specpro round 6 digests

8/3/2019 SpecPro Round 6 Digests

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6 A2010 PROF. BATTAD

SINCO v LONGA51 Phil 507

STREET; 1928INA

FACTS- Hacienda Rosario was owned by Escolastico

Sinco, who was married to Saturnina Lopez. Theyhad 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz, and Coloma.Coloma had 3 children of her own, Vicente, Pilar,and Desemparados. Coloma’s children are theplaintiffs in this case.- When Escolastico died, his estate was indebtedfor P14k. In order to pay for this, Saturnina andtheir children leased the hacienda for 7 years toLonga & his sister-in-law (Longa). The leaseagreement was such that the lessees wouldassume the indebtedness and the rentals wouldbe applied to the payment of the estate’s debts.

The lease was extended for 2 years.- Coloma predeceased Saturnina. When Saturninadied, she left a will acknowledging the

encumbrance of the hacienda. Sergio and MariaPaz tried to question the right of Coloma’schildren (plaintiffs) to inherit, but the oppositionwas abandoned (kasi medyo obvious diba).- After Saturnina’s death, Sergio was hard-pressed for money to sustain his huge family, sohe offered to sell his 1/3 undivided share in thehacienda to Longa. Longa wanted to buy thewhole property because he was trying to borrowmoney from the Tabacalera Company to pay thepurchase price of the hacienda and the companywasn’t secure in having a 1/3 undivided share assecurity for the loan. Maria Paz got on board.

They sold their undivided shares to Longa. Sowhat was left to sell was the share of Coloma’s

children, who at that time were all minors underthe guardianship of Emilio Tevez, which couldn’tbe sold without court approval.- Before the approval of the court to sell, uncleand auntie executed a document, guaranteeingto Longa that (1) they will not take back their 2/3,regardless of the decision of the court; and (2)they will not oppose the sale of the children’sshare, once approved by the court.- The court approved the sale. And so thechildren’s share was sold to Longa. The childrenbrought a case, questioning the regularity of thesale of their property.

ISSUE

WON the sale of the property of the minors wasattended with fraud (of Longa).

HELDNO.- In passing upon controversies of this characterexperience teaches the danger of acceptinglightly charges of fraud made many years after

the transaction in question was accomplished,when death may have sealed the lips of theprincipal actors and changes effected by timemay have given a totally different color to thecause of controversy. In the case before us theguardian, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is trueof Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendantAgueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now livingin Spain. It will be borne in mind also that, in sofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraudrests principally of the testimony of a singlewitness who, if fraud was committed, was aparticipant therein and who naturally would nowbe anxious so far as practicable, to put the blameon others. In this connection it is well to bear in

mind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:

xxx But length of time necessarily obscures allhuman evidence; and as it thus removes from theparties all the immediate means to verify thenature of the original transactions, it operates byway of presumption, in favor of innocence, andagainst imputation of fraud. It would beunreasonable, after a great length of time, torequire exact proof of all the minutecircumstances of any transaction, or to expect asatisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real orapparent, with which it may be incumbered. Themost that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if

the parties are living, from the frailty of memory,and human infirmity, is that the material factscan be given with certainty to a common intent;and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest inconfidence, and in parol agreements the mostthat we can hope is to arrive at probableconjectures, and to substitute generalpresumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud,or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputedto the living; for, the legal presumption is theother way; and as to the dead, who are not hereto answer for themselves, it would be the heightof injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes,and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless theevidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable

doubt. (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U. S.], 481,498.)- The attorneys for the appellees criticize theorder of the court of November 16, 1910,authorizing the sale of the share of the minors inthe hacienda as irregular and beyond the

jurisdiction of the court. We are unable to concurin this view. The petition presented by the

guardian stated a case, we think, for a sale of aportion of the guardianship estate forreinvestment, as contemplated in section 569 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it wasclearly set forth that the income of the children'sproperty was insufficient property to maintainand educate them and that it was for their benefitthat their share should be sold. It was also thereinstated that the property was encumbered.Admitting that these statements of the petitionwere untrue the jurisdiction of the court toauthorize the sale was not thereby affected,because the jurisdiction of the court rests on theaverments of the petition and not upon the truthof those averments. The suggestion that the

order was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court because publication was not made overthe whole period required by law losses its forcein view of the fact that the next of kin of theminors are stated in the order to have personallyappeared in court.* The court here said that the minors here werereally in a dangerous position since no oneintervened in the sale who was really looking outfor the minors’ interests. Uncle and Auntie wereprotecting theirs. Even the guardian was after thecash that would be realized from the sale to applyto his own uses, instead of reinvesting it.Especially considering that the minors were not indire need of the proceeds as was reflected in the

petition for the authorization to sell. They hadsufficient properties aside from the 1/3 share inthe hacienda to support them (as evidenced bythe fact that they got by without even using theproceeds kasi nga kinuha ni Tevez). Tsk tsk tsk.

MARGATE V RABACAL7 SCRA 894

PAREDES; April 30, 1963APPLE

FACTS-This is an application for the registration of aresidential land, with a house, containing an area

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of 465 square meters, situated in Iriga,Camarines Sur, by Jose Margate, who claims tohave purchased the property from Julia Rabacalfor P4,000.00.-Rabacal and her minor children opposed theapplication, on the ground that the property wasunder guardianship proceedings when sold; thatthe sale was not authorized by the court ;

that the purchase price of P4,000.00 was not fullypaid, as there was a remaining balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot andhouse was P10,000.00.-After due hearing, the registration courtconfirmed the title of the applicant, and orderedthat the same be registered in the name of Margate-Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appealswhich certified the case to SC stating that theissues involved are purely legal in character.**(facts as found by trial court)-the parcel of land and house, was owned by Dr.

Julio Berina, who died on October 15, 1945,survived by his widow, Julia Rabacal, and his

minor children, the oppositors herein.-Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minorchildren and letters of guardianship was issued inher favor. She filed a petition alleging that it wasnecessary to sell parcel 4 of the inventory, inorder to defray the expenses in the prosecutionof Civil Case No. 919 and for the support andeducation of the wards. This petition wasapproved by the court, authorizing the guardianto sell the residential lot and its improvements.-Rabacal offered to sell to Margate the residentiallot in question, for P5,000.00. After negotiations,the parties agreed on the selling price of P4,000.00. After the agreement, Rabacal begangetting money from Margate, such that when

Rabacal secured the authority to sell from thecourt, she had already obtained from Margate thesum of P500.00, and after having secured theorder of authority to sell, Rabacal showed toMargate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, adeed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal,acknowledged before a Notary Public, selling theland in question to Margate for P4,000.00, onwhich date Margate paid the balance of P3,500.00 to Rabacal.-Notwithstanding the fact that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the inventory, and executed a deed of sale on May 27, 1948, Rabacal, inthe guardianship proceedings, asserted that despite her efforts, she was unable to

find a buyer for said parcel of land, leadingthe court to cancel the granted authority tosell

ISSUEWON the sale of the land to Margate was valid

HELD

Yes.-Appellants argue that the deed of sale executedby Rabacal had no binding effect because theauthority to sell was cancelled and the sale wasnot approved by the guardianship Court.-the cancellation of the authority to sell did not,and could not, affect, the rights of the buyer,because at the time that the order cancelling theauthority to sell was entered, the guardian, JuliaRabacal, had already acted in accordance withauthority, and sold the land to Jose F. Margate.-The authority of the Court had already beenexhausted, after it was fulfilled by the guardian,and there was nothing to cancel.-Moreover, the cancellation of the order to sell

was entered by the Court due to the deception of the guardian. If the court had been informed of the sale, the court would certainly not haverevoked the authority.-Moreover, the revocation was entered withoutnotice to the purchaser Jose F. Margate-With respect to the lack of approval of the saleby the court, the law merely requires that theguardian should be authorized, and that theauthority to sell did not impose the condition thatthe deed of sale executed by the guardian shouldbe approved by the Court. The approval of thesale by the court, under the facts andcircumstances obtaining in this case, would thenbe merely pro-forma, since the appellants were

not able to show any reason why theguardianship would have refused to approve thesale which was already a fait accompli and withinthe authority given by said court.-Being the petitioners-vendors, appellants cannotvalidly attack the proceedings had in the sale, oncertain formal technicalities, considering the factthat they were the very persons who requested,obliged and prayed the court in the guardianshipproceedings to approve the said sale, and thatthey had derived the utmost advantage andbenefit out of the proceeds thereof.

LICHAUCO VS TAN PHO

ROMUALDEZ; November 21, 1923ATHE

NATUREAppeal from the judgments of the CFI of Manila

FACTS- Galo Lichauco, Geronimo Jose as guardian of the

spendthrift Zacarias Lichauco, and Amparo N. Jose as guardian of the minors Luis and JulitaLichauco entered into a contract of lease of landwith Tan Pho in his capacity “as general atorney-in-fact of Tan-U, widow of the late Chua Piengco,and administrator of all of the property of thelatter’s heirs.” The contract of lease provided forthe erection of a building of strong materials forthe period of twenty years, from the date of theexecution of the contract, for the price or rent of P1,560 monthly. Upon the termination of theperiod of the lease, all the improvements orbuildings constructed on the leased land shallbecome the property of the owners of the land,without the lessee being entitled to payment orcompensation of any kind, either by reason of said building or by the improvements on the land.- At the time the contract of case was executed,the owners of this and were: Galo Lichauco, of one-third pro indiviso; Zacarias Lichauco, at thattime incapacitated, of another one-third proindiviso; and Luis Lichauco then a minor and JulitaLichauco also at that time and still a minorcoowners of the remaining one-third part proindiviso.- Faustino Lichauco, the new guardian ad litemboth of the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco, and of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco, filed a caseagainst the lessee Tan Pho, his principal Tan U(alias Tan O), the children of the latter andagainst Galo Lichauco one of the lessors. In saidcase, the Court of First Instance of Manilarendered judgment finding, among other things,that said contract of lease is valid. From this

judgment plaintiff appealed. Faustino assailed thecontract as void raising the following issues:

ISSUES1. WON the contract of lease is valid

a. WON the guardians of the incapacitatedperson and of the minors could not execute it

b. WON the contract was not, and could nothave been authorized by the court;

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c. WON Tan Pho had no power to enter intoit.2. WON the registration of the said lease in theregistry is final and conclusive.

HELD1. NO. That the contract of lease is void asregards the plaintiffs, and the effects of this

declaration of partial nullity retroacts toSeptember 17, 1920, the date on which thecomplaint for nullity was presented.

a. YES. Article 1548 of the Civil Code providesthat “No lease for a term of more than six yearsshall be made by the husband with respectto the property of his wife, by the father withrespect to that of his children, by the guardianwith respect to that of his ward, or by a managerin default of special power with respect to theproperty entrusted to him for management.”Reasoning:- The lease was for a period greater than sixyears and the respective guardians of the

incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco and the minorsLuis and Julita Lichauco lacked the special powerrequired by this legal provision.

b. Although the lease in question could beapproved by the court, nevertheless, suchapproval was neither obtained in due time, norsubsequently.Reasoning- There was an allegation that Amparo Nableverbally requested the presiding Judge Crossfieldto execute said lease. Judge Crossfield alsoexecuted an affidavit stating that he approved of the lease, in the presence and with the completeapproval of all the parties interested and he

ordered that clerk to prepare orders for entry inthe record. However, F. Canillas, the deputy clerkdenied that Crossfield ordered him to prepareorders for entry in the record nor did the judgegive him any orders or instructions with referenceto the approval of the lease. Thus, the allegedapproval signed by Judge Crossfield was notattached to the court records of the case, nor didever form part thereof. Consequently, theapprobatory nunc pro tunc1 order impliedly

1 The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to recordsome act of the court done at a former time which wasnot then carried into the record, and the power of acourt to make such entries is restricted to placing upon

entered in the judgment appealed from, is invalidon account of having been entered without asufficient legal basis therefor.

c. NO. If Tan Pho was the administrator of theestate of Chua Piengco, then he had the power tomanage to manage the property of said estate.

The employment of funds of the latter for the

construction of a building on leased land, for thepurpose of obtaining rents from such building isan investment of capital which may beconsidered as included in the powers of anadministrator of a decedent's estate. We cannotforce ourselves to believe that, in view of thefacts of the case, Tan Pho took part in this leaseas direct attorney-in-fact of the heirs of thedeceased Chua Piengco. If at the time, the estatehad not been partitioned, as it appears in thecase, such heirs had as yet no hereditaryproperty to dispose of, nor to answer for theiracts, seeing that the estate was legally in thehands of the administrator.

