Strategic Adaptation or Institutional Stability? Tracking Organizational Change in a Social Movement Field*

 

 

Jeff A. Larson University of Arizona 

Words: 10,549 

* Please do not cite or quote without permission. Direct correspondence to Jeff A. Larson at Department of

Sociology, University of Arizona, Social Sciences Bldg. room 400, Tucson, AZ 85721; jlarson@u.arizona.edu.

This research was supported by a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation

(NSF #0622866), two Graduate Research Grants from the Social & Behavioral Sciences Research Institute at

the University of Arizona, and through funds from the Department of Sociology at the University of Arizona.

Abstract 

Although the contemporary study of social movements is founded upon a rationalist critique

of earlier collective behavior and strain theories, an alternative institutionalist tradition has

grown up along side it. When studying organizational behavior, rationalists predict strategic

adaptation in the face of changing political circumstances, whereas institutionalists predict

stability rooted in the rules, routines, habits, relationships, expectations, and experience of

actors in the social movement field. Drawing on interviews and archival evidence from 39

organizations active in Seattle, Washington between 1999 and 2005, I present evidence that

change in this field, as indicated by the combinations of issues, tactics, and targets, is, in fact,

minimal at both the organizational and field levels. Such dramatic political events as the

anti-WTO protests in 1999, terrorist attacks, two closely contested presidential elections, and

two new, controversial American-led wars, had no noticeable effect on the shape of the

social movement field, even as the peace movement grew threefold. I further show that this

field is divided between at least three competing visions of how social movement

organizations should behave. The most prominent division is between organizations that lie

inside and outside of the political field. This division corresponds not just to issues, tactics,

and targets, but to the size and shape of the organizations.

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Strategic Adaptation or Institutional Stability? Tracking Organizational Change in a Social Movement Field 

For the practical purposes of understanding how and why social movement

organizations behave as they do, the social movements literature is confusing. It is divided

between two seemingly contradictory traditions. One predicts change, the other stability.

One sees strategic adaptation where the other sees institutional conformity. The differences

are significant, and their implications anything but trivial. After all, institutionalization is

anathema to the novelty and disruptiveness that are the hallmarks of a social movement’s

strength. It may be true that social movement organizations (SMOs) are adaptable, driven

by the strategic decisions of leaders. This is good if we believe that these leaders have

complete and reliable information (or if we want to constrain the impact of their actions

with well placed incentives). Alternatively, it might be the case that organizations do not

change much, that leaders stick with what they are most skilled at or familiar with. Maybe

their actions are tied to their identities which express the kind of activist, Christian, woman,

or organization they perceive themselves to be. Or, they may be simply imitating their peers.

This is good if we believe that movements influence institutions by creating alternative

institutions. In the study of social movements, we have seen evidence of both possibilities.

This division in the study of SMO behavior reveals a persistent tension in our

theories between rationalist and institutionalist accounts. The first emerges from studies of

movement strategy and success which view social movement organizations as highly

adaptable, readily changing to meet the demands of their environments. According to this

tradition, organizers are rational tacticians plotting their challenge to the polity. If the

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behavior of SMOs is the straightforward result of decisions based on concerns for efficiency

and self-interest, it makes sense that analysts focus as they do on what makes a tactic

effective (Gamson 1975; McAdam 1983; Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Tarrow

1998; Cress and Snow 2000; McAdam et al. 2005; Soule and Earl 2005; McCammon et al.

2008).

The second perspective is reflected in the tradition of Charles Tilly (1978) who

asserts that organizations draw from a limited and highly stable “repertoire of contention,”

the set of means by which collective actors make claims. We recognize this repertoire in the

familiar forms (e.g., marches, rallies, pickets, strikes, boycotts) of social movements. Despite

frequent experimentation around the margins, repertoires of contention change very slowly.

The slow rate of change is due to institutional constraints associated with governments and

state building and by the limited knowledge and experiences of collective actors. Every so

often a novel, apparently effective tactic emerges, diffuses widely, and secures a place

alongside other standard forms in the repertoire of contention (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1995;

Chabot 2000). More rarely, an entire repertoire changes, as happened around 1830 when

rough music, house sacking, and grain seizures gave way to marches, rallies, and boycotts

(Tilly 1978, 1995). According to this view, behavior is stable and shaped by institutions.

For all their differences, both approaches explicitly boast rationalist roots in the

tradition of Mancur Olson (1965). Nevertheless, the institutionalist influence on Tilly’s

conception of repertoires of contention is plainly evident, albeit unacknowledged.

Repertoires are sustained, he argues, by widely held cultural understandings that reside not in

any one organization or leader but in a social movement’s institutional environment. This

includes a population’s standards of rights and justice, routines, internal organization, and

experience with collective action, as well as patterns of repression by institutional authorities

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(1978: 156-8). Inspired by his work, the political opportunity perspective has produced an

impressive body of research on the institutional foundations – namely, the political

institutional foundations − of much social movement behavior (for recent reviews see Meyer

and Minkoff 2004; Kriesi 2004). Yet, as criticisms of this tradition reflect, its rationalist

foundations have prevented it from taking full advantage of the institutionalist’s toolkit: it is

too narrowly focused on political institutions at the expense of other institutional contexts

(Van Dyke et al. 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Walker et al. 2008); it rests on an

unrealistic assumption of under-socialized actors, each with predetermined interests and an

efficiency-maximizing instinct (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Crossley 2003); and it holds an

emaciated view of culture (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Polletta 1999).

In this paper I present new evidence from a study of the field of social movement

organizations in Seattle, Washington between 1999 and 2005. This was a period marked by

several major events that changed the political and social landscape for social movements

across the country, as well as in Seattle. They include the unprecedented protests in Seattle

against the World Trade Organization (1999), terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), launching of

two U.S.-led wars (Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003), and two closely contested presidential

elections (2000, 2004). Two significant movements emerged during this period, a national

movement against the Iraq War and a global movement to challenge the spread of a

neoliberal political economy. What impact did these events have on the behavior of SMOs

in Seattle? Do we see evidence of rational and adaptable leadership, or do we instead see

resilience to change anchored in institutionalized tactical repertoires?

To answer these questions, I conducted interviews with 60 organizations, 39 of

which are examined here, to gather information about their activities during this period. I

am particularly interested in how organizers combine issues, tactics, and targets in their

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campaigns to influence authorities. Using correspondence analysis and techniques developed

by Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (forthcoming), I develop a sequential series of visual maps of

this field of organizations that allows us to observe macro-level changes in SMO behavior.

The maps reveal several interesting findings. Most significantly, Seattle’s social

movement field displays a remarkable degree of stability in the face of changing political

opportunities. This calls into question rationalist accounts of tactical adaptability and

provides some support for the view that tactics are rooted in the institutional environment.

