southeast asiain south andreligious conflictanatomy of · dehumanisation process by sanctifying the...

Anatomy ofReligious Conflict

in South andSoutheast Asia



Institute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological University

Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.idss.edu.sg

An Institute of Nanyang Technological University



Anatomy of

Religious Conflict

in South and

Southeast Asia

3 – 4 May 2005

Traders Hotel, Singapore

2 ANATOMY OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

ANATOMY OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 3

Welcoming Remarks by BarryDesker, Director, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

Mr Barry Desker giving the welcoming remarks

In his welcoming remarks, Mr. Barry Desker,Director of IDSS, observed that at the end ofthe Cold War, the large peace dividend expectedby many scholars has failed to materialise.Instead, the new environment has produced newinternal conflicts and aggravated old ones withintrastate conflicts erupting far more frequentlythan inter-state conflicts. Indicative of this trendis the fact that 90% of UN peacekeepingoperations since 1989 have been deployed todisputes that have a significant internal conflictcomponent. Consequently, civil conflicts havefar reaching implications for internationalsecurity. Policy makers are faced with the issueof dealing with such conflicts before they spiralinto large-scale violence.

Recognising the importance of examining suchconflicts, Mr Desker announced that IDSS hasput in place a Civil and Internal ConflictProgramme. The aim of the program is three-fold:

1) To conduct and facilitate first-rateconceptual, empirical, and policy-orientedresearch on the topic of civil conflict;

2) To serve as a knowledge and informationdissemination institution on the latest

academic and policy trends in the fieldof civil conflict:

3) To work towards the objective of capacitybuilding

Mr Desker went on to say that the Anatomy ofReligious Conflict in South and Southeast Asiaconference is the first workshop to be organisedas part of this programme. The aim of theconference is to bring together theoreticians ofthe field of civil conflict as well as area studiesexperts who have conducted extensive researchin the region.

To understand the phenomenon of religiousconflict, there is a need to understand the nexusof religion, conflict and politics. As such, it isnecessary to comprehend how religious textsare misinterpreted by terrorist organisations fortheir own benefit. In a similar vein, there is aneed to understand the psychology of a personwho chooses to use violence to achieveretribution for his grievances.

Recognition of the source allows aninvestigation of the structure of religiousconflicts. Religious-inspired violence can takethe form of sectarian violence, social riots orterrorism. Knowledge of the variousmanifestations of religious violence enhancesour grasp of religious conflict.

States across South and Southeast Asia are nowfaced with the challenge of countering religiousviolence without inciting new ones. It isapparent by now that a purely military solutionwill not help quell religious conflicts. Responsesneed to be found by examining the role of theNGOs and peace processes with the relevantgroups.

Mr Desker concluded with the hope that theconference will expand our understanding ofreligious conflicts and be able to provide deeperinsights into how they can be managed andresolved.


Opening Remarks by Dr. VivianBalakrishnan, Minister forCommunity Development, Youthand Sports, Singapore.

Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan began by saying thatreligious conflicts have existed in this worldfrom time immemorial. People of South andSoutheast Asia are very familiar with suchviolence. Religion not only provides us aspiritual meaning in life, but also identity,loyalty and association. These elements,according to Dr. Balakrishnan, present the nexusbetween religion and politics. This has allowedmany people to exploit this relationship andthis myopic action has let loose forces that theycan no longer control.

Singapore being a small, multi-religious societycannot be shielded from such outside events.Hence such issues are not taken for granted.Singapore is not bound by political correctnessand therefore religion cannot be used forpolitical ends and, in the same vein, politicscannot be used for religious ends. It is thedivision of religion and politics in the commonspaces of Singapore that has helped preservereligious harmony in Singapore.

Common spaces in Singapore include schools,housing estates, national service and the

Dr Vivian Balakrishnan giving the opening address

workplace. In all these areas, Singapore hasstrived to ensure there is no discrimination onracial or religious grounds. Dr. Balakrishnanfurther highlighted that after the September 11attacks, the need for a constructive dialoguebetween religious groups is imperative.Singapore has recognised this and soon afterthe 9/11, it drafted a Declaration of ReligiousHarmony and set up inter-racial confidencecircle at the grassroots level. Dr. Balakrishnanconcluded by saying that Singapore’s successas an open, globalised city depends on its abilityto maintain a balance between religious freedomand harmony.


Panel 1 - Origins of ReligiousConflict

Religious Resonances in Bush’s‘War on Terrorism’, Linell Cady,Professor, Arizona StateUniversity, U.S.A.

From left to right, Professor Linell Cady andAssociate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna

Linell Cady presented a paper on the impact ofreligion in Bush’s war on terrorism. She beganby highlighting that religion has always playedan important role in the American politicalsphere. U.S. Presidents are not hesitant to talkabout religion and President Bush is noexception. Religion has been significant inBush’s personal life and he has used religiousmotifs in his political campaign and publicaddresses. About seventy percent of Americanpublic expect their President to have religiousvalues and articulate them publicly. In short,every time President Bush uses religious terms,he is playing to his voting base.

After the September 11 attacks, religiouscurrents have become more evident. PresidentBush began to use the word ‘evil’ in hisspeeches a lot more than his predecessors. Thishas given rise to the perception that God was

somehow involved. Speaking specifically onthe war on terrorism, Cady stressed that religionhas not played a leading role on the post-September 11 policies. For Cady, the foreignpolicy schema of the neo-conservatives wasdevised well before September 11. Religion hasthence only served as a rationalisation exercise.Religious symbols have been used by the Bushadministration to defend the American responseto the September 11 attacks.

Cady concluded that the separation of thesecular and religious spheres in the U.S. isdeceptive. While religious themes have beenpresent when dealing with domestic politicalissues, they paint a very different picture at theglobal level. Making reference to religion mayseem benign to the American public but it hasthe potential to raise emotions when viewedfrom the outside. Hence we need to be moreaware of the complex dynamics betweenreligion and the secular when studying religiousconflict.

Grievances, Religion and MassMurder: Tracing the SocialPsychological Dynamics of theDescent into Religious Violence,Kumar Ramakrishna, AssociateProfessor, Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies, Singapore.

