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DesigningJudicialInstitutions:SpecialFederalCourtsandtheU.S.JudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation

TraceyE.GeorgeandMargaretS.Williams1

ThedefinitivefeatureoftheArticleIIIjudiciaryisindependentjudgesworkinginahierarchical structure. Special federal courts effectivelyoperateoutsidethis structure, raising questions about the implications for the proceduralrightsofpartiesandimpartialadjudication.TheUnitedStatesJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation(or“MDLPanel”) isonesuchspecialcourt.Apowerfuljudicial institutionwith substantial discretion over complex litigation in theUnitedStates,theMDLPanelisoneofasmallnumberofspecialfederalcourtscreated pursuant to Article III by Congress and staffed by a Chief‐Justice‐appointedgroupofArticleIIIjudgesforlimitedterms.Thesecourtsadjudicatewith little oversight and limited public awareness but exercise substantialauthority. TheMDLPanel, forallpracticalpurposes,controlswheremanyofthe most far‐reaching and significant private civil actions will be resolvedwhich can affect procedural and substantive rights of the parties. Anunderstanding of theMDL Panel would shed light on the design of specialcourtsandtheeffectsoncorequestionsofjudicialtheory.Thispaperreliesonalarge‐scaledatabasetoexamineempiricallythisspecialfederalcourtandtoconsidertheimplicationsforthefederaljudicialbranch.

I. INTRODUCTIONThefederaljudicialsystemistypicallydescribedasahierarchicalsystemwiththreetiers:civil suits and criminalprosecutions are filed in the federaldistrict courts, losingpartiesmayappeal to theU.S.CourtsofAppeals, andpetitionersmayask for reviewby theU.S.SupremeCourt,whichhasthelastwordonfederallaw.And,formorethanthreehundredthousandlawsuitsannually,thataccountislargelycorrect.2Butitisincomplete.Missing 1 George is Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, Tarkington Chair in Teaching Excellence, andDirector of the Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation and Dispute Resolution Program at Vanderbilt University.WilliamsisVisitingScholaratVanderbiltLawSchool.AnearlierversionofthisarticlewaspresentedattheRoyalNetherlandsAcademyofArtsandSciences(Amsterdam)CivilJusticeColloquiumandtheUniversityofChicagoJudicialBehaviorWorkshop.Weappreciatethefeedbackwhichwereceivedatthosepresentationsand from JoeCecil,KevinClermont,FrankEasterbrook,LeeEpstein,ChrisGuthrie,BillLandes,EmeryLee,RichardNagareda,DickPosner,JeffRachlinski,andKevinScott.TheauthorsthankDavidMitchell,GeraldineYoung,andThomasMcFarlandforresearchassistance. GeorgethanksVanderbilt’sBranstetterLitigation&DisputeResolutionProgramforfinancialsupport.

2 Themodern structurewhereby actions begin in the federal district courts are appealed to the courts ofappealsandcertpetitionsarefiledwiththeSupremeCourtdatestoroughly1911whentheoldcircuitcourtswere finally abolished. An intermediate appellate court had been created in twenty years earlier. TheSupremeCourt’sdiscretionover itsdocketdatestothesametimebuthasbeenexpandedrepeatedlysincethen.Forahistoricalevolutionofthehierarchy,seeTraceyE.George,OntheDynamicsandDeterminantsoftheDecisiontoGrantEnBancReview,WASH.L.REV.(1999).

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are a set of courts established by Congress under Article III to address specific types ofclaims, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA),3 the TemporaryEmergencyCourtofAppeals,4theIndependentCounselCourt,5andmostrecentlytheAlienTerroristRemovalCourt.6Allfourcourts,whicharestaffedonashort‐termandoverloadbasis by life‐tenured judges fromother courts,were createdon the grounds that certainquestionsrequirespecialtreatmentoutsidethenormalArticleIIIprocess. Specialcourtshandle important matters and set far‐reaching legal policy while acting almost entirelyoutside theproceduralprotectionsat theheartof theArticle III judiciary. Butnonemayhavebeenaswidelyinfluentialasthefirstcourtcreatedinthemodernspecializationwave,theJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation. TheUnitedStatesJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation,or“MDLPanel”,acourtof seven federal circuit anddistrict judges,may transfer factually related actions filed indifferentfederaldistrictstoasinglejudgeinanyfederaldistrictforconsolidatedpre‐triallitigation.8 Theconsolidatedmultidistrictaction(or“MDL”)mayinvolveonlyafewcaseswith a small number of parties or include hundreds (or even thousands) of cases andparties. The transferee judge has significant discretion over the management of thelitigation prior to trial.9 Questions of federal law are controlled by the law of thetransferee,notthetransferor,court.10Whileacasetheoreticallyreturnstothetransferor 3Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749(creatingtheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(FISA)andtheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtofReviewin1978).

4EconomicStabilizationActAmendmentsof1971,Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749.

5Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749

5EthicsinGovernmentActof1978,Pub.L.No.95‐521,§602(a)(creatingaspecial“division”oftheDistrictofColumbia Circuit staffed by three judges chosen by the Chief Justice to appoint and oversee IndependentCounsel).

6AntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996,Pub.L.No.104‐132,110Stat.1214.

828U.S.C.§1407(a).

9Thetransfereejudgehasdiscretionovertheextentofcoordinationorconsolidation(aswellasthechoicebetweenthetwo). See,e.g., InreTheBearStearnsCos., Inc.Sec.,Derivative&ERISALitig.,572F.Supp.2d1377(J.P.M.L.2008);InreMut.FundsLitig.,310F.Supp.2d1359(J.P.M.L.2004);InreEquityFundingCorpofAmericaSec.Litig.,375F.Supp.1378(J.P.M.L.1974).Moreover,thejudgecan,withlittlereview,remandanyindividualcasetoitstransferorcourttherebyremovingitfromthecentralizedproceeding.See,e.g.,InreIvy,901F.2d7 (2dCir.1990); In rePrudential Ins.Co.ofAmericaSalesPracticesLitig.,170F.Supp.2d1346,1347‐48 (J.P.M.L. 2001). The transferee judge alsohasauthority toappoint leadattorneysanddeterminetheir compensation. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi‐Class ActionMethod ofManagingMultidistrictLitigations:ProblemsandaProposal,63VAND.L.REV.107(2010). Thescopeof the transfereejudge’sdiscretiongrantsthe transferee judgeconsiderable leveragetoencourageparties toprogressalongthecoursewhichthejudgedeemsmostprudent.Asonetransferorjudgewrylyobserved,“itisalmostapointofhonoramongtransfereejudgesactingpursuanttoSection1407(a)thatcasessotransferredshallbesettledratherthansentbacktotheirhomecourtsfortrial.”DeLaventurav.ColumbiaAcornTrust,417F.Supp.2d147(D.Mass.2006).

10SeeInreKoreanAirLinesDisasterofSeptember1,1983,829F.2d1171(D.C.Cir.1987),aff’dsub.nom.,

George&WilliamsDRAFTforMPSA2013

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judgefortrial,nearlyallcasesareresolvedinthetransfereecourt.11 Yet,theMDLPanel,likemostspecial federalcourts, isnotwell‐knownoutsidetheattorneysandpartieswhoappearbeforeit. The relative obscurity of theMDL process belies its importance.12 Let’s start byconsidering the lawsuits involved. If a manufacturer produces a harmful product, anairplanecrashes,orapubliccorporationlosesalargeamountofmoney,thenmultidistrictlitigationisanaturalconsequence.ThePanel’sdocketreadslikealaundrylistofthemostimportant lawsuits of the half‐century. High‐profile securities and derivative lawsuitsrelated to the collapse of financial services firm Lehman Brothers13 and to the PonzischemeofBernieMadoff.14 Consumerprotectionclaims involvingthousandsofplaintiffs

Chanv.KoreanAirLines,Ltd.,490U.S.122(1989)(holdingthattheairline’sliabilitywasnotunlimitedasitwouldhavebeeninthetransferorcourtbutratherwaslimitedto$75,000perpassengerbasedonthelawofthe transferee circuit). Questions of state law, however, are treated as though the case had not beentransferred.SeeVanDusenv.Barrack,376U.S.612(1964)(holdingthatsection1404(a)transferorsdonotchangetherelevantstateforpurposesofchoice‐of‐lawrules);InreAirCrashDisasteratBoston,Mass.onJuly31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1119‐21 (D.Mass. 1975) (extending Van Dusen to section 1407 transfers.);Stirlingv.ChemicalBank,382F.Supp.1146,1150n.5(S.D.N.Y.1974)(same).

11SeeEmeryG.Lee,MargaretS.Williams,RichardA.Nagareda,JoeS.Cecil,ThomasE.Willging,&KevinM.Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: An EmpiricalInvestigation, working paper (detailing how, when, and where MDL cases are resolved); see also MarcGalanter,TheVanishingTrial:AnExaminationofTrialsandRelatedMatters inFederalandStateCourts, 1J.EMP.LEGALSTUD.459(2004)(demonstratingthattrialisrareinlitigationgenerally).AsRichardNagaredahasexplained,“consolidatedpretrialproceedingsatthebehestoftheMDLPanelalreadyformasettingripeforplaintiffs’lawyersanddefendantstobegindiscussionsaboutacomprehensivepeace.”RICHARDA.NAGAREDA,MASSTORTS IN AWORLD OF SETTLEMENT260 (2007). NinthCircuit JudgeAlexKozinskihas takenadifferentview, concluding that the small numbers of cases returned to the transferor court “tell the story of aremarkable power grab by federal judges who have parlayed a narrow grant of authority to conductconsolidateddiscoveryintoamechanismforsystematicallydenyingplaintiffstherighttotrialintheirforumof choice.” In reAmericanContinentalCorp./LincolnSav.&LoanSec.Litig., 102F.3d1524 (9thCir.1996)(Kozinski,J.,dissenting),rev’dsub.nom.,LexeconInc.v.MilbergWeissBershadHynes&Lerach,523U.S.26(1998).

12QuantitativeempiricalscholarshipontheMDLPanelalsohasbeenlimited.TheauthorscompletedarecentstudyofthePanel’sdecisions.MargaretS.Williams&TraceyE.George,WhoWillManageComplexLitigation?TheDecisiontoTransferandConsolidateMultidistrictLitigation,J.EMP.LEGALSTUD.forthcoming.Earlierworksanalyzedasubsetof theMDLPanel’srulings. SeeMarkHerrmann&PearsonBownas,MakingBookontheMDL Panel: Will It Centralize Your Products Liability Cases?, 8 BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 110 (2007)(examiningthePanel’s137decisionsinproductsliabilitycasesfrom1968to2007);Note,TheJudicialPanelandtheConductofMultidistrictLitigation,87HARV.L.REV.1001(1974)(reviewingalltransferordersissuedbefore 1974); Daniel A. Richards,An Analysis of the Judicial Panel onMultidistrict Litigation’s Selection ofTransfereeDistrictand Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311 (2010) (categorizing the reasons given by theMDLPaneltosupportitsdesignationofatransfereecourtandjudgeduringafiveandahalfyearperiod).

13InreLehmanBrothersHoldings,Inc.,Securities&ERISALitig.,598F.Supp.2d1362(2009).

14See,e.g.,InreTremontGroupHoldings,Inc.,Sec.Litig.,626F.Supp.2d1338(J.P.M.L.2009);InreMeridianFundsGroup Sec.& ERISALitig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2009); In reOptimal StrategicU.S. EquityFundsSec.Litig.,648F.Supp.2d1388(J.P.M.L.2009).


andmillionsofdollarsincludingthosearisingfromthesubprimemortgagecrisisof2006.15Products liability actions, includingmore than40,000 asbestos cases16 and thousands ofsilicone gel breast implant suits,17 as well as common disasters like the Union Carbidechemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India.18 The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 overLockerbie,Scotland,theSoviet’sdowningofaKoreanAirLinesflightovertheSeaofJapan,and nearly every other air crash claim filed in federal court.19 TheseMDLs are simplyillustrativeofthescopeandscaleofmultidistrictlitigationinfederalcourts. Therawnumberofcases,claims,parties,anddollarsalonewouldmakethePanel’sdecisionsasignificantsubjectofstudy,buttheimpactofthosecasesreachesevenfarther.Becausethelawsuitsareamongthemosthigh‐profilefederalcivilactions,theirdispositioninfluencesthepublic’sperceptionoftheciviljusticesystemandimpactsthedevelopmentofpublicpolicyintherelatedsubstantiveandproceduralareasof law. Thehandlingandresolutionofthesedisputesaffectslargenumbersofindividualsandaltersthebehaviorofcorporations,federalagencies,stategovernments,andlawfirms. Likeotherspecialcourts, theMDLPanel’ssubstantiveauthority,membership,andproceduresaredifferentfromtraditionalArticleIIIcourts.ThePaneldoesnotdecidecasesbutratherdecideswhowilldecidecases.Judgesarenotappointedtothecourtbutratherare assigned temporarily from other courts where they continue to hear cases. Panel

15See,e.g., InreAmeriquestMortgageCo.MortgageLendingPracticesLitig.,408F.Supp.2d1354(J.P.M.L.2005).

