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39202 2127

SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF FRIDAY, i3th APRIL, 1951

b?Registered as a Newspaper

THURSDAY, 19 APRIL, 1951

AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA SRD MAY, 1945TO 12TH SEPTEMBER, 1945

NOTE.—A set of maps for this despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net.This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Air and Army despatchesof the Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945.

The following despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for Air in August, 1946,by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR KEITHPARK, G.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., AlliedAir Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia.

FOREWORD.1. Air Power's contribution to the overthrow

of Japanese land forces during the closingstages of the war in South East Asia, is re-viewed in this Despatch, which opens withthe period following the Allied Forces' vic-torious entry into Rangoon on 3rd May, 1945,and culminates in the official surrender of theJapanese Southern Army to Admiral The LordLouis Mountbatten, at Singapore, on 12th.September, 1945.

2. During this period, squadrons of theRoyal Air Force played a conspicuous role inthe last battle against the enemy land forceson Burmese soil. More than ten thousandJapanese troops, ill-equipped, sick anddemoralised, were annihilated by our air and.ground forces while attempting a mass escapefrom the Pegu Yomas across the Sittang Riveriand south to Moulmein. Their Air Forcehad already been eliminated from Burma.

3. August 1945 brought with it Japan'srealisation of defeat and her decision to sur-render. It forestalled by only a few weeksthe planned invasion of Malaya in which over500 aircraft of the Royal Air Force and about200 carrier-borne aircraft of the Royal Navywould have demonstrated again the power of.air superiority.

4. Instead, squadrons of the Royal Air Forcere-directed their energies to the most extensivemission of mercy by bringing relief and libera-tion, in the initial stages, to tens of thousandsof Allied prisoners-of-war and internees in themany Japanese prison camps scattered through-out the vast territories of South East Asia.

5. The successful accomplishment of thistask made a fitting conclusion to Air Power'sparticipation in a war against a ruthless andfanatical enemy whose years of aggression inthese territories ended with crushing and com-plete defeat.

PART I.RANGOON AND AFTER.

THE SITUATION IN MAY, 1945, AFTER THEFALL OF RANGOON.

1. With unconditional surrender of Germanyon 8th May, 1945, the conflict in South EastAsia and in the Far East against the last re-maining of the Axis Powers took on a newsignificance, with the balance weighted heavilyin favour of the Allies against Japan.

2. The only outcome of -the war in the East,like the one prescribed for Germany, couldbe complete and unconditional surrender ofJapan.

3. Decisively beaten in Burma, and withRangoon recaptured only five days before thesurrender of Germany in Europe, Japan, fight-ing alone, faced almost certain invasion of herhomeland hi the coming months. The system-atic loss of territories throughout South East

2128 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951

Asia which she had invaded during her orgyof conquest some three years before, was nowinevitable.

4. A redeployment of manpower andmaterial resources from Europe for .the waragainst Japan was scheduled to begin, whichwould thus quicken the tempo of operations.But long before the collapse of Germany hadtaken place in Europe, the plans for the re-conquest of Malaya and Singapore had beenprepared. With the other Commanders-in-Chief in this Theatre, I shared the convictionthat the second halt of 1945 would bring thereinforcements promised by London.

5. On the entry into Rangoon on 3rd May,1945, theatre strategy was directed -to theliberation of Singapore at the earliest possibledate with a view to opening up -the sea-routeto Indo^China and the East Indies, and toliberating enemy-occupied countries. There-after, strategy subsequent to the re-occupationof Singapore would depend upon the marchof events in the Western Pacific Theatre.

6. It had been the contention, hitherto, thatthe capture of Singapore would involve at leasttwo intermediate operations before the finalgoal could be achieved. Firstly, it was con-sidered that an initial operation would benecessary to establish an advanced air andnaval base. Through this base, aircraft andassault craft could be staged and operated insupport of the next operation for the seizureand occupation of a bridgehead on theMalayan Peninsula. Occupation and develop-ment of this bridgehead on the mainland wasconsidered an essential prelude to the finaloverland advance on Singapore itself.

7. Hastings Harbour was originally selectedas the initial objective, but this was postponedto take place after the Monsoon. Further ex-amination by the Joint Planning Staff at Head-quarters, S.A.C.S.E.A., however, indicated thata stepping-stone still further south thanHastings Harbour was not only desirable inrelation to the time margin, but also a prac-ticable proposition as regards the fly-in ofsingle-engined fighters and close support air-craft. It was essential, however, from theaspect of resources available, that such anoperation should be a limited commitment asa military operation and also as regards theshipping lift. These limitations, therefore,narrowed down the selection of this objectiveto a lightly defended island. Puket Islandfulfilled this requirement. Its occupation wastherefore planned for June, 1945.