The second speaker was Kumar Ramakrishnawho spoke on the psychological aspect ofreligious conflict. He began by highlighting thatexisting structural explanations of economic,political and historic explanations wereinsufficient to explain religiously motivatedviolence. In order to better understand religiousviolence, Ramakrishna stressed that moreattention needs to be paid to the “unholy trinity”of the prejudiced who have negative stereotypesof the out-group; the bigots who wantlegislation that discriminates against theantagonists and the haters, who want toobliterate the perceived enemy.


Ramakrishna put forward the theory of mimeticdesire where people crave for things becauseother people have them. For Ramakrishna,frustration sets in when this desire is notsatisfied. Perceived humiliation and envy aretwo ways how the dissatisfaction can becomedestructive. Religion then, serves as the mediumthough which the out-group is constructed.Ramakrishna gave an example where an attackon a mosque is seen as an assault on thecollective self. Furthermore, radical preacherslike Jemaah Islamiyyah leader Abu BakarBashir present to their followers a dichotomousworldview where reconciliation is impossiblebetween ‘true Muslims’ and the out-group.

In the final part of his paper, Ramakrishnasuggested that haters can turn into religiously-motivated killers because of four factors. First,cognitive restructuring of morality gives thehaters the way to justify their violence againstthe adversary. They are able to sanction theirbehavior by morally disengaging themselves.Second, euphemistically labeling allows thehater to bestow an upright status on hisreprehensible acts. The convicted Bali bomberImam Samudra for instance, did not see hisacts as mass murder but jihad against Westwho were subjugating the Muslims. UsingOsama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa as an example,Ramakrishna highlighted displacement ofresponsibility as the third way haters couldbecome killers. When a legitimate person ororganisation accepts responsibilities for theiractions, the dislocation of liability is aconvenient way to sanction their deeds. Lastly,the dehumanisation process of the other allowsthe hater to remove human qualities from theenemy. Religious ideology helps to justify thedehumanisation process by sanctifying thekilling.

Islamic Doctrine and Violence:The Malaysian Case, AhmadFauzi Abdul Hamid, SeniorLecturer, School of DistanceEducation, Universiti SainsMalaysia, Malaysia.

The penultimate speaker on the panel wasAhmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid who spoke aboutthe violence related to Islamic revival inMalaysia. He began by highlighting that Islamicresurgence in Malaysia has been relatively smallcompared to the Middle East. Islamic revivalin Malaysia has usually taken the form ofdakwah, or the peaceful dissemination of Islam.The Malaysian government’s handling of theproblem has been two-fold. First, instead ofreprimanding these resurgent Muslims, theyhave been largely accommodated and the statehas managed to maintain control. Second, thegovernment has also embarked on a policy ofadvancing economic and cultural relations withthe Islamic countries.

In 1981, the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS)President, Haji Abdul Hadi Awang gave theinfamous Amanat Haji Hadi speech where hecalled for jihad against the ruling UnitedMalays’ National Organization (UMNO) party.For Abdul Hamid, this led to the polarisationof Malay society. In response, the Malaysiangovernment decided to implicate PAS membersin the dissident acts of extremist Islamic groups.It culminated in the use of physical force againstPAS members in Memali in November 1985.This was the first major incident of violencerelated to Islamic revival in Malaysia. Sincethen, there has been no attempt to build peacebetween both sides. Another significant incidentwas Al-Ma’unah affair in July 2000 whenIslamic extremists attacked an army camp. Thegovernment responded by detaining Al-Ma’unah members under the Internal SecurityAct (ISA). Ahmad Fauzi stressed that reliableinformation on the incident has been scarcebecause of contradictory press reports.


Compared to the Laskar Jundullah in Indonesiaand the Abu Sayaaf in the Philippines, theMalaysian Islamic revivalist groups are smalland only the fringe units have resorted toviolence. For Abdul Hamid, to group all of themas terrorists or Islamic extremists only helpsthe political elites secure mileage as it instillsfear into the minds of the moderate Muslims.Further, he disagrees that particularinterpretations of Islam will automatically leadto violence. As the Malaysian case exemplifies,the relation between Islam and violence is muchmore complicated.

Countering New Age Terror:Non-lessons of post 911American Counter TerrorismStrategies, Ong Teng Kwee,Research Analyst, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies,Singapore.

The final paper presenter for this panel, OngTeng Kwee, spoke about the flawed U.S.counter-terrorism strategy. He began by makinga distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism.For Ong, the key attribute of the old terrorparadigm is the “centrality of politics as adriving idea”. Terrorists of this pattern want toattain legitimacy while corroding that of theenemy state. Terrorism thence is a meanstowards a political end. In direct contrast, themain facet of new terrorism is the death ofpolitics. The main motivation of such terroristgroups is the annihilation of the enemy. In thisnew paradigm, terrorism is no longer the meansbut becomes the end in itself.

For Ong, new terrorism has clouded many ofthe post September 11 counter-terrorismstrategies. He opined that terrorists like Osamabin Laden still have a political goal. The newterror paradigm creates a world of ‘us’ versus‘them’. Terrorism is explained through aprimordial lens and this gives rise to the fearof irrationality of today’s terrorists. Onghighlighted that President George Bush had

resorted to cultural accounts of the September11 attacks. Radical Islamists have beenportrayed as people who hate freedom and life.The narrow view of new terrorism also givesthe impression that we cannot negotiate withterrorists. Indirectly, this means that coercivemilitary force is the only apt response to defeatthe enemy.

Elaborating further, Ong stressed that militaryforce is insufficient to defeat the terrorists. The‘shock and awe’ tactic will only seek toradicalise the people and swell the ranks ofterrorist organisations. Instead, the U.S.government needs to realise that the strugglestill remains a political contest for legitimacy.According to Ong, Osama bin Laden is an angrypolitical activist and not a religious scholar.Hence more effort needs to be put to win thehearts and minds of the Muslim masses. Onlythen can the counter-terrorism strategies haveany long-term success.

Discussant: Syed Farid Alatas,Associate Professor, NationalUniversity of Singapore,Singapore.

