Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–04–1 September 2004 Vol. 17, No. 1

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Following the terrorist attacks on theUnited States in September 2001, the atten-tion of the nation and of the world wasfocused on the activities of U.S. special-oper-ations forces in Afghanistan. During thatsame time, other U.S. Army special-opera-tions forces, or ARSOF, were diligently train-ing a counterterrorist force in the Philip-pines, as well as countering insurgent andterrorist forces there by implementing secu-rity-assistance, civic-action and humanitari-an projects. Although those efforts were suc-cessful, they were overshadowed by Opera-tion Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, andthey remain largely unpublicized.

Unlike other issues of Special Warfare thatcontain articles from a variety of authors,this issue contains only articles written bymembers of the Historian’s Office of the U.S.Army Special Operations Command torecord the role of ARSOF in the Philippines.Based upon interviews with ARSOF Soldierswho served at all levels of the operation, thearticles paint a comprehensive picture ofARSOF’s activities and provide observationsregarding the uses of ARSOF in combatinginsurgency and terrorism.

While those observations reveal someareas that may require greater attention infuture operations, they validate the trainingof Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psycho-logical Operations Soldiers — training con-ducted at the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School.

Since June, it has been my honor to com-mand the Special Warfare Center and School,the world’s best special-operations trainingcenter and institution. Not only do we producethe Army’s special-operations warriors whohave the skills needed to win on today’s bat-tlefield, we also instill the flexibility that willallow them to remain relevant in the battles ofthe future, and we provide the doctrinal andpolicy support for that elite force.

We must never forget that we are trainingSoldiers who will go into combat, and that

their lives depend upon the training that wegive them. We must do more than train tostandard. We must be receptive to new ideasand responsive to changing operationalrequirements. We must harness new tech-nologies and training methodologies such asdigital and Web-based learning to keep pacewith a new, dynamic generation of warriorscoming to join our brotherhood.

There has never been a more rewardingtime to be in Army special operations thannow. Our Soldiers have an important job, andtheir skills have never been in greaterdemand. They have never received morerecognition or greater support, and they havenever been more successful. Our challenge isto ensure that we train enough of these quietprofessionals to continue the success ofARSOF on the battlefield, whether it is inwidely publicized engagements such as thosein Iraq or in obscure operations such as thosein the remote jungles of the Philippines.

Major General James W. Parker

Features2 Why the Philippines?: ARSOF’s Expanded Mission

in the War on Terrorby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

4 A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippinesby Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

12 Multiple Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Securityby Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Downey

15 Rugged Terrain Makes Philippine Islands Haven for InsurgentGroupsby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

16 Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippinesby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

26 Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02-1by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

30 Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Islandby Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

36 Impact of the Semipermissive Environment on Force-Protection in Philippine Engagementsby Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

42 Special Forces Training Exercises Continue Balikatan Missionby Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

46 Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Missionby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

52 112th Signal Battalion Opens the ‘Big Pipe’ During Balikatan 02-1by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

55 Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

Departments58 Enlisted Career Notes

59 Officer Career Notes

60 Foreign SOF

62 Update

64 Book Reviews

PB 80–04–1 ContentsSeptember 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 17, No. 1

Commander & CommandantMajor General James W. Parker

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorJanice L. Burton

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0418208

Headquarters, Department of the Army

In March 2001, in response to a requestfrom the Philippine government, a mil-itary training team composed of Sol-

diers from the 1st Special Forces Grouparrived in the Philippines to begin traininga national counterterrorist force.

After the United States turned Clark AirForce Base and Subic Bay Naval Stationover to the Philippines in June 1991, com-bined training of the U.S. and Philippinemilitary had ended, and U.S. security-assist-ance funding for the Philippines had beensignificantly curtailed. In the ensuing dec-ade, without U.S. support and the benefits ofa U.S.-Philippines professional military

relationship, the operational capabilities ofthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP,declined rapidly. That military erosionallowed latent insurgencies, some of whichhad ties to international terrorism, to flareto the point that they posed a threat to theviability of the Philippine government.

In November 2001, members of Armyspecial-operations forces, or ARSOF, beganparticipating in Exercise Balikatan 02-1,again assisting in the training of Philippineforces to counter insurgency and terrorism.Following the exercise, ARSOF conductedpost-Balikatan training, humanitarian andsecurity-assistance missions. Althoughpost-Balikatan missions ended in late 2003,some of the missions continue today, asUnited States troops provide security-assistance training and conduct mainte-nance programs with the AFP.

As part of its charter to documentARSOF’s participation in past and presentoperations, the Office of the Historian, U.S.Army Special Operations Command, hasinterviewed ARSOF Soldiers who participat-ed at all levels of operations in the Philip-pines. The articles in this issue of SpecialWarfare, written by the USASOC historians,explain the missions of ARSOF in the Philip-pines from March 2001 to late 2003 and passalong observations that may benefit ARSOFSoldiers in future operations.

The ARSOF mission of November 2001,originally combined by the Special OperationsCommand, Pacific, or SOCPAC, and the U.S.

2 Special Warfare

Why the Philippines?: ARSOF’s ExpandedMission in the War On Terror

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

U.S. Army photo

An SF Soldier shows a Fil-ipino soldier how to adjustthe sights on his weapon.Common tasks such assight-adjustment wereoften neglected by Filipinosoldiers prior to their train-ing by SF Soldiers.

Pacific Command, or PACOM, with ExerciseBalikatan in the Joint Chiefs of Staff-spon-sored Cobra Gold combined exercise series,underwent several permutations.At one time,it was referred to as “America’s Second Frontin the Global War on Terrorism.”

Unfortunately, that sobriquet was some-what misleading, because the resultanthybrid exercise was principally trainingassistance conducted primarily in the semi-permissive combat environment of BasilanIsland, which has become the primary refugefor the most active terrorist elements in thePhilippines. For more than a decade, BasilanIsland has been a live-fire environment forthe AFP.

In light of the uncertain environmentand the aggressive actions taken by terror-ists against U.S. citizens, the standing“train, advise, assist and maintain” mis-sion originally assigned to the 1st SFGroup subtly transformed from unconven-tional warfare to foreign internal defenseand development, leaving the ARSOFground campaign best explained by usingthe counterinsurgency model, which ismost often associated with Special Forcesmissions during America’s war in Vietnam.

The ARSOF benefits gained in the Phil-ippines ranged from the validation of Spe-cial Forces, Psychological Operations andCivil Affairs training, to the reinforcementof the importance of information opera-tions and the demonstration of the impact

that cell-telephone text messaging canhave on force-protection measures.

In the end, the missions of SF, PSYOP, CA,the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-ment and the 112th Signal Battalion in sup-port of SOCPAC and PACOM in the Philip-pines established an acceptable Americanmilitary presence in the Southeast Pacific andre-established professional military relation-ships, both worthy objectives for futureARSOF missions in the Pacific region.

Author’s note: The articles in this issue ofSpecial Warfare would not have been possiblewithout the emphasis provided by LieutenantColonel Dennis J. Downey, deputy commanderof the 1st SF Group and former commander ofJoint Special Operations Task Force-Philip-pines. Downey provided regular updates on thePhilippines mission, a good cross-section ofofficers and NCOs — from detachment- to bat-talion- and group-level — for interviews, aswell as briefings and documentation. He alsoreviewed the articles in this issue for accuracy.His chronology of U.S.-Philippines relationsproved invaluable. Thanks are also due toMajor Robert A. Culp, S2 of the 1st SF Group,for his help with the rules of engagement andfor his classification reviews of the articles.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

September 2004 3

Philippine soldiers practicemap reading during train-ing in basic infantry skillsprovided by U.S. SpecialForces Soldiers duringExercise Balikatan.

USASOC Historical Archive

In order to understand the con-text of current United Statesmilitary operations in the Phil-

ippines, it is necessary to reviewmore than 100 years of America’smilitary and political involvementin Philippine affairs.

Beginning in 1898, during theSpanish-American War, and endingin 1992 with the closing of the lastAmerican base, the U.S. main-tained a visible military presencein the Philippines. During thatsame 94-year period, U.S. partici-pation in Philippine politics rangedfrom actual governance during thefirst half of the 20th century toCold War patronage during the sec-ond half. Considering the legacy ofU.S. military and political pres-ence, the Philippines is under-standably sensitive to sovereigntyissues and to possible U.S. influ-ence in Philippine domestic affairs.

Philippine InsurrectionMuch of the political “baggage” of

Philippine-American relationsdates from the Spanish-AmericanWar. The U.S. fought the war to winCuba’s independence from Spain.But because the U.S. was obliged todefeat Spain’s fleet in the Philip-pines, which Spain also claimed,

the U.S. came into possession of thePhilippines as well.

Unfortunately, the U.S. acquirednot only the Philippine Islandsfrom its victory over Spain but alsothe Philippine Insurrection. ThePhilippine Insurrection began in1896 when Emilio Aguinaldo andhis guerrillas declared war onSpain. The U.S. temporarily alliedwith Aguinaldo, encouraging himto besiege Spanish troops in Mani-la while Commodore GeorgeDewey and the U.S. Navy’s Chinafleet destroyed Spain’s antiquatedarmada in Manila Bay.

Aguinaldo, led to believe that hisefforts would be rewarded withPhilippine independence, kept theSpanish trapped in Manila untilU.S. ground forces arrived in June1898. Ever the optimist, Aguinaldo

then declared the Philippines inde-pendent and himself head of thenew government. Much to his dis-may, when the U.S. VIII Corpslanded, U.S. officials arranged for arelatively peaceful surrender fromthe Spanish governor general, Fer-mín Jáudenes, and occupied Mani-la themselves.

American officials shut Aguinal-do out of negotiations and refusedto recognize his government aslegitimate. Having effectively trad-ed places with the Spanish, theAmericans found themselves sur-rounded by Filipino revolutionar-ies. While neither side was particu-larly anxious to resume fighting,the U.S. government was deter-mined to exercise sovereignty, andthe Filipino guerrillas were equallydetermined to be independent.Fighting resumed along the Mani-la perimeter on Feb. 4,1899.1

Instead of capitalizing on theinherent strengths of his guerrillaunits, Aguinaldo formed theRepublican Army to fight the U.S.troops in conventional style. Ini-tially, the U.S. Army was able todominate the main population cen-ters easily, but it lacked sufficienttroops to control rural areas. InNovember 1899, with the arrival ofU.S. reinforcements, the U.S. Army

4 Special Warfare

A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

Emilio Aguinaldo (seated, third from right)and other Filipino insurgent leaders.

National Archives

began using its now superiorstrength to defeat the RepublicanArmy. In the face of U.S. conven-tional superiority, Aguinaldoreturned to guerrilla warfare.2

By April 1900, the war hadbecome one of insurgency andcounterinsurgency efforts. The Fili-pino revolutionaries and the Amer-ican Soldiers alike fought to winallegiance and support from thepopulace. The Army focused oninstituting civil government and onimproving the lives of the commonpeople, usually working throughlocal leadership.3

Recognizing the value of benevo-lence to pacification, the Armyinstituted civic-action programs.Beginning in Manila and thenspreading afield to other majorpopulation centers, reform pro-grams focused on expanding theinfrastructure for transportation,education and public health in aneffort to raise Filipino standards ofliving. New railroads, bridges,roads and telegraph and telephonelines strengthened the economyand forged commercial interde-pendence among the islands.

Convinced that education wasmore effective than troops in pre-venting further uprisings, the U.S.Army organized a public-schoolsystem to reduce illiteracy. Themilitary public-health assault ondisease virtually eliminated small-pox and bubonic plague, and itreduced the infant mortality rate.Although these programs wereoften conducted with an arrogantethnocentrism typical of Westerncivilization of the day, they earnedFilipino admiration.4

The guerrilla insurgents, on theother hand, used terrorism tocounter the attractive Americanpolicies. The guerrillas establishedshadow governments to control vil-lagers and to mete out punish-ment. The system of terror andinvisible governments was most

successful in areas far removedfrom Manila and the larger cities,in which U.S. Army garrisons werestationed. In those remote areas,revolutionary civil-military officerscontrolled villages, collected taxes,gathered supplies for guerrillatroops and influenced local govern-ments. They enforced their controlthrough executions and propertydestruction.5

By September 1900, the guerril-las were sufficiently organized toincrease the pressure on U.S.

troops. In response to theincreased violence, and in keepingwith President William McKin-ley’s re-election promise to remainin the Philippines, on Dec. 20,1900, Major General ArthurMacArthur placed the Philippinesunder martial law. Under thestricter policy, the Army beganimprisoning, deporting and evenexecuting captured guerrilla lead-ers.6 In the field, Army patrolshounded insurgent bands, denyingthem rest and sanctuary and iso-lating them from the villages,where more numerous and better-organized garrison troops werestationed to provide security. U.S.troops captured Aguinaldo inMarch 1901, and on April 19,1901, the former revolutionaryissued a proclamation acceptingU.S. rule of the Philippines.7

Anticipating the collapse of theweakened Philippine insurgency,the U.S. created the PhilippineCommission to assume the legisla-tive and executive functions of thegovernment in areas under Ameri-can control. In July 1901, McKinleyappointed William Howard Taft,who was head of the commission,

September 2004 5

In this 1900 photo, Philippine insurgents pray before surrendering.National Archives

U.S. Soldiers talk to Filipina women duringoperations in the early 1900s.

USASOC Historical Archive

governor-general of the Philip-pines. In August, the commissionestablished the Philippine Con-stabulary. Separate from the U.S.Army-controlled Filipino Scoutsand the municipal police, the con-stabulary, led by American officers,maintained law and order in paci-fied areas. The U.S. Army contin-ued to exercise control in theunpacified areas, concentrating itsefforts where guerrilla bands werestill active.

The final Army pacification cam-paigns on Samar Island and inBatangas Province turned brutalafter an American infantry compa-ny was massacred at Balangiga,Samar, in September 1901. Inresponse to the massacre, theArmy adopted tactics of “no-quar-ter fighting,” crop and livestockdestruction and the forcible reloca-tion of 300,000 civilians to concen-tration camps.

By April 1902, the rogue guerril-la leaders Lukban and Malvar hadsurrendered, and Samar Islandand Batangas Province had beenpacified, ending Aguinaldo’s dreamof an independent republic. OnJuly 4, 1902, when PresidentTheodore Roosevelt proclaimed anend to the Philippine Insurrection,

the Christian parts of the countrywere essentially secure.8 Accordingto the American measures of suc-cess — the accomplishment ofbasic pacification objectives, thedevelopment of solid U.S.-Philip-pine relations and the adoption ofmany American democratic insti-tutions by the Filipinos — the needfor war was over.

A new enemyMuslim Moros in the Sulu Archi-

pelago, however, continued fightingfor another 11 years on Mindanaoand the adjacent islands.9 Unassoci-ated with the “insurrectos” of 1899-1902, the Moro groups sought todefend their traditional practices ofslavery, tribal warfare and Islam.The U.S. organized a “bambooarmy” that comprised U.S. Army,Filipino Scout and constabularycompanies and was led by futureAmerican military icons like John J.Pershing and Douglas MacArthur.The bamboo army began operationsagainst the Moros in 1902 andfought a series of arduous cam-paigns. While these jungle cam-paigns influenced a new generationof Army officers, the battles withthe Moros were much like 19th-cen-tury clashes with Native Americansin the western U.S.10

By 1915 the Moro Province hadbeen pacified to the point that onMarch 22, Governor Frank W. Car-penter was able to convince thesultan of Jolo, Jamalul Kiram II, torelinquish his rights to politicalrule. With that agreement,Moroland came completely underU.S. rule, if not into complete inte-gration with the Philippines’Christian majority.11

A new eraBeginning with Taft in 1901, U.S.

presidential appointees governedthe Philippines for 34 years. OnJuly 1, 1902, the U.S. Congress

passed the Philippine Bill of 1902,permanently establishing a Philip-pine civil government that includ-ed an elective assembly. Philippinepoliticians continued to strive forindependence, even as they workedpeaceably with the American civilgovernor and the appointed Philip-pine Commission, which was ini-tially dominated by Americans. In1901 the commission includedthree Filipinos, and by 1913, Filipi-nos filled the majority of civil-administrative positions, includingfive of the nine seats of the Philip-pine commission.12

In 1916, Congress passed theJones Act, which openly stated thatAmerica intended to grant Philip-pine independence once a stablegovernment was fully established.To that end, the appointed Philip-pine Commission was disbandedand replaced by the elective Philip-pine Senate. The PhilippineAssembly was also renamed theHouse of Representatives. In aneffort to appease Moro separatistsin the South, two seats in the Sen-ate, and nine in the House of Rep-

6 Special Warfare

Captain John J. Pershing was one of theleaders of the Philippine “bamboo army.”

USASOC Historical Archive

Soldiers of the Philippine Constabularystand in formation in Manila, 1907.

Library of Congress

resentatives, were reserved forappointees who represented thenon-Christian populace. The Amer-ican civil governor retained vetopower, and U.S. citizens had immu-nity from Philippine legislation,but the Philippines was movingtoward self-rule.13

In March 1934, Congress passedthe Tydings-McDuffie Act, whichpresented a 10-year plan for thetransition to Philippine independ-ence. In spite of certain restric-tions, the new law did provide aroad map to independence. Asrequired by the law, a constitution-al convention convened in July1934, and on Feb. 8, 1935, the con-vention approved the PhilippineConstitution.

On Sept. 17, 1935, in fulfillmentof the second requirement of theTydings-McDuffie Act, a nationalelection was held. Manuel L.Quezon was elected president,and his former rival, SergioOsmeña, was elected vice-presi-dent. This pattern of selectingvice-presidents from the opposi-tion party continues today. TheCommonwealth of the Philippines

was established on Nov. 15, 1935,marking the beginning of whatwas supposed to be a 10-yeartransition to independence.14

World War IIThe march to independence was

delayed slightly when the Japan-ese attacked the Philippines onDec. 8, 1941. In spite of valiantefforts by U.S. and Philippinetroops in such battles as those onthe Bataan Peninsula and on Cor-regidor, the U.S.-Philippine forceshad all been captured or had sur-rendered by May 1942. The Philip-pine government, still led by Que-zon and Osmeña, went into exile inthe U.S. Those political leaders leftin the Philippines walked a fineline between collaborating with theJapanese and cooperating justenough to mitigate the effects ofoccupation on the populace. Japansought to enlist Filipino support bydeclaring Philippine independencein October 1943. In spite of Japan-ese efforts, and in spite of govern-

ment cooperation with the Japan-ese, a considerable resistancemovement developed among thefarming classes.15

Although as many as 75 Philip-pine guerrilla groups organized,very few coalesced because thenumerous islands isolated thegroups and because many groupshad self-serving agendas. Mostgroups received very little U.S.materiel support.

One of the best-organizedgroups, the communist Hukbala-haps (People’s Army to Fight theJapanese), or HUKs, savaged rivalsin central Luzon who opposed theirpost-war plans. In addition, Christ-ian guerrillas seldom sided withthe Muslim Moros on Mindanao.Still, the first priority for all groupswas the expulsion of the Japaneseoccupation forces. Only after theJapanese were defeated and thePhilippines was back on the road toindependence would the guerrillasreturn to their individual causes,which ranged from land reforms toMoro sovereignty.16

September 2004 7

A Philippine guerrilla scout during WorldWar II.

National Archives

Members of the Philippine Legislature during the 1920s.Library of Congress

Traditionally, the U.S. hadfocused on the northern islands,especially Luzon, in building Pacif-ic defense bastions like Corregidor.Despite greater attention beinggiven to liberating the north byGeneral Douglas MacArthur in1945, the southern islands becamestrategically important becausethey served as staging bases forU.S. aircraft attacking Japaneseforces on Borneo. However, thesouthern airfields at Zamboanga,Mindanao and Sanga Sanga, offTawi-Tawi Island, proved invalu-able when the Allies experiencedunexpected delays in getting newlycaptured Japanese airstrips onBorneo operational. At about thesame time, a loosely organizedMuslim guerrilla “division” fromthe southern islands fought along-side the Americans on Mindanao.17

Philippine independenceAlmost a year after the war

ended, on July 4, 1946, the Philip-pines proclaimed its independence,per the Tydings-McDuffie Act, andManuel Roxas was inaugurated asthe first president of the republic.Roxas’ election signaled to theHUKs and other peasant groupsthat the elites were once again incontrol of the government and thatland reforms would not be forth-coming. The HUKs subsequentlydisinterred their hidden weaponsand proceeded to incite a rebellionon Luzon, promising overduesocial, economic and politicalreforms that the newly independ-ent government and its supporter,the U.S., would not produce.

In 1946, in response to the newcommunist insurgency, the U.S.Congress passed the PhilippinesMilitary Assistance Act, authoriz-ing the president to provide Philip-pine forces with military instruc-tion and training, maintenanceservices for military equipment,

and “arms, ammunition and imple-ments of war.” The act also allowedhim to detail officers and enlistedmen from the U.S. Army, Navy andMarine Corps to assist the Philip-pine armed forces. In 1947, theJoint United States Military Advi-sory Group, or JUSMAG, wasestablished to fulfill this assistancemission, a role it maintains to thisday.18 In addition, responding toRussia’s growing influence in East-ern Europe, Congress approved$27,640,000 in military assistancefor the Philippines, Iran and SouthKorea as part of the MutualDefense Assistance Act of 1949.

Military advisory groupsIn September 1950, Ramon

Magsaysay was appointed by thePhilippine president as secretaryof national defense. He quicklybegan implementing programsthat attacked the causes, as well asthe symptoms, of insurgency in thePhilippines, relying heavily onJUSMAG assistance. Militaryreforms protected the peasantsfrom the Philippine armed forcesand the HUKs alike. Politicalreforms ensured honest electionsand worked to recapture confi-

dence. Economic reforms withgreat symbolic importance, includ-ing a land-redistribution program,were initiated. Magsaysaypresided over civic-action projectsthat were designed to improve thelot of the rural population.19

To enlist allied support for theUnited Nations’ effort in Korea,Congress extended military assist-ance another year, authorizing $16million for Korea and the Philip-pines, with specific language thataddressed the HUK guerrillainsurgency.20 Congress’s attemptat winning support was not lost onMagsaysay, and the Philippineswas among the first countries tosend an expeditionary force toKorea, establishing a legacy withthe U.S. military in Korea.

In 1951, the U.S. and the Philip-pines signed the Mutual DefenseTreaty, which formed the founda-tion of U.S.-Philippines relationsup through the 1980s.21 At home,Magsaysay won a landslide victoryand became president in 1953. Heused the armed forces to supporthis civic-action campaign, while hecontinued to rely on JUSMAG formonetary and training support. By1953, JUSMAG officers evenaccompanied AFP troops as“observers.”22

The HUKs, who had never beenable to mount a strong ideologicalcrusade, began to lose supportbecause the programs of Mag-saysay’s Economic DevelopmentCorps offered more land and socialreform than the communists werelikely to deliver. The HUK rebellionhad virtually ended by December1955, when Congress authorizedU.S. forces and appropriated fundsspecifically for counterinsurgencyefforts in the Philippines.23

In March 1957, during his sec-ond term in office, PresidentMagsaysay was killed in a planecrash on Cebu. Vice President Car-los P. Garcia became president in a

8 Special Warfare

Philippine president Ramon Magsaysaypresided over a number of beneficial reforms.

USASOC Historical Archive

subsequent election, and in 1959he renegotiated the status of someU.S. military installations in thePhilippines. The agreement cededto the Philippines a considerableamount of land that had beenreserved by the U.S. for militarybases but left unused. In 1965, Fer-dinand E. Marcos replaced Garciaas president of the Philippines. Re-elected in 1969, Marcos ruled as adictator from 1972 until his deposi-tion in 1986.24

Marcos regimeUnder Marcos, a number of

events significantly affected Phil-ippine relations with the U.S. mili-tary. In the mid-1960s, the U.S.completed negotiations concerningthe status of U.S. military person-nel and bases in the Philippines. In1965, provisions similar to theNATO Status of Forces Agreementwere adopted to settle issues ofcriminal jurisdiction over U.S. mil-itary personnel. A 1966 amend-ment to the original 1947 agree-ment establishing U.S. bases in thePhilippines moved the expirationdate for U.S. base rights to 1991.25

In addition to renegotiatingterms for U.S. military presence inthe Philippines, Marcos deployed acivil-affairs brigade task force tosupplement U.S. war efforts inVietnam for three years. The taskforce was comprised of an engineerconstruction company, a mecha-nized infantry company and anartillery battery (for security). Con-tinuing a pattern of assistance thathad been established during theKorean War, this act of supportgarnered additional economic aidand military assistance for thePhilippines.

During Marcos’ second term, acombination of political corruption,serious economic problems, decay-ing social programs and human-rights abuses helped communist

insurgents regain much of the influ-ence they had lost underMagsaysay. Muslim secessionists inthe southern Philippines were alsocausing trouble, and an aura of law-lessness permeated the country.

Turning the situation to hisadvantage in September 1972,Marcos suspended the constitu-tion, declared martial law andimposed censorship. The measures

were supposedly instituted tocounter the insurgencies, but theyalso effectively controlled the polit-ical opposition. With the countryunder martial law, Marcos and hisallies exploited their new powerand practiced “crony capitalism,”economic strategies designed tomake them rich while ostensiblyenacting critical land reforms.

