spinoza’s ethics 3

8/10/2019 Spinozas Ethics 3

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SpinozasEthi cs: Books II & III Independent Study | Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

In this paper Ibegin by introducing Spinozas conception of adequate ideas and locating

it more broadly in his theory of knowledge. I then provide a brief overview of Book III

before turning to close consideration of the doctrine of conatus, and ofthe three primary

emotions, the passive emotions, and the active emotions.

Adequate Ideas, Knowledge, and Doubt1

Spinoza devoted the lions share of Book II to an elaboration of perception and the

inadequate knowledge derived thereby. His conclusion is that as long as the human

Mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate,

but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own Body, and of external

bodies (EIIP29c). But the situation is not hopeless: through the use of reason, we may

obtain adequate ideas.

An adequate idea is an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself without relation to

its object, has all the propertiesthat is, the intrinsic characteristicsof a true idea

(EIIdef4). Spinoza says intrinsic in order to exclude extrinsic characteristics, namely

the agreement of the idea with that of which it is the idea (EIIdef4 explication) .

1I greatly benefited from Margaret Wilsons chapter in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza,

specifically her section discussing adequate ideas.


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There is something peculiar here worth noting, because it will allow us to trace a

connection between true and adequate ideas, illuminating both. In considering adequate

ideas Spinoza seems to bracket the matter of its concurrence with that of which it is the

idea. But in Book I he writes, A trueidea must agree with that of which it is an idea.

This raises the questions: Are all true ideas adequate? and Are all adequate ideas true?

Equally important is the question of what Xthere is to consider about an idea, beyond

its concurrence with the object of which it is an idea, for it seems to be that this X is

what will determine whether or not the idea is adequate.

The first two questions find an answer in the proof of Proposition 41 in Book II: we

asserted that to knowledge of the second and third kind [that is, Reason and Intuition]

there belong those ideas which are adequate. Therefore this knowledge is necessarily

true. This conclusion is itself a citation of EIIP34: every idea which in us is absolute

that is, adequate and perfectis true. This comes after Proposition 32, which states that

all ideas insofar as they relate to God are true; that is, ideas in God agree completely with

their objects. This is the case because, as per the doctrine of parallelism, an idea in

Thoughtjust is an object in Extension, and the order and connection of ideas is the same

as the order and connection of things (EIIP7).

It becomes clear that the Xthat feature which makes an idea adequate, as apart from

considerations of its alignment with its objectis that ideas position in the infinite

intellect. As Spinoza writes in the Corollary to Proposition 7, whatever follows formally

from the infinite nature of God, all this follows from the idea of God with the same


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[necessary] order and connection as an object of thought in God. Thus adequate ideas in

us are those that are congruent with those same adequate ideas in God. As has been

shown, ideas in God are necessarily true. Therefore, those same ideas in us are true as

well. In considering adequate ideas it is this congruence in Thought that makes them

adequate, and not their agreement with objectsalthough, as seen, these ideas will be

true, in agreement with their objects.

This is perfectly consistent with the explanatory barrier Spinoza sets up between

attributes from the very start: Things which have nothing in common with each other

cannot be understood through each other (EIAx5). We see that theadequacy of ideas,

which are modes under the attribute of Thought, could not have been explained by

reference to objects, which are modes under the attribute of Extension. It now becomes

clear why Spinoza identifies the second kind of knowledgewhich is necessarily

truewith Reason, which is an affair of the mind, of Thought. Spinozas rationalist

definition of knowledge in Book Ithe knowledge of an effect depends on the

knowledge of the cause (EIAx5)makes predictable 1) the elaboration of adequate

ideas in us in terms of congruence (perhaps overlapping is here a better word) with

those ideas in God, and 2) the reference to their position in the necessary causal chain

unfolding deterministically across infinite attributes and flowing from Gods essence.

My citation of Axiom 5 above, however, should not imply that knowledge of infinite

causal chains is necessary for our possession of an adequate idea. Such knowledge is

impossible for finite beings, and exists solely in the infinite intellect of God. A given


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adequate idea in us is adequate in virtue of its identity, or overlapping, with that perfect

idea in God. This requires not the humanly impossible knowledge of each of the infinite

causes of an idea or object, but, instead, a grasp of the essence of things. This

interpretation is strongly supported by a passage in Spinozas Treatise on the Emendation

of the Intellect: The essences of singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from

their series, or order of existing, since it offers us nothing but extrinsic denominations,

relations, or at most, circumstances, all of which are far from the inmost essence of

things. That essence is to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the

same time from the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes, according to

which all singular things come to be, and are ordered (TIE101).2Possessing an adequate

idea of a thing consists, then, in understanding why it is; notby reference to, or situation

in, an infinite causal series of other objects, but rather in virtue of grasping the reasons

which reveal the thing as existing necessarily and determinedly. It is the nature of

Reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent (EIIP44).

Nothing is genuinely contingent on Spinozas metaphysical view. However, insofar as we

do not have adequate knowledgerelying instead on opinion, the first kind of

knowledge, arising from our being affected (that is, determined)by external things and

our conflation of those muddled affections with realitywe mistakenly regard things

from the common order of nature, taking them to be contingent. As long as the human

Mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate,

but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own Body, and of external

2This passage and the TIE were brought to my attention through a reference in Michael Della

Roccas Spinoza. Although this Treatise is the earliest of Spinozas writings, it provides useful

guidance for understanding some of the themes in theEthics.