Associate Professor Syed Farid Alatas discussing the panel’s papers


In discussing the papers, Syed Farid Alatashighlighted that origin, nature and function formthe three dimensions of Muslim extremism andall four papers discussed these three facets.Much of the literature on the origins of Muslimextremism comes under the macro categoriesthat stress the political, economic andsociological situations. Ramakrishna’s paper onthe other hand emphasises the psychologicalaspect of the problem. For Alatas, the theory ofmimetic desire is good but raised the questionof how the out-group is defined? For instance,to what extent are the Chinese in Indonesia theout-group?

Deliberating on Abdul Hamid’s paper, Alatasmentioned this paper discusses the nature ofMuslim revival. Two key features of the paperwas the notion of kafir and jihad. Alatas alsodrew attention to problem of definingextremism. Today, it is defined from a secularistpoint of view. This does not take into accountthe notion of extremism within Islam itself,which according to Alatas, can take the formof jurisprudential, philosophical, theological orsufi views.

Moving on to Ong’s paper, Alatas said that thepaper discusses extremism in relation toterrorism. For Alatas, the distinction betweenold and new terror is reductionist because thetwo actually coexist. Both political grievancesand hatred are present in the lives of Osamabin Laden, Sayyid Qutb and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Alatas also highlighted that thedistinction made in Ong’s paper was useful inanalysing the function of Muslim extremism.

Addressing Cady’s paper, Alatas was skepticalthat religion was only used by President Bushto legitimate post-September 11 policies. Hequeried on the extent to which religion guidedPresident Bush in making his decisions. In amore general comment, Alatas said that thedehumanisation process goes on in all religions,not just Islam. Hence a more in-depth study isrequired to examine trans-religious extremism.

Discussion

Responding to Alatas’ comments, Cady saidthat the dehumanisation process takes placeeven in nation-states. While terms likedemocracy and freedom are usually perceivedas secular, they have some religiousconnotations. Ramakrishna opined that the out-group is defined as whoever does not share thesame worldviews or interpretation of faith asthe extremists. Abdul Hamid highlighted thatthere is a scarcity of sources when examiningIslamic violence in Malaysia because of theuse of the ISA. Ong stressed that the distinctionbetween the old and new terror is necessary fortheoretical clarity.

Bryan Turner observed that religion mightactually play a causal role in generating conflict.For him, theology via the unavailability of theright interpretation of religious texts has led toviolence. In response, Ramakrishna said thatreligion is only a necessary condition to conflict.Religion, nationalism and ideology all putforward a particular worldview. We can as neo-fundamentalists let other people have differentviews from us or as religious fundamentalistsseek to impose our version of the truth onothers. Alatas added that religion by itself doesnot generate violence. Especially in Islam, it isimportant to make a distinction of Islam as afaith and its socio-historical phenomenon. Onlywhen religion is seen in the latter perspective,does it become a cause for conflict.

Riaz Hassan commented that extremism in itselfis constructed. This is because the evidence usedto study extremism comes from evidence thatis collected by the state. For Hassan, there isvery little critique of the data obtained fromthe state. The evidence itself may beproblematic. Hence more attention needs to bepaid to the role of the state in sustainingreligious conflict.

Elena Pavlova queried on whether there wereinstances in the U.S. where religion was used


by the Bush government beyond rhetoric. Inresponse, Cady said that religion sometimesplayed a central role in the formulation ofpolicies. She gave examples of gay andwomen’s reproductive rights in the U.S. wheredecisions by the Bush government have beenclearly influenced by religion.

Panel 2 - Nature of ReligiousConflict

Conceptions of Jihad and ConflictResolution in Muslim Societies: AnExploration, Riaz Hassan, Professor,Flinders University, Australia.

Professor Riaz Hassan delivering his paper

The first speaker on this panel Riaz Hassanspoke about the changing ideas of jihad asrepresented in the Quran. He began byhighlighting the considerable difference ofopinion on the meaning of jihad and stressedthat there is no single reading. In exploring thevaried notions of jihad in Muslim societies,Hassan argued that ideas of jihad are formedbecause of social and economic environments.As the milieu changed, the conceptions of jihadwere also altered.

Hassan examined the doctrine of jihad acrossfive periods in history. During the firstformative stage of Islam in the Seventh Century,the ideology of jihad was for its followers toinstitute an Islamic social order. It was used toconstruct an Islamic identity. The second empirephase from the eighth to the sixteenth centurieswitnessed Muslim expansion. The doctrine ofjihad now changed to spreading Islam. The


world was now divided into the Abode of Islam(Darul-Islam) and Abode of War (Darul-Harb).The third colonial period between theseventeenth and nineteenth centuries saw muchof the Muslim world colonised by theEuropeans. Economic and social problems werewidespread and the notion of jihad was againchanged to one of resistance against thecolonisers. The fourth post-colonial and ColdWar stage saw many Muslim countries gainindependence but the ‘national project’ did notsucceed. The rise in Islamic radicalisationhappened during this period and jihad wastransformed into mobilisation against the state.The final post-Cold War period saw publicinstitutions in the Muslim world collapse andthe ideology of jihad was modified to one ofreclaiming true Muslim identity. This periodalso saw the increasing privatisation of jihadiactivities. For instance, other than impartingeducation, madrassas began to recruit men forjihad.

Hassan concluded by discussing whether thereis support for the contemporary jihadis. Byanalysing Muslim attitudes towards suicidebombings and the role of war in conflictresolution, he suggested that low educationlevels in Muslim countries would be acontributing factor to generating support forjihadi actions. Much of the Muslim world todayis undergoing a religious revival. While it ispossible that there is some passive backing forjihadi organisations among Muslims, theperception that the ‘war on terrorism’ is a ‘waron Islam’ will only cause this support toincrease.

The Sectarian Conflict inPakistan: Social Tensions andSearch for Identity, Mariam AbouZahab, Researcher, Centred’Etudes et de RecherchesInternationales, France.