Marcos also undermined theAFP by promoting officers on the

basis of their personal loyalty, nottheir ability, and by encouraging acorrupt patronage system at everylevel. The resulting AFP dealtharshly, and ineffectively, with thegrowing communist and Musliminsurgencies, often resorting tobrutal tactics in dealing with civil-ians, which served only tostrengthen the insurgencies theAFP was trying to quell.26

The U.S. maintained close tieswith the Marcos regime, even asthe two countries renegotiatedtrade and defense agreements. In1979, the U.S. and the Philippinessigned another amendment to theMilitary Bases Agreement of 1947,emphasizing Philippine sovereign-ty over the bases and again reduc-ing the bases’ total area. Marcosfinally ended martial law in 1981,and he was overwhelmingly re-elected president that year.Although the well-publicizedassassination of opposition leaderBenigno Aquino Jr., on Aug. 21,1983, escalated domestic turmoiland invoked formal complaints bythe U.S. government, senior Ameri-can officials, congressmen and themilitary, preoccupied with per-ceived Soviet threats, continued tosupport the Marcos regime.

In February 1986, anxious toreaffirm U.S. support for hisregime, Marcos held an early pres-idential election. To his astonish-ment, although the regime-friendlyNational Assembly ratified the cor-rupt election results, various rebelfactions united in protest. BetweenFeb. 22 and 24, the ranks of pro-testers grew to include religiousofficials, children and even militaryofficers.

Finally tiring of Marcos, the U.S.threatened to suspend all foreignaid to the Philippines unless Mar-cos stepped down, and U.S.Embassy officials quietly boycottedthe inauguration. Realizing that heno longer had U.S. support, Marcos

September 2004 9

During Marcos’ secondterm, a combination ofpolitical corruption, seri-ous economic problems,decaying social programsand human-rights abuseshelped communist insur-gents regain much of theinfluence they had lostunder Magsaysay. Mus-lim secessionists in the southern Philip-pines were also causingtrouble, and an aura oflawlessness permeatedthe country.

and his wife, the infamous Imelda,abandoned the capital and left thecountry in defeat.27

A new leaderWith Marcos’ self-imposed exile,

opposition candidate CorazonAquino took office as president ofthe Philippines, an office that shehad rightfully won in the elections.Aquino successfully fought offnumerous coup attempts over thenext few years, sometimes withU.S. military support. FollowingAquino’s accession to power, theU.S. Congress twice boosted aid tothe Philippines. House Resolution4515, of July 2, 1986, provided anadditional $100 million in econom-ic support funds, or ESF, and $50million in military assistance. OnOct. 20, 1986, the minimum ESFfor the Philippines was set at $200million for 1987.28

Despite U.S. programs of foreigninternal defense, or FID, duringAquino’s term in office, the prob-lems of insurgency grew. A recalci-trant government bureaucracypurposely delayed critical politicalimprovements and economic mea-sures, exacerbating serious socialproblems and furthering insur-gent causes. The AFP, while seem-ingly incapable of combatinginsurgencies, attempted fourcoups against President Aquino.Still, Congress continued to sup-port the Aquino government.

In 1989, U.S. support to thePhilippines included $124 millionin ESF, $125 million in militaryassistance and the promise of $50million for land reform if the Phil-ippine government could create asuitable program. In 1990, Con-gress appropriated $40 million fordevelopmental assistance and$125 million for military assist-ance,29 but the murder of U.S. ser-vicemen during the base-rightsnegotiations revealed how com-

bat-ineffective and politicized theAFP had become and how inade-quate U.S. assistance had been tochange the situation.30

With U.S. base rights due toexpire in 1991, Aquino’s govern-ment began negotiations with theU.S. in 1990 to define future mili-tary relations between the Philip-pines and the U.S.

Philippine concerns over sover-eignty had been increasing fordecades, and they were height-ened by the awareness that sover-eignty prerogatives that the U.S.accorded Panama in the Canal

Treaty settlements had not pre-vented American intervention inthat country in 1989. In 1991, theU.S. announced plans to closeClark Air Force Base, initiating aturnover of the base to Philippinemilitary and civilian interests. Fil-ipino insurgents’ threats to evictAmerican forces from perpetuallyleased bases increased pressurefor the handover, and the June1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubohastened the departure of the U.S.military. By late 1992, the U.S.had closed all its military installa-tions in the Philippines.31

In 1992, Fidel Ramos succeededAquino as president of the Philip-pines. In accordance with his plat-form of unification, the Ramosadministration began talks with

insurgent groups. While someinsurgent groups later enteredinto peace agreements with thegovernment, the more radicalgroups refused to negotiate, turn-ing instead to banditry and terror-ism. In May 1998, Joseph Estradawas overwhelmingly elected presi-dent. His term in office was quick-ly stigmatized by allegations ofcorruption, and in January 2001,Estrada was forced from office andreplaced by his former vice-presi-dent, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Aswell as inheriting a faltering econ-omy, Arroyo faced aggressive ter-rorist threats in the south, wherethe Abu Sayyaf Group and theMoro National Liberation Front,as well as other splinter groupswith Islamist agendas, werebecoming increasingly bold intheir kidnapping and bombingcampaigns.

Decline of the Philippine armyThe 1990s were a period of

uncertainty in U.S.-Philippine rela-tions, and America reduced itssecurity-assistance funding signifi-cantly. As a result, the Philippinemilitary declined measurably interms of its operational capabili-ties, logistics, professionalism andmorale. The Philippine govern-ment’s 1999 ratification of the Vis-iting Forces Agreement restoredprotections to U.S. military person-nel during combined exercises andraised the possibility of resumingexercises in the Philippines as partof the Joint Chiefs of Staff CobraGold training series in the Pacifictheater.32

In 2001, President Arroyorequested U.S. help in suppressingthe continually escalating insur-gent threat in the south and agreedto allow U.S. forces to train Philip-pine troops to be more effective inthe new Global War on Terrorism.When U.S. special-operations

10 Special Warfare

Philippine President Gloria Arroyo speakingto the United Nations.

USASOC Historical Archive

forces arrived in the Philippines,they carried, in addition to theirrucksacks, the baggage of morethan 100 years of military andpolitical tensions between the twoallies.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a histo-rian on the staff of the USASOCHistorian’s Office.

Notes:1 Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For

the Common Defense: A Military History ofthe United States of America (New York: TheFree Press, 1994), 299-300.

2 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Armyand Counterinsurgency in the PhilippineWar, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The Universi-ty of North Carolina Press, 1989), 12-17.

3 Linn, 21-22.4 Millett and Maslowski, 307.5 Linn, 17-19.6 Linn, 23-25.7 Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine Political

and Cultural History, Volume II: The Philip-pines Since the British Invasion (Manila:Philippine Education Company, 1956), 224.

8 Millett and Maslowski, 311-13.9 John M. Collins, America’s Small Wars

(Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, 1991): 91-92.10 Millett and Maslowski, 337-38.11 Zaide, 245-46.12 Zaide, 240-45; Ronald E. Dolan, ed., ThePhilippines: A Country Study (Washington,D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library ofCongress, 1993), 32-33.13 Dolan, 32-33.14 Zaide, 313-18; Dolan, 38-39.15 Dolan, 38-41.16 Collins, 111-12.17 Robert Ross Smith, The United StatesArmy in World War II: The War in the Pacif-ic: Vol. 10: Triumph in the Philippines(Washington, D.C., 1963); Forrest L. Marion,“Opening the Second Front: OperationEnduring Freedom-Philippines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM classified drafthistory of JTF-510, stored in the classifiedfiles of the USSOCOM History Office,MacDill AFB, Fla.18 U.S. Code Congressional Service, 1946,Public Law 454, 306; Lawrence M. Green-berg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A CaseStudy of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Oper-ation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 (Wash-ington, D.C.: Analysis Branch, U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History), 99-102.19 Collins, 121-22.20 U.S. Code Congressional Service, 1949,

Public Law 329, 731, 733; Senate Report No.1068, 1991-2003, and Senate Report No.703, 2250, 2277.21 Walter G. Hermes, The United StatesArmy in the Korean War: Truce Tent andFighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Center ofMilitary History, 1992), 68-69; Billy C.Mossman, The United States Army in theKorean War: Ebb and Flow November 1950-July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History, 1990), 24, 26, 29.22 Smith; Marion, “Opening the SecondFront.”23 Greenberg, 104-11.24 Collins, 121-22.25 Dolan, 49-62.26 Dolan, 48-49.27 Dolan, 52-55.28 Collins, 197-98; Dolan, 55-62.29 100 Statute 710 at 726 (Public Law 99-349); 100 Statute 3341, 3341-214, and 3341-21 (Public Law 99-591).30 Collins, 197-98.31 Collins, 197-98.32 Brigadier General Donald C. Wurster,interview with Forrest L. Marion at CampZamboanga, Republic of the Philippines, 31March 2002, stored in the classifiedarchives of the USSOCOM History Office.

September 2004 11

For more than a century, the Philip-pines has struggled with unrest.Today, that unrest continues as vari-

ous ethnic, religious and political factionscompete for control of the country, oftenusing terror as a means to their end.

Four main insurgent factions, alongwith various splinter groups and crimi-nal organizations spread throughout therepublic’s more than 7,000 islands, cur-rently threaten the Philippines. Claim-ing that all the factions are actually“money-seeking thugs” rather than ideo-logically oriented insurgents, the Gov-ernment of the Republic of the Philip-pines, or GRP, officially refers to allinsurgent groups as “bandits” ratherthan as terrorists or rebels. That stanceenables the GRP to refuse any interna-tional antiterrorism assistance thatmight conceivably infringe on Philippinesovereignty.

In spite of official protests to the con-trary, the Philippines are indeed both atarget and a producer of terrorism. It isthis latter role, more than any other rea-son, that has recently focused the attentionof the United States military on the south-ern Philippines.

New People’s ArmyThe most serious insurgent threat in the

Philippines is the militant arm of the Com-munist People’s Party, known as the New

People’s Army, or NPA, which was foundedin 1969. As the successor to the Hukbala-

hap, or HUK, insurgency ofthe 1940s and 1950s, theNPA has always sought tooverthrow the Philippinerepublican regime. Althoughthe NPA has been engaged

in peace talks since 1986, it continuesguerrilla operations, primarily on LuzonIsland. The group also claimed responsibil-ity for the assassination of U.S. ArmyColonel Nick Rowe, founder of the special-operations Survival, Evasion, Resistanceand Escape Course, in 1989. The NPAmaintains a small presence in northernMindanao, but it has done little in the pre-dominantly Muslim southern Philippines.

Moro National Liberation FrontThe Moro National Liberation Front, or

MNLF, was founded in the 1960s to push forMoro autonomy in the southern Philippines.In 1972, under the leadership of Nur Misuari,

the group esca-lated its effortsto the level ofguerrilla war-fare. Aftermore than twodecades of

armed conflict, the MNLF and the GRPsigned a peace agreement in 1996, signal-ing the MNLF’s metamorphosis from an

12 Special Warfare

Multiple Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Security

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Downey

armed faction to a political entity. Thepeace agreement called for the creation ofthe Autonomous Region in Muslim Min-danao, or ARMM; the appointment of NurMisuari as governor of the ARMM; and theintegration of 5,500 ex-guerrillas into theArmed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP,and the Philippine Navy.

Many in the MNLF, however, feltbetrayed by Misuari’s peace negotiations,taking particular umbrage at the conces-sions he had negotiated for himself. Overthe next five years those dissatisfied mem-bers of the MLNF pushed for Misuari’s dis-missal as governor. In April 2001, the GRPfinally removed Misuari on charges of graftand corruption. That act prompted othermembers of the MNLF who were loyal toMisuari to form the Misuari RenegadeGroup, or MRG, which began conductingterrorist attacks in Jolo and Zamboanga.In the wake of these attacks, Misuari fledto Indonesia, where he was subsequentlyarrested, returned to the Philippines, andimprisoned on Luzon. While the MRG con-tinued its bombing campaign and becameinvolved in attacks on the AFP, the MNLFcontinued its primarily political activities.1

Moro Islamic Liberation FrontIn 1978, MNLF members who were dis-

gusted with Nur Misuari’s leadership of thegroup broke away to form the Moro IslamicLiberation Front, or MILF, and continued

militant resist-ance againstthe Philippineg o v e r n m e n t .The MILF hasbecome thestrongest and

most active insurgent group in the south-ern Philippines, as well as the most vocallyanti-American. Although Mindanao is itsprimary area of operations, the MILF hassupport cells based on Basilan Island. Dur-ing 2002, terrorists with links to the MILFrepeatedly bombed Manila’s business dis-trict and transportation system. The MILFhas recently been linked to the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organi-zation. In spite of its continued terrorist

activities, the MILF has been conductingpeace negotiations with the GRP since1997, and it signed a formal peace agree-ment in 2001.

Abu Sayyaf GroupThe U.S. has been most concerned with

the emergence of the third major insurgentfaction in the southern Philippines, theAbu Sayyaf Group, or ASG. Abdurajak Jan-jalani, a teacher influenced by fundamen-tal Islamism, founded the group between1990 and 1992. Janjalani, a radical MILFunit commander who had fought inAfghanistan in the late 1980s, adopted thenom de guerre Abu Sayyaf (Father of theSword) from a celebrated Afghan resist-ance leader, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

Originally organized to fight against thePhilippine government in the cause of anindependent Muslim rule for Basilan, Joloand Tawi-Tawi, the ASG has also becomean extortion and kidnap-for-ransom gang.In assuming the revolutionary struggle forMuslim independence, the ASG sought togain the attention of other Islamic coun-tries and to garner the international fund-ing that was provided to the MNLF prior tothe establishment of the ARMM. The ASGalso maintains tenuous ties to al-Qaeda.2

In 1992, the ASG launched its first oper-ations, mainly bombings in the Zamboangaarea of Mindanao. The following year, inaddition to bomb attacks, the ASG beganits signature activity: kidnapping foreign-ers for ransom. The AFP, focused on thelarger MNLF and MILF groups, did notconsider the ASG to be a legitimate threatuntil the spring of 1995, when a well-exe-cuted attack devastated the Christiantown of Ipil. Fifty dead civilians and sol-diers, as well as more than 100 wounded,changed the AFP’s and the U.S. PacificCommand’s assessments of the ASG. Thegroup’s more than 100 attacks soon elevat-ed it to regional-threat status with the U.S.Pacific Command.

Periodic well-coordinated major attackscontinued until December 1998, whenmembers of the AFP killed Janjalani dur-ing a shootout on Basilan Island. As a tes-tament to his importance to the GRP, Jan-

September 2004 13

jalani had been the country’s most wantedman, with a “dead or alive” reward of 1.5million pesos. His demise most likelyprompted the transition of the ASG froman ideologically motivated organizationinto a primarily kidnap-for-ransom groupthat also used bombings to extort moneyfrom the local population in a terrorist ver-sion of the protection racket.3

In early autumn 2002, the ASG initiateda month-long bombing campaign on Min-danao. The campaign eventually spread toManila and other parts of the Philippinesin response to increased AFP patrols. OnSept. 19, 2002, two bus bombs were foundin southern Mindanao — one was defused,but the other, in Zamboanga, exploded andkilled a guard. Eight days later, ASGleader Khadaffy Janjalani (brother ofAbdurajak) appeared on Radio Mindanaoand called for a Muslim offensive againstU.S. forces in the Philippines. The Pak-istan-educated leader called on “all believ-ers in the oneness of Allah and who fearthe day of judgment to do their sacred dutyto protect the interest of Islam and strikeat its enemies, both foreign and local.”

After promising attacks against Ameri-can civilian and military targets in retalia-tion for continuing government offensivesagainst rebels, Janjalani announced thatthe ASG would change its name to IslamicMovement, thereby affiliating with the

Indonesia-based Jamaah Islamiya and ele-vating the organization’s fight to a higherlevel — Islamic jihad.4 Shortly afterward,the group’s bombing campaign escalateddramatically.

The ASG has ensured that it wouldbecome the primary focus of the Philip-pine government’s antiterrorism atten-tion in recent years by conducting high-visibility kidnappings of Western foreign-ers. To build notoriety, the ASG has heldAmerican hostages on Basilan withimpunity, and it has even beheaded someof its victims. It is the ASG with whichU.S. forces have had to contend mostdirectly as they have conducted militarytraining and civic-assistance missions inthe southern Philippines.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Downey is thedeputy commander of the 1st SF Group and isa former commander of Joint Special Opera-tions Task Force-Philippines.

Notes:1 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian

(January-December 2002), dated 5 May 2003, in theclassified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.

2 Abu Sayyaf Group Primer, 27 April 2000, lastupdated 27 September 2001, from Forrest L. Marion,“Opening the Second Front: Operation EnduringFreedom-Philippines, January-August 2002,” USSO-COM classified draft history of JTF-510, stored in theclassified files of the USSOCOM History Office,MacDill AFB, Fla.

3 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.”4 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel

Duane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.

14 Special Warfare

Originally organized to fight against the Philip-pine government in the cause of an independ-ent Muslim rule for Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi,the ASG has also become an extortion and kid-nap-for-ransom gang. In assuming the revolu-tionary struggle for Muslim independence, theASG sought to gain the attention of otherIslamic countries and to garner the internation-al funding that was provided to the MNLF priorto the establishment of the ARMM.

The Republic of the Philippines,located in Southeast Asia, compris-es 7,107 islands that are bounded

by the Philippine Sea on the east and theSouth China Sea on the west. The Philip-pines lie south of Taiwan, northwest ofMalaysia and north of Indonesia. ThePhilippines’ largest island, Luzon, ishome to the capital city, Manila. Thenation’s second largest island is Min-danao. Approximately 250 miles to thenorthwest of Mindanao is Palawan, aresort area that became widely known in2001 following the kidnapping of 20 indi-viduals, including two American mission-aries, Gracia and Martin Burnham.

Extending south from the ZamboangaPeninsula of Mindanao is the Sulu Arch-ipelago, which includes the islands ofBasilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi. During theongoing Global War on Terrorism, theUnited States military’s interest hasfocused primarily on the island of Basi-lan, only 12 miles south of Zamboanga.Basilan measures approximately 40miles east to west and 25 miles north tosouth.

Because of the topography of theisland, most of Basilan’s residents live inthe lower elevations, along the perimeterof the island. In fact, the majority of the330,000 residents live in and around themajor cities.

The perimeter of the island is almostentirely cultivated. Rubber, coconut and

palm-tree plantations predominate, andcasaba melons are grown in adjacentfields. Inland, a triple-canopy jungle isprevalent, resulting in good naturalcover and concealment, as well as in gooddefensive areas for guerrilla forces.

Basilan is also part of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao, a self-gov-erning territory populated predominant-ly by Muslims.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histo-rian for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

September 2004 15

Rugged Terrain Makes Philippine Islands Haven for Insurgent Groups

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

The topography of Basilan causes most of the island’s res-idents to live along the perimeter of the island. The ruggedinterior provides good defenses for guerrilla groups.

Defense Mapping Agency

The Global War on Terrorism,or GWOT, brought a newUnited States military pres-

ence to the Philippines. The U.S.military had conducted largepeacetime joint training exercisesin the Philippines during the early-to-mid 1990s, including the suc-cessful Balikatan exercise, until itwas dropped from the Cobra Goldseries after 1995. With the increasein insurgent activity in the south-ern Philippines during the late1990s, the U.S. began to followPhilippine military activities withrenewed interest.

Terrorist activityWhen U.S. citizens became

targets of the Abu Sayyaf Group, orASG, leaders of the U.S. PacificCommand, or PACOM, began to payspecial attention to terrorist fac-tions and to develop strategies forhelping the Philippines deal withthreats to its internal stability.

Even before terrorists attackedthe U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001,Balikatan had been revived, andthe U.S. military was already train-ing Philippine troops to more effec-tively combat terrorism in theirown country. The events of 9/11,however, emphasized the necessity

of confronting terrorism in thePhilippines and refocused U.S.efforts to help the Philippine mili-tary enhance its capabilities andits joint operability.

In April 2000, the ASG threat-ened to kill Americans in the Phil-ippines and then seized 20 Westernforeigners at a resort in Sipadan,Malaysia. These two developmentscompelled PACOM to closely trackall terrorist groups and to begindeveloping strategies for combat-ing terrorism in the region.

Focusing on the Philippines asa historic ally and as a criticaltheater for the struggle againstterrorism, PACOM began to lookat training-assistance options de-signed to upgrade the capabili-ties of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, or AFP, to combatterrorism and restore popularconfidence in the national gov-ernment. In a number of inci-dents during July and August2000, the ASG kidnapped anoth-er 30 hostages, including U.S. cit-izen Jeffrey Schilling. The inci-dents prompted PACOM to offertraining help to the Governmentof the Republic of the Philip-pines, or GRP.

Mobile training teamsIn September 2000, Admiral

Dennis C. Blair, commander ofPACOM, accompanied by officersfrom the Special OperationsCommand, Pacific, or SOCPAC,traveled to Manila to brief lead-ers of the GRP and the AFP onthe concept of a mobile trainingteam, or MTT, designed to trainand equip a company-sized unitto respond to the escalating ter-rorist threat. President JosephEstrada rejected the Americanoffer of assistance, but whenEstrada was forced out of office inJanuary 2001, his replacement,Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, provedto be much more amenable toPACOM’s offer of assistance.

Under Arroyo’s leadership, the

16 Special Warfare

Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

GRP invited PACOM to send anMTT to train the AFP in moreeffective counterinsurgency tech-niques in the southern Philippines.In March 2001, Company B, 1stBattalion, 1st Special ForcesGroup, out of Okinawa, begantraining the first AFP light reac-tion company, or LRC.

LRC training was conducted inphases in order to develop soldiers’tactical skills at the individuallevel before progressing to squad,platoon and company tactics and tolive-fire field operations.

“Since the vast majority ofAmerican instructors teachingleadership, professional ethics,responsibility and small-unit tac-tics were SF noncommissionedofficers, the young Philippinesergeants and junior officers inthe LRC quickly grasped theadvantages of empowered leadersat all levels. That was a real suc-cess story,” said Major MartyCromwell (pseudonym) of the 1stSF Group.1

Despite their students’ improve-ments, the SF trainers assessedthe AFP’s tactical capabilities asweak, and their equipment as poor.It was obvious why terrorist groupswere enjoying success against theAFP.

The ASG’s superiority was dri-ven home on May 27, 2001, when

the terrorist group raided the DosPalmas Resort on Palawan Island,kidnapping 17 Filipinos and threeAmericans, including missionariesMartin and Gracia Burnham.

TCAV visitAfter the LRC completed train-

ing in July, it was sent south toBasilan Island, the ASG’s sanctu-ary and its staging base for the DosPalmas raid.

Unfortunately, the LRC’s com-mand and control, or C2, had notbeen clearly established beforedeparture, which drasticallyreduced the company’s effective-ness. Attempting to address theC2 issue, Brigadier General Don-ald Wurster, commander of SOC-PAC, and Colonel DavidFridovich, commander of the 1stSF Group (now a brigadier gener-al), scheduled a meeting for Sept.11, 2001, to discuss incorporatinga terrorist coordination andassistance visit, or TCAV, into theinitial-planning survey for Exer-cise Balikatan 02-1.

The meeting’s emphasis shift-ed abruptly, however, with thatday’s terrorist attacks in the U.S.The SOCPAC staff quicklyfocused on identifying al-Qaedaconnections in the region inorder to help PACOM develop itsSoutheast Asian GWOT cam-paign plan. The TCAV planningwas left to Fridovich, and theassessment trip was pushed backto October.2

The SF-heavy TCAV includedplanners from the 1st SF Group,Naval special-warfare units andthe Air Force’s 353rd SpecialOperations Group. While theplanners considered militaryinterdiction to be important, themajority of the AFP belonged tothe army, and the anticipatedmission of the exercise would beto train and advise the AFP in

countering ASG terrorism.The TCAV team, after visiting

Manila, Zamboanga and Basilan,reconfirmed the deficiencies thataffected the AFP’s ability to con-duct effective combat operationsagainst terrorist groups: A mar-ginal communications structure,ineffective civil affairs, limitedmobility and a lack of the intelli-gence fusion needed to supportoperations.3

Combating terrorismDuring November and December

2001, SOCPAC and its componentsworked to develop a training package that would improve theAFP’s capability to conduct inter-nal defense and thereby combatterrorism.

In addition to the TCAV’s recom-mendations, the planners had agrim logistics and maintenanceassessment from PACOM focusingon the key AFP mobility systems,including aircraft, trucks andnaval patrol craft. The assessmentfound many of the assets to beunder-supported, with repairs tak-ing longer than they should havebecause of a lack of parts andknow-how.

Because the state of its mobilitysystems severely hampered theAFP’s ability to conduct effectiveoperations, any effort to upgradethe AFP’s capability would have toinclude a long-term logistics andmaintenance-support plan.4

Evidently the GRP gave seriousattention to the SOCPAC/PACOMrecommendations. During Presi-dent Arroyo’s Nov. 19-23, 2001,visit to Washington to meet withPresident George W. Bush, the twonational leaders affirmed theirintent to continue working on avigorous, integrated plan forstrengthening the AFP’s capabili-ty to combat terror and protectPhilippine sovereignty.

September 2004 17

A Philippine SF soldier takes aim during a training exercise.

USASOC Historical Archive

The plan included a robust pack-age of training, assistance andmobility equipment. After Presi-dent Bush pledged to provide $100million in military assistance(including a C-130 transport air-plane and 30,000 reconditioned M-16 rifles) and $4.6 billion in eco-nomic aid, Arroyo agreed to allowthe U.S. military to deploy to thePhilippines to “advise and assistthe AFP.”

Arroyo also undercut the ter-rorists’ political support by sus-pending Nur Misuari, leader of the Moro National LiberationFront, or MNLF, from the gover-norship of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao, orARMM.