2. NO.

the record evidence of judicial action which has beenactually taken. It may be used to make the record speakthe truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speakbut ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendereda judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if ithas rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it hasno power to remedy these errors or omissions byordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment.Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc tunc has nopower to construe what the judgment means, but only toenter of record such judgment as had been formerlyrendered, but which had not been entered of record as

rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actualrendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgmentwill not furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L.,pp. 622-623.)

The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then,"or that a thing is done now that shall have the samelegal force and effect as if one at the time it ought tohave been done. A court may order an act done nunc

pro tunc when it, or some one of its immediateministerial officers, has done some act which for somereason has not been entered of record or otherwisenoted at the time the order or judgment was made orshould have been made to appear on the papers orproceedings by the ministerial officer. (Secou vs. Leroux,1 N. M., 383, 389.)

DISPOSITION: the judgment appealed from isreversed and it is hereby declared and ordered:1. That the contract of lease here in questionexecuted by Galo Lichauco and the respectiveguardians of Zacarias Lichauco and the minorsLuis and Julita Lichauco on the one side, and by

Tan Pho on the other, is void as regards theplaintiffs, and the effects of this declaration of

partial nullity retroacts to September 17, 1920,the date on which the complaint for nullity waspresented.2. Without prejudice to any contract or contractswhich the interested parties herein may desire toexecute in accordance with the law and inharmony with this opinion, the plaintiffs, from thetime Tan Pho is notified of this decision, shall beentitled to appropriate two-thirds part proindiviso of the buildings and improvementsconstructed by the party represented by said TanPho on the property in question, upon payment of the proper indemnity, according to the provisionsof articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code inforce or said plaintiffs shall have the right to

compel the party represented by the defendant Tan Pho to pay to the plaintiffs the value of two-thirds pro indiviso of the land.3. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to demand andto receive from the party represented by thedefendant Tan Pho a rental for the occupation of two-thirds part pro indiviso of the land, fromSeptember 17, 1920, until said two-thirds part

pro indiviso of the buildings and improvementsconstructed by said Tan Pho becomes theproperty of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, or until thetwo-thirds part pro indiviso of the land belongingto the plaintiffs becomes the property of theparty represented by said Tan Pho in the mannerspecified in the preceding paragraph. The amount

of this rental mentioned in this paragraph shall befixed by the interested parties, reserving themthe right to resort to the courts for itsdetermination, in case they cannot reach anagreement; provide that the rents, which byvirtue of the lease in question the plaintiffs mayhave received or may receive from Tan Pho fromSeptember 17, 1920, shall be applied upon saidrent to be agreed upon by the interested partiesor judicially fixed.4. The registrar of deeds of Manila is herebyordered to amend the certificate of title to theland in question issued under decree No. 17729in registration proceeding No. 9667, as also thecorresponding books of registry, as well as the

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copies of said certificate of title, to the effect thatsaid lease therein registered, as far as theplaintiffs are concerned, has been extinguishedand rendered void and of no effect by virtue of this decision.

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF

INCHAUSTI, V MANUEL SOLERG.R. No. L-15119STREET, J.; January 19, 1920

TERRY

FACTS- On January 18, 1915, CFI Manila ordered theappointment of Maria Consuelo Rico, mother of Inchausti, as guardian of the person andproperty of her son Jose R. de Inchausti, as hehad become demented and incapable of properlycaring for himself and estate, after which he wassent to Barcelona, Spain, where he has continuedto reside.- On August 30, 1915, Manuel Soler, Inchausti’sfriend, petitioned the court to rehabilitate himand end the guardianship.- This was opposed by the guardian, on thegrounds (1) that the ward had not been givensufficient notice of the hearing and (2) that it hadnot been satisfactorily shown that he is nowcapable of taking care of himself and property.- Upon hearing the petition the trial judgeoverruled both of these objections and adjudgedthe ward, Jose R. de Inchausti, to be of soundmind, notwithstanding an ordering to theguardian for an accounting of the estate of

InchaustiISSUES1 WON the proper procedure of due notice toward was followed2 WON there was a sufficient showing thatInchausti was already capable of taking care of himself

HELD YES- The clerk, by order of the court, sent acablegram to the United States Consult atBarcelona, requesting him to notify Jose R. deInchausti that the petition for his restoration to

capacity would be heard in the Court of FirstInstance of Manila on October 19, 1918. [a] Inreply to this, a cablegram was received fromBarcelona on October 14, 1918, signed by theConsul General of the United States in that city,advising that Inchausti had been duly notifiedaccording to instructions. [b] The trial judge held

that notice to the ward had been given asrequired by law, and he proceeded, on theappointed day, to dispose of the petition upon itsmerits in accordance with the proof thensubmitted.- The notification of the ward required in section562 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not intendedas a personal service of process in the sensenecessary to give the court jurisdiction over theward. It is, therefore, of no moment that theperson to be notified was living in a foreigncountry and thus beyond the territorial

jurisdiction of the Manila court. Nor is the manner

in which the court procured service of the noticeof any importance. It is sufficient that the noticewas given.- Rationale of notification upon petition by

friend: Notification to the ward � where thepetition to rehabilitate him is presented by afriend � is required merely as an assurance thatthe individual chiefly concerned shall havecognizance of what is being done. It at least giveshim an opportunity to advise the court in caseaction taken by the mover of the petition wasofficious or unauthorized. That the messageswere sent and received by cable, as above

stated, affords sufficient evidence, in the absenceof anything to the contrary, that notification wasduly effected, as reported in the return of theConsul General.2 YES- The violent access of dementia whichmanifested itself prior to the original appointmentof the guardian passed off after Inchausti wastaken away from Manila in 1915 and the sameextreme manifestations of derangement have notreappeared. Furthermore, the evidence showsthat at the time the petition for his rehabilitationwas heard, the ward was in normal mental state

and had been in this condition for a periodsufficiently long to justify the belief that he ispermanently restored- The opposition to the termination of theguardianship seems to be based chiefly on thefear, entertained by his mother, that Inchausti, if placed in control of the large property to which

he is heir, will prove to be a spendthrift. Eventhough this fear should be well-founded, it affordsno reason for maintaining a guardianship whichhad its origin in his mental incapacity. Anyway,proper proceedings can be instituted to protecthim from wasteful proclivities in the event thederangement reoccurs. But present mentalcapacity being proved, he is entitled to bedischarged from tutelage.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTIONOF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLALUIS & EDIPOLA SANTOS V

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESGR L-22523

ANGELES; September 29, 1967MAIA

NATUREAppeal from decision of Juvenile and DomesticRelations Court dismissing the petition foradoption of Edwin Villa

FACTS- Santos spouses filed the petition on January 8,1963, to adopt minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4years old, and brother of petitioner-wife Edipola.- the spouses are both 32 years old, Filipinos,residing in Manila. They were married in 1957and have maintained a conjugal home of theirown. They do not have a child of their own blood.Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated,illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, ornatural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moralturpitude.- Edwin is a child of Francisco Villa and FlorenciaMendoza (Edwin is the younger brother of Edipola). Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, withvarious business interests. His income is

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approximately P600/month. His wife Edipola, is anurse, with an average monthly earning of P300- Edwin was born on May 22, 1958 and was asickly child since birth. Due to the child'simpairing health his parents entrusted him to thepetitioners who reared and brought him up forthe years thereafter, and as a result, theredeveloped between the petitioners and the child,

a deep and profound love for each other. Thenatural parents of the minor testified that theyhave voluntarily given their consent to theadoption of their son by the petitioners, andsubmitted their written consent and conformity tothe adoption, and that they fully understand thelegal consequences of the adoption of their childby the petitioners.- trial court dismissed the petition, saying that“the adoption will result in an incongruoussituation where the minor Edwin Villa, alegitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will alsobe her son. In the opinion of the court, thatincongruity not neutralized by othercircumstances absent herein, should prevent the

adoption.”

ISSUEWON an elder sister may adopt a younger brother

HELD YESRatio There is no provision in the law thatrelatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibitedfrom adopting one another.Reasoning The only objection raised is thealleged “incongruity” that will result in therelation of the adopter and the adopted, in thecircumstance that the adopted who is the brotherof the adopter, will also be her son by adoption.

The theory is, therefore, that adoption among

people who are related by nature should not beallowed, in order that dual relationship should notresult- It cannot be stated as a general proposition thatthe adoption of a blood relative is contrary to thepolicy of the law, for in many states of the US, norestriction of that sort is contained in the statutesauthorizing adoption, although laws of other

jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption maynot take place within persons within a certaindegree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629).Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationshipbetween the parties is not a legal impediment tothe adoption of one by the other, and there may

be a valid adoption where the relation of parentand child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d869). Principles vary according to the particularadoption statute of a state under which any givencase is considered. It would seem that in thosestates originally influenced by the civil lawcountries where adoption originated, the rulesare liberally construed, while in other states

where common law principles predominate,adoption laws are more strictly applied becausethey are regarded to be in derogation of thecommon law.- Art.335, CC enumerates those persons who maynot adopt, and it has been shown that adoptersherein are not among those prohibited fromadopting. Art.339 names those who cannot beadopted, and the adoptee here is not one of those excluded by the law. Art. 338, on the otherhand, allows the adoption of a natural child bythe natural father or mother, of other illegitimatechildren by their father or mother, and of astepchild by the stepfather or stepmother. Thislast article is, of course, necessary to remove all

doubts that adoption is not prohibited even inthese cases where there already exist arelationship of parent and child between them bynature. To say that adoption should not beallowed when the adopter and the adopted arerelated to each other, except in these casesenumerated in Article 338, is to precludeadoption among relatives no matter how farremoved or in whatever degree that relationshipmight be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child tobe adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humaneand salutary, and designed to provide homes,care and education for unfortunate children,

should be construed so as to encourage theadoption of such children by person who canproperly rear and educate them- wrt objection that the adoption here will resultin a dual relationship between the parties, thatthe adopted brother will also be the son of theadopting elder sister, that fact alone should notprevent the adoption. One is by nature, while theother is by fiction of law. The relationshipestablished by the adoption is limited to theadopting parents and does not extend to theirother relatives, except as expressly provided bylaw. Thus, the adopted child cannot beconsidered as a relative of the ascendants andcollaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the

legitimate children which they may have after theadoption except that the law imposes certainimpediments to marriage by reason of adoption.Neither are the children of the adoptedconsidered as descendants of the adopter. Soeven considered in relation to the rules onsuccession which are in pari materia, theadoption under consideration would not be

objectionable on the ground alone of the resultingrelationship between the adopter and theadopted. Similar dual relationships also resultunder our law on marriage when persons who arealready related, by blood or by affinity, marryeach other. But as long as the relationship is notwithin the degrees prohibited by law, suchmarriages are allowed notwithstanding theresulting dual relationship. And as there is noprovision in the law that expressly prohibitsadoption among relatives, they ought not to beprevented.Disposition Decision reversed.Adoption granted

REPUBLIC VS HONORABLERODOLFO TOLEDANO & SPOUSES

CLAVE233 SCRA 9

Puno ; June 8, 1994MEL

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of RTC Zambales (Iba) in Special Proceedingentitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of theMinor named Solomon Joseph Alcala”

FACTS

- In a verified petition filed before the RTC of Iba,Zambales, private respondents spouses Clousesought to adopt the minor, Solomon JosephAlcala, the younger brother of private respondentEvelyn A. Clouse. The petition was set forhearing.- The principal evidence disclose that privaterespondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural borncitizen of the United States of America. Hemarried Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 atOlongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelynbecame a naturalized citizen of the United Statesof America in Guam. They are physically,

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mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.- Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcalawas and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent tothe adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty

and inability to support and educate her son.- Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social workerassigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,favorably recommended the granting of thepetition for adoption.- Finding that private respondents have all thequalifications and none of the disqualificationsprovided by law and that the adoption willredound to the best interest and welfare of theminor, respondent judge rendered a decisiongranting the petition for adoption- Petitioner, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral appealed

ISSUE

WON petitioner’s argument is correct (won Alvinand Evelyn are qualified to adopt under Phil law)

HELD YESRatioArticle 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No.209 expressly enumerates the persons who arenot qualified to adopt, viz .:(3) An alien, except:(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt arelative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks toadopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipinospouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipinocitizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her

spouse a relative by consanguinity of thelatter.Aliens not included in the foregoingexceptions may adopt Filipino children inaccordance with the rules on inter-countryadoption as may be provided by law.- There can be no question that privaterespondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified toadopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of theexceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. Inthe first place, he is not a former Filipino citizenbut a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon JosephAlcala is neither his relative by consanguinity northe legitimate child of his spouse. In the thirdplace, when private respondents spouses Clouse

jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon JosephAlcala on February 21, 1990, private respondentEvelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen.She lost her Filipino citizenship when she wasnaturalized as a citizen of the United States in1988.- Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on theother hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to

paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. Shewas a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopther younger brother. Unfortunately, the petitionfor adoption cannot be granted in her favor alonewithout violating Article 185 which mandates a

joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,except in the following cases:(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his ownillegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt thelegitimate child of the other.- Article 185 requires a joint adoption by thehusband and wife, a condition that must be readalong together with Article 184. 3

- This was so crafted to protect Filipino childrenwho are put up for adoption. The Family Codereiterated the rule by requiring that husband andwife "must" jointly adopt, except in the casesmentioned before. Under the said new law, jointadoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Thisis in consonance with the concept of jointparental authority over the child, which is theideal situation. As the child to be adopted iselevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is butnatural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.