Dr Mariam Abou Zahab talking on sectarian conflict in Pakistan

The second presenter on the panel was MariamAbou Zahab who spoke on the sectarian conflictbetween the Sunnis and Shias in the Jhangprovince of Pakistan. Emphasising theimportance of regional and local contexts instudying sectarian violence, Abou Zahabcontended that the conflict in Jhang is rather atussle for power. The 1980s saw theradicalisation of the religious identities inPakistan. There was an increase in the anti-Shia rhetoric, which helped the Sunnis to getforeign assistance.

The leaders inciting the violence were theupwardly mobile Sunni urban middle class. Thefoot soldiers were students of madrassahs,where sectarian literature was already beingtaught. For Abou Zahab, the sectarian leadersneeded to identify an enemy, identify a problemthat needed to be resolved, suggest a solutionand mobilise the people. The adversary in this


case was the Shias. In order to rally the ruralpeople, the crisis was linked to a bigger globalproblem. Iran was portrayed as the countrysupporting the Shias. The rhetoric of the Sunniswas that if you follow Shiism or support theShias, you are an infidel.

Abou Zahab also highlighted that the deridingof the Shias strengthened the Sunni identity.When leaders of the Sunni-based Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan party were assassinated, theSunnis thought it right to wage jihad againstthe Shias. Mosque, trader and caste networkswere mobilised to fight the Shias. Hence thesectarian violence in Pakistan is actually apower struggle and a vehicle for social change.

‘Hindu-Muslim Riots: An Attemptto Rank Cultural, Economic andPolitical Factors’, ChristopheJaffrelot, Research Director,Centre d’Etudes et de RecherchesInternationales, France.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot delivering his paper

Christophe Jaffrelot followed with hispresentation on ‘Hindu-Muslim Riots: AnAttempt to Rank Cultural, Economic andPolitical Factors’ that analysed the varioustriggers for Hindu-Muslim riots in India fromthe 1960s to the present. He observed thatalthough cultural, economic and international

factors have had a role in fuelling these religiousriots, the political dimension has played agreater role since the 1980s. According toJaffrelot, riots from the 1980s onwards havetended to coincide with upcoming electionsgiving credence to the theory that religious riotshave become incorporated into the electoralstrategy of Hindu nationalist leaders.

According to Jaffrelot, a study of riots fromthe 1980s reveals how the political dimensioninflames religious riots. Typically, these riotsprogress in the following fashion. Hindunationalists are mobilised as a response to thesupposed pan-Islamism of the Muslim minorityand this is then followed by the organisation ofpseudo-religious processions as a display ofstrength. These provocative processions helptrigger riots with political and electoralconnotations at a national level. Moreover, inaddition to this process, India has experiencedan injection of local factors into the riot triggermatrix. Recently, as seen in Bhagalpur, thecriminalisation of local politics has exploitedthe foundation laid by Hindu nationalists at thenational level to employ religious riots for theirown local political ends.

Jaffrelot concluded that with the rise of Hindunationalists to positions of power at a nationaland local level, a stronger correlation betweenthe upsurge of religious riots and the electioncalendar is to be expected.

Analysing Religious Conflicts asWars of the Third Kind: TheCase of Mindanao, Renato Cruzde Castro, Chair, InternationalStudies Department, De la SalleUniversity, Manila, Philippines.

The closing speaker for this panel Renato Cruzde Castro shared with the conference his paperon ‘Analysing Religious Conflicts as Wars ofthe Third Kind: The Case of Mindanao’. Heargued that although Islam plays an importantrole in the religious conflict experience in


Mindanao, the primary motivating force forconflict has surrounded the issue of creating acommunity among various Muslim groups inthe Philippines - a situation de Cruz refers toas a ‘war of the third kind’. As such, althoughreligion has a role in the conflict, the conflictis more to do with the aspirations of the MuslimFilipino community who desire to crave acultural space for themselves in an evolvingFilipino nation that has generally excludedthem.

By referring to the situation in Mindanao, deCastro illustrated how Islam has been utilisedas a rallying call for an alienated communitythat perceives itself to be oppressed by theFilipino state since the 1970s. The effectivenessof Islam as a mobilising vehicle nonethelesshas been tempered by the continued presenceof tribalism and kinship as alternativeidentificational avenues for Mindanao Muslims.This is exemplified by the relative isolation ofAbu Sayaff from the mainstream Muslimsecessionist groups. Islam also faces a challengeby the Filipino state that has appeased Muslimanger somewhat by projecting itself as a sponsorrather than an enemy of Islam. In addition, theFilipino state has also been successful at drivinga wedge between secessionist groups thusweakening their efficacy.

de Castro concluded by holding that theMindanao example shows the sway andlimitations of religion as a basis for an alienatedpeople’s struggle of an identity and acommunity. For de Castro, the current situationthough is set to alter with the introduction oftransnational Islamic groups into Mindanao.Besides offering logistics and training, thesegroups offer an identity that is transethnic andtranspolitical. The ability of these groups tomake in roads into the Muslim Filipino strugglenevertheless is dependent upon the Filipinostate’s capability to integrate Muslim Filipinosinto the greater Filipino fold.

Discussant: Bryan Turner,Professor, Asia Research Institute,National University of Singapore,Singapore

Bryan Turner as the discussant for Panel Twofelt that two shared themes exhibited by thefour papers was the role of the state in religiousconflict as well as the manner in which religioussymbols can be essentialised in order to expressgroup identity.

For Turner, the papers of Abou Zahab, Jaffrelotand de Castro to a degree illustrate the dangersof mobilising a state along the lines of themajority - violence is then driven by macrostructures of the political where the state eitherfails or supports violence for its own endsthrough its institutions such as the military orthe police.

Furthermore, all four presenters captured howreligion can become essentialised to supportone particular form of identity. Abou Zahabillustrated this vis-à-vis the Sunni and Shiitestruggle over resources in a failing state; Hassangave a good account of how the theology ofjihad has evolved in relation to its largerpolitical environment; and Jaffrelot and deCastro both illustrated how symbols my bemobilised for political advantage.