In response to his dismissalby President Arroyo, Misuarideclared war against the GRPon Nov. 19. Four hundredMNLF fighters loyal to Misuariformed the Misuari RenegadeGroup and attacked the AFPairfields on Jolo and at Zam-boanga City. Although the AFPsuccessfully defended both air-fields, 60 AFP troops were

killed and 100 wounded, whilejust over 100 insurgents werekilled during the week the bat-tles lasted.5

JTF-510In response to the terrorists’

aggression, PACOM activated astanding joint task force, JTF-510, that would plan and prepareto implement the first phase ofOperation Freedom Eagle as partof Exercise Balikatan 02-1. Indeference to the Philippines’ sen-sitivity to sovereignty issues, the1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, mod-ified its initial plan. Rather thanuse Exercise Balikatan as aspringboard for conducting acombined unconventional-war-fare, or UW, campaign againstterrorism in the Philippines, U.S.forces would advise and assistthe AFP in internal defense anddevelopment.6

The SOCPAC and PACOMstaffs labeled their effort theGWOT Southeast Asian Cam-paign, a name that connoted theirregional and long-term involve-

ment. “It was a unique mission,because in one sense SF was‘training, advising, assisting andmaintaining,’ but the locationwas a combat zone where AFPsoldiers were fighting the AbuSayyaf Group,” observedCromwell.7

Gearing upWhile the SF companies and

teams began their UW missionplanning, the staff of the 1st SFGroup began preparing a state-ment of requirements for support-ing the GWOT in the tropics withall three of the group’s battalions.It would be a major environmentalshift for the two battalions basedat Fort Lewis, Wash.

Those battalions found that theylacked items necessary for conduct-ing operations in a tropical combatzone: multiband interteam radios(PRC-148s); mobile satellite anten-nas; additional PRC-112 radios;and individual jungle uniforms,boots, field equipment and bodyarmor. The battalions were forbid-den to purchase the equipment

18 Special Warfare

One of the keys to bringing Philippine troopsup to speed was ensuring that they had up-to-date equipment, like this body armorbeing issued to Philippine soldiers.

USASOC Historical Archive

using operations funds, so they hadto rely on the standard supply sys-tem. Because special-operationselements already engaged in OEF-Afghanistan received a higher pri-ority from the U.S. Special Opera-tions Command, or USSOCOM,U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, or USASOC, and theU.S. Army Special Forces Com-mand, or USASFC, most newequipment arrived after the SFdetachments were already in thePhilippines.

One exception to the late supplysituation was the individual emer-gency medical package, an itemthat proved to be most critical.The 24-hour helicopter medicalevacuation plan was “soft” for life-threatening injuries or wounds,because of the unreliability of theUH-1 Huey helicopters of the Phil-ippine Air Force, or PAF, duringthe day, and basic time-distanceissues for the MH-47Es of theArmy, which were supposed tohandle night rescues.

Aircraft of Company E, 160thSpecial Operations Regiment,were initially based at MactanAir Base, Cebu, with the C-130Paerial refuelers of the 351st Spe-cial Operations Wing based 350miles north of Basilan Island.Both locations were too far fromthe area of operations to makenight extractions practical. ThePAF Hueys were much closer —only 20 minutes flight time awayat Zamboanga, Mindanao — butthe aircraft were unreliable, andtheir pilots had no training innight operations.8

Anticipating approval of thecounterterrorism mission, Fridovichdecided to establish his initial stag-ing base at Torii Station, Okinawa.This would allow the SF detach-ments to focus on mission prepara-tion and to train in the junglebefore they deployed to the Philip-pines. Facing a long-term “train,

advise, assist and maintain” mis-sion, Fridovich planned to use SFcompanies from all three battal-ions, rotating the forward-operat-ing-base, or FOB, mission, as wellas the companies, every six-months. FOB 11 planned for thefirst hand-off and redeploymentperiod to be from May 1 throughJune 15, 2002.9

After the Christmas holidays,the advance echelons, orADVONs, of the 2nd and 3rd Bat-talions’ companies began deploy-ing to Okinawa to coordinate bil-lets and training areas for theforthcoming SF detachments. TheSF teams, three per company,rotated through the northern jun-gle training area and the variousfiring ranges as part of their UWmission prep. The 1st SF Group’sADVON, which included a C2 ele-ment, “slices” of the headquartersand headquarters company andthe general-support company,and two more detachments forforce protection, followed them.By Jan. 28, 2002, the group tacti-cal operations center, or TOC, wasfully operational on Okinawa.10

Exercise openingOn Jan. 29, Fridovich with his

group C2 pilot team flew directlyfrom Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, toEdwin Andrews Air Base in Zam-boanga, Mindanao. Two days later,on the official opening day of Exer-cise Balikatan, SF detachments112 and 134 joined the 1st SFGroup commander to provideantiterrorist protection and forceprotection for the C2 element, theJTF-510 ADVON on Basilan. Thesedetachments would later rotatebetween the Quick Reaction Forceand the Zamboanga forces trainingmission.11

In order to establish rapportwith the AFP, the three companiesand their detachments were based

with the Philippine headquarterselements down to the battalionlevel. FOB 11, commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin(pseudonym), acted as the back-bone of the Army special-opera-tions task force, or ARSOTF, ofJTF-510 and was aligned with the1st Infantry Division (Forward) orTask Force Comet (Forward), atIsabela, Basilan, when it arrivedon Feb. 12. With the ADVONsalready in place, the remainder ofthe 1st Group personnel begandeploying into Basilan on Feb. 17,2002, getting Phase I of ExerciseBalikatan under way.12

The ARSOTF was also responsi-ble for the two SF detachments(180 at Isabela and 150 at Lami-tan) that supported the 103rdInfantry Brigade Army TaskGroup Thunder, which controlledthe northern half and southeast-ern sector of Basilan, and SF B-detachment 120, which supportedthe 2nd Marine Brigade TaskGroup Tornado at Maluso in thesouthwest sector.

The detachments were locatedthroughout the area of opera-tions, or AO. SF Detachment 114was located at Abungabung withthe 1st Marine Battalion LandingTeam. SF Detachment 125 wasposted in the north central partof Tornado’s area of operation,with the 5th Marine BattalionLanding Team, and SF Detach-ment 126 advised the MarineForce Reconnaissance Battalionat Libak.

SF Detachment 143 wasassigned to advise the Civil Aug-mentation Force GeographicalUnit, or CAFGU, at Mahebal. SFDetachment 153 advised the 32ndInfantry Battalion at Tipo-Tipo,and SF Detachment 163 supportedthe 18th Infantry Battalion fromYacan. SF Detachment 134 wastasked to “train, advise and assist”the LRC. Other detachments were

September 2004 19

assigned to the infantry andMarine battalions for a one-yearrotation on the island.13

Force protectionBecause the AFP had very little

in the way of heavy firepower, theSF teams had to provide their ownforce protection. Heavy-weaponsfire support for the AFP brigadesand battalions stationed on Basi-lan consisted of two pre-VietnamWar vintage M-101 105 mm how-itzers. Each fired a single rounddaily into the AO as harassmentand interdiction fire. Additionalfirepower for the battalions con-sisted of a variety of 81 mm mor-tars (the tubes, base plates andsights had been manufactured inthree different countries), and afew Simba armored personnel car-riers that had inoperable guns.14

The teams consequently relied ontheir HMMWV-mounted MK-19sand .50-caliber heavy machineguns.

Unlike the SF units preparingfor Afghanistan, the 1st Group Sol-diers did not receive additionalammunition on Okinawa for use inqualifying on the heavy-gun sys-tems, nor did they receive M-240machine guns, claymore mines forself-protection or smoke grenadesfor marking medevac landingzones. Balikatan was still catego-rized as a training exercise, so SFSoldiers got off the MH-47Es onBasilan carrying only 5.56 mm M-4carbines, M-203 grenade launch-ers, 9 mm Beretta automatics andhand grenades.15

Base-camp security was greatlyenhanced after the arrival of the SFteams. Because many of the Philip-pine soldiers had their families liv-ing with them, the Americansstressed the necessity of providingmore secure living conditions forwomen and children. They encour-aged the soldiers to push the outer

camp perimeter further out —beyond hand-grenade range — andto clear fields of fire all around.The Philippine soldiers then builtfighting bunkers to defend thecamp, and they staked andstretched barbed wire along theouter perimeter. Those simpleimprovements greatly enhancedforce protection for the SF teamsand the Philippine military. TheAFP later contracted bulldozers tobuild marksmanship ranges andto further improve the campdefenses. While they waited forthe ammunition, the Soldiers tookadvantage of down time by teach-ing basic individual tactical skillsand schooling the junior officersand sergeants in leadership, plan-ning and defensive measures.16

Shortly after it arrived, JTF-510 changed the ARSOTF’s prior-ities from making tactical assess-ments of the AFP’s needs forcounterterrorism training toimproving the legitimacy of theGRP through the use of the coun-terinsurgency model, or COIN.PACOM was determined to getthe Philippine military involved

in helping to meet the needs ofthe populace on Basilan. To thatend, the teams were tasked toconduct security assessments ofall the Basilan villages.

The SF Soldiers were also told todetermine the needs of the popu-lace by surveying at least 60,000 ofthe 350,000 residents on theisland.17 The JTF furnished a 70-question survey form, heavily ori-ented toward civic and humanitar-ian programs, with a March 31assessment-completion date. Tofulfill the security aspect of theirmission, the SF teams developedforce-protection plans for each vil-lage that would support future tac-tical offensive operations.

In a survey of more than 100communities, the SF detachmentsfound that the Christian villageswere relatively safe, and that Phil-ippine forces rarely visited Muslimvillages. AFP units would not entera Muslim stronghold without over-whelming strength, because theywanted to be prepared to fight theentire village, not just the ASG orMNLF fighters hidden inside.18

The SF teams “expected to shoot or

20 Special Warfare

A Philippine soldier moves through Basilan Island’s dense foliage while on patrol.USASOC Historical Archive

to be shot in the Muslim villages.19

In spite of improvements to thesecurity situation, SF teams oftenfound themselves having todepend on local AFP for force pro-tection. In the north central areaof the Task Group Thunder AO, SFDetachment 184, led by CaptainJames Brown (pseudonym), wasbased with the AFP’s 10thInfantry Battalion at Calvario.The primary focus of the battalioncommander, Lieutenant ColonelRay Ordeñez, was the Christiantown of Lantawan, an ASG breed-ing ground and hometown of theHapilon brothers, two well-knownguerrilla leaders.20 Ordeñez kepttrack of what was happening inhis AO by providing troops for vil-lage security and by employingintelligence agents. His securityarrangement with Lantawan’smayor was to keep squad-sizedelements in the outlying villageson a rotational basis to augmentCAFGU personnel.

In addition, Ordeñez maintaineda number of intelligence operativesin the villages to collect informa-

tion and to warn him of potentialguerrilla activity. Because morethan 5,000 former MNLF fightershad been integrated in the AFP aspart of the Tripoli Accords in 1996,the compromising of current opera-tions was an ever-present danger,and Ordeñez used his own agentsto try to counter that threat.21

The SF teams were initiallyunable to contribute much in theway of intelligence resources. Nei-ther current information nor intel-ligence came down from the battal-ion to the detachments operatingon Basilan — JTF-510’s intelli-gence focus was elsewhere. Withthe exception of occasional close-hold photo imagery, the team com-manders could contribute little tothe AFP battalion commander’splanning efforts besides intelli-gence fusion. Because the Philip-pines had been off PACOM’s “radarscreen” for almost 10 years, up-to-date map sheets (1/50,000 scale)were not available when the teamsdeployed. The most current tacticalmaps arrived after the SF teamshad been “on-station” nearly two

months, and the maps were morethan 40 years out-of-date.

Vital language skills were alsolacking on the teams. Among the1st SF Group personnel who ini-tially deployed to the Philippines,only two Soldiers were of Filipinodescent. While their Tagalog lan-guage skills were useful withChavacano, a combination of Taga-log and Spanish, they helped littlewith the Tausug and Yacan dialectsthat are common to Basilan andthe southern Philippines.22

Training the AFPOnce the teams had taken appro-

priate force-protection measures,they were able to focus on their pri-mary mission: training the AFP.The SF Soldiers’ initial operationalassessments of the tactical profi-ciency of the AFP battalion ele-ments confirmed the findings ofthe PACOM TCAV in mid-October2001. Those assessments formedthe basis of a long-term military-training strategy for correcting theAFP’s tactical shortcomings onBasilan. The basic concept fortraining was that the detachmentcommanders, team sergeants andintelligence sergeants would focuson teaching the military decision-making process; the planning andexecution of basic joint operations;the simple fusion of varioussources of intelligence in planningfuture operations; and the methodfor exploiting emerging situations.

The rest of the team would teachthe basics: troop-leading proce-dures, rifle marksmanship, map-reading and land navigation andindividual combat-lifesaving skills.From fire team through platoonlevel, they instructed the troops insmall-unit tactics, live fire, maneu-ver and immediate-action drills.Training progressed through com-pany level following the crawl-walk-run methodology. Progress

September 2004 21

American aviators train Philippine soldiers in casualty evacuation during the Balikatan exercise.U.S. Army photo

was impeded by the fact that each“company” available for trainingoperations consisted of only 20 sol-diers, with the balance of the com-pany, the NCOs, being detailed tosupervise CAFGU detachmentsand to fulfill other responsibilities.

As part of their training pro-gram, SF teams accompanied AFPtroops on patrols as often as possi-ble, which was permitted only dur-ing the last 415 days of JTF-510’spresence in Zamboanga. As SFDetachment 184, attached to theAFP 10th Infantry Battalion,found out, patrolling could be morecomplicated than expected. At hisbattalion headquarters, Ordeñezkept a company-sized strike forceready to act on intelligence leads.The strike force served as his pri-mary agent for attacking the ASG,and it received the majority of thetraining provided by Detachment184. Conducting split-team opera-tions, half of the detachmenttaught individual and collectivetraining, while the other halfaccompanied the battalion’spatrols.

Split-team operations were sup-portable because the AFP unitsrarely conducted operations afterdark.23 Still, the necessity for SF-detachment personnel to have theJTF’s approval before accompany-ing the infantry battalion com-manders on each operation becamean administrative nightmare fordetachment commanders. To pre-clude compromise, the AFP battal-ion commanders typically keptmovement plans to themselvesuntil just before departure.Because the SF teams could notparticipate in operations withoutpermission from the JTF, they wereunable to go on missions when theyhad only five minutes notification,and their credibility was called intoquestion. FOB 11’s solution was towrite an all-encompassing conceptof operations and get it pre-

approved by the JTF. Thereafter,the detachment commander need-ed only telephonic approval fromthe company commander. The solu-tion allowed SF teams to accompa-ny AFP troops on seemingly spur-of-the-moment operations.24

Despite the fact that Basilan hadbeen a live-fire situation for morethan a decade, the Philippine sol-diers and marines stationed therewere not proficient jungle fighters.They were certainly no match tac-tically for the guerrilla forces oper-ating from the remote areas ofBasilan. A typical firefight resultedin one AFP killed and three AFPwounded; many of the casualtieswere the result of friendly fire.

ASG casualties were light unlessthe guerrillas resorted to conven-tional tactics. SF teams were wel-come on AFP patrols, not onlybecause they were trainers, butalso because they could call forcasualty evacuations, or casevacs,using their satellite telephones.Staff Sergeant Ronald Vandergrift(pseudonym), an SF Detachment184 medic, applied his combat-life-saving skills and administeredintravenous fluids after the fire-fights, and he was eventually ableto train the Filipinos in combat-

lifesaving. With the extra medicaland casevac support provided bySF teams, the AFP soldiers morewillingly engaged the enemy.25

CAFGU trainingSF teams also trained members

of the CAFGU. Each week, one ortwo members of the CAFGUwould attend the individual andcollective training with the 10thBattalion elements. These villagecivil guards wore mixed uniformsand carried a variety of olderAmerican military rifles: VietnamWar-era M-14s, World War II-vin-tage M-1 Garands and even pre-World War I M-1903 Springfields.Disbanded in the early 1990s foralleged human-rights violationsduring the Marcos regime, theCAFGUs had been resurrected inremote areas, like Mindanao,where the AFP presence wasreduced.

CAFGU personnel were autho-rized to carry weapons and ammu-nition only when “in uniform.”26

Two AFP NCOs supervised eachCAFGU detachment. By regulation,the NCOs controlled all CAFGUammunition — in response to anincident in which CAFGU person-

22 Special Warfare

SF teams were welcome on AFP patrols because they could call for casualty evacuations usingtheir satellite telephones.

USASOC Historical Archive

nel shot and killed their AFP super-visors.27 The next scheduled orien-tation training for CAFGU troopswas months away, so SF Detach-ment 143 conducted a “train thetrainer” class for the more seniormembers of the CAFGU: those 30 to40 years of age. Training that groupproved to be difficult, because whilethe group members were receptiveto the training, they proved to becomplacent about their regional-guard responsibilities.

The CAFGU veterans, most ofwhom were illiterate, had little hopeand regarded their peacekeepingrole as meaningless. To compoundmatters, U.S. Title 10 restrictionsprevented the Americans from con-ducting training using their unitbasic load of ammunition. The AFPhad no .30-caliber ammunition forthe CAFGU M-1 rifles and 1903Springfields and only belted 7.62mm ammunition for the M-14s. Inthe end, the SF trainers resorted toconducting small-unit tactical train-ing in patrolling and reconnaissance.

SF Detachment 186, assigned toadvise the 55th Infantry Battalionat Isabela, was based at Sugpan-gan in the mountainous center ofthe island. It had a much differentexperience from Detachment 184,according to Staff Sergeant VanceWood (pseudonym), although thetwo teams were in the same north-central AO. While Isabela had50/50 mix of Christians and Mus-lims, the majority of the villages inthe mountainous interior were pre-dominantly Muslim. Because the55th commander considered allinterior roads to be “ambushalleys,” he insisted that the Ameri-cans travel in their pickup truckswith Simba APC escorts in thefront and rear.28

The 55th Infantry Battalionmaintained three company-sizedcamps. While platoon-sized combatpatrols went out daily, they avoidedthe low areas because the ASG

stayed there. SF Detachment 186quickly assessed the battalion’slevel of training, equipment andsoldier morale. The officers weretactically proficient, but becauseenlistment terms were indefinitein the Philippine army andmarines, the sergeants were basi-cally just older soldiers. When offi-cers were not around, no one was incharge. In addition, “the M-16 riflescould not be zeroed — rear-sightadjustment knobs and the frontpost sights were frozen solid.

Equipment and weapons mainte-nance was not in the AFP lexicon,”Wood stated.29

The AFP emphasizes propertycontrol, not maintenance. When asoldier enlists, he is issued a basicset of equipment, including ammu-nition, for which he is ever afterresponsible, and for which he mustaccount — down to the last bullet —upon leaving the AFP. Such anarrangement discourages handlingthe equipment, even for cleaningand maintenance.30 (The PACOMlogistics and maintenance assess-ment in September 2001 had citedthe same problems.) The 30,000 M-

16 rifles that had been promised byPresident Bush would do much toimprove AFP combat effectivenessat the tactical level.

Instead of improving the battal-ion’s overall readiness, however,the 55th Infantry Battalion com-mander wanted SF Detachment186 to select, organize and train areconnaissance platoon of 30 sol-diers to act as his strike force. Themore experienced SF Soldiers onthe team prepared a training pro-gram to accomplish this. Theystarted with basic rifle-squad tac-tics and rehearsed immediate-action drills that would preparethe platoon for combat operations.Then, while refining collective tac-tical training, they focused on indi-vidual soldier skills, including com-bat lifesaving and basic NCO lead-ership. They selected the bestmarksmen for sniper training.31

In May 2002, intelligencereports indicated that two Ameri-can missionaries who had beenkidnapped by the ASG in May2001, Martin and Gracia Burn-ham, had been moved from Basi-lan to Zamboanga del Norte, somedistance from Zamboanga City.AFP Major General Glicerio Suadirected the staff of the AFP’s 1stInfantry Division to develop plansfor finding and rescuing the Burn-hams, and Operation Day Breakbegan.

The Burnham rescue becameall-encompassing for the AFP:Blocking ASG resupply andescape routes required all ele-ments of the AFP to get involvedin the operation. Several of thebattalions from Basilan that hadbeen preparing for major combatoperations against the ASG werereassigned to mainland Mindanaoto hunt for Abu Sabaya, the ASGleader holding the kidnappedAmericans. As a result, many ofthe SF detachments on Basilanwere left with only remnants of

September 2004 23

The AFP emphasizesproperty control, notmaintenance. When asoldier enlists, he isissued a basic set ofequipment, includingammunition, for whichhe is ever after respon-sible, and for which hemust account — downto the last bullet — uponleaving the AFP.

the units that they had beentasked to train.

Advisory teams authorizedSecretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld’s long-awaited orderallowing American SF teams toadvise and assist AFP company-level tactical operations cameshortly after the Burnham rescuemission. When the PACOM execu-tion order arrived on July 1, 2002,it was somewhat anticlimactic topermit “advisory teams down tocompany level,” because the Amer-ican hostage situation had beenresolved. By then, the official enddate for Exercise Balikatan 02-1was little more than a month away,and the JTF was already hard atwork planning its redeployment.The SF teams had four weeks totrain and advise at the companylevel and to accompany units onpatrols against the remaining ASGon Basilan. The PACOM command-er had retained the approvalauthority to expand advisory workto the ASG home islands of Joloand Tawi-Tawi.32

In retrospect, Wurster had amore pragmatic view of theexpanded mission: “Significanttactical success” in the Philip-pines in the few weeks remainingwas not realistically achievable,and the possibility of killing someASG terrorists did not outweighthe risks to American advisers.The SOCPAC commander wantedto impress on the AFP the valueof unity of planning efforts, ofrapid adaptation to current intel-ligence and of fused operationsfrom brigade down to companylevel, because the joint opera-tions center would know exactlywhere all the ground forces were.This was not a change from hisoriginal long-term AFP trainingand education focus.33

Still, the tactically-oriented SF

teams aggressively tackled theirextended mission in the remain-ing weeks of Balikatan. Havingacquired ground-truth awarenessabout the operational capabilitiesof the infantry companies, theteams were ready to move againstthe ASG, but they bumped into aconservative JTF that screenedconcepts of operations, orCONOPs, closely to mitigate risk.CONOP approvals took between24 and 48 hours, often negatingthe exploitation value of intelli-gence leads.34

The commander of SF B-Detachment 170, Major ClarkSaunders (pseudonym), statedthat SF Soldiers actually per-formed the role of trainer andadviser for company field opera-tions where “the guys were in thethick of it.” The major advantageof working with the rifle compa-nies in the field was that afterascertaining strengths and weak-nesses, the SF Soldiers couldmore assertively train the unitsand effectively advise the leaders.When the Americans began rou-tinely participating in AFP com-pany operations, morale for bothgroups rose: The SF Soldiers wereanxious to “get in the fight,” andthe Filipinos patrolled moreaggressively because the U.S. Sol-diers had the ability to call forhelicopter casevacs.35

Early in April, a raid by theAFP’s 18th Infantry Battalion onthe house of the mayor of Tubu-ran demonstrated the positiveresults of the mission planningand rehearsals stressed by SF B-detachment 150. Unfortunately,the raid also demonstrated howthe pervasive corruption in theAFP and GRP could negate tacti-cal improvements. According toagent reports, the mayor was har-boring the most outspoken ASGleader, Abu Sabaya. Havingplaced the house under surveil-

lance, Lieutenant Colonel DanielLucero, the battalion commander,went to civil authorities to obtaina warrant for Sabaya’s arrest, asrequired by law. Lucero was pri-marily responsible for the 18thbeing the AFP’s “best infantrybattalion,” and he was widelyconsidered to be incorruptible.His proper actions in this case,however, compromised the mis-sion, because they allowed cor-rupt officials to leak informationabout the raid to the ASG. Sabayawas long gone when the 18th ini-tiated its raid.36

Balikatan ends While the JTF-510 headquarters

continued to “draw down” duringAugust after the formal closing cer-emony for Exercise Balikatan 02-1,the remaining SF detachments onBasilan provided security forhumanitarian assistance-fundedprojects that were still ongoing:The drilling of several deep-waterwells, and the conducting of sitesurveys for schools and medicalclinics to be constructed later inthe year. While the SF Soldierswere no longer officially advisingand assisting the AFP units onBasilan, the rapport they had pre-viously established helped to main-tain the government’s positiverelationship with the people, arelationship that was critical to thetriangular COIN model. When theJoint Special Operations TaskForce-Philippines was formed inlate August 2002, Wurster kept SFB-detachment 170 and four SF A-detachments on Basilan to contin-ue “overwatching” the HA projectsin progress.37

Even as Osama bin Laden andhis terrorist group were preparingto attack the U.S., the Philippineswere already experiencing anincrease in domestic terrorism.Concerned with a sudden upsurge

24 Special Warfare

in Islamist activity in the southernPhilippines, leaders of PACOM andSOCPAC capitalized on a change ofPhilippine leadership, as well asthe outpouring of support after9/11, to expand their fight againstterrorism to the Philippines.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the commandhistorian for the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command.

Notes:1 Classified interview with Major Marty

Cromwell (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoeand Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 20 June 2003,MacDill AFB, Fla., tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asCromwell interview; classified interviewwith Lieutenant Colonel Duane Dillard(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording inthe classified files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asDillard interview.

2 Dillard interview; classified interviewwith Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asMandarin interview.

3 Mandarin interview.4 Mandarin interview.5 Dillard interview.6 On order, in support of Operation Free-

dom Eagle, FOB 11 was to conduct UWoperations in the southern Philippinesthrough, by and with the AFP to assist theGRP in the destruction of terrorist organi-zations and separate the population fromthose groups. JSOTF-P, “Enduring Free-dom-Philippines brief,” undated.