The rule also insures harmony between thespouses.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted

REPUBLIC VS MILLERG.R. No. 125932

PARDO; April 21, 1999EVA

NATURECA certified the case to the SC because thepetition raised only questions of law. SC treatedthe appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the RTC.

FACTS- July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and

Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the RTC Angeles City a

verified petition to adopt the minor MichaelMagno Madayag.- At the hearing spouses Miller adduced evidenceshowing that:1. Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S.Miller, 40 years of age, both American citizens,are husband and wife, having been married on

June 21, 1982.

2. They were childless and "do not expect to havesibling out of their union on account of a medicalproblem of the wife."3. Claude A. Miller was a member of the US AirForce assigned at Clark Air Base. The familymaintains their residence at Angeles City, since1985.4. The minor Michael has been in the custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987.Poverty and deep concern for the future of theirson prompted the natural parents who have novisible means of livelihood to have their childadopted by respondents. They executedaffidavits giving their irrevocable consent to theadoption by respondents.

5. DSWD recommended approval of the petition.- RTC rendered decision granting the petition foradoption petitioners.- Solicitor General interposed an appeal

ISSUEWON aliens may adopt a Filipino child despite theprohibition under the Family Code, effective onAugust 3, 1988 when the petition for adoptionwas filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowedaliens to adopt.

HELD YES. The SC has ruled that an alien qualified to

adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,which was in force at the time of the filing of thepetition, acquired a vested right which could notbe affected by the subsequent enactment of anew law disqualifying him.Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code,effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the rightof respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipinochild because the right has become vested at thetime of filing of the petition for adoption and shallbe governed by the law then in force.- As long as the petition for adoption wassufficient in form and substance in accordancewith the law in governance at the time it wasfiled, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it

6




until it fully disposes of the case. The jurisdictionof the court is determined by the statute in forceat the time of the commencement of the action.Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal orcivil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted bya subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented

jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition foradoption before the effective of the Family Code,although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184of said Code, may continue with his petitionunder the law prevailing before the Family Code.- Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonableintendment should be sustained to promote andfulfill these noble and compassionate objective of the law.DISPOSITIVE Affirmed.

SANTOS VS. ARANZANSO16 SCRA 345

BENGZON; February 28, 1966 JP

FACTS- Eight years after the order of adoption of thenminors Paulina and Aurora Santos, one of theiradoptive parents, Juliana Reyes, died leavingsubstantial properties.- In the settlement of her estate, her cousins,respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and DemetriaMendoza intervened alleging the invalidity of themarriage of Juliana Reyes to Simplicio Santos,and the adoption decree of the two minors.

ISSUES1 WON adoption is valid adoption2 WON adoption can be attacked collaterally

HELD1 YES.- After holding that it matters not whether themarriage was valid or invalid, the deceased canstill adopt, the Court addressed the allegations of the respondents upholding the adoption decree.- Parental Consent. “Consent of parents not anabsolute requisite if child was abandoned.Consent by the parents to the adoption is not anabsolute requisite. If the natural parents have

abandoned their children, consent by theguardian ad litem suffices.” (Simplicio wasguardian ad litem)- Meaning of abandonment. In adoptionproceedings imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evidences a settled purpose toforgo all parental duties and relinquish allparental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or

refusal to perform the natural and legalobligations of care and support which parentsowe to their children.”- The Court further said that adoptionproceedings being proceedings in rem,constructive notice, such as the publication dulymade in a newspaper of general circulation, isenough where the residence of the parents isunknown. Notice is not required in adoption casesin regard to the abandoning parent.

2 NO, adoption cannot be attacked collaterally.- On the MR, the Court said that the adoptioncannot be attacked collaterally, and that theaction appealed with the CA was not the adoption

decree but the settlement, the adoption cannotbe attacked collaterally there being no evidenceto be re-examined in the present action. Thecourt also declared that leaving children in thecustody of others constitutes abandonmentespecially when permanently and indefinitely.

DSWD v. BELEN275 SCRA 645 (1997)

DIANNA

FACTS- Administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M.Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of the DSWS Field

Office in La Union.- Respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen is chargedwith rendering an erroneous decree of adoptionin violation of Article 33 of Presidential DecreeNo. 603 and the corresponding SC Circular No.12.- Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social WelfareOfficer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional

Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is chargedwith disregarding the provisions of the sameCircular No. 12.

1. Spouses Desiderio Soriano and AuroraBernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American

citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.2. Judge Belen granted the petition after findingthat petitioner spouses were highly qualified toadopt the child as their own.3. Belen based his decree primarily on the“findings and recommendation of the DSWD thatthe adopting parents on the one hand and the

adoptee on the other hand have alreadydeveloped love and emotional attachment andparenting rules have been demonstrated to theminor.”4. On these considerations, respondent judgedecided and proceeded to dispense with trialcustody. Judge says the DSWD findings andrecommendations are contained in the “AdoptiveHome Study Report” and “Child Study Report”prepared by the local office of the DSWD throughrespondent Vedaña.5. However, when the minor Zhedell BernardoIbea sought to obtain the requisite travelclearance from the DSWD in order to join heradoptive parents in the United States, it turned

out that the DSWD did not have any record in itsfiles regarding the adoption and that there wasnever any order from respondent judge for theDSWD to conduct a “Home and Child StudyReport” in the case.6. FURTHER, there was no directive fromrespondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD onthe matter of the required reports for said minor’sadoption.7. ARTICLE 33, PD 603 states: Petitions foradoption shall be granted only after the DSWDhas conducted and submitted a case study of theadoptee, the natural parents and the adoptiveparents.

Circular No. 12 directs Regional Trial Courtshearing adoption cases: (1) to NOTIFY theMinistry of Social Services and Development, thruits local agency, of the filing of adoption cases orthe pendency thereof with respect to those casesalready filed; (2) to strictly COMPLY with therequirement in Article 33 of the aforesaiddecree… The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinatewith the Ministry of Social Services andDevelopment representatives in the preparationand submittal of such case study.8. It was also alleged by the DSWD thatrespondent Elma P. Vedaña had asked for anundisclosed amount of money from the adopting

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parents in order to expedite the adoption casewith the DSWD.9. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith,claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña toconduct the home and case study, and thereaftersubmit the required reports thereon. Belencontends that, except only for direct coordinationwith the DSWD in the preparation of said reports,

no approval from the DSWD is necessary for thehome and case study reports and it need not befurnished therewith.10. The OCA recommended that respondent

judge be administratively punished for violatingCircular No. 12 and Article 33 of PD 603.11. Vedaña meanwhile, pointed out that therenever was any directive from respondent judgefor her to coordinate with the DSWD concerningthe adoption in question. She was only ordered toconduct the case study and submit her reportthereon to the court at least one week before theinitial hearing of the case, as was also thepractice in the other RTCs.

ISSUEWON approval from the DSWD is necessary forthe home and case study reports (and whether a

judge may decide based on such report). HELDNO.- Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree inderogation of the provisions of Article 33 andCircular No. 12 and Vedaña should havecoordinated with the DSWD in connection withthe preparation of the home and case studyreports.Ratio1. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course

that respondent judge should have taken was tonotify the DSWD at the outset about thecommencement of the Special Proceeding so thatthe corresponding case study could have beenaccordingly conducted by said department.2. DSWD has the necessary competence, morethan that possessed by the court social welfareofficer, to make the proper recommendation.3. Belen should never have merely presumed thatit was routinary for the social welfare officer tocoordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoptionproceedings. It was his duty to exercise cautionand to see to it that such coordination wasobserved in the adoption proceedings, togetherwith all the other requirements of the law.

4. Belen may well have wittingly or unwittinglyplaced in jeopardy the welfare and future of thechild whose adoption was under consideration.Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legaldevice by which a better future may be accordedan unfortunate child.5. As for Vedaña, she has compromised theprescribed process in the administration of justice

in proceedings such as the one underconsideration.6. Belen acted in good faith however inpresumably believing that it was standardprocedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of aRegional Trial Court to do so in coordination withthe DSWD. Also, there is no evidence whatsoeverthat respondent Vedaña sought to obtain anyamount from the adopting parents.

DUNCAN V CFI OF RIZAL69 SCRA 298

February 10, 1976; ESGUERRA, J.LORA

FACTS- Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan andMaria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, theformer a British national residing in thePhilippines for the last 17 years and the latter anAmerican Citizen born in and a resident of thePhilippines.- A child, only 3 days old was given to petitionersfor them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de LeonVelasquez. The child was later on baptized asColin Berry Christensen Duncan with theaforementioned spouses appearing in the recordsof said baptism as the parents of said child- Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez received the

infant from the child's unwed mother who told theformer never to reveal her (the mother's) identitybecause she wanted to get married and did notwant to destroy her future. The mother instructedAtty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for asuitable couple who will adopt the child. Themother did not provide for the maintenance andsupport of her child- In the petition for adoption filed by petitionersAtty. Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or locoparentis of the child subject of the adoptionpetition, gave the written consent required by law- Learning from the testimony of witness Atty.Velasquez that the natural mother of the childsought to be adopted was still alive, the court

then pressed upon the witness to reveal theidentity of said mother. The witness refused todivulge the same on the ground that thereexisted an attorney and client relationshipbetween them. She had been instructed by herclient not to reveal the latter's identity. She couldnot now violate such privileged communication.- The petition for adoption was dismissed. The

principal reason given for the dismissal of thepetition was that ". . . the consent given in thispetition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law."- CFI: The contention that for her (Atty. Corazonde Leon Velasquez, the witness for the petitionerswho gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in her capacity as loco parentis to saidchild) to reveal the identity of the mother wouldbe violative of the client-attorney relationshipexisting between her and the mother cannot holdwater, because in the first place, there was nosuch relationship existing between them in so faras this case is concerned and secondly, it is notonly a question of revealing the identity of the

mother but rather, of giving consent to theadoption by that alleged unwed mother.

ISSUEWON the person who gave the consent foradoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon deLeon Velasquez, is the proper person required bylaw to give such consent.