Puket Operation or " Roger ".8. The iPuket operation-^" Roger ")—was

approved in'principle by the Chiefs of Staffin February, 1945, but they reserved judgmentas to its timing in relation to the fall ofRangoon. A plan for the operation was never-theless prepared by the Joint Planning Staffand Force Commanders' Staffs were appointed.

.9. Force Planning began in Delhi on Febru-ary 2nd, but it became apparent that the occupa-tion of an island so close to the mainlandwould involve a greater military commitmentthan had been envisaged earlier. The Armyconcept of this operation demanded one Divi-sion for the assault and initial occupation ofthe island, including a small bridgehead on the

mainland, and one follow-up Division to con-solidate the position. The Japanese garrisonof this island was reported to be approximatelyone battalion, but other land forces could havebeen assembled on the mainland once theattack was disclosed.

,10. Owing to the distance from our ownmainland bases, air cover and support wouldhave to be given by carrier-borne aircraftinitially until the capture of the first airstrip,when the Air Forces would accept full respon-sibility for all air operational requirements. Isuggested that the Army demands, both in man-power and material, were excessive for so smallan operation (the same opinion being expressedby the Supreme Allied Commander and theNaval C. in C.). I felt that if such demandswere persisted in, it might mean that the opera-tion (whichi would have given vital air basesto support a major operation) would have tobe dropped. These fears were well-founded,as the proposed operation was subsequentlyabandoned, mainly for this reason.

.11. Development of the air base at Puketenvisaged the completion of three runways toall-weather standard, with an initial force ofthree Single Engine Fighter Squadrons and anultimate build-up to: —

3 S.E.F. Squadrons.1 Fighter/Recce Squadron.3 Light Bomber Squadrons.2 Heavy Bomber Squadrons.Detachments of Air Sea Rescue and Photo-

graphic Reconnaissance Unit.Staging facilities for air transport and other

types of air traffic.i!2. In addition to this, the base would also

require to be capable of staging airborne opera-tions in relation to future requirements of thecampaign in Malaya. The air base, too, wouldrequire to be fully operational by D plus 100days, while its development to full capacitywas so tuned as to provide the necessary airsupport and cover for the next stage of opera-tions comprising re-occupation of the PortsSwettenham and Dickson areas, and a bridge-head for the final overland advance on Singa-pore. The occupation of this bridgehead wasplanned to take place some four months afterthe initial occupation of Puket with a view tothe final assault for the capture of Singapore.

13. Events in Burma, however, had forceda change of plan, which envisaged the neces-sity to capture Rangoon from the sea before themonsoon broke, and open it as a port to relievethe other overworked supply routes.

14. In this connection, it can now be.puton record that a R.A.F. Mosquito aircraft,carrying Wing Commander Saunders, made alow reconnaissance of Rangoon the day beforethe British Armada disembarked. Finding thecity empty of Japanese, -and Allied flags flyingover P.O.W. camps, he landed at the nearestairfield, hitchhiked into Rangoon and releasedsome of our P.O.W's. ,Wing CommanderSaunders then borrowed a native boat androwed down the river to tell the British Com-mander that Rangoon was unoccupied by theenemy, and offered his services as guide tothe Expedition. This unusual incident revealedthat the enemy forces in Rangoon itself haddeparted between the times of departure andarrival of the sea convoy. It was later revealed

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951 2129

that the Japanese Commander of the BurmaArea Army had been ordered to hold Rangoonto the end, but on his own initiative decided towithdraw in the face of the Fourteenth Army'spressure.

15. It was realised after Rangoon's capturethat to postpone the Puket operation later thanmid-June, 1945, would inevitably retard the pro-gress of subsequent operations timed progres-sively for the capture of Singapore by the end -of the year. The Puket operation was there-fore abandoned. With it, there vanished a step-ping-stone to Singapore which the British AirForces could well have utilised to great advan-tage.

Effect of Delay upon Future Strategy16. The importance of accelerating the Allied

Malayan offensive had been emphasised. Inthe first instance, it necessitated planning forthe occupation and development of Puketapproximately one month after the Monsoonhad set hi. Any further delay than this in-curred a steady deterioration in weather con-ditions and a heavy swell on exposed beaches.The cumulative effect of rain was also calcu-lated to cause a steady increase in the saturationof the ground and proportionately greater diffi-culty in airfield and road construction.

17. It was estimated that the closing stagesof the campaign in Burma, involving at theeleventh hour a mounting of the amphibiousoperation " Dracula " to make doubly certainRangoon's capture, had imposed a minimum ofnine weeks delay in the initiation of the opera-tion to capture 'the weakly held Puket. It fol-lowed, therefore, if Malayan strategy was to beimplemented to meet the proposed timeschedule for the capture of Singapore that thisinitial delay must be made good quickly.