7 Cromwell interview.8 Mandarin interview; classified interview

with Captain James Brown and StaffSergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recording in the classified filesof the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg,N.C., hereafter cited as Brown and Woodinterview.

9 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group,briefing (undated), “Operation Eagle Freedom(S),” copy of briefing in the classified files ofthe USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.,hereafter cited as Eagle Freedom brief.10 Eagle Freedom brief.11 Eagle Freedom brief.

12 Brown and Wood interview; Eagle Free-dom brief.13 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief forhistorian (January-December 2002), dated 5May 2003, hereafter cited as 5 May 2003brief; classified interview with CaptainEldon Williams (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H.Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., taperecording in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.,hereafter cited as Williams interview; clas-sified interview with Major EdwardDougherty (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe,7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape record-ing in the classified files of the USASOCHistory Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereaftercited as Dougherty interview.14 Brown and Wood interview; Eagle Free-dom brief.15 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the SecondFront: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip-pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOMclassified draft history of JTF-510 stored inthe classified files of the USSOCOM Histo-ry Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.; Brown andWood interview.16 Classified interview with Sergeant FirstClass Peter Kenshaw (pseudonym) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recording in the classified filesof the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg,N.C., hereafter cited as Kenshaw interview.17 Brown and Wood interview.18 Brown and Wood interview.19 5 May 2003 brief.20 Brown and Wood interview.21 Classified interview with CaptainEdward Wilkins, Captain James Brown andStaff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) byDr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recordings in the classified filesof the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg,N.C., hereafter cited as Wilkins interview.22 Brown and Wood interview; classifiedinterview with Major Robert Conrad (pseu-donym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 18 August 2003,Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordings in theclassified files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asConrad interview.23 Brown and Wood interview.24 Brown and Wood interview; Cromwellinterview.25 Brown and Wood interview.26 Brown and Wood interview.27 Classified interview with Sergeant FirstClass Mark Schwartz (pseudonym) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 19 April 2004, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recording in the classified filesof the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg,N.C., hereafter cited as Schwartz interview.28 Brown and Wood interview.29 Brown and Wood interview.

30 Schwartz interview.31 Brown and Wood interview.32 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.”33 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.”34 Classified interview with Staff SergeantMichael Carter and Master Sergeant JamesUpchurch (pseudonyms) by LieutenantColonel Forrest Marion, 28 February 2003,Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordings in theclassified files of USSOCOM History Office,MacDill AFB, Fla.35 Classified interview with Major ClarkSaunders (pseudonym) by LieutenantColonel Forrest Marion, 28 February 2003,Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in theclassified files of the USSOCOM HistoryOffice, MacDill AFB, Fla., hereafter cited asSaunders interview.36 Dougherty interview.37 Saunders interview.

September 2004 25

Psychological operations are an inte-gral part of any program of coun-terinsurgency, and the Exercise

Balikatan-related campaign of unconven-tional warfare conducted by United StatesArmy special-operations forces in 2002 wasno exception.

In spite of a challenging operating envi-

ronment, including media-driven force lim-itations and residual Philippine suspicionof psychological operations, or PSYOP,caused by abuses under the Marcosregime, PSYOP personnel were able to con-tribute to the effort to rescue two Americanmissionaries, Martin and Gracia Burn-ham, from the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group,

or ASG, in the southern Philippines.In the wake of 9/11, the Army special-

operations forces, or ARSOF, communityfocused on Islamist terrorists around theworld. The battalion of the Fort Bragg-based 4th Psychological Operations Grouporiented on the U.S. Pacific Command, orPACOM, focused its research efforts oncountries with significant Muslim popula-tions and concentrated on developingappropriate target-audience analyses.

Even as the 4th POG began targetingMuslim extremist groups in the southernPhilippines, it sent a small military/civil-ian mission-planning cell to Hawaii toassist the staffs of PACOM and the Spe-cial Operations Command, Pacific, orSOCPAC, in developing the proposal for aregional campaign of the Global War onTerrorism.

A large part of the resulting campaignplan focused on the Philippines as a criti-cal theater of operations in the Pacificregion. The initial concept of operationscalled for a six to 10-person PSYOP ele-ment to support JTF-510, which wasbased at Zamboanga on the southernisland of Mindanao, and a tactical PSYOPdetachment, or TPD, headquarters andthree tactical PSYOP teams to supportthe U.S. forces operating on BasilanIsland, just south of Zamboanga.

The PSYOP element that the 4th POGsent to the Philippines was a skeletonoperation: It had little print capability,

26 Special Warfare

Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

The “wanted” poster, aproduct of the 4th POG,was key in driving ASGterrorists from theisland of Basilan in thePhilippines.

USASOC Historical Archive

performed communication and researchprimarily through laptop-computer con-nections and carried only small, portableloudspeakers.1

Although the 4th POG had developed arapport with the psychological-warfarepersonnel of the AFP during the annualBalanced Piston and Balikatan exercises,they could not use that rapport to fillPACOM’s lack of information on the Phil-ippine media. The Philippine psychologi-cal-warfare personnel were more interest-ed in the Communist People’s Army — theHukbalahaps, or HUKs — the oldest,largest and best-organized terrorist groupin the Philippines, which operated primar-ily throughout the central and northernislands.

Fortunately, the primary Southeast Asiaanalyst in the 4th POG, Nate Godwin(pseudonym), had been staying abreast ofthe activities of Muslim insurgents in thesouthern islands and was well-versed inthe ideologies and methods of the MoroNational Liberation Front, or MNLF, theMoro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF,and the ASG.2

While Captains Roger Oswald andCathy Hines (the TPD commander)worked with the 1st Special Forces Group,first at Fort Lewis and then at the 1st SFGroup’s initial support base on Okinawa,the remainder of the PSYOP elementdeployed to the Philippines to prepare aPSYOP support plan. On Jan. 23, MajorDan Helms and Sergeant Chuck Andrews(pseudonyms) briefed the plan to thedeputy commander, the J3 and thePSYOP staff officer at SOCPAC, MajorRebecca Sims (pseudonym), the formercommander of the Headquarters SupportCompany of the PACOM battalion.

In addition to developing and staffingthe PSYOP annex to the operations plan,or OPLAN, for Freedom Eagle, the opera-tion that comprised all operations againstthe ASG, the PSYOP team also had thetask of developing an appropriate strate-gy for handling the Philippine media.Some segments of the Philippine mediahave a decidedly anti-American bias. Themedia loudly objected to the presence ofU.S. Soldiers on Philippine soil. Media

negativity toward ARSOF activities con-tributed to an already hostile operatingenvironment in the Sulu Archipelago. Themedia had to be taken into account asARSOF conducted information activitiesin support of the counterinsurgency cam-paign. Despite the fact that JTF-510 oper-ated a press center and embedded Philip-pine journalists with AFP elements inBasilan, the activities of the Muslim guer-rillas did not generate any significant dis-approval within the local population.3

One of the PSYOP Soldiers, Andrews,was able to establish a rapport with hishost-nation counterparts by drawing on hislanguage abilities and his previous experi-

ences in the Philippines. He had spent twoyears living and working with residents ofLeyte and Samar, and he had learned tocommunicate in Tagalog, Ilocano, Cebuanoand Waray-Waray, which gave him credi-bility with natives and Americans alike.Andrews’ time in the Philippines also hadgiven him an insight into the culture thatcame in useful to both the PSYOP teamand the JTF staff.

The initial idea for stimulating a flow ofnew information about the kidnappedmissionaries was to saturate the southernPhilippines with baseball-type “tradingcards” of the ASG leaders to obtain infor-mation on their whereabouts as part ofthe FBI’s “Rewards for Justice” program.After collecting photos of prominent ASG

September 2004 27

Two Filipino children read the “wanted” flyer. The flyer wasprepared by the 4th PSYOP Group as a means of gaininginformation about the ASG, an insurgent group that washolding two American missionaries for ransom.

U.S. Army photo

leaders, Andrews used computer softwareto create layouts for printing individualtrading cards.

He realized that “wanted” posters wouldbe more effective and simpler to produce.The posters would enable the team tosimultaneously publicize the role of all theASG leaders involved in the Burnhams’kidnapping, instead of relying on chance toget people to see every photo. After review-ing the legal implications, PACOM agreedto support the initiative as part of its com-mand-information program, as long as theposters were clearly marked as being prod-ucts of the Department of State Diplomat-ic Security Service. The resulting tips onthe fugitives’ whereabouts had to be han-

dled by the American Embassy, and indict-ments had to be issued by the JusticeDepartment before the posters could bepublicly released.4

For Andrews, it was an opportunity, inhis words, to “fulfill every PSYOPer’sdream — to design, produce and distributeproducts in combat and see the results.”

“It would be the biggest success of mymilitary career,” he said. “It blew the whole[standard] PSYOP production process outof the water,” but the desired results wereachieved in the limited time allotted. Thewanted posters and leaflets had to beprinted in numerous dialects common tothe southern Philippines. A Chavacanawoman, Carol Landers (pseudonym),helped with the translations into Tausulg,Yacan and Chavacano. Andrews observed,“They weren’t the best linguistic products,

but time was of the essence.”5

Having worked with the State Depart-ment’s regional print center in Manilasince Exercise Balikatan 1999, Andrewswas familiar with the administrativeand financial details of preparing prod-ucts.6 After getting approval, the PSYOPteam of only two people had 96 hours inwhich to produce 3,000 large, glossy,color posters and 15,000 color pictureleaflets featuring the top-ranking ASGleaders. The task took a considerableamount of scrambling, but it was done in72 hours, allowing the American ambas-sador to announce the program at a spe-cial press conference on May 29, 2002. Aphoto of Ambassador Frank Ricciardoneholding an ASG wanted poster made thefront page of the Manila-based Philip-pine Daily Inquirer, and the story wascarried by most Philippine news mediaoutlets for a week.

SOCPAC’s intent had been to do a“media blitz” — to distribute 3,000 postersat the press conference and 24 hours laterto saturate the Sulu Archipelago with sixfocused leaflet drops. But just as the toll-free Rewards for Justice telephone num-ber began to ring steadily with calls, andtext messages and e-mail traffic began toflow, the follow-up air delivery of leafletsran into legal problems.7

When the State Department assumedresponsibility for the posters, the projectplanners no longer had the authority touse Department of Defense military air-craft to transport and disseminate theleaflets. The final legal determinationwas that the State Department had toreimburse DoD for the use of its aircraft.Brigadier General Donald Wurster, theSOCPAC commander, considered theprompt delivery of the leaflets to beessential to sustaining the momentum ofthe Rewards for Justice program: Ameri-can lives were at stake.

Just as he had done to get criticalequipment to the Philippines in order tostart the training of the national counter-terrorist Light Reaction Company in May2001, Wurster authorized the transportmission to be taken “out of hide” by usingtraining flying hours. The State Depart-

28 Special Warfare

The fact that cell-phone usage was wide-spread throughout the Philippines was botha challenge and an advantage to the U.S. inits operations against the ASG. Virtuallyevery Filipino had a cell phone, and coverttext messaging of U.S. forces’ movementshad already proved to be a major challengeto force protection on the islands.

ment paid a nominal $1 fee for the MC-130 flight, and the leaflets were distrib-uted almost on schedule.8

Unfortunately for Andrews, distributionmeant kicking the leaflets and posters outof the airplane, and that did not occuruntil after his rotation. The closest he gotto seeing the project through, as had beenhis dream, was constructing themakeshift leaflet drop boxes and accumu-lating the necessary static lines from the1st SF Group. He had to be satisfied with85 percent of his dream. Staff SergeantAndy Keltner, Sergeant Al Norman andMajor Bob Watson (pseudonyms) receivedthe honor of actually distributing theleaflets.9

The fact that cell-phone usage was wide-spread throughout the Philippines wasboth a challenge and an advantage to theU.S. in its operations against the ASG. Vir-tually every Filipino had a cell phone, andcovert text messaging of U.S. forces’ move-ments had already proved to be a majorchallenge to force protection on the islands.In the case of the Rewards for Justice pro-gram, however, the easy access to cellphones facilitated the passing of confiden-tial tips (verbally or by text message) to thephone numbers listed on the posters andleaflets.

The concept of offering money for infor-mation sat well with the Filipinos, too. Theproffered rewards appealed to a culture inwhich a large portion of the populationlives below the subsistence level. Theexchange of money for information couldwork for the greater good in a poverty-rid-den society.

The AFP rescued Gracia Burnham onJune 7, 2002.10 The ASG had alreadymoved the Burnhams and Deborah Yap,another hostage, from Basilan Island to alocation north of Zamboanga City, on theisland of Mindanao, sometime in April2002, so it is debatable whether or notthe reward posters and leaflets were thekey to determining the whereabouts ofthe captives. Considering the timing,however — the operation took place lessthan two weeks after Ambassador Riccia-rdone promoted the wanted poster at hispress conference in Manila — it is quite

likely that the PSYOP team’s efforts con-tributed to the rescue.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Notes:1 Classified interview with Major John Matsumoto

(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 January 2004, FortBragg, N.C., tape recordings in the classified files ofthe USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., here-after cited as Matsumoto interview; classified inter-view with Staff Sergeant Weldon C. Andrews (pseudo-nym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 9 January 2004, Fort Bragg,N.C., tape recordings in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereaftercited as Andrews interview.

2 Andrews interview.3 Andrews interview; classified interview with Lieu-

tenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin (pseudonym) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 23 May 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., taperecording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.

4 Andrews interview.5 Andrews interview.6 Andrews interview.7 Matsumoto interview.8 Matsumoto interview.9 Andrews interview.

10 Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies(Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2003), 246,254.

September 2004 29

The entrenched nature of the terroristand criminal elements on BasilanIsland in the Philippines led the

United States to apply the counterinsur-gency, or COIN, model to its efforts of uncon-ventional warfare, or UW, in the region.

The COIN model emphasizes the relation-ships between the populace and the govern-ment, between the populace and the insur-gents, and between the military and theinsurgents. In order to strengthen the crucialrelationship between the populace and theGovernment of the Republic of the Philip-pines, or GRP, U.S. Army special-operationsforces, or ARSOF, undertook a number ofCivil Affairs, or CA, projects on the island.

Because of a force cap imposed by the U.S.Pacific Command, or PACOM, in responseto restrictions of the GRP, which were aresponse to public and political concernsabout possible violations of Philippine sov-ereignty, very few CA specialists were actu-ally deployed to the island. The CA effortwas supplemented by activities of the NavalConstruction Task Group, or NCTG, com-prising Navy Seabees and Marine engi-neers, and of Army Special Forces opera-tional detachments. In addition to buildingschools, bridges and piers, improving roadsand upgrading numerous water systems,ARSOF personnel treated thousands of Fil-ipinos as part of medical civic-action pro-grams, or MEDCAPs, and dental civic-action programs, or DENTCAPs.

The plans for a CA mission to the Philip-

pines were made during the post-9/11 flurryof activity at the headquarters of PACOMand the Special Operations Command,Pacific. Company B of the 96th Civil AffairsBattalion immediately began making planswith the 1st Battalion of the 1st SpecialForces Group, which is stationed in Oki-nawa. By January 2002, the 96th had ordersto send a CA team to the Philippines viaOkinawa. On March 10, 2002, several CAteams flew from their home at Fort Bragg,N.C., to Okinawa, where they were attachedto the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group.1

Before the CA teams even arrived in the-ater, 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, kicked offBalikatan 02-1. In February 2002, SF per-sonnel, including a number of SF detach-ments, had deployed to Zamboanga and toBasilan Island in order to train troops ofthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, orAFP, in counterterrorism tactics. JointTask Force 510 retained control of theoperations of all U.S. special-operationsforces, or SOF, in the Philippines, and inlate February or early March, the taskforce ordered the SF detachments to shifttheir focus from making security-focusedassessments of the Basilan villages to con-ducting a general humanitarian surveythat dealt with socio-economic trends andliving conditions. The goal was to sample60,000 of the island’s 350,000 residents byMarch 31 and to use the information toplace SF teams and AFP forces where theycould best strengthen the relationship

30 Special Warfare

Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

between the government and the people.2The CA teams were prevented from fully

deploying to Basilan Island by PACOM’sforce cap. The Philippine press was sensi-tive to the presence of American forces inthe Philippines, insisting that their pres-ence was a violation of the Constitution ofthe Philippines. Because of the force cap,only one of the slated CA teams, CAT-A23,was able to deploy to Basilan Island. Sev-eral other CA teams were broken up, withsome members left on Okinawa while oth-ers deployed to Zamboanga, on Mindanao.On March 24, 2002, three members of CAT-A23, Sergeant First Class Derek Thomas,Master Sergeant Nelson and team medicRoger Larsen, (pseudonyms) arrived byhelicopter on Basilan Island. Two other CASoldiers from CAT-A23 found berths on aboat with the Marines, where they couldwait until spaces on the island opened up.3

When CAT-A23 arrived outside Isabela,it discovered that it had much more workto do than had been originally indicated.The information the team had receivedprior to deployment was that over theyears, the island had been repeatedlyassessed for humanitarian projects, andthat the CA teams would simply need tostart planning and completing projects.The reality was that hardly any detailed

CA assessments had been done: a completeCA survey was needed. To that end, theteam sergeant, Nelson, based himself inIsabela, and Thomas and Larsen took atwo-week whirlwind tour of the island.4

The two spent one week surveying thewest side of the island, from Lantawandown through Sumisip, and one week sur-veying the east side, from Lamitan down toTipo-Tipo. The survey revealed that no non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, hadworked on Basilan since 1999, and thatmost of the islanders lived in distinctly sub-standard conditions. The insurgents haddriven away all schoolteachers and medicalpersonnel outside the predominantly Chris-tian villages of Lamitan and Isabela, leav-ing the majority-Muslim islanders withoutadequate health care or educational oppor-tunities. The water was not safe to drink,and there was little or no electricity.

Isabela, the largest city, was subject tobrownouts, and in Lamitan, electricity wassparse. Maluso and Sumisip had one or twoprivate generators each, which provided spo-radic electricity to a few residents. By thetime the CA specialists returned to Isabela,they had a much better idea of the projectsthey needed to plan and execute. Upon theirreturn to Isabella the ship with the other CAteam was given permission to land, and the

September 2004 31

A map of Basilan Islandshows some of thehumanitarian-assistanceprojects that wereplanned during ExerciseBalikatan 02-1.

USASOC Historical Archive

number of CA Soldiers on the island doubled.5While the primary CA mission was

humanitarian assistance, or HA, the teamshad to operate in the hostile environmentof an island that so favored the Abu SayyafGroup, or ASG, that the AFP used it as alive-fire training center. Thomas andLarsen, both SF-qualified, were in fullagreement with the guidelines for forceprotection set down by JTF-510. The teamsgenerally traveled in convoys of at leastfour vehicles, one of which usually sporteda mounted M-240B machine gun as a visu-al, and actual, deterrent. The SF teams’standard operating procedure for entering

Muslim villages wasto enter “guns up,”recognizing thatsuch villages oftenharbored insurgentforces. Even MED-CAPs could be tar-gets of ASG attacks,so AFP and SF per-sonnel maintained aclose watch at allgatherings.6

Because of force-protection require-ments, the CA teamsremained close to theSF teams as theyconducted their plan-ning and execution.CAT-A23’s usual rou-tine was to travelfrom the forwardoperating base inIsabela down to the

advanced operating base in Maluso and tostay with various SF detachments in thearea for three to four days at a time, thenmove on to Sumisip and do the same. Oncethe assessments and plan were complete,the CA teams would return to Isabela andturn in their reports.7

An important part of CA work is makingcontacts among the local populace. The mostimportant connection Thomas made onBasilan was an officer in the AFP marines.He was the CA liaison for the AFP marinebattalion located in the southern part ofBasilan Island, but his value stemmed more

from his personal abilities than from hisofficial position. The officer had grown up onthe island, in Lamitan, and spoke all of theisland languages, which made him aninvaluable liaison for the CA Soldiers. Per-haps even more useful were the officer’s con-nections with the local leadership. Heseemed not only to know everybody of sig-nificance, regardless of their religious orpolitical affiliation, and he was respected asan incorruptible arbitrator. His presenceassured cooperation and safety, even inASG-controlled areas of the island.8

A telling example of the AFP marineofficer’s influence, and the way that hefacilitated CA involvement on the island,was his mediation of a conflict on a smalloutlying island between a camp of theMoro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF,and two local village chiefs, according toThomas. Thomas and a number of SF Sol-diers, the officer and some of his ownmarines, rowed over to the island in smallboats. The Soldiers set up a MEDCAP inthe center of one of the villages (whosepeople had abandoned it out of fear of theMILF), in order to entice the villagersback with the offer of free medical care.Once the MEDCAP was concluded, theconcerned parties met with the AFPmarine officer. When it became clear thatthe warring parties would not make peacethemselves, the officer indicated that ifthey did not work out a viable truce, hewould return with his entire battalion ofmarines and force them to get along. InThomas’ words, everyone shook handsand agreed to a truce, albeit reluctantly.9

A survey conducted by the SF detach-ments echoed many of the CA team’s conclu-sions regarding the state of the island’shumanitarian services. Using the data col-lected by the SF detachments on Basilan, theJTF staff and AFP leadership developedplans of action for addressing the most press-ing concerns of the populace and set priori-ties for providing resources. Highest on thelist was the desperate need for potable waterto reduce the high childhood death ratecaused by waterborne diseases. The next pri-ority was improving local medical facilitiesand establishing clinics in areas where noneexisted.

32 Special Warfare

One of the primary CAprojects was ensuringresidents had potablewater, which was accom-plished in part by drillingwells.

USASOC Historical Archive

The third priority was improving thetransportation infrastructure: providingall-weather roads, building and improvingbridges and linking existing roads to createa viable perimeter road that would helpcommerce and would expand markets foragricultural products. These prioritiesbecame the focus of JTF and AFP effortsduring the early months of ExerciseBalikatan, when infrastructure improve-ments benefited U.S. trainers and advisersand contributed to force protection.10

In addition to planning humanitarianprojects, Thomas and Larsen were taskedto act as CA liaisons with the NavySeabees. Thomas noted that while theSeabees were excellent at construction,they had little training in dealing with thepopulace. The CA team would step in tosettle disputes or conduct preliminarynegotiations between the Seabees and locallandowners or leaders. The CA Soldiers’skill at working with the locals smoothedthe way for the Seabees a number of times,such as when the Seabees needed to ask alocal farmer for permission to temporarilystore some bridge-building equipment onhis land. Thomas appreciated the opportu-nity to prevent problems rather than tohave to react to a bad situation, and thepartnership between CA and the Seabeeswas beneficial to all concerned.11

While the NCTG and the CA contingentboth placed potable water at the top oftheir priority lists, they favored differentsolutions to the problem. The Seabees,whose area of responsibility included mostof the eastern side of the island, favoredwells as a solution to the islandwide prob-lem of polluted water. CA Soldiers aretrained to assess situations according tothe Special Operations Imperatives, whichinclude ensuring that applied solutions areculturally appropriate and sustainable inthe long-term. Thomas and Larsen con-cluded that gravity-fed pipe systems wouldlast longer and would be more economicalin the long run.

While the wells had to be dug severalhundred feet deep and required expensiveand relatively fragile submersible pumpsto operate, the gravity-fed pipe systemrelied on simple pipes (buried to avoid

unauthorized water diversion) to bringwater to a distribution point. The pipe sys-tem had the added advantage of beingrepairable by local Filipinos, unlike thetechnologically advanced pump systems.Unfortunately, Thomas said, many of thegravity-fed systems were later downgradedto wells. Either solution, however, was avast improvement of local water resourcesand positively affected the island.12

Medical improvements were also a priori-ty for ARSOF teams. Once PACOMapproved the MEDCAPs in the summer of2002, they proved to be the most successfulCA program on the island and were con-ducted not only by the CA teams, but also bySF detachments in the field. By the time SFDetachment 186 rotated out of the Philip-pines, its members had arranged and sup-ported between 20 and 25 MEDCAPs andDENTCAPs. Sergeant First Class Jack Wal-lace (pseudonym), an SF medic, also held aregular “sick call” for the local populace withthe help of AFP medics he had trained. Itbecame a standard practice for SF medics tooffer medical care to anyone who needed it.13

The MEDCAPs were also ARSOF’s mosteffective tool in building good relationswith the populace. Staff Sergeant RogerMadison (pseudonym), SF Detachment114, was instrumental in taking heroicmeasures to save a critically ill Muslimbaby. Madison administered lifesavingtreatment until the JTF could arrange totransport the child to a hospital in Zam-boanga. In spite of everyone’s best efforts,

September 2004 33

MEDCAPS proved to be the most successful CA programand went far in winning the hearts and minds of the people.

USASOC Historical Archive

the baby died in the hospital; however,Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin(pseudonym) noted, “The people fromGeong, on the southern coast, were eter-nally grateful for the SF team’s gallantefforts. From that time forward, the SFteam could do no wrong in that area.”14

Less dramatic efforts were likewiserewarded with good feelings and accep-tance from the locals. One Muslim villageleader expressed his deep gratitudewhen a medic removed a large, rustyfishhook from his five-year-old grand-daughter’s thigh. A Christian village’smayor was similarly grateful when an SFmedic set the broken foot of one of the

village’s small children. By engenderingpositive feelings among the locals, theMEDCAPs became an effective force-pro-tection measure.

