structuring special purpose securitization vehicles to attain...
TRANSCRIPT
Structuring Special Purpose Securitization Vehicles to Attain Bankruptcy Remoteness Avoiding Substantive Consolidation and Achieving True Sale With SPVs
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2013
Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A
John C. Keith, Attorney, Valensi Rose, Los Angeles
Michael V. Blumenthal, Partner, Thompson & Knight, New York
Demetra L. Liggins, Partner, Thompson & Knight, Houston
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Structuring Special Purpose
Securitization Vehicles to Obtain
Bankruptcy Remoteness
Michael Blumenthal John C. Keith
Demetra Liggins
999999.999999 ACTIVE 6105481.4
● Pretty self-explanatory: the status of being
remote – or insulated – from the prospect of a
bankruptcy or the effects of a bankruptcy.
● Probably for as long as there has been a
bankruptcy law, creditors have attempted to
insulate themselves from the impact of that
law.
What is bankruptcy remoteness?
6
● Bankruptcy affects the balance of power between
debtors and creditors, by providing debtors with
substantial protections.
● Bankruptcy affects the balance of power between
different creditors, who must compete for the limited
resources of the debtor within the confines of the
bankruptcy law.
● Examples:
● Automatic stay
● Discharge of prepetition debts
Why does bankruptcy remoteness matter?
7
● The terms “special purpose entity” (“SPE”) and “special purpose
vehicle” (“SPV”) are used interchangeably.
● "A SPE is an independent legal entity that can be used to mitigate
the disruption caused by a bankruptcy filing by all or some of the
members of a corporate group.”
● "Ideally, the SPE will be a newly created” business entity, and,
"most commonly, SPEs are either limited partnerships or limited
liability companies.”
● Samantha J. Rothman, Lessons from General Growth Properties: The
Future of the Special Purpose Entity, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L.
227, 229-30 (2012).
What is a bankruptcy remote special purpose
entity/vehicle?
8
● SPEs are a securitization tool for lenders.
● “[T]he new entity will take title to the property that
serves as collateral for the loan. Transferring the
property collateral to the [SPE] accomplishes the goal
of separating the property collateral from the
bankruptcy risks of its prior owner.”
● Adam B. Weissburg & John Matthew Trott, Special Purpose
Bankruptcy Remote Entities, Los Angeles Lawyer (January 2004).
What is a bankruptcy remote special purpose
entity/vehicle?
9
● "The SPE's corporate documents will generally contain restrictive
provisions requiring that the SPE be limited to its stated purpose
of holding the collateral assets,” thereby "reducing the risk of the
SPE becoming insolvent.”
● "In addition, a SPE's bankruptcy remote provisions will also
generally require that in order to file for bankruptcy voluntarily,
there must be unanimous consent of the SPE's directors or
partners with an 'independent' director, partner, or managing
member of the SPE," who is generally "designated by the lender
and can presumably veto any suggestion of the SPE filing a
voluntary bankruptcy petition.”
● Samantha J. Rothman, Lessons from General Growth Properties: The
Future of the Special Purpose Entity, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L.
227, 230-32 (2012).
What is a bankruptcy remote special purpose
entity/vehicle?
10
● Ratings agencies, large loan originators and other
major market players (collectively, the “rated market”)
view the SPE structure as important for ensuring that
an SPE’s creditors will not potentially compete with
creditors of another entity.
Why do lenders care?
11
● The means by which lenders have endeavored to
achieve bankruptcy remoteness have developed over
the years.
● Although by now an established securitization tool for
lenders, bankruptcy remote SPVs are, in the long view,
a recent permutation of these endeavors.
● Earlier efforts focused on advance contractual waivers
of the protections of bankruptcy law, which were met
with judicial hostility.
Why did SPEs/SPVs emerge as a tool to
achieve bankruptcy remoteness?
12
● Advance waivers of the right to file bankruptcy are
unenforceable.
● “To sustain a contractual obligation of this character
would frustrate the object of the Bankruptcy Act.”
● The “Bankruptcy Act would in the natural course of
business be nullified in the vast majority of debts
arising out of contracts, if this were permissible.”
● In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (citing Fed. Nat.
Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157 (1925).
Judicial Hostility to Waivers of Bankruptcy Law
Protections
13
● "It is a well settled principal that an advance
agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the
bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public
policy.”
● In re Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1983).
Judicial Hostility to Waivers of Bankruptcy Law
Protections
14
● Waivers of specific bankruptcy protections are also unenforceable.
● Automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362)
● In re Shady Grove Tech Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 216 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) (“self-executing clauses in pre-petition agreements purporting to provide that no automatic stay arises in a bankruptcy case are contrary to law and hence unenforceable, and ... self-executing clauses in prepetition agreements ... to vacate the automatic stay are likewise unenforceable.").
● In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 435 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("The Bankruptcy Code pre-empts the private right to contract around its essential provisions, such [as] those found in 11 U.S.C. § 362.")
Judicial Hostility to Waivers of Bankruptcy Law
Protections
15
● Waivers of specific bankruptcy protections are also unenforceable.