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bodies (EIIP29c).To illustrate, take the example of a trains arriving on time. On some

occasions I have experienced the train running on schedule; on other occasions I have

known it to be late. When I head to the station, then, I regard it as a real possibility that

the train might be either late or on time. Of course, the train will be either late or on time,

but whichever is the case is the case necessarily, not contingently. My opinion that things

can go this way or that, depending perhaps on other contingent factors, such as whether

or not the conductor spontaneously decided to stop for a cigarette break at the previous

station, is mistaken. The source of my mistaken judgment is my reliance on my past

haphazard experiences, or affections, which have appeared to me, in the absence of

adequate knowledge, as fortuitous encounters that may have equally happened or not

happened. In fact, the trains arrival time was necessary and determined, as was the

conductors decision (or lack of) to have a cigarette, and as were all my previous

affections. I relied on opinionwhich provides at best a fragmentary, partial, and

shallow knowledgeand it proved to be a source of falsity and error. More strongly,

opinion, the first kind of knowledgebeing intrinsically inadequate, as it is arises from

encounters that are limited by perspective, seeing things from one point, from one angle,

at only one time, and so onis the source of falsity and error. Spinoza makes this explicit

when he distinguishes, in the second Scholium to Proposition 40, three kinds of

knowledge, and identifies the second and third kind to be always adequate and

necessarily free of falsity. Thus, as already shown, opinion is the sole source of falsity

and inadequate ideas.

But how is it possible for us, finite human minds, to obtain adequate ideas?


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When we are externally determined, we have inadequate ideas; when we are internally

determined, we have adequate ideas. In the realm of Extension this could mean that the

body is affected from within itselfthat is, the affection is not caused by interaction with

any external object. The parallel in the realm of Thought must be some sort of closed

system of ideas which is not determined, or affected, from without. In the realm of

Extension, we can imagine that some spatially dispersed set of fundamental particles

collide (by predetermined necessity), and begin to interact with one another in a self-

perpetuating pattern thereby creating an object in duration, e.g. an existing bowl or an

existing human body. If all ideas in us correspond to some part of our body then, just as

material particles enter into clusters of mutually interacting, self-perpetuating objects, so

ideas enter into mutual causal relations in a self-perpetuating pattern according to the

order of the intellect (EIIP18s).3

This concerns Spinozas theory of knowledge. If the human mind is a closed system of

ideas, what could ground Reason? All ideas in a closed system ultimately point to one

another. As Spinoza implies in the final pages of the TIE, and as his choice of the

geometric method suggests: we must discover (or simply assume?) axioms and basic

3This is precisely Spinozas picture of the physics of bodies: an existing body is a

conglomeration of stuff coexisting, across a duration of time and space, in some stable,

and self-perpetuating ratio. If certain bodies composing an individual thing are made tochange the existing direction of their motion, but in such a way that they can continue

their motion and keep the same mutual relation as before, the individual thing will

likewise preserve its own nature without any change of form (EII.Lemma6). And,Furthermore, the individual thing so composed retains its own nature, whether as a

whole it is moving or at rest, and in whatever direction it moves, provided that each

constituent part retains its own motion and continues to communicate this motion to the

other parts (EII.Lemma7).


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definitions. Descartes had made an appeal to God as the guarantor of truth and Reason, as

the underwriter of our most clear and distinct perceptions. But, as Spinoza observes in

Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, the arguments for the existence of such a God are

themselves based on the Reason which they are meant to ultimately guarantee. In other

words, the arguments are circular. Spinoza attributes to us innate adequate ideas, which

we are capable of clearly and distinctly perceiving by the use of Reason, which

functions within a closed system of self-referencing ideas, which are actually identical to

parts of our body. This identity of ideas (modes of Thought) and bodies (modes of

Extension) shuts down skeptical objections by making any disjunction between ideas and

objects metaphysically impossible, for they are not ultimately two different things.

Descartes had been vulnerable to the skepticsobjection only because he had erroneously

entertained the possibility that his thoughts could be mistaken about how the world really

is. In Cartesian terms, he was vulnerable to doubt because of the yawning abyss between

Thinking substance and Extended substance. Spinozas metaphysics, on the other hand,

fuses together Thought and Extension. The skeptic is unable to pry open any space he can

leverage into wholesale doubt because such a prying open is rationally inconceivable

given the unity of the two attributes, Thought and Extension which were, for

Descartes, two distinct substancesin God. In other words, Spinoza rejects skepticism

from within his own metaphysical system, which he has rationally deduced from

definitions and axioms as if a geometric proof. Whereas Descartes grounds Reason (and

clear and distinct perception) in God, Spinoza, the arch-rationalist, grounds Reason in

Reason.


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In EIIP43 Spinoza writes, He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a

true idea, and cannot doubt its truth. It is now needless to say that the proof of this

proposition is made by deduction from previous propositions. And the circularity

becomes clear: the validity of this deductive method is proven only in Proposition 40 of

Book II, Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also

adequate. It follows that if Spinozas propositions express adequate, true ideas, then the

original axioms and definitions, from which all the propositions ultimately follow, must

themselves express adequate, true ideas. To him who has these ideas, they are known at

the same time to be true, and cannot be doubted. They are perceived clearly and

distinctly as certain knowledge without doubt. Spinoza writes in the Scholium to

Proposition 43, that a true idea involves absolute certainty. Indeed, just as light

makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and

falsity.