18. To achieve this there were three coursesopen for consideration, each of which involvedmuch planning: —

(1) To select an alternative objectivewhere airfield development was an easierproposition in relation to weather conditionsand time available, or where airfields alreadyexisted.

(2) To retain the existing objective but ona less ambitious scale of airfield develop-ment and military occupation, thereby speed-ing up development.

(3) To abandon any project for develop-ment of a stepping-stone, and to embarkupon the second phase of our overall strategyiwhich envisaged a bridgehead on theMalayan Peninsula as a prelude to the finaladvance on Singapore.19. Course 1, on examination, -revealed that

areas more suitable for airfield developmentdid not fulfil the operational requirements,while the occupation of existing airfields insuitable areas was likely to require a majormilitary operation.

20. As regards Course 2, if some reduction inthe scale of effort was acceptable, particularly asregards the requirements of heavy bombers,then a substantial reduction in runway develop-ment could be achieved. This, however,would reduce the overall period of develop-ment to the extent by which the base couldbe fully operational to provide the necessaryair support and softening up operations on a

(68742)

lighter scale in relation to the next phase ofMalayan operations as timed. Furthermore,if reduction in base development were accom-panied by a decrease in the scale of militaryeffort required to occupy the island, this wouldresult not only in saving time, but also in ageneral economy in resources and shipping.The Army, however, would not agree to anyreduction in strength of assault and garrisonforces.

21. Course 3, when considered, had thegreat advantage of making up the total timelost, which, for reasons which have already,been stated, was of paramount importance.

22. It was obvious, however, that withoutintermediate air bases, close support by landbased aircraft could not be provided eitheras a prelude to or during the initial occupa-tion of the bridgehead.

23. For this purpose, complete reliance hadtherefore to be placed upon air support andair cover by carrier-borne aircraft until suit-able airstrips could be prepared within thebridgehead. Furthermore, the degree of heavybomber support would be severely limited bydistance and weather. Even on the mostoptimistic assumption that one or more heavybomber airfields would be available in Burmaby September, air bombing involved a distanceto targets of 1,000 miles with a consequentreduction in bomb load and intensity of effort

24. It was obvious, therefore, that opera-tions at such a range could not afford the re-quired support for the initial occupation of thebridgehead. The lack of an advanced air basealso introduced difficulties as regards the fly-inof aircraft for the build-up, and a routine ser-vice for aircraft replacement.

<25. When the problem was examined, theJoint Planning Staff recommended Course 3,provided that carrier-borne air forces could beassured.

26. Course 3 was therefore adopted, and theoperation which, in planning, became knownas "Zipper", envisaged the occupation of abridgehead in the Port Dickson—Swettenhamarea. The assault, it was intended, should becarried out by two Divisions of No. 34 IndianCorps, with 15 Corps in the following-up role.The amphibious operation .would be under-taken by a naval task force.

27. It was planned that air cover and sup-port would be provided initially by carrier-borne air forces, presupposing that at least threelight fleet carriers would be available for theoperation in addition to the escort carriersalready in the Theatre. The R.A.F. Squadronsof 224 Group, which had given outstandingservice in Burma, were to be flown into thebridgehead as soon as strips were available.

28. As complementary to operation "Zip-per", planning was also initiated for theoccupation of Singapore Island under planningcode word " Mailfist".

29. The initial assault for "Zipper" wastimed to take place in early September, 1945,and subsequent exploitation southwards jnMalaya was so timed as to permit of the finalassault on Singapore by the end of December.

,30. From the air point of'view I considerthe " Zipper " plan for the assault on Malayapossessed one distinct disadvantage—its great

A 2


range from established air bases, principally inBurma. Had it not been for the diversion ofconsiderable military resources to the captureof undefended Rangoon, I would have preferredan intermediate step to Singapore which wouldhave permitted adequate air support and stagingof aircraft. Time, however, was not on ourside. In view of the Army's commitments atRangoon, and of the naval disinclination tomake an assault without a suitable anchoragenearby, the prospects of any intermediate opera-tion completely faded away.

