spatial reuse in spectrum access: a matrix spatial congestion games approach
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Spatial Reuse in Spectrum Access: A Matrix Spatial Congestion Games Approach. Kai Zhou, Gaofei Sun, Xinbing Wang Department of Electronic Engineering Shanghai Jiao Tong University Zhiyong Feng Key Lab. of Universal Wireless Commun. Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications. Outline. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Spatial Reuse in Spectrum Access:Spatial Reuse in Spectrum Access:A Matrix Spatial Congestion Games ApproachA Matrix Spatial Congestion Games Approach
Kai Zhou, Gaofei Sun, Xinbing WangDepartment of Electronic Engineering
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Zhiyong FengKey Lab. of Universal Wireless Commun.
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
OutlineOutline Introduction
Motivations Related work Objectives
System Model and Problem Formation Potential Game Approach Matrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric Results Conclusion and Future Work
MotivationsMotivationsHow to allocate spectrum in CRNs efficiently?
system throughput fairness issue … …
MotivationsMotivations Spatial reuse is a key feature in wireless networks
Interference model … …
Related worksRelated works
Model distributed spectrum competition as Congestion Games Congestion games [3] Convergence speed [8] Price of anarchy [9]
[3]R. Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 65–67, 1973.[8] R. Southwell and J. Huang, “Convergence dynamics of resource homogeneous congestion games,” in Proc. International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). Shanghai, China, Apr. 2011.[9] L. Law, J. Huang, M. Liu, S. Li et al., “Price of anarchy for cognitive mac games,” in Proc. Global Telecommunications Conference. Hawaii, Dec. 2009.
Congestion !
Related worksRelated works Extend congestion games to consider spatial
reuse Virtual resource [13] Conflict graph [11] [12]
[11]C. Tekin, M. Liu, R. Southwell, J. Huang, and S. H. A. Ahmad, “Atomiccongestion games on graphs and its applications in networking,” IEEETransactions on Networking, In Press.[12] M. Liu and Y. Wu, “Spectum sharing as congestion games,” in Proc. the 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. IAllerton House, Illinois, Sept. 2008.[13] S. Ahmad, C. Tekin, M. Liu, R. Southwell, and J. Huang, “Spectrumsharing as spatial congestion games,” Arxiv preprint arXiv:1011.5384,2010.
directed or undirected
weighted or unweighted
ObjectivesObjectivesMulti-radios for each SUWeighted interference level
Local
Updates
EquilibriumConverge
?
Will SUs’ local selfish updates of channel selection finally converge to an Equilibrium ?
OutlineOutline Introduction System Model and Problem Formation
System model Problem formation
Potential Game Approach Matrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric Results Conclusion and Future Work
System modelSystem model User set :Resource (channel) set :
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Payoff functions : User-specific Non-user-specific Non-increasing with n
Utility :
{1,2,..., }U N
{1,2,..., }R R
1
( )N
ir jr ij
j
g S I
1
( ) ( )i
Ni i
r jr ijr j
p g S I
Problem formationProblem formationChannel selection matrix
Each user can access channels simultaneously ( )Interference level matrix
m m R
1 2 3 4
1 0 0.6 0.3 1
2 0.6 0 0 0.7
3 0.3 0 0 0.1
4 1 0.7 0.1 0
User number (N=4)
User
nu
mb
er
1 2 3
1 1 1 0
2 1 0 1
3 0 1 1
4 1 1 0
User n
um
ber
Channel number (R=3,m=2)
ijI
Channel selection matrix Interference level matrix
irS
Problem formationProblem formation Strategy profile: Matrix Spatial Congestion Games (MSCG)
Four types of MSCG according to payoff function:non-resource-specific and non-user-specificnon-resource-specific and user-specific resource-specific and non-user-specific resource-specific and user-specific
( , , ( ) , ( ) , , )i U r r R ir ijiU R g S I
1 2( , ,..., )N
Outline Outline Introduction System Model and Problem Formation Potential Game Approach Matrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric Results Conclusion and Future Work
Potential game approachPotential game approachPotential function [3]: Basic idea :
for each user : the value of potential function changes
correlating to the change of each user’s payoff
e.g.
potential function is boundedusers can’t update infinitely to increase
payoffs
[3] R. Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria,”INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, vol. 2, no. 1,pp. 65–67, 1973.