They also show that, based on their choices of issues, tactics, and targets, organizations stake

claims to different parts of the field. That is, rather than choosing freely from the full range

of tactics in the repertoire, SMOs specialize in one or a few tactics which they believe are

most effective and appropriate given their chosen issues and targets. In particular, we see a

division between larger, politically-oriented, professional organizations and smaller, publicly-

oriented, voluntary organizations. This division cuts across social movements, raising

questions for political opportunity theories that treat movements as unified, homogeneous

actors. I interpret these results in light of current theories of SMO behavior and conclude

by discussing how this analysis fits into my larger dissertation project.

Social Movements, Organizations, and Fields: Seeking a Synthesis 

Organizational behavior within social movements has usually been studied from the

perspective of an undersocialized actor, one driven by predetermined interests, an

instrumental need to mobilize resources, and a desire to find the most effective tactics for a

changing political context. Social movements are thought to be extra-institutional affairs,

transgressing the boundaries of routine politics with innovative issues, actors, identities,

tactics, or targets (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

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According to Koopmans (1993: 637), “Social movements are characterized by a low degree

of institutionalization...and a volatility matched by few other social phenomena.” As such,

social movement organizations are better able to innovate and adapt to changing conditions

than other, institutionalized types of organizations (e.g., business, religious, and educational)

(McAdam 1983; Koopmans 1993; McCammon et al. 2008).

The rationalist account of organizational behavior is in some ways limited. In a

recent study of the U.S. women’s jury movement, McCammon and her colleagues (2008)

find that when movement organizations adapted to defeats and changing political and

cultural conditions they increased their speed of success. Thus, they present some evidence

that adaptation serves the presumed interests of movement actors. However, the authors

overlook the interesting fact that some women’s organizations did not adapt (including some

that persisted without adapting for 33 years!). It is difficult to see how the rational actor

account can explain these cases. Neither can it explain why SMOs sometimes adopt

unsuccessful tactics (Soule 1999) or differ in the speed with which they adopt these tactics

(Soule 1997), at least without some understanding of the larger environments within which

organizers gather, exchange, and interpret information. Nor can the rationalist account

explain persistent differences in the diverse tactics used within the same movement. The

movement to oppose the U.S.-led war in Iraq, for example, includes hundreds if not

thousands of organizations that share a common campaign issue (anti-war) and target (the

President and Congress), so they presumably face the same or similar political opportunity

structures. Yet, tactically they differ considerably. Some SMOs adopt political strategies that

include lobbying, letter-writing, testifying, and ballot initiatives while others adopt publicly-

oriented, street-style strategies of marching, rallying, and civil disobedience. A focus on the

efficiency-maximizing rational actor does not serve us well in explaining such differences.

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Organizational scholars have identified many factors that influence the behavior of

organizations, and rational decision-making to maximize efficiency is only one of them (for a

recent review see Scott 2004). Organizers also seek legitimacy in the eyes of potential

resource providers, regulatory agencies, institutional gatekeepers, and peer organizations

(Suchman 1995). They face competitive pressures from organizations that rely on the same

resources (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Their positions within interorganizational networks

(whether cooperative or antagonistic) shape which information and other resources they are

likely to encounter (Brass et al. 2004). Organizational scholars also recognized long ago that

structural inertia may inhibit organizational adaptation (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984).

These organizational theories offer powerful models for understanding organizational life

that extend beyond the individual organization to the population level and pay particular

attention to the co-constitution of organizational populations and their environments.

Moreover, they have been applied with some success to the study of social movements (e.g.,

Minkoff 1997; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Soule and King 2008; Larson and Soule 2004) and

offer the potential to extend existing theories of social movements and account for much

unexplained SMO behavior.

This study builds on these approaches by examining the entire field of social

movements in Seattle, Washington across a seven year period. A field, as the term is used

here, is a relatively autonomous domain of social action within which actors are oriented

toward a similar set of institutions and social relations. It is characterized by a relatively

stable cultural environment (although, stability need not imply conflict-free) that structures

the behavior of those within it (Levi Martin 2003). A social movement field is similar to

McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) “social movement sector,” which includes all organizations

related to all social movements in a given locale, rather than focusing on one or a few

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movements, as most studies have done. It differs, however, by recognizing that SMOs are

influenced by a much broader array of actors in their social environment, including activists

and their informal networks, charitable foundations, media, bookstores, police, activist

websites and event calendars, and service providers (e.g., of food, entertainment, legal

support for protesters). This is much closer to the “organizational field” of organizational

scholars (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) than it is to the social movement sector of resource

mobilization theorists.

Which issues are most pressing? What are the best tactics to influence institutions?

Where is the best place to target our efforts? These are contested questions, and their

diverse answers are implicit in the divergent practices of social movement groups. In the

social movement field, actors come with a set of dispositions, learned in the home and at

school, that shape their very understanding of what it means to be an activist, organize a

social movement, and to be successful (Bourdieu 1984; Crossley 2003). They are engaged in

a struggle over material and symbolic resources to set the “rules of the game” by which all

others in the field must abide (McAdam and Scott 2005). Friedland and Alford (1991) refer

to these rules as an institutional logic, which they conceptualize as a field’s organizing principles.

Some scholars see fields as dominated by one logic (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott et

al. 2000; McAdam and Scott 2005), and all field actors must conform to that logic or risk

exclusion, expulsion, failure, misunderstanding, or other negative sanctions. Others view

fields as the sites of struggle among multiple, competing logics (e.g., Bourdieu 1984; Rao

1998; Rao et al. 2000; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Mohr and Guerra-Pearson

forthcoming), with players in the field distinguishing themselves from one another by their

mastery of prestigious logics and their associated awards, connections to elites, and other

distinctions. Whether the social movement field contains one or many competing cultural

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logics is an empirical question, and it is in this spirit of investigation that the current study

examines the distribution of organizational forms (and their implicit institutional logics) in

Seattle’s social movement field.

By looking at the entire field of social movement organizations over time, we have

the opportunity to scrutinize the foundations of resource mobilization and political

opportunity theories, and to examine the utility of theories of organizational fields. With an

eye toward the underlying tension between rationalist and institutionalist traditions in the

study of social movements, this study seeks to understand organizational behavior in

Seattle’s social movement field.

The Logic of Issues, Tactics, and Targets 

A growing number of scholars view organizations as more than simply resources for

movements but also as expressions of underlying beliefs and identities (Clemens 1996;

Morrill forthcoming; Haveman and Rao 1997; Rao 1998; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000;

Schneiberg 2002; Armstrong 2002). Clemens (1993: 771), for example, writes, “As a group

organizes in a particular way, adopts a specific model of organization, it signals its identity

both to its own members and to others. Models of organization are part of the cultural tool

kit of any society and serve expressive or communicative as well as instrumental functions.”