● Right to a discharge or to discharge particular debts.
● Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19, 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979) ("It is a well settled principle that an advance agreement to waive the benefit of a discharge in bankruptcy is wholly void, as against public policy.").
● Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 222 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("As a matter of superseding federal bankruptcy policy ... , a prepetition waiver of a discharge of a particular debt or of all debts is against public policy and unenforceable.")
Judicial Hostility to Waivers of Bankruptcy Law
Protections
16
● Ipso facto clauses are also unenforceable.
● “An ipso facto clause is a provision in an executory
contract or unexpired lease that results in a breach
solely due to the financial condition or the bankruptcy
filing of a party.”
● “Such clauses are generally unenforceable in
bankruptcy."
● In re Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 652 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998)
Judicial Hostility to Waivers of Bankruptcy Law
Protections
17
● Why an SPE?
● Preserve separateness and avoid substantive consolidation
● Limit other potential liabilities
● Limit ability to file bankruptcy
● Sole purpose is to own the property or assets being financed
● In purpose section
● May do all other things necessary in connection with owning and operation
SPE’s AND NECESSARY PROVISIONS
18
● Limitations and Affirmative Obligations while loan outstanding
● Maintain separate books and records
● File own tax returns, if applicable
● Will not commingle assets with any other Person
● Maintain separate financial statements
● Pay its own liabilities
● Will not guarantee or pledge its assets for benefit or obligations of any other Person
Limitations & Affirmative Obligations
19
● Cannot file Bankruptcy (sometimes called Material Action)
without unanimous consent of Members and Independent
Manager(s)
− Includes state law receiverships or other similar proceedings
● May not dissolve
● Cannot make distribution in violation of loan documents
Limitations & Affirmative Obligations
20
● Cannot modify or repeal SPE provisions of
LLC/Operating Agreement without lender consent,
including the following provisions
● Waiver of right to partition
● SPE provisions are for benefit of creditors
● Any amendments shall be subject to required SPE provisions
Limitations & Affirmative Obligations
21
Limitations on the Company's Activities.
(i) This Section is being adopted in order to comply with certain provisions required in
order to qualify the Company as a "special purpose" entity.
(ii) The Member shall not, so long as any Obligation is outstanding, amend, alter, change or
repeal the definition of "Independent Manager" or [the special member, purpose, powers,
management, independent manager, distributions, exculpation and indemnification, assignments,
resignation, admission of additional members, dissolution, waiver of partition/nature of interest,
benefits of agreement/no third party rights, amendments, and definitions sections of the LLC
agreement] without the unanimous written consent of the Independent Managers. [Any
amendment, alteration, change or repeal of provisions in this agreement shall be subject to this
Section.]
(iii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement and any provision of law that
otherwise so empowers the Company, the Member or any Officer or any other Person, so long as
any Obligation is outstanding, neither the Member nor any Officer nor any other Person shall be
authorized or empowered, nor shall they permit the Company, without the prior unanimous written
consent of the Member and all Independent Managers, to take any Material Action, provided,
however, that, so long as any Obligation is outstanding, the Member may not authorize the taking
of any Material Action, unless there are at least two Independent Managers then serving in such
capacity.
Limitations and Affirmative Obligations:
Sample Provision
22
(iv) The Member shall cause the Company to do or cause to be done all things necessary to
preserve and keep in full force and effect its existence, rights (charter and statutory) and franchises.
The Member also shall cause the Company to:
(A) maintain its own separate books and records and bank accounts;
(B) at all times hold itself out to the public as a legal entity separate from the Member and any
other Person;
(C) file its own tax returns, if any, as may be required under applicable law, to the extent (1)
not part of a consolidated group filing a consolidated return or returns or (2) not treated as a division
for tax purposes of another taxpayer, and pay any taxes so required to be paid under applicable law;
(D) except as contemplated by the Transaction Documents, not commingle its assets with
assets of any other Person;
(E) conduct its business in its own name and strictly comply with all organizational
formalities to maintain its separate existence;
(F) maintain separate financial statements;
(G) pay its own liabilities only out of its own funds, provided, however, the foregoing shall not
require the Member to make any additional capital contributions to the Company;
Limitations and Affirmative Obligations:
Sample Provision
23
(H) maintain an arm's length relationship with its Affiliates and the Member;
(I) pay the salaries of its own employees, if any, provided, however, the foregoing shall not
require the Member to make any additional capital contributions to the Company;
(J) not hold out its credit or assets as being available to satisfy the obligations of others;
(K) allocate fairly and reasonably any overhead for shared office space;
(L) use separate stationery, invoices and checks;
(M) except as contemplated by the Transaction Documents, not pledge its assets for the
benefit of any other Person;
(N) correct any known misunderstanding regarding its separate identity; and
(O) maintain adequate capital in light of its contemplated business purpose, transactions and
liabilities, provided, however, the foregoing shall not require the Member to make any additional
capital contributions to the Company.