1 2( ) : N Z
'( ')i i
( ') ( ) ( ') ( ),i ip p i U
( )
Potential game approachPotential game approachFinite improvement property (FIP)
Improvement steps Improvement steps are finitePure Nash Equilibrium (PNE)
( ') ( ) 0,i ip p i U
( *) ( ), , , *i ip p i U
PNE
FIPLocal
updates
OutlineOutlineIntroduction System Model and Problem FormationPotential Game ApproachMatrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric ResultsConclusion and Future Work
MSCG –I/IVMSCG –I/IVMSCG with non-user-specific & non-
resource specific payoff functions payoff function : utility :
potential function :
proved:
1
( )N
jr ijj
g S I
1
( ) ( )i
Ni
jr ijr j
p g S I
1
( ) ( )i
ir jr iji U r R j
g S S I
( ') ( ) ( ') ( ),i ip p i U
MSCG – I/IVMSCG – I/IV Theorem 1:For matrix spatial congestion games with non-
resource-specific and non-user-specific payoff functions, every asynchronous improvement step path is finite and converges to a pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). Furthermore, any change of the strategy profile can not result in a grater value of potential function , which indicating that this PNE is also a local optimum in potential function.• FIP PNE• Local optimum in potential function
MSCG – II/IVMSCG – II/IVMSCG with user-specific & non-
resource specific payoff functions payoff function : utility :
potential function :
, where
,
( ) ( )ij iji j U
n I
( ) ,ij i j ir jrr R
n r r r S S
1
( ) ( )i
Ni i
jr ijr j
p g S I
1
( )N
ijr ij
j
g S I
MSCG – II/IVMSCG – II/IVProved:
with increasing and non-increasing with
when increases,
decreases accordingly
Theorem 2: For matrix spatial congestion games with non-resource-specific and user-specific payoff functions, every asynchronous improvement path is finite and converges to a pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE).
1 1
( ) ( )N N
ir jr iji r R j
S S I
1
( ) ( )N
i iir jr ij
r R j
p g S S I
( )ip ( )ig x x
( )ip ( )
MSCG – III,IV/IVMSCG – III,IV/IV Proposition 1: For MSCG with resource-
specific and non-user-specific payoff functions, FIP does not hold. PNE ?
Proposition 2: For MSCG with resource-specific and user-specific payoff functions, FIP does not hold. Moreover, a PNE dose not necessarily exist.
OutlineOutlineIntroduction System Model and Problem FormationPotential Game ApproachMatrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric Results
user number channel utilization proportion updating mechanism
Conclusion and Future Work
User numberUser number using updating steps indicating convergence
speed users update in a predefined order
User numberUser number
Avera
ge im
pro
vem
en
t ste
ps
tota
l imp
rovem
en
t ste
ps
Channel utilization proportion Channel utilization proportion
Channel utilization proportion: more radios better ?
Avera
ge im
pro
vem
en
t ste
ps
Channel utilization proportion
Updating mechanismMechanism 1: updating in a predefined
orderMechanism 2: maximum improvement first
[8]
[8] R. Southwell and J. Huang, “Convergence dynamics of resource homogeneous congestion games,” in Proc.
International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). Shanghai, China, Apr. 2011.
imp
rovem
en
t ste
ps
User number
OutlineOutlineIntroduction System Model and Problem FormationPotential Game ApproachMatrix Spatial Congestion Games Discussion Based on Numeric ResultsConclusion and Future Work
ConclusionFuture work
ConclusionConclusionMSCG model
Multi-radioSpatial reuse with weighted interference
level
Four types of MSCGGeneral payoff functionsFIPPNEConvergence speed analysis
Future workFuture workMore work on later two types of MSCG
achieve PNE?• Network topology• Charging scheme
Performance of PNE POA analysisFairness issueDistributed algorithm to achieve global
optimality
Convergence speed
Thank you !Thank you !