Similarly, in their study of the early thrift industry, Haveman and Rao (1997: 1611) write that

the forms these thrifts took on “were incarnations of beliefs and values concerning saving

and home ownership.” Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (forthcoming: 4) stress, “Organizational

forms provide the containers into which the multiple dimensions of institutional life are

poured….Thus it is through the establishment and institutionalization of organizational

forms that one or another set of institutional logics comes to be anchored in place.” Seen in

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this light, organizational forms embody cultural scripts for such things as who should

organize, how they should do it, and for what purposes (Clemens 1997).

For the purposes of this study, I adopt a convention that takes account of these

symbolic and expressive aspects, incorporating both the beliefs and practices of social

movement organizations. SMOs share an organizational form to the extent that they adopt

in their challenges similar combinations of issues, tactics, and targets. Issues are the perceived

problems and proposed solutions that animate institutional challenges – e.g., worker

protections, civil rights, tax relief, protection of clean water. Tactics are the practices that

challengers perform when interacting with and attempting to influence those outside of their

ranks – e.g., lobbying, picketing, meeting with elites, destroying property, pronouncements

to the media, petitioning. Finally, targets are the objects of challengers’ campaigns that are

expected to take action on an issue – e.g., lawmakers, a private business, university

administrators, the public, the President. Each particular combination of issues, tactics, and

targets is a visible expression of what an organization’s members believe is the problem,

what should be done about it, and who is responsible for its resolution.

By examining issues, tactics, and targets together, I am breaking from the tendency

of social movement theories to treat them as independent. Research on tactics is typical of

this tendency. Among the first to explicitly examine organizational behavior in social

movements was William Gamson (1975) who conceptualized tactics as characteristics of

organized challengers who are excluded from and seek entry into the polity. This view is

echoed in many subsequent studies that claim that challengers adopt social movement forms

because they are excluded from more institutionalized avenues for making change (Tilly

1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). Gamson’s main purpose differs from ours as he sought

to explain the effects of tactics rather than their causes. However, one might infer – and it is

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consistent with rationalist accounts of social movements − that he intended to illuminate

why organizers choose one or another type of tactic by examining their relative effectiveness.

In a similar vein, Tarrow (1998) discusses the tradeoffs of each of three kinds of tactics –

conventional, disruptive, and violent − as if knowing these tradeoffs will help analysts

understand why SMOs make the (rational) decisions that they do. Charles Tilly (1978)

provides an analysis of the origins of not just a single tactic but the entire repertoire of

tactics which together we recognize as the social movement form – marches, rallies, strikes,

boycotts, etc. Like his contemporaries, Tilly also sees those excluded from the polity as

those most likely to use these tactics, and he offers an explanation of tactics rooted in

shifting political opportunities. According to this perspective, rational actors make decisions

about which tactics to use based on their interests and assessment of the political

opportunities for their success. The threat of repression, for example, is an important

component for such deliberations. One advantage of Tilly’s account is that it explains why

social movements have remained so similar across time and space since their nineteenth

century origins. An important drawback is that it doesn’t explain variation within the social

movement field, that is, why some SMOs use one set of tactics while others use a (related

but) different set.

The predominant explanation of issues is separate from, and less developed than, the

explanation of tactics. Which issue a movement takes up has not been as central to recent

social movement scholarship as has the circumstances under which aggrieved groups

collectively make their shared claims (e.g., when resources or political opportunities become

available), whatever those claims may be. The question of issues is implicitly left to an earlier

generation of theories that find that the sources of social movements’ issues are the social

strains, breakdowns, or threats that actors face (e.g., Smelser 1962; Snow et al. YEAR).

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Targets are a third component of social movement campaigns that are relevant to

organizational behavior. This is a topic that has heretofore received little empirically

systematic attention from social movement researchers. In many, if not most, studies the

targets of social movement campaigns are governments, and policy adoption is the goal.

However, this is beginning to change as some scholars recognize movements that do not

target governments or that struggle in civic rather than political arenas (e.g., Buechler 1995;

Van Dyke et al. 2004). In a rare study that recognizes a linkage between targets and tactics,

Walker et al. (2008) find that state targets tend to attract more conventional tactics while

educational and corporate targets attract more disruptive tactics. The authors attribute this

difference to structural characteristics of the targets, namely their relative power to channel

protest away from disruptive forms and their dependence on the public to sustain their

routine operations. That is, the state is less threatened by the withdrawal of popular support

than are corporations or educational institutions. These conclusions can be interpreted as

either overly deterministic (e.g., SMOs hurtle themselves unthinkingly toward whichever

target is most vulnerable) or overly rationalistic (e.g., SMOs always know precisely which

target is most vulnerable and strategically go after it). There is no room in this theory for

poor decision-making, incomplete information, legitimacy pressures, mimicry, identities,

resource competition, or individual dispositions. Still, the authors should be credited for

recognizing this understudied area and the interdependency of tactics and targets.

Although our theories view them as analytically distinct, the issues, tactics, and

targets of social movement campaigns are not independent of one another. When one

targets the state, certain tactics (e.g., lobbying, testifying, letter-writing) are likely to appear

more appropriate than others. The reverse is also true; when one employs lobbying as a

tactic, certain targets (e.g., lawmakers) appear more appropriate than others. Issues too

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shape decisions about targets and tactics. When residents oppose a decision by their city to

build a new stadium, the city (mayor or city council) may seem to be the most appropriate

target of protests. Yet, these decisions are not always as obvious as they may seem. In a

unique study of an anti-nuclear weapons campaign that targeted the local government in

Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ennis (1987) found disagreement among activists about which

tactics they supported, would participate in, and believed to be the most effective. Some

believed the most effective tactics included supporting candidates, lobbying, and non-

binding referenda, while others believed rallies, demonstrations, and civil disobedience

would be more effective. How organizers combine issues, tactics, and targets, and why they

choose one combination over another, are topics about which we have very little

understanding. Existing theories have paid them little attention and, to some extent, failed

to take them seriously. In the analysis that follows, we will take seriously these combinations

of issues, tactics, and targets and how they changes over time. In doing so we may gain

insight into the processes that shape organizational stability and change.

Data and Methods 

The data for this study come from field work conducted over the past three years.

The social movement field in question is in Seattle, Washington, city of 3 million in the U.S.

Pacific Northwest known for its vibrant history of protest. The study period begins nine

months before the city captured international headlines when a massive four-day protest in

downtown shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings, as well as downtown

Seattle. This event marked the first significant public recognition of an emerging movement

for global justice (Smith 2000). The study period ends in 2005, bracketing a dramatic seven-

year period in the U.S. political arena. In addition to the WTO event, activists in Seattle saw

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the end of the Clinton years and beginning of the Bush White House (January 2000), the

terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq

(March 2003), and the reelection of Bush (November 2004). Any one of these events could

have had a measurable impact on the social movement field in Seattle.