Failure of the Company, or the Member on behalf of the Company, to comply with any of the
foregoing covenants or any other covenants contained in this Agreement shall not affect the status
of the Company as a separate legal entity or the limited liability of the Member.
Limitations and Affirmative Obligations:
Sample Provision
24
(v) So long as any Obligation is outstanding, the Member shall not cause or permit the
Company to:
(A) except as contemplated by the Transaction Documents, guarantee any obligation of
any Person, including any Affiliate;
(B) engage, directly or indirectly, in any business other than the actions required or
permitted to be performed under Section [the single-purpose provision], the Transaction
Documents or this Section;
(C) incur, create or assume any indebtedness other than as expressly permitted under
the Transaction Documents;
(D) make or permit to remain outstanding any loan or advance to, or own or acquire any
stock or securities of, any Person, except that the Company may invest in those investments
permitted under the Transaction Documents and may make any advance required or expressly
permitted to be made pursuant to any provisions of the Transaction Documents and permit the
same to remain outstanding in accordance with such provisions;
(E) to the fullest extent permitted by law, engage in any dissolution, liquidation,
consolidation, merger, asset sale or transfer of ownership interests other than such activities
as are expressly permitted pursuant to any provision of the Transaction Documents and
subject to obtaining any approvals required under this Agreement; or
(F) except as contemplated or permitted by the Transaction Documents, form, acquire
or hold any subsidiary (whether corporate, partnership, limited liability company or other).
Limitations and Affirmative Obligations:
Sample Provision
25
● Independent manager – sometimes two, depending upon size
of deal
● Must consider only interests of company, including its
creditors
● Excludes consideration of Member(s) and Affiliate interests
● But consider duty of good faith
● Exculpation except for bad faith or willful misconduct
● Resignation ineffective until successor
● Cannot remove unless notice which names successor
Independent Managers
26
Independent Manager.
As long as any Obligation is outstanding, the Member shall cause the Company at all
times to have at least two Independent Managers who will be appointed by the Member.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, including Section 18-1101(c) of the Act, and
notwithstanding any duty otherwise existing at law or in equity, the Independent
Managers shall consider only the interests of the Company, including its creditors, in
acting or otherwise voting on the matters referred to in Section 9(d)(iii). Except for
duties to the Company as set forth in the immediately preceding sentence (including
duties to the Member and the Company’s creditors solely to the extent of their
respective economic interests in the Company but excluding (i) all other interests of the
Member, (ii) the interests of other Affiliates of the Company, and (iii) the interests of any
group of Affiliates of which the Company is a part), the Independent Managers shall not
have any fiduciary duties to the Member or any other Person bound by this Agreement;
provided, however, the foregoing shall not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. To the fullest extent permitted by law, including Section 18-
1101(e) of the Act, an Independent Manager shall not be liable to the Company, the
Member or any other Person bound by this Agreement for breach of contract or breach
of duties (including fiduciary duties), unless the Independent Manager acted in bad faith
or engaged in willful misconduct.
Independent Managers: Sample Provision
27
No resignation or removal of an Independent Manager, and no appointment of a
successor Independent Manager, shall be effective until such successor shall have
accepted his or her appointment as an Independent Manager by executing a counterpart
to this Agreement. In the event of a vacancy in the position of Independent Manager, the
Member shall, as soon as practicable, appoint a successor Independent Manager.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, no Independent
Manager shall be removed or replaced unless the Company provides the Lender with no
less than two (2) business days' prior written notice of (a) any proposed removal of such
Independent Manager, and (b) the identity of the proposed replacement Independent
Manager, together with a certification that such replacement satisfies the requirements
for a Independent Manager set forth in this Agreement. All right, power and authority of
the Independent Managers shall be limited to the extent necessary to exercise those
rights and perform those duties specifically set forth in this Agreement. Except as
provided in the second sentence of this Section 10, in exercising their rights and
performing their duties under this Agreement, any Independent Manager shall have a
fiduciary duty of loyalty and care similar to that of a director of a business corporation
organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. No Independent
Manager shall at any time serve as trustee in bankruptcy for any Affiliate of the Company.
An Independent Manager is hereby designated as a "manager" within the meaning of
Section 18-101(10) of the Act.
Independent Managers: Sample Provision
28
● Special Member
● If borrower is a sole member entity then a special member needs
to spring into existence – Independent Manager becomes
special member
● Avoids liquidation or dissolution
Special Members
29
Members.
Upon the occurrence of any event that causes the Member to cease to be a member of the
Company (other than upon continuation of the Company without dissolution upon (i) an
assignment by the Member of all of its limited liability company interest in the Company and
the admission of the transferee pursuant to [the assignments and admission of additional
members sections of the LLC agreement], or (ii) the resignation of the Member and the
admission of an additional member of the Company pursuant to the resignation and
admission of additional members sections of the LLC agreement]), each Person acting as an
Independent Manager pursuant to [the independent manager section of the LLC agreement]
shall, without any action of any Person and simultaneously with the Member ceasing to be a
member of the Company, automatically be admitted to the Company as a Special Member and
shall continue the Company without dissolution. No Special Member may resign from the
Company or transfer its rights as Special Member unless (i) a successor Special Member has
been admitted to the Company as Special Member by executing a counterpart to this
Agreement, and (ii) such successor has also accepted its appointment as Independent
Manager pursuant to [the independent manager section of the LLC agreement]; provided,
however, the Special Members shall automatically cease to be members of the Company upon
the admission to the Company of a substitute Member.