Turner concluded by warning how the shift inpolitical conflict from post World War Two -where political conflict was between states aswell as between classes within states - to thecurrent conflict - where conflict is between andwithin the state based on ethnic and religiousgrounds - is something most states are notequipped to battle. These local, low cost andlow intensity conflicts draw upon issues at thelocal level while also appealing to a highertransnational level. Citing Michael Ignatieff,Turner predicts that these conflicts will carryon so long as majorities care less aboutdeprivations of liberty that harm minorities thanthey do about their own security.


Discussion:

The Ambassador of Egypt to Singapore,Mohamed Elzorkany, agreed with Hassan thatthe use of violence by radical Islamic groups isa sign of their isolation and weakness ratherthan a sign of their success. However, he calledto question the idea that a majority of Egyptianssupport terrorism. In addition, the Ambassadorwas keen to stress that jihad was not stronglysupported by the majority of the Muslim world.Hassan replied that his paper had as its focusthe evolution of jihad from an ideology ofMuslim piety, to power, to resistance and nowreligious business. He was in agreement withthe Ambassador that most Egyptians did notsupport terrorism and pointed out that thequestion in his survey was concerned withEgyptian attitudes towards the use of war whenother means of resolving an issue has failed.

S P Harish questioned if there was a relationshipbetween structural factors and the emergenceof particular types of violence since religiousviolence can manifest in multiple ways. Inresponse, Hassan was of the view riots tend tobe unplanned and they tend to be employed asa response to issues that are not yet resolvedwhereas terrorism is more planned action.Jafferlot was of the view that, especially withregards to India, riots tend to be planned sincethere is a strong correlation between riots andthe electoral calendar. In contrast, terrorism isa tool of the weak and Muslims who are anunderclass in India generally utilise it.

Keith Fitzgerald asked if there was great utilityin the idea of civil society acting as a bulwarkagainst religious violence. He cited evidenceof low levels of Hindu-Muslim violence inplaces where the communities had greaterinteraction as an illustration of this concept.Jaffrelot maintained that he was not convincedby this civil society argument as violence haserupted in place such as Bombay where thereis a high level of interaction.

Panel 3 - Responses toReligious Conflict

‘Blessed are the Peacemakers’:Lessons in Interfaith Dialogue andReconciliation for Southeast Asia,Tan See Seng, Assistant Professor,Institute of Defence and StrategicStudies, Singapore.

Assistant Professor Tan See Seng speaking on the role ofinterfaith dialogue in resolving religious conflict

The first speaker on this panel, Tan See Seng,spoke on the role of interfaith dialogue insolving religious conflict in Southeast Asia. Heargued that despite the view that religions areunable to play an important role in peacemakingdue to their exclusivist claims, a strongargument could be made for faith-basedpeacemaking. For Tan, the reasons whyreligions can play a greater role in peacemakingis three fold. Firstly, as the examples ofMahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr andArchbishop Desmond Tutu are illustrative of,there is already a precedence of religion playinga large role in peacemaking. Secondly, recentstudies on religious peacemaking in Africa, theMiddle East, Southeast Asia, Northern Irelandand the Balkans have shown that religion isbetter placed at fostering peace rather thanfuelling war. Thirdly, if the exaggerated causalrelationship between religion and conflict wereacknowledged, this would allow for a betterunderstanding of the other reasons of conflict.


For religion to play the role of peacemaker,Tan opined that certain factors have to be inplace for interfaith dialogue to be useful meansto resolve conflict. These are: individual biashas to be left out of the dialogue process toensure that mutual understanding can begenerated; trust has to be built during thedialogue process; all the relevant religiousparties have to be represented; an ethic of self-criticism has to be fostered; joint projects shouldbe undertaken to promote mutual understanding;and all parties should endeavor to educate eachother on their different religions.

Due to the numerous religious conflicts andtensions present in Southeast Asia, Tan stressedthat interfaith dialogue is necessary now morethan ever. Religion can reawaken communitiesto the view that the door should always be keptopen to those who with whom one does notsee eye-to-eye and inter-faith dialogue canfacilitate different religious groups to walkhand-in-hand.

Facilitated Joint Brainstorming,Keith Fitzgerald, Senior Fellowand Head, Asian Programme onNegotiation and ConflictManagement, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies,Singapore.

The second speaker was Keith Fitzgerald whospoke on ‘Facilitated Joint Brainstorming’.Fitzgerald was primarily concerned with thecognitive psychology behind perceptionformation and the phenomenon of partisanperception that can lead to conflict. Accordingto Fitzgerald, humans are generally unable todevelop a common understanding of events -that is, we tend to develop a partisan perception- due to the following factors. Firstly, perceptionis a subjective process as no two individualscan experience an event in the exact same way.Moreover, our different interests unwittinglylead us to focus on different things. Theabsorbed data then tends to be employed to

support rather than challenge our prior viewsand data that does not conform to our priorviews is likely to be dismissed. Finally, memoryalso plays a key role in our experientialdifferences as we have a predisposition toselectively remember data. When these factorscombine, conflict may result as individuals areprevented from understanding and adequatelycommunicating with each other.

To resist the tendency to develop a perceptiongap, Fitzgerald proposed an exercise dubbedthe ‘Path to Reasoning’. The ‘Path toReasoning’ encourages individuals to participatein true dialogue where the goal is to understandrather than to win a debate. In addition, thedialogue focuses on the origins of anindividual’s experience rather than the beliefsand assumptions generated through thoseexperiences. According to Fitzgerald, anotheroverlooked aspect of generating fruitfuldialogue is the utilisation of active listening.Active listening requires individuals to engagewith what is being discussed rather thandoggedly putting our own points across.

Fitzgerald was keen to stress that the ‘Path toReasoning’ is by no means a foolproofmethodology for conflict resolution. Heconcluded the paper by highlighting the possibleobstacles to clear dialogue. For Fitzgerald,individuals in a group may be pressured fromparticipating fully in a dialogue if dialogueshould be aware that understanding is not theidentical to agreeing. It is possible to understanda person’s point of view without being inagreement with him.


Towards Better Peace Processes:A Comparative Analysis ofAttempts to Broker Peace withMNLF and GAM, S.P. Harish,Associate Research Fellow,Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies, Singapore.