The above discussion of knowledge began with a question: How is it possible for us to

obtain adequate ideas? I considered the possibility that adequate ideas are those that are

internally determined by the causal interactions of sub-ideas of the complex idea that is

the human mind. But this may be mistaken, for Spinoza writes, The idea of the idea of

any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human

mind (EIIP29). A resolution is not here necessary for two reasons. First, the preceding

discussion of knowledge, doubt, and adequacy does not depend on it. Second, Spinoza

offers us another means by which to gain adequate knowledge.


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This comes in Proposition 38: Those things that are common to all things and are

equally in the part as in the whole can be conceived only adequately (EIIP38). This

proposition requires unpacking. Supposing that there is something, A, common to all

bodies. It follows that 1) the idea of A will be in God and 2) that, just asA is common to

all bodiesthat is, to all modes in Extensionso, in virtue of parallelism, the idea of A

will be common to (or will be equally in) all ideasthat is, to all modes of Thought,

including all those modes of Thought that are human minds (or, what is the same, ideas

of the human body). Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to

all men. For all bodies agree in certain respects, which must be conceived by all

adequately, or clearly and distinctly (EIIP38c). For example, the modes of Substance

considered under the attribute of Extension all have in common that they have

determinate sizes. Spinoza himself does not go into any detail elaborating on these

commonalities but to say that these things in common are, when considered under the

attribute of Thought, adequate ideas. These ideas are not mutilated or inadequate because

they are not ideas of externally determined affections of the body. Instead, they seem to

pervade the entire realm of Thought. When they are known, they are known directly and

with certainty to be true.

We have now seen how adequate ideas are possible. Before proceeding to Book III, I will

highlight two more critical conclusions of Book II: first, that knowledge of God is not

only possible but exists adequately in all minds; second, that there is no free will.


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In Proposition 45 Spinoza claims that every idea necessarily involves the eternal and

infinite essence of God since no mode can be conceived but through an attribute and

attributes express the essence of God. Furthermore, the knowledge of the eternal and

infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect (EIIP46). This

follows from Proposition 38: Those things that are common to all things can be

conceived only adequately. The knowledge of the essence of God, being common to all

things, is an adequate idea in the human mind.

The human minda definite and determinate mode of thinkingis, like all else,

completely determined by necessity, possessing no absolute, or free, will. The mind is

determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is likewise determined by another

cause, and this again by another, and so ad infinitum (EIIP48). Moreover, There is in

the mind no volitionthat is, affirmation and negationexcept that which an idea,

insofar as it is an idea, involves (EIIP49). Affirmation and negation are, in other words,

intrinsic to ideas, and do not depend on the assent or dissent of some faculty, such as

Descartesfaculty of the will, that exists somehow apart from ideas.

A Brief Overview of Book III

Book III represents Spinozas derivation of a psychology from his metaphysics. He

introduces his psychology as against those of authors who believe man disturbs rather

than follows Nature's order, and has absolute power over his actions, and is determined

by no other source than himself (EIIIPref). As Della Rocca notes, this project stems


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from Spinozas guiding belief in naturalism about human beingsa belief he famously

expresses as the view that man is not a kingdom within a kingdom. For Spinoza, the

principles at work throughout nature in general also govern human psychology.4

Spinoza states this same point unequivocally in the Preface to Book III: Nature is always

the same, and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the same; that is, the

laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form

to another are everywhere and always the same. So our approach to the understanding of

the nature of things of every kind should likewise be one and the same; namely, through

the universal laws and rules of Nature. Therefore the emotions of hatred, anger, envy,

etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as all

other particular things.

Spinoza holds that there are three primary emotions: desire, joy, and sadness. Desire is

related to our conatus, orstriving, to persist in existence. All other desires derive from the

desire to persevere in being. Striving is common to all finite modes. Joy is an increase in

our power. Sadness is a decrease in our power. All other emotions are various

constellations of the primary emotions in conjunction with our ideasfor example, love

is a constellation of joy and an idea, namely the idea of the cause of our joy. Spinoza

derives numerous psychological principles from this foundation. In a lengthy section of

EIIISpinoza explicates dozens of emotions on this basis.

4Della Rocca, M. (1996). Spinoza's metaphysical psychology. In The Cambridge Companion

to Spinoza(9th ed., p. 192). New York: Cambridge University Press.


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Spinoza will identify some emotions as passive and some as active. Active emotions are

connected with adequate ideas. Therefore we can expect that active emotions will be

compounds of primary emotions with adequate ideas. We can also expect that passive

emotions will be compounds of the primary emotions with inadequateor, what is the

same, externally determinedideas.

Striving and the Emotions

I begin this section with a careful consideration of Spinozas doctrine of conatus, or

striving, as it appears in Propositions 4 through 11 of Book III. This consideration will

require an explication of Spinozas notion of essence. I will present and defend what I

believe is the correct and consistent definition of essence.5I then proceed to fill out the

notion of striving through an elaboration of it in terms of Extension, relying on the

Physics Interlude in Book II (where Spinoza presents his physics). Finally I provide an

introductory explication of his emotional psychology, focusing mainly on the three

primary emotionsdesire, joy, and sadness.