Special Members: Sample Provision
30
Each Special Member shall be a member of the Company that has no interest in the
Company’s profits, losses and capital and has no right to receive any distributions of
Company assets. Pursuant to Section 18-301 of the Act, a Special Member shall not be
required to make any capital contributions to the Company and shall not receive a limited
liability company interest in the Company. A Special Member, in its capacity as Special
Member, may not bind the Company. Except as required by any mandatory provision of the
Act, each Special Member, in its capacity as Special Member, shall have no right to vote on,
approve or otherwise consent to any action by, or matter relating to, the Company, including,
without limitation, the merger, consolidation or conversion of the Company. In order to
implement the admission to the Company of each Special Member, each Person acting as an
Independent Manager pursuant to Section 10 shall execute a counterpart to this Agreement.
Prior to its admission to the Company as Special Member, each Person acting as an
Independent Manager pursuant to Section 10 shall not be a member of the Company.
Special Members: Sample Provision
31
● Substantive Consolidation
● True Sale vs. Fraudulent Transfer
Issues Arising From Bankruptcy of Transferor
What is substantive consolidation?
● Substantive consolidation is a judicially created
doctrine that results in consolidating the assets and
liabilities of different entities by merging such
entities’ assets and liabilities and treating the related
entities as a consolidated entity for purposes of
distribution in a bankruptcy case.
33
● The assets of the debtor and its consolidated affiliates
will be treated as common assets.
● Creditors of each entity all hold claims against the
common assets of the consolidated entity.
● Inter-entity claims against each entity that has been
consolidated will be eliminated.
Effects on the parties and the transaction
34
Borrower SPE
LLC
99% LLC Member
1% SPE Member
Corporation A (operating company)
35
Borrower SPE
LLC
99% LLC Member
1% SPE Member
Corporation A (operating company)
36
THREE TESTS (and variations) COURTS HAVE USED
IN SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION ANALYSIS
1. The Owens Corning standard in the Third Circuit;
2. The Augie/Restivo standard in the Second Circuit;
3. The Auto-Train standard in the DC Circuit.
37
● Under the Owens Corning standard, a proponent of
substantive consolidation must establish:
● the entities pre-petition disregarded their separateness so
significantly that their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity
borders and treated them as one legal entity, or
● post-petition that the assets and liabilities of the entities are so
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all
creditors.
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Owens Corning Standard (Third Circuit)
38
● The Third Circuit emphasized five principles:
● First, the general expectation of state law and the
Bankruptcy Code is that courts respect entity separateness
absent compelling circumstances.
● Second, the harms that substantive consolidation
addresses are nearly always those caused by debtors (and
the entities they control) that disregard separateness.
Harms caused by creditors typically are remedied by
fraudulent transfer actions or equitable subordination.
The Owens Corning Standard (Third Circuit)
39
● Third, mere benefit to the administration of the case is
hardly a harm calling substantive consolidation into
play.
● Fourth, because substantive consolidation is extreme,
it should be rare and a remedy of last resort.
● Fifth, although substantive consolidation may be used
defensively to remedy identifiable harms, it may not be
used offensively (e.g., to disadvantage tactically a
group of creditors in the plan process or to alter
creditors’ rights).
The Owens Corning Standard (Third Circuit)
40
● The Augie/Restivo standard, established by the Second
Circuit and adopted by the Ninth Circuit, looks at two
factors:
● whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic
unit and did not rely on their separate identity in extending
credit and
● whether the affairs of the two entities are so entangled that
consolidation will benefit all creditors.
Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
Augie/Restivo Standard (Second Circuit,
adopted by Ninth Circuit)
41
● Under the Auto-Train standard, the proponent of
consolidation must first make a prima facie case
demonstrating that:
● there is substantial identity between the entities to be
consolidated, and
● that consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to realize
some benefit.
Auto-Train Standard (DC Circuit)
42
● Once the proponent for consolidation has made this
showing, “the burden shifts to an objecting creditor to
show that
● it has relied on the separate credit of one of the entities to be
consolidated; and
● it will be prejudiced by substantive consolidation.”
Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.,
Inc.), 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Auto-Train Standard (DC Circuit)
43
● In its recent opinion in Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. (In
re Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc.), 2013 WL
3779657 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 17, 2013), the Seventh
Circuit held that a court should go beyond evaluation of
a documented list of separateness “factors” and should
examine whether the behaviors of the related entities
are consistent with separateness over the life of the
transaction, not just at the time the SPE is established.
● The bankruptcy court, on remand, nevertheless held
that the entities were separate, focusing on the parties’
intentions.