, 31. The "Zipper" plan, on the other hand,gave the recently occupied Cocos Islands a newand important role as an offensive air basein addition to its primary function as a stagingpost to the South West Pacific. Originally, itwas intended that the garrisoning Air Forcesto be based in the Cacos should comprise oneSingle-Engined Fighter and one Coastal Tor-pedo Fighter Squadron. The inclusion of theCoastal T.F. Squadron was mainly on accountof a possible threat of enemy sea-borne attack.This threat, however, had steadily declined. Inconsequence, the operational role of the T.F.Squadron virtually disappeared, while thelimited range of T.F. aircraft precluded themfrom employment offensively against targetswithin and beyond the Netherlands East Indiesbarrier. Therefore, I decided to substitute oneLong Range General Reconnaissance squadronin the Cocos in place of the T.F. Squadron, thusenabling General Reconnaissance Liberatoraircraft to carry out strikes from the Cocos ontargets along the coast of Malaya and N.E.I.An additional advantage of the Cocos was thecertainty of more favourable weather condi-tions during the monsoon.

32. In short, the R.A.F. developed the CocosIslands into a most valuable offensive air base,and air staging post.

THE Am BUILD-UP IN BURMA FOR FUTUREOPERATIONS.

33. From the review of strategy and plan-ning for the impending assault of Malaya, itwas evident that the air forces would be calledupon to fulfil commitments extending over avast area from Central Burma southwards toSouthern Malaya and around N.E.I., until thedefeat of the enemy in the South East AsiaTheatre.

34. As the result of this trend in futureoperations, the problem of command andcontrol of the Air Forces became far widerin responsibility than that which had obtainedhitherto. Accordingly, it was decided thatoperational command and control of all R.A.F.Groups other than those serving in Burmashould be exercised directly by Headquarters,Air Command, South East Asia, through therespective Group Commanders. Air power, itwas realised, would soon embark upon a large-scale intensification of operations against theJapanese, not only in South East Asia, but alsoin the South West Pacific Theatre.

35. While the tempo of air operations hadjased off considerably after the capture ofRangoon, the immediate task neverthelessfacing the Air Forces was to secure bases andall weather airfields for the future redeploy-ment and reinforcements of the squadrons in•Burma and Malaya in the quickest possibletime.

36. The decrease in air operations whichcoincided also with the arrival of the monsoon,was, in every respect, a welcome relief for.squadrons. The task of the preceding sixmonths in supporting and supplying the Alliedland forces in the non-stop advance toRangoon ha<i exhausted R.A.F. personnel to adegree never experienced in the Middle Eastor North West Africa or the Central Mediter-ranean during 1942-1945. HeadquartersS.E.A.C. required our squadrons to operate atmaximum effort for a longer period than calledfor in other Theatres. Aircraft, too, had with-stood the gruelling test of climate and semi-developed airfields. In the race through Burmato beat the Jap and the monsoon, No. 221Group Headquarters had moved four times;moves of Wing Headquarters totalled twenty-five, a^, squadrons made no less than 112movements'. iThese moves by the Air Forcesin Burma through a tortuous country whoseroads and communications were notoriouslybad, had meant some disorganisation and muchdiscomfort, but hardly an operational sortiehad been lost owing to any forward movement.Neither the men, nor the aircraft, however,could go on indefinitely. For the former aperiod of rest was necessary; for^the latter,re-equipment was in many instances, alreadylong overdue.

37. It was during this lull in operations thatcertain of these squadrons in Burma were restedand re-equipped before the next phase in thecampaign in South East Asia was due to begin.The "Battle of the Break Through" bythousands of Japanese forces trapped in thePegu Yomas of Southern Burma had still tocome—a battle in which the Air Forces hadconspicuous success.

38. At this time there were ominous signsthat the Japanese Empire was beginning toreel under the fury of American air attack,which was now directed upon it without pause.

39. With the next blows in South East Asiaabout to descend upon Malaya, the trend ofthe Air Forces was a movement to the south—as far south as possible with Southern Burmaas the springboard for the major operationwhich was to come.

40. The plan required a gradual movementof squadrons of fighter bombers, light andmedium bombers and indeed, heavy bombers,to Southern Burma. It was hoped that byAugust, 1945, Mingaladon Airfield, Rangoon,would be capable of providing facilities for 100aircraft, Toungoo with a capacity for 70 air-craft ; Pegu 70 aircraft; Zayatkwin 48 aircraft;Pabst 50 aircraft; Myingyan 70 aircraft; andMeiktila 70 aircraft.

41. This phased build-up was by no meansfirm, for there was a decided lack of engineers*information on the eventual ability of certainof the more important and vital airfields. Inface of Army representations that the originalplan for the net of airfields in Southern Burmacould not be met without diverting Armyengineers from other tasks in Rangoon, I hadto agree, most reluctantly, to a much reducedconstructional programme in the Rangoonarea.