HELD YES.- Art. 340 of the Civil Code. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary:(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.- Rule 99, Sec. 3.Consent to adoption. There shallbe filed with the petition a written consent to theadoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by thechild's spouse, if any, and by each of its knownliving parents who is not an insane or hopelesslyintemperate or has not abandoned such child, orif there are no such parents by the generalguardian, or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,children's home, or benevolent society or person,by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,home or society, or by such person; but if the

8




child is illegitimate and has not been recognized,the consent of its father to the adoption shall notbe required.- Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may beconsidered here as legally capable of giving therequired written consent. They are:1. Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent,

guardian or person in charge of the person to beadopted2. Rule 99.3 of the Rules of Court: each of theknown living parents who has not abandonedsuch child.- The father's consent here is out of the questionas the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.- The natural and unwedded mother, from thatdate on to the time of the adoption proceedingsin court which started in mid-year of said 1967,and up to the present, has not bothered toinquire into the condition of the child, much lessto contribute to the livelihood, maintenance andcare of the same.- In short, this parent is the antithesis of that

described in the law as "known living parent whois not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has notabandoned such child."- Said mother had completely and absolutelyabandoned her child. Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces asettled purpose to forego all parental claims tothe child . Applying this legal yardstick, theunidentified mother of the child in this case canbe declared, as she is hereby declared, as havingabandoned her child with all legal consequencesattached thereto.- Having declared that the child was anabandoned one by an unknown parent, thereappears to be no more legal need to require the

written consent to such parent of the child to theadoption.- Santos vs. Aranzanso: the parental consentrequired by the law in adoption proceedingsrefers to parents who have not abandoned theirchild.- Since there had been no showing that theidentity of the natural mother was made knownto the trial court or to the herein petitioners, norhad said mother seen fit to present herself beforethe court despite the public notice given to theproceedings as required by law, there clearlyappears only one person who could be consideredas the guardian exercising patria potestas oversuch abandoned child. Since there was no

guardian ad litem appointed by the court and thechild not being in the custody of an orphanasylum, children's home or any benevolentsociety, there could not have been anyone otherthan Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could,with reason, be called the guardian of said infant.- It was she who had actual physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and

motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infantwhich otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate,like being thrown into some garbage heap as hadoften happened to some unwanted illegitimatebabies.- Court stated that the least that it could do is torecognize and acknowledge her good Samaritandeed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to herthe recognition that she was a de facto guardianexercising patria potestas over the abandonedchild.- The trial court in its decision had sought refugein the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sedlex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh

decision it rendered. While this old adagegenerally finds apt application in many otherlegal cases, in adoption of children, however, thisshould be softened so as to apply the law withless severity and with compassion and humaneunderstanding, for adoption is more for thebenefit of unfortunate children, particularly thoseborn out of wedlock, than for those born with asilver spoon in their mouths.- The herein petitioners appear to be qualified toadopt the child. There is no showing that theysuffer from any of the disqualifications under thelaw. Above all, they have the means to providethe child with the proper support, care, educationand love that a growing child needs, even if they

have previously adopted another child as theirs.- The fact that even before they have applied forlegal custody and adoption of the infant theyhave already showered it with love and care andhad it baptized, with them appearing in therecords of the baptism as the parents of the child,speaks well of the genuine desire of petitioners tohave the child as their very own. The child wasborn in May, 1967, and he will be at this time,1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, fromthe time he was turned over to the hereinpetitioners when he was only about a week old,(there is no showing that the said child was everplaced at any time in the care and custody of some other persons) he had been cared for and

loved by the spouses Robin Francis RadleyDuncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He musthave known no other parents than these persons.- To sustain the decision of the court below,Court will be doing a graver injustice to allconcerned particularly to said spouses, andworse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on thisinnocent child and on all other children who

might be similarly situated.- Court considered it to be justifiable and morehumane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the petitioningspouses and the minor child baptized by them asColin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustainthe hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of the lawthat was done by the respondent court and Judge.Disposition Decision annulled and the minorColin Berry Christensen Duncan declared theadopted child and the heir of petitioners RobinFrancis Radley Duncan and Maria LucyChristensen.

CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS [&

SPS. CLAVANO]296 SCRA 128; ROMERO; Sept 25, 1998

MARGE

FACTS:-Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavanobegot 3 children: Keith, Charmaine and JosephAnthony. During the early years of their marriage,the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed.Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learnedof her husband’s alleged extramarital affair withWilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.-Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicitliaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal

separation with alimony pendente lite with thethen JDRC of Cebu which rendered a decisionapproving the joint manifestation of the Cangspouses providing that they agreed to “liveseparately and apart or from bed and board.”

They further agreed that their children shall beentitled to a monthly support of P1,000,constituting constitute a first lien on the netproceeds of the house and lot jointly owned bythe parties.-Herbert Cang then for Nevada, USA where hesought a divorce from Anna Marie. The divorcedecree was granted. Sole custody of the threeminor children was granted to Anna Marie,

9




reserving rights of visitation at all reasonabletimes and places to Herbert.-Thereafter, Herbert took an American wife andthus became a naturalized American citizen. In1986, he divorced his American wife and neverremarried. While in US, a portion of his incomewas remitted to the Phils for his children’sexpenses and/or deposited in the bank in the

name of his children.-Sept 25, 1987: Sps. Ronald and Maria ClaraClavano [brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie]filed Spec Proc No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before RTC Cebu.

The petition bears the signature of then 14-yr-oldKeith signifying consent to his adoption. AnnaMarie likewise filed an affidavit of consentalleging that her husband had “evaded his legalobligation to support” his children; that herbrothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano,had been helping her in taking care of thechildren; that because she would be going to theUS to attend to a family business, “leaving thechildren would be a problem and would naturally

hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;” andthat her husband had “long forfeited his parentalrights” over the children.-Upon learning of the petition for adoption,Herbert immediately returned to the Phils andfiled an opposition thereto, alleging that,although the Sps Clavano were financiallycapable of supporting the children, he could not“in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of hisparental authority over his beloved children.”-Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,Herbert moved to reacquire custody over hischildren alleging that Anna Marie had transferredto the US thereby leaving custody of theirchildren to Sps Clavano.

-Jan 11, 1988: RTC Cebu City Br. 19 issued anorder finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,relinquished custody over the children and,therefore, such custody should be transferred tothe father. The court then directed the Clavanosto deliver custody over the minors to Herbert.-March 27, 1990: RTC Cebu City Br. 14 issued thedecree of adoption, citing as impelling reasonsthe ff:(1) the Cang children’s “close filial ties with theClavano family;(2) the childless Clavano spouses had substantialassets and income;(3) the natural mother Anna Marie approved of the adoption;

(4) the Clavanos could provide the children moraland spiritual direction;(5) the children manifested their desire to beadopted by the Clavanos.-RTC further ruled that Herbert’s oppositionrested on “a very shaky foundation” because of its findings that:(1) Herbert is “morally unfit to be the father of h is

children”(2) Authenticity of joint deposit of around $10,000could not be verified(3) Possibility of reconciliation w/ Anna Marie was“dim if not nil”(4) as US citizen, his attachment w/ Filipinochildren is an open question-RTC quoted with approval theevaluation/recommendation of the RTC SocialWorker in her Child Study Report, that theoppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned hischildren thereby dispensing with his consent tothe adoption.-CA affirmed the decree of adoption, ruling that:(1) Consent of the parent who has abandoned the

child is not necessary. In adoption cases,abandonment connotes any conduct on the partof the parent to forego parental duties andrelinquish parental claims to the child, or theneglect or refusal to perform the natural andlegal obligations which parents owe their childrenor the withholding of the parent’s presence, hiscare and the opportunity to display voluntaryaffection.(2) Oppositor’s argument that he has beensending dollar remittances to the children isbelied by the fact that he was woefully in arrearsunder the terms of the divorce decree. His claimthat he has maintained bank accounts in thechildren’s name is negated when we consider

that such bank accounts were “withdraw-able byhim alone.”-Herbert filed MFR but CA denied the same.

ISSUE:WON the minor children be legally adoptedwithout the written consent of their naturalparent

HELD: NO.Both RTC and CA failed to appreciate facts andcircumstances that should have elicited adifferent conclusion on the issue of WONpetitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby

making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.But here, there was no abandonment.[guys, sorry ang haba ng digest. ang dami kasingdoctrines, eh.. ̂ _^]-Written consent of natural father is required byArt.31(2) of PD No. 603, the Child and YouthWelfare Code2, and Art.188(2) of the FamilyCode3.

-Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law,the established rule is that the statute in force atthe time of the commencement of the actiondetermines the jurisdiction of the court. As such,when Clavano spouses filed the petition foradoption on September 25, 1987, the applicablelaw was the PD 603, as amended by EO91.-During the pendency of the petition for adoptionor on Aug 3, 1988, the Family Code took effect.Article 256 of the Family Code provides for itsretroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice orimpair vested or acquired rights in accordancewith the Civil Code or other laws.”-Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, thewritten consent of the natural parent to the

adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.

2PD 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by

EO 91:“Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. - The writtenconsent of the following to the adoption shall benecessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of ageor over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legalguardian after receiving counselling and appropriatesocial services from the Ministry of Social Services andDevelopment or from a duly licensed child-placementagency;

(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development orany duly licensed child-placement agency under whosecare and legal custody the child may be;

(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.”3

Family Code. “Art. 188. The written consent of thefollowing to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age orover;

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legalguardian, or the proper govt instrumentality;

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, 10 yrs of ageor over, of the adopting parent or parents;

(4) The illegitimate children, 10yrs of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and thelatter’s spouse, if any; and

(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to beadopted.”

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Notably, such requirement is also embodied inRule 99.3 of the RoC.GenRule: The written consent of the naturalparent is indispensable for the validity of thedecree of adoption.Exception: if the parent has abandoned the childOR

if such parent is “insane or hopelessly

intemperate”>In these cases, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without thewritten consent of the parents or one of theparents provided that the petition for adoptionalleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption fromcompliance therewith. This is in consonance withthe liberality with which this Court treats theprocedural aspect of adoption.>In the instant case, only the affidavit of consentof the natural mother was attached to thepetition for adoption. Herbert’s consent, as thenatural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petitionsufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father.

This allegation vested the court with jurisdiction.-However, in cases where the father opposes theadoption primarily because his consent theretowas not sought, the matter of whether he hadabandoned his child becomes a proper issue fordetermination. The issue of abandonment by theoppositor natural parent is a preliminary issuethat an adoption court must first confront. Onlyupon failure of the oppositor natural father toprove to the satisfaction of the court that he didnot abandon his child may the petition foradoption be considered on its merits.-In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” meansto forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.xxx The dictionaries trace this word to the root

idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is onthe finality and publicity with which a thing orbody is thus put in the control of another, hence,the meaning of giving up absolutely, withintent never to resume or claim one’s rightsor interests. In reference to abandonment of achild by his parent, the act of abandonmentimports “any conduct of the parent which evincesa settled purpose to forego all parental dutiesand relinquish all parental claims to the child.” Itmeans “neglect or refusal to perform the naturaland legal obligations of care and support whichparents owe their children.” Physicalestrangement alone, without financial and

moral desertion, is not tantamount toabandonment.-In the case at bar, while admittedly, Herbert wasphysically absent as he was then in the US, hewas not remiss in his natural and legal obligationsof love, care and support for his children. Hemaintained regular communication with his wifeand children through letters and telephone. He

used to send packages by mail and catered totheir whims. Herbert also presented certificationsof banks in the US showing that even prior to thefiling of the petition for adoption, he haddeposited amounts for the benefit of his children.

This is further evidenced by copies of checks sentby Herbert to the children from 1985 to 1989.-The courts below attached a high premium tothe prospective adopters’ financial status buttotally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychologicalwell-being of the children. True, Keith hadexpressed his desire to be adopted by his uncleand aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness onthe matter as shown by his testimony is

contradicted by his feelings towards his father asrevealed in his letters to him. It is not at allfarfetched to conclude that Keith’s testimony wasactually the effect of the filing of the petition foradoption that would certainly have engenderedconfusion in his young mind as to the capabilityof his father to sustain the lifestyle he had beenused to.-The courts below emphasized respondents’emotional attachment to the children. This ishardly surprising for, from the very start of theiryoung lives, the children were used to theirpresence. Such attachment had persisted andcertainly, the young ones’ act of snuggling closeto Ronald was not indicative of their emotional

detachment from their father. The Clavanospouses, being the uncle and aunt of the children,could not but come to their succor when theyneeded help as when Keith got sick and Ronaldspent for his hospital bills.-Parental authority cannot be entrusted to aperson simply because he could give the child alarger measure of material comfort than hisnatural parent. It is enough that the naturalparent is earning a decent living and is able tosupport his children according to his means. Inascertaining the welfare and best interests of thechild, courts are mandated by the Family Code totake into account all relevant considerations. The

welfare of the child is the paramountconsideration.-The record of the case bears out the fact that thewelfare of the children was not exactly the“paramount consideration” that impelled AnnaMarie to consent to their adoption. The adoptionappears to be a matter of convenience for herbecause Anna Marie herself is financially capable

of supporting her children but is often out of thecountry leaving her children to the care of herrelatives. When the family first discussed theadoption of the children, they decided that theprospective adopter should be Anna Marie’sbrother Jose. However, because he had childrenof his own, the family decided to devolve the taskupon Ronald (businessman) and Maria Clara(international flight stewardess) who howevercould not always be in Cebu to care for thechildren.-A close analysis of the testimonies of siblingsRonald, Anna Marie and Jose points to theinescapable conclusion that they just wanted tokeep the children away from their father,

allegedly a “womanizer.”-Herbert described himself as single in status anddenied being a womanizer and father to the sonsof Wilma Soco. As to whether he was telling thetruth is beside the point. In any case, theactuality that Herbert carried on an affair with aparamour cannot be taken as sufficient basis forthe conclusion that he was necessarily an unfitfather. Conventional wisdom and common humanexperience show that a “bad” husband does notnecessarily make a “bad” father. That a husbandis not exactly an upright man is not, strictlyspeaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as afather of his inherent right to parental authorityover the children.