Behaviors Consistent with Separateness
44
● The courts, in reaching their conclusions under the
various tests, consider the following factors:
● Is it possible to segregate and ascertain individual assets and
liabilities? Or are the assets of the parent and the SPE
commingled?
● Does the SPE observe the legal formalities of separateness?
● Do the entities have common directors or officers, or, if the SPE
has separate directors and officers, do they take direction from
the parent corporation?
CONCLUSION
45
● Are the business affairs of the parent and the SPE intertwined?
In the papers of the parent and in its officers’ statements, is the
SPE referred to as a subsidiary, department or division? Are
the entities more profitably consolidated at a single physical
location?
● Could the SPE exist independently of the parent? Or does the
SPE have substantially no business except with the parent and
no assets except those conveyed from the parent? Does the
parent finance the subsidiary, pay salaries or cover losses and
costs for the SPE? Is the SPE grossly undercapitalized?
CONCLUSION
46
● Does the parent own all or a majority of the capital stock of the
SPE? Did the parent subscribe to all the capital stock of the
SPE or otherwise cause its incorporation?
● Are there parent or intercompany guaranties and loans?
CONCLUSION
47
● “A ‘true sale’ is a crucial step in the formation of a valid
BRE [bankruptcy remote entity] because . . . the new
entity will take title to the property that serves as
collateral for the loan. Transferring the property
collateral to the [BRE] accomplishes the goal of
separating the property collateral from the bankruptcy
risks of its prior owner.”
● “If the transfer is a true sale the assets transferred
should not be considered assets of the estate of the
transferor under 11 U.S.C. § 541, and the transfer should
not be subject to revocation as a fraudulent
conveyance.”
True Sale vs. Fraudulent Transfer
48
● “The Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘true sale’ and
so presently, the matter of sale characterization is
largely governed by state law.”
● "Under the common law of most states, transfers of
property . . . even though characterized as sales and
made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value, may
. . . where the economic risks and rewards of the
transferred asset are retained by the transferor, be re-
characterized as secured loans.”
● Adam B. Weissburg & John Matthew Trott, Special Purpose Bankruptcy
Remote Entities, Los Angeles Lawyer (January 2004).
True Sale vs. Fraudulent Transfer
49
● On remand from Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. (In re
Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc.), 619 F.3d 688 (7th
Cir. 2010).
● Debtor sells accounts receivable (A/R) to SPV.
● A/R used to secure loan to SPV.
● SPV makes rent payments to lessor at above fair
market value, which debtor seeks to recover as
fraudulent transfers.
● Issue: Was sale of A/R to SPV a “true sale”?
Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
3074 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2013)
50
● A “court will look to the substance of the
transaction, rather than the form. Therefore, it is
important to focus on whether the transaction is
arms length and commercially reasonable as well as
in proper form and subsequent acts actually treat the
sale as real.”
Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
3074 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2013)
51
● In addition, court will look to factors including the following:
● “Recourse: Whether, considering the nature and extent of the recourse, direct and indirect against the transferor, the risk of loss is transferred to the SPE. The originator must retain little if any of the benefits and burdens of owning the receivables. If the originator retains too much risk or benefit from the receivables and later becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, there is a risk that the receivables will be included in the bankruptcy estate.”
● “Post-transfer control over the assets and administrative activities: Whether the transferor is permitted to service or collect the assets but must be removed if it defaults on those duties.”
Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
3074 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2013)
52
● “Accounting Treatment: Whether the transfer must be treated as a sale on the transferor's books.”
● “Adequacy of Consideration: Whether the transaction is at arms'-length for adequate consideration (full market value) received by the transferor.”
● “Parties intent: Whether the documents reflect statements that the parties intend a sale.”
● 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3074, at *407-413.
● Analyzing these factors, court finds sale of A/R to SPV was a true sale.
Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
3074 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2013)
53
● Authority to File Bankruptcy, Dismissal for Bad Faith
Filing, and Involuntary Bankruptcies
● Fiduciary Duties
● Conflicts of Interest
● Springing or “Bad Boy” Guaranties
Issues Arising from an SPV’s Bankruptcy Filing
● 11 SPV debtors with same current or past principal.
● Governing documents require that secured lender's
designee on board consent to any bankruptcy filing.
● SPVs' properties in foreclosure.
● Board concludes following intended procedures to file
bankruptcy would be futile.
● Principal pays law firm to solicit creditors to file
involuntary petitions.
In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
55
● Trade creditors and professionals file involuntary petitions.
● Secured lenders seek to dismiss, argue that collusion between debtors and petitioning creditors constitutes bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
● Court holds:
● "a bankruptcy petition will be dismissed if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.”
● "although the debtors plainly orchestrated the filing of the involuntary petitions, they had reason to believe that reorganization was possible and did not circumvent any court-ordered or statutory restrictions on bankruptcy filings such that, absent any evidence of objective futility of the reorganization process, the cases ought not be dismissed now.”
− 214 B.R. at 714-15, 734.