16In1977,theMDLPanelissuedanordertoshowcausewhy103asbestospersonalinjuryactionspendingin19districtsshouldnotbecentralized. Whenallbutonerespondingpartyopposedcentralization,theMDLPanelvacateditsshow‐causeorderanddidnotcentralizetheactions.InreAsbestos&AsbestosInsulationMaterialProductsLiab.Litig., 431F. Supp.906 (J.P.M.L.1977). Fourteenyears laterat theurgingof eightfederaldistrictjudges,theMDLPanelagainissuedashowcauseorderwithrespectto26,639actionspendingin 87 federal districts. The parties disagreed overwhether to consolidate and, if consolidation occurred,wherethemattersshouldbeassigned.TheMDLPanelcentralizedtheactionsbeforeJudgeCharlesWeiner,anexperiencedMDL judgeand formerMDLPanelmember, in theEasternDistrictofPennsylvania. In reAsbestosProductsLiab. Litig. (No.VI), 771F. Supp.415 (J.P.M.L. 1991). Thousandsof other actionswerejoined as tag‐alongs. For a history of the course of the litigation at the district court level, see AmchemProducts, Inc. v.Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597‐608 (“In the face of legislative inaction, the federal courts—lackingauthoritytoreplacestatetortsystemswithanationaltoxictortcompensationregime—endeavoredto work with the procedural tools available to improve management of federal asbestos litigation. Eightfederaljudges,experiencedinthesuperintendenceofasbestoscases,urgedtheJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation (MDL Panel), to consolidate in a single district all asbestos complaints then pending in federalcourts.Acceptingtherecommendation,theMDLPaneltransferredallasbestoscasesthenfiled,butnotyetontrialinfederalcourtstoasingledistrict[.]”).

17InreSiliconeGelBreastImplantsProd.Liab.Litig.,793F.Supp.1098(J.P.M.L.1992).

18 In reUnionCarbine Corp. Gas PlantDisaster at Bhopal, India inDec., 1984, 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.L.1985).

19See,e.g.,InreAirDisasterinLockerbie,Scotland,onDecember21,1988,733F.Supp.547(J.P.M.L.1990);InreKoreanAirLinesDisasterofSeptember1,1983,575F.Supp.342(J.P.M.L.1983).


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judgesincludedistrictandcircuitjudgeswhocomefromacrosstheUnitedStatesbecausethesevenjudgesmustsitindifferentfederalcircuits.TheChiefJusticeappointsmembersfrom among the hundreds of sitting Article III judges and sets their terms. Just as itsmembership is distinctive, theMDL Panel’s customs and procedures are as well.27 ThePanel travels to different places to hear oral arguments which are more informal andcollegial than those before othermultimember courts. The Panel sits for all caseswithseven judges, more judges than any other collegial decision‐making body in the federalcourtsexceptforenbanccourtsofappealsandtheSupremeCourt.ThePanel’sdenialofamotiontoconsolidateisunreviewable,andagrantisonlyreviewablebyextraordinarywrittothecourtofappealsforthedistricttowhichthecaseshavebeentransferred.28Finally,thePanel has over time and in differentways solicitedworkwhere other federal courtshavetriedtoturnitaway. AllspecialcourtsaredefinedbytheirexceptionalitywithintheArticleIIIbranch.29Mattersareremovedfromthetypicaladjudicativeprocesstobehandledbythejudgesofthe special court. The court’s members are chosen by the Chief Justice without anyexplanationorconstraint.Thespecializationbringsthejudgesinmoreregularcontactandexchangewith a defined set of interested parties. The special court’s decisions are notsubjecttotheusualoversightbyhighercourtsorthepublic.Thespecialcourtjudgesmayhaveastakeinthecourt’scontinuationandanabilitytoaccumulateauthoritythroughthecourt’shighlyspecialized focus. Standardsubstantiveandproceduralrulesdonotapply.And, these exceptional and defining features raise meaningful concerns about party’sproceduralrightsandtheindependenceoftheadjudicators. TheMDLprocessdeprivesparties,especiallyplaintiffs,ofcertainproceduralrightswhichtheyotherwisehold.Forexample,theplaintiff’schoiceofforumisusuallystronglyfavored.30 But, a plaintiff’s suit may be transferred to a district which she opposed and

27TheMDLPanelstaffmaintainsausefulwebsite,gearedtowardprospectivefilers,thatprovidesextensiveinformationonitsproceduresaswellasorders.http://www.MDLPanel.uscourts.gov/.

28 28 U.S.C. §1407(e) (“No proceedings for review of any order of the panelmay be permitted except byextraordinarywritpursuant totheprovisionsof title28,section1651,UnitedStatesCode.Petitions foranextraordinarywrit to reviewanorderof thepanel to set a transferhearing andotherordersof thepanelissuedpriortotheordereitherdirectingordenyingtransfershallbefiledonlyinthecourtofappealshavingjurisdictionoverthedistrictinwhichahearingistobeorhasbeenheld.Petitionsforanextraordinarywritto review anorder to transfer or orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed only in the court of appealshaving jurisdictionoverthetransfereedistrict.Thereshallbenoappealorreviewofanorderof thepaneldenyingamotiontotransferforconsolidatedorcoordinatedproceedings.”).

29SeeLAWRENCEBAUM,SPECIALIZINGTHECOURTS(2011).

30GulfOilCorp.v.Gilbert,330U.S.501(1947).TheU.S.Constitutionandfederalandstatestatutesconstraintheavailableoptions.Federalcourtsmusthavebothpersonaljurisdictionandsubjectmatterjurisdictiontohear a case. But, in large‐scale and/or high‐stakes cases, a plaintiff typicallymay choose amongmultiplelocationsandbetweenstateandfederalcourt.Thedefendantsinsuchactionstypicallyarenationalormulti‐nationalcorporations,whichhavenecessaryminimumcontactstosubjectthemselvestosuitinmanystates.Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (expanding state reach over corporations by findingminimumcontactswith,ratherthanpresencein,astatewassufficienttomeetthedemandsofdueprocess);


which even lacks personal jurisdiction overher claim. Theplaintiff’s chosen counsel nolonger handle her case as they effectively turn over pretrial decisions to lead attorneyschosenbythetransferee judge.31 MDLtransfer thereforemeansthatparties loseabasiclevel of control over the litigationof their claims. Ninth Circuit JudgeAlexKozinski haslikened the process to both a “web” that “ensnare[s]” civil actions and a “vortex” that“sucks”incases.33 Amore fundamental criticismof special courts like theMDLPanel is grounded inquestionsabouttheimplicationsoftheassignmentofArticleIIIcasestoacourtwhichmaylack important Article III protections. TheArticle III court structure is seen as the bestavailable means of providing a fair and just means of resolving disputes. Life tenuredjudgeswho are assigned to a generalist court and handle an array ofmatters involvingdifferentpartiesaremore likely tobedisinterested in theoutcomeof anydispute: theylackself‐interestintheoutcomeaswellasprotectionfromoutsidepressures.Monitoringby judges on the same court and reviewing courts serve as additional checks. And, thepracticesdevelopedbycourtsfurtherthoseinterestsaswell.Asaresult,federalcourtssetthe standard for what process is necessary for fairness. Debate over the trial ofGuantanamodetainees has repeatedly turned on the need for justification for taking theprosecutionsoutof federaldistrictcourtsandputting theminmilitary tribunals. Onthecivil side, arguments regarding mandatory arbitration clauses often focus on whetherarbitration provides a resolution process sufficiently similar to that afforded by courts.Specialcourtsmaybemoreeasilyinfluencedbypoliticalpowerswhetherexercisedbytheotherbranchesorby interestgroups,by theirown interests in themattersbefore them,andbythepreferencesoftheChiefJusticewhochosethem. Ourpaperproceedsasfollows.WebeginourpaperbylookingatthecreationoftheMDLPaneland itsplace in thehistoryofspecial federalcourts(Part II). “Special federalcourts”forpurposesofthisprojectincludeonlythosecourtswhosemembersareArticleIIIjudgesonothercourts.34WethenlookmorecloselyattheevolutionofthePanel,offeringthefirstdetailedexaminationofwhohasservedonthepanel.InPartIII,weproposeaset AsahiMetalIndus.Co.v.SuperiorCourtofCalifornia,480U.S.102(1987)(definingtheboundariesofmodernjurisdictionlaw).

31SeeCharlesSilver&GeoffreyP.Miller,TheQuasi‐ClassActionMethodofManagingMulti‐DistrictLitigations:ProblemsandProposal,63VAND.L.REV.107(2010).

33InreAmericanContinentalCorporation/LincolnSav.&LoanSec.Litigation,102F.3d1524(9thCir.1996)(Kozinski,J.,dissenting),rev’dsub.nom.,LexeconInc.v.MilbergWeissBershadHynes&Lerach,523U.S.26(1998).

34Wearenotconsideringallcourtsofspecialjurisdiction,whichwouldincludeArticleIIIbodiesliketheU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheFederalCircuitandtheU.S.CourtofInternationalTrade.TheirjudgesareappointeddirectlytothecourtthroughtheArticleIIIprocess,thecourtsoperatejustlikeothercourtsatthesamelevelin their substantivepowers andprocedures, and theyworkwithin the judicial hierarchy.See,e.g., FederalCourts ImprovementActof1982,Pub.L.No.97‐164,§127(a),165,96Stat.25(codifiedasamendedat28U.S.C. §1295) (creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); Customs Courts Act of 1980(establishingtheU.S.CourtofInternationalTrade).


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ofcriteriabywhichwecanevaluateaspecialfederalcourtliketheMDLPanelinordertoassesswhetherthecourt’sorganizationandoperationareconsistentwiththefundamentalgoalsofArticleIII.WeoffertheresultsofourempiricalanalysisoftheMDLPanelonthosemetrics.WeconcludeinPartIVwithrecommendations.II. THEHISTORYOFSPECIALJUDICIALINSTITUTIONSANDTHEGENESISOFTHEMDLPANELA. TheCreationofSpecialFederalCourtsandtheCaseofMultidistrictLitigationThe federal courts in theTwentiethCenturyexperienced substantial growthandchange,especiallyinthenumberandcomplexityofcivilsuits.35 Federal judgesfoundthemselveshandlingcaseswithmultiplepartiesandmultipleclaimswhichmightbe filedasasinglecivilactionor inseparateactionsbut involvingcommonfacts. TheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure as originally created in 1937 provided that a district court could consolidateseparate actions involving a common question into a single action for pretrial and eventrial. The goals were convenience, economy, and consistency. Trial courts wereencouragedtoconsolidate.ButneithertheFederalRulesnoranyfederalstatuteaddressedhowtohandleseparateactionsinvolvingacommonquestionifthoseactionswerefiledindifferentdistricts.36 Thefailureoffederallawtoaddressmultidistrictlitigationbecameapparentintheearly 1960s when 1,880 civil anti‐trust lawsuits were filed against a group of electricalequipmentmanufacturersin35judicialdistrictsfromcoasttocoast.37Thesuitsinvolvedmore than 25,000 claims seeking treble damages from defendants, who had previouslypled guilty or been convicted of criminal anti‐trust violations.38 These “electricalequipment” lawsuits, as they became known, threatened to overwhelm the federal trialcourts.39 The sheer number of suits was substantial. (To put the numbers in context,roughly 59,000 civil suits, most involving simple claims, were filed before 241 active 35ForalongerhistoricalviewofSection1470,seeJudithResnik,From“Cases”to“Litigation”,54L.&CONTEMP.PROBLEMS5,29‐34(1991).

36Thefederalvenuestatuteonlyallowedtransfertoaplacewheretheactioncouldhaveoriginallybeenfiled.

37SeeLetter fromWilliamE.Foley,DeputyDirector,Officeof theDeputyAttorneyGeneral,AdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S.Courts,toRep.JohnW.McCormack,SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,April12,1965;Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases:Novel Judicial Administration, 50A.B.A. JOURNAL621 (1964) (This first‐personhistory of the coordinationof these caseswaswrittenby theExecutiveSecretaryandAdministrativeAssistanttotheCo‐ordinatingCommitteeforMultipleLitigation).

38Theallegedanti‐trustviolationsinvolvedmorethan1.5billiondollarsinheavyelectricalequipmentsales.SeeNeal&Goldberg,supranote,at621;RichardAustinSmith,TheIncredibleElectricalConspiracy,parts1&2,Fortune,April1961,at132;May1961,at161(Thisin‐depthinvestigativereportpublishedintwopartsontheprice‐fixingconspiracyandthegovernment’scaserevealsacomplexwebofshadydealingsthatresultedinprisontimeforsevenexecutivesandnearly$2millioninfinesfor29corporations.).