Striving

5I owe a debt to the discussion of striving presented by Della Rocca in his chapter in The

Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, although I go my own way in seeking to define essence and

connecting that notion with Spinozas doctrine ofstriving.


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Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being (EIIIP6).This

is Spinozas explicit statement of the doctrineof striving. First I will present and support

Spinozas proof of this proposition. Then I will further unpack its meaning.

As we know from Book I, all singular things are modes through which the attributes of

God are expressed in definite and determinate ways (EIP24c) and that Gods power is

his very essence (EIP34). The proof of Proposition 34 states that Gods power,

whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence. Thus Spinoza writes that

particular things are things which express in a definite and determinate way the power of

God whereby he is and acts (EIIIP6d). That alone does not obviously suggest that

particular things strive to persist in being. The deduction of conatus depends on the two

preceding propositions.

Proposition 4 states that no thing can be destroyed except by an external cause. Spinoza

takes this to be self-evident. The definition of a thing, after all, affirms and does not

negate, the things essence. Therefore, insofar as we are considering something in

itself, bracketingall external causes that may come to affect it, we can find nothing in it

which can destroy it (EIIIP4d). Although the notion ofessence is far from clear, the gist

of the argument makes intuitive sense. If, for example, we consider a teacup apart from

all the external things that might shatter it to piecessuch as other dishes, clumsy dinner

guests, and the floorit seems that the cup should persist in existence. This is especially

obvious given Spinozas rationalism. For there would be no reason that the cup, once

existing, should suddenly cease to exist; this would be an unacceptable brute fact.


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So, the argument shapes up: 1) If the cup goes out of existence, then there must be some

cause, 2) The cause can either be external or internal, 3) If the cause (or reason) of the

cups destruction is external, then we are no longer considering the cup in itself, and

are thus no longer considering conatus, 4) The cause (or reason) cannot be internal, 5)

Therefore, in the absence of destruction from without, the cup will continue in existence.

This argument is valid, but not obviously sound. (1) is true given rationalism. (2) is true,

exhausting the possibilities. That (3) is a nonissue follows from the meaning of striving,

which makes external causes irrelevant. But what about (4)? What reasons does Spinoza

have for denying that an object can have within itself the cause of its destruction? To the

extent that the notion of essence is unclear, we cannot rely on Proposition 4 for an

answer.

Proposition 5 states that, Things are of a contrary nature, that is, unable to subsist in the

same subject, to the extent that one can destroy the other. Unfortunately, this proposition

also fails to provide an answer, for its proof depends on Proposition 4: If [two or more

things of contrary natures] were able to be in agreement with one other, or to coexist in

the same subject, there could be something in the said subject [that is, the larger thing of

which the former are parts] which could destroy it, which is absurd (Prop. 4). Although

it fails as an argument for Premise (4) above, this proposition reminds us of two

important, related ideas. First, a particular thing can have other things within itselffor

example, the human body has within itself the stomach, heart, and so on. Second, for a


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thing to persist is just for its parts to maintain certain stable ratios of rest and motion

amongst themselves. Therefore, for a thing to be destroyed is just for its part to cease

maintaining those ratios among themselves.

On the one hand, if two things are anathema to each other, they are incapable of entering

into stable and persisting interactions with one another. To illustrate, we wouldnt ask fire

and gunpowder to subsist in the same subjectthey cant. It makes sense, then, that

existing subjects dont and cant feature things of contrary nature, for the very moment

those things interact either one, the other, or both are destroyed. On the other hand, we

can imagine possible counterexamples. Della Rocca brings up a time-bomb. I would

suggest a more familiar example: a human being afflicted by a genetic degenerative

disease.

Both examples have shortcomings. Spinoza could respond that the time-bomb is not

really an object at all. Yes, the parts of the bomb stand in stable positions in space and

time with regard to each other, but this is not enough. After all, the White House and the

Eiffel Tower stand in stable relation as well, and they are certainly not a singular object.

Neither are two adjacent books on the library bookshelf. The parts of a singular object

must enter into causal relations together. The bomb is one thing, the fuse another, and the

timer a third.

My own example is not open to this rebuttal since Spinoza agrees that the human body is

a particular object. However, Spinoza could offer at least three other responses. First, the


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degenerative mutation does not pertain to the objects essence. Second, thecause of the

mutation was an external object. Third, conatus does not involve finite time, but

indefinite time (EIIIP8). I cannot definitively resolve these challenges here, so instead I

will proceed with the presentation of the doctrine.

Proposition 8, partially quoted above, states that, The conatus with which each single

thing endeavors to persist in its own being does not involve finite time, but indefinite

time. The proof is as follows: If it involved a limited period of time which would

determine the duration of the thing, then solely from the power by which the thing exists

it would follow that it could not exist after that limited period of time, but is bound to be

destroyed. But (EIIIP4), this is absurd. It should be clear that Proposition 4 is a

cornerstone of Spinozas conative doctrine, and so we must grapple with the notion of

essence it presents.