-Sps Clavano themselves explained why Herbertfailed to abide by the agreement re: support of the children: he was an illegal alien in the US. Assuch, he could not have procured gainfulemployment.Counsel for Clavanos argue that the authority given to Anna Marie by the legal separationdecree to enter into contracts was “allembracing” and included giving her sole consent to the adoption.SC: This conclusion is anchored on the wrongpremise that the authority given to the innocentspouse to enter into contracts that obviouslyrefer to their conjugal properties, shall includeentering into agreements leading to the adoption

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of the children. The transfer of custody over thechildren to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, depriveHerbert of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. The law onlyconfers on the innocent spouse the “exercise” of parental authority.-Parental authority and responsibility are

inalienable and may not be transferred orrenounced except in cases authorized by law. Theright attached to parental authority, being purelypersonal, the law allows a waiver of parentalauthority only in cases of adoption, guardianshipand surrender to a children’s home or an orphaninstitution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,even in a document, what is given is merelytemporary custody and it does not constitute arenunciation of parental authority. Even if adefinite renunciation is manifest, the law stilldisallows the same.-As such, in instant case, Herbert may not bedeemed as having been completely deprived of

parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separationcase. To reiterate, that award was arrived at bythe lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.-While parental authority may be waived, as inlaw it may be subject to a compromise, there wasno factual finding in the legal separation casethat petitioner was such an irresponsible personthat he should be deprived of custody of hischildren or that there are grounds under the lawthat could deprive him of parental authority. Infact, in the legal separation case, the courtthereafter ordered the transfer of custody overthe children from Anna Marie back to Herbert.

The order was not implemented because of AnnaMarie’s MFR thereon. The Clavano family alsovehemently objected to the transfer of custody toHerbert, such that the latter was forced to file acontempt charge against them.-The law is clear that either parent may loseparental authority over the child only for a validreason. No such reason was established in thelegal separation case. In the instant case foradoption, the issue is WON Herbert hadabandoned his chi ldren as to warrantdispensation of his consent to their adoption.Deprivation of parental authority is one of theeffects of a decree of adoption. But therecannot be a valid decree of adoption in this

case precisely because the finding of thecourts below on the issue of Herbert’sabandonment of his family was based on amisappreciation, tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. [In other words, there was no abandonment ^_^]-As regards the divorce obtained in the US, thisCourt has ruled that a divorce obtained by Filipino

citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code isnot recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contraryto State policy. While Herbert is now an Americancitizen, as regards Anna Marie who hasapparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorcehas no legal effect.-Since the incorporation of the law concerningadoption in the Civil Code, there has been apronounced trend to place emphasis in adoptionproceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramountinterest of a child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and YouthWelfare Code and the Family Code, thediscernible trend has impelled the enactment of

Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry Adoption[approved 7 June 1995] and Republic Act No.8552 establishing the rules on the domesticadoption of Filipino children [approved 25February 1998].-The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of recent laws4. Inasmuch as the Philippines is asignatory to the United Nations Convention onthe Rights of the Child, the government and itsofficials are also duty bound to comply with itsmandates5. Underlying the policies and preceptsin international conventions and the domestic

4 R.A. No. 8552. Domestic Adoption Act. Art. 1, Sec. 2.(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care

and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided withlove, care, understanding and security towards the fulland harmonious development of his/her personality.

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody andadoption of a child, his/her interest shall be theparamount consideration in accordance with the tenetsset forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on theRights of the Child.

(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separationfrom his/her biological parent(s).5

Convention on the Rights of the ChildArt. 5. “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities,rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a mannerconsistent with the evolving capacities of the child,appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise bythe child of the rights recognized in the presentConvention.”

statutes with respect to children is the overridingprinciple that all actuations should be in the bestinterests of the child. This is not, however, to beimplemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parentalauthority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-visthat of their children are not antithetical to eachother, as in fact, they must be respected and

harmonized to the fullest extent possible.-Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have allgrown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legalage while Joseph Anthony is approachingeighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shallbe endowed with the discretion to lead livesindependent of their parents. This is not to statethat this case has been rendered moot andacademic, for their welfare and best interestsregarding their adoption, must be determined asof the time that the petition for adoption wasfiled. Said petition must be denied as it was filedwithout the required consent of their father who,by law and under the facts of the case at bar, hasnot abandoned them.

Disposition Petition for review on certiorarigranted. Questioned CA Decision and Resolution,as well as the RTC Cebu decision, set asidethereby denying the petition for adoption.

TAMARGO V CA209 SCRA 518

FELICIANO; June 3, 1992MONCH

FACTS- Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with anair rifle causing injuries which resulted in

her death.-Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer'sadopting parent, and petitioner spouses

Art. 9, par. 3. “States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents tomaintain personal relations and direct contact with bothparents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to thechild’s best interests.”Art. 10, par. 2. “A child whose parents reside in differentStates shall have the right to maintain on a regularbasis, save in exceptional circumstances personalrelations and direct contacts with both parents. . .”Art. 14, par. 2. “States Parties shall respect the rightsand duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to thechild in the exercise of his or her right in a mannerconsistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”

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Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer'snatural parents filed a complaint fordamages against respondent spouses Victorand Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's naturalparents with whom he was living at the timeof the tragic incident.- A case for Homicide through RecklessImprudence was also filed against

Adelberto. It was dismissed on the groundthat he was exempted from criminal liabilitysince he acted without discernment.- Prior to the incident, spouses Sabas andFelisa Rapisura filed a petition to adoptAdelberto. The petition was granted afterthe incident.- Spouses Bundoc claim that the Rapisurasare the indispensable parties since parentalauthority has already shifted to the latterupon the filing of the petition to adopt.Petitioner however contend that theBundocs are the indispensable parties sinceAdelberto still lived with them, thus,parental authority has not yet shifted.

ISSUEWON parental authority has shifted from the filingof the petition for adoption

HELDNOReasoning Respondent Bundoc spouses rely onArticle 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Codewhich reads as follows:Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after consideringthe report of the Department of Social Welfare orduly licensed child placement agency and theevidence submitted before it, the court issatisfied that the petitioner is qualified to

maintain, care for, and educate the child, that thetrial custody period has been completed, and thatthe best interests of the child will be promoted bythe adoption, a decree of adoption shall beentered, which shall be effective he date theoriginal petition was filed. The decree shall statethe name by which the child is thenceforth to beknown. (Emphasis supplied)- The Bundoc spouses further argue that theabove Article 36 should be read in relation toArticle 39 of the same Code:Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural

parents, except where the adopter is the spouseof the surviving natural parent; xxx

and urge that their Parental authority must bedeemed to have been dissolved as of the timethe Petition for adoption was filed.- Uthe Civil Code, the basis of parental liability forthe torts of a minor child is the relationshipexisting between the parents and the minor childliving with them and over whom, the lawpresumes, the parents exercise supervision and

control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth WelfareCode, re-enacted this rule:Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians areresponsible for the damage caused by the childunder their parental authority in accordance withthe civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)- Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippineshas similarly insisted upon the requisite that thechild, doer of the tortious act, shall have been inthe actual custody of the parents sought to beheld liable for the ensuing damage:Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercisingparental authority shall be civilly liable for theinjuries and damages caused by the acts oromissions of their unemancipated children living

in their company and under their parentalauthority subject to the appropriate defensesprovided by law. (Emphasis supplied)- We do not consider that retroactive effect maybe given to the decree of adoption so as toimpose a liability upon the adopting parents. Tohold that parental authority had beenretroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses soas to burden them with liability for a tortious actthat they could not have foreseen and which theycould not have prevented (since they were at thetime in the United States and had no physicalcustody over the child Adelberto) would be unfairand unconscionable.- Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code

fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35provides as follows:Art. 35. Trial Custody . � No petition for adoptionshall be finally granted unless and until theadopting parents are given by the courts asupervised trial custody period of at least sixmonths to assess their adjustment and emotionalreadiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested inthe adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)- Under the above Article 35, parental authority isprovisionally vested in the adopting parentsduring the period of trial custody, i.e., before theissuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual

custody of the child during such trial period . Inthe instant case, the trial custody period eitherhad not yet begun or bad already beencompleted at the time of the air rifle shooting; inany case, actual custody of Adelberto was thenwith his natural parents, not the adoptingparents.

SAYSON V CACruz; GR 8922423 January 1992

ICE

FACTSAt issue in this case is the status of the privaterespondents and their capacity to inherit fromtheir alleged parents and grandparents. Thepetitioners deny them that right, asserting it forthemselves to the exclusion of all others.Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children-Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and

Teodoro. Eleno and Rafaela died. Teodoro, who

had married Isabel Bautista, died after them. Hiswife died 9 yrs. later. Their properties were left inthe possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be theirchildren.Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and IsabelSayson. The action was resisted by Delia,Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who allegedsuccessional rights to the disputed estate as thedecedent's lawful descendants.A different action was filed by Delia, Edmundoand Doribel filed their own complaint, for the

accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple'sfour surviving children. The complainantsasserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No.1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were theadopted children and Doribel was the legitimatedaughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, theywere entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in hisparents' estate by right of representation.

ISSUEWON Delia and Edmundo were legally adoptedWON Doribel is a legitimate child using the BirthCert as only basis

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HELD1 YES. On two grounds argumentativeinconsistency and timeliness. They argue thatDelia and Edmundo could not be adoptedbecause Doribel was born already prior to theadoption and such disqualifies the couple fromadopting while they also argue that Doribel was

born of another perso, Edita Abila.It is also untimely made. It is too late now tochallenge the decree of adoption, years after itbecame final and executory. That was way backin 1967. Assuming that the petitioners wereproper parties, what they should have done wasseasonably appeal the decree of adoption,pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified

Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia andEdmundo. They did not. In fact, they should havedone this earlier, before the decree of adoptionwas issued. They did not, although Mauricioclaimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, orabout TEN (10) days before the issuance of the

Order of Adoption, the petitioners could havenotified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition orperhaps petitioners could have filed a petition forthe revocation or rescission of the adoption(although the birth of a child is not one of thoseprovided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the consideredopinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIAand EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding andbinding to the present, the same not having beenrevoked or rescinded.Not having any information of Doribel's birth to

Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannotbe faulted for granting the petition for adoption

on the finding inter alia that the adopting parentswere not disqualified.A no less important argument against thepetitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as intheir action for partition but in a directproceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous ornot, cannot be questioned in a collateralproceeding, for a presumption arises in suchcases where the validity of the judgment is thusattacked that the necessary jurisdictional factswere proven.

An adoption order implies the finding of thenecessary facts and the burden of proof is on theparty attacking it; it cannot be considered voidmerely because the fact needed to showstatutory compliance is obscure. While a judicialdetermination of some particular fact, such as theabandonment of his next of kin to the adoption,may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to

enter the order of adoption, this does not make itessential to the jurisdictional validity of thedecree that the fact be determined upon properevidence, or necessarily in accordance with thetruth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction,and the determination must stand until reversedon appeal, and hence cannot be collaterallyattacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain,since the evidence might not be the same at allinvestigations, and might be regarded withdifferent effect by different tribunals, and theadoption might be held by one court to havebeen valid, while another court would hold it tohave been of no avail.

2 YES, Doribel is a legitimate child. Doribel's birthcertificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It isone of the prescribed means of recognition underArticle 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of theFamily Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress,that the birth certificate offers only prima facieevidence of filiation and may be refuted bycontrary evidence. However, such evidence islacking in the case at bar. Another reason whythe petitioners' challenge must fail is theimpropriety of the present proceedings for thatpurpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot bequestioned in a complaint for partition andaccounting but in a direct action seasonably filedby the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . .. does not have this purely evidential character. Itserves a more fundamental purpose. It actuallyfixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,and that civil status cannot be attackedcollaterally. The legitimacy of the child can beimpugned only in a direct action brought for thatpurpose, by the proper parties, and within theperiod limited by law. The legitimacy of the childcannot be contested by way of defense or as acollateral issue in another action for a differentpurpose . . .

JOHNSTON V REPUBLIC205 SCRA 1040

LABRADOR; April 30, 1963REAN

FACTS

- Petitioner Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petitionfor the adoption of one Ana Isabel HenrietteAntonia Concepcion Georgiana, 2 yrs and 10 mos.old, then under the custody of the Hospicio deSan Jose, an orphanage situated in Manila. Thepetition shows that petitioner is 48 years old,married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino;that the couple are childless; that the consent of the mother Superior of the orphanage and thehusband of Isabel was obtained.- After due notice and hearing petition wasgranted by the CFI of Rizal. Petitioner filed amotion, praying that the surname given to theminor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes"only, but this motion was denied by the lower

court in. Hence, this appeal.- Petitioner argues: [a] Since she is now using thesurname of her husband (A370, par. 1 NCC), andbec. “Valdes Johnston “ is the surname she usedin filing the petition in the present case, underwhich she is now known to all her relatives,friends and acquaintances, she had ceased to beknown by her maiden surname, so CFI shouldhave decreed that the minor she adopted shouldbe allowed to bear the surname she is now using.[b] The use of surname "Valdes" by adopted childwill create the impression that she is theillegitimate child of petitioner begotten before hermarriage, a situation humiliating to both adopterand adopted.