In September 2002, ARSOF achieved animpressive MEDCAP record on Basilan,seeing 687 patients at Libug on Sept. 5;537 in Lumbang on Sept. 8; and 786 in theTubaran area on Sept. 9. On Sept. 11, SFpersonnel conducted the largest everMEDCAP on Basilan Island, treating 1,028patients in one day. The next day, they saw867 in Magcawa.15

Some of the most concerted MEDCAPefforts, however, were performed in an effortto offset the ASG’s influence. After the ASGkidnapped four Mindanao State Universityteachers on Sept. 13, ARSOF and AFP per-sonnel simultaneously held two MEDCAPsin large villages near Zamboanga City, serv-ing both Christians and Muslims. A Bud-

dhist relief organization called Tzu Chiassisted as well, and in the Christian villageof Guisao, 718 people were treated. In theMuslim area of Mariqui, a shantytown builtover the waters of Zamboanga harbor, SFand AFP medical personnel treated 2,334patients. Unfortunately, the ASG immedi-ately countered the good feelings engen-dered by the MEDCAPs with further terror-ist bombings.

In spite of the ASG’s retaliatory mea-sures, the MEDCAPs improved lives andwon hearts wherever they were held. Vil-lagers in Tuburan were so won over thatthey warned U.S. and AFP forces ofimpending ASG attacks, realizing that ifthe American and AFP troops withdrew,the villagers would no longer benefit fromtheir humanitarian assistance.16

When SOF personnel deployed to thesouthern Philippines in 2002, they weretasked with fighting the Global War onTerrorism by training a foreign military tocounter domestic terrorist threats, and towin local support for the Philippine gov-ernment (and indirectly for the U.S.) byimproving living conditions on BasilanIsland. In the face of a hostile insurgentforce, and hampered by lack of manpowerand support, ARSOF nevertheless man-aged to accomplish their training andhumanitarian missions.

The medical contributions alone justifiedthe SF and CA teams’ efforts, as by Novem-ber 2003, more than 30,000 people hadreceived treatment through ARSOF-spon-sored MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs. In addi-tion to the medical programs, however, CAand SF teams improved water sources,designed public-sanitation systems, con-tributed to infrastructure upgrades andplanned numerous other life-improvingprojects. Each success and show of interestin the well-being of the local populaceserved to further the ARSOF mission inthe region.17

The NCTG also accomplished its missionof supporting the ARSOF training efforts.By the end of their 60-day deployment,Navy Seabees had cleared, graded and com-pacted a 3,000-foot by 60-foot C-130-capablerunway, and they had cleared eight heli-copter landing zones used by the military

34 Special Warfare

In spite of the ASG’s retaliatory measures, theMEDCAPs improved lives and won heartswherever they were held. Villagers in Tuburanwere so won over that they warned U.S. andAFP forces of impending ASG attacks, realiz-ing that if the American and AFP troops with-drew, the villagers would no longer benefitfrom their humanitarian assistance.

for casevacs. Seabees also repaired andimproved 80 kilometers of road, connectingmore overland routes to the all-weatherperimeter road, which enabled ARSOF andAFP troops to travel more quickly. TheNCTG erected four bridges and built a pierat Lamitan to enable ARSOF resupply andto generally improve the port. In addition tothe surface improvements, the Seabees alsodrilled three much-needed deep-waterwells, which not only supported ARSOF per-sonnel but also improved the lives of thepopulace.18

The purpose of having ARSOF in thesouthern Philippines was to reduce theimpact of terrorism in that area and inthe Southeast Asia region as a whole. Tothat end, ARSOF applied the COIN modelto battling the terrorist and criminalactivities on Basilan Island. The medicalprograms and infrastructure improve-ments sponsored and completed byARSOF, as well as the money the projectsinfused into the local economy, howevertemporarily, went a long way towardimproving feelings between the populaceof Basilan Island and the GRP, which isone of the three critical relationships inthe COIN model.

The fact that ARSOF personnel alwaysdealt honestly with the populace alsoreduced corruption on the island, if only tem-porarily. While time and resources were toolimited to allow ARSOF to fully eradicate theinsurgency, the efforts of CA, SF and NCTGpersonnel made a difference in the lives ofthe local population and laid the groundwork

for further counterinsurgency and antiter-rorism efforts in the Philippines.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a historian onthe staff of the USASOC Historian’s Office.

Notes:1 Interview with Sergeant First Class Derek Thomas

(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 5 December 2003,Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording and notes inUSASOC Classified Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C., here-after cited as Thomas interview.

2 Classified interview with Captain James Brownand Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash. Taperecording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brownand Wood interview; JSOTF-P Enduring Freedom-Philippines briefing, n.d., in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.

3 Thomas interview.4 Thomas interview.5 Thomas interview.6 Thomas interview; Brown and Wood interview.7 Thomas interview.8 Thomas interview.9 Thomas interview.

10 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian(January 2002 through December 2002), 5 May 2003, inthe classified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.11 Thomas interview.12 Thomas interview.13 Brown and Wood interview; Thomas interview.14 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel DouglasMandarin (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May2003, Fort Bragg, N.C. Tape recording in the classifiedfiles of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.15 Classified interview with Lieutenant ColonelDuane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash. Tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.16 Dillard interview.17 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian(January 2002 through December 2002), dated 5 May2003.18 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front: Oper-ation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January-August2002,” USSOCOM classified draft history of JTF-510,stored in the classified files of the USSOCOM HistoryOffice, MacDill AFB, Fla.; classified interview withCaptain Eldon Williams (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H.Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordingin the classified files of the USASOC History Office,Fort Bragg, N.C.

September 2004 35

An SF medic’s removal of a rusty fishhook from a villageleader’s granddaughter’s thigh won the leader’s support.

USASOC Historical Archive

Conducting a major joint com-bined training exercise inthe semipermissive environ-

ment of the Philippines posed seri-ous challenges during the planningand execution of Balikatan 02-1, aswell as during the security-assist-ance missions that continued afterthe exercise ended.

In 2001, the 1st Special ForcesGroup was tasked to advise, assistand train the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, or AFP, to combat theAbu Sayyaf Group, or ASG, the sameterrorist group that had kidnapped20 Western hostages and in April2000 had threatened to kill Ameri-cans. The first American hostageheld by the ASG, Jeffrey Schilling,was taken captive on Aug. 29, 2000,on Jolo Island. In May 2001, Martinand Gracia Burnham and GuillermoSobero became the second, third andfourth American citizens to be kid-napped by the ASG in the southernPhilippines. In spite of the demon-strated danger to American lives andthe focus on counterterrorism byboth the American and Philippinegovernments, Balikatan was anexercise, and the rules of engage-ment, or ROE, were structuredaccordingly.

The legal guidelines for participa-tion by American Soldiers in the

exercise were laid out in the 1999Visiting Forces Agreement in theexercise-specific terms of reference,or TOR, and in an appendix to theoriginal Joint Task Force-510 opera-tions order, or OPORD. Subsequentannexes to the OPORD clarified theROE. Under the original ROE, armedforce up to and including deadly forcewas authorized for U.S. troops in self-defense and in defense or protectionof U.S. troops, U.S. citizens, Philippineforces and third-country citizens des-ignated by JTF-510, as well as in pro-tection of AFP property and U.S. mis-sion-essential property.

The TOR also authorized the useof U.S. assets and resources, incombination with those of the AFP,for medical evacuations. As itturned out, casualty evacuations,or casevacs, became necessary dur-ing the course of the joint fieldexercises on Basilan Island. WhileU.S. forces were not authorized toinitiate combat operations, theywere authorized to act in self-defense and in defense of others intheir presence while they were onfield operations with the AFP. 1

During America’s heightenedemotional state in the monthsimmediately following 9/11, themilitary and civilian planners atthe Special Operations Command,

Pacific, or SOCPAC, at the U.S.Pacific Command, or PACOM, andat the 1st SF Group began develop-ing a regional campaign plan forthe Global War of Terrorism, orGWOT. The SOCPAC commander,Brigadier General Donald Wurster,considered Exercise Balikatan tobe a contingency operation for theGWOT plan, so his staff and thestaff of PACOM planned it as apeacetime combined exercise.

The commander of the 1st SFGroup, Colonel David Fridovich,and the commander of the 1st Bat-talion, 1st SF Group, LieutenantColonel Douglas Mandarin (pseu-donym), headed a SOCPAC teamfor making a tactical capabilityassessment visit, or TCAV, whileaccompanying the larger PACOMplanning-survey staff traveling tothe Philippines in preparation forExercise Balikatan 02-1.

In accordance with the standardprocedures for peacetime combinedtraining exercises, the PACOM plan-ning-survey party was composed ofsenior staff officers who met withtheir AFP counterparts in Manila, atMactan Air Base on Cebu, and in theSouthern Command headquartersat Zamboanga, Mindanao. In orderto complete the TCAV, Fridovich andhis assessment team traveled to

36 Special Warfare

Impact of the Semipermissive Environment on Force-Protection in Philippine Engagements

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

Zamboanga and Basilan Island, theprojected area of operations forBalikatan. Because of its remotelocation more than 500 miles southof Manila, and because of its primar-ily Muslim population, BasilanIsland had been both a safe havenand a training site for Philippineinsurgent groups for decades.

The Moro National LiberationFront, or MNLF, Moro Islamic Lib-eration Front, or MILF, and theASG regularly engaged the localAFP battalions in combat. The AFPbattalions moved between BasilanIsland and southern Mindanao ona two- to three-year rotation sched-ule that offered little opportunityfor enlisted soldiers to move up andout of the region. The sergeantmajor of the 32nd Infantry Battal-ion had reportedly been in Basilansince 1976, when the battalion wasfirst stationed on the island.

The situation had degraded tothe point that AFP soldiers nolonger aggressively pursued theinsurgents. The AFP went so far asto hire local guides instead of usingits own scouts on patrol, whichensured that the patrols wouldnever purposely encounter oppos-ing forces. The combination ofneglect and lack of military initia-tive created circumstances thatwere less than ideal, not only forthe continuing presence and evengrowth of insurgent groups butalso for the genesis of new terroristand criminal organizations.2

In the middle of newly-appointedPresident Gloria MacapagalArroyo’s first official visit to Wash-ington, Nov. 19-23, 2001, a combinedassault force from the MNLF andthe Misuari Renegade Groupattacked Jolo Air Base, inflictingheavy casualties on AFP forces andon local civilians. The attack was inretaliation for Arroyo’s recent sus-pension of Nur Misuari (the formerMNLF leader) as governor of theAutonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao because of his corruption.In light of the escalating terror-

ist threat in the southern Philip-pines, President Arroyo acceptedPresident George W. Bush’s offer of$100 million in military assistance(including a C-130 turboprop air-craft and 30,000 M-16 rifles) and$4.6. billion in economic aid. Shealso stated that she would allowthe U.S. military to advise, trainand assist the AFP in the fightagainst the ASG, the group thathad been specifically targetingAmericans earlier in the year. WithArroyo’s decision, Exercise

Balikatan became directly linkedto America’s GWOT.

In accordance with ExerciseBalikatan’s new importance, thePACOM standing Joint Task Force-510 was activated for planning pur-poses. While Fridovich turned ToriiStation, Okinawa, into an initialstaging base for deploying elementsof Army special-operations forces, orARSOF, a PACOM engineer-surveyteam was sent to Camp Navarro atZamboanga, Mindanao, to identify,assess and obtain facilities for “bed-ding down” the JTF.

A U.S.-based contractor accompa-

nied them as part of the LogisticsCivil Augmentation Program. Signif-icant repairs and constructionimprovements were needed to house,feed, support and protect the JTFheadquarters, which would consist ofmore than 300 personnel. EdwinAndrews Air Base’s flight line alsorequired barriers to be installed forprotection against small-arms fire.Force-protection considerations alsodictated that upon arrival, JTF air-craft and crews would have to beplaced outside the operational areaat Mactan Air Base.

The PACOM operations orderissued in December 2001 set the tonefor Exercise Balikatan. The exercise’sTOR established a U.S. military forcecap for the Philippines — 500 person-nel for the JTF headquarters in Zam-boanga and 160 SF Soldiers on Basi-lan Island, at the battalion level. Ini-tially, PACOM’s focus was to get theJTF headquarters operational beforetroop elements arrived. Unfortunate-ly, that meant that when Fridovichand his 1st SF Group command-and-control group for ARSOF arrived atEdwin Andrews on Jan. 29, 2002,JTF-510 had already exceeded theexercise-force cap limits. Fortunately,the exercise’s area of operations, orAO, was limited to southern Min-danao and Basilan Island, which putthe U.S. air assets — aircrews, air-craft-maintenance personnel, thestaff of the joint special-operations aircomponent, and aircraft at MactanAir Base on Cebu — outside the areacovered by the force cap.

Two SF teams from the 1st SFGroup, detachments 112 and 134,arrived in the AO at the end of Janu-ary to provide antiterrorist protectionand force protection for the JTF head-quarters and for the 1st SF Group’sadvance echelons at Zamboanga andon Basilan Island. The detachmentsrotated between performing theirforce-protection role, providing an on-call quick-reaction force, and conduct-ing training for AFP soldiers around

September 2004 37

The combination ofneglect and lack of mili-tary initiative created cir-cumstances that wereless than ideal, not onlyfor the continuing pres-ence and even growth ofinsurgent groups butalso for the genesis ofnew terrorist and crimi-nal organizations.

Zamboanga. In the semihostile envi-ronment of the southern Philippines,providing force protection over such alarge AO proved to be a major task forthe two operational teams.3

As the realities of the situation inthe Philippines became evident tothe ARSOF personnel, the term“contingency operation” proved tobe a misnomer. Although requiredto deploy with unit basic loads ofammunition for contingency pur-poses and required to carry loadedweapons at all times as part offorce-protection measures, ARSOFpersonnel had to adhere to peace-time supply-accountability rules —a single round of ammunition miss-ing was cause for an investigation.

Additional ammunition requiredfor qualification on basic and crew-served weapons was not provided atthe intermediate staging base onOkinawa, and claymore mines,hand grenades and crew-servedweapons — from heavy machineguns to mortars — were thereforenot carried into the Philippines bythe units. (The forward operatingbases later brought in crew-servedweapons.) Armored HMMWVs werealso limited, in spite of their obviousforce-protection value. So tight wasthe ammunition accountability thatAFP basic weapons training andweapons qualification were delayeduntil security-assistance-allocatedammunition arrived.

Soldiers traveling off-base had toremain in groups of two or more,all group members had to carryloaded sidearms, and each grouphad to carry at least one rifle. Allvehicles going off-base had toestablish and maintain radio orcell-phone communications withthe joint operations center.Because the handgun became theprimary weapon for force protec-tion, proficiency was critical, butpistol and rifle qualification weretaken for granted at JTF-510 andat the ARSOTF headquarters.4

In the Philippines, the cell phonewas an unusual challenge to forceprotection. Cell-phone technology iswidespread in the Philippines, as inmuch of the developing world,because the land lines date to beforeWorld War II and are concentratedin the few large cities. While thenumber of cell-phone providers islimited, the commonplace mixing oflocal dialects with English and Taga-log, and the sheer volume of traffic,created major challenges for signals-intelligence personnel.

The popularity among younger Fil-ipinos of using cell phones to sendcoded-text messages and photographshad major affects upon force protec-tion. During firefights, AFP lieu-tenants were prone to send cell-phonemessages to company commanders(and to the press) instead of usingtheir tactical radios. Even with theoccasional dead spots on the cellularnetworks, especially in southern Basi-lan, cell phones often outperformedthe tactical radios. The AFP’s stand-ard field radio was the early VietnamWar-era PRC-25, but AFP units alsoused more modern tactical radios, forwhich they had repeaters set upacross Basilan. Senior AFP officersaccepted the tactical radios’ shortranges and unreliability under thetriple-canopy jungles of Basilan as agood rationale for the common fielduse of cell phones, in spite of the secu-rity risk inherent in the practice.5

As a way of strengthening theirrelationships with the populace,the SF teams turned from perform-ing tactical missions to implement-ing the counterinsurgency modelthat had been practiced by theAmerican military in Vietnam. Theteams also prepared a force-protec-tion plan for each village.

Having established themselveswith the village leaders on Basilanduring the security, civic andhumanitarian-needs assessments,the Soldiers of Forward OperatingBase 11 initiated area medical

civic-action programs, or MED-CAPs, using their assigned medicalpersonnel, to demonstrate theircommitment and to build rapport.

While the families of terroristsroutinely received free medical treat-ment along with the other inhabi-tants, the terrorist groups did notconsider MEDCAP sites to be sacro-sanct, and force protection for MED-CAPs was always an issue. An AFPmotorcyclist usually preceded vehi-cle convoys to the MEDCAP sites,and personnel of the local CivilianAuxiliary Force Geographical Unitwere pulled in by the infantry bat-talions to augment AFP securitywhile the MEDCAPs were conduct-ed. Nonmedical SF personnel contin-ually patrolled in and around the vil-lage to make their presence known,and the military helicopters used totransport the medical teams normal-ly loitered overhead to provide earlywarnings in case of attack. The SFteams and JTF-510 never lost sightof the fact that the same people whowelcomed humanitarian assistancecould be supporting terrorists.6

The SOCPAC commander wantedto focus on unity of planning and onmaking coordinated operationalresponses to current intelligence,from the brigade down to the compa-ny level.The JTF-510 operations cen-ter knew where all AFP groundforces were positioned, so that wasnot a change to the commander’soriginal focus on long-term AFP mili-tary training and education.7 Howev-er, the SF detachments on Basilanhad already acquired ground truthabout the operational capabilities ofthe AFP infantry companies, as theyhad patiently trained them for fivemonths. The SF teams were eager “togo to work” on the ASG, but theirenthusiasm had to be restrained asthey bumped into a very conservativeJTF-510. The JTF-510 screened allconcepts of operations closely to miti-gate risk, and situation reports fromthe SF teams in the field grew volu-

38 Special Warfare

minous. Approvals for concepts ofoperations routinely took 24 to 48hours, often negating the exploitationvalue of current intelligence leadsand frustrating the detachments.8

At the same time that the SFteams were attempting company-level operations, JTF-510 waspreparing to draw down to 400 per-sonnel by the end of July 2002, andto transition to a headquarters fora 50-person joint special-opera-tions task force, or JSOTF, for thePhilippines by Oct. 31.9 The riptideof the JTF-510 exodus was sostrong that the JSOTF-P “stoodup” on Sept. 1, 2002, within 30 daysafter the official end of Balikatan.

The accelerated transition timewas facilitated by the 1st SFGroup’s change of command in thePhilippines. Since the 1st SF Grouphad functioned as the ARSOTF forJTF-510, Colonel Joseph Smithassumed command of JSOTF-Pwhen he assumed command of theSF troops in theater.10

With the end of Exercise Balikatan,both funding and command and con-trol of continuing operations madetransitions. SF teams were asked totrain two more AFP light reactioncompanies and four more lightinfantry battalions, while other spe-cial-operations forces were committedto training Philippine Air Force UH-1H pilots and crews in night flying.While similar to the operations car-ried out during Balikatan, these mis-sions now fell in the category of secu-rity assistance, which was specificallyfunded by a $25 million congressionalappropriation. With the transition tosecurity-assistance funding, control ofthe missions also passed to the JointU.S. Military Advisory Group, or JUS-MAG, in Manila. The JUSMAGsupervised, but since it was located atthe U.S. Embassy in Manila, theJSOTF-P had tactical control over theArmy SF teams in the joint operatingarea.11

There had been no overt terrorist

acts against U.S. personnel duringExercise Balikatan, and JTF-510presumed that most of the ASGhad left Basilan Island by the timeof the Burnham rescue in June2002. With a much smaller Ameri-can presence in the south after thetransition — JSOTF-P headquar-ters at Zamboanga and an SF bat-talion on Basilan — the force-pro-tection package was commensu-rately reduced. Forgotten was howmuch the extensive information-collection effort by the SF detach-ments had contributed to the “safeenvironment” that the Philippineshad enjoyed during Balikatan.

Indications that a bombing cam-paign was imminent — a satchelcharge was found on the airfieldfence, people were observed watch-ing troop movements throughbinoculars, attempts were made toblock U.S. vehicles, and an AFPofficer was murdered — weredownplayed in the face of the draw-down, and previous force-protec-tion assessments were assumed tohave remained valid in spite of thechanging situation. In this environ-ment, ARSOF lost its first Soldierto terrorist action since the JTFhad stood up in January 2002.12

At 8:20 p.m., Oct. 2, 2002, a bombwas detonated at a small open-airrestaurant along the main road toCamp Enrile, Malagutay, killing fourpeople and wounding more than 40.Having been too close when he deto-nated the bomb, the “trigger man”was also killed.13 Among the victimswere two members of SF Detach-ment 145 who had been conductingadvanced special-operations work inthe surrounding area in support offorce protection and had stopped for alate meal before returning to theirbase. Captain Max Horton (pseudo-nym) was seriously wounded in theexplosion, and Sergeant First ClassMark Jackson was killed. Fortunate-ly, the Air Force surgical team hadnot yet redeployed, although theiremergency room had already beenclosed down and their medical equip-ment packed. The surgeons brokeinto the locked equipment containersto treat the captain and the injuredFilipinos.14

The bomb had been rigged into amotorcycle that was parked in frontof the restaurant just three kilome-ters from the JSOTF-P headquar-ters. No terrorist group claimed cred-it, and after several days it was pre-sumed that the two Americans had

September 2004 39

U.S. Special Forces Soldiers trained Philippine forces in recognizing a variety of improvisedexplosive devices.

USASOC Historical Archive

served as a “target of opportunity”for the bomber. Rather than floodingthe area with advanced special-oper-ations-trained SF and intelligencepersonnel to assess the threat and torecommend additional force-protec-tion measures, the second JSOTF-Pcommander “locked down” the Amer-icans on Camp Enrile for 72 hoursand imposed an 11 p.m. curfew forall Americans under the task force’scontrol, including those troops onBasilan Island.

All advanced special-operationswork was stopped, as the dangeroutside the wire seemed to out-weigh the long-term security gainsof such a posture. While the lock-down may have kept the troopstemporarily safe, the momentum ofthe information-collection effort

was lost, and the necessity of quick-ly regaining situational awarenesswas ignored. The AFP and otherU.S. government elements were leftto investigate the bombing site, buteven the AFP did not survey the siteuntil the next morning.

The urgent need for the resump-tion of information-collection effortsin the surrounding area appeared tobe ignored even as the terroristbombing campaign escalated withboldness. In response to the height-ened danger, the Marine securityelement was quickly reinforcedfrom Hawaii to improve the defen-sive posture of JSOTF-P at CampNavarro, Zamboanga. Since con-stant support to the advanced oper-ating base on Basilan was a neces-sity, schedules for resupply convoys

were constantly varied andswitched to the late-night hours.15

While the JSOTF-P regrouped, theASG and MILF exploited the oppor-tunity with an abundance of counter-propaganda and more attacks. Thegroups bombed the Tiguma PoliceStation near the Pagadian Airportand threw grenades into a crowd atthe Iglesia Christos Cathedral to addto the unrest. On Oct. 4 and 5, bombswere found and defused at a hard-ware store and in a dumpster at theZamboanga City mall. Because manyof the AFP soldiers based on BasilanIsland had families in the provinces ofZamboanga del Norte and Zamboan-ga del Sur, the bombings had anadded effect.

To recover lost face, JSOTF-P con-ducted a MEDCAP with the supportof the AFP, the Rotary Club, a non-government organization, and theTzu Chi, a nongovernment organiza-tion, in Toloso, just north of Zamboan-ga City. SF Detachment 145 organ-ized tight security, and the Marinesecurity element was supported byAFP armored cars and UH-1Hs flyingoverhead.The MEDCAP was success-ful, treating 803 people. However, theMEDCAP was not enough to turn thetide against the terrorists.

The ASG countered the U.S.-AFPeffort with more bombings. On Oct. 7,four bombs were discovered in andaround the hotels Paradise, Imperialand Platinum in Zamboanga. Fortu-nately, only one exploded. On Oct. 9,another bomb was discovered anddefused on a vehicle near EdwinAndrews. On Oct. 10, a bomb explod-ed in Kidapawan near Cotabato City,killing eight people and wounding 60,while another exploded on a bus inNorth Cotabato, killing six andwounding 10. Two days later, twoAFP infantry battalions operating onJolo were caught by a well-executedambush by the ASG and MRG. Theysuffered heavy losses, and all AFPwho surrendered were summarilyexecuted by the organizations’ signa-

40 Special Warfare

Jackson, Chapman early casualtiesfrom 1st SF Group in GWOT

When Sergeant First Class Mark W. Jackson was killed inaction near Zamboanga on Oct. 2, 2002, his team, SF A-detach-ment 145, had the enhanced force-protection mission for JTF-510. Jackson, a team sergeant, was part of the ARSOF contin-gent training Philippine soldiers to combat the terrorist AbuSayyaf Group. A 19-year Army veteran, Jackson had served inthe 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment priorto his nine years of service in Special Forces. A Farsi and Arabicspeaker, he had served in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Haiti andnumerous countries in Southeast Asia.

Jackson was not the first Soldier from the 1st SF Group to diein the Global War on Terrorism. As Soldiers from the 1st Groupprepared to deploy to the Philippines, Sergeant First ClassNathan R. Chapman, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group, was killed inaction on Jan. 4, 2002, near the town of Khowst in Afghanistan. Acommunications NCO in SF A-detachment 194, Chapman wasattached to Task Force Dagger during Operation Enduring Free-dom. The 13-year Army veteran had participated in the 75thRangers’ parachute assault into Panama during Operation JustCause and was also a veteran of Operation Desert Storm. Chap-man, a Tagalog speaker, had served nine years in Special Forcesand had deployed to Panama, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Haiti andnumerous countries in Southeast Asia. Chapman’s fellow SpecialForces Soldiers named the airfield at Khowst in his honor.

ture machete beheadings.16 The term“semi-permissive environment” sud-denly took on new meaning in thesouthern Philippines.