Id like to consider Spinozas text with regard to essence. He writes: The conatus with

which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of

the thing itself (EIIIP7). This seems to be the claim that a things conatus is (identical

to) its essence. If we replace conatus with powerwhich is justified by the proof of

Prop. 7, Therefore, the power of any thing, or the conatus with which it acts or

endeavors to actand retrofit this identity to the proof of Proposition 4 we get the

following: This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of anything affirms, and

does not negate, the thing's power: that is, it posits, and does not annul, the thing's


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power. So, the actual essence of a particular, determinate affection of God is its power,

with which it acts.

This is not a surprising conclusion, for as we saw above in Book I Spinoza writes, God's

power is his very essence (EIP34). The proof, again, is as follows: From the sole

necessity of God's essence it follows that God is self-caused and the cause of all things.

Therefore, God's power, whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence. In

other words, God is the only necessary being and thus he is his own cause and the cause

of all modes. And Gods power, and hence his essence, just ishis necessary existence and

law-governed causationflowing from his nature, and manifest in infinite modes across

attributesof all things. We can run a modified definition regarding particular objects,

power, and essence: A particular things power, and hence its essence, is just its 1)

determined (by God) existence and 2) law-governed causation3) flowing from its

natureof other things.

I believe this is the correct definition of the power and essence of particular objects for

several reasons.

First, it is in line with the traditional notion of essence in that it says what it is that makes

a particular object the particular object that it is. This is related to criteria (1) of the

definition, determined existence. The determined object is not merely determined to exist.

Rather, it is determined to exist within a necessary causal chain flowing from Gods

power. That is, the object has a definite, necessary, and unique place within that chain,


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and it is this unique position within the infinite intellect that makes it the object that it is.

This is perfectly consistent with Spinozas claim, at the very beginning of theEthics, that

knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of causes and with his discussions of the

order and connection of things. The matter of what makes an object the object that it is

has therefore been settled, but there is something more to say. Recall, from my section on

adequate ideas, that Spinoza wrote, in the TIE, that the essences of singular, changeable

things are not to be drawn from their series, or order of existing. Recall also that no

finite mind can grasp an infinite causal chain. This may appear to contradict all Ive said

above. In fact, however, it is perfectly consistent. My definition features a metaphysical

claim about essence and identity conditions. The two details Ive recalled are

epistemological claims. The passage in the TIE continues, essence is to be sought only

from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these

things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, and are

ordered. In deducing my definition of the essence of particular objects from

metaphysical certainties about God, I have done precisely what Spinoza prescribesI

have sought essence from the fixed and eternal, i.e. God, and from the laws inscribed

therein, i.e. Gods necessary existence and essence according to which all singular

things come to be, and are ordered. Now, it is true that we, finite minds, cannot situate

an object, or idea, in an infinite chain, but Spinoza does not ask us to. In Book V it will

become clear that our adequate knowledge of particular objects is intuitive, knowledge

of the third kind. We intuit, or clearly and distinctly perceive, all particular object s as

causally situated modes unfolding like clockwork from the necessary nature of God.


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Second, this definition is in line with our common notion of power; that is, the ability to

act on and affect external objects. This is related to criteria (2), law-governed causation

of other things. The object is not only the effect of previous causes; it is also, insofar as it

is an individual expression of Gods power to act,a cause of effects. This is consistent

with what Spinoza writes in Book III: From the given essence of a thing certain things

necessarily follow, nor do things effect anything other than that which necessarily

follows from their determinate nature (EIIIP7d). In other words, the individual mode

stands only in those relations of cause and effect which it is uniquely determined to stand

in by the necessary nature of God. This is also perfectly consistent with Book I: Nothing

exists from whose nature an effect does not follow (EIP36) and all things are from the

necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way (EIP29).

Third, this definition makes Spinozas talk of increases and decreases of power, and

hence essence, perfectly intelligible, while making the connection of this to the

possession of adequate ideas absolutely apparent. This is related to criteria (3), flowing

from its nature. Spinoza writes: By emotionI understand the affections of the body by

which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished (EIIIDef.3) and The

human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or

diminished (EIIIPt.1). A bodys power, as we have seen, is identical to its essence. So

we ask: with reference to which of the three elements of the above definition can we

understand the possibility of degrees of essence and power? (1) and (2) are immediately

ruled out, for necessity and determination are not matters of degree. We conclude: a

particular body is powerful to the extent that its actions flow from its own nature. In other


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words, (3) is the variable that determines a particular objects degree of power and

essence. So, an objects increase in power is identical (but not limited) to a decrease in its

external determination. And now the connection to adequate ideas emerges. A decrease in

external determination, which is the source of inadequate ideas, is a decrease in

inadequate ideasand, therefore, it is at the same time an increase in the proportion of

adequate to inadequate ideas. By the same token, a particular objects increase in

adequate ideas is identical to an increase in that objects power, since adequate ideas are

internally determined. And this is precisely Spinozas view: Hence it follows that the

more the mind has inadequate ideas, the more it is subject to passive states; and, on the

other hand, it is the more active in proportion as it has a greater number of adequate

ideas (EIIIP1c).

I qualified the definition above with the phrase and of its own perseverance in being.

This should not be taken to mean that particular objects are self-causing in the way that

God is self-causing, or that existence is involved in the essence of particular objects.