39See112Cong.Rec.22146(1966)(SenatorTydingsdescribedthelitigationgivingrisetotheMDLbillwhichheintroduced).


district judges in 1960.40) Plus, the cases raised complex substantive and proceduralissues.41 Thesimultaneousindependentlitigationoftheserelatedactionswouldnotonlyhave been inefficient and wasteful but also posed the risk of inconsistent decisions asdifferentjudgesruledonthesamelegalquestions.42 TheJudicialConferenceoftheUnitedStatescreatedanewsubcommittee—theCo‐ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts—tomanage the pre‐trial stages of the electrical equipment litigation. The Committeeestablishedacentralized,nationalpre‐trialprocesswiththevoluntaryparticipationofallpartiesandjudges.Despitesomeinitialskepticism,thecoordinatedpre‐triallitigationwasconsidered a great success.43 In 1965, Chief Justice Earl Warren and the Conferenceproposedthepermanentestablishmentofasimilarbody:ajudicialpanelwiththepowerto transfer civil actions involving common questions of fact to a single district forconsolidatedpre‐trialproceedings.44Thisproposalreflectedabroaderandlongerinterestamong federal judges in “complicated” litigation. But, unlike the Federal Rules of CivilProcedureand the federalvenuestatute, theproposal took theauthority for the transferdecisionaway from the individualdistrict judge towhom theoriginal casewasassignedandgaveittoacollectivebody. Congresshadpriorexperiencewith“special”courts.Thefederaljudiciarybeganasessentially a two‐tier system with district courts as the primary trial court and theSupreme Court as the primary appellate court with mandatory jurisdiction.45 “Circuit 40AdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S.Courts,AnnualReportoftheDirector(1960).In2008,267,000suitswerefiledbefore667activedistrictjudges.Id.

41Thefederaltrialcourtshadlimitedexperiencewithprivateanti‐trustsuits: Theaverageannualnumberhadbeen less than250 in the threeprioryears. SeeNeal&Goldberg, supranote, at621Tab.1. And, theproceduralchallengesposedbytherelatedcriminallitigation,aswellastheoverlappingdiscoveryrequests,weresubstantial.

42Asoneobserverputit,“[t]hespecterofconfusionandconflictinthediscoveryprocess,withhundredsofpartiesalloverthecountryseekingsimultaneouslytotakethedepositionofthesamewitnessesortoobtainproduction of the same documents, was alarming.” Neal & Goldberg, supra note, at 622; see alsoAdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S.Courts,AnnualReportoftheDirector95(1962).

43SeeNote,ConsolidationofPretrialProceedingsUnderProposedSection1407oftheJudicialCode:UnansweredQuestionsofTransferandReview,33U.CHI.L.REV.558,560‐61(1966);JohnT.McDermott,TheJudicialPanelonMultidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973) (reporting that Chief Justice Warren in remarks to theAmericanLawInstituteclaimedthat“[i]fithadnotbeenforthemonumentaleffortoftheninejudgesonthisCommittee *** and the remarkable cooperation of the 35 district judges before whom these cases werepending,thedistrictcourtcalendarsthroughoutthecountrycouldwellhavebrokendown.”).TheCommitteeexpandeditseffortstocoordinatepre‐triallitigationinothermultidistrictdisputes,continuingitsoversightuntilreplacedbythePanel.

441965ReportoftheJudicialConferenceoftheUnitedStates12,13(approvingthedraftofsection1407forsubmission to Congress); 112 Cong. Rec. 22146 (1966) (Senator Tydings introducing a bill, S. 159,incorporatingmostoftheConference’sproposal).

45TheJudiciaryActofSept.24,1789,ch.20,IStat.73.


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courts”were created as part of the original judiciary act and given authority to try andreview specific categories of cases, but Congress did not at that time also create circuitjudgeships.46 . Instead, circuit courtswere staffedby twodistrict judges anda SupremeCourt justicewho rode the circuit to different places to hear argument.47 Circuit courtsthus were the first special federal courts.48 The longest standing practice of a federalspecial court has been the use of three‐judge district courts to hear challenges to theconstitutionality of certain statutes.49 But these prior courts were not granted theprospectivepowerthatwouldbegrantedtotheMDLPanel.50 At the same time that it was considering the establishment of a special court onmultidistrict litigation, Congress created the Federal Judicial Center “for the purpose ofseekingknowledgeofthebestmethodsof judicialadministrationthroughscientificstudyso that it may be possible to administer justice in the Federal courts with maximumeffectiveness and minimum waste.”51 The research arm of the federal judiciary wouldprove instrumental to innovation and adaptation in the federal courts, including thecreationofspecialcourts. In1968,CongressadoptedChief JusticeWarren’srecommendation,asrevised, “toprovide centralized management under court supervision of pretrial proceedings inmultipledistrict litigation…toassure the justandefficientconductofsuchcases.”52 Thenew court was focused entirely on procedure: it would not decide disputes, but rather

46RICHARDH.FALLON, JR.ETAL.,HARTANDWECHSLER’STHEFEDERALCOURTSANDTHEFEDERALSYSTEM29(4thed.1996);FELIXFRANKFURTER&JAMESM.LANDIS,THEBUSINESSOFTHESUPREMECOURT(1927).

47 See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 103‐105 , 194‐204 (1940); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIAHARRISON,CREATINGTHEFEDERALJUDICIALSYSTEM(2ded.1994).Thecircuitcourtswereabolishedin1911.TheEvartsAct,ActofMar.3,1011,ch.231,§297,36Stat.1087,1168.

48When Congress in 1893 created intermediate appellate courts (whichwe now think of as the “circuit”courts),itconsideredthepossibilityofotherstructuralchangeswhichwouldhaveincludedArticleIIIcourtswith special functions.Foradetailed listofproposedbut rejected courts from1800sandearly1900s, seeGeorgeW.Rightmire,SpecialFederalCourts,13ILL.L.REV.15,15‐17(1918)(describingcourtswhichwouldhavespecializedbyclaim(Indians,Patents,andPensionAppeals,)orbyprocess (Arbitration)). Itwasnotalwaysclearhowthejudgeswouldbeselectedorthebodieswouldoperate.Rightmirealsoreviewsallcourtsthatwerecreatedoutsidethestandardhierarchy.Seeid.;GeorgeW.Rightmire,SpecialFederalCourts—II,13ILL.L.REV.98(1918).These,however,werelargelyArticleIcourtsofshortduration.

49SeeMichaelE.Solimine,Congress,ExParteYoung,andtheFateoftheThree‐JudgeDistrictCourt,70U.PITT.L.REV.101(2008)(offeringahistoryofthethree‐judgedistrictcourt).

50Wesay“prospective”intentionallyasitwasunclearatthetimehowoftentheMDLPanelwouldactgiventhelimitedexperiencewithmasslitigationofthetypeatissueintheelectricalequipmentdispute.

51H.R.6111,113Cong.Rec.16199(1967).

52HouseReportonS.159,114Cong.Rec.4925(1968).TheseideasalsoinformconstructionoftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.Fed.R.Civ.P.1(“[Theserules]shouldbeconstruedandadministeredtosecurethejust,speedy,andinexpensivedeterminationofeveryactionandproceeding”).


decidewhoshoulddecide. TheMDLPanelwasthebeginningofawaveofspecialcourtscreatedtoaddressnarrowbutessentialquestionsthroughthevehicleofagroupofArticleIIIjudgesfromothercourtsworkingonapart‐timebasis:

TheTemporaryEmergencyCourtofAppealswascreatedin1971.53

TheSpecialRailroadCourtwascreatedin1973.54 Inanoddtwist, theMDLPanelappointsthethreedistrictjudgeswhoserveontheSpecialRailroadCourt.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign IntelligenceSurveillanceCourtofReviewwerecreatedin1978.55

The“IndependentCounselCourt”alsowascreatedin1978.56

Themost recently created special court is theAlienTerroristRemoval Courtwhichwasestablishedin1996.57 Thecourt,comprisedoffivedistrict judgesappointedbytheChiefJustice, may deport alien terrorists without following standard procedures.58 As of lastyear,thecourthadnotheardanymatters,raisingquestionsastowhetheritsspecialstatushasdiscourageditsuse.59 Whytheturntospecialcourts?Advocatespredictedbothreducedcostsandgreaterefficacydecisionsthroughthedivisionoflaborwhichbothreflectsandcreatesexpertise.60

53EconomicStabilizationActAmendmentsof1971,Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749.Comment,TheAppellateJurisdictionoftheTemporaryEmergencyCourtofAppeals,64MINN.L.REV.1247(1980)

54 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93‐236, §289(b), 87 Stat. 985, 999 (codified asamendedat45U.S.C.§719(b)).

55Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749

55Foreign IntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978,Pub.L.No.95‐511, §103,92Stat.1783,1788 (codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.§1803).

56Pub.L.No.92‐210,§211(b),85Stat.743,749

56EthicsinGovernmentActof1978,Pub.L.No.95‐521,§602(a).

57AntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996,Pub.L.No.104‐132,sec.401,§§501‐506,110Stat.1214,1258‐68(codifiedat8U.S.C.§§1531‐37(2006).

58 JohnDorsettNiles,Assessing theConstitutionalityof theAlienTerroristRemovalCourt,57DukeL.J.1833(2008).

59See Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It and Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused Counterterrorism Laws andImplicationsforFutureCounterterrorismPolicies,16LEWIS&CLARKL.REV.677(2012).

60SeealsoRichardA.Posner,WilltheFederalCourtsofAppealsSurviveUntil1984?AnEssayonDelegationandSpecializationoftheJudicialFunction,56S.CAL.L.REV.761,776‐778(1983)(placingthequestionofjudicial


11

InthecaseoftheMDLPanel,forexample,specializationwouldextendtoknowledgeoftheprocess and patterns of multidistrict litigation as well as predictable and earlydeterminationofwhethercasesshouldbemoved. SincealimitednumberoftrialjudgeswouldhavehandledMDLmattersandthe issuesraisedbycomplex litigationarespecial,specialization seemed a logical approach.61 A single decision‐making body was alsofavoredasmore likely tobe consistent andpredictable in its rulingsona subjectwherethat consistency was especially important. Finally, Congress would better be able tomonitorrulingsonthespecial topicsassignedtothesecourtsbywatchingonlyonebodyratherthanmonitoringthe94districts. ThestatutecreatingtheMDLPanelprovidesforthebasicstructureofthecourtbutleavesmuchoftheimplementationtothePanelitselfaswellastheChiefJustice.Thenextsection turns towhat happened after Congress created the Panel. The statute providedonlyaverybasicframewhichtheChiefJusticeandthejudgeswhomheappointedhadtofillin.B. TheCharacteristicsoftheMDLPanelMembersWhohasservedontheMDLPanel?Thecharacteristicsofthepanelistsobviouslytellusagreatdealaboutthecourtasadescriptivematterbutalsohasimplicationsforitsoperationandpublicperception.Inthissection,weexamineindetailthesocialbackground,judicialexperience,andappointingPresidentandChiefJusticeforeachoftheforty‐fiveMDLPaneljudgeswhohasservedsincethePanel’screationin1968. In order to put the panel’s composition in context, we need to compare it to arelevantbenchmark. TheMDLstatuteprovides that “[t]he judicialpanelonmultidistrictlitigationshallconsistofsevencircuitanddistrictjudgesdesignatedfromtimetotimebytheChief Justice of theUnited States, no twoofwhom shall be from the same circuit.”62Thus,anysittingArticleIIIjudge,otherthanaSupremeCourtjustice,iseligible.Ourfirstbenchmark, then, is thepopulationof2,371 judgeswhohaveservedonArticle III courtsfrom1968‐2012.63 But, those judgesmaynotbeequallyappropriate forappointmentor

specialization in the larger context of the call for labor specialization beginningwithAdamSmith); Baum,supranote,at4‐5.

61 Richard L. Revesz, SpecializedCourtsand theAdministrativeLawmaking System, 138U. PA. L. REV. 1111(1990)(“Ofcoursethebroadapplicationofthisargumentwouldcounselagainstanyuseofgeneralistjudges.Anarrowerargument,however,isthatcertainareasaresocomplexthatitisinefficientforageneralistjudgetolearnaboutthem.”).

6228U.S.C.§1407(d).