42. On entry into Rangoon, speed in airfieldconstruction was absolutely essential. Deliveryof bithess, for servicing the only airstrip, was,


however, retarded owing to the land com-munication difficulties within the area, and Ihad to give orders that No. 96 (Dakota)Squadron should be given the task of flying-inbithess from Bengal to Mingaladon. The taskwas completed to scheduled time.

43. I regret that the Air Forces should havehad to call upon the Army for airfield construc-tion in Burma owing to the absence of R.A.F.airfield construction units and Air .MinistryWorks Supervisory personnel in this Theatre.There is no doubt that the American systemof providing aviation engineer battalions inBurma proved better and more satisfactory.It might also be noted that some fifteenthousand R.A.F. constructional personnel wereallocated by Air Ministry to the Tiger ForceOperation in the Pacific, although South EastAsia Command was deplorably short ofengineers, and it must have been evident thatthis new Air Force was most unlikely tooperate before the defeat of the Japanese.

Hastening Construction of Burma Airfields.44. Early in June, my Air Marshal Adminis-

tration visited Rangoon to obtain first-handdetails of the problems being encountered, andto hasten construction of airfields as much aspossible. On my own visit to Rangoon onJune 15th, 'l was assured by Major GeneralAdministration, Headquarters, A.L.F.S.E.A.,that all points brought up by my Air OfficerAdministration were receiving attention.

45. The enormous increase in the Air Forces'radius of action which the new airfields underconstruction would afford was foreshadowed inJune, when R.A.F. heavy bombers, operatingfrom bases in Bengal, attacked and sank a10,000-ton Japanese tanker in the Gulf of Siam.One aircraft damaged by flak was forced toland at Mingaladon Airfield, Rangoon, whichwas not yet completed, and over-ran the avail-able length of the runway, killing the crew.

46. The continued pressure by Air Commandon the Army for more speedy constructionbrought better results, and it was a little moreheartening, on June 28th, to be given datesestimated for the various stages in the com-pletion of the following airfields in the Rangoonarea: —

Zayatkwin—1,750 yards. A/W runwayby July 20th.

Zayatkwin—2,000 yards. A/W runwayby July 31st.

Mingaladon—1,750 yards. A/W runwayby July 31st.

Mingaladon—2,000 yards. A/W runwayby August 15th.47. By October 1st, it was estimated that

Mingaladon Airfield would be capable ofaccommodating a total of 150 aircraft foroperational purposes. The airfield at Zayat-kwin was expected to handle 130 Thunderboltsor Mosquitos, and would be staging throughthe Squadrons for "Zipper" by 1st October.Pegu was also being developed as quickly aspossible as a heavy bomber airfield.

48. While it was expected that squadronswould be able to move into the new airfieldsby the end of July, No. 224 Group, which hadbeen linked with Lieutenant-General Sir PhilipChristison's 15 Corps in some of the fiercestfighting in Burma, was preparing to leave the

Arakan with its units and to proceed to Indiafor training and re-equipment in preparationfor the mounting of " Zipper ".

49. The move of 224 Group squadrons wasgreatly delayed and handicapped on account of.the shortage of shipping and the inadequate,land transport facilities in Burma. The factthat Army units were also leaving Burma atthe same time did not make the position easierfor the movement of Air Force personnel andtheir equipment. June, indeed, ended withthe move of 224 Group far from complete, andit soon became apparent that units would notsucceed in clearing from the Arakan before thethird week in July.

Withdrawal of U.S.A.A.F. from Air Com-mand, South East Asia50. On June 1st, 1945, because of our air

dominance, the narrowing front, and the factthat the tactical situation after Rangoon, per-mitted no offensive action by the 10thU.S.A.A.F., the British and American AirForces reached the parting of the ways in SouthEast Asia Command. The American commit-ment in Burma had ended with the captureof Northern Burma and removal of the enemythreat to the supply line to China.

51. Each Air Force was now to prosecutethe air war against the Japanese in neighbour-ing Theatres. For the Royal Air Force, theoffensive now headed down the Malay Penin-sula to Singapore. For the U.S.A.A.F., how-ever, the route lay across the Himalayas toChina, since the sphere of the American Com-mand was designated the China-Burma-IndiaTheatre. Yet another reason for the withdrawalof the 10th U.S.A.A.F. was the critical airsupply situation in the Northern Combat AreaCommand, due mainly to the high rate of effortat which the 10th Air Force Transport Squad-rons had been operating and which was nowbeginning to tell on personnel and aircraftalike. At the same time, the American squad-rons required refitting and rest before theirimpending move to China.

52. The withdrawal of American Squadronsfor service in another Theatre did not affectthe strategic situation in South East Asia Com-mand. The only aircraft which could havebeen retained with advantage were (a) thetransports which were being phased out gradu-ally to bridge the gap until the arrival of ourStage 2 aircraft, and whose withdrawal couldnot be further delayed on account of the urgentneed in China, and (6) the photographic Libera-tors of the 24th Combat Mapping Squadron.