In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
56
● Court dismisses argument that it’s wrong to let debtors circumvent bankruptcy remote provisions in their governing documents:
● "The Movants may feel bruised because the Respondents outmaneuvered what the Movants thought was an iron-clad provision in the corporate by-laws preventing a bankruptcy filing, but this does not mean that, without more, the petitions must be dismissed.”
● Court has harsh words for lenders' designee on board:
● “he completely ignored the limited partners' plight in the face of foreclosure actions instituted by the group which placed him on the boards of directors”
● "If he was the 'independent' director, it was in name only."
− 214 B.R. at 736.
In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
57
● Court expressly refuses to opine whether it should
nullify bankruptcy remote provisions in debtors' bylaws
as against public policy.
● But, case is an early illustration of limitations, as a
bankruptcy proofing device, of an SPV with governing
documents requiring secured lender's board designee
to consent to any bankruptcy filing.
In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
58
● Relying on Kingston Square Associates, court denies
secured lenders' motions to dismiss Chapter 11 cases of
debtors owned by General Growth Properties, Inc. ("GGP").
● GGP is a real estate investment trust and ultimate parent of
750 subsidiaries, joint venture subsidiaries and affiliates.
● Bankruptcy cases commenced in April 2009, in wake of
credit market crisis, which prevented GGP and affiliated
entities from refinancing debt.
● At the time, the largest real estate bankruptcy in history.
In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
59
● Many debtors are project-level SPVs holding single real estate assets (e.g., shopping centers).
● Governing documents require consent of nominally "independent" directors or managers – really lender designees – to file bankruptcy.
● Debtors remove lender designees and replace them with directors who approve bankruptcy filings.
● Court rejects lenders' argument that it is bad faith for SPVs to make this end-run around bankruptcy remote provisions in their own governing documents.
In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
60
● “[I]t cannot be said that the admittedly surreptitious firing of the two 'Independent Managers' constituted subjective bad faith on the part of the Debtors sufficient to require dismissal of these cases.”
● “The corporate documents did not prohibit this action or purport to interfere with the rights of a shareholder to appoint independent directors to the Board.”
● “[T]he Independent Managers did not have a duty to keep any of the Debtors from filing a bankruptcy case.”
● “[T]hey had a prima facie fiduciary duty to act in the interests of 'the corporation and its shareholders.'"
In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
61
● Court says Kingston Square Associates involves a "far more egregious action [] 'suggestive of bad faith,'" – debtors' collusion with petitioning creditors – which still did not warrant dismissal, since "the collusion was not rooted in a 'fraudulent or deceitful purpose' but designed 'to preserve value for the Debtors' estates and creditors.’”
● Court finds similar design here, which outweighs delay and inconvenience to secured lenders:
● "It is clear . . . that Movants have been inconvenienced by the Chapter 11 filings . . . However, inconvenience to a secured creditor is not a reason to dismiss a Chapter 11 case.”
− 409 B.R. at 67-69.
In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
62
● Court does not address whether bankruptcy remote
provisions in SPVs' governing documents are
unenforceable as against public policy.
● Case is like the flip side of Kingston Square Associates
– debtors maneuver into voluntary, instead of
involuntary, bankruptcy.
● But, same result: SPVs allowed to proceed with
bankruptcy cases.
In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
63
● Unlike Kingston Square Associates and General Growth Properties, court addresses – and rejects – public policy challenge to anti-bankruptcy provision in SPV’s governing documents (LLC agreement prohibits filing bankruptcy).
● After defaulting on secured loans, and facing receivership, LLC files Chapter 11 case through its Manager.
● Court dismisses on ground that Manager filed without authorization and in bad faith.
● Court reasons: "all of the case law upon which Manager relies” for public policy argument “involves a debtor's agreement with third parties to waive the benefits of bankruptcy."
In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 463 B.R. 142 (10th Cir.
BAP Dec. 6, 2010)
64
● "Debtor has not cited any cases standing for the proposition
that members of an LLC cannot agree among themselves
not to file bankruptcy, and that if they do, such agreement is
void as against public policy, nor has the court located any.”
● Also, operating agreement limits Manager's authority to
operating business "as presently conducted," and prohibits
"any act that would make it impossible to carry on the
ordinary business of the Company.”
● DB Capital Holdings indicates courts might accept a waiver
of the benefits of bankruptcy, so long as it is purely internal
to the debtor, and not part of a third-party agreement.
In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 463 B.R. 142 (10th Cir.
BAP Dec. 6, 2010)
65
● But, lenders ought not rely too heavily on DB Capital
Holdings.
● Opinion technically unpublished.
● Holding narrow – court expressly declines to say if
anti-bankruptcy provision enforceable if evidence
shows it was coerced by lender.
● Other creditors file involuntary case, during which
court rejects as against public policy debtor’s waiver of
right to oppose relief from stay.
In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 463 B.R. 142 (10th Cir.
BAP Dec. 6, 2010)
66
● Lenders inserting themselves or designees as "independent" directors or managers, with veto power over a borrower’s bankruptcy filing, should be careful.
● Refusing to authorize a bankruptcy otherwise in the borrower’s interest may be a breach of fiduciary duty.