63Inadditiontothe94districtcourts,13appellatecourts,andSupremeCourt,theCustomsCourt,theCourtofInternationalTrade,CourtofCustomsandPatentAppeals,andtheCourtofClaimsareallincludedinthisanalysis.Ofthe2,371judgeswhoservedononeofthosecourtsduringthisperiod,218servedontwocourtsand16 judges servedon threeArticle III courts. Several judges servedon themultiple courts at the sametime, includingthoseappointedto theEasternandWesterndistrictsofMissouriandtheWestern,Eastern,andNorthernDistrictsofOklahoma.Otherjudgesservedonmultiplecourtsconsecutively.Judgesappointed


willingtoserve.InordertoaddressthatconcernandalsotoprovideacomparisontotheChiefJustices’otherappointments,oursecondbenchmarkisthe861judgesappointedbytheChiefJusticetoatleastonecommitteeoftheU.S.JudicialConference.64Ofthose861,thirty‐onejudgesservedonbothaJudicialConferencecommitteeandtheMDLPanel.651. GenderandRaceMostfederaljudgeshavebeenwhitemen.FranklinRooseveltappointedthefirstwomantoan Article III court in 1934.66 Only six women had been appointed by 1968. Therepresentationofwomenincreaseddramaticallysincethattime:327women,comparedto2,044men, served onArticle III courts between1968 and 2011 (or 13.8% compared to86.2% of judges). Women have made up a relatively larger portion of conferencecommittee appointees. Of the 861members of the judicial conference committees, 152havebeenwomen(17.7%).Bycontrast,theMDLpanelhashadrelativelysmallershareofwomen:only4ofthe45Paneljudges(or8.9%)havebeenwomen.Thefirstwoman,JuliaGibbons, was appointed by Rehnquist in 2000. Recent MDL appointments, however,suggestthatfemaleappointmentsaretrendingup:fouroutofthe17appointmentssince2000havebeenwomen(23.5%).67 Since 1968, the federal judiciary has become an increasingly racially diverseinstitution. During this period, 175African‐Americans served (7.4%),while other racialgroups have seenmoremodest gains. Two American Indians (less than 1%), 22 AsianAmericans (1%), 1 Asian and Hispanic judge (less than 1%), and 103 Hispanics (4.3%)haveservedonArticleIIIcourts.Seventeenjudgesdidnotlistaracialorethnicgroup.Theremainingjudges(2051)identifiedaswhite(86.5%). Ofthe861membersoftheJudicialConferenceCommittees,754identifiedaswhite(87.6%). Fifty‐nine judges (6.9%) were African American, thirty‐seven were Hispanic

tomultiple courts simultaneouslyareassigned toa single court forpurposesofcalculating thedescriptivestatisticsabouttheMDLPanelandtheConferenceCommittees.

64 Our committee membership data is based on appointments since 1971, the first year when data isavailable.Someofthese861judgesservedonmorethanonecommittee,andothersservedonlyas“chair”ofa committee and not as a member. For a basic explanation of the Judicial Conference committees, seeADMINISTRATIVEOFFICEOFTHEU.S.COURTS,THEFEDERALCOURTSYSTEMINTHEUNITEDSTATES:ANINTRODUCTIONFORJUDGESANDJUDICIALADMINISTRATORSINOTHERCOUNTRIES38‐39(2000).

65TermsofserviceonthePanelandtheConferenceCommitteesvaryintheirlength.Panelistswereinitiallyappointed without fixed terms, but now the Chief asks them to serve for seven years. Likewise theConference Committee appointments vary in terms of length (with some appointments listed as “OpenTerm”)andintermsofhowlongaparticularjudgeserves.Becausethereisnocleartermlimitforeithersetofappointments,wedonotcontrolfortermlength.

66FlorenceEllinwoodAllenservedontheSixthCircuitfrom1934through1959.JEANETTEE.TUVE,FIRSTLADYOFTHELAW:FLORENCEELLINWOODALLEN(1984).

67SeeAppendixTableAforacompletelistofMDLPaneljudges.


13

(4.3%),fivewereAsianAmerican(.6%),andonejudgewasAmericanIndian(.1%).Unlikethemembers of the Judicial Conference Committees, all themembers of theMDL Panelhavebeenwhite. The tables below show the gender and racial breakdown of each group by courttype.SpecializedcourtsareArticleIIIcourtstowhichthejudgeisappointed,suchastheU.S.CourtofInternationalTrade(anditspredecessor,theU.S.CustomsCourt).

Table1.WomenonArticleIIICourts

MDL Panel(N)

JudicialConference(N)

AllArticleIII(N)

DistrictCourt7.89%(3)

18.43%(117)

14.21%(275)

AppellateCourt14.29%(1)

15.53%(34)

12.26%(45)

SpecializedCourt0 14.29%

(1)9.26%(5)

SupremeCourt ‐‐ ‐‐ 13.33%(2)

TOTAL 8.9%(4)

17.7%(152)

13.8%(327)

Note: Percentages reflect the proportion ofwomen appointed to that level ofcourtwhoalsoservedontheMDLPaneloronaJudicialConferenceCommittee.Thelastcolumnreportsthepercentageofallmembersofthattypeofcourtwhoarewomen.Ajudgewhoservedonmorethanonetypeofcourtisreportedbasedonlyonthejudge’sinitialappointmentduringourperiodofstudyor,ifalreadyonthebench,theseatheldin1968.


Table2.RacialMinoritiesonArticleIIICourts

MDLPanel

JudicialConference AllArticleIII

DistrictCourt

AfricanAmerican 06.61%(42)

7.60%(147)

Hispanic/Latino/a 04.88%(31)

4.91%(95)

Other 00.63%(4)

1.13%(22)

AppellateCourt

AfricanAmerican 0 7.76%(17)

6.81%(25)

Hispanic/Latino/a 0 2.74%(6)

2.18%(8)

Other 0 .91%(2)

.54%(2)

SpecializedCourt

AfricanAmerican 0 0 3.70%(2)

Hispanic/Latino/a 0 0 0

Other 0 01.85%(1)

SupremeCourt

AfricanAmerican ‐ ‐(6.67%)

1

Hispanic/Latino/a ‐ ‐(6.67%)

1

Other ‐ ‐ 0

TOTAL Allracialminoritygroups 0 11.9%(102)

12.8%(302)

Note:Thecalculationsarebasedonlyonjudgeswhoreportedarace. PercentagesreflecttheproportionofminoritiesappointedtothatlevelofcourtwhoalsoservedontheMDLPaneloronaJudicialConferenceCommittee.The“Other”categoryincludesjudgeswhoidentifyasAsianAmerican,AmericanIndian,ormorethanonerace.Thelastcolumnreportsthepercentageofallmembersof that typeofcourtwhoareminorities. A judgewhoservedonmore thanonetypeof court is reportedbasedonlyon the judge’s initialappointmentduringourperiodofstudyor,ifalreadyonthebench,theseatheldin1968.


15

2. JudicialExperienceWeexaminedthreespecificjudicialexperiencevariables:typeofcourt(districtorcircuit)onwhich the judge served, the length of a judge’s tenure prior to appointment, and thejudge’spriorexperienceasanMDLtransfereejudge.Wefindthatdistrictjudgesmakeupan even larger percentage of theMDLpanel (96%) thanwewould predict based on thesamefigureforConferencecommittees(81%)andtheArticleIIIcourtsasawhole(82%).68MDLPanel judgeshave servedon thebench longerbeforeappointment thanConferencecommitteejudges(16yearsascomparedto8.4years).Finally,theyaremuchmorelikelytohaveexperiencewithmultidistrictlitigation. MDL Panel judges may be either district judges or circuit judges. Perhaps notsurprisinglygiventhecompositionoftheArticleIIIcourtsthemselves,boththeMDLPaneland the Judicial Conference Committees are dominated by judges serving on the districtcourts.Between1968and2011,1,935judgesservedondistrictcourts,367judgesservedon appellate courts, 15 judges served on the Supreme Court, and 54 judges served onspecializedArticleIIIcourts.Ofthe45membersoftheMDLPanel,43weredistrictjudges(95.6%), while only two judges were from appellate courts. No specialized judges orSupreme Court justices have served on the MDL Panel. The committees of the judicialconferencearealsolargelymadeupofdistrictjudges.Ofthe861membersofthejudicialconference,700initiallyservedondistrictcourts(81.3%),151servedonappellatecourts(17.5%), and 10 judges began their Article III service on a specialized court (1%). 161membersofjudicialconferencecommitteeshadnoexperienceasadistrictjudge(18.7%)while1memberoftheMDLPanelhadnosuchexperience(2%). Lookingatthecourtonwhichajudgeservedatthetimeofhisorherappointmentshowsa slightlydifferentbreakdownby court type. Three‐eight judgeswere servingondistrict courts when they were appointed to the MDL Panel (84.4%), while seven wereserving on appellate courts (15.6%). One judge, Julia Gibbons, was elevated from thedistrictbenchtotheappellatecourtwhileservingontheMDLPanel. JudicialConferenceappointment isagainmorecommonfordistrict judges,with635committeemembersondistrict courtswhen appointed (73.8%). Appellate judgeswere a substantial portion ofappointments, with 219 judges serving on the courts of appeals when tapped for acommitteeposition(25.4%). Seven judgeswereservingonspecializedcourts(.8%),andnojudgesweresittingontheSupremeCourt. The average length of service forArticle III judges between1968 and 2011 is 19years.(Ifwelookonlyatthosejudgeswholeftthebench,andnotthoseservinguntiltheendofourstudyin2011,wefindanaveragejudicialserviceof21years.)Judgesservingonthecommitteesofthejudicialconferenceservedbetween0and50yearsbeforejoininga

68ThesefiguresarebasedonthecourtofserviceatthetimeofappointmenttotheMDLPanelorConferencecommittee.


committee,with the average amount of time being approximately 8.4 years. Themodalvaluewas4or5yearsofservicebeforeappointmenttoaconferencecommittee.69 Judges on theMDL Panel also had varying lengths of tenure before appointment,between 5 and 29 years of service. Judge Hodges served the longest (29 years) beforeappointment while Judge Pollak had the briefest tenure (5 years). On average, judgesservedalmost16yearsbeforeappointmenttotheMDLPanel,perhapsaresultoftheneedforexperiencewithcomplexlitigationbeforeappointmenttothePanel.70 ThedisproportionatenumberofdistrictjudgesonthePanelmayreflectanefforttoappoint judges with complex litigation and in particular multidistrict litigationmanagement experience. The statute makes no specific requirement about any othercharacteristicorexpertiseofthejudge;however,thegoalofspecializationwouldseemtofavortheselectionofjudgeswithpriorMDLexperience.And,thisappearstohavebeenthepractice of Chief Justices. Chief Justice Earl Warren named the first seven panelists,appointingthreefromtheCo‐ordinatingCommitteeincludingitschair,TenthCircuitChiefJudgeAlfredMurrah,asthefirstchairofthePanel.71SeveralotherpanelistsservedastrialjudgesintheelectricalequipmentlitigationwhichledtothecreationoftheMDLPanel.Wefind evidence to support the common view that the norm of appointing panelists withcomplexlitigationexperiencestillprevails.72 Between1968and2011therewere1465multidistrictactionsconsolidatedbefore778differentjudges.73Figure1showsthat,ofthe2371judgesservingbetween1968and2011, 1598havehadno experience as a transferee judgewithmultidistrict litigation, atleastnotasajudge.Attheotherendofthespectrum,JudgeWeinerhad15MDLsduringhis 69Becausethesetimesareestimatedfromthefirstcourtonwhichthejudgeservedduringtheperiod,weareover‐estimating the timeof service slightly. Abettercomparison is toconsider the time in theposition inwhichthejudgeservedwhenappointedtotheconferencecommitteeseat.Again,therangewasfrom0to50years,andtheaveragetimeofservicewasslightlysmallerat7.9years.Themodaltimetoappointmentwas4years.

70InconsideringthetimeajudgespendsintheseatwheretheyserveatthetimeofappointmenttotheMDLPanelweseeaslightlydifferentpattern.Theaveragetimespentis15.4years,againraisedbyoutlierssuchasJudgesHodgesandMurrah,whoservedseveraldecadesbeforeappointmenttotheMDLPanel.Therangeofservice times is smaller, with one judge, Judge Gurfein, serving four years on the Second Circuit beforeappointment to theMDL Panel. Overall, appointment to theMDL Panel appears to take twice as long asappointmenttotheJudicialConferenceCommittees.

71JohnT.McDermott,TheJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation,57F.R.D.215(1973)(McDermottservedastheExecutiveAttorneytothePanel,andthisshortessayoffershisobservationsontheformativeyearsofthePanel.).JudgeMurrahalsoservedasthesecondDirectoroftheFederalJudicialCenter,holdingbothpostssimultaneouslyfrom1970‐1975.FederalJudicialCenter,BiographicalDirectoryofFederalJudges.

72SeeJohnG.HeyburnII,AViewFromthePanel:PartoftheSolution,82Tul.L.Rev.2225,2227(2008).

73Threecaseswereconsolidatedbeforemultiple judges, andareexcluded fromthisanalysisbecause theywere exceptional cases. Within the life of anMDL, cases are transferred to other judges for a variety ofreasons.OurfocusisonthejudgeinitiallyassignedtotheMDLatthetimeofconsolidation.