- SolGen: Although a married woman is permittedto add to her surname her husband's surname,the fact remains that petitioner’s surname isValdes and not Johnston; that a married womanhas a surname of her own to which may be addedher husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surnameValdes Johnston, much confusion would resultbecause the public would be misled into believingthat she was adopted by Isabel’s husband also,which is not true in this case.

ISSUEWON CFI erred authorizing or prescribing the useof the surname Valdes by the adopted child

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HELDNO.- Art. 341, par. 4, NCC which entitles the adoptedminor to the use of the adopter's surname, refersto the adopter's own surname and not to hersurname acquired by virtue of marriage. Isabel'sreal surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and asshe made the adoption singly w/o her husband’sconcurrence, and not as a married woman, hername as adopter was her maiden name. Theadoption created a personal relationship betweenthe adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to theadoption by her individually, did not have theeffect of making him an adopting father, so as toentitle the child to the use of Johnston's ownsurname.- Since adoption gives the person adopted thesame rights and duties as if he were a legitimatechild of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, NCC), muchconfusion would indeed result, as correctlypointed out by the SolGen, if the minor child were

allowed to use the surname of the spouse whodid not join in the adoption.- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of thehusband of the adopter, would mislead the publicinto believing that she had also been adopted bythe husband, which is not the case. And whenlater, questions of successional rights arise, thehusband's consent to the adoption might bepresented to prove that he had actually joined inthe adoption.Disposition: CFI’s order prescribing the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted minor AnaIsabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana,is AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC V WONG209 SCRA 189

REGALADO; May 21, 1992BAUZ

FACTS-Respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate sonof Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala.When he was 2 ½ yrs old and then known asMaximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret, wasthen 9 yrs old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court inSP Case 593 issued on Sept 9, 1967, adopted byspouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,

both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong, now deceased,was an insurance agent while Concepcion was ahigh school teacher. They decided to adopt thechildren as they remained childless after 15 yrs of marriage. The couples showered their adoptedchildren with parental love and reared them astheir own children.-Upon reaching 22, Maximo, by then married anda junior Engineering student at Notre DameUniversity, Cotabato City, filed a petition tochange his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It wasaverred that his use of the surname Wongembarrassed and isolated him from his relativesand friends, as the same suggests a Chineseancestry when in truth and in fact he is a MuslimFilipino residing in a Muslim community, and hewants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed forcarrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering hisbusiness and social life; and that his adoptivemother does not oppose his desire to revert to hisformer surname.-On July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor

of Maximo, TC decreeing that, the jurisdictionalrequirements having been fully complied with,petitioner's prayer to change his name fromMaximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted.On appeal to respondent CA, and over theopposition of petitioner Republic through theSolGen, TC decision was affirmed in full, hence,this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES1. WON the reasons given by private respondentin his petition for change of name are valid,sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition

HELD1. YES.Ratio The purpose of the law in allowing of change of name under Rule 103 is to give aperson an opportunity to improve his personalityand to provide his best interest. In granting ordenying the petition for change of name, thequestion of proper and reasonable cause is left tothe discretion of the court. The evidencepresented need only be satisfactory to the courtand not all the best evidence available isrequired.Reasoning Art 364 to 380,CC provides thesubstantive rules which regulate the use of surnames. Art 365 mandates that "an adopted

child shall bear the surname of the adopter," incorrelation with Art 341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to "entitle the adopted

person to use the adopter's surname." This sameentitlement of an adopted child is maintained in

Art 39(3), PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The Family Code echoesthe same statutory right of an adopted child to

use the surname of the adopter. Clearly, from thevery wordings of the law, it may be inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by theadopted child is both an obligation and a right.Under Art 376, CC, "no person can change hisname or surname without judicial authority." Theapplication for change of name thereunderinvolves a special proceeding governed by andconducted under the strictures of Rule 103 andone which involves substantial changes, with thedeclared objective of such judicial proceedingsbeing the prevention of fraud. Its purpose issimply to have, wherever possible, a record of thechangeA change of name is a special proceeding to

establish the status of a person involving his hislegal position in, or with regard to, the rest of thecommunity. It is a proceeding in rem, so strictcompliance with all jurisdictional requirements,particularly on publication, is essential in order tovest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For thispurpose, the only name that may be changed isthe true or official name recorded in the civilregister.

The change of name under Art 376 andreglementarily implemented by Rule 103 mustnot be confused with and cannot be effectedthrough the summary proceeding proposed in Art412, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108,which refers only to correction of clerical errors,

such as those which are visible to the eye orobvious to the understanding, or an error madeby a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copyingor writing, or some harmless or innocuouschange.We find unacceptable the assertion of theSolicitor General that private respondent'sallegation of ridicule and embarrassment due tothe use of his present surname isunsubstantiated. The testimony of privaterespondent in the lower court bears out theexistence of valid cause in his bid for change of name:

Q Now, after you adopted the surname"Wong?" in your studies, what did you observe?

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A I observed that "Wong" as a surnameembarrassed me to my friends and when I gowith Chinese friends I cannot talk Chinese. I amliving in Campo Muslim, a Muslim communitybut no one can believe that I am Muslim. I havea little business of Furniture but I have little(sic) customer because no one believes methat I am Muslim.

This was materially corroborated by thetestimony of private respondent's adoptivemother.From the testimony of Maximo and of his adoptermother, it can be discerned that he wasprompted to file the petition for change of namebecause of the embarrassment and ridicule hisfamily name brings in his dealings with hisrelatives and friends. Another cause is his desireto improve his social and business life. It hasbeen held that in the absence of prejudice to thestate or any individual, a sincere desire to adopta Filipino name to erase signs of a former aliennationality which only hampers social andbusiness life, is a proper and reasonable cause

for change of name. Justice dictates that a personshould be allowed to improve his social standingas long as in doing so, he does not causeprejudice or injury to the interest of the State orother persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown inthe record of this case that such prejudice orinjury to the interest of the state or of otherpersons would result in the change of petitioner'sname.

To justify a request for change of name,petitioner must show not only some proper orcompelling reason therefor but also that he willbe prejudiced by the use of his true and officialname. Among the grounds for change of namewhich have been held valid are: (a) When the

name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremelydifficult to write or pronounce; (b) When thechange results as a legal consequence, as inlegitimation; (c) When the change will avoidconfusion; (d) Having continuously used and beenknown since childhood by a Filipino name,unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sinceredesire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and withoutprejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surnamecauses embarrassment and there is no showingthat the desired change of name was for afraudulent purpose or that the change of namewould prejudice public interest.

While it is true that the statutory fiat underArt 365 is to the effect that an adoptedchild shall bear the surname of the adopter,it must nevertheless be borne in mind thatthe change of the surname of the adoptedchild is more an incident rather than theobject of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, that of parent and child.More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legallyexisting between persons not so related bynature. It has been defined as the taking intoone's family of the child of another as son ordaughter and heir and conferring on it a title tothe rights and privileges of such.It is the usual effect of a decree of adoptionto transfer from the natural parents to theadoptive parents the custody of the child'sperson, the duty of obedience owing by thechild, and all other legal consequences andincidents of the natural relation, in thesame manner as if the child had been bornof such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock,

subject, however, to such limitations andrestrictions as may be by statute imposed. The SolGen maintains that to sustain the changeof name would run counter to Art 365 and theruling in Manuel vs. Republic that "one should notbe allowed to use a surname which otherwise heis not permitted to employ under the law," andwould set a bad example to other persons whomight also seek a change of their surnames onlame excuses.We do not believe that by reverting to his oldname, private respondent would then be using aname which he is prohibited by law from using.

True, the law prescribes the surname that aperson may employ; but the law does not go so

far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of anyother surname, and only subjects such recourseto the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction.If we were to follow the argument of the SolGento its conclusion, then there will never be anypossibility or occasion for any person, regardlessof status, to change his name, in view of thesupposed subsequent violation of the legalimperative on the use of surnames in the eventthat the petition is granted. Rule 103 would thenbe rendered inutile.Sec 1 of Rule 103 uses the generic term"persons" to signify all natural persons regardlessof status. If a legitimate person may, undercertain judicially accepted exceptional

circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, there is no legal basis or logic indiscriminating against the availment of such aremedy by an adopted child.Herein respondent is already of age and as suchhe can decide what is best for him. Hisexperience with regard to his social and businessdealings is personal and it is only he who canattest to the same. Finding his predicament'sproper remedy is solely through legal process,herein respondent accordingly filed a petitionpursuant to Rule 103 which was granted bytheTC.It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name of hisparents by nature as crass ingratitude. To go bythe SolGen's suggestion that private respondentshould have his adoption revoked if he wants touse the surname of his natural father would be toexact too clear a toll for making use of anappropriate and valid remedy available under thelaw.Herein private respondent, before he filed the

petition for change of name, asked for hisadoptive mother's permission to do so. As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition,Concepcion executed an affidavit in Cotabato Cityon May 27, 1985.

There could be no other plausible reason forprivate respondent to first secure his adoptivemother's consent before resorting to thequestioned legal recourse other than the parentalrespect and reverence which is owed by and tobe expected of a dutiful child.Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that privaterespondent's adoptive mother emphasized thatshe executed the above affidavit "withoutaffecting the legal adoption granted by the Court

on Sep 9, 1967, making him as one of my legaland compulsory heirs." This is incontrovertibleproof that she never entertained any misgivingsor reservations with respect to her consent to hispetition. This likewise dispels any possibleconfusion as to private respondent's legal statusor adoptive paternity and his successional rights.Concordantly, a change of name does not defineor effect a change in one's existing familyrelations or in the rights and duties flowingtherefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity,civil status or citizenship; all that is altered is thename.

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Aaron Joseph, the same being the name withwhich he was baptized in keeping with religioustradition, and by which he has been called by hisadoptive family, relatives and friends since hearrived at their residence.- The Republic opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition foradoption, arguing that these petitions should beconducted and pursued as two separateproceedings.- RTC granted the adoption and change of name.

ISSUES1. WON TC erred in granting the change of theregistered proper or given name of the minoradoptee embodied in the petition for adoption2. WON there was lawful ground for the change of name.

HELD

1. YESRatio The official name of a person whose birth isregistered in the civil register is the nameappearing therein. If a change in one’s name isdesired, this can only be done by filing andstrictly complying with the substantive andprocedural requirements for a special proceedingfor change of name under Rule 103, wherein thesufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor canbe threshed out and accordingly determined.Reasoning- Art. 189 of the FC enumerates the legal effectsof adoption:“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall bedeemed to be a legitimate child of the adoptersand both shall acquire the reciprocal rights andobligations arising from the relationship of parentand child, including the right of the adopted to

use the surname of the adopters;(2) The parental authority of the parents bynature over the adopted shall terminate and bevested in the adopters, except that if the adopteris the spouse of the parent by nature of theadopted, parental authority over the adoptedshall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.”- The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of rightand obligation, to bear the surname of theadopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.It is the change of the adoptee’s surname tofollow that of the adopter which is the natural andnecessary consequence of a grant of adoption

and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for bypetitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of theadoptee must remain as it was originallyregistered in the civil register. The creation of anadoptive relationship does not confer upon theadopter a license to change the adoptee’sregistered Christian or first name. The automaticchange thereof, premised solely upon theadoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of adecree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incidentin nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, suchthat a prayer therefor furtively inserted in apetition for adoption cannot properly be granted.- The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civilregister should be used in the adoptionproceedings in order to vest the court with

jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, andshall continue to be so used until the court ordersotherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is asubstantial change in one’s official or legal nameand cannot be authorized without a judicialorder. The purpose of the statutory procedureauthorizing a change of name is simply to have,wherever possible, a record of the change, and inkeeping with the object of the statute, a court towhich the application is made should normallymake its decree recording such change.- A petition for change of name being aproceeding in rem, strict compliance with all therequirements therefor is indispensable in order tovest the court with jurisdiction for i tsadjudication. It is an independent and discretespecial proceeding, in and by itself, governed byits own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot begranted by means of any other proceeding. To

consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrateits role and significance as the appropriateremedy available under our remedial law system.- Neither can the allowance of the subject petitionbe justified under the rule allowing permissive

joinder of causes of action. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of aparty litigant, Rule 2.5 allows causes of action tobe joined in one complaint conditioned upon thefollowing requisites: (a) it will not violate the ruleson jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and(b) the causes of action arise out of the samecontract, transaction or relation between the

parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.- While it is true that there is no expressprohibition against the joinder of a petition foradoption and for change of name, we do notbelieve that there is any relation between thesetwo petitions, nor are they of the same nature orcharacter, much less do they present anycommon question of fact or law, which conjointlywould warrant their joinder.- A petition for adoption and a petition for changeof name are two special proceedings which, insubstance and purpose, are different from eachother. Each action is individually governed byparticular sets of laws and rules. These twoproceedings involve disparate issues. In apetition for adoption, the court is called upon toevaluate the proposed adopter’s fitness andqualifications to bring up and educate theadoptee properly. On the other hand, in apetition for change of name, no family relationsare created or affected for what is looked into isthe propriety and reasonableness of the groundssupporting the proposed change of name.- We do not perceive any injustice that canpossibly be visited upon private respondents byfollowing the reglementary procedure for thechange in the proper or given name that theyseek for their adopted child. We are hard put todescry the indispensability of a change of the firstname of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit.Nor is the said change of such urgency that would

justify an exemption from or a relaxation of theRules.2. NORatio Grounds sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or

pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legalconsequence of legitimation or adoption; (c)when the change will avoid confusion; (d) whenone has continuously used and been known sincechildhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based ona sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erasesigns of former alienage, all in good faith andwithout prejudice to anybody; and (f) when thesurname causes embarrassment and there is noshowing that the desired change of name was fora fraudulent purpose or that the change of namewould prejudice public interest.Reasoning