53. The period of integration between Britishand American Forces in South East Asia hadshown a very real spirit of close co-operation—a fact which I emphasised in a special Orderof the Day published on June 1st, announcingthe withdrawal from Air Command, South EastAsia, of the United States Army Air Forcesunder Major General George E. Stratemeyer.Eastern Air Command, Calcutta.

54. In my' Order of the Day, which I sentto General Stratemeyer, I revealed how airpower had followed the basic principle inmodern warfare—that the air battle had firstbeen won before embarking on the land battle.Once the air battle was decided, air powerwas then able to provide the ground forceswith direct forms of assistance.


• 55. " Having taken a vital part in .the defeatof the Japanese in Burma", I said, " theU.S.A.A.F. units are being withdrawn fromEastern Air Command to fight the Jap inanother Theatre. The closing down of the fullyintegrated Eastern Air Command Headquartersis, therefore, an important 'milestone in the waragainst Japan.

" Eastern Air Command was formed on 15thDecember, 1943, at a critical .time in the Battleof Burma, in order to weld into one Commandthe British and American Air Forces on thisfront.

" The British Army was hanging on to thewestern fringes of Burma, having stemmedthe Japanese advance into Bengal.

"When the British Army was besieged inImphal due to Japanese infiltration resultingfrom their superior mobility, the first task of.the newly formed Eastern Air Command wasto obtain air superiority in order to enableour close support squadrons to assist the landforces.

"Within a short time air superiority wasobtained, due in no small measure to the longrange fighter squadrons of the U.S.A.A.F. Itenabled the Allied Transport Squadrons to sup-ply and reinforce the beleaguered Army ; also,it gave them the mobility which previously theJapanese had monopolised. From this time,until the capture of Rangoon in May, 1945,the Allied Land Forces enjoyed all the benefitsof air supremacy which, in turn, kept inviolatethe air supply lines and endowed the AlliedArmy with the mobility and striking power toforge ahead to Mandalay, followed shortly byRangoon. It made possible the isolation ofthe Japanese Army in Burma by Allied air-craft, thus preventing the arrival of reinforce-ments and supplies from Siam and Malaya.

"In Northern Burma, the Tactical andTransport Squadrons of the 10th U.S.A.A.F.played a decisive part in the repulse of theenemy from the Chinese border and in the re-opening of the overland route to China.

"A Japanese officer who was captured inBurma attributed the defeat of the JapaneseArmy to the superior mobility of the AlliedArmy. This mobility was almost entirely dueto the air supply provided by the Allied AirForces, whose record tonnage exceeded 2,900tons per day in April, 1945. Due mainly totheir superior numbers and operating at maxi-mum effort, the American Transport Squadronscarried the greater portion of the air lift insupport of the land forces in Burma.

" In conclusion, it is fair to say that withoutthe support of the American Air Forces inBurma, we could not have defeated theJapanese Army as rapidly and as decisively in1945. All British Forces, both land and air,are deeply grateful for the whole hearted sup-port and complete harmony that existed'between the American and British Air Forceunits in this Theatre.

" I am exceedingly proud to have had theseAmerican Air Force units in my Command,and, together with all members of the BritishAir Force in South East Asia, wish them goodluck, and good hunting."

56. In my Order of the Day announcing dis-integration of Eastern Air Command, I did notmake especial mention of units of the AirService Command, but, instead I wrote to

Lieutenant General D. I. Sultan, CommandingGeneral, India-Burma Theatre, U.S. Army, andexpressed the valuable and splendid work•which the Air Service Command had per-formed under Major General T.. J. Handley,Jnr. Without this help, we should have failedto carry through the intensive operations of theprevious 12 months.

57. While it was necessary to sever theBritish and American Combat units of EasternAir Command, and Air Command, South EastAsia, there was, however, no break as yet withthe Air Service Command.

58. With disintegration pi Eastern Air Com-mand, the ah- offensive in South East Asianow passed in its entirety to the Royal AirForce, and an exceedingly active period in thedeployment of squadrons in Burma began.Thus, the integration ordered by the SupremeCommander in December, 1943, had been ful-filled in so far as it concerned the integrationof British and American Air Forces employedin the defeat of the Japanese in Burma.The Impact of "Tiger Force" on Air Com-

mand59. For some time after the capture of Ran-

goon in May, there were indications that TigerForce was going to be favoured by London inmen and material resources previously pro-mised to South East Asia Command.