17

tenureon thebench. TheaveragenumberofMDLs forall judges servingbetween1968and2011is .62MDLsassignedper judge. Amongjudgeswhoneverservedonthepanel,

theaveragewas.58MDLsassigned.

Of course, MDL assignments overwhelmingly go to district judges. Becauseincluding circuit judges in the frequency of assignment depresses the average, the chartbelow excludes circuit court judges. The average number of appointments is a slightlyhigher.75perjudge.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 15

1598

408

199100

33 12 9 5 3 1 2 1

Number of Judges

Number of MDLs

Figure 1. Frequency of MDL Assignment: All Judges, 1968‐2011


While looking at the judiciary as a whole is interesting, we would expect thosesittingontheMDLPaneltohavemoreexperiencethantheaveragejudge.Whiletherangeof the data is the same, the average is, not surprisingly, higher for panel members (2.4MDLsassigned). Interestingly,eightmembersof thepanelreceivednoMDLsduringthisperiod, three ofwhomwere original panelmembers. Seven of the eight judgeswith noassignments served as circuit judges, either once appointed to the panel or prior toappointment.Oneofeightcircuitjudgeshadnodistrictjudgeexperience.Figure3showsthevariation.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 15

1164

406

199100

33 12 9 5 3 1 2 1

Number of Judges

Number of MDLs

Figure 2. Frequency of MDL Assignment: District Judges, 1968‐2011

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0 1 2 3 4 5 7 11 15

8

13

11

32

5

1 1 1

Number of Pan

el M

embers

Number of MDLs

Figure 3. Frequency of MDL Assignment: MDL Panel Judges, 1968‐2011


19

Once again, it is important to exclude those judges serving on circuit courts. Figure 4shows the assignments for district judge panel members only. The average number ofassignmentsis2.8.

Interestingly,thevastamountofexperiencewithmultidistrictlitigationcomesoncea member has joined the panel, as we will discuss in greater detail in our evaluationsection.Twenty‐oneofthe45MDLPaneljudgeshadnopriorMDLexperiencebeforebeingappointedtothePanel.WhilethereiscertainlymorepriorMDLexperienceforjudgesonthepanelthanforotherjudges,withanaverageof1.3MDLsassignedbeforeappointment,themodalnumberofMDLspriortoservingiszero.Ifweexcludethosejudgesservingoncircuit courts at the time of appointment, only one of whom (Judge Gurfein) had MDLexperience when he joined the panel, the average number of MDL assignments beforejoiningthepanelfordistrictjudgesis1.5MDLs,butthemodelcategoryremains0.3. AppointingPresidentandAppointingChiefJusticeAllMDLPaneljudgesareArticleIII judgesoneitherdistrictorcircuitcourts,andassuchwereappointedbythePresidentwiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate.Focusingsolelyon initial appointments,we find a judiciary almost evenly split betweenDemocratic andRepublican appointees. 1,126 judges (47.5%) were initially appointed to the bench byDemocrats, while 1245 (52.5%) were appointed by Republican presidents. Like thejudiciaryitself,theMDLPanelisevendividedbetweenjudgesappointedbyDemocratsand

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0 1 2 3 4 5 7 11 15

2

1211

32

5

1 1 1

Number of Pan

el M

embers

Number of MDLs

Figure 4. Frequency of MDL Assignment: District Judges on the MDL Panel, 1968‐2011


thoseappointedbyRepublicans.Ofthe45membersoftheMDLPanel,22wereappointedbyDemocraticpresidents(48.9%)while23(51.1%)wereappointedbyRepublicans.TheJudicialConferenceCommittees,however,arenotsoevenlysplit. Ofthe861membersofthejudicialconferencecommittees340(39.5%)wereappointedbyDemocratswhile521(60.5%)wereappointedbyRepublicans. Because judges are typically promoted to higher judicial positions by Presidentsotherthantheonewhoinitiallyappointedthem,itisillustrativetoconsiderthevariationinappointmentsforthecourtonwhichthejudgeservedwhenheorshewasselectedforthe MDL Panel or a Conference committee. Once again, the Panel is closely dividedbetween Democratic (21 or 46.7%) and Republican (24 or 53.3%) appointees. TheConferenceCommitteesweremorelikelytobeappointedbyRepublicans(514or59.7%)ratherthanDemocrats(334or38.8%).Becauseofthechangesinthejudiciaryduringthisperiod,13judgesarelistedassittingintheirseatbyreassignment.Nineofthe13(69.2%)were reassigned by Republican presidents and four were reassigned by Democrats(30.8%). Adding these reassignments into the appointments listed above shows aConferenceCommitteecomposedof60.7%Republicanappointeesand39.3%DemocraticappointeesatthetimethejudgejoinedaJudicialConferenceCommittee. ThevariationinappointingChiefJusticeislimitedbytheshortperiodofourstudy(1968forthePaneland1971forcommittees),duringwhichtheMDLPanelmemberswereappointedbyonly fourChiefs and the JudicialConferenceCommitteemembersby three.The original sevenmembers of theMDL Panelwere appointed by Chief JusticeWarren.TheremainingmemberswereappointedbymoreconservativeChiefs:11wereappointedby Chief Justice Burger, 18 were appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 9 wereappointedbyChief JusticeRoberts. Because thedata for the JudicialConferenceonlygoback to 1971, all members of the committees were appointed by conservative ChiefJustices.74 Chief Justice Burger appointed 74 of the members (8.6%), Chief JusticeRehnquistappointed652ofthemembers(75.7%),andChiefJusticeRobertsappointed135ofthemembers(15.7%).

74 Judicial conference committee service dates are listed by year but changes in Chief Justice can occurthroughouttheyear.ChiefJusticeRehnquiststartedhistenureinSeptemberof1986anddiedinSeptemberof 2005. BecauseChief JusticeBurger served themajority of 1986but Chief JusticeRehnquist served themajority of 2005, we assigned Chief Justice Burger to the appointments made in 1986 and Chief JusticeRehnquisttotheappointmentsmadein2005.


21

III. EVALUATINGTHEWORKOFTHEMDLPANELSpecial courts raise two sets of concerns: one related to the court and the second to itsjudges. Specialcourtsmaydeprivepartiesofproceduralrights.75 Thoseproceduralrightsinclude the right of access to the same courts available to thosewho have substantiallysimilarclaimsand/ordefenses,theopendebateandexaminationofargumentsfoundinaourcommonlawsystem,andthereviewensuredbyahierarchicaljudicialsystem. Special court judges may lack the independence that Article III was designed tocreate. Judicial independence is ensured through several features of Article III courts.ArticleIIIjudgesdonotdependonpartiesthatappearbeforethemforthecontinuationoftheirpositions.Indeed,mostdistrictcourtsandappellatecourtsfaceworkloadpressuressosignificantthattheriskisthattheywilltoostronglydiscouragepartiestocometothecourt.ArticleIIIjudgesdonothaveastakeintheoutcomeofthecaseswhichtheydecide,and therefore are more likely to be neutral. Article III establishes a judicial selectionsystem thatprovides for the input of thePresident and the Senate (and theoversight ofvoters)andasaresultfavorsadiversity(definedbroadly)ofjudges;thatis,noArticleIIIjudge serves based on one person’s preference and the political system incentivizes theappointmentofjudgesfromdifferentbackgrounds. Weconsiderbeloweachcriteriaandhowtotestwhetheritissatisfiedintheworkofonespecialcourt,theMDLPanel. Wefindthatmanyaspectsofthecourt’sfunctioningshouldprovideuswithassurancethatspecialcourtscanmeettheendsofArticleIII. Butotheraspectsraiseconcernswhichneedtobeaddressedaswelayoutinourconclusion.A.ProceduralRightsoftheParties1. ChoiceofForumTheMDLstatutetransferscasesfromthedistrictinwhichtheywerefiledtoatransfereecourt forallpre‐trialmatters. Theoriginaldraftersofsection1407recognizedthat theywere balancing the “litigant’s traditional privileges of selectingwhere,whenandhow toenforcehissubstantiverightsorasserthisdefenses”againstthecostsandburdensposedbyoverlappingand conflictingpre‐trialprocesses.76 Thedrafters emphasized that caseswouldreturntothetransferorcourtfortrial. But,therealityisthatfewcasessurvivetotrial.77Thus,consolidationinevitablylimitslitigants’righttoselectaforum. 75See,e.g.,Niles,supranote(analyzingtheFifthAmendmentimplicationsoftheAlienTerroristDeportationCourt).

76Co‐ordinatingCommitteeforMultipleLitigationoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourts,CommentonProposed§1407,at5(1965).

77SeeEmeryG.Lee,MargaretS.Williams,RichardA.Nagareda,JoeS.Cecil,ThomasE.Willging,&KevinM.Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: An Empirical


NinthCircuitJudgeAlexKozinskicomplainedthattherateatwhichMDLcasesareresolved while at the transferee court “tell[s] the story of a remarkable power grab byfederal judges who have parlayed a narrow grant of authority to conduct consolidateddiscovery intoamechanismforsystematicallydenyingplaintiffstherightto trial in theirforumof choice.”78 Theprocedurewhichevoked JudgeKozinski’s irewas “self‐transfer”wherebyMDLtransfereejudgestransferredallofthematterstothemselvesfortrial,ratherthan just pre‐trial, on the basis of the federal venue statute.79 The U.S. Supreme Courteventuallystruckthatpractice,concludingthatCongressintendedthatanytrialwouldtakeplaceintheoriginalcourtratherthantheMDLcourt.80 Theimplicationsofthetransferandconsolidationdecisiontosubstantiverightscanbe seen by focusing on litigation resulting from the 2010 DeepWater Horizon oil spilldisaster.HundredsoftortsuitswerefiledagainstBPseekingcompensationforeconomicloss,propertydamage,andpersonalinjuries.81Tortvictimsfiledsuitineverydistrictalongthe Gulf Coast as well as districts scattered across the country. BP quickly moved toconsolidateandtransferall suits to JudgeLynnHughes in theSouthernDistrictofTexas.JudgeHughessitsinHoustonwhereBPhasitsNorthAmericanheadquartersandwhereitbases its Gulf‐drilling operations.82 BP’s motion drew strong opposition from most Investigation,workingpaper(detailinghow,when,andwhereMDLcasesareresolved)AsRichardNagaredahasexplained,“consolidatedpretrialproceedingsatthebehestoftheMDLPanelalreadyformasettingripefor plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants to begin discussions about a comprehensive peace.” Richard A.Nagareda,MassTortsinaWorldofSettlement260(2007).

78 In re American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Savings, 102 F.3d 1524, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). JoanSteinman,TheEffectsofCaseConsolidationontheProceduralRightsofLitigants:WhatTheyAre,WhatTheyMightBe‐PartII:Non‐JurisdictionalMatters,42UCLAL.REV.717(1995).

79 The venue transfer statute allows a district court to “transfer any civil action to any other district ordivisionwhereitmighthavebeenbrought”ifdoingsoisbothconvenienttothepartiesandwitnessesandintheinterestofjustice.28U.S.C.§1404(a).TheMDLstatuteonitsfaceallowedtransferforpre‐trialmatterswithremandofcasesaftersuchmatterswereresolved.Nevertheless,thestatuteformorethan25yearswasinterpretedtoallowtransfereejudgestogrant1404(a)motionstochangevenuefortransferredcasestothetransfereecourt,effectivelyconvertinganMDLtoasingledistrictcase.SeePfizer,Inc.v.Lord,447F.2d122,124‐125 (2d Cir. 1971). The JPML Rules of Procedure specifically anticipated the possibility that a MDLtransferee judgewouldtransferconsolidatedactionspursuant to1404(a). See JPMLRule15(d), laterRule14(b).

80Lexecon,Inc.v.MilbergWeissBershadHynes&Lerach,523U.S.26(1998).

81 Plaintiffs also sued various other companies including rig owner Transocean Ltd., well contractorHalliburton Company, blowout preventer maker Cameron International, safety valve manufacturerWeatherfordInternational,andBP’sjointoperatorsAnadarkoE&PCompanyandMOEXOffshore2007.Foracontemporaneousanalysisoftheparties’positions,seeFelicityBarringeretal.,SeekingAnswersonOilSpillasQuestionsMount,N.Y. Times, June 26, 2010, at A11; Carol J.Williams, AnEpic Legal Battle Is About toBegin;APanel of JudgesWillDecideWhoWillOverseeOil Spill Suits. Location IsKey, L.A.Times, July28,2010,atA12.