There is no exhaustive directory of SMOs in Seattle, many of which are loosely

structured and fleeting. So, together with a team of student assistants, and relying on

publicly available media, I compiled a list of 460 SMOs active in Seattle between 1999 and

2005. 1 We skimmed daily issues of The Seattle Times (from randomly selected months during

the study period), three online activist directories, and five online events calendars (see

Appendix A for a list of sources). In addition to having a local address (although they could

also be local affiliates of national SMOs), an organization had to meet three criteria to qualify

as a SMO:

1. Mobilize the grassroots − It calls on a mass base or membership to take action (at least

some of the time), e.g., to join a march or demonstration or write to their

representatives.

2. Work on contentious campaigns − It participates in one or more sustained, organized

campaigns (rather than one-time events) that we call “contentious” because, if

successful, they threaten someone else’s interests (Tilly 2004).

3. Are led by “outsiders” − It is a vehicle for people who lack routine access to decision-

makers (e.g., Congress, boards of directors, the mayor, school administrators).

1 I gratefully acknowledge the work of Miri Sessions, Ashley Cain, Amanda Saeed, Jill Cooper, Sarah Stanton,

Chris Mazzarella, and Steven Mitts.

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Because a random sample would most likely be dominated by tiny, ephemeral, less

influential organizations, I stratified the sample by level of visibility. Visibility was chosen as a

proxy for organizational size and prominence, data which would be prohibitively time-

consuming to collect for all 460 organizations. I define visibility here as the number of

sources (from among the eight online directories and calendars in Appendix A and The Seattle

Times) in which an organization is mentioned. SMOs were then classified as high, medium,

or low visibility and I randomly selected 20 from each category. The present analysis draws

on interviews, both in-person (75%) and by phone (25%), with representatives from 25 of

these organizations plus an additional 14 interviewed prior to selecting the random sample.

Interviews typically lasted between one-half and one-and-a-half hours and most were

recorded. I asked informants about the issues, tactics, and targets of their organization

throughout the period, the names of organizations with which their SMO works,

organizational demographic (e.g., age, size, structure), and changes in their social

environment that might have affected their activity. This method does have important

drawbacks. By relying on respondents’ recollections of past campaigns I lose a measure of

accuracy. Most of the organizational representatives with whom I spoke had worked with

their SMO throughout the study period, but some came along later and were asked to

recount an organizational history before they arrived. Almost all seemed confident that they

could do so, but I raise this as a note of caution as we interpret the results. Because I am not

asking people to recall details of their protest events but rather whether or not they engaged

in broad categories of issues, tactics, and targets, I believe that these data are of sufficient

accuracy.

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The quantitative analysis is modeled closely on Mohr and Guerra-Pearson

(forthcoming; also see Mohr and Duquenne 1997; Rawlings and Bourgeois 2004). From the

interviews I created seven matrices, one for each year, in which each row is an organization,

and each column is a particular issue, tactic, or target (see Appendix B for a list of column

categories). Cells are coded 1 if the row organization is associated with the column issue,

tactic, or target, and 0 otherwise. The number of SMOs ranges from a low of 33 in 1999 to

a high of 39 in 2003.

We are interested in not just which issues, tactics, and targets an organization

chooses but also how they combine them, and for that we need to create an ITT (Issue-

Tactic-Target) profile for each organization-year which captures these combinations. A

single organizational profile may include several combinations of issues, tactics, and targets.

So, for example, a hypothetical organization might be coded: (A8*B10*C2), (A8*B10*C5),

(A19*B1*C5), (A19*B9*C5), where the A[#] corresponds to a particular issue (e.g., peace),

B[#] to a particular tactic (e.g., march), C[#]to a particular target (e.g., the state legislature).

Each set of three represents a particular combination of issues, tactics, and targets used by

an organization. In this particular example, the organization made two different claims (8

and 19), used tactic 10 for each of them (as well as tactics 1 and 9), and aimed its campaigns

at two targets (2 and 5). We want to retain all of the partial combinations nested within the

ITT profiles so that we can observe when organizations employ the same elements. Taking

the above example further, the complete profile looks like this: (A8*B10*C2), (A8*B10*C5),

(A19*B1*C5), (A19*B9*C5), (A8*B10), (A8*C2), (A8*C5), (B10*C2), (B10*C5), (A19*B1),

(A19*B9), (A19*C5), (B1*C5), (B9*C5), (A8), (B10), (C2), (C5), (A19), (B1), (B9).

Next I created a series of square matrices of organizations-by-organizations, one for

each year. Each cell entry is a similarity score reflecting the number of A, B, C, AB, BC, AC,

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and ABC combinations shared between the row organization and column organization,

divided by the total number of combinations in the row organization’s profile. Each matrix

is then subjected to a correspondence analysis that arrays the organizations in an n-

dimensional space where the distance between organizations reflects the similarity of their

ITT profiles. These serve as annual snapshots of the social movement field in Seattle.

Results 

The social movement organizations in this analysis change very little, if at all,

between 1999 and 2005. Of the 241 observed organization-years (39 SMOs x 28 issue-

tactic-target categories), we see a change in 64 of them (27%). While one in every four

organization-years is not an insignificant rate of change, the degree of change that occurred

was miniscule. The typical change was 10% of an organization’s ITT profile. A 100%

change would be a SMO with one issue, one tactic, and one target that adds three new tactics

(or tactics or targets) to its profile. By contrast, a 10% change is illustrated by the Infernal

Noise Brigade (INB). In every year the INB participated in six issue categories (global

justice, anti-war, animal rights, environmental, labor, abortion rights, and Zapatista solidarity),

used two tactics (march, civil disobedience), and challenged one target (pubic). Twice during

the period, INB added a new target when President Bush visited Seattle in 2000 and 2004.

This type of minor change was typical of SMOs in this study, i.e., small and temporary.

These organizations stick with familiar issues, tactics, and targets, occasionally experimenting

around the margins.

Figures 1-7 provide further evidence of this at the field level. The correspondence

analyses presented here depict the distribution of organizations in each of the seven years.

We can interpret proximity between points in the graphs as similarity between organizations’

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issue-tactic-target profiles. Distance from the origin indicates increasing influence in shaping

this space. For example, in Figure 1 we see that SHARE stands out from the crowd in the

lower-left quadrant. That year (and every year), SHARE targeted the city council to provide

more low income housing and support for homeless people using a form of civil

disobedience they call tent cities in which homeless people squat illegally. WHEEL, the

most proximate organization in the graph, falls on a line between the origin and SHARE.

WHEEL is a sister organization to SHARE (they share a 501(c)3 designation) that has an

identical ITT profile, but it also organized demonstrations and targeted the state legislature,

making it more similar to other organizations. On the opposite side of the origin, SKCFOR

is a peace organization that used demonstrations to target the federal government. We can

interpret SMOs on opposite sides of the origin as having distinctively different ITT profiles.

The farther from the origin, the more distinctive they are. Each axis is labeled with the

percent of variation between organizations for which each dimension accounts (e.g., 20% on

Dimension 1 and 18.7% on Dimension 2 in 1999).