● “[A]n independent director's or manager's fiduciary duties are to the company and its shareholders . . . not to the secured lender.”
● Sheldon L. Solow & Uday Gorrepati, Can Lenders Prevent LLC Bankruptcy Filings? A Recent Decision Highlights the Debate, 128 Banking L.J. 220, 224 (2011).
Fiduciary Duty Issues
67
● SPE financings are typically non-recourse loans with
certain non-recourse carve outs based upon specific
acts and events which will trigger recourse liability.
● Lenders usually require a guaranty from the sponsor or
principal of the borrower which is triggered only upon
the occurrence of non-recourse carve outs.
Springing or “Bad Boy” Guaranties
68
● Recourse against the guarantor is typically comprised
of two subsets:
● The first is limited to specific acts and events for which there will
be liability for lender’s actual loss, including actions such as:
waste, misappropriation or conversion of funds, environmental
issues, fraud or misrepresentation, gross negligence or willful
misconduct, breach of representations, warranties or covenants
of the loan documents and removal or disposal of assets after
an event of default.
Springing or “Bad Boy” Guaranties
69
● A second subset of acts and events triggering liability for the
entire debt (as opposed to just damage caused by the act or
event) usually include: the borrower filing a voluntary
bankruptcy petition or colluding with others to have petitions
filed or having an involuntary petition filed against the borrower;
appointment of a receiver, trustee or examiner; failure to provide
financial information; failure to maintain a Single Purpose Entity;
failure to obtain lender’s prior written consent to any voluntary
financing or lien encumbering the financed assets.
Springing or “Bad Boy” Guaranties
70
● Another trigger for the entire debt typically in CMBS
loans and approved by rating agencies is that the
borrower becomes insolvent and fails to pay its debts
as they become due. Typically these clauses do not
provide or say that the failure to remain solvent must
be caused by some act or mission of the borrower or
guarantor or any one associated with them (more
about this later).
Springing or “Bad Boy” Guaranties
71
● Courts have generally sided with lenders in litigation
challenging the enforceability of these guaranties:
● Rejecting equitable arguments that the non-recourse carve out
guaranties result in “unenforceable penalties” or should
otherwise be voided on public policy grounds
● The majority of courts favor a plain reading of unambiguous
provisions negotiated by sophisticated parties
Court Decisions Interpreting Springing
Guaranties
72
● ESH acquired the Extended Stay hotel chain, which
thereafter filed a chapter 11.
● Lightstone Holdings and Mr. Lichtenstein, which
owned the membership interests of ESH, also delivered
bad boy guaranties to the mezzanine lenders which
would be triggered if ESH filed bankruptcy.
● The recourse liability was capped at $100,000,000.
In re Extended Stay: Bank of America v. Lightstone
Holdings, 32 Misc.3d 1244A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
73
● Defenses raised by Lichtenstein:
● He had a fiduciary duty to preserve company assets which
would be accomplished by filing bankruptcy.
● Absent a bankruptcy filing, he would be committing waste.
● He had attempted to tender the collateral, offering the lenders a
deed or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, but lenders were
unable to agree and refused to accept the tender.
● The trigger based upon the bankruptcy filing was void as
against public policy.
In re Extended Stay: Bank of America v. Lightstone
Holdings, 32 Misc.3d 1244A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
74
● The court held that the guaranties were executed and
negotiated by sophisticated parties, and all of the
arguments and defenses raised were rejected. The
court also ruled that lenders had no obligation to
accept tender as a remedy.
In re Extended Stay: Bank of America v. Lightstone
Holdings, 32 Misc.3d 1244A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
75
● Bad boy guaranty provided for liability of the entire
loan if subordinate financing was placed on the
collateral without lender’s prior consent
● A second mortgage was placed on the property
without lender’s consent; however, was paid prior to
any default under the senior mortgage.
● Upon default of senior loan the lender sued guarantors
for the deficiency alleging it was triggered when the
subordinate financing was obtained without their
consent.
4 Princeton Park Corporate Center v. SB Rental,
410 N.J. Super. 114 (N.J. App. Div. 2009)
76
● Court strictly construed and enforced the bad boy
guaranty even though there was no negative impact to
the lender.
● The court ruled that the language of the guaranty was
unambiguous, negotiated by sophisticated parties at
arms length and triggered upon a subordinate financing
without lender’s consent.
4 Princeton Park Corporate Center v. SB Rental,
410 N.J. Super. 114 (N.J. App. Div. 2009)
77
● Borrowers and guarantors were alleged to have
breached the non-recourse carve out provisions in both
the loan agreement and guaranty by failing to maintain
the property and permitting it to become encumbered
by taxes in the amount of $90,000, Environmental
Control Board Liens aggregating $650 and a
Mechanic’s Lien of $148,000.
● The lender accelerated the indebtedness originally in
the amount of $13 million and sought $20 million
constituting principal, contract and default interest, exit
fees and its costs and expenses, including legal fees.