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- A person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, anddistinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or inspeaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that everyperson must have a name. The name of anindividual has two parts: the given or propername and the surname or family name. Thegiven or proper name is that which is given to theindividual at birth or at baptism, to distinguishhim from other individuals. The surname orfamily name is that which identifies the family towhich he belongs and is continued from parent tochild. The given name may be freely selected bythe parents for the child, but the surname towhich the child is entitled is fixed by law.- By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birthmust be entered in the civil register. The officialname of a person is that given him in the civilregister. That is his name in the eyes of the law.And once the name of a person is officiallyentered in the civil register, Article 376 of thesame Code seals that identity with its precisemandate: no person can change his name orsurname without judicial authority. The only waythat the name of person can be changed legallyis through a petition for change of name underRule 103. For purposes of an application forchange of name under Article 376 of the CivilCode and correlatively implemented by Rule 103,the only name that may be changed is the true orofficial name recorded in the civil register.- A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of thecourt which has the duty to consider carefully theconsequences of a change of name and to denythe same unless weighty reasons are shown.

Before a person can be authorized to change hisname, he must show proper and reasonablecause or any convincing reason which may justifysuch change.- A petition for change of name grounded on thefact that one was baptized by another name,under which he has been known and which heused, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. Baptism isnot a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitionerhas been using a different name and has becomeknown by it constitute proper and reasonablecause to legally authorize a change of name. Aname given to a person in the church records or

elsewhere or by which he is known in thecommunity - when at variance with that enteredin the civil register - is unofficial and cannot berecognized as his real name.- The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child hadbeen baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping withthe religious faith of private respondents and thatit was the name by which he had been called andknown by his family, relatives and friends fromthe time he came to l ive with privaterespondents.- While the right of a natural parent to name thechild is recognized, guaranteed and protectedunder the law, the so-called right of an adoptiveparent to re-name an adopted child by virtue oras a consequence of adoption, even for the mostnoble intentions and moving supplications, isunheard of in law and consequently cannot befavorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of theadoption and to follow that of the adopter doesnot lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.Dispositive Assailed order is MODIFIED. Thelegally adopted child of private respondents shallhenceforth be officially known as Kevin EarlMunson y Andrade unless a change thereof ishereafter effected in accordance with law.

GIL GO V. REPUBLIC77 SCRA 65

AQUINO; May 25, 1977CHRIS CAPS

FACTS- Gil GO was born in Tacloban. His name in civil

register is Gil CO.- When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedlygiven the name Gil Yao Eng Hua. Baptismalcertificate wasn’t presented.- Go testified that since childhood, he was knownas Henry Yao among relatives and friends. In biz& govt transactions, he used the name Gil CO.No third person corroborated his testimony.- In his alien registration certificate, his isregistered as Gil GO.- He wants to use the name HENRY YAO.- Lower court granted. City fiscal appealed.

ISSUE

WON lower court correctly granted Go’s petition

HELDNO.1. Lack of jurisdiction by lower court- Proceeding for a change of name is aproceeding in rem. Jurisdiction is acquiredafter publication of order, setting it forhearing, w/c order shld contain data incl thename sought to be adopted, a matter w/cshld be indicated in title of petition.- The reason for the rule is that the ordinaryreader only glances fleetingly at the captionof the order or title of petition. Only if thecaption or title strikes him does he proceedto read the contents. Probability is greatthat he doesn’t at all notice the othernames or aliases of applicant if these arementioned only in body of order / petition.Noninclusion of names or aliases of applicant in caption / title defeats thepurpose of publication.- It was not indicated in the title / caption that GilGo desired to change his name to Henry Yao. Norwas it indicated that his registered name is GilCo. In his petition, he used Gil Go.2. Insufficient reason to change name- Change of name is a matter of publicinterest. It’s a privilege, not a right. Courtshld weigh consequences of change of name and deny unless weighty reasons areshown. State has interest in names borneby individuals and entities for purposes of identification.

YU CHI HAN v. REPUBLIC15 SCRA 454

BAUTISTA ANGELO; 1965INA

FACTS- Yu Chi Han sought to change his name from YuChi Han to Alehjandro Go Yu on the grounds thathis given name is YCH, but that since birth, hehad always been called AGY, that he wasbaptized according to Catholic rites, and giventhe name.- The court found no compelling reason to grantthe request for change of name.

ISSUE

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WON the petition for change of name should bedenied

HELD YES- This Court has already had the occasion toexpress the view that the State has an interest inthe names borne by individuals and entities forpurposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right, sothat before a person can be authorized to changehis name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper orreasonable cause, or any compelling reasonwhich may justify such change. Otherwise, therequest should be denied. The following may beconsidered, among others, as proper andreasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the nameis ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or isextremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural childis acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when thechange is necessary to avoid confusion- This situation, can easily be remedied by merelyasking his friends and business associates to callhim simply Yu Chi Han instead of asking for a

judicial authority to change his name. His instantpetition does not come under any of the caseswhich may warrant the grant of a petition forchange of name as above adverted to.

SILVERIO V REPUBLIC537 SCRA 373

CORONA; October 22, 2007APPLE

FACTS-On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel

Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for thechange of his first name and sex in his birthcertificate in the RTC of Manila-Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was bornin the City of Manila to the spouses MelecioPetines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel

Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of livebirth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as"male."-He further alleged that he is a male transsexual,and that he underwent psychological

examination, hormone treatment, breastaugmentation, and later on, sex reassignmentsurgery in Bangkok, Thailand, and that from thenon, he lived as a female and was in fact engagedto be married.-He then sought to have his name in his birthcertificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."-The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, saying that: 1. the petition would bemore in consonance with the principles of justiceand equity; 2. no harm, injury [or] prejudice willbe caused to anybody or the community ingranting the petition; 3. no evidence waspresented to show any cause or ground to denythe present petition despite due notice andpublication thereof. Even the State, through the[OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any[o]pposition.-On August 18, 2003, the Republic of thePhilippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed apetition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Italleged that there is no law allowing the changeof entries in the birth certificate by reason of sexalteration.-On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appealsrendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Itruled that the trial courts decision lacked legalbasis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth onthe ground of sex reassignment through surgery.-Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it wasdenied, hence, this petition.

ISSUEWON the change of petitioner's name and sex inhis birth certificate is allowed under the law

HELDNo.1. A person's first name cannot be changed onthe ground of sex reassignment-The State has an interest in the names borne byindividuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege,not a right. Petitions for change of name arecontrolled by statutes. In this connection, Article376 of the Civil Code provides:ART. 376. No person can change his name orsurname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name orNickname. No entry in a civil register shall bechanged or corrected without a judicial order,except for clerical or typographical errors andchange of first name or nickname which can becorrected or changed by the concerned city ormunicipal civil registrar or consul general inaccordance with the provisions of this Act and itsimplementing rules and regulations.-RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.It vests the power and authority to entertainpetitions for change of first name to the city ormunicipal civil registrar or consul generalconcerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdictionover applications for change of first name is nowprimarily lodged with the aforementionedadministrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first namefrom the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,until and unless an administrative petition forchange of name is first filed and subsequentlydenied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedingsregulating change of first name are primarilyadministrative in nature, not judicial.-RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds6 for whichchange of first name may be allowed

6 SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or

Nickname. The petition for change of first name ornickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to beridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult towrite or pronounce;(2) The new first name or nickname has been habituallyand continuously used by the petitioner and he has beenpublicly known by that first name or nickname in the

community; or(3) The change will avoid confusion.-A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity orcivil status.-RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name onthe ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoidingconfusion, changing petitioners first name for hisdeclared purpose may only create grave complicationsin the civil registry and the public interest.-Before a person can legally change his given name, hemust present proper or reasonable cause or anycompelling reason justifying such change. In addition, hemust show that he will be prejudiced by the use of histrue and official name. In this case, he failed to show, oreven allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as aresult of using his true and official name.

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2. No law allows the change of entry in the birthcertificate as to sex on the ground of sexreassignment-The determination of a persons sex appearing inhis birth certificate is a legal issue and the courtmust look to the statutes-In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Codeprovides:ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall bechanged or corrected without a judicial order.-Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, thisprovision was amended by RA 9048 in so far asclerical or typographical errors are involved. Thecorrection or change of such matters can now bemade through administrative proceedings andwithout the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of theRules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule108 now applies only to substantial changes andcorrections in entries in the civil register.-Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registryinvolving the change of sex is not a mere clericalor typographical error. It is a substantial changefor which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.-Among the entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles4077 and 4088 of the Civil Code-To correct simply means "to make or set aright;to remove the faults or error from" while tochange means "to replace something withsomething else of the same kind or withsomething that serves as a substitute." The birthcertificate of petitioner contained no error. Allentries therein, including those corresponding tohis first name and sex, were all correct. Nocorrection is necessary.

7ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning

the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civilregister.

8ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil

register:(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legalseparations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgmentsdeclaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)

judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntaryemancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

-A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriageand family relations. It is a part of a person’slegal capacity and civil status. In this connection,Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:-ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to theregistration of civil status shall be governed byspecial laws.-But there is no such special law in the Philippinesgoverning sex reassignment and its effects. Thisis fatal to petitioners cause.-Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate isa historical record of the facts as they existed atthe time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person isdetermined at birth, visually done by the birthattendant (the physician or midwife) byexamining the genitals of the infant. Consideringthat there is no law legally recognizing sexreassignment, the determination of a persons sexmade at the time of his or her birth, if notattended by error, is immutable.-While petitioner may have succeeded in alteringhis body and appearance through theintervention of modern surgery, no law authorizesthe change of entry as to sex in the civil registryfor that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis forhis petition for the correction or change of theentries in his birth certificate.-Neither may entries in the birth certificate as tofirst name or sex be changed on the ground of equity-The changes sought by petitioner will haveserious and wide-ranging legal and public policyconsequences.-The statutes define who may file petitions forchange of first name and for correction or changeof entries in the civil registry, where they may befiled, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall beobserved. If the legislature intends to confer on aperson who has undergone sex reassignment theprivilege to change his name and sex to conformwith his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislationlaying down the guidelines in turn governing theconferment of that privilege.

REPUBLIC v VALENCIAG.R. No. L-32181

GUTIERREZ JR.; March 5, 1986 JOJO

FACTS

- Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minorchildren, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed withthe Cebu CFI a petition for the cancellation and/orcorrection of entries of birth of Bernardo and

Jessica in the Civil Registry of the Cebu City,seeking to change the nationality or citizenship of the two minors from "Chinese" to "Filipino" andtheir status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate",and changing also the status of the mother from"married" to "single" and her nationality from"Chinese" to "Filipino".- SolGen filed an opposition to the petitionalleging that the petition for correction of entry inthe Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of theNew Civil Code of the Philippines in relation toRule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,contemplates a summary proceeding andcorrection of mere clerical errors, those harmlessand innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc.- The trial court issued an order directing thepublication of the petition and the date of hearingthereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutiveweeks, and notice thereof, duly served on theSolicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of CebuCity and Go Eng.- Leonor Valencia replied, alleging thatsubstantial changes in the civil registry recordsinvolving the civil status of parents, theirnationality or citizenship may be allowed if ---- (1)the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence issubmitted, either to support the allegations of thepetition or to disprove the same; thatrespondents have complied with theserequirements by filing the present specialproceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108of the RoC and that they have caused reasonablenotice to be given to the persons named in thepetition and have also caused the order for thehearings of their petition to be published for three(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the province.- Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed an MTDon the ground that the corrections sought are notmerely clerical but substantial, involving as theydo the citizenship and status of the petitioningminors and the status of their mother.- The lower court denied the MTD. After trial, thelower court granted the petition.