The first thing to notice is that, at the field-level, social movements in Seattle do not

change very much at all. Notice, for example, the four organizations to the left in all years,

SHARE, WHEEL, CC, and LIHI; the same organizations clustered together in the center;

EJ on the rightmost edge; NEC and SAS at the bottom. The overall pattern holds. This is

surprising when we recall the major events that punctuated this period: WTO protests in

November 1999, hotly contested elections of President Bush in 2000 and 2004, terrorist

attacks in September 2001, invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March

2003.

With regard to the WTO protests, a remarkable event by all accounts, most local

organizations did not participate. The overwhelming majority of participating organizations

20

were from out of town (WTO History Project n.d.). Few people that I interviewed

mentioned the WTO event as significant for their organization’s work, and none attributed

to this event any lasting changes in their issues, tactics, or targets. For those local SMOs that

did participate, it was often seen as a one-time occurrence. Some, like the Church Council

of Greater Seattle (CC) and Seattle Audubon Society (SAS), were well acquainted with global

economic issues before (and after) the WTO came to town, but neither had ever set their

sites on an international target. When the WTO left town, so too did their interest in

international targets. Others, like Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) and

Northwest Animal Rights Network (NARN), marching under the banner “animals are not a

trade barrier,” were new to both the issue and the target. A representative from NARN

described the event as a strategic opportunity to reach a large audience: “Anytime there’s a

big gathering of people we try to be there” (NARN interview). But like the others, when the

WTO left town, NARN reverted to familiar targets and issues. This was a common pattern

for participants in this event. By and large, the much heralded WTO protests were an

exciting but fleeting episode for Seattle’s social movement field.

The beginning of the war in Iraq was much more influential for the field, but more

for its size than its shape. In December of 2002, a group of Seattle peace activists organized

a mass meeting at an area high school. The group took the name Sound Nonviolent

Opponents of War (SNOW) and the most significant outcome of the meeting was the

emergence of more than thirty new neighborhood peace organizations, including South King

County Peace Vigil (SKCPV) and Mercer Island Peacemakers (MIPM). Of the 460

organizations identified in this research, one-quarter are explicitly peace oriented (the

number is likely higher, since for most of these organizations I have had to rely on

organization names and, when available, SMO websites to infer their issues). Of the 39

21

organizations in this study, four were campaigning for peace at the beginning of the study

period and thirteen had adopted the issue by the end of 2003. Despite this explosive growth

in the number of peace organizations marks, the social movement field changed

comparatively little. In 1999 (Fig. 1), all of the peace organization (CC, INB, SSJP,

SKCFOR) participated in demonstrations (which includes marches, rallies, pickets, and

vigils). Among the other SMOs active that year, only half used this type of tactic. That

pattern continues throughout the study period, even as the number of peace organizations

tripled. The new peace organizations that emerged by 2003 (SKCPV, CFP, SNOW,

WWVFP, MIPM), also took up the demonstration. In the graphs, they emerge in a region of

the social movement field (mostly in the upper-right quadrant) already populated by peace

organizations. Among the existing organizations that took up the peace issue in 2003

(NARN, RW, CC, SSJP), all had used demonstrations prior to that time. We can conclude

that, in Seattle’s social movement field, there is a correspondence between the peace issue

and demonstrations.

Another way to look at these graphs is to interpret the axes based on the distribution

of organizations in the field. Looking at the organizations at either extreme is helpful here.

At the top of Dimension 1 are small, volunteer-driven, publicly-oriented SMOs. Action for

Animals (AFA) is essentially a one-person show that distributes animal rights materials

(videos, books, stickers, and leaflets) to the public from the home of its director and only

regular member. He distributes nationally via the internet and, with the help of a continually

rotating cast of 15 or so student volunteers, to local restaurants, cafés, groceries, universities,

and music festivals. Donations to AFA are generally small and sporadic, aside from one

wealthy patron who supplies a steady stream of fifty dollars each month. In 2003, AFA

began to organize demonstrations targeting two local businesses, a Kentucky Fried Chicken

22

restaurant and a pet store whose animals come from dubious sources. Another organization

at the extreme of Dimension 1, Palestine Information Project (PIP), rivals AFA in smallness,

with only five regular volunteers, no budget, and no regular office space. As its name

suggests, PIP’s main activities involve distributing information to the public about the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict (with a strong pro-Palestinian emphasis). AFA and PIP are both

small organizations populated mostly by volunteers that target the public at-large.

Contrast this with the large, professional, politically-oriented SMOs at the other end

of Dimension 1. Northwest Energy Coalition (NEC) is a coalition of 100 dues-paying

member organizations that include environmental SMOs (e.g., Friends of the Earth) and

energy industry companies (e.g., Seattle City Light) from around the Northwest region. It

employs approximately 10 fulltime staff and has a 13-member volunteer board of directors

that controls an annual budget of $300-600,000. NEC advocates for the development and

implementation of clean and renewable sources of energy and to make existing energy

production more efficient. It does this through a combination of lobbying public and

private utilities, utility regulators (utility commissions), and state legislatures, testifying at

public hearings, publishing editorials, hosting press conferences, and, in 2003, NEC began

mobilizing people for a letter-writing campaign. Earthjustice (EJ; previously Sierra Club

Legal Defense Fund) is a national organization with eight regional offices, including one in

Seattle that employs eight attorneys. This organization brings lawsuits against federal

agencies on behalf of non-profit environmental SMOs to enforce environmental protection

laws. NEC and EJ are large, professional organizations that target governments.

Across all seven years, Dimension 1 distinguishes small, volunteer-driven, publicly-

oriented organizations and large, professional, politically-oriented organizations. But it also

corresponds to a tactical distinction. On the one hand are tactics variously labeled insider,

23

conventional, or institutionalized that include lobbying, testifying at public hearings, coordinated

letter-writing and phone calls, petitions, writing editorials, letters to the editor, and press

conferences. On the other hand are outsider, unconventional, confrontational, or non-institutionalized

tactics such as marches, rallies, pickets, vigils, street theater, educational forums, posting

flyers, signs and banners, distributing leaflets, videos, stickers, t-shirts, and buttons, and

running print, radio, and television advertisements. The latter are what Charles Tilly (1978)

refers to as the standard repertoire of modern social movements.

Table 1 compares the relative propensity of organizations located above and below

the origin in Figures 1-7 to use each of three insider tactics (lobby, media, letter-writing) or

three outsider tactics (education, demonstration, information distribution). The numbers

represent the percent of all possible insider or outsider tactics used by SMOs in a given year.

The denominator is the number of insider or outsider tactics (always three) times the

number of SMOs in the given region of the field (above or below the origin) each year. The

numerator is the number of insider or outsider tactics actually used by those organizations.

