Khomeini Cultural Center, Harat Huriek, Beirut.11. Ibid., p. 34.12. Surat al-Ma’ida (5:56). The verse also warns against “taking Jews and Christians as friends” and contains the prophe-

cy that Allah will choose those who “love Him, lowly before the believers, mighty against the unbelievers, wage jihad forAllah’s sake and do not fear censure” to be victorious.

13. It does so in such books as Minhaj, which deals with how the party intends to found a Caliphate, and Nizal al-Islam,which describes the Islamic regime in great detail.

14. “The [last] hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. A Jew will hide behind a rock or a tree,and the rock or tree will call upon the Muslim: ‘O Muslim, O Slave of Allah! There is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.’” Sahih Muslim, Book 041, No. 6985.

15. See Khamenei: http://www.leader.ir/langs/EN/index.php. 16. “Ahdaf al-Ikhwan al Muslimin” (“The Goals of the Muslim Brotherhood”), www.ikhwanonline.com/Target.asp. 17. The traditional Muslim Brotherhood view of the reinstatement of the Caliphate is that such a regime is to be created

only after the final reunification of the Muslims under one political umbrella. Mitchell, pp. 232-235; Amir Weissbrod, Turabi:Spokesman of Radical Islam (Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 1999), in Hebrew, p. 97.

18. Mitchell, p. 261.19. Quoting verses of the Quran: “Had your God wished so, every one on earth would have become a believer” (Sura

10:99); “I created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you know each other” (Sura 49:13), and“Had your God so wished, he could have made all mankind one nation” (Sura 16:93).

20. See, for example, Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi. http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/03/31/50294.shtml

22. An updated version of the stages of the MB strategy can be found in the “Mustaqbal al-Tanzim al-Duwali li-Jama’atal-Ikhwan al-Muslimin,” Wikalat al-Ahram lil-Sahafi, www.diwanalarab.com, 29 January 2006

23. Mitchell, p.308. 24. Hasan Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front of Sudan, played a leading role in the June 1989 military coup d’é-

tat. At that time, he argued that it was impossible to reach power by peaceful means because “the Crusader and Imperialistforces preclude the arrival of Islam to power.” In fact, he had been preparing for a coup using the military for years and wrotethat the Islamists should create the option to take power by force, and to do so they should mobilize the support of the mili-tary through political participation and gradual penetration of state institutions. When he was in power, he said that in thefirst stage of the Islamic experiment, the state should be given absolute authority in every field, and that the vision of an Islamiccivil society running its affairs independently of the government would materialize only at a much later stage. After his down-fall in the late 1990s, Turabi returned to the position he had held much earlier, when he had rejected military means for reach-ing power. But even after the Hamas victory and the Egyptian MB’s gains in national elections, he expressed deep skepticismabout the ability of Islamist movements to reach power through democratic means because of the West’s commitment to pre-serving its civilization in the face of Islam.

Notes


25. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the movement was involved in violent activities against the government. Its leaderGhannushi, particularly embittered by what he considered to be the regime’s denial of the movement’s electoral achievements,concluded that nonviolent political means would not take the Islamists very far. He then sought to eliminate the rulers, whomhe called apostates. “Facing a terrible fate,” he wrote, “our nation has only jihad against the regimes of heresy, tyranny, trib-alism, particularism and loyalty to the foreigner.” A decade later, however, he wrote that the results of the jihad against unjustand tyrannical governments were poor and in some cases catastrophic. He did not call this kind of jihad illegitimate, butendorsed the alternative of seeking change through peaceful means.

26. Diya’ Rashwan (ed.), Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi al-‘Alam (World Islamic Movements) (Add City: Al-Ahram Center forPolitical & Strategic Studies, 2006) , pp. 259-263, 265.

27. Abu Umar al-Sayf, Maqasid al-Jihad wa-Anwa’uhu (The Objectives and Types of Jihad), Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad.

28. See Abu Bakr Naji, “Idarat al-Tawahush: The Most Dangerous Phase That The Islamic Nation Will Go Through,”Center for Islamic Studies and Research, as posted on the al-Firdaws website, October 2005.

29. Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad al-Fahd, Risalah fi HukmIstikhdam Aslihat al-Damar al-Shamil didd al-Kuffar (A Treatiseon the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels), n.p., 1 May 2003.

30. Fatwa: Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, “Using WMD in War: Islamic View,” 16 December 2002,http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=52398.

31. Qaradawi to Qatari TV, 18 October 2002.31. Al-Wa’i, no. 170 (June 2001).32. Fatwa: Sheikh Ala’ al-Shanawihi, “Imtilak al-Asliha al Naawawiyya Wajib” (“Possessing Nuclear Weapons Is

Mandatory”), fax text in handwriting, no source, http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2002-12/23/article06.shtml.33. http://www.islamonline.net/iol-arabic/dowalia/alhadath-17-11/alhadath2.asp, 17 November 1999.34. Shmuel Bar, Iranian Defense Doctrine and Decision Making, (Herzliya: Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2004), p. 51.35. Ayatollah Montazeri, interview with Die Welt, 9 November 2003.36. Ayatollah Saanei interviewed by Robert Collier, San Francisco Chronicle, 31 October 2003: A1.37. Mustafa al-Labbad, “Pressuring Tehran,” Al-Ahram Weekly 656 (2003).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Shmuel Bar is Director of Studies at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Inter -disciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya. He holds a Ph.D. in the History of the Middle Eastfrom Tel Aviv University. Dr. Bar served in the Israeli intelligence community for thirty years,where he held senior analytical, planning, and diplomatic positions, specializing in regionalsecurity, Islamic radicalism, and terrorism in the Middle East and East Asia. Dr. Bar has pub-lished a number of books and articles in the areas of radical Islam, Iranian defense doctrine,Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians

ABOUT THIS SERIES

This second series of research monographs on the Muslim world is the product of a researchproject undertaken jointly by Hudson Institute and the Institute for Policy and Strategy atHerzilya, Israel for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Theviews, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and shouldnot be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision.

ABOUT THE CENTER

Hudson Institute’s Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World conductsa wide-ranging program of research and analysis addressed to the political, religious, social, andother dynamics within majority Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world.A principal focus of the Center’s work is the ideological dynamic within Islam, and the connect-ed issue of how this political and religious debate impacts both Islamist radicalism as well as theMuslim search for moderate and democratic alternatives. By focusing on ideology, the Centeraims to contribute to the development of American policy options and to effective strategies toprosecute and to win the worldwide struggle against radical Islam.

To learn more, visit www.futureofmuslimworld.com

ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE

Hudson Institute is a non-partisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative researchand analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. We challenge conventionalthinking and help manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary and col-laborative studies in defense, international relations, economics, culture, science, technology, andlaw. Through publications, conferences and policy recommendations, we seek to guide globalleaders in government and business.

To learn more, visit www.hudson.org

sources of islamist strategic thought...on six “pillars”: the religious or “legalistic”...

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