/60. The Supreme Allied Commander,Admiral Mountbatten, showed his reliance onthe Air Force in this Theatre, by a strong signalto the Chiefs of Staff expressing his intensedisappointment at the contemplated step sincehe considered it would delay his carrying outtheir directive to open up the Straits of Malaccaand to recapture Singapore at the earliest pos-sible date.

.61. I also communicated the concern feltby the Supreme Allied Commander to theChief of Air Staff, emphasising that futurestrategy and operations in this Theatre hadbeen based on the agreed rate of build-up ofthe British Air Forces and especially of BritishTransport and Heavy Bomber squadrons.Moreover, the withdrawal programme of theU.S.A.A.F. forces for China which had nowbegun, had been agreed and phased in withthe rate of build-up of the British Air Forces.

62. The question of airfields in South EastAsia for staging Tiger Force through to theFar East also presented some difficulties, sincethe most suitable area' was Rangoon whereinsufficient bases for our own aircraft wereavailable. In the United Kingdom it wasthought that Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar weretoo far from Manila, and they were notaccepted as alternatives.

<63. It became clear that Air Command,South East Asia, must accept the situationwherein the air war in the Pacific againstJapan received higher priority than ourselves.This was finally confirmed by a signal fromthe Chief of Staff in London on June 22nd,part of which read: —

" In case you are in doubt, ' Zipper' and' Mailfist' have been approved by the Com-bined Chiefs of Staff with the proviso thatthese operations are conducted without pre-judice to the preparation and execution of.operations for the invasion of Japan andother operations directly connected there-with."


64. At the beginning of July, Air Vice-Mar-shals Sharp and Satterly arrived at Air Com-mand on their return from the West Pacificwhere they had been making preliminaryarrangements for air bases of Tiger Force.

165. I then learned that, owing to the lack ofairfields, operations by the V.H.Bs. (VeryHeavy Bombers) were not expected to beginuntil the end of 1945. This delay greatly sim-plified the problem of providing staging postsfor Tiger Force aircraft through India andBurma since, by the time Tiger Force couldbe in transit, both the monsoon and " Zipper "would have finished, leaving fair-weather air-fields available for Tiger Force in the Rangoonarea.

/66. It was indicated by the visiting Air Vice-Marshals that A.C.S.E.A. were expected to(provide staging facilities, not only for theinitial aircraft, but also for the reinforcementflow and for a daily transport service of three(aircraft each way. They further expressedthe hope that the maintenance of their reserveaircraft would be accepted by this Command.

•67. I consider it worthy of note that whileAir Command South East Asia was barelymaking do with transport resources of Dakotaswhich still constituted the major life-line ofthe 12th Army, engaged with the Japanese atbay in the Sittang area of Southern Burmaduring July, the representatives of Tiger Forceassumed that Yorks and C.87s would be forth-coming as a matter of course, for their trans-port requirements.

68. Other examples of this clash in prioritieswere not lacking, for it was disappointing tolearn from Air Ministry by signal on July 21stthat, owing to prior needs of Tiger Force, noLancasters or Lincolns could be expected savefor Air/Sea Rescue before mid-1946.

69. My appeal to Air Ministry for Lan-casters and Lincolns had been for no otherreason that I was concerned about the futureheavy bomber supply situation in the Com-mand. I took the long view that we couldnot expect to rely upon U.S. supplies ofLiberators and, as title result of the difficultieswhich were already arising over spares andmaintenance backing, I was, therefore, anxiousto start the re-equipment of the heavy bombersquadrons and to introduce Lancasters viceLiberators into Air/Sea Rescue, Meteorologicaland several training units.

PART II.

THE AIR WAR IN BURMA ANDBEYOND.

AIR SUPERIORITY.Won and Maintained after Air Battles over

Arakan in 1943-44.70. Allied air superiority in South East

Asia was won and maintained in the Theatreafter the air battles over Bengal and Burmalate in 1943 and the Spring of 1944, and re-mained almost unchallenged until the finalsurrender of the Japanese.

71. This air superiority is not always givenits full value when the fortunes of war inBurma are weighed. Without it, the historyof the indomitable 14th Army might wellhave centred around a fighting force, justlycapable of defence, but not capable of sus-tained offence. Air superiority too, meant a

"safe conduct" for the air transport fleetsengaged upon air supply and reinforcing ofthe advancing troops. At one time no singleDakota in Burma could with safety have takenthe air on any supply mission had not theair lanes been protected by our short rangefighters,

72. Air superiority, whether used for theclose support of the ground forces, or theinterdiction of lines of communication farbeyond the battle area, or in air supply or incasualty evacuation, was indisputably ours,a fact which Japanese Army Commandersthemselves confirmed after their surrender inAugust, 1945.