G3-Purves Street v. Thomas Purves, 101 A.D.3d
37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
78
● Guarantors asserted defenses that the guaranty was a
liquidated damage provision imposing an
unenforceable penalty based upon the fact that it
provided for full recourse liability against the
guarantors if any of the carve out acts occurred
irrespective of how minor the default was.
● The trial court rejected each of the defendants’
arguments and held that the bad boy guaranty was
enforceable.
G3-Purves Street v. Thomas Purves, 101 A.D.3d
37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
79
● On appeal, the appellate division affirmed, holding that the
triggering of the guaranty based upon the non-recourse carve out
was not a liquidated damage provision and therefore was
enforceable. The court also held that the non-recourse carve outs
were previously enforced against the borrower.
● The appellate court further pointed out that the guaranty
provisions did not provide for liquidated damages and only the
recovery of actual damages incurred by lender. The guaranty
simply provided and established who was responsible for
repaying the outstanding loan—guarantors in addition to the
borrower, and the damages were to be calculated pursuant to the
terms of the loan documents and therefore not speculative or
incalculable.
G3-Purves Street v. Thomas Purves, 101 A.D.3d
37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
80
● There have been a few court cases which held that de
minimis defaults, like failure to pay real estate taxes
which were cured within the applicable grace period,
did not trigger recourse liability. See, e.g., ING Real
Estate Financial (USA) v. Park Avenue Hotel
Acquisition, 4010 slip op. 50276 (U) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
Feb. 24, 2010).
Minority View
81
● See also, the California case of GECCMC 2005 – C1 Plummer Street
Office v. NRFC NNN Holdings, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 366 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. Mar. 29, 2012), holding that a guaranty providing for liability
upon termination of the lease of the sole tenant was not triggered
where the tenant simply stopped paying rent and abandoned the
property, because the guarantor and the borrower had not engaged
in any misconduct. The court varied from the language of the
guaranty and opined that the “intent” of the guaranty was to
protect lender from specific bad acts of borrower or guarantor
rather than acts outside of their control, holding that the sole
security for loans was the property.
● The foregoing decisions are an extreme minority and courts
throughout the country have generally enforced springing/bad boy
guaranties.
Minority View
82
● The standard definition of an SPE used in CMBS loans
provides, inter alia, that the borrower must remain
solvent and pay its debts as they become due from its
own assets.
● The cases of Wells Fargo Bank v. Cherryland Mall
(“Cherryland”), 812 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011)
and 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings v. Chesterfield Dev.
Co., 835 F.Supp.2d 384 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“Chesterfield)
ruled that the bad boy guaranties were triggered based
upon the failure to remain an SPE based upon the fact
that the borrower failed to remain solvent and pay its
debts as they became due.
Solvency of Borrower
83
● In both cases, the guarantors argued that to interpret
the guaranties to spring into effect based upon
borrower’s insolvency would, in essence, make all non-
recourse loans recourse as to guarantors upon a
default of the loan and lead to absurd and draconian
results.
● The legislative bodies of both Michigan and Nevada
have enacted statutes which make the Cherryland and
Chesterfield carve outs unenforceable.
Solvency of Borrower
84
● Guarantors should carefully look at their bad boy guaranties
prior to execution and also review them throughout the term
of the loan so as not to inadvertently trigger liability.
● Triggers may have occurred prior to maturity or default, even
though the lender has not called the default, and courts have
typically enforced strictly the terms of the guaranties.
● Although bad boy guaranties typically have non-interference
clauses, guarantor should negotiate a release with the
lenders and condition their cooperation in an uncontested
foreclosure to obtain a release.
Drafting Pointers
85
● Another pitfall is when a mezzanine lender forecloses on a
membership interest in the borrower, it can subsequently file a
bankruptcy and trigger liability under the bad boy guaranty. A
guarantor has no control over this type of involuntary bankruptcy.
One solution is to obtain an indemnification from the mezzanine
lender upon tender of the membership interest.
● At inception of the loan, a guarantor may seek to require language
that it is no longer liable if the mezzanine lender ultimately
becomes the owner of the property, or a guarantor will not be liable
to the mezzanine lender under its bad boy guaranty unless the
mezzanine lender indemnifies the guarantor prior to its filing of its
involuntary bankruptcy.
Drafting Pointers
86
● The inter-creditor agreement between the senior and
mezzanine lender should provide that the mezzanine
lender cannot foreclose on the membership interest
unless it tenders a replacement bad boy guaranty.
● Sometimes a majority of the lenders actually request or
consent to a borrower’s bankruptcy filing, in which
event the guarantor should seek an exculpation from
liability under the guaranty agreement.
Drafting Pointers
87
● Cap the guaranty.
● Provide that the guaranty expires or decreases after a
certain period of time or under certain conditions, i.e.
borrower not being in control of the underlying asset.
● Carefully analyze any required net worth or liquidity
covenants of a guarantor which are becoming more
common: which assets or liabilities to include/exclude;
GAAP or other standards; clauses requiring net worth
maintenance.
Drafting Pointers
88
Michael Blumenthal
John C. Keith
Demetra Liggins
89