Mr S P Harish delivering his paper

The penultimate presenter S P Harish presenteda paper entitled ‘Towards Better PeaceProcesses: A Comparative Analysis of Attemptsto Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM’.According to Harish, a comparison between theattempts to broker peace with the MNLF andGAM by the Filipino and Indonesiangovernments respectively reveals importantelements that may make peace processes moreeffective and sustainable.

Defining a peace process as a sustained dialoguewith the intention of stopping violence as wellas attaining resolution of disputed issuesbetween contending parties, Harish through acomprehensive comparison of the two peaceprocesses gleaned six important elements thatmay make a peace process more effective.Firstly, not only is an impartial mediator autopian fantasy but also the lack of impartialityby a mediator does not necessarily have abearing on the outcome of a peace process.Secondly, although the utility of a mediator liesin the leverage it has over the disputants, all

disputants have to sincere seek peace. Thirdly,greater emphasis should be placed on re-integrating rebels into the political mainstreamrather than on the disarmament anddemobilisation of the insurgent army. Fourthly,peace zones create the foundation for a cultureof peace especially if they involve the localpopulation. The fifth important element that hasto be taken into consideration during a peaceprocess is that human rights abuses have to beaddressed fully if peace is to be durable. Finally,symbols such as flags, language and negotiationvenues have to be managed well as theiremotive significance should not beunderestimated.

Harish was keen to point out that the resolutionof internal conflicts is a demanding task that islaboriously slow. For Harish, comparativeanalyses of peace processes offer deeper insightinto how certain elements can be made moreeffective even though these elements in theirtotality should not be taken as a blueprint forsuccess.

Problematising the Role of theState in the Dynamics ofReligious Conflict in Indonesia:The Case Of Maluku, AleksiusJemadu, Head of theDepartment of InternationalRelations, Parahyangan CatholicUniversity, Indonesia.

From left to right, Dr Ralf Emmers and Professor Aleksius Jemadu


Aleksius Jemadu presented the final paper forthe conference on ‘Problematising the Role ofthe State in the Dynamics of Religious Conflictin Indonesia: The Case Of Maluku’. Jemadu inhis paper investigated the role of stateintervention in ending religious conflict andargued that the Indonesian state under thestewardship of President Soeharto laid thegroundwork for the intense communal conflictexperienced in Maluku. The groundwork forconflict cannot be attributed squarely to thepractise of clientilist politics but the role ofstate-making, state-breaking and state failurein Indonesia has also played a significant role.

Jemadu noted that during Soeharto’s state-making project beginning in 1965, power wasaccumulated by the central government via thenurturing of Christian and moderate Muslimsat the expense of marginalising and repressingless-moderate Islamic opposition groups.However, the end of the Cold War andthreatened by demographic forces, Soeharto wasforced to seek out support conservative Islamicforces he previously repressed as they were seento be naturally opposed to greaterdemocratisation. A consequence of this actionwas the division of the state along religiouslines - that is, state-breaking. The consequencesof this action was felt strongly in Maluku aspreviously favoured Moluccan Christiansdeveloped a strong enmity towards theincreasing number of conservative Muslimsentering all levels of the province’s bureaucracy.This festering tension erupted into bloodyconflict in the run up to elections in 1999. Itwas at this point that state failure wasexperienced as the government was split downreligious lines and the army and police did notperform its responsibility to quell the violencefully.

Jemadu concluded on a mixed note byobserving that the situation in Maluku has yetto be resolved as Indonesians presidents afterSoeharto have had to work with the institutionscorrupted by Soeharto’s legacy. In spite of this,Jemadu was of the opinion that the

professionalisation of the Indonesian militaryand the consolidation of democracy in Indonesiaholds open the prospect for a lasting peace tobe produced.

Discussant: Syed Nazakat, SaharaTime, Kashmir.

Discussing the four papers, Syed Nazakatremarked that the presentations shared twocommon themes. All four highlighted thedifficulty of resolving religious conflict whilealso demonstrating how a successful resolutionof religious conflict begins from a sustainedcollective effort by as many levels of societyas possible.

Syed picked up on Jemadu’s point that theresolution of religious conflict is especiallydifficult when elements of the government havea vested interest in continued fighting andsuggested that Tan’s argument concerning therole of inter-religious dialogue offers one wayout of such a quagmire. Syed howeverexpressed his reservations on focussing purelyon inter-faith dialogue as the panacea forreligious conflict and pointed out that politicalinstitutions need to be part of the process aswell. While noting that political institutionsneed to part of the process, Syed asked Jemaduabout the ways in which a government can bedrawn to the negotiating table.

Turning to Harish’s paper, Syed was inagreement that the peace process should not bedependent on a complete implementation of aceasefire - talks should continue regardless ofthe fighting. Nevertheless, Syed questioned theefficacy of analyses that focus on themechanics/procedures of a peace process. Inthat regard, Syed pointed to the need for anaccount of the success of some processes andthe failure of others even though all thenecessary elements are present.

Moving away from the more analytical papers,Syed pointed out that Fitzgerald’s paper on howthe discussion process should be approached


and managed fills an important void indiscussions on religious conflict. It is notenough to merely bring people to the table butthere is a need to understand how the discussioncan be orchestrated in order to achieve optimalresults. Despite his general agreement withFitzgerald, Syed queried Fitzgerald on whowould fulfil the role of mediator in a peaceprocess most successfully.

With approximately eighty conflicts around theglobe, Syed in his conclusion drove home theimportance of finding practical solutions andemphasised the vital role governments, NGOs,religious leaders and the common man have toplay.

Discussion

In reply to Syed, Tan agreed that religiousinstitutions cannot act alone in resolving aconflict. Instead, all the stake-holding factionsneed to participate. With regard to inducinggovernments to the negotiating table, Jemaduopined that a coalition of democratic forces isrequired to cashier the government of itsresponsibilities. Responding to Syed, Harishwas of the view that lessons may be learnt fromprocedural analyses but was also aware thatthe substantive issues on the ground will differfrom place to place and these substantive issueswill have a bearing on the outcome of peaceinitiatives. Finally, Fitzgerald stressed that thebest mediators are those that realise that peaceis an ongoing never-ending process that requiresconsistent labour.