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Hence this appeal by the Republic.

ISSUEWON the lower court erred in granting thepetition of Leonor Valencia

HELDNO.- It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matterof a petition is not for the correction of clericalerrors of a harmless and innocuous nature, butone involving nationality or citizenship, which isindisputably substantial as well as controverted,affirmative relief cannot be granted in aproceeding summary in nature. However, it isalso true that a right in law may be enforced anda wrong may be remedied as long as theappropriate remedy is used. This Court adheresto the principle that even substantial errors in acivil registry may be corrected and the true factsestablished provided the parties aggrieved by theerror avail themselves of the appropriateadversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, theopposition of the SolGen admits that "the entriessought to be corrected should be threshed out inan appropriate proceeding."Appropriate adversary proceeding - Onehaving opposing parties; contested, asdistinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legalwarning to the other party, and afforded thelatter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes anadoption proceeding."

The private respondent distinguishes betweensummary proceedings contemplated underArticle 412 of the Civil Code and fullblownadversary proceedings which are conductedunder Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.- The court's role in hearing the petition tocorrect certain entries in the civil registry is toascertain the truth about the facts recordedtherein. Under our system of administering

justice, truth is best ascertained or approximatedby trial conducted under the adversary system.- Excerpts from the Report on ProfessionalResponsibility issued jointly by the Association of American Law Schools and the American BarAssociation explain why:"An adversary presentation seems the onlyeffective means for combatting this naturalhuman tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. Thearguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in

suspension between two opposing interpretationsof it. While the proper classification of the case isthus kept unresolved, there is time to explore allof its peculiarities and nuances."These are the contributions made by partisanadvocacy during the public hearing of the cause.When we take into account the preparation thatmust precede the hearing, the essential quality of the advocate's contribution becomes even moreapparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries mustbe instituted to determine what facts can beproved or seem sufficiently established towarrant a formal test of their truth during thehearing. There must also be a preliminaryanalysis of the issues, so that the hearing mayhave form and direction. These preparatorymeasures are indispensable whether or not theparties involved in the controversy arerepresented by advocates.”"Where that representation is present there is anobvious advantage in the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchangeof written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel.Without the participation of someone who can actresponsibly for each of the parties, this essentialnarrowing of the issues becomes impossible. Buthere again the true significance of partisanadvocacy lies deeper, touching once more theintegrity of the adjudicative process itself. It isonly through the advocate's participation that thehearing may remain in fact what it purports to bein theory; a public trial of the facts and issues.Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared topresent his proofs and arguments, knowing at thesame time that his arguments may fail topersuade and that his proofs may be rejected asinadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb thesepossible disappointments. The deciding tribunal,on the other hand, comes to the hearinguncommitted. It has not represented to the publicthat any fact can be proved, that any argument issound, or that any particular way of stating alitigant's case is the most effective expression of its merits."- Provided the trial court has conductedproceedings where all relevant facts have beenfully and properly developed, where opposingcounsel have been given opportunity to demolishthe opposite party's case, and where theevidence has been thoroughly weighed andconsidered, the suit or proceeding is"appropriate."

- Under pertinent sections of Rule 108, thepersons who must be made parties to aproceeding concerning the cancellation orcorrection of an entry in the civil register are ----(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons whohave or claim any interest which would beaffected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, itbecomes the duty of the court to ---- (1) issue anorder fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearingto be published once a week for three (3)consecutive weeks in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the province. The following arelikewise entitled to oppose the petition: ---- (1)the civil registrar, and (2) any person having orclaiming any interest under the entry whosecancellation or correction is sought.- If all these procedural requirements have beenfollowed, a petition for correction and/orcancellation of entries in the record of birth evenif filed and conducted under Rule 108 of theRevised Rules of Court can no longer bedescribed as "summary". There can be no doubtthat when an opposition to the petition is filedeither by the Civil Registrar or any person havingor claiming any interest in the entries sought tobe cancelled and/or corrected and the oppositionis actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereonbecome adversary proceedings.- In the instant case, a petition for cancellationand/or correction of entries of birth of BernardoGo and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the Cityof Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valenciaon January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the saidpetition was published once a week for three (3)consecutive weeks in the Cebu Advocate, anewspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on theSolicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and GoEng. The order likewise set the case for hearingand directed the local civil registrar and the otherrespondents or any person claiming any interestunder the entries whose corrections were sought,to file their opposition to the said petition. Anopposition to the petition was consequently filedby the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereaftera full blown trial followed with respondent LeonorValencia testifying and presenting herdocumentary evidence in support of her petition.

The Republic on the other hand cross-examinedrespondent Leonor Valencia.

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- The petition filed by the respondent in thelower court by way of a special proceeding forcancellation and/or correction of entries in thecivil register with the requisite notice andpublication and the recorded proceedings thatactually took place thereafter could very well beregarded as that proper suit or appropriateaction.- To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule108 is not an appropriate proceeding without inany way intimating what is the correctproceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all,would result in manifest injustice.- Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, thereare 4 other sisters and 1 other brother born of thesame father and mother. Not only are all fiveregistered as Filipino citizens but they havepursued careers which require Philippinecitizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. Toemphasize the strict policy of the governmentregarding professional examinations, it was thelaw until recently that to take the board examsfor pharmacist, the applicant should possessnatural born citizenship.

The sisters and brother are: 1. Sally Go -licensed Pharmacist; 2. Fanny Go - RegisteredNurse; 3. Corazon Go - fourth year medicalstudent, qualified to take the government boardexaminations after successfully completing therequirements for a career in medicine, andpresumably is a licensed physician now; 4.Antonio Go - engineering student during the1970 trial of the case and qualified by citizenshipto take government board examinations; 5.Remedios Go - licensed Optometrist.- The above facts were developed and proved

during trial. The petitioner failed to refute thecitizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.- In this petition, it limits itself to a proceduralreason to overcome substantive findings byarguing that the proper procedure was notfollowed.- There are other facts on the record. LeonorValencia is a registered voter and had alwaysexercised her right of suffrage from the time shereached voting age until the national electionsimmediately preceding the filing of her petition.

The five other sisters and brother are alsoregistered voters and likewise exercised the rightof suffrage.- An uncle of the mother's side had held positionsin the government having been elected twice ascouncilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias,

Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valenciahas purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land. These allegations are well documented andwere never contradicted by the Republic. Ascorrectly observed by the lower court.- "The right of suffrage is one of the importantrights of a citizen. This is also true with respect tothe acquisition of a real property. The evidencefurther shows that her children had been allowedto take the Board Examinations given by theGovernment for Filipino citizens only."- It would be a denial of substantive justice if twochildren proved by the facts to be Philippinecitizens, and whose five sisters and brother bornof the same mother and father enjoy all the rightsof citizens, are denied the same rights on thesimple argument that the "correct procedure" notspecified or even intimated has not beenfollowed.

LIM vs ZOSACRUZ; December 29, 1986

ATHE

NATUREAppeal by certiorari from two Orders of therespondent judge dismissing a petition for thecorrection of an allegedly wrong entry in the birthrecords of Kim Joseph describing him as aChinese national instead of a Filipino citizen.

FACTS- The petitioner filed a petition for the correctionof an allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese nationalinstead of a Filipino citizen.- The petitioner had offered to prove the errorthrough several pieces of evidence, among theman earlier birth certificate of Kim Josephdescribing him as a Filipino citizen, the birthcertificates of his seven brothers and sisters alldescribing them as Filipinos, and a decision of theCourt of Appeals recognizing their grandfather asa Filipino citizen.- On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu,however, the respondent judge dismissed thepetition and sustained the contention that onlyclerical errors were allowed to be corrected in thesummary proceedings authorized under Article412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were notcovered as held in several cases. In effect, it was

held the petition was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed under existingrules.

ISSUEWON change in the birth entry regarding aperson’s citizenship is now allowed

HELD

YES. Article 412 of the Civil Code simplyprovides: "No entry in the civil registry shall bechanged or corrected without a judicial order."Changes in the birth entry regarding a person'scitizenship is allowed as long as adversaryproceedings are held. Where such a change isordered, the Court will not be establishing asubstantive right but only correcting or rectifyingan erroneous entry in the civil registry asauthorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rulesof Court provides only the procedure ormechanism for the proper enforcement of thesubstantive law embodied in Article 412 of theCivil Code and so does not violate theConstitution (Valencia ruling).We note that in the case at bar the petition wasdismissed outright without a trial being held, onthe justification that it was not permitted. In thelight of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of therespondent judge must now be reversed, to giveway to the appropriate proceedings necessary tothe resolution of the substantial issue raised bythe petitioner. The records show that thepublication requirement has already beencomplied with. 13 The next step, therefore, is forthe petitioner and all adverse and interestedparties to be given their day in court in a regulartrial on the merits.DISPOSITION

The challenged Orders are hereby set aside, andSpecial Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional

Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is reinstated fortrial on the merits without delay. Nopronouncement as to costs.

REPUBLIC v. BAUTISTAG.R. No. L-35316

FERNAN; October 26, 1987GLAISA

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari to annul the

judgment of the then CFI of Rizal

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FACTS- Petitioner Imelda Mangabat Sorensen testifiedthat she is married to Bo Huage Sorensen, aDanish citizen and begot two children, namely:Launny and Raymund. In the birth certificate of her second son Raymund, her husband'snationality was erroneously stated as 'American.’- Bo Huage Sorensen testified that he was born of a Danish father in Denmark, and presented acertification issued by the Royal Danish Consulateof Manila. He is still considered tourist and livingwith his wife and two sons in Pasay.- The Republic opposed the petition and movedfor the dismissal on the ground that a correctionof entry in the Civil Registry is allowed only whenthe same refers to mere clerical errors ormistakes, but not to substantial changes affectingthe civil status, nationality or citizenship of theperson concerned.- CFI ordered the Local Civil Registrar of PasayCity as prayed for to make the necessarycorrections in the entry of birth of minorRaymund Mangabat Sorensen.

ISSUEWON the challenged decision which involves thequestion of citizenship is a matter which canlegally be treated under the provision of Article412 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Rule108 of the Rules of Court. 3

HELD YES. If the correction sought to be made in thecivil register is clerical, then the procedure to beadopted is summary. If the rectification affectsthe civil status, citizenship or nationality of aparty, it is deemed substantial, and theprocedure to be adopted is adversary.- If the procedural requirements provided inSections 3, 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court arefollowed, the procedure ceases to be summaryand becomes litigious. Proceedings following theaforementioned sections may then beappropriate for the correction of substantialmatters in the civil registry.- The consistent rule laid down was that therevision of any entry pursuant to Article 412, asimplemented by rule 108, referred to thosechanges that are harmless and innocuous. Inthose cases, however, it was intimated thatrectifications regarding nationality or citizenship

in the civil register may be undertaken as long asthe appropriate remedy is used.- The appropriate remedy may well be a petitionfiled by way of special proceeding for thecancellation and/or correction of substantialentries in the civil register with the requisiteparties, notices, publications and the proceedingsto be taken thereafter pursuant to Sections 3, 4and 5 of Rule 108 because then the proceedingswill be adversary in character.- In the present case, the records show that thePasay City Local Civil Registrar and the SolicitorGeneral were made parties to the petition forcorrection of entry in the civil registry filed in theCFI. The proper notice was published once a weekfor three consecutive weeks in the Rizal WeeklyBulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. TheRepublic appeared through a trial attorney of theOSG who was present and did not object to thepresentation of evidence, although after thehearing, the said trial attorney filed an oppositionand or motion to dismiss on the ground that thecorrection being sought did not refer to a mereclerical mistake but to a substantial changeinvolving the nationality of a person.- In the light of the foregoing which showcompliance with Sections 2, 4 and 5 of Rule 108,the proceedings undertaken in the lower courtwere unmistakably adversary, thus removing theinitial apprehension of the State that "if theentries in the civil registrar could be corrected . . .through a mere summary proceeding and notthrough an appropriate action wherein all theparties who may be affected by the entries arenotified or represented, we would set wide openthe door to fraud or other mischief, theconsequence of which might be detrimental andfar-reaching."Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition forreview on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit and the decision of the court a quo isaffirmed.

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