For example, in 1999, 11 SMOs have non-negative values on Dimension 1 (i.e., they lie

above the origin) and there are three types of insider tactics that each could possibly use.

The denominator is therefore 11 x 3 = 33. Some SMOs used all three types of tactics while

others used only one; their combined total is 21. 21/33 = 64%. It is clear from the lopsided

distribution of tactics that SMOs in the upper halves of Figures 1-7 are much more likely to

use outsider tactics and those in the lower halves are more likely to use insider tactics. This

tactical division corresponds with previous research that finds small, volunteer-driven SMOs

are prone to use outsider tactics more often than are large, professional SMOs (Staggenborg

1988; Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1999).

24

Dimension 2 distinguishes between those that target the local or federal government.

Locally-oriented SMOs, located on the left-hand side of the graphs, are more likely to use

civil disobedience and information distribution for issues related to poverty and labor.

Although it had additional issues, tactics, and targets, the Church Council (CC) is exemplary.

It worked with organizations like SHARE and WHEEL to support the illegal tent cities (i.e.,

squatter settlements for homeless people) and supported their efforts to pressure the City of

Seattle to provide more assistance to low-income and homeless people. In addition, it used

information distribution (as well as education and demonstrations) in its living-wage

campaign to benefit local workers (other issues included peace, immigration, racism, and

debt relief for poor countries). By contrast, federally-oriented SMOs on the right-hand side

tend to be environmentalists that host press conferences, write op-eds, testify at public

hearings, and coordinate mass letter-writing and phone call campaigns to influence Congress

and other federal government targets.

Taken together these two dimensions depicted in Figures 1-7 present a fairly

consistent, stable picture of a social movement field divided between different types of social

movement activity. There is no one way to “do” activism in Seattle. Rather, there are

competing visions of which issues, tactics, and targets should be adopted and combined.

The field seems to be divided into three regions, roughly corresponding to the upper-right,

lower-right, and lower-left quadrants in the graphs. In the upper-right are small, volunteer-

driven SMOs that tend to target the public using so-called outsider tactics (e.g., march, rally,

leafleting, banners, educational forums). In the lower two quadrants are large, professional

SMOs with paid staffs, large memberships, ample budgets, and permanent office space.

Those to the left are more concerned about materialist issues (Inglehart YEAR) of poverty,

homelessness, and labor, and, compared to their counterparts on the lower-right, are more

25

likely to target the local government (city or county officials) using civil disobedience and

information distribution. Those to the right are more concerned with post-materialist issues

of environmental protection and are more likely to target the federal government using

media tactics (e.g., press conferences, op-eds, letters to the editor).

Discussion & Conclusion 

“If there is a single element that distinguishes social movements from other political

actors…it is the strategic use of novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and noninstitutionalized forms of

political expression to try to shape public opinion and put pressure on those in positions of

authority” (emphasis added; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 263). This statement from a recent

review article on tactics is potentially misleading in two important ways. First, it denies the

possibility that social movement forms, no matter how dramatic and unorthodox they may

appear to be, are institutionalized. This is difficult to reconcile with studies of the repertoire

of contention (Tilly 1978; Traugott 1995; Tarrow 1998) which show that social movements

have been making use of the same basic set of forms for the past two hundred years.

Second, it assumes a level of rationality among social movement organizers that denies the

non-strategic aspects of SMO behavior. The role of collective identities (Polletta 2002;

Bernstein 2002), imitation (Soule 1997), and the expressive aspects of organizing (Clemens

1996, 1997) are discounted. The statement does, however, accurately reflect the main

current of social movement research over the past thirty years which has been grounded in a

rationalist tradition and in the presupposition that movements are extra-institutional affairs.

However, for at least as long, there has also been an alternative current of social movement

research that, while not as explicit in our theoretical frameworks, is rooted in an

institutionalist tradition (e.g., Tilly 1978; Traugott 1995; Clemens 1997; Tarrow 1998; Moore

26

1999; Armstrong 2002; Polletta 2002). It sees social movements as shaped by widely held

cultural understandings in their institutional environment. In this paper, we have asked a

question for which the rationalist and institutionalist traditions suggest different answers:

How do social movement organizations make decisions about the issues, tactics, and targets

of their campaigns? If we follow a field of SMOs over time, can we see evidence of rational

and adaptable leadership, or resilience to change anchored in institutionalized beliefs and

practices?

The field of organizations examined here includes 460 SMOs active in Seattle,

Washington between 1999 and 2005. Based on interviews with representatives from 39 of

these and quantitative analyses of change at both the organizational and field levels, the

pattern that emerges is one of remarkable stability. It is remarkable in that this period was

marked by a series of dramatic events in the political arena including anti-WTO protests in

1999, closely contested presidential elections in 2000 and 2004, terrorist attacks in 2001, and

the beginning of wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Although most organizations

did change during this period, these changes amounted to little more than minor, temporary

perturbations from their generally stable repertoires. This pattern is borne out at the field

level too where the most significant change is quantitative rather than qualitative – i.e., the

number of anti-war SMOs increases dramatically, but the shape of the field remains the same.

Should we be surprised by this lack of change? The answer is certainly yes, if we rely

on the dominant accounts of SMO behavior exemplified by resource mobilization and

political opportunity theories. Their rationalist roots presume strategic leaders who adapt to

changing political circumstances in search of success. Critics may argue that perhaps a

longer or different study period (e.g., during the peak of a protest cycle) would provide a

different picture. However, this is not the first study to find that organizations sometimes

27

do not adapt, even in the face of failure (e.g., McCammon et al. 2008). Furthermore, we

know that SMO leaders commonly loathe experimenting with novel tactics that may threaten

their organization’s survival (e.g., Michels 1962 [1911]; Piven and Cloward 1977).

Organizational scholars would not be surprised by the lack of change. They have

long known that organizations are bound to familiar and reliable routines by such things as

acquired skill sets, capital investments, and limited information. Members of organizations

accumulate experience, develop habits and conventions, and establish normative and

professional commitments that inhibit change. Trusted relationships within and between

organizations and institutional claims to legitimacy may all be threatened when an

organization changes, potentially opening it to a renewed “liability of newness”

(Stinchcombe 1965; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Some argue that when change does occur

it occurs at the population level, where organizational turnover (i.e., births and deaths),

rather than adaptations by rational managers, is the engine of change (Hannan and Freeman

1977, 1989). This may in fact be what we would observe in Seattle’s social movement field

over a longer period of time. Others see the source of inertia in the taken-for-granted beliefs

and institutional pressures organizations face to conform to the most socially acceptable

ways of behaving (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2001). In this view, organizations resist

change when they are limited by legal, normative, and cultural expectations in the

institutional environment. Deviating from the established models of behavior risks one’s

legitimacy and, with it, the support of others.