Renato Cruz de Castro observed that the roleof moderator by Libya in negotiations in thePhilippines was not strictly neutral as it was ingeopolitical competition with Egypt and SaudiArabia who were supporting another rebelfaction. In response, Harish maintained thatstates are rarely neutral moderators as the Libyacase exemplifies but the dearth of one does notnecessarily scuttle a peace process.

Norman Vasu noted that there is littledisagreement that dialogue plays a key role inconflict resolution but asked if there was everan optimal time for dialogue to be conductedin order to ensure success. Tan and Fitzgeraldanswered that dialogue at any stage was a betteroption than continued fighting. Moreover,Harish offered William Zartman’s concept of a‘mutually hurting stalemate’ between parties asthe subjective moment in time for parties tochoose dialogue over conflict. Jemadu addedthat an optimal time may not be the key issuebut the discovery of the political will to startdialogue.

Joseph Liow commented that few states haveacted as successful peace brokers and wonderedif there was a possibility for states to take agreater role. Jemadu responded by stressing thatthere is a growing awareness within ASEANcountries that the conflict in one state affectsanother. As such, he called for ASEAN toabandon its policy of non-interference in orderto permit its members to act as peace brokersin the conflicts of other member states.

Closing Remarks: Joseph Liow,Assistant Professor, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

The conference concluded with the closingremarks made by conference coordinator JosephLiow. Liow expressed his thanks to themembers of the three panels as well as theattendees for their enthusiastic participation andthe sophisticated discussion. In addition, he waseager to convey his gratitude to theadministrative staff of the Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies for their first-rate workin ensuring that the conference ran smoothly.

Liow summarised the proceedings of theconference by categorising the various paperspresented into four fundamental subdivisions.In the first category, the role played by boththe state and the various elements of vested


interest that make up the state in the rise ofreligious violence was explored thoroughly bythe papers presented by Renato Cruz de Castro,Christophe Jaffrelot and Aleksius Jemadu. Inthe second category, the role of civil societyand other forms of social mobilisation wasinvestigated via Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid,Mariam Abou Zahab and Tan See Seng’ssterling analyses. Another important categorythat was intensely reflected upon was the roleof religion in conflict. Papers that contributedsignificantly to the rumination of this importanttopic were the papers by Linell Cady, KumarRamakrishna, Ong Teng Kwee and RiazHassan. Finally, it was through the papers ofKeith Fitzgerald and S P Harish that themechanics and processes of religious violencewere illuminated.

Liow articulated his desire to build on thequality of the papers and accompanyingdiscussions. This would be achieved in threestages. Firstly, a conference report will bepublished in the immediate future. Followingfrom this, a policy paper informed by the ideasdiscussed at the conference will be produced.Ultimately, the papers categorised in the foursubdivisions above will be developed into amanuscript for publishing.


P r o g r a m m e / A g e n d a

&

L i s t o f P a r t i c i p a n t s


P r o g r a m m e / A g e n d a

DAY 1 – Tuesday, 3 May 2005

0800 – 0900 Registration

0900 – 0910 Welcoming Remarks by Barry Desker, Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

0910 – 0920 Opening Remarks by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Community Development, Youth andSports, Singapore

0920 – 0940 Coffee / Tea Break

0940 – 1110 Panel One Origins of Religious Conflict

Chair: Joseph Liow, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

Presenters Religious Resonances in Bush’s War on TerrorismLinell Cady, Professor of Religious Studies and Director, Centre for the Study ofReligion and Conflict, Arizona State University, U.S.A

Grievances, Religion and Mass Murder: Tracing the Social Psychological Dynamicsof the Descent into Religious ViolenceKumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor & Head of Studies, Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies, Singapore

Islamic Doctrine and Violence: The Malaysian CaseAhmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Senior Lecturer, School of Distance Education,Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia

Countering New Age Terror: Non-Lessons of Post 911 American Counter TerrorismStrategiesOng Teng Kwee, Research Analyst, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore


1130 – 1150 Discussant Syed Farid Alatas, Associate Professor, National University of Singapore

1150 – 1250 Questions and General Discussion

1250 – 1350 Lunch (Venue: Ah Hoi’s Kitchen @ Level 4)

1350 – 1520 Panel Two Structures of Religious Conflicts

Chair: Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor and Head of Studies, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Presenters Conceptions of Jihad and Conflict Resolution in Muslim Societies: An ExplorationRiaz Hassan, Professor, Flinders University, Australia

The Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Social Tensions and search for IdentityMariam Abou Zahab, Lecturer, INALCO, France

Hindu-Muslim Riots: An attempt to Rank Cultural, Economic and Political FactorsChristophe Jaffrelot, Research Director, CERI, France

Analyzing Religious Conflicts as Wars of the Third Kind: The Case of MindanaoRenato Cruz de Castro, Chair, International Studies Department, De la SalleUniversity, Manila, Philippines



1540 – 1600 Discussant: Bryan Turner, Professor, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore


1700 End of First Day

1900 Dinner (By invitation only)

Venue: House of Peranakan @ 1020 East Coast Parkway

DAY 2 – Wednesday, 4 May 2005

0900 – 1030 Panel Three Responses to Religious Conflicts

Chair: Ralf Emmers, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

Presenters ‘Blessed Are the Peacemakers’: Lessons in Interfaith Dialogue and Reconciliationfor Southeast AsiaTan See Seng, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

Facilitated Joint BrainstormingKeith Fitzgerald, Senior Fellow & Head, Asian Programme on Negotiation& Conflict Management, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Towards better peace processes: A comparative analysis of attempts to brokerpeace with MNLF and GAMS.P.Harish, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

Problematising the role of the state in the dynamics of religious conflict in Indoneis:The Case of MalukuAlesius Jemadu, Head of Department of International Relations, ParahyanganCatholic University, Indonesia


1050 – 1110 Discussant: Syed Nazakat, Sahara Time, Kashmir


1210 – 1240 Closing RemarksJoseph Liow, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,Singapore