When a particular object perseveres in being, its self-perpetuating activity does not

determine its position in the order of things. The objects self-perpetuation, conatus, is an

entirely internal, local affair, so to speak. Furthermore, in considering the essence, which

does not involve existence, of a particular thing that is, considering it in itself we

see that it does not involve finite time, but indefinite time. The objects actualduration

is not determined by its essence, from within, but by the order of things flowing from

Gods necessary nature, i.e. it will be brought into existence by its external causes, will

instantiate and manifest its essence and strive to persist in being, until it is destroyed by


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external causes, which are, of course, determined by the necessary order of things in

infinite intellect and not by the objects own essence.

With a clear definition of essence I set out the argument for P6.

The proof of P4 begins as follows: This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of

anything affirms, and does not negate, the thing's essence: that is, it posits, and does not

annul, the thing's essence.

To paraphrase,

The definition of a thing, T, affirms (or posits) Ts essence.

Plugging in the definition of essence we get:

The definition of a thing, T, affirms (or posits) Ts determined existence and

law-governed causationflowing from its natureof other things.

The proof continues: So as long as we are attending only to the thing itself, and not to

external causes, we can find nothing in it which can destroy it.

Insofar as we are considering only the essence of T, we should be unable to find anything

which can destroy it. That is, insofar as we are considering T as a law-governed finite


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mode of God, uniquely situated within the necessary order of things, and without external

determination by other finite modes, we should be unable to find anything which can

destroy it.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as uniquely positioned in the infinite

order and connection of things. What could it mean for T to be destroyed? T would have

to no longer occupy its unique and necessary place in the order of things. This is absurd,

since it is the essence of T to uniquely occupy this place, and it is metaphysically

impossible that any other objectwhich essentially occupies adifferent position in the

order of thingscould occupy Ts place. If it did, that objectjust would be Tto occupy

a determinate position in the infinite is what it is to be a particular object.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as internally determined. For T to cease

to be internally determined it would have to be externally determined. This is absurd,

since considered in its essence T is by definition internally determined. Moreover, if T

were determined by external objects, Ts destruction would be externally caused, which

is completely consistent with P4.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as a law-governed cause. T would have

to cease to be law-governed, but that is impossible. Can T cease to be a cause? No, since

T is essentially the cause that it is just as it essentially occupies the position it does in

infinite intellect.


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We can conclude, therefore, that Proposition 4 is true: No thing can be destroyed, except

by an external cause. P5 follows trivially from P4: If no thing can be destroyed except by

an external cause, then no thing can be destroyed by an internal cause. Therefore a thing,

considered in itself, will persist in its being, unless destroyed by an external cause. P6 is

true.

I now discuss Spinozas physics to flesh out the idea of striving.

Bodies strive to persist in being. In physical termsconsidering things as modes under

the attribute of Extensionto be a body is to be composed of smaller bodies that stand in

stable relations of motion and rest. Therefore bodies persevere in being when these

relations are preserved. According to Spinoza, a body in motion will continue to move

until it is determined to rest by another body, and a body at rest continues to be at rest

until it is determined to move by another body (EIILemma3c).6The Lemma states that

A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another

body, which likewise has been determined to motion or rest by another body, and that

body by another, and so ad infinitum. It follows that complex individuals come to exist

when simpler bodies, each following its determined path, intersect and become tangled

up, so as to preserve an unvarying relation of movement among themselves. In order

for component bodies to stably compose these complex, self-preserving conglomerations,

such as the human body, they must fall into mutually causal relations with each other.

6This conclusion is an upshot of Spinozas typical rationalism and commitment to thePrinciple of

Sufficient Reason: If we suppose a moving body simpliciter, without consideration of any otherbody, we must continue to regard solely as a moving body. For if it stopped, or slowly, or sped up

without reason, this change would be an unacceptable brute fact.


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Once they have fallen into such unvarying relations of movement the pattern sustains

itself.

Importantly, Spinoza believes that parts of a complex body can be swapped out, as long

as they are at the same time replaced by parts of the same nature. If the union of bodies

is maintained the individual thing will retain its nature as before, without any change in

its form. Similarly, the bodys parts, and thus the body, may become proportionately

bigger or smaller so long as the same mutual relation of motion-and-rest are preserved.

The human body is composed of many individual parts of different natures, each of

which is extremely complex. Each of those sub-parts can undergo numerous changes

while retaining its nature. The same goes for the sub-parts sub-parts. These parts of all

different natures are each affected in numerous different ways, communicating their

motions to other parts. As a result of its complexity, the human body can be affected in

myriad ways and can move external bodies and dispose them in a great many ways.

To summarize: a body is defined by the relations in space and time of its part, whether

these parts are themselves complex or simple. The body will, in itself, seek to preserve

these ratios. This preservation is consistent with certain external affections, such as when

substance is replaced by substance of the same kind. An example of this is when the

human body consumes food and water in order to sustain itself. It is also consistent with

increases and decreases in the size of the body, depending on which makes the body more

adaptable to the vast set of other external objects with which it must contend.


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Importantly, as Charles Jarrett puts it, each of an objects states has, or rather is, a force

for continuing. It is a change of state, not the continuation of one, that is in need of

explanation.7

We are now prepared to consider Spinozas primary emotions: joy, sadness, and desire.