In and around Zamboanga, MED-CAPs and dental civic-action pro-grams conducted to counter the neg-ativism of the bombing campaignwere limited to the AFP bases. TheJSOTF-P commander was reluctantto assume responsibility for Ameri-cans operating outside the wire, andhe put an end to advanced special-operations work. Since he felt thatthe tactical information-collectionwas a critical element for recom-mending viable force-protectionmeasures, the commander of SFDetachment 145 requested redeploy-ment of his team. The commanderfelt that the “risk aversion andbunker mentality” in the face ofrenewed terrorist activity wentagainst his training and experienceand made the situation intolerablefor him. His request was granted,and Detachment 145 was replaced.17

In spite of the increased terroristactivity on Mindanao, the security-and humanitarian-assistance pro-grams and projects on Basilan wererelatively unaffected. The rotationaltraining of AFP rifle companies andthe operation of an NCO academy onsouthern Mindanao were delayeduntil after the Christmas holidays of2002–2003 because of PACOM’sinexperience with the technicalitiesof security-assistance funding, notbecause of force-protection concerns.In February 2003, training beganagain in earnest, and it is still ongo-ing in the Philippines.

Force protection in the semiper-missive environment of the SuluArchipelago meant different thingsduring Exercise Balikatan than itdid during the period associatedwith JSOTF-P. It proved to be inci-dental during the exercise whenpressure was being applied to theASG on Basilan. Having resolvedthe Burnham hostage situation

before the end of the exercise, theregional command, satisfied withits GWOT contribution, reverted topreparing for the AFP security-assistance mission to come.

Just as end-of-combat operationshad stimulated rotations inAfghanistan and provided time forthe al-Qaeda and Taliban to regroup(before Anaconda), the post-Burn-ham-rescue lull in AFP operationsduring the post-Balikatan transitionfacilitated terrorist efforts to pub-licly discredit the accomplishmentsof the U.S.-assisted AFP. The coun-terinsurgency progress made duringBalikatan was lost under the flurryof terrorist actions and propaganda,and it would not be regained untilseveral months after Jackson hadbeen killed. Everyone involved inthe post-Balikatan mission wasreminded the hard way of the impor-tance of force protection, even in asemipermissive environment.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a histo-rian on the staff of the USASOCHistorian’s Office.

Notes:1 Classified interview with Captain James

Brown and Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudo-nyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, FortLewis, Wash., tape recording in the classifiedfiles of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brown and Woodinterview; Armed Forces of the Philippines andU.S. Pacific Command, “Terms of Reference forRP-US Exercise Balikatan 02-1”, 9 February2002, copy in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.;JTF-510, “Appendix 2 to Annex C in OPORDFreedom Eagle,” 20 December 2001, copy in theclassified files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C.; 1st Special ForcesGroup, “Law of War, Deployment ReadinessTraining Brief,” 2001, copy in the classifiedfiles of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.

2 Classified interview with Sergeant First ClassMark Schwartz (pseudonym) by Dr.C.H.Briscoe,19 April 2004, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordingin the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asSchwartz interview.

3 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group,briefing (undated), “Operation Eagle Free-dom (S),” copy in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.,hereafter cited as Eagle Freedom brief.

4 Classified interview with Colonel WilliamC. Ball by Forrest L. Marion, 12 April 2002,Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, tape recording inclassified files of the USSOCOM HistoryOffice, MacDill AFB, Fla.; classified interviewwith Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC History Office,Fort Bragg, N.C.; classified interview withStaff Sergeant James Holmes (pseudonym) byDr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recording in the classified files ofthe USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.

5 Schwartz interview.6 Brown and Wood interview.7 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second

Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip-pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM clas-sified draft history of JTF-510, stored in theclassified files of the USSOCOM History Office,MacDill AFB, Fla.

8 Classified interview by Lieutenant ColonelForrest Marion, 28 February 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recordings in the classified files of theUSSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.

9 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.”10 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.”11 Marion, “Opening the Second Front”; classi-

fied interview by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003,Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classi-fied files of the USASOC History Office,FortBragg, N.C.12 Schwartz interview.13 Classified interview with LieutenantColonel Duane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis,Wash., tape recording in the classified filesof the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg,N.C., hereafter cited as Dillard interview.14 Classified interview with Chief WarrantOfficer 3 Jack Landers and Sergeant FirstClass Bart Johnson (pseudonyms) by Dr. C.H.Briscoe, 7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., taperecording in the classified files of the USASOCHistory Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereaftercited as Landers and Johnson interview.15 Landers and Johnson interview; classifiedinterview with First Sergeant Steve Donnerand Lieutenant Colonel Duane Dillard (pseu-donyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, FortLewis, Wash., tape recordings in the classifiedfiles of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.; classified telephone interview byDr. C.H. Briscoe at Fort Bragg, N.C., 9 Decem-ber 2003.16 Dillard interview.17 Landers and Johnson interview.

September 2004 41

Exercise Balikatan 02-1 ended in July2002, but the presence of Army spe-cial-operations forces, or ARSOF, in

the Philippines did not. Even as Joint TaskForce-510 stood down and handed commandand control, or C2, over to Joint Special Oper-ations Task Force-Philippines, or JSOTF-P,teams of Special Forces Soldiers continued to provide force protection for ongoing humanitarian-assistance projects.

The end of the exercise did signal a shift infunding sources, however. During Balikatan,funding came from security-assistance funds

of the United States Pacific Command, orPACOM, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff thatwere re-allocated from the budget for jointcombined exercise training. FollowingBalikatan, funding came from a Departmentof Defense-administered security-assistancefund and from humanitarian- and civic-assistance funds administered by the U.S.Agency for International Development. Withthe shift in funding sources came a shift inmission focus.

For ARSOF, the shift meant that whilethey were still able to build on the gainsmade during the Balikatan training exer-

cise, they also became more involved inprojects of humanitarian and civic assist-ance, or H/CA. SF teams found themselvesspending much of their time providingforce-protection support to H/CA projectteams. In 2003, however, a few mobiletraining teams, or MTTs, did deploy, givingSF troops the opportunity to continuetraining Philippine troops in the tech-niques and strategies of counterterrorism.

In September 2002, decision-makers fromthe U.S. Army Security Assistance Com-mand, or USASAC; the Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory Group, or JUSMAG; theDefense Security Coordination Assistance, orDCSA; and the Security Assistance TrainingManagement Office, or SATMO, met atPACOM headquarters to discuss security-assistance plans for the Philippines. Con-gress had allocated $25 million in security-assistance funds, and those at the meetingwere tasked with deciding how best to usethose funds. SATMO was specifically taskedwith funding and coordinating already-planned MTT missions for training troops ofthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP.1

Soldiers of the 1st SF Group, based atFort Lewis, Wash., and the 1st Battalion, 1stSF Group, based at Torii Station, Okinawa,were tapped to conduct the MTTs.2 As the1st SF Group began preparing for theMTTs, however, the staffs of SATMO,PACOM and the Special Operations Com-mand, Pacific, or SOCPAC, encountered dif-ficulties working out the details of allocat-

42 Special Warfare

Special Forces Training Exercises ContinueBalikatan Mission

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

“Coordinating with the SOUTHCOM directorof training, a lieutenant colonel, was muchlike dealing with a guerrilla chief. It was theRobin Sage scenario every day.”

ing funds and tasking personnel. Recentchanges in the procedures of the U.S. Spe-cial Operations Command, or USSOCOM,prevented SATMO from directly taskingARSOF personnel for MTTs, which compli-cated personnel issues. In addition, the AirForce’s 6th Special Operations Squadron,based at Hurlburt Field, Fla., had also beentasked to the Philippines MTTs, which com-plicated fund movements. SOCPAC itselfhad to learn the new procedures for request-ing personnel and funds before the 1st Bat-talion, 1st SF Group, would be able todeploy.3

The procedural delays pushed the first setof MTT deployments back. In January 2003,the 1st SF Group’s 2nd Battalion, based atFort Lewis, Wash., deployed to Camp Enrile,Malagatay, Mindanao, to begin training anAFP light infantry battalion. SF B-Detach-ment 140 (+) arrived with five SF teams: oneteam to provide force protection, three to teachlight-infantry tactics to company-sized ele-

ments, and one to conduct a tactical leaders’course.

The MTT’s goal was to combat insurgencyin the southern Philippines by improvingthe tactical effectiveness of the AFP. Thethree training teams conducted a six-weekprogram of instruction for the companies inthree phases: basic infantry skills, weaponsmarksmanship and a field-training exerciseon platoon and company tactics. A new com-pany entered the training cycle every twoweeks, and the six-week tactical leaders’course (for 40 soldiers) was conducted sixtimes. The goal was to train four AFPinfantry battalions — the 10th, 32nd and55th Infantry, and the 5th Marine BeachLanding Team, or MBLT, during the courseof a year. All four battalions had previouslytrained with teams from the 1st SF Groupduring Exercise Balikatan.4

As the earlier SF detachments had dis-covered, the involvement of the leaders ofthe AFP’s army and marine battalions waslukewarm. The AFP commanders recog-nized the value of the SF training, but whilethe 1st Infantry Division Training School,the Scout Reconnaissance Battalion, thePhilippine Special Forces Battalion and themarines all provided quality English-speak-ing soldiers to act as assistant instructors insupport of the “train the trainer” concept,only the commander of the 5th MBLT,whose forces were based nearby, actuallyvisited training. The other commandersremained on Basilan: They even missed theformal graduations of the companies andthe tactical leaders’ classes.5

The readiness of weapons and equipmentpresented another obstacle to effective train-ing. Thirty percent of the army’s M-16 rifles(primarily manufactured in the Philippines)were technically dead-lined, with shot-outbarrels and chambers, frozen extractors andlocked sights. Some barrels were so wornout that the bullets fired from them hit theflash suppressor and disintegrated, result-ing in dangerous splashback. The marines’weapons were in slightly better shape, withonly 10 percent of their rifles dead-lined; onthe other hand, 80 percent of their M-16swere manufactured in the U.S. But neitherservice performed routine weapons cleaningand maintenance, and the SF trainers found

September 2004 43

After Balikatan, SF Soldiers continued to train Philippineinfantry soldiers in basic skills such as marksmanship.

U.S. Army photo

small-arms lubricants and cleaning equip-ment to be nonexistent. The AFP soldiers’explained that after all, the bullets cleanedthe barrels.6

Teaching the required classes posed evenmore challenges. Working with the AFPleadership proved to be difficult: “Coordinat-ing with the SOUTHCOM director of train-ing, a lieutenant colonel, was much likedealing with a guerrilla chief. It was theRobin Sage scenario every day,” remem-

bered Captain Mark Williams (pseudonym),the commander of SF Detachment 144. Nei-ther were the AFP troops necessarilyequipped to learn quickly. After the 1996Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF,Accords integrated former Muslim insur-gents into the AFP, the Army battalions inthe southern Philippines became 30-percentMuslim. The former MNLF soldiers camefrom the southern islands and had little orno education, and they spoke primarilyeither Tausug or Yakan. They had little or

no ability to speak Tagalog, and they had noknowledge of English. Literacy was higheramong the marines, who were reputedly allhigh-school graduates, and all of them spokeTagalog and had at least a smattering ofEnglish. SF Detachment 140 had only twoTagalog speakers, Sergeant First ClassLonny Woods and Staff Sergeant Mike Bel-lows, so in the face of such educational andlanguage gaps, the trainers determined thatthe language of instruction would be Eng-lish, with the Filipino assistant instructorsinterpreting as necessary. “Still, as all SFare taught in school, the surest way to con-vey the message to the Filipinos wasthrough photos, pictures and demonstra-tions,” said Williams.7

The infantry company training culminat-ed with a “graduation” combat operationfrom a base camp outside of Camp Enrile.The troops and trainers had to provide theirown water, fuel, rations, laundry and marks-manship ranges — and they had to do sounder heightened levels of force protection.The SF Soldiers found themselves in adilemma created by the nature of their secu-rity-assistance mission and the live-firetraining environment of Basilan Island.Security-assistance missions preclude thetrainers from being combatants or from per-forming duties in which they are likely tobecome combatants. But the trainers’ credi-bility and effectiveness as teachers mandat-ed that they accompany the AFP troops ontheir graduation exercise, of which combatwas an integral part. By carefully applyingtheir mission’s rules of engagement duringthe mission, the SF trainers managed towalk a fine line and fulfill their trainingresponsibilities.8

Despite the constraints and their uncertainstatus as combatants during field operations,members of SF Detachment 144 made greatheadway with the AFP sergeants and juniorofficers during training. As these were futureAFP leaders, the training would have a lastingimpact on AFP preparedness and tactics. TheSF Soldiers were also able to form personalrelationships with, and further influence,some AFP soldiers. Detachment 144’s com-mander developed such a good professionalrelationship with the commander of CompanyC, 10th Infantry Battalion, 1st Lieutenant

44 Special Warfare

Training by SF medics in casualty-evacuation proce-dures made Philippine soldiers more proficient andimproved their morale.

U.S. Army photo

Despite the constraints and their uncertainstatus as combatants during field operations,members of SF Detachment 144 made greatheadway with the AFP sergeants and juniorofficers during training. As these were futureAFP leaders, the training would have a lastingimpact on AFP preparedness and tactics.

Julius Navales, that he was asked to be a god-parent for the Navales’ third child. WhenNavales was promoted to captain, he becamethe 10th Infantry Battalion’s operations offi-cer, an honor that reflected well on his per-formance as a commander and on the SF teamthat trained him.9

The SF Soldiers accomplished their mis-sions in spite of numerous challenges. At theregional-command level, a shifting missionfocus and new sources of funding complicat-ed and delayed MTT deployment. On theground, the readiness of AFP troops andequipment, as well as AFP commanders’indifference, limited the amount of trainingthat could be offered. Strict rules of engage-ment further challenged the SF trainers tobalance their responsibilities as combatinstructors with their roles as security-assistance providers.

In the end, however, the Soldiers of the 1stSF Group managed to increase the AFP’s abil-ity to combat terrorism in the southern Phil-ippines, increasing security not only in thatcountry but also in the entire region.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a historian onthe staff of the USASOC Historian’s Office.

Notes:1 Interview with Lewis J. Grastie Jr., conducted by Dr.

Cherilyn A. Walley, 6 January 2004, Fort Bragg, N.C.,tape recording in the files of the USASOC HistoryOffice, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Grastieinterview.

2 Grastie interview.3 Classified interview with Captain Mark Williams

(pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, FortLewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified files ofthe USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., here-after cited as Williams interview; Grastie interview.

4 Williams interview.5 Williams interview.6 Williams interview; Classified interview with

Sergeant First Class Mark Schwartz (pseudonym) byDr. C.H. Briscoe, 19 April 2004, Fort Lewis, Wash., taperecording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Schwartzinterview.

7 Schwartz interview.8 Schwartz interview.9 Schwartz interview.

September 2004 45

While the primary mission of Armyspecial-operations forces in thePhilippines was to train the

Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, incounterterrorism, the kidnapping of twoAmerican missionaries changed the scopeof the mission to include facilitating therescue of American citizens held hostageby the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG.

The selection, organization and trainingof a light reaction company, or LRC, for thePhilippines by United States SpecialForces Soldiers had been under way atCamp Aguinaldo, Luzon, for nearly twomonths when the ASG attacked the DosPalmos Resort, offshore of Palawan Island,on May 27, 2001. The daring 200-milecross-ocean raid netted the ASG 20hostages for ransom. Among them werethree American citizens, Gracia and Mar-tin Burnham, both missionaries, andGuillermo Sobero.

The difficult maritime operation,launched across the Sulu Sea from Basi-lan, reflected detailed reconnaissance, goodlogistics planning and a well-rehearseddawn assault that neutralized resort secu-rity and caught the vacationers by sur-prise. The Dos Palmas kidnappingsoccurred about a month after the firstAmerican hostage, Jeffrey Schilling, a con-verted Muslim, had been releasedunharmed by ASG terrorists followingeight months of captivity on Jolo Island.Now, the ASG held three Americans, and

the U.S. State Department recommendedthat military assistance be provided.1

ASG threats and the group’s seizure of20-Western guests from Sipadan resort inMalaysia in April 2000 had energized thestaffs of the U.S. Pacific Command, orPACOM, and the Special Operations Com-mand, Pacific, or SOCPAC. While intelli-gence analysts had expanded their effortsto track all Philippine terrorist groups,operations planners had developed securi-ty-assistance recommendations for improv-ing the AFP’s capabilities of combatingincreased terrorism and for restoring lawand order in the predominantly Muslimsouthern archipelago.

After Libya had paid the ASG terroristsmore than $20 million to release theSipadan hostages, the ASG seized morehostages in July and August 2000 — morethan 30 people in several actions. By thetime Schilling was kidnapped in Jolo onAug. 29, 2000, Admiral Dennis C. Blair,commander, PACOM, accompanied by offi-cers from SOCPAC, had already traveled toManila to brief the government of theRepublic of the Philippines and the AFP onthe concept of a mobile training team thatwould train and equip a company-sizedunit to respond to the escalating terrorism.The creation of a Philippine response unitmight restore popular confidence in thePhilippine government.

President Joseph Estrada rejected theAmerican offer of assistance, but with a

46 Special Warfare

Rescuing the Burnhams: The UnspokenSOCPAC Mission

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

change of the Philippine administration afew months later, the Philippines wel-comed American assistance. Company B,1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group,began training the LRC in March 2001.

The 1st SF Group’s mission was to organ-ize and train a national counterterroristforce for the Philippines in five months. Thechallenge for SOCPAC had been to accumu-late equipment for the 90-man LRC — M-4carbines, Kevlar helmets, body armor, night-vision goggles and radios — and deliver it toFort Magsaysay on Luzon before the start oftraining. Brigadier General Donald C.Wurster, commander of SOCPAC, taskedthe Air Force’s 353rd Special OperationsGroup, based at Kadena Airbase, Okinawa,to deliver the equipment as a training mis-sion, “taking the costs out of hide” because itwas the only way to execute the program.2

The mass ASG kidnapping at Dos Pal-mas prompted the U.S. Department ofState to support security assistance for thePhilippine armed forces, allowing PACOMto shift $2 million from its regional securi-ty-assistance program to fund the ongoingLRC training. When the AFP discoveredthat Sobero had been beheaded shortlyafter his capture, and that some hostagesseized in the Dos Palmas raid were beingheld on Basilan, the Philippine militaryleadership felt pressured to use the LRC torescue them. Fortunately, senior U.S. offi-cials convinced them that the LRC wouldbe more capable of rescuing the hostagesafter it completed training.3

In the meantime, Major General GlicerioSua, commander of the Philippine 1stInfantry Division, was working jointly withWurster and with Colonel David Fridovichof Joint Task Force-510 as the SouthernCommand Task Force Comet commanderresponsible for Mindanao and BasilanIsland. Under the auspices of the combinedExercise Balikatan, starting Jan. 1, 2002,Sua used the first two phases of his Opera-tion Liberty to get the army and marineinfantry battalions on Basilan ready toconduct major combat operations againstthe ASG. When SF detachments from the1st SF Group began providing individualand collective training to the Philippinebattalions on Basilan in late February

2002, Sua concentrated TF Comet’s effortson finding the Burnhams and preparingplans to rescue them.

JTF-510 supported the development ofintelligence-driven operations by theSouthern Command, and it promoted coor-dinated staff work and the fusion of intelli-gence from all sources in the AFP jointoperations center. PACOM dedicated aNavy P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft toJTF-510. Signal-intercept teams from the1st SF Group worked with AFP elementsat Camp Enrile, Zamboanga, as part of the1st SF Group mission of “training, advisingand assisting” the AFP in joint command,control and communications, fusion of all-source intelligence, counterterrorism,information operations and civil-militaryoperations.4

The individual and collective trainingconducted by the SF teams assigned to thePhilippine battalions on Basilan raisedPhilippine soldier confidence levels,because most culminated in “graduation”combat operations in the field. Despite thefact that Basilan had been serving as the“combat JRTC” for AFP battalions for morethan 10 years, the Filipino soldiers andmarines were not proficient jungle fight-ers. Tactically, they were no match for theguerrilla forces operating from the remoteareas of Basilan. A typical firefight result-ed in one AFP killed and three AFP wound-ed, with many casualties of friendly fire.

The presence of the Americans who haddirect radio contact with helicopters (Phil-

September 2004 47

When the AFP discovered that Sobero hadbeen beheaded shortly after his capture, andthat some hostages seized in the Dos Palmasraid were being held on Basilan, the Philip-pine military leadership felt pressured to usethe LRC to rescue them. Fortunately, seniorU.S. officials convinced them that the LRCwould be more capable of rescuing thehostages after it completed training.

ippine Air Force UH-1D Hueys during theday and U.S. aircraft at night) also meantprompt air medical evacuations of Filipinocasualties when contact was made with theguerrillas.5 But the first evidence thatincreased combat operations in remoteareas of the island were having the desiredeffect — pressuring the ASG elements todisperse and move from long-establishedsupport areas — was the mass surrender ofguerrilla fighters on the southern coast ofBasilan in early April. 2002.6

SF Detachment 114, with the 1st MarineBattalion Landing Team at Abungabung,arranged the surrender of an ASG guerril-la and his extraction to Manila. The guer-rilla agreed to be the “test case” for his

group of 19 fighters who were short of foodand tiring of running from AFP patrols.After the guerrilla received his firstdemand of several cheeseburgers and alarge order of French fries, he was flown toManila for further interrogation. A cell-phone call assuring his buddies that theywould receive similar meals prompted thesurrender of another 18 hungry ASG fight-ers three days later.7

As the large force (more than 300 per-sonnel) of Seabees and Marine engineerscomposing the Naval Construction TaskGroup from Okinawa arrived to begin workon humanitarian and civic-action projectsthroughout Basilan, the increased Ameri-can presence provided rural residents withassurance that some of their basic needswould be met. The primary contact for the

locals, the few Army Civil Affairs teams(protected by the SF detachments) thatcoordinated humanitarian and security-assistance activities with all ethnic groups,seemed to be everywhere.8 The increasedAmerican presence also constrained themovement of terrorist elements on Basilanat the same time that local Muslim supportof the ASG was being eroded by thehumanitarian projects in progress and bythe widespread public knowledge of theASG’s inflated ransoms and abuse offemale hostages.

When multiple-source intelligence fromPhilippine and American assets confirmedthat the Burnhams had been moved fromBasilan to Zamboanga del Norte, some dis-tance from Zamboanga City, in late May orearly June 2002, planning for the rescuemission, Operation Day Break, began inearnest, making the Burnham rescue themajor focus of the Southern Command.Southern Command began makingarrangements for moving several infantrybattalions aboard Philippine Navy vesselsto southern Mindanao to hunt for AbuSabaya, the ASG leader holding the kid-napped Americans.

Interdiction of ASG maritime supply andescape routes required greater naval sup-port and made Operation Day Break onsouthern Mindanao a joint effort. As moreBasilan infantry battalions were includedin the operation, many of the SF detach-ments were left with only remnants of theAFP units that they had been tasked totrain. Some detachments split, so that partof the detachment could accompany theirAFP battalion commanders during combatoperations on Mindanao.

Fridovich, as the ARSOTF commanderof JTF-510, assigned key staff from the1st SF Group to develop viable courses ofaction based on a detailed intelligencepreparation of the battlefield. He usedthose plans to steer the AFP leadershipand to convince them of the need for con-ducting joint rehearsals on the islands offMindanao. Nightly aerial surveillance byU.S. Navy P-3C Orion aircraft had beenarranged through PACOM. After a night-surveillance photo was leaked to the Phil-ippine press, access to that imagery was

48 Special Warfare

When multiple-source intelligence fromPhilippine and American assets confirmedthat the Burnhams had been moved fromBasilan to Zamboanga del Norte, some dis-tance from Zamboanga City, in late May orearly June 2002, planning for the rescuemission, Operation Day Break, began inearnest, making the Burnham rescue themajor focus of the Southern Command.

strictly controlled. Success withunmanned aerial vehicles was limited.Despite the fact that the Southern Com-mand (TF Comet) and JTF-510 had madeconsiderable progress integrating andverifying all-source intelligence, the AFPbattalion commanders would not investi-gate every possible terrorist location iden-tified, and they would not consider nightoperations.9

Primary casualty evacuation wasassigned to the MH-60L Black Hawks ofthe 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment, which replacedthe Air Force’s 33rd Rescue Squadron HH-60Gs in May 2002. Wurster, at CampNavarro, maintained control of the 160thSOAR helicopters.10

JTF-510 worked closely with SouthernCommand at Camp Enrealy as Sua andJTF Comet on Camp Navarro coordinatedthe naval movement of army and marineelements from Basilan and the truck move-ment into assigned operational areas ofsouthern Mindanao and observed therehearsals conducted on the offshoreislands. Three army battalions (the ScoutReconnaissance and the 10th and 55thInfantry) were brought north by ship tosupport the joint operation designed tolocate and rescue the Burnhams.11 For ashort time, Fridovich had a temporary tac-tical operations center aboard a Philippinenaval vessel to monitor the marine land-ings, the navy-patrol-boat interdiction ofkey estuaries, the offshore naval patrollingto blockade the southern Mindanao coast,and the ground movement of army battal-ions into battle positions.12

The movement of AFP elements wasreported by the news media and did not gounnoticed by locals sympathetic to theASG. The volume of cell-phone trafficincreased significantly: Surreptitious textmessages kept ASG field elementsinformed of AFP movements.13 By May 27,2002, even the captive Burnhams hadheard on the radio that several shiploads ofAFP soldiers had landed on the Zamboan-ga peninsula.14

Gracia Burnham later stated that dur-ing the early days of May 2002, several ofher ASG captors, expecting a night resup-

ply boat, inadvertently greeted an AFP ele-ment coming ashore on the beach. As theASG party finished saying “Salamalaikom” (Peace to you), they realized thatthe boat contained AFP, and they immedi-ately fled into the heavy undergrowth. TheAFP characteristically failed to pursue theASG. It was dark, the AFP units had veryfew operational night-vision goggles, and,the AFP did not like night operations.15

Following a scheme of maneuver devel-oped during Operations Liberty I and II,JTF Comet employed the 10th and 55thInfantry battalions as fixed blocking forceswhile the Scout Ranger Battalion conduct-ed platoon and company-sized movementsto contact in areas where ASG elementswere reportedly operating. In southernMindanao, as on Basilan, contact oftenoccurred by chance, when the ScoutRangers bumped into ASG groups whowere moving out of concentrated-searchareas. Despite these cautious, deliberateand readily compromised Philippine com-bat operations, elements of the 55thInfantry Battalion managed to capture alocal forester while moving to surround asuspected ASG element. Questioned, theforester said that he had seen a group withhostages, two of whom were Americans.16

As it turned out, the ASG element thathad the Burnhams, unfamiliar with south-ern Mindanao, had started using loggingroads to move faster. They, too, captured alocal forester and forced him to act as theirguide. The ASG, like the AFP, did not oper-ate after dark, and they kept the foresterchained up at night. The absence of localMuslim support — food, shelter and villagesilence — had made the Burnham captorsvulnerable. To further complicate theirmovement, seasonal rains had turned thelogging roads into sucking mud, and thefleeing ASG group was leaving plenty offootprints.17

Despite additional details provided bythe forester and by signal intercepts thatWurster and Fridovich provided, Suaremained unconvinced that the hostageshad been moved to Mindanao. After hissearch proved fruitless, Sua agreed toinsert Scout Rangers into the area wherethe Burnhams had been spotted, and while

September 2004 49

moving up a riverbed toward the suspectedASG site, a platoon-sized patrol of ScoutRangers bumped into the terrorist elementencamped on the back side of a hill.