The institutionalist perspective, which is consistent with the organizational and field

stability we see here, can be found in Tilly’s (1978, 1986, 1995b) studies of repertoires of

contention. He argues that the stability of repertoires is rooted in the widely held cultural

understandings that reside in an organization’s institutional environment, rather than the

28

rational decisions of leaders alone. Tilly (1995a: 26-7) writes, “At any particular point in

history…[people] learn only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively.”

The limits of that learning, plus the fact that potential collaborators and antagonists

likewise have learned a relatively limited set of means, constrain the choices available

for collective action. The means, furthermore, articulate with and help shape a

number of social arrangements that are not part of the collective action itself, but

channel it to some degree: police practices, laws of assembly, rules of association,

routines for informal gatherings, ways of displaying symbols of affiliation, opposition,

or protest, means of reporting news, and so on. By analogy with a jazz musician's

improvisations or the impromptu skits of a troupe of strolling players (rather than,

say, the more confining written music interpreted by a string quartet), people in a

given place and time learn to carry out a limited number of alternative collective-

action routines, adapting each one to the immediate circumstances and to the

reactions of antagonists, authorities, allies, observers, objects of their action, and

other people somehow involved in the struggle.

Many of the institutional locations Tilly mentions (e.g., laws of assembly, police practices) are

found in the political field, but others are more characteristic of the social movement field.

How a group displays symbols of protest, for example, depends on how they and others

before them have done it. Sitting at a lunch counter in open defiance of local customs and

Jim Crow laws is a symbolic display that is meaningful in a particular context of the U.S.

South, the 1950s, and the civil rights movement. Of course, the Indian independence

movement had popularized similar tactics in the previous three decades (Chabot 2000). As

29

Tilly says, movement organizers know how to organize a sit-in and they know that their

antagonists, authorities, allies, and observers will understand what they are doing. These

social movement traditions reside not in state houses and parliaments, but in the experiences,

organizations, and networks of activists, antagonists, authorities, and other audiences of

social movements, received histories about prior movements, organizational models, training

academies, manuals, and artwork. The social movement field entails all actors (whether

people, organizations, or movements) oriented toward the same set of institutions, most

notably, the social movement, including its distinctive issues, tactics, and targets.

Jepperson (1991) reminds us that institutions are actually ongoing processes in which

departures from standard patterns of interaction are routinely counteracted by some set of

socially constructed rewards and sanctions. What are these routines, these rewards and

sanctions that lead to SMO stability, even in the face of a changing political context? Where

should we be looking for them? Most social movement research pays more attention to the

minor adaptations of social movement actors than the institutional rewards and sanctions

that limit the range of those adaptations. In Seattle, organizations did change their

combinations of issues, tactics, and targets (e.g., targeting the President when he visits

Seattle), but those changes amounted to little more than minor, temporary experimentation

around the margins. Most organizations quickly returned to the combinations with which

they were most familiar. If it is true that novelty and disruption are the strongest weapons of

social movements, these experiments might prove to be the most important objects of study.

On the other hand, if most of the work that social movements do is in fact institutionalized

(i.e., routinely constrained by a set of rewards and sanctions), then we should ask what is

inhibiting novelty and disruption.

30

This study has shown that SMOs that operate in very disparate contexts, as reflected

in the many issues they address (e.g., anti-war, animal rights, abortion, Zapatista solidarity,

pro-Cuba, global justice). Each issue orients them toward a different field of potential

antagonists, allies, authorities, and cultural exigencies, and each field exerts pressures to

conform to its organizing principles. Yet, SMOs in very different movements commonly

adopt the same or similar combinations of issues, tactics, and targets. In other words, their

contexts differ but their forms (to a large degree) do not. What then do all of these

organizations have in common that might lead them to adopt similar forms? I believe the

social movement field may be the answer. It is in this field that, as Tilly (1995: 26) says, the

means of acting collectively “articulate with and help shape a number of social arrangements

that are not part of the collective action itself, but channel it to some degree.”

To really understand the dynamics within the social movement field, we would need

a study that examined all of the actors that populate the field, including but not limited to

police, regulators, media, training academies, donors, activists, and SMOs, and the relations

between them. Such a study would recognize that activists in the social movement field have

dispositions that do not stop at the picket line, but reach into their daily lives, their style of

dress, choice of occupation, racial or gender identities, what they read, where they shop,

what they eat (Crossley 2003; McAdam 1988; Armstrong 2002; Polletta 2002). The field of

must be seen as part of a long history of movements, one that transcends movement

boundaries, and which has existed in roughly the same form since the abolitionists of the

eighteenth century (Tilly 2004).

There is not just one culture, however. As we have seen here and elsewhere

(Koopmans 1993; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; McAdam et al. 2005), some members of the

social movement field are more embedded in and influenced by the political field than others.

31

Some organizations are simultaneously embedded in the political and social movement fields

and are therefore subject to two sets of institutional pressures. These pressures may

complement or contradict one another (Friedland and Alford 1991). In fact, some believe

that it is here, in the interstices between fields, where the seeds of real social change lie

(Clemens 1997; Clemens and Cook 1999; Morrill forthcoming). The pressures of the

political field have a dampening effect on movement disruptiveness and a professionalizing

effect on organizational structures (Staggenborg 1988; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Pressures

from the social movement field may promote democratic participation in SMOs (Polletta

2002), or lead SMOs to differentiate their tactics from those of more prominent SMOs

(Bearman and Everett 1993).

Those outside of the political field tend to stay small, rely on volunteers, engage in

“outsider” tactics like marches, rallies, and leafleting, and target the public. Those touched

by the political field grow large, hire professional staff, maintain offices, adopt “insider”

tactics like lobbying, testifying, and letter-writing, and target governments. Within the latter

group there appears to be another division between, on the one hand, poverty- and labor-

related groups embedded in the local political field and more open to outsider tactics, and,

on the other hand, environmental groups embedded in the national political field and who

adhere most closely to insider tactics. Unlike previous studies that have found SMOs to face

pressures of “institutionalization” (by which they mean political institutionalization), SMOs

in Seattle do not appear to be adapting to the concessions and repression doled out by

political authorities (Koopmans 1993; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; McAdam et al. 2005).

Instead, they seem to have found a set of issues, tactics, and targets with which they are

familiar, which they believe are effective, and which seem appropriate, and they stick with

them.

32

Appendix A. List of Sources

 Calendars 

1. Eat the State! http://eatthestate.org/

2. Seattle Community Network, "P&J Events, Seattle Area"

http:/www.scn.org/activism/calendar/

3. Seattle Activism, "Latest Additions" http:/www.seattleactivism.org/latest.asp

4. Church Council of Greater Seattle

http:/www.churchcouncilseattle.org/calendar.htm

5. SNOW Event Listing http:/www.snowcoalition.org/site/events

Directories 

1. Seattle Community Network, "Activism" http:/www.scn.org/activism/

2. Seattle Activism, "Organizations"

http:/www.seattleactivism.org/links.asp

3. Food Not Bombs Seattle http:/www.scn.org/foodnotbombs/

33

Appendix B. Categories of issues, tactics, and targets. 