1240 – 1400 Lunch (Venue: Café Biz @ Lobby Level) / End of Conference


L i s t o f P a r t i c i p a n t s

PAPER PRESENTERS

1. Mariam Abou Zahabb, Lecturer, INALCO,France

2. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Senior Lecturer, School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia

3. Linell Cady, Professor of Religious Studies and Director, Centre for the Study of Religion and Conflict, ArizonaState University

4. Renato Cruz de Castro, Chair, International Studies Department, De la Salle University, Manila, Philippines

5. Keith Fitzgerald, Senior Fellow & Head, Asian Programme on Negotiation & Conflict Management, Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

6. Riaz Hassan, Professor, Flinders University, Australia

7. Christophe Jaffrelot, Research Director, CERI, France

8. Alesius Jemadu, Head of Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University, Indonesia

9. Ong Teng Kwee, Research Analyst, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

10. Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor & Head of Studies, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

11. S.P. Harish, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

12. Tan See Seng, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

DISCUSSANTS / CHAIRPERSONS

13. Syed Farid Alatas, National University of Singapore, Singapore

14. Ralf Emmers, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

15. Joseph Liow, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

16. Syed Nazakat, Sahara Time, Kashmir

17. Bryan Turner, Professor, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

AMBASSADORS / HIGH COMMISSIONERS

18. H. E. Pengiran Dato Paduak Haji Yusof bin Pengiran Kula, High Commissioner, High Commission of BruneiDarussalam

19. H. E. Angel Flisfisch, Ambassador, Embassy of Chile

20. H.E. Mohamed Elzorkany, Ambassador, Embassy of the Arab of Egypt

21. H. E. Itzhak Shoham, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel

22. H. E. Ryu Kwang-Sok, Ambassador, Embassy of The Republic of Korea

23. H.E Mrs Belen A. Fule-Anota, Ambassador, Philippines Embassy

24. H. E. Dr Mohamad Amin Kurdi, Ambassador, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia

25. H. E. Chalermpol Thanchitt, Ambassador, Royal Thai Embassy

DIPLOMATIC CROPS / DEFENCE ATTACHE

26. Mark Carroll, First Secretary (Political), The Australian High Commission

27. Yvonne Grawert, Research Officer, The Australian High Commission

28. Charmaine Quade, Counsellor (Police Liaison), The Australian High Commission

29. Affonso Santos, Minister of Counsellor, Embassy of Brazil

30. Carole Johnson, Director of Political Affairs, British High Commission

31. Philip Malone, Director-General Political & Communications, British High Commission


32. Annie Legault, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission

33. Ludek Zahradnicek, Charge d’ Affaires, Embassy of the Czech Republic

34. Anita Csiszar, Personal Assistant, The Embassy of the Republic of Hungary

35. Sanjiv Kumar, First Secretary, High Commission of India

36. Nasri Gustaman, Minister Counsellor, Indonesia Embassy

37. Irwan Heryudanto, Indonesia Embassy

38. Widya Rahmanto, Head of Information, Press & Culture (Second Secretary), Indonesia Embassy

39. Zulkifli Mansor, Defence Adviser, Malaysian High Commission

40. Azhar Tahir, Assistant Defence Advise, Malaysian High Commission

41. Wibe Ploeg, First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy

42. Cotu Sever, Charge D’affaires, Embassy of Romania

43. Bafedile Margeret Ramarlape, First Secretary, High Commission of the Republic of South Africa

44. Patrick Kupelwieser, Swiss Embassy

45. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Second Secretary, Royal Thai Embassy

46. Kesanee Palanuwongse, Counsellor, Royal Thai Embassy

47. Qiana Bradford, Economic Officer, US Embassy

48. Jacob P Merciez, Assistant Navel Attache, US Embassy

JCTC/PMO

49. Jerome Kho, Research Analyst, JCTC, PMO

50. Lim Ai Teng, AD (Research), JCTC, PMO

MFA

51. Kevin Cheok, Deputy Director, Southeast Asia Directorate, MFA

MHA

52. Kasthuri, Officer,

53. Lim Hock Chuan, Deputy Secretary

54. Lin Chung Ying, Director (Security Education)

55. Jeannie Tan, Officer

56. Serene Toh, Officer

MINDEF HQ

57. Chio Su-Mei, Officer, MINDEF

58. Chua Yee Sian, Officer, MINDEF

59. Phyllis Goh Yi Yuen, Officer, MINDEF

60. Irene Lim Sye Cheng, Officer, MINDEF

61. Tan Kim Ann, MINDEF

62. Tan Gwee Khiang, Deputy Director, MINDEF

63. Paul Tan Wei Chean, Officer, MINDEF

64. Adeline Yeo En Hui, Office, MINDEF


PSG/MINDEF

65. Kenneth Chong, Staff Officer, PSG, MINDEF

66. Simon Sim, Staff Officer, PSG, MINDEF

SPF

67. Rozlan Giri, Deputy Director (SD), Singapore Police Force

Think Tank

68. Lai Ah Eng, Senior Research Fellow, IPS

69. Mette Ekeroth, Researcher, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

IDSS

70. Faizah Abdul Samat, Research Analyst (ICPVTR), IDSS

71. Sarah Burnell, Research Analyst (ICPVTR), IDSS

72. Sabrina Chua, Research Analyst (ICPVTR), IDSS

73. Morten Hansen, Graduate Research Assistant, IDSS

74. Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Research Analyst (ICPVTR), IDSS

75. Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow, IDSS

76. Elena Pavlova, Research Associate, IDSS

77. Premarani Somasundram, Senior Fellow, IDSS

78. Norman Vasu, Post Doctoral Fellow, IDSS

79. Bentley Walter, Visiting Fellow (ICPVTR), IDSS

80. Wong Tze Yung, Research Analyst (ICPVTR), IDSS

MSc Student, IDSS

81. Francisco N Cruz Jr, MSc, IDSS

82. Justin Hastings, Intern, IDSS

83. Gurbachan Singh, MSc, IDSS

southeast asiain south andreligious conflictanatomy of · dehumanisation process by sanctifying the...

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