The Scout Rangers had been followingthe ASG and the hostages for almost 24hours. On the day before the firefight (June6), they had spotted tracks crossing thelogging road late in the afternoon andbegan following them. The next morningthe Rangers discovered the remnants of ahurried breakfast of fruit at a farm andkept tracking the ASG and hostages untilthe group stopped for the day.18 Using arainstorm to cover their maneuvers, theyattacked the ASG. Until this action, theFilipino military had been reluctant to con-duct operations when it was raining.Caught by surprise by the change in modusoperandi, Abu Sabaya initially thoughtthat he was being attacked by an AmericanSF team.

Gracia Burnham describes the attack:

We (Martin and Gracia) had just closedour eyes when a fearsome barrage of gunfirecut loose from the crest of the hill. The AFP?Surely not. It was raining and they neverfought in the rain … My instincts, after six-teen previous battles, told me instantly whatto do: drop immediately. I flipped my feetaround to get out of the hammock — andbefore I even hit the ground, I felt the zing! ofa bullet slamming through my right leg. Irolled down the steep hill maybe eight feet,dazed. I looked up and saw Martin on theground, too, so I quickly crawled to his side.He was kind of twisted, with his legs under-neath his body … blood was beginning tosoak through his shirt on his upper leftchest … Shots continued to ring out. TheAbu Sayyaf were just getting themselvespositioned to fire back … The shooting con-tinued. Grenades blew up … The shootinggradually became more sporadic. At the topof the ridge I heard shouting in Tagalog, thelanguage of the AFP. No sounds came fromthe bottom, however, which told me that theAbu Sayyaf had fled down the streambed. Ididn’t want to startle anyone who might benearby, so I slowly waved my hand to signalthat I was still alive.19

Radio communications became very spo-

radic when the encounter turned into a fire-fight, but the Rangers managed to confirmthe presence of the Americans and to reportcasualties. When the firefight began, theJTF-510 quick-reaction force, an SF detach-ment on standby at Camp Navarro, Zam-boanga, was immediately activated,although the Burnham contact site was 45minutes away via Black Hawk. Beyond theconfirmation that Americans were presentand that the Rangers had suffered casual-ties, the SF team and the MH-60L aircrewshad only vague information.20

Actually, both sides had casualties —seven AFP had been wounded, and threeASG had been killed. Martin Burnham anda Filipino hostage had been killed; GraciaBurnham had been wounded. When thefirefight ceased, the QRF mission wasscrubbed, and the Black Hawks were usedfor casevac. She was evacuated by MH-60Lto Camp Navarro for treatment and subse-quently flown to Manila on an MC-130Prefueling aircraft.21

After the firefight, the majority of theASG captors, including Sabaya, escapeddown the riverbed toward the coast. TheAFP continued to pursue Sabaya, however,it was believed that since his element wasshort of food and lacking Muslim support,the group would probably try to escapeMindanao by boat.

Wurster praised the SF teams for mak-ing the AFP battalions more tactically pro-ficient, for training them to be bettermarksmen and for instilling confidence inthe soldiers. The Scout Rangers had prac-ticed combat lifesaving on their woundedas well as on Gracia Burnham.

The individual and collective training ofthe army and marine infantry battalionsby the SF teams, and JTF-510’s emphasison JTF Comet using multisource intelli-gence to plan operations against the ASG,made the rescue possible. Operations Lib-erty I and II not only coordinated army andmarine field operations but increased pres-sure on the ASG on Basilan, while the Psy-chological Operations wanted-poster cam-paign and the humanitarian projects ofCivil Affairs reduced Muslim popular sup-port of the terrorists. Despite the con-straints imposed by the Philippine govern-

50 Special Warfare

ment, the ARSOF elements managed toaccomplish their assigned “advise, assistand train” mission and significantlyaltered ASG power on Basilan.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Notes:1 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel Dou-

glas Mandarin (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe andDr. Kenn Finlayson, 23 May 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C.,tape recording in the classified files of the USASOCHistory Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asMandarin interview.

2 Classified interview with Brigadier General Don-ald C. Wurster by Forrest L. Marion, Camp Navarro,Zamboanga, Republic of the Philippines, 31 March2002, tape recording in the classified files of theUSSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.

3 Mandarin interview.4 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front:

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM classified draft history ofJTF-510, stored in the classified files of the USSO-COM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.

5 Classified interview with Captain James Brownand Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr.C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., taperecording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brownand Wood interview.

6 Mandarin interview; Marion, “Opening the SecondFront.”

7 Mandarin interview; Marion, “Opening the SecondFront.”

8 Classified interview with Sergeant First ClassDarrel Thomas (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 5December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording inthe classified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.; Company B, 96th CA Battalion, “OEF-Pbriefing,” undated, in the classified files of theUSASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.

9 Classified interview with Chief Warrant Officer 3John J. Hemingway (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe,7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in theclassified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Hemingway interview.Filipino fishermen helped to retrieve a U.S. militaryunmanned aerial vehicle that crashed into the seanear Zamboanga on 31 March 2002, while on a train-ing mission.10 Classified interview with Staff Sergeant Clark Kelt-ner (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 26 July 2003, taperecording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo-ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.; classified interview withStaff Sergeant John Price and First Sergeant FredRandolph (pseudonyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 13 Sep-tember 2003, Fort Campbell, Ky., tape recordings in the

classified files of the USASOC History Office, FortBragg, N.C.11 Hemingway interview.12 Hemingway interview.13 Hemingway interview.14 Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies(Wheaton, Ill.:Tyndale House Publishers, 2003), 252, 257.15 Mandarin interview.16 Hemingway interview.17 Burnham, 252, 257.18 Burnham, 266.19 Burnham, 262-65.20 Hemingway interview.21 Hemingway interview.

September 2004 51

Operations in the United StatesPacific Command’s theater typicallyinvolve movements and communi-

cations over vast distances. ExerciseBalikatan 02-1 was no exception, and theSoldiers of the 112th Special OperationsSignal Battalion, headquartered at FortBragg, N.C., were charged with helping toshrink the distances and with allowingU.S. special-operations forces stationed inthe Philippines to stay in touch.

When the 1st Special Forces Group tookpart in Exercise Balikatan 02-1, CompanyC, 112th Signal Battalion, developed andperfected improved satellite communica-

tions procedures that enhanced the effec-tiveness of operations in the theater.

Company C, created in July 2001 entire-ly with internal assets, is the newest of the112th’s three companies. The formation ofthe unit allowed the 112th to institute athree-cycle training model: support to jointand Army special operations forces; inten-sive mission training; and support andrecovery.1

Because it was created “out of hide,” Com-pany C obtained some of its equipment byrebuilding older communications systemsacquired from a variety of sources. The sig-nal Soldiers put all their ingenuity and skillinto the refurbishing and upgrading of theequipment — and their efforts resulted inenhanced capabilities that played a key rolein the Philippine operations.

Even though Company C stood ready todeploy to Afghanistan in support of Opera-tion Enduring Freedom, a change of mis-sion required that it follow the 1st SFGroup to the Philippines, without the ben-efit of an established communicationspackage. In conjunction with the 1st SFGroup, the 112th held a planning confer-ence at Fort Lewis, Wash., in early January2002 to work out the details of the compa-ny’s operations.2 Sergeant First ClassJames Sierra (pseudonym) represented the112th. The communications-support por-tion of the joint special-operations taskforce, or JSOTF, of the Special OperationsCommand, Pacific, or SOCPAC, would be

52 Special Warfare

112th Signal Battalion Opens the ‘Big Pipe’ During Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

A satellite dish and a communications van belonging to the 112th Signal Battalion sitnext to Landing Zone X-Ray on Mindanao.

USASOC Historical Archive

performed by the Joint CommunicationsSupport Element, or JCSE, based atTampa, Fla. Company C rapidly puttogether a support package for augmentingthe 1st SF Group’s signal detachment andfor ensuring communications throughoutthe area of the group’s operations.

The mission pre-deployment site sur-vey took place Jan. 6, 2002, in Hawaii,and Company C moved to Zamboanga, onthe southern Philippine island of Min-danao, on Jan. 10. With preparations fordeployment under way, the companyworked hard to complete validation of itssystems. During Company C’s buildup todeployment, it designed, tested and vali-dated its improved satellite multipleaccess system, the 93 V-3 system, alsoknown as the “Big Pipe.” The Big Pipeuses a standard 3036-disk antenna and aTSC-93 van with an enhanced tacticalsatellite signal processor — the compo-nents of the 93C V (2) system.3

But the 112th Soldiers modified their93 V-3 system to make it capable of simul-taneous satellite-communications accessto two of the Department of Defense’sstandardized entry-point, or STEP, facili-ties. This was a first for the 112th,because most communications systemsprovide access to only one STEP facility ata time. The 15 worldwide STEP facilitiesprovide a standardized, tactical-communi-cations package to deployed warfightersin order to support global command, con-trol, communications, computers andintelligence. By providing simultaneousprimary and secondary satellite links,4the 93 V-3 system effectively doubles thecapacity of the 93C V (2) system and pro-vides a safety net for communications.

When rotating into the Philippines, thefirst troops from the 112th moved to ToriiStation, Okinawa, on Feb. 7, 2002, and setup and tested their equipment.5 From Oki-nawa, the 112th personnel moved to theisland of Basilan, establishing their opera-tions on the helicopter-landing area atLanding Zone X-Ray. From that location,the 93 V-3 could access two-step sites —one at Fort Buckner, Okinawa, the other atWahiawa, Hawaii.6

Colonel David Fridovich, the 1st SF

Group’s commander, could talk not only tothe JSOTF in Camp Navarro, on Min-danao, but also to the forward operatingbase on Basilan. The commander of 1stGroup’s 1st Battalion, Lieutenant ColonelDouglas Mandarin (pseudonym), couldcommunicate with Fridovich, with thebattalion’s rear element on Okinawa, andwith the JSOTF. All the elements men-tioned had the ability to communicatewith SOCPAC.7

At the JSOTF, the JCSE set up with aforce of more than 90 Soldiers, three timesthe size of the standard 112th JSOTFpackage.8 Because of the force-cap issuesthat plagued the exercise, Company Coperated the Big Pipe with the bare mini-mum number of personnel.

Conditions were austere on LZ X-Ray.The airfield was the primary rotary-winglanding zone for the 160th Special Oper-ations Aviation Regiment, whose MH-47E Chinooks provided the aviationcapability to the 1st SF Group’s detach-ments. The 112th was forced to erect itsantenna dishes and set its communica-tions van in close proximity to the land-ing area, where the prop wash of eachlanding and takeoff threatened theintegrity of the systems.9 Ever resource-ful, the Soldiers found a way of reposi-tioning the equipment and vehicles thatcounteracted the prop wash.

While Company C’s standard of livingimproved over time, space restrictionsdid not abate, forcing the unit to leave itsrepair parts and equipment on Okinawaduring the first rotation.10 After several

September 2004 53

The 112th Soldiers modified their 93 V-3 sys-tem to make it capable of simultaneous satel-lite-communications access to two of theDepartment of Defense’s standardized entry-point facilities. This was a first for the 112th,because most communications systems pro-vide access to only one STEP facility at a time.

rotations, one container full of equip-ment was moved forward to Zamboanga.Despite separation from their source ofresupply, Company C maintained contin-uous communications while it was onBasilan.

The 1st SF Group made arrangementsfor a civilian contractor to move suppliesby water from Mindanao.11 As the materi-als were moved up from the beach landingarea, the signal teams pitched in to assistwith the off-loading and security of thesupplies. Security became a common mis-sion for the teams, as well as intensivetraining on force protection and individualSoldier skills, making the 112th Soldiersinvaluable as a security force for convoysand operations.

The 112th also played a vital role inimproving the infrastructure on the islandand in providing humanitarian assistanceto the local populace, by supporting theNaval Construction Task Group withsecure and nonsecure communications andphone lines, as well as by pulling securityas the construction teams moved to andfrom job sites.

Company C Soldiers demonstrated theirversatility and ingenuity during theirdeployment to the Philippines. Their suc-cessful fielding of the Big Pipe systembecame a model for future operations, andtheir ability to deliver uninterrupted com-

munications support earned high markswith the 1st SF Group.

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command his-torian for the U.S. Army JFK Special War-fare Center and School.

Notes:1 Patrick,Flood, “Special Operations Signal Support:

Operation Iraqi Freedom” (draft) for submission toArmy Communicator, 29 Jul 2003. Fort Gordon, Ga.In author’s possession.

2 Interview with Sergeant First Class James Sierra(pseudonym) by Dr. Kenn Finlayson, USASOC Histo-ry Office, 24 December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., here-after cited as Sierra interview.

3 Interview with Sergeant Andy Arlen (pseudonym)by Dr. Kenn Finlayson, USASOC History Office, 24December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited asArlen interview.

4 Arlen interview.5 Sierra interview.6 Interview with Robert Lamore (pseudonym) by Dr.

Kenn Finlayson, USASOC History Office, 24 Decem-ber 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Lamoreinterview.

7 Arlen interview.8 Sierra interview.9 Lamore interview.

10 Arlen interview.11 Classified interview with Major Edward Dougher-ty (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, FortLewis, Wash.; and Forrest L. Marion, “Opening theSecond Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip-pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM classifieddraft history of JTF-510, stored in the classified filesof the USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.

54 Special Warfare

A member of the 112thsets up a communica-tions van near LandingZone X-Ray. The Soldiershad to find ways of posi-tioning the signal equip-ment that would counter-act the prop wash of thehelicopters.

USASOC Historical Archive

While the United StatesPacific Command’s effortsto aid the Philippine gov-

ernment in combating the terror-ists of the Abu Sayyaf Group, orASG, did not become a second frontin the Global War On Terrorism, orGWOT, the operation was success-ful and yielded a number of valu-able lessons.

Official special-operations lessonslearned are the purview of the chiefof staff for operations, U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, andare beyond the scope of this article.Still, the observations presentedhere, taken from interviews withnon-attributable sources — primar-ily participants in all grades and atall levels of the operation — arevaluable as aspects of a successfulmission that can be applied to otheroperations.

That the mission of Army spe-cial-operations forces, or ARSOF, inthe Philippines was successful isevident from five measurements ofsuccess. First, ARSOF trainingefforts significantly improved theoperational capability of more than10 infantry battalions of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, or AFP.The most notable long-term effectof the individual and collectivetraining conducted by U.S. Special

Forces teams was the impact onthe younger Philippine NCOs andjunior officers (to the captainlevel). From the SF Soldiers, thejunior leaders learned the basics ofdecision-making, of command andcontrol, of staff coordination and ofthe way that intelligence shoulddrive operations. SF detachmentsconverted AFP base camps on Basi-lan into tactically defensible areas,and they trained Philippine sol-diers and marines in the combatlifesaving skills needed for provid-ing emergency medical treatmentwith confidence. Those lifesavingskills were a significant moralebooster for the AFP.

Second, humanitarian and civic-action projects, or H/CA, medicalvisits and the daily presence ofAmerican SF teams on Basilanimproved the images of the AFPand the Manila government, andthey helped return law and orderto the island.

Third, the ASG presence and thethreat on Basilan were significant-ly reduced, and the communistNew People’s Army was added tothe AFP terrorist target list.Fourth, the AFP resolved a hostagesituation involving two Americanmissionaries, Martin and GraciaBurnham. As a result, the ASG

leader responsible for multiple kid-nappings, Abu Sabaya, was laterpresumed killed offshore as hetried to flee southern Mindanao.

Finally, the Philippine govern-ment agreed to contribute an AFPinfantry battalion for service inIraq as part of the recently estab-lished Operation Iraqi FreedomInternational Division.

Although the presence of SFdetachments advising the AFP onBasilan and in southern Mindanaodeterred the activities of the ASG,the ARSOF mission to the Philip-pines did not become the secondfront of the GWOT. Planners at theUnited States Pacific Command, orPACOM, and at the Special Opera-tions Command, Pacific consideredBalikatan 02-1 to be a joint com-bined training exercise, not a sepa-rate campaign of Operation Endur-ing Freedom.

The U.S. did not authorize theuse of additional training ammuni-tion for predeployment weapons-qualification, nor did it initiallypermit the use of heavy, crew-served weapons. Those two restric-tions, as much as any considerationof Philippine sovereignty, preclud-ed Balikatan from becoming aspringboard for U.S.-led combatoperations against terrorist groups

September 2004 55

Reflections and Observations on ARSOF OperationsDuring Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

in the southern Philippines.The majority of the combat-

equipment needs identified by the1st SF Group in its statement ofrequirements for supporting “con-tingency” operations in the Philip-pines could not be funded, and thepriority of the Philippine missionfell well below the mission of theARSOF elements committed toOEF in Afghanistan. The receipt ofoutdated 1:50,000-scale topograph-ical maps two months after the SFdetachments arrived on Basilanreflected the priorities.

It made sense to employ all threecritical elements of the counterin-surgency, or COIN, model — SF;Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psycholog-ical Operations, or PSYOP. Howev-er, the PACOM-imposed “force cap”on ARSOF personnel and heavyweapons in the exercise area ofoperations constrained the use ofCA teams. That compelled the com-mander of Forward Operating Base11 to task SF detachments withthe CA mission. The use of tacticalPSYOP teams to train, advise andassist AFP psychological-warfareelements was not approved by thePhilippine government because thePhilippine Psychological WarfareGroup had been severely compro-mised during the regime of Presi-dent Ferdinand Marcos.

For the exercise to be successful,all three critical elements of theCOIN model needed to support oneanother. Unfortunately, while therole of PSYOP support had beenidentified as early as December2001, planners had not developedan information-operations plan toemphasize H/CA accomplishmentson Basilan. The H/CA projectsreceived little or no news coveragefrom the Filipino media, while AbuSabaya, who was holding the Burn-hams captive, was readily givenradio-broadcast access for his tele-phone call-ins. In a country inwhich the media has a dramatic

effect on government leaders, JointTask Force-510 took a traditionalpublic-affairs approach, reacting tonegative press accounts and focus-ing on winning journalists over byfacilitating media access to theAFP elements on Basilan and inZamboanga. Consequently, self-serving commanders and staff offi-cers, anxious to promote theircareers in Manila, regularly“leaked” information to the mediarepresentatives.

The original unconventional-warfare, or UW, mission envisionedby the 1st SF Group leadershipnever materialized. Sympathy

toward America for the tragic 9/11attacks on New York and Washing-ton did not extend to national-sov-ereignty rights. As a former U.S.colony, the Philippines wasextremely sensitive regarding itssovereignty. Still, the impertinentASG tactic of seizing and holdingWesterners hostage for large ran-soms had become embarrassing tothe Philippine government, forcingit to make a show of targeting theASG as a “political sop” for theAmerican government, while otherinsurgent elements that posedgreater threats to law, order andstability were allowed to continue

disrupting the country. However,the U.S. military presence, AFPtraining and increased operationsdrove most of the ASG from itsBasilan sanctuaries.

ObservationsBased on ARSOF’s experience in

the Philippines during Balikatan,there are a number of observationsthat we can make that will apply tothe force in other situations.

• Every regional special-opera-tions command, or SOC, will operatedifferently. The characteristics ofeach SOC will be affected by a num-ber of factors: the maturity of theSOC headquarters: the militaryservice and the prior experience ofthe SOC commander in dealing withspecial-operations forces, or SOF;the service orientation and prioritiesof the combatant command; theexperience of the SOC and the com-batant command with the nuancesof security assistance; and the expe-rience of the SOC and the combat-ant command with Army Reserveand National Guard mobilizations.

• Issues of national sovereigntyand a colonial heritage will inhibitU.S.-dominated security assistanceand military training. U.S. SF-led“Mike Forces,” popularized duringthe Vietnam War, are history intoday’s developing world. U.S. secu-rity-assistance and military-train-ing operations will be more accept-ed if there is parity between U.S.and host-nation forces.

• Large population centers arebecoming the natural geographicalenvironment for UW operations.

• The Special Forces QualificationCourse’s Robin Sage exercise pre-pares Soldiers for challenging advi-sory missions, such as those theyencountered in the Philippines.

• CA will continue to be a majorSF mission, based on SF Soldiers’daily contact with the local popu-lace at all levels and the continued

56 Special Warfare

Although the presenceof SF detachments ad-vising the AFP on Basi-lan and in southernMindanao deterred theactivities of the ASG,the ARSOF mission tothe Philippines did notbecome the secondfront of the GWOT.

imposition of force caps on ARSOFand other U.S. forces. Limitationson crew-served heavy weapons,armored vehicles, tanks andartillery are another form of forcecaps.

• Aggressive AFP patrollingdenied the ASG its habitual sanctu-ary and curtailed ASG movement,while U.S.-directed H/CA projectsearned local respect, improvedforce-protection measures andreduced Muslim village support forthe terrorists on Basilan.

• MEDCAPs did much to fosterthe image that the AFP was pro-viding a secure environment. Themedical and dental-assistance vis-its reached out to those areas lack-ing medical care and providedmuch-needed aid. The MEDCAPSalso enabled the AFP, Philippineofficials, nongovernment organiza-tions and the SF detachments towork together and interact withthe Basilan populace in a positivemanner.

• Logistics proved challengingfor the 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment, as well as forthe 1st SF Group, because unitshad to be self-sufficient; there wasno forward support team from the528th Special Operations SupportBattalion attached to the Armyspecial-operations task force tosupport its SOF-unique require-ments. The most reliable assist-ance came from the units’ homebases in the continental U.S.,Korea and Okinawa.

• In OEF-Philippines, in OEFAfghanistan, and later in Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom, peacetime sup-ply rules applied. The simultane-ous conduct of two GWOT cam-paigns stretched Army materieland ARSOF-specific equipmentthin. Statements of requirementsshould include the needs of CA andPSYOP attachments; otherwise theneeds of these small ARSOF ele-ments will get lost.

• Force protection was, and con-tinues to be, a constant challenge.Improvised explosive devices arethe simplest and safest tools forterrorists to use. Acquiring a situa-tional awareness and keeping apresence “on the streets” proved tobe key to a proactive force-protec-tion program. Neither a semiper-missive/uncertain environment nora reduced U.S. troop presence justi-fies maintaining a lower force-pro-tection posture — the bombingdeath of Sergeant First Class MarkJackson and the serious woundingof his team leader during the jointspecial-operations task force phaseof the Philippines mission, whenthe American presence was limit-ed, demonstrated that force protec-tion is a constant in the asymmet-ric war against terrorism.

• Maintaining a high state ofalertness and being well-armed atall times proved to be good deter-rent to terrorist attacks, just asregular firing of heavy weapons onthe ranges emphasized the fire-power and the well-honed capabili-ties of U.S. troops.

• The widespread use of cellphones in countries of the develop-ing world — the most commonworkplace for ARSOF — com-pounds the challenges of force pro-tection. Text-messaging using codewords, dialect slang and linguisticcode-switching — the mixing ofEnglish, Spanish,Tagalog and localdialect words — demonstrated howFilipinos have capitalized on tech-nology to which Westerners arestill getting accustomed.

• Access to certain U.S. Embassymessage traffic during “contin-gency” missions overseas requiredtop-secret clearances and focal-point “read-ons.” Those clearanceswere difficult for SF groups toobtain because of the limited num-ber of top-level security positionsthe groups are allocated. The 5thSF Group experienced a similar

problem during its planning forOEF missions. Groups have justover 30 top-secret billets, and evenfewer positions for focal-point pro-gram read-ons. As relations withother U.S. government elementshave grown during the GWOT, theneed for more top-level security bil-lets has increased.