82MediaaccountsfromthetimecharacterizedBPasseekingtoobtainahome‐courtadvantageinthechoiceoffederalcourthouselocationandajudgewithsignificantexperienceinoilsuits.See,e.g.,BPWantsOilSpill


23

plaintiffs as well as the U.S. Department of Justice, which asked for assignment in NewOrleansintheEasternDistrictofLouisiana(withsomeplaintiffsaskingthePaneltoassignSouthern District of New York Judge Shira Scheindlin who has extensive MDLexperience).83 The Panel ultimately assigned the matter to Judge Carl Barbier in NewOrleans.84WhilethePaneldidnotsidewithBPonthelocationforpre‐triallitigationinthetortsuits,thejudgesunanimouslygrantedBP’scontestedmotiontotransfersecuritiesandshareholderderivativesuits, alsorelated to theoil spill, toDistrict JudgeKeithEllison inHouston.85 BP later agreed to pay 7.8 billion to settle the tort suits consolidated inLouisiana.86 BP won the dismissal of nearly all shareholder derivative, securities, andERISAclaimstransferredtoTexas.87

LawsuitsCombinedinHoustonCourt,Hous.Chron.,May11,2010,atB10;ScottHiaasen&CurtisMorgan,BPSeeksOil‐TestedJudgeonLawsuits,MiamiHerald,May27,2010,at1AFront;JadMouawad&JohnSchwartz,Rising Cleanup Costs and Numerous Lawsuits Rattle BP’s Investors, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2010, at A17(emphasizing the need for consolidation because court rulings in oil spill cases already conflict with oneanother);RebeccaMowbray,JudgesGathertoConsiderBPTrialSite;OilCompaniesWantHouston;PlaintiffsWantAnywhereElse,Times‐Picayune(NewOrleans),July28,2010,atA1.

83BPPLCMotion toTransfer andConsolidate, In reOil Spill by theOilRig “DeepwaterHorizon”,MDLNo.2179,www.MDLPanel.uscourts.gov;seealsoTresaBaldas,BigEasyorBayouCityforSpillMDL?,Tx.Lawyer,May17,2010,at1(reportingthatBPhadmovedforconsolidationintheHoustonDivisionoftheSouthernDistrictofTexasbeforeJudgeLynnHughes(BPAmerica’sheadquartersareinHouston),whilemostplaintiffshad countered by recommending the Eastern District of Louisiana); Bill Lodge, Pressure Rising on BP:Lawsuit Turf Battles Beginning of LongWar, Baton Rouge Advocate, June 14, 2010, at A1 (reporting thatjudgesand/orlitigantsinLouisiana,Mississippi,AlabamaandFloridawereresistingeffortstostaylitigationwhileBP’smotion to transferwaspendingbefore thePanel); Jeff Feeley&MargaretCroninFisk,BPSuitsShould Be Sent to New Orleans, U.S. Says, Bloomberg, June 17, 2010,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010‐06‐17/bp‐oil‐spill‐federal‐suits‐should‐be‐combined‐in‐new‐orleans‐u‐s‐says.html.

84InreOilSpillbytheOilRig“DeepwaterHorizon”intheGulfofMexico,onApril20,2010,731F.Supp.2d1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Foradiscussionof the livelyBoise‐basedhearingson themotion, see SusieBoring‐Headlee,TheUnitedStatesJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation:TheSprezzaturaoftheFederalJudiciary,TheAdvocate(IdahoStateBar),Sept.2010,at58.

85Theshareholderderivative, securities, andERISAactionswereoriginally filed in theWesternDistrictofLouisianaandtheCentralDistrictofCaliforniawithpotentialtag‐alongactionspendingintheEasternDistrictofLouisiana. Briefswerealso filedbyprospectiveplaintiffswhosesubsequent suits, filed in theNorthernDistrictofIllinoisandtheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,werelaterconsolidatedwiththeearlieractionsSeeInreBPPLCSecuritiesLitigation,734F.Supp.2d1376(J.P.M.L.2010);InreBPPLCSecuritiesLitigation,734F.Supp.2d1380(J.P.M.L.2010)

86Foranexaminationof JudgeBarbier’smanagementof the litigation, seeEdwardF.Sherman,TheBPOilSpillLitigationandEvolvingSupervisionofMultidistrictLitigationJudges,30Miss.Coll.L.Rev.238(2011).

87 See, e.g., In reBPPLC Sec. Litig., 2012WL2617244 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In reBPPLC Sec. Litig., 2012WL432611(S.D.Tx.2012);InreBPShareholderDerivativeLitigation,2011WL4345209(S.D.Tex.2011).


Resolution in the transferee court should not be considered in isolation from thepotentialpositiveimplicationsforplaintiffs’claims,whichmightbetoosmallforindividuallitigation.Thatis,transfermayexpandtheircapacitytoexercisetheirsubstantiverights.2. CollegialDecisionmakingandDebateSpecialfederalcourtsholdamonopolyontheresolutionofaspecificandnarrowrangeofissues. A judicialmonopolymaybringattendantcostssuchashomogeneityof ideasandapproachesand theconcentrationofpower in thegovernedsetofcases. But,unlike thegeographic monopoly found in federal districts, an intercircuit body would havegeographicaldiversity. Acloser lookat theworkingsof thePanelwouldbenecessarytodeterminewhetherthecourtengagedindiscussionanddebatethatreflectedacompetitionofperspectives. Thepurposeofamultimemberbodyistoensurethedebateofideasandarguments;hence,appellatepanels,specialcourtsconsideringconstitutionalityofcertainstatutes,andspecial courts all rely upon collective decision‐making bodies. Oneway to evaluate thedegreeofdiscussionanddebateistoseewhatcanbeobservedinthebody’sdecisions.AllPanelactionsrequiretheagreementoffourPanelmembers.88In2005,JudgeWm.TerrellHodgesnotedthatduringhistenurethePanelhadneverseenadissentingvotecastintheirdecisiontoconsolidateacaseornot.89 WearecollectingdataonauthorshipanddissentingvotesinallMDLdecisionsfrom1968‐2011. Thus far, we have found that for the first seven years when the Panel’smembershipdidnotchange,therateofdisagreementontheMDLPanelwascomparabletothatonthecourtsofappealsduringthesameperiod,roughlynineortenpercentincasesinwhich the panelmade a substantive decision.90 But, dissents essentially disappear after1978. We will be able to present more detailed information when the data work iscomplete. The high degree of agreementmay stem from how the Panel now goes about itswork.MembersofthePanelhearoralargumentsatvariouslocationsaroundthecountryevery twomonths. SinceMayof2009, thePanelhasheld thesehearingsover twodays,insteadofone,inresponsetoincreasingcaseloaddemands.91AsJudgeHeyburnnoted,thePanelonlyhearsoralargumentson thecreationofanewMDL,anddecisionsabout tag‐

8828U.S.C.§1407

89ChairofJudicialPanelSeesRoleasGatekeeper,TheThirdBranch,Vol.37,Number11.November2005.

90DonaldR.Songer,ReginaldS.Sheehan&SusanB.Haire,ContinuityandChangeontheUnitedStatesCourtsofAppeals104‐107(2000).

91PanelPromotes Just andEfficientConductofLitigation,TheThirdBranch,Vol.42,Number2. February2010.


25

alongcasesaredecidedonthepaperrecord.92 Withintwoweeksofahearing, thePanelissuesitsdecision.3. MeaningfulReviewandOversightSpecialization poses the risk of capture by interested parties who appear repeatedly infrontofthesamegroupofjudgesratherthanirregularlybeforeadispersed,generalistset.But a hierarchical system can check that process: higher courtsmay review the specialcourt’srulingstoensureneutrality.InthecaseoftheMDLPanel,theappropriatecourtofappeals may review their decisions to grant consolidation and to remand previouslyconsolidated cases to the original transferor court. The effectiveness of these checks onpoliticalinfluencewilldependonhowmeaningfultheyare. Thestatutesetsthefirstbarriertomeaningfuloversight.94Adenialofamotiontoconsolidateisunreviewable.Agrantisonlyreviewablebyextraordinarywrittothecourtof appeals for the district to which the cases have been transferred. And, the (rare)decisiontoreturnacasetothetransferorcourtalsorequiresawrit.96Writsofmandamus“are reserved for really extraordinary causes.”97 The writ is required for a range ofmanagerial decisions made by district judges during the pre‐trial process. But, thejustification for the deference granted to pretrial management by trial judges cannotsustain the deference granted towhat are in essence jurisdictional decisions by a courtcreatedsolelyforthatpurpose.Theeffectcouldbetoinsulatethecourtfromoversightonasignificantexerciseofjudicialauthority.

92PanelPromotes Just andEfficientConductofLitigation,TheThirdBranch,Vol.42,Number2. February2010.

94 28 U.S.C. §1407(e) (“No proceedings for review of any order of the panelmay be permitted except byextraordinarywritpursuant to theprovisionsof title28, section1651,UnitedStatesCode.”). Basedonanextensivesearch,wefailedtolocateasingleinstancewherethegrantofatransfermotionwasoverturned.WedidfindonecasewhereanMDLPanel’sremanddecisionwasoverturned:Roysterv.FoodLion,Inc.,73F.3d528(4thCir.1996), inwhichadividedFourthCircuitpanelsuaspontereversed thePanel’s remandofdismissedclaimstotheoriginaltransferorcourts(whichwereinothercircuits)toallowthepartiestoappealthe transferee court’s dismissal to the Fourth Circuit (where the transferee court was located). Thedissentingpanelistcharacterizedthemajority’sdecisionas“extraordinary,unsolicited,andill‐advised.”Id.at533,535(Butzner,J.,dissenting).

96 28U.S.C. §1407(e) (“Noproceedings for reviewof any order of the [JPML]maybepermitted except byextraordinarywrit.”).Thismustbedistinguishedfromreviewofthedecisionsofthetransfereejudgewhichare subject to the normal rules for appellate review by the court of appeals for the circuit inwhich it islocated.

97ExparteFahey,332U.S.258(1947).


IntheMDLsetting,courtsofappealhaveinterpretedtherequirementofthewritasextremely hard to meet.98 As one panel explained, the Panel has “unusually broaddiscretion.. .tocarryoutitsassignedfunctions,”includingtheinitialdecisiononwhethertocreateanMDLandthedecisiontoendthe lifeofanMDLbyremandingactionstotheoriginalcourt.99Toqualifyformandamusrelief,thepartychallengingthePanel’sdecision(whether the initialdecision to transfer (ornot)ora laterdecision toreturn transferredcasestothetransferorcourt)mustfirstshowthatithasnootheradequatemeanstoobtainrelief.100Thepetitioningpartymustshowthatitsrighttothewritisclearandindisputable.Evenifthepetitioningpartysatisfiesthisburden,thecourtofappealsmayrefusetograntthe petition if the court concludes it is inappropriate under the circumstances.101Moreover,“onlyexceptionalcircumstancesamountingtoajudicialusurpationofpoweroraclearabuseofdiscretionwilljustifytheinvocationofthisextraordinaryremedy.”102 The statutory text coupledwith the judicial interpretationof that textwould leadone to expect that circuit courts rarely grant thewrit inMDL cases. Yet,with somuchopportunityforconsolidation,andanincreasingtotalnumberofMDLseachyear,wewouldexpect circuits to occasionally conclude that a writ is appropriate. We conducted asystematic search of all circuit court rulings in the Westlaw CTA database to test thathypothesis. We found only one case where an MDL Panel ruling was overturned. InRoysterv.FoodLion,Inc.,103adividedFourthCircuitpanelsuaspontereversedthePanel’sremandofdismissedclaimstotheoriginaltransferorcourts(whichwereinothercircuits)toallowthepartiestoappealthetransfereecourt’sdismissaltotheFourthCircuit(wherethe transferee court was located). The dissenting panelist characterized the majority’sdecision as “extraordinary, unsolicited, and ill‐advised.”104 While we cannot evaluatewhether itwas ill‐advised,wecansaythat itwasextraordinary. Indeed,noothercircuitpanel has ever reversed anMDLPanel decision.More significantly, a Panel’s decision totransferandconsolidate—clearlyitsmostsignificantpower—hasneverbeensetasidebyareviewingcourt.

98DavidF.Herr,MultidistrictLitigationManual§11.1(2012ed.)(reviewoftheMDLPanel’sdecisions,asthisleadingcommentatorputit,“isatbestdifficulttoobtain.”

99SeeInreMaryNellCollins(asbestos),233F.3d809(3rdCir.2000)(denyingpetitionforwritofmandamusonscopeofremandbyMDLPanel).233F.3d809(3rdCir.2000)(denyingpetitionforwritofmandamusonscopeofremandbyMDLPanel).

100Cheneyv.U.S.Dist.CourtforDist.ofColumbia,542U.S.367,380,124S.Ct.2576,159L.Ed.2d459(2004).

101SeeCheney,542U.S.at381,124S.Ct.2576.

102Id.at380,124S.Ct.2576(internalquotationmarksandcitationsomitted).

10373F.3d528(4thCir.1996).

104Id.at533,535(Butzner,J.,dissenting).