Primary Emotions

Proposition 9 states that The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and

insofar as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its own being over an indefinite

period of time, and is conscious of this conatus.8The mind is necessarily conscious of

its conatus because, as EIIP23 established, it is necessarily conscious of itself through

the ideas of the affections of the body. This awareness, when it is related to the mind

alone, is the Will. When it is related to both mind and body it is called appetite. As may

already be clear, this appetite in a man is therefore nothing else but man's essence,

since striving isessence, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things

7Jarrett, C. (2007). Ethics III: Emotions. In Spinoza a guide for the perplexed(p. 105). London:

Continuum.8This Proposition attributes both adequate andinadequate idea to the essence of the mind. This

may seem strange but, in my opinion, such an attribution is unmysterious. An objects givenessencethat is, the objects essence when it is considered as existingis necessarily situated in

the infinite intellect, i.e. it is not free-floating but in-the-world and hence affected in certainnecessary ways. Admittedly, Im puzzled as to how inadequate ideas are included in striving for

one reasondont they diminish an objects power of acting, and hence striving? I conclude thatmy summary in the final paragraph of my section of striving is correct, that is, some externalaffections prove beneficial to an objects persistence in being insofar as they make the object

better suited to survive in its unique situated position. As an analogy, alcohol might be good insome cases, such as when a wound must be cleanedin that case alcohol actually serves torestore the bodys health, i.e. its power to act, its striving. This example foreshadows one of

Spinozas most famous claims, that nothing is good or bad in itself, but is rather good or badrelative to us, insofar as we are affected by it in a way that promotes or decreases or power and

desire to continue in being.


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that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform (EIIIP9s).

Spinoza identifies appetite with Desire, with one qualification which brings his

conception of Desire in line with our common notion of the same: desire is appetite

accompanied by the consciousness thereof" (EIIIP9s)and it is certainly true that we

tend to ascribe desire to others only when they themselves are conscious, aware of their

wants.9From this explication, however, Spinoza does draw at least one counterintuitive

conclusion: we do not desire a thing because we judge it to be good; rather, we judge a

thing good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.

In EIIIP11s Spinoza defines three primary emotions: desire, joy, and sadness. Joy is

nothing but the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection. Pain is

nothing but the passive transition of the mind to a state of lesser perfection.10

Joy, when

related to both mind and body is expressed as pleasure and cheerfulness. Sadness is

similarly expressed as pain and melancholy. (In Shirley: Anguish and Melancholy,

respectively.) The pair of pleasure and pain are related to man when one part of him is

affected more than others; cheerfulness and melancholy when all parts are equally

affected. An example will be useful here. A shoulder rub or a flesh wound are examples

9If it was not clear before, its certainly obvious now: not everything mental is an object of

awareness. Apparently we can have an appetite we ourselves are unaware of, though such anappetite will not be called desire. Unconscious motivations? Do we have here a precursor toFreud?!10 Im using Curleys terms from the 1985 translation of the Ethics. Shirley, in his 2002translation, uses pleasure in place of joy and pain in place of sadness. In Shirley pleasureis termed titillation and pain is termed anguish. The original Latin parallels to Curleys

terms: joy/ laetitia; pleasure/ titillatio; cheerfulness/ hilaritas; sadness/ tristitia; pain/ dolor;melancholy/ melancholio; gladness/gaudium.


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of localized pleasure and pain, respectively; being with a loved one or learning of a loved

ones death are examples of general cheerfulness and melancholy, respectively.

In the remainder of the above cited Scholium Spinoza returns to a clarification of

Proposition 10, which states that An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot

be in our mind, but is contrary to it. How can one idea be contrary to another idea? As

we have seen, the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involvesthe existence

of the body for as long as it exists. As soon as the mind ceases to affirm the existence of

the body its capacity to perceive through the senses [is] annulled. The mind itself

cannot cease to affirm the body, as follows from P6. This cessation must result from

another, external idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and thereby of

the mind as well. It is in this sense that an idea can be contrary to the idea that constitutes

our mind. As Spinoza writes in Proposition 12, The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to

think of those things that increase or assist the bodys power of activity. When the body

is affected by external things, those things will remain present to the mind and hence the

mind (and body) will remain affected in a specific way involving the nature of that

external thing. When the body is affected by those things that increase its powers of

activity, the mind thinks of those things and endeavors to continue thinking of those

things. On the contrary, when the mind thinks of those things that diminish the bodys

power, it endeavors to call to mind those things that exclude the existence of the former.

For example, if we find ourselves out in the harsh cold and rain the mind will call to mind

shelter, i.e. it will desire it and, if possible, act so as to procure it, since it is in the actual

procurement of shelter, and not in its imagining, that the idea of shelter excludes the idea


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of cold and rain. Hence, Spinoza writes, it [is apparent] that the mind is averse to

thinking of things that diminish its power and [what is the same] the bodys power

(EIIIP13c).

A question remains regarding how desire can be both an essence and an emotion. It

seems that concrete, specific desires are modifications or affectionsof the desire to

persevere in our being. The desire to live, for example, gives rise to a desire for shelter

from the snow. [T]he upshot of this is that we have one most basic desire, the desire to

persevere in existence, and all other desires arise from it.

11

We now have a picture of Spinozas psychological basics. Increases in power are

experienced as joy; decreases of power are experienced as sadness. Desire, which is just

the conscious awareness of our conatus, leads us to an aversion toward those things that

decrease our power and an affirmation of those things that increase it. All the other

emotions will be permutations, or permutations of permutations, of these basic three

desire, joy, sadnesscoupled with other ideas. I will conclude this paper with a cursory

overview of the remainder of Book III, to which I now turn.