The Philippines mission is anARSOF success story. Balikatan isagain an integral part of the JointChiefs of Staff Cobra Gold exerciseseries for the Pacific. After morethan 10 years, PACOM has re-established an acceptable presencein the Philippines and is now bet-ter able to monitor the pulse of theregion. AFP training and initia-tives on Basilan compelled theASG to return to its home islands.The 1st SF Group detachments, byfocusing their efforts on the profes-sional development of junior offi-cers and NCOs, have had a majorimpact on the AFP of the future.Side benefits from a constantARSOF presence are that the AFPis looking at its diverse ethnic pop-ulation in a different way and thatthe H/CA projects have given theBasilan islanders significantlyimproved lives.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the commandhistorian for the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command.

September 2004 57

58 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Department of the Army approved the revision of Career ManagementField 38 (Civil Affairs) on July 21. Changes to CMF 38 will be effective Oct.1, 2005. The 38B military occupational specialty, or MOS, (Enlisted CivilAffairs) will be added to the Active Army, and Soldiers serving in MOS 38A(Enlisted Civil Affairs) will be converted to MOS 38B. The Army is devel-oping a process that will allow Soldiers currently assigned to the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion to request reclassification to MOS 38B and remainin the Active Army Civil Affairs community. Other Soldiers seeking toreclassify into Civil Affairs must have five years of service and be in thegrade of E5 or E6. The Army is also developing a process that will enableArmy Reserve Soldiers to become members of the Active army 38B MOS.

Authority for approving the voluntary retirement of enlisted Soldiers hasbeen transferred to the commander of the Army Human Resources Com-mand, or HRC, effective Aug. 1, 2004. Soldiers affected by the transfer ofauthority include retirement-eligible NCOs in the grades of staff sergeant(promotable) and above from all branches of service. Retirement-servicesofficers at all installations will continue to process applications for volun-tary retirement, but they will submit the requests to HRC for approval.Soldiers in the grade of staff sergeant and below, or Soldiers who have beendenied continued service under their service’s retention-control-point pol-icy, will not be affected by the changes. Enlisted Soldiers who have at least20 years of active federal service are generally eligible for retirement, butthey are not entitled to retire upon request, while Soldiers with at least 30years of active federal service are.The transfer of retirement-approval authority is not intended to denyretirement to Soldiers but to ensure that the timing of authorized retire-ments is consistent with services’ manning priorities. The authority for theapproval of officer retirements has resided with HRC for several years.Under the officer retirement-approval system, the chief of each officerbranch identifies a replacement for each officer who requests retirementbefore the officer’s separation date is established. If a replacement cannotbe identified prior to the officer’s requested date of separation, the losingunit will be requested to accept a personnel shortage. In nearly all cases,officers are allowed to retire within 12 months of their date of applicationfor retirement. It is unlikely that the Special Forces Branch at HRC willdefer retirement requests from enlisted Soldiers if those requests arereceived at least six months before the Soldier’s requested date of separa-tion. For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel atDSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to deell@soc.mil.

CMF 38 approved, MOS 38Abecomes 38B

Retirement authority transferred to HRC

September 2004 59

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Thomas K. Asselta was awarded the Departmentof the Army’s MacArthur Award for outstanding leadership in March.Asselta is assigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special ForcesGroup, Fort Campbell, Ky.The MacArthur Award, named in honor of General Douglas MacArthur, wasstarted by the Army in 1987 as a way of promoting and sustaining effectivecompany- and junior-grade officer leadership in the active Army and in thereserve components. It is jointly sponsored by the United States Army andthe General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is given to officers andwarrant officers who exhibit extraordinary leadership abilities and embodythe ideals embraced by MacArthur — duty, honor and country.Army Regulation 600-89, General Douglas MacArthur Leadership AwardProgram, outlines the Department of the Army selection criteria for board-ing 13 active-Army winners out of a group of 24 nominees — 23 from Armymajor commands and one from Headquarters, Department of the Army.The board also chooses Army National Guard and Army Reserve winnersof the MacArthur Award. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Per-sonnel oversees the program and announces the winners each February.Asselta joins the ranks of three other SF warrant officers who haveachieved this honor. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Nicholas L. Punimata, an SFdetachment commander in the 1st SF Group, was the first warrant officerto earn this honor, in 2000. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Paul W. Herber, Com-pany B, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, took the honor in 2001, and in 2002,Chief Warrant Officer 2 Anthony J. Linza, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 5thSF Group, won the award.Following the presentation of the Macarthur Award, Asselta and his fam-ily participated in a number of events, including a wreath-laying ceremo-ny at Arlington National Cemetery’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a visitto Congress and briefings and discussions with senior Army officials.

SF warrant officer earns prestigious award

60 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Components of the Armed Police Corps of Xinjiang Province in the PeoplesRepublic of China are placing increased emphasis on counterterrorist train-ing and improved force structure for special-purpose elements. This includesa recent exercise focusing on rapid crisis response and on the integrated useof helicopters, paratroopers and ground combat vehicles, as well as on cre-ating a special-operations component and reorganizing the anti-hijackingcomponent of the corps. The police corps has also reportedly upgraded itscommunications infrastructure. While the Armed Police Corps concerns gen-erally include what are characterized as “criminal gangs” and other violentlawbreakers, the force has also been involved in rural and urban suppres-sion and counterinsurgency efforts against Uighur independence activitiesin “Eastern Turkestan,” a republic that was incorporated into China in thewake of the Chinese communist victory. Approximately 15,000 personnel ofthe Armed Police Corps are stationed in the southern portion of EasternTurkestan to ensure what officials of the regional Chinese Communist Partycall “the unity of the great motherland.”

The Russian Federation’s principal defense-arms sales agency — known bythe contraction Rosoboronexport — pursues highly active initiatives to pro-vide foreign clients with a range of modern, if often less than top-of-the-line,weaponry. Among the modern arms offered for sale are a variety of weaponsbilled as “special operations” small arms. These include the 4.5 mm SPP-1M,an underwater pistol designed to provide personal protection for combatswimmers; the 5.66 mm APS underwater assault rifle, which may be used forpersonal protection underwater or on shore, or mounted on underwater vehi-cles and used against mini-subs; a 9 mm silenced assault rifle and sniper rifle,and a variety of 9 mm submachine guns, body armor, night-vision and sur-veillance equipment. Rosoboronexport is heir to the highly corruptRosvoorouzhenie, whose irregular and illegal weapons transactions in the1990s were the focus of official Russian-government prosecution. The reputa-tion for irregularity has followed the successor organization Rosoboronexport.Critics charge that its ill-considered and wholly profit-driven sales of weapon-ry to rogue regimes and groups is undermining Russian security by armingterrorist sponsors whose goals and activities are contrary to Russia’s assertedsupport for the Global War on Terrorism.

Japan’s 2004 defense white paper has identified general development direc-tions for Japanese special-operations forces and has reaffirmed previousJapanese initiatives. The paper’s recommendations are based on Japan’scontinued assessment of serious external threats, notably from North Koreaand from terrorist groups, as well as the identified need for improved self-defense forces. In reviewing the force posture of North Korea, the whitepaper noted that Pyongyang is believed to maintain some 100,000 special-operations personnel intended for missions that range “from intelligencegathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare.” Particular attention will be

Chinese armed policeemphasize special

operations

Russian arms-exportagency threatens national

security

Japan looks at combatingexternal special-ops threats

September 2004 61

given by Japan to the threat of enemy special forces and guerrillas — totheir early detection and their subsequent destruction or capture. Maritimeand ground dimensions of the challenge are identified, as is the need for pro-tecting critical infrastructure. As in other countries around the world, theinteraction of military and police forces will receive more emphasis.

The Lithuanian Army’s special-operations unit — known by the acronym SOJ —is scheduled to undergo some restructuring and training that may result in adecrease in its size, but which reportedly will increase the capabilities of itsmain components. Changes will feature greater cross-training among compo-nents and some realignment in light of the army’s new NATO responsibilities.Missions will include “special reconnaissance of strategic installations, short-term direct combat actions and antiterrorist activity,” as well as supportinglaw-enforcement inside the country when required. Lithuanian special-opera-tions components have been operating in Afghanistan, where their perform-ance has been, by all accounts, highly regarded.

The famed Russian counterterrorist unit “Alfa” celebrated its 30th anniver-sary July 29. Formed in 1974 under KGB control, during the supposed high-water mark of Soviet military power, the unit became publicly visible to West-ern eyes following its role as a special-operations spearhead for the invasionof Afghanistan in 1979. Now under the Russian Federal Security Service, Alfais better known because of its involvement in post-Soviet internal counterter-rorist actions, hostage-rescue, and in the serial conflicts in Chechnya. Mostrecently, Alfa suffered a substantial number of casualties during its failedefforts to resolve the hostage crisis at Besian, Ossetia, in Russia. Hundreds ofhostages were killed and wounded in a firefight among Russian securityforces, Chechen hostage-takers, and armed family members and civilians atthe scene. Alfa and other security forces were severely criticized for their poorperformance and lack of coordination. Veterans of Alfa also have been promi-nent in private security and paramilitary activities. New or recast special-pur-pose units continue to join Alfa and other military, intelligence and police spe-cial-operations forces in Russia. In this regard, the commander of the Russianairborne troop recently announced the formation of special mountain-warfareunits trained to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.He noted that the units would be provided with new equipment, and whileChechnya was not specifically designated, it appears to be the targeted envi-ronment. There are currently more than 1,500 airborne troops in Chechnya,comprising three battalion and tactical groupings from the 76th AirborneDivision, as well as a special-forces detachment. It is unclear whether the newunits referred to will be formed from these units or from other existing air-borne units. New police antiterrorist units also continue to be formed. Onesuch “21st century” 16-man unit, operating near Moscow, is said to be experi-mental in nature, although the counterterrorist skills, approaches and mis-sions described, including the assault on tall urban structures from multipledirections, appear to be analogous to those of some other units now in service.They will provide high-quality local support for counterterrorism.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr, who served in a number of Army and Departmentof Defense intelligence positions and is now a Texas-based defense consultant working on regional-security issues.

Lithuania restructures special-operations unit

Russia beefs up special-warfare units

SWCS names best instructors for 2004

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School, or SWCS, named its2004 Instructors of the Year Aug. 11.

Major General James W. Parker,the commanding general of SWCS,recognized the winners and pre-sented awards to the top officer,NCO and civilian instructors.

The officer instructor for 2004 isChaplain (Major) Charles E.Reynolds, who served as the SWCSstaff chaplain during the nominationperiod and taught classes in cross-cul-tural communication, religious issuesin special operations, suicide preven-tion and ethics.

The NCO instructor of the year isSergeant First Class FernandoVerones Jr., who is assigned to theSWCS NCO Academy as a small-group leader.

The civilian instructor of the yearis Ernest K. Tabata. Tabata, whosemilitary and civilian service totalmore than 58 years, is a civilianinstructor with the 1st Special War-fare Training Group. He has trainedevery Special Forces engineersergeant who has served since 1985.

All three of the SWCS instruc-tors will participate in the ArmyTraining and Doctrine Commandinstructor-of-the-year competitionin November.

Wolff takes command of 96th CA Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel James J.Wolff assumed command of the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion from Lieu-tenant Colonel Michael J. Warmackduring a ceremony at Fort Bragg’sBull Simons Plaza June 17.

Wolff previously served duringOperation Iraqi Freedom as chief ofoperations for the Office of Recon-struction and Humanitarian Assist-ance Southern Region.

Book details ARSOF activitiesin OEF-Afghanistan

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command has published abook that details the activities ofmembers of the Army special-opera-tions community during OperationEnduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The book, Weapon of Choice:ARSOF in Afghanistan, wasproduced by the USASOC com-mand historian’s office. Thebook was written by militaryhistorians who all have special-operations experience. Accord-ing to Dr. C.H. Briscoe, theUSASOC command historian,the book is an attempt to sharethe stories of ARSOF soldierswith the American public.

The USASOC Historian’s Office isdistributing copies of the book to allARSOF units and welcomes readercomments and suggestions. For moreinformation, contact the USASOCcommand historian at DSN 239-3732 or commercial (910) 432-3732.

112th Signal Battalion holdschange of command

Lieutenant Colonel Randy S. Tay-lor assumed command of the 112thSpecial Operations Signal Battalionfrom Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Gal-lagher during a change of commandceremony at Fort Bragg June 24.

Taylor, a native of Gowanda,N.Y., enlisted in the Army in 1982.He was commissioned in Infantry

upon his graduation from the Uni-versity of Maryland in 1987.

Specializing in advanced com-munications capabilities, Soldiersof the 112th Signal Battalion pro-vide communications support toArmy special-operations forces aswell as to joint special-operationsforces around the globe.

Manuals to update doctrinefor SF skills

The Special Forces Doctrine Divi-sion, Directorate of Training andDoctrine, JFK Special Warfare Cen-ter and School, is working on newand updated doctrinal publicationsthat have applicability to SF skills.

The SF Doctrine Division’sAdvanced Skills Branch has com-pleted FM 3-05.210, Special ForcesAir Operations, and graphic trainingaid, GTA 31-02-001, Special ForcesAir Operations. Both are scheduledfor distribution to field units duringthe fall of 2004. For more informa-tion, telephone Master SergeantAntonio Masterjohn at DSN 239-3043 or commercial (910) 432-3043,or send e-mail to: masterj@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch hasalso completed the final draft of FM 3-05.212, SF Waterborne Operations.The FM has been updated withchanges that will enable users to con-duct waterborne missions more effi-ciently. The manual has been submit-ted to the Army Training SupportCenter for printing and is scheduledfor distribution to field units duringthe fall of 2004. For more information,telephone CWO 3 Jeff Kula at DSN239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: kulaj@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch has

62 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

also updated FM 3-05.211, SFMFF Operations. The updatedmanual contains comprehensiveinformation on military free-fallmissions so that users will notneed to consult any other publica-tions. FM 3-05.211 is also sched-uled for distribution to field unitsin the fall of 2004. For more infor-mation, telephone CWO 3 RandallC. Wurst at DSN 239-5952 or com-mercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: wurstr@soc.mil.

The Collective Training Branchhas completed ARTEP 31-805-MTP,Special Forces Group and Battalion,which is also scheduled for distribu-tion to field units during the fall of2004. For more information, tele-phone Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dou-glas Jenkins at DSN 239-8286 orcommercial (910) 432-8286, or sende-mail to: jenkindo@soc.mil.

USASOC chooses top NCO,Soldier for 2004

The United States Army SpecialOperations Command announcedthe winners of its 2004 competitionfor NCO and Soldier of the Year inAugust.

Sergeant John R. Parker and Spe-cialist Joseph R. Camire, both of the3rd Battalion, 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment, are the2004 winners.

Runners-up were Sergeant Bren-dan N. Gleespen, 6th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, 4th Psycholog-ical Operations Group; and Special-ist James K. Campbell, 3rd Battal-ion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Other competitors for NCO of theYear included Sergeant First ClassMichael J.A. Vaulx, NCO Academy,JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool; Sergeant Mark C. Reed, 1stSpecial Forces Group, Fort Lewis,Wash.; Staff Sergeant Matthew D.Leland, 3rd Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment; and Staff SergeantMichael H. Daigle, 528th SpecialOperations Support Battalion.

Soldier of the Year competitors

also included Specialist Michelle L.Maguire, Support Battalion, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School;and Specialist Brandon A. Lantz,415th Civil Affairs Battalion, Kala-mazoo, Mich. — Specialist Jennifer J.Eidson, USASOC PAO

528th Support Battalionwelcomes new commander

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick V.Pallatto Jr., assumed command ofthe 528th Special Operations Sup-port Battalion from LieutenantColonel Michael P. Saulnier duringa ceremony at Fort Bragg’s DickMeadows Field July 16.

Pallatto, a native of Pittsburgh,Pa., enlisted in the U.S. MarineCorps Reserve in 1983. He graduat-ed from Indiana University of Penn-sylvania in 1987 and was commis-sioned a second lieutenant in theInfantry through the Army ReserveOfficer Training Corps. His previousassignment was with 1st Corps Sup-port Command.

Specializing in resupply capabil-ities, Soldiers of the 528th providesupplies, maintenance, equipmentand expertise to Army and jointspecial-operation forces around theglobe. They were among the firstdeployed in support of OperationEnduring Freedom, and since thattime they have continuouslydeployed in support of the GlobalWar on Terrorism.

SF officers, NCOs mustmeet new DLPT minimum

The commander of the U.S. ArmyJohn F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, or SWCS, hasestablished a new minimum stand-ard for the Defense Language Profi-ciency Test, or DLPT, for all gradu-ates of the Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course, or SFQC.

The new standard of 1/1/1 (reading,listening and oral proficiency) reflectsa priority on foreign-language capa-bilities for the force. The change indi-cates a serious commitment to

increasing the base of proficiencybefore SFQC graduates arrive in theforce. The prior standard was 0+/0+.

Additionally, the Officer RecordBrief, or ORB, will be modified Army-wide to reflect officers’ reading, listen-ing and oral proficiency, DLPT scoresand their test date. All SF officers andNCOs, regardless of their assignment,will be required to test annually and tomaintain language proficiency.

SWCS and the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command’s languageoffice are working to identifymethodologies and resourcing forsupporting initial language trainingand unit language-enhancementprograms to maximize the benefitsto the force and to support the long-term language initiative.

For more information, telephoneLieutenant Colonel Mark Strong, inthe SWCS Special Operations Propo-nency Office, at DSN 239-3296, com-mercial (910) 432-3296, or send e-mail to strongm@soc.mil.

SF warrant officers get newcollar insignia

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command, or USASOC, host-ed a ceremony July 8 to mark achange of insignia for all SpecialForces warrant officers.

SF warrant officers now wear thesame uniform collar insignia as thatworn by SF commissioned officers.

USASOC commanding generalLieutenant General Philip R.Kensinger Jr., hosted the ceremo-ny, which featured the changing ofthe branch insignia from the war-rant-officer eagle, worn by all Armywarrant officers since May 1921, tothe crossed arrows worn by SF offi-cers since June 1987.

The ceremony coincided with the86th anniversary of the Army War-rant Officer Corps July 9.

September 2004 63

Seeds of Terror: An EyewitnessAccount of al-Qaeda’s NewestCenter of Operations in South-east Asia. By Maria Ressa. NewYork: The Free Press, 2003. ISBN 0-7432-5133-4. 274 pages. $26.

For more than 16 years, MariaRessa, the current CNN Jakartabureau chief, has lived and worked inSoutheast Asia, and she has called onthat experience to provide insight intothe development of today’s globalinsurgency networks in her new book,Seeds of Terror. For special-operationspersonnel charged with conductingcounterinsurgency, her book providesan excellent understanding of the ter-rorist organizations we face today.

While serving in Indonesia and thePhilippines, Ressa has made connec-tions and contacts throughout theregion that have given her access tosensitive information on the existingthreats. Ressa’s book is a detailedanalysis of the inner workings of al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asian opera-tional arm, Jemaah Islamiah, or JI.

The book opens with a detailed listof al-Qaeda and JI key leaders, fol-lowed by a timeline that chroniclesthe inception and growth of theexisting network. Ressa explainshow Osama bin Laden took advan-tage of opportunities to expand hisreach from the Middle East intoSoutheast Asia and to connect withthe already-growing JI cells createdby Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, who is knownas the “Asian Osama bin Laden.”

Ressa, privy to nongovernmentsources as well as to classifiedreports of the CIA, FBI and South-east Asian intelligence agencies,tracks the progress of SoutheastAsian Muslims who traveled to

Afghanistan in the late 1980s tohelp fight the Soviets and thenreturned home with a thirst forJihad. The book outlines in detailthe 2002 JI bombing of a Balinightclub that left 202 dead, fol-lowed by the 2003 bombing of theJ.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta thatleft 11 dead and 150 injured.

Ressa documents how every terror-ist attack since 1993, including 9/11,has had a connection to the Philip-pines. She recounts how during Oper-ation Enduring Freedom-Philippines,or OEF-P, in 2001, 660 United StatesSpecial Forces Soldiers deployed tothe southern Philippine islands ofZamboanga and Basilan to train,advise and assist the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, or AFP, in combatingterrorist insurgents. The book alsodocuments the impact that SF had onthe fight against the ASG and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front, orMILF, two of the leading terroristorganizations in the region. Ressa

explains why U.S. forces and the AFPwere unable to eliminate those terror-ist threats because of politics and poli-cies, and she implies that the terror-ists will be a force to be reckoned within the future.

In conclusion, Ressa explains thata security vacuum has been createdin Southeast Asia while the world’sattention is on the Middle East. Shedescribes the war on terror as aglobal insurgency that will be wononly after the world has a greaterunderstanding of the radicalIslamist threats being mobilizedtoday. The author contends that,armed with new intelligence, theU.S. has the capability of risingabove its own self-interest, of com-municating with the reasonable andrational Muslims of the world, andof eliminating the global insurgency.

An expert on the workings ofSoutheast Asian terrorist net-works, Ressa had her credibilityand status as an authority rein-forced when the Army invited herto speak at West Point’s 2004 con-ference on Asian security issues,titled “Terrorism in Asia: Threats,Options, Implications.” ColonelDavid Maxwell, chief of staff of theSpecial Operations Command –Korea, said, “She understands thenature of unconventional warfareand counterinsurgency and thefight in the ideological wars. Shealso understands the importance ofintelligence and link analysis.”

Seeds of Terror documents thegrowth of the Southeast Asian ter-rorist networks that today’s spe-cial-operations forces must under-stand and eliminate. This book is a“must read” for anyone interestedin the Global War on Terrorism,

64 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

Southeast Asian security affairs orthe development of the globalinsurgency networks that theworld faces today.

CPT J.C. LumbacaNaval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, Calif.

In the Presence of My Enemies.By Gracia Burnham with Dean Mer-rill.Wheaton, Ill.:Tyndale House Pub-lishers, Inc., 2003. ISBN 0-8423-8138-4 (hard cover). 307 pages. $22.99.

For a little more than a year, twoAmerican missionaries, Martin andGracia Burnham, were held captive byFilipino rebels on the Philippine islandof Basilan. In the Presence of My Ene-mies is the story of their captivity, toldfirsthand by Gracia Burnham.

The Burnhams, New Tribes Mis-sion evangelicals, became pawns inthe kidnap-for-ransom racket in thePhilippines. The couple was takencaptive by the Abu Sayyaf Group, orASG, and held hostage for 376 daysbefore being rescued by members ofthe Filipino Army. Martin was killedduring the rescue operation. GraciaBurnham provides the reader withcandid descriptions of life as ahostage under the control of Islamicwarriors, painting a picture of con-trasting cultural contexts and givinginsight into the Philippine kidnap-for-ransom industry.

Burnham focuses on their cap-tivity, which began May 21, 2001,when the ASG took 20 people,including the Burnhams, captivefrom the Dos Palmas resort.

With brutal honesty, Burnhamreflects on that captivity, bringingto light her own battles withdespair, hunger and physicalexhaustion. She articulates herspiritual odyssey, as she ques-tioned her faith in God. She creditsMartin for her survival.

Abdurak Janjalani, an Islamicscholar and a member of themujahideen during the Afghan-Sovi-et war, founded the ASG in 1991 as a

means of achieving an independentMuslim state. Upon his death, thegroup changed its philosophy andbegan to cash in on the kidnap-for-ransom culture of the country. TheASG maintains ties to militantIslamic groups like al-Qaeda.

In the book, Burnham provides agraphic account of ASG operations.While the group usually had suffi-cient equipment, it did occasionallylack funding.

Without being overly dramatic,Burnham talks about the ASG’streatment of hostages, includingthe beheading of Guillermo Soberoon June 11, 2001. She notes thathis death served as a warningagainst agitating their captors.

In talking about the jihad,Burnhamcontrasts the ASG’s views of Allahwith the Burnhams’ idea of God.According to Musab, the second-in-command, the mujahid code acknowl-edged that “the civilian is nothing; thenormal person is nothing.The mujahidmust go on.” For the members of theASG, death in a jihad was a greathonor, so the wounding or death of acomrade or innocent civilian could eas-ily be dismissed as destiny.

The Burnhams found that theASG altered its interpretation ofthe Koran to meet its needs. TheKoran makes it clear that slave

owners are to treat slaves withrespect and feed them well; howev-er, the rebels did not abide by thatrule and kept supplies for them-selves, maintaining that the ruleapplied only to Muslim slaves.

While Burnham acknowledges thatthe ASG was her true enemy, she doescriticize the AFP and the governmentof the Philippines, noting that theASG maintained that its source ofammunition was none other than theAFP. Although she stops short ofassigning blame for the death of herhusband to the military, she clearlyimplies collusion between the ASGand government officials.

The book describes the hope thatthe Burnhams felt when theyobserved U.S. reconnaissance planesflying over Basilan. While Burnhambelieves that the presence of U.S.military helped focus the rescueeffort, she hints that a greater par-ticipation by the U.S. military mighthave produced a different, less costlyending to the hostage-taking.

The book poses some interestingquestions: Should the U.S. and mis-sionary agencies maintain a no-ran-som policy? Is the U.S. governmentdoing enough to protect its citizensabroad? Is victory in the war on ter-rorism possible, especially given theambition of the enemy? While shedoesn’t try to answer these ques-tions, Burnham does draw the read-er into the hostages’ reality.

While at one level a Christianaudience will identify with thespiritual aspects of the book, In thePresence of My Enemies has abroader scope and will draw audi-ences who will appreciate thisaccount of survival under the mali-cious control of Islamist terrorists.

CW3 James A. SchroderU.S. Army (ret.)Fayetteville, N.C.

September 2004 65

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