27

Thus, thecriteriaofmeaningfuloversight isabsent for theMDLPanel. Reviewofthisdecisionisnotonlydifficulttoobtain,ithasneverempiricallyhappened. Ourresultruns counter to expectations thatCongress, by creating a specialized court,will increasethemonitoringof itsdecisionsbothbyCongressionalcommitteesandotherbodies. TheoppositehashappenedasCongresshasonlyoncelimitedthePanel’sprospectivepowersandthenonlyindirectlywhenitletstandtheSupremeCourt’srulingthattheMDLstatutedoes not override the requirement of appropriateness of venue for the trial of civilactions.105 Thus, transferee judgesmaynot assign to themselves thepower to try casesoverwhichtheydonothavepropervenueandjurisdiction.B. IndependenceoftheJudgesandtheRiskofPoliticization1. CapturebyInterestGroupsSpecial courts exist to meet specific needs of identifiable parties. The FISA Court onlycontinuestohavework if the federalgovernmentseeks itspermissionto issuewarrants.But, administrations may side step the court’s authority through its definition andconstructionoftheActandthesurveillanceworkofagencieslikeNSA.TheGeorgeW.BushAdministration did just that with its Terrorist Surveillance Program.106 But, afternegotiatingwiththeFISACourt,itagreedtoseekwarrantsfortheprogram.107Itappeared,asonecommentatorputit,thattheFISACourtpromisedthatwarrantswouldbeissuediftheadministrationwouldbringthematterstoit.108 TheMDLPanel,liketheFISACourt,onlyhasworkifpartiesseekconsolidationandtransfer.CongresscouldchoosetoterminatethePanelifitappearsthatfewcasesrequireMDLtreatment.TheoriginalPanelactivelyfishedforcases,monitoringdocketsforspecifictypesofcasesand issuingshow‐causeorderstopartieswherecasesseemedappropriateforconsolidation.And,therateatwhichpetitionsweregrantedwasveryhigh,wellabovehalfofmotionsweregranted.Whilethegrantratecontinuestobehigh,itappearstohavesoftenedslightly.

105Congressdidtheoppositeinthecaseofactionsundersection4CoftheClaytonAct.Pub.L.94‐435,TitleIII,§31,Sept.30,1976,90stat.1394(addingsubsectionhwhichprovidesthatthePanelmaytransfersuchactionsforbothpretrialandtrial).

106ShaneHarris&TimNaftali,Tinker,Tailor,Miner,Spy:WhytheNSA’sSnoopingisUnprecedentedinScaleandScope,SlateMagazine(Jan.3,2006).

107EricLichtblau&DavidJohnston,CourttoOverseeU.S.WiretappinginTerrorCases,NYTimesA1(Jan.18,2007).

108SeeRichardPosner.


Figure5showsthepatternforMDLconsolidationdecisionsovertime.109Whilethereisasignificantamountofvariationovertime,thetrendshowsthatwhilesubstantiallymorecasesaregrantednowthaninyearspast,thepercentageofgrantsissmallerthanintheearlyyearsofthepanel.Figure6moreclearlydepictstheincreaseinthenumberofmotionsforconsolidations,whiletherawnumberofconsolidationsisrelativelystable.

109InformationforFiguresXandX+1weregatheredfromtheMDLordersthemselves,availableonWestlaw.

0

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Figure 5. Transfers Granted Over Time

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29

The risk of capture increases as the length of tenure does. Panel tenure is not set bystatute.ChiefJusticeWarrensuggestedthatnoappointeeshouldserveformorethanthreeyears.110Thefirstsevenmembersstayedonforanaverageof10years,however,settingaprecedent. From1968through2012, forty‐one judgeshaveservedonthePanelwithanaverage tenure of eight years.111 According to current Panel Chair John Heyburn, ChiefJusticeWilliamRehnquistin2000adoptedapracticeofappointingpanelistsforseven‐yearterms, and Chief Justice John Roberts has continued that practice.112 The terms arestaggeredwithonememberrotatingoffeveryyear.113 This turnoverhelps to lessen theriskofcapture.

110SeeMcDermott,supranote53,at218n.5.

111ForacompletelistofPanelmembersandtheirterms,seeAppendixTableA.

112SeeHeyburn,supranote54,at2227;ChairofJudicialPanelSeesRoleasGatekeeper,TheThirdBranch,Vol.37,Num.11,November2005.

113See“JudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigationReorganized,”TheThirdBranchNewsLetter(June2000).

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Figure 6. Number of Consolidations Relative to Potential MDLs

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Consolidated


2. InterestsofPanelistsJudgescannotsitincasesinwhichtheyhaveafinancialstakeundertherulesofethics.But,otherinterestsmaybeimplicatedbyspecificcases.Forexample,theMDLPanelmayselectone of its ownmembers to serve as the transferee judge. The appointment is seen asrecognitionofajudge’sskillandacumenandasignofherstatus.AnMDLjudge’sworkloadwillbecalculatedtoreflecttheadditionofthecomplexMDLmatter.WorkonMDLmatterstypicallyinvolvesmorecomplexand/ornovelissuesandsophisticatedcounsel. And,anyrulinghas far‐reachingconsequences. Ifa trial judgewants tobe involved in interestingandimportantdisputeresolution,MDLcasesofferanopportunitytohaveanimpact.

WefoundthatPanelmembersarefrequentlyassignedMDLsasreflectedinFigure7.But,many factors other than self‐serving biasmay account for that frequency, includingseniorityandpriorexperience.WetestedwhetherMDLPanelmembershipexplainedtheselection of a judge to serve as the transferee judge through a multivariate modelpresentedinTable3. Wecontrol for factorswhicharefrequentlycitedbythePanelandcommentatorsasimportanttoitsdecision.114

114SeeWilliams&George,supranote.

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31

Table3.RegressionModeloftheMDLPanel’sChoiceofTransfereeJudge:2005‐2009

Variable CoefficientRobust

Std.ErrorP‐Value

ChiefJudgeofthedistrictatthetimeoftheorder

0.5717 0.2057 0.005

Seniorjudgeatthetimeoftheorder ‐1.1135 0.1543 0.000

Panelmemberatthetimeoftheorder 1.2658 0.4664 0.007

Panelmemberduringcareer 0.4708 0.6109 0.441

FormerChiefJudge 0.5569 0.1821 0.002

Numberofcasesperjudgeindistrict ‐0.0003 0.0000 0.000

JudicialCohort 0.0366 0.1176 0.756

Constant ‐2.7619 0.0833 0.000

ThetablereportsresultsfromalogitmodelestimatingthedistrictjudgetowhomanMDLisassignedforallMDLscreatedbetween2005and2009. Thedataisbasedon330ordersand7,521potentialjudges. Thedependent variable iswhether thePanel transferred to the judge (1=yes,0=no).Theindependent variables related to the judges’ experience are collected from the FJC judicialbiographiesdatabase.District courtworkload isbasedonAdministrativeOfficedata.Dataon theMDLPanelandjudicialcohortwerecollectedbytheauthors.

Statisticallysignificantcovariatesarebolded.

Themultivariatemodel inTable3revealsthatanumberof judicialcharacteristicsaffect,negativelyorpositively,theprobabilitythatanMDLwillbetransferredtoajudge.115Currentand former chief judgesaswell as currentmembersof theMDLPanel aremorelikely to be assigned anMDLwhereas senior judges are less likely, all else being equal.Predictedprobabilitiesof the factorsabovewereestimated,andtheresultsareshowninTable4.

115Themodelcorrectlypredicts96%of theobservations inthedataset,butreducestheerrorby lessthan1%.BecausetherearemultipleobservationsforthesameMDLnumber,weclusteredtheresultsontheMDLnumbersotheestimatesofthestandarderrorweremorerobust.


Table 4. Factors Affecting Probability of Designation as Transferee Judge forJudgesinTransfereeDistrict:2005‐2009

VariablePredictedProbabilityof

AssigningCasetoJudge

Baseline 5%

CurrentChiefJudge 9%

Seniorjudge 2%

FormerChiefJudge 9%

CurrentJPMLmember 17%

Caseloadminimum 6%

ThetablereportsthelikelihoodofassigningacasetoadistrictjudgegiveneithermeanormodalvaluesofallotherindependentvariablesinthemodelreportedinTable3.

Thebaselineprobability is the likelihood thata casewillbeassigned toa specificjudgegiventhatthejudgehasneverbeenChiefJudge,isonactivestatus,hasnotservedonthe MDL Panel, sits on a district court with an average annual caseload per judge (ascalculatedby theAdministrativeOffice of theU.S. Courts), and the judge is not from thesamejudicialcohortasacurrentPanelmember.AsreflectedinTable3,thelikelihoodofanyspecificjudgebeingassignedtheMDLisapproximatelyfivepercent.Seniorjudgesarelessthanhalfaslikelyastheiractivecolleaguestoreceivethetransfer.ChiefJudges,bothformer and current, are nearly twice as likely to receive the transfer, and current PanelmembersaremorethanthreetimesaslikelytotakeanMDLassignment.Theworkloadofjudges has minimal effect; even the lowest caseload only increases the probability ofassignmentbyonepercentagepoint. TheMDLPanel, then, frequently draws on the experience of its ownmembers tomanagecomplexlitigation.TheChiefJustice’sappointmentofadistrictjudgelikelyreflectsthe Chief’s assessment of the judge’s knowledge and experience with complex cases.Indeed,Warrenstaffed the firstPanelwith judgeswhowereat thevanguardof complexlitigation,managing theelectricalequipmentcases. Thus, thePanel selects from itsownranks with the confidence that its members can handle the unique challenges of MDLlitigation.Yet,self‐selectionalsomayraisesomeconcernsabouttheabilityofthePaneltoobjectivelyevaluateaprospectivetransfereejudge’squalificationsandconcernsaboutself‐dealingbythecourt.


33

3. ControlbytheChiefJusticeTheArticleIIIappointmentprocessforfederaljudgeshasbeenthesubjectofagreatdealofresearchanddiscussion,butfarlessattentionhasbeenpaidtoappointmentswithinthejudicialsystem.116WheretheChiefJusticeappoints,wemightexpecttoseetheappointingChief’spreferencesreflectedintheidentityandbehavioroftheMDLPaneljudges.Thatis,as Ted Ruger haswritten in his research on the Chief Justice’s appointment power, theunchecked power grants the Chief “unusual latitude to shape outcomes by matchingparticularkindsofjudgeswithparticulartribunals.” Ifitisnotpriorjudicialexperiencewithmultidistrictlitigationthatmakesajudgealikely candidate for appointment to theMDL Panel,what characteristic could be drivingtheseappointments? Thediscussionsaboveshowthatthedifferencesbetweenthepanelandthebenchasawholearenotgreat,withsomeexceptions.Infact,theMDLlooksmuchlikeothereliteorganizationswithinthejudiciary. OnepossibilityisthattheArticleIIIjudgesappointedbytheChiefJusticearemoreliketheChief thanothermembersof the judiciary. Amodest literaturesuggests that theappointmentpoweroftheChiefJusticeallowshimtoshapejudicialadministrationinlinewithhisownpreference.117 Toconsiderthispossibilityweexaminedthe JudicialCommonSpacescores forallArticleIIIjudgesbetween1968and2011.118Ofthe2068judgeswithscores,theaverageideologywas .03,amoderate toconservative judge. Membersof the JudicialConferenceweremoreconservative,withascoreof.07,astatisticallysignificantdifferenceatthe.05level.Ontheotherhand,memberoftheMDLPanelwerenotdifferentfromtherestoftheArticle III judiciary,withanaveragescoreof ‐.01,but thedifferencewasnot statisticallysignificant. While group differences are certainly interesting, perhaps a more interestingrelationship can be found in the variation of appointments by individual Chief Justices.

116 But see Dawn M. Chutkow, Policy Control, Political Entrepreneurs, and the Courts: Judicial ConferenceCommittee Appointments, Working Paper (August 2012); Theodore Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’sAppointmentstotheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActCourt:AnEmpiricalPerspective,101NW.L.REV.239(2007);JudithResnik&LaneDilg,RespondingtoaDemocraticDeficit:LimitingthePowersandtheTermoftheChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStates,154U.PENN.L.REV.1575(2006).

117 SeeChutkow, supra; Fish 1973; Nixon 2003; for an example of appointment to specialized courts seeRuger2004.

118 See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007);http://epstein.usc.edu/research/JCS.html. (providing the individual scores). While not all judges haveCommonSpace scores, the vastmajoritydo. Of the2371 judges inour study, 2068hadaCommonSpacescore(87.2%).AswithserviceintheArticleIIIcourts,ideologyscoresarebasedonthefirstavailablescoreforeachjudge.


Table5belowshowstheaveragescoreofeachChiefJusticeappointingtotheMDLPanel,alongwiththeChief’sscoreandtheaveragedistanceforeachChief’sappointments.