The other emotions and psychological principles

The other emotions are permutations of the primary three coupled with ideas of external

causes. Thusly Spinoza defines love and hate in EIIIP13s. Love is joy accompanied by

11Jarrett, C. (2007). Ethics III: Emotions. In Spinoza a guide for the perplexed(p. 108). London:

Continuum.


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the idea of an external cause. Similarly, hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an

external cause. One seeks to preserve and have present that which one loves. The

converse is true for that which one hates.

Spinoza introduces several psychological principles. [1)] If the mind has once been

affected by two emotions at the same time, when it is later affected by the one it will also

be affected by the other. [2)] Anything can indirectly [per accidens] be the cause of

joy, sadness, or desire (EIIIP14&15). 3) Sometimes we may come to love or hate an

object on the basis that we imagine it to have something in common with another object,

one we love or hate, respectively (P16). We may also come to love and hate one and the

same object when that object, which we imagine as likely to affect us with sadness, is

imagined to bear something in common with another object, one that we imagine as

likely to affect us with joy (P17). An exceedingly clear example of this last may be a

drug. We may know that the drug ultimately lead to sadness; nonetheless, the drug has

become associated, from the past concurrence of drug use with pleasure, with joy. This

brings us to the principle expressed by Proposition 18: From the image of things past or

future man is affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain as from the image of a

thing present. Spinoza relies on this principle in his explication of hope, fear,

confidence, despair, gladness (gaudium, not laetitia), and disappointment. Hope, for

example, is an inconstant joy, arising from the image of a thing future or past, of whose

outcome we are in doubt. Fear is similarly an inconstant pain, arising from the image of

a thing in doubt (EIIIP18s2). Confidence and despair arise to the extent that doubt is

removed. For example, I come to despair when I learn that my friends diagnosis is


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nearly certain and dire. This brings us to the principles of Propositions 19 through 22.

He who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will feel pain. If, however, he

imagines that it is being preserved, he will feel pleasure. He who imagines that a thing

that he hates is being destroyed will feel pleasure (EIIIP19&20). When I suppose that

the thing I love is joyful or sad, I too will experience joy or sadness, respectively (P21). If

we suppose that someone is causing the object of our love joy or sadness we will be

affected with love or hate toward him, respectively (P22). The underlying rationale

should be obvious. Insofar as the object of our love brings us joy, we desire to preserve it.

Thus whatever causes that object joy serves to preserve the object in being and thereby

indirectly preserves our own joy derived from our object of love. Spinozas reasoning is

always rooted in the psychological basics presented above in this way. He continues

deriving a breadth of principles from those fundamentals and showing how they give rise

to dozens of emotions.

In Proposition 58 Spinoza returns to the distinction between passivity and activity

previously discussed in the Definitionsof Book IIIwith regard to emotions. He writes:

Besides the joy and desire that are passive emotions, there are other emotions of joy and

desire that are related to us insofar as we are active and Among all the emotions that

are related to the mind insofar as it is active, there are none that are not related to joy or

desire (EIIIP59)that is, only those emotions involving desire and joy, but not all such

emotions, are active emotions. Active joy and active desire are central to the ethical

arguments Spinoza will present in Books IV and V, so we must understand these clearly.


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The definitions of passivity and activity refer to external and internal determination,

respectively. These definitions are worth quoting.

Definition 1: I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly

perceived through the said cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect

cannot be understood through the said cause alone.

Definition 2: I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to

us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is, when from our nature there follows in us

or externally to us something which can be clearly and distinctly understood through our

nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when something takes place in

us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause.

Thus, when we are the adequate cause of an emotiondefined as an affection of the

body by which [its] power of activity is increased or diminished (EIIIDef3)that

emotion, or action, is active. (Spinoza refers to all other emotions as passions, of which

we are, at most, onlypartial causes.)

Active joy and active desire are intimately related to adequate ideas. An increase in

adequate ideas, or knowledge, is concomitant with active joy. In fact, they can be seen as

identical since both are transitions to states of greater power or, what is the same, greater

degrees of internal determination. If we recall, external affection represents, in a sense, a

mutilation of clear and distinct perception. Thus the passionsbeing joy, sadness, or

desire coupled with external causesare necessarily muddled and confused. Those


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activities which flow from adequate understanding Spinoza calls Strength, which he

subdivides into two: Courage and Nobility. Courage is the desire whereby every

individual endeavors to preserve his own being according to the dictates of reason

alone while Nobility is the desire whereby every individual, according to the dictates

of reasons alone, endeavors to assist others and make friends of them (EIIIP59s).

Activities which are directed solely toward the agents advantage are filed under courage;

those directed to the advantage of others (and thereby indirectly benefit one) are filed

under nobility. To the extent that our ideas are adequate we will correctly perceive what

will increase our powers of acting and perseverance and, at the same time, our desire will

be properly calibratedfor it can be muddled by associations and other externally

determined factorsso as to orient us toward those things and away from things that will

diminish our powerthat is, we will be guided by reason toward what is genuinely good

for us, i.e. conducive toward our perseverance in being.

spinoza’s ethics 3

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