73. In the Japanese Army, one Commanderhad said, there had never been any real planto develop the Military Air Forces. The airweapons he said, had been neglected from thebeginning in favour of ground weapons. Eversince the China Incident, however, there hadbeen a growing feeling that Japanese airpower must be developed at all costs, but thisrealisation had come too late, and even then,the Army's claims had over-ridden the longterm policy which recognised the absolutenecessity of a wide expansion of air powerand the production of aircraft.

74. Another Japanese officer, after fightingagainst us in South East Asia, said that almostalways the Japanese Army had left the con-struction of airfields until the last, having con-centrated firstly upon its own ground defences.

Few Airfields left to J.A.F. in Burma.(75. While the main Japanese Army had re-

treated to Moulmein after the fall of Rangoonin May, it still preserved enough strength tomake a spirited stand during July at whatcame to be known as "The Battle of theSittang Bend."

76. The Japanese Air Force, on the otherhand, had been driven out of Burma com-pletely broken. No attempt, indeed, was1 made,to alleviate the distress in which the thousandsof trapped Japanese forces in Burma foundthemselves during July.

77. Only twelve months earlier, the JapaneseAir Force in South East Asia had made 333sorties in May of 1944 in their last bid totip the scales in their favour at the siege ofImphal, but had failed. For them, this aireffort was a record for the Japanese Air Forcefor any single month when the targets wereAllied airfields and troop concentrations in theManipur Valley.

(78. 'The enemy had behind them at that timethe important air bases at Shwebo, north ofMandalay, and, in Central Burma, they pos-sessed the airfields at Meiktila, Magwe,Pyinmana, Prome and Toungoo. Their mostsoutherly bases were those which comprisedthe Rangoon group of airfields.

79. The .Allies' sweep through Burma andthe capture of Rangoon however, had takenall these airfields from the Japanese. All thatremained to .them in Southern Burma werethree serviceable airfields located at Tavoy,Mergui and Victoria Point, on the TenasserimCoast, and these soon became the regulartargets for our aircraft based at Rangoon.

80. In June, 1945, yet another indication ofthe weakness of the Japanese air power inSouth East Asia in face of 'air superiority was


the withdrawal of R.A.F. fighter protection forthe air transports—a protection which had beenmaintained consistently from the beginning ofthe Allied advance through Burma afterImphal in 1944, and had involved fighter coverover a front extending many hundreds of miles.

81. When Fourteenth Army marched athousand miles through Burma in six monthsthey achieved a great military feat in a countrywhich had been deemed hitherto to be almostphysically impassable and medically disastrousfor the mass movement of men. With thatArmy, the Air Forces went every mile of theway—scouting, supporting, reinforcing, supply-ing, evacuating wounded and striking aheadof the advancing troops, to disrupt Japaneselines of communication and supply bases.

82. The same air-ground co-operation whichbrought about the fall of Rangoon and there-conquest of Burma would have been re-peated on a grand scale for the assault plannedon Malaya—forestalled only by Japanesesurrender. Even then the flexibility of AirPower was such that, in the emergency whichfollowed the cessation of hostilities, it was ableto re-direct its energies in one of the greatestrelief and liberation operations of WorldWar IL

)83. In any final analysis of the war inSouth East Asia, air superiority is of para-mount importance, and an indispensable factorupon which maintenance and supply of allour Forces in the Theatre depended.

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS.After Rangoon.

84. When the Japanese pulled out of Ran-goon, and the remnants of the main armysucceeded in reaching Moulmein after the dis-astrous retreat down the Central Corridor inApril, hostilities in Burma were by no meansover. •

85. There was no question of the enemy'scapacity to stage a serious comeback ; his sup-ply lines were no longer reliable and theJapanese Air Force was out of the race.

86. But there was one aspect of the cam-jpaign which was not yet complete and onewhich began to assume greater importance nowthat the Allied Forces had established them-selves firmly in Southern Burma and Rangoon.It was the presence of the large isolatedforces of Japanese troops in Central and NorthBurma, estimated at over 50,000 men. Whilethe Allied advance down the Central Corridorduring March and April had driven awedge through a crumbling enemy defence, ithad, at the same time, forced a considerablestrength of Japanese troops into the hillregions of Eastern, and Western Burma, iso-lating them from the main Japanese army asit retreated on Moulmein.

87. The Air Forces, principally 'those of No.221 Group, and the Allied ground forcesdeployed in Southern Burma, swung round toface these large concentrations of Japanesetroops in the north between the Irrawaddy and'the Mandalay railway corridor in CentralBurma and the railway corridor and theSittang and Salween Rivers to the east