Table5.AverageIdeologyofChiefJustice’s MDLPanelAppointees

ChiefJustice

Justice’sIdeology

AverageIdeologyofAppointees

(N)

AverageAbsoluteDistancebetween

ChiefandAppointee

EarlWarrenWarrenBurgerWilliamRehnquistJohnRoberts

‐0.110.220.630.53

‐0.13(7)‐0.13(11)0.18(18)‐0.14(9)

0.240.440.450.67

While Chief Justice Rehnquist was the only chief justice to appoint moreconservativemembersofthepanel,onaverage,ChiefJusticeRobertsappointsmemberoftheMDLPanelthemostunlikehimself intermsof ideology. In fact, theappointmentsofChiefJusticeRehnquistarethemostunlikeanyothergroupintermsoftheirconservatism,with statistically significant differences between the appointments of Rehnquist andBurger, Rehnquist and Roberts, and the appointments of Rehnquist to non‐panelmembers.119 All other ideological differences are not statistically significant atconventional levels. Chief Justice Warren appointed members of the Panel most likehimself, and his appointments differed significantly from Chief Justices Rehnquist andRoberts. In terms of ideological distance, no other relationships are statisticallysignificant.120 Asnotedabove,themembersoftheJudicialConferenceCommittees,onaverage,aremoreconservativethantheArticleIIIjudiciaryasawholeduringourtimeperiod.Asthetable below shows, this is largely driven by more conservative conference membersappointedbyChiefJusticeRoberts.Table6belowshowthedifferencesinappointeesforthethreeChiefJustices.

119ThosewerenotmembersoftheJPMLhadanaverageideologyof.03.

120WhileamoregenerouscomparisonmightbemadebetweentheappointmentsofaChiefandthejudgeseligibleforthemtoappointatanygiventime,thedataarenotstructuredtotestthatrelationshipatthistime.


35

Table 6. Average Ideology of Chief Justice’s Conference CommitteeAppointees

ChiefJustice

Justice’sIdeology

AverageIdeologyofAppointees

(N)

AverageAbsoluteDistancebetweenChiefJusticeand

Appointee

WarrenBurgerWilliamRehnquistJohnRoberts

0.220.630.53

‐0.00(71)0.06(633)0.14(121)

0.330.570.39

On average, the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts to the Judicial ConferenceCommittees are more moderate than himself, but more conservative than those of hiscolleagues,andthedifferencesarestatisticallysignificant.Infact,boththeappointmentsofChiefJusticeRehnquistandChiefJusticeRobertsarestatisticallysignificantdifferentfromthosewhodonot serveonConferenceCommittees.121 In termsof the absolutedistancebetweenaChiefandhisappointee,wefindthatRehnquistappointedcommitteememberslesslikehimself(intermsofideology)thaneitherofhiscounterparts,thoughheappointedsubstantiallymoremembers overall. The differences between Rehnquist and the otherChiefJusticesarestatisticallysignificant. To gather a sense of how these appointments are affecting the ideologicalcomposition of the MDL Panel and the Judicial Conference Committees over time, weplottedtheaverageideologyforeachgroupalongwiththeArticleIIIjudiciaryasawholebytime.Theresultsareshownbelow.

121Theaverageideologyofanon‐committeememberis.03.

‐0.3

‐0.2

‐0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Figure 8. Average Ideology of

Panel Article II Judicial Conference


The above table shows the average ideology for members of the MDL Panel, allArticleIIIjudges,andmembersoftheCommitteesoftheJudicialConferencebytime.TheaveragesfortheMDLPanelwerecreatedbyestimatingtheaverageideologyforalljudgesservingon theMDLPanel inagivenyear, regardlessof theNaturalPanelonwhich theyserved(formoreonthis,seebelow).ThismeansthatinyearswithasignificantamountofMDLPanel turnover, suchas2000,more thanseven judgesare included in theestimate.Whilethisrunscountertounderstandingthedynamicsofanyindividualpanel,itismorecomparabletotheaveragesforentirejudiciaryandthemembersofthejudicialconference,whichareestimatedthesameway.

Togainasenseofthepaneldynamics,averageideologyscoreswereestimatedforeachindividualpanel,andthenaveragedbyyear.Theseaveragesareplottedinthetableabove, alongwith the averages for all Article III courts and themembers of the JudicialConference for comparison. Both charts show some interesting patterns. The JudicialConference committee beganmore conservatively than theMDL Panel or the Article IIIjudiciaryasawhole,butallthreearemuchcloserideologicallynowthantheyhavebeeninthepast.ThisisafunctionoftheMDLPanelandthejudiciarybecomingmoreconservativeandoftheJudicialConferencemovinginamoreliberaldirection. Overallthough,itwouldappearasifmembersoftheMDLPanelarenotsignificantlydifferentfromtherestoftheArticleIII,norhavetheyvariedallthatgreatlyacrossthefourChief Justicesappointing them. Onerelationshipdoesstandout,however. Thirty‐oneofthe45membersofthePanelwereappointedtoboththepanelandtheJudicialConferenceCommittee,andonlytwoofthethirty‐oneservedonaJudicialConferenceCommitteeafterservingon theMDLPanel. Thus,perhapsConferenceCommitteeserviceputsa judgeontheradaroftheChiefJusticeforappointmenttotheMDLPanel.

‐0.3

‐0.2

‐0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Figure 9. Average Ideology based on Natural Panel

Natural Panel Article III Judicial Conference


37

WithallthevariationintheMDLPanel,theJudicialConferenceCommittees,andthejudiciaryasawhole,itisimportanttostepbackandsummarizewhatweknowabouttheMDLPanelandhowitfitsintothelargerjudiciary.Onewaytosummarizethisinformationis by looking at “Natural Panel” similar to looking at Natural Courts. Appendix Table Bshows the variation in court type, women’s representation, Chief Justice Appointments,ideology,andamountofMDLexperience. OneinterestingfindingoflookingattheNaturalPanelistheebbsandflowsofpriorMDLexperienceamongpanelmembersserving inanygivenyear. Figure10showshowtheamountofMDLexperiencepriortojoiningtheMDLPanelchangedovertimeduringtheperiodofourstudy.

Whiletheaverageamountofexperiencewithmanagingcomplexcaseshasstayedbetweenroughly1and2casesperjudgesincetheearlyyearsoftheMDLPanel,themaximumnumberofcasesforanyindividualjudgehasvariedquiteabit.(Theminimumnumberofcasesis0for45outof50naturalpanels).TheappointmentofJudgeCharlesBreyerbroughtawealthofMDLexperiencetothePanel,with11priorMDLsbeforeservingontheMDLPanel.ThisappointmentmorethandoubledtheaverageamountofexperienceinthepanelpriortoBreyer’sappointment.IV. CONCLUSION

[UNDERCONSTRUCTION]

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1968

1975

1977

1978

1979

1980

1983

1987

1989

1990

1992

1994

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Number of MDLs

Figure 10. MDLs Assigned Prior to Service Natural Courts

Average Prior Assignments Maximum Prior Assignments


APPENDICES

A. MembersoftheU.S.JudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation:1968‐2012B. NaturalMDLPanels:CompositionofPanelswithConstantMembership

AppendixA:MembersoftheU.S.JudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigation:AppointedbyU.S.SupremeCourtChiefJusticefrom1968to2012

Judge AppointingPresident

HomeCourt

AppointedtoPanel

AppointingChiefJustice

ResignedfromPanel

ChairAppointmen

t

AlfredP.Murrah

FDR 10thCir. 5/29/1968 Warren 10/30/1975 5/29/1968

EdwardWeinfeld Truman NY‐S 5/29/1968 Warren 11/15/1978 –

EdwinA.Robson

Eisenhower IL‐N 5/29/1968 Warren 7/1/1979 –

JohnMinorWisdom Eisenhower 5thCir. 5/29/1968 Warren 11/15/1978 11/6/1975

JosephS.Lord,III

JFK PA‐E 5/29/1968 Warren 7/17/1978 –

StanleyA.Weigel JFK CA‐N 5/29/1968 Warren 7/1/1979 –

WilliamH.Becker JFK MO‐W 5/29/1968 Warren 2/1/1977 –

AndrewA.Caffrey

Eisenhower MA 11/6/1975 Burger 6/1/1990 2/20/1980

RoyW.Harper Truman MO‐E 2/1/1977 Burger 9/30/1983 –

CharlesR.Weiner

LBJ PA‐E 10/25/1978 Burger 9/30/1983 –

MurrayJ.Gurfein Nixon 2ndCir. 11/15/1978 Burger 12/16/1979 11/15/1978


39


JudgeAppointingPresident

HomeCourt

AppointedtoPanel


ResignedfromPanel

ChairAppointmen

t

EdwardS.Northrop JFK MD 6/6/1979 Burger 9/30/1983 –

RobertH.Schnacke

Nixon CA‐N 7/1/1979 Burger 11/19/1990 –

FredDaugherty JFK OK‐E 3/1/1980 Burger 11/19/1990 –

SamC.Pointer Nixon AL‐N 3/1/1980 Burger 12/7/1987 –

HughS.Dillin JFK IN‐S 10/1/1983 Burger 10/26/1992 –

LouisH.Pollack Carter PA‐E 10/1/1983 Burger 10/26/1992 –

MiltonPollak LBJ NY‐S 10/1/1983 Burger 11/30/1994 –

HalbertO.Woodward LBJ TX‐N 3/8/1989 Rehnquist 6/23/1992 –

JohnF.Nangle Nixon MO‐E 6/1/1990 Rehnquist 12/1/2000 6/1/1990

RobertR.Merhige,Jr. LBJ VA‐E 11/19/1990 Rehnquist 6/8/1998 –

WilliamB.Enright

Nixon CA‐S 11/19/1990 Rehnquist 6/1/2000 –

BarefootSanders Carter TX‐N 10/26/1992 Rehnquist 6/1/2000 –

ClarenceA.Brimmer Ford WY 10/26/1992 Rehnquist 6/1/2000 –

JohnF.Grady Ford IL‐N 10/26/1992 Rehnquist 6/1/2000 –



Judge AppointingPresident

HomeCourt

AppointedtoPanel


ResignedfromPanel

ChairAppointmen

t

LouisC.Bechtle

Nixon PA‐E 12/6/1994 Rehnquist 6/29/2001 –

JohnF.Keenan Reagan NY‐S 6/8/1998 Rehnquist 6/1/2006 –

BruceM.Selya Reagan 1stCir. 6/1/2000 Rehnquist 6/1/2004 –

JuliaSmithGibbons

W.Bush

(Reagan)

6thCir.

(TN‐W)1226/1/2000 Rehnquist 12/30/2003 –

MoreyL.Sear Ford LA‐E 6/1/2000 Rehnquist 12/31/2002 –

Wm.TerrellHodges Nixon FL‐M 6/1/2000 Rehnquist 6/13/2007 12/1/2000

D.LowellJensen

Reagan CA‐N 12/1/2000 Rehnquist 06/01/2008 –

J.FrederickMotz Reagan MD 7/13/2001 Rehnquist 06/01/2009 –

RobertL.Miller,Jr.

Reagan IN‐N 1/1/2003 Rehnquist 10/15/2010 –

KathrynH.Vratil H.W.Bush KS 2/2/2004 Rehnquist NA –

DavidR.Hansen

H.W.Bush 8thCir. 7/9/2004 Rehnquist 05/01/2011 –

AnthonyJ.Scirica Reagan 3rdCir. 6/1/2006 Roberts 06/15/2008

122 Judge Julia Smith Gibbonswas a district judge in theWestern District of Tennessee at the time of herappointment to theMDL Panel. Shewas appointed to the district bench by President Reagan. PresidentGeorgeW.Bushnominatedhertothecourtofappeals.


41


JudgeAppointingPresident

HomeCourt

AppointedtoPanel


ResignedfromPanel

ChairAppointmen

t

JohnG.HeyburnII H.W.Bush KY‐W 6/14/2007 Roberts NA 6/14/2007

W.RoyalFurgeson

Clinton TX‐W 09/22/2008 Roberts NA

FrankC.Damrell,Jr. Clinton CA‐E 12/09/2008 Roberts 10/15/2011

DavidW.Trager

Clinton NY‐E 10/07/2009 Roberts 04/01/10

BarbaraS.Jones Clinton NY‐S 05/21/2010 Roberts NA

PaulJ.Barbadoro

H.W.Bush NH 11/08/2010 Roberts NA

MarjorieO.Rendell Clinton 3rdCir. 05/24/2011 Roberts NA

CharlesR.Breyer Clinton CA‐N 10/16/2011 Roberts NA

TheU.S.JudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigationiscomprisedofsevendistrictand/orcircuitjudges.AnysittingdistrictorcircuitjudgemaybeappointedbythesittingU.S.SupremeCourtChiefJusticetofillavacantseat,withtheoneconstraintthatnotwojudgesmaysitinthesamecircuit.

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