  No. of organization‐

years Issues  Boycott 13 Ballot initiative 13 Lawsuit 29 Civil disobedience (sit-in, blockade, tent city) 57 Education (speakers, panel discussion, film) 91 Demonstration (picket, march, rally, vigil, concert, street theater) 141 Information distribution (leafleting, tabling, flyers, advertisements, clothing) 123 Lobby (meetings with officials, testifying at public hearings) 146 Media (press conference, op-ed, letters-to-the-editor) 84 Letter-writing (letters, petitions, phone calls)

136

Tactics  Animal rights 28 Peace 60 Environment 77 Poverty/homelessness 49 Immigration 30 Urban/transportation (alternative transportation, urban growth) 14 Labor 47 Abortion (pro-choice) 14 Racism (anti-racism, affirmative action) 16 Foreign policy/politics (U.S. foreign policy, Cuban embargo, Isreali-

Palestine conflict, E. Timor relief, Zapatistas)

58

Targets  International (WTO, World Bank) 15 Business (Caterpillar Inc., Boeing Corp.) 65 Non-profit organization (Woodland Park Zoological Society) 1 Federal government (President, Congress, Dept. of Treasury, FCC) 99 State government (Governor, legislature, Dept. of Health) 109 Local government (Mayor, city council, county council, animal control) 98 School (university, school board, superintendent) 52 Public at-large (voters, veterans, Catholics) 113

34

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WTO History Project. N.d. […]

Table 1. Relative propensity of SMOs to use insider and outsider tactics.* 

Insider Tactics† Outsider Tactics††

Above origin

Below origin Above

origin Below origin

1999 64 33 15 65 2000 62 33 21 65 2001 67 30 19 67 2002 57 32 18 67 2003 62 43 14 67 2004 61 43 19 68 2005 69 40 15 65

Mean 63 36 17 66

* Numbers represent the percent of all possible insider or outsider tactics used by SMOs in a given region of Figures 1-7.

† Insider tactics are grouped into three categories (lobbying, media, letter-writing) which encompass lobbying, testifying, writing editorials and letters-to-the-editor, press conferences, coordinated letter-writing and phone calling, and petitions.

†† Outsider tactics are grouped into three categories (education, demonstration, information distribution) encompassing educational forums (e.g., panel discussions, film screenings, lectures), dinners/banquets, ceremonies, pickets, marches, rallies, theater, vigils, posting flyers/signs/banners, wearing or distributing clothing (e.g., t-shirts, hats), tabling, and print, radio, and television advertisements.  

 

Table 2. Relative propensity of SMOs to target the public at‐large and governments.* 

Target Public Target Govt.

Above origin

Below origin Above

origin Below origin

1999 73 20 27 47 2000 86 14 26 60 2001 86 21 19 45 2002 87 20 20 48 2003 86 35 14 54 2004 87 24 21 54 2005 85 30 23 62

Mean 84 23 21 53

* Numbers represent the percent of SMOs in a given region of Figures 1-7 to target the public or a local, state, or federal government.

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

ETAN

FW

INB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTMSASSHARE

SCFC

SSJPSPEEA

SKCFOR

TUTCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

-2-1

01

23

Dim

ensi

on 1

(20.

0%)

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2Dimension 2 (18.7%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

1999

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

ETAN

FW

INB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTMSASSHARE

SCFC

SSJPSPEEA

SKCFOR

TUTCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

-2-1

01

23

Dim

ensi

on 1

(20.

0%)

-2 -1 0 1 2Dimension 3 (13.9%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

1999

Figure 1. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 33)

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

ETAN

FW

INB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SKCFOR

TU

TCCTPL

WHEEL WAC

WECWAJWJ

WWC

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

2.0%

)

-6 -4 -2 0 2Dimension 2 (15.7%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2000

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

ETAN

FW

INB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SKCFOR

TU

TCCTPLWHEELWAC

WEC WAJWJ

WWC

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

2.0%

)

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2Dimension 3 (11.6%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2000

Figure 2. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 33)

AFA

CC

COA

CN

EJ

ETAN

FW

HFZINB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SASSHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SKCFOR

TUTCC

TPLWHEEL

WACWECWAJWJ

WWC

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

4.2%

)

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4Dimension 2 (15.2%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2001

AFA

CC

COA

CN

EJ

ETAN

FW

HFZINB

LIHI

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SASSHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SKCFOR

TU

TCCTPL

WHEEL

WAC

WECWAJWJ

WWC

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

4.2%

)

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2Dimension 3 (11.5%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2001

Figure 3. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 35)

AFA

CC

COA

CN

EJ

FW

HFZINB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SASSHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SNOW

SKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJ

WWC

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

2.6%

)

-6 -4 -2 0 2Dimension 2 (15.3%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2002

AFA

CC

COA

CN

EJ

FW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSC

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SNOW

SKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCC

TPL

WHEEL

WAC

WEC

WAJWJ

WWC

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

2.6%

)

-3 -2 -1 0 1 2Dimension 3 (10.5%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2002

Figure 4. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 36)

AFA

CFP

CC

COA

CN

EJ

FW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPMMAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SNOWSKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJ WWC

WWVFP

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

5.4%

)

-6 -4 -2 0 2Dimension 2 (16.6%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2003

AFA

CFP

CC

COA

CN

EJ

FW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPMMAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SNOWSKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCCTPL

WHEEL

WAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

WWVFP

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

5.4%

)

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1Dimension 3 (10.6%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2003

Figure 5. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 39)

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

FW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SNOWSKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCCTPL

WHEELWACWEC

WAJWJ WWC

WWVFP

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

6.1%

)

-20246Dimension 2 (16.6%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2004

AFA

CC

COA

CN

EJ

FW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SF

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SNOWSKCFORSKCPV

TU

TCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

WWVFP

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

5D

imen

sion

1 (2

6.1%

)

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1Dimension 3 (10.8%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2004

Figure 6. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 39)

AFA

CC

COA

CN EJFW

HFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSCPAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SASSHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SNOWSKCFORSKCPV

TUTCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

WWVFP

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

6.6%

)

-4-2024Dimension 2 (14.3%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2005

AFA

CC

COA

CNEJ

FWHFZ

INB

LIHI

MIPM

MAS

NARN

NEC

PIP

PSC

PAWS

PSEW

RW

RTM

SAS

SHARE

SCFC

SSJP

SPEEA

SNOWSKCFOR

SKCPV

TUTCCTPL

WHEELWAC

WEC

WAJWJWWC

WWVFP

-2-1

01

2D

imen

sion

1 (2

6.6%

)

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1Dimension 3 (11.0%)

coordinates in symmetric normalization

2005

Figure 7. Correspondence analysis of social movement organizations in Seattle,based on similarities of issues, tactics, and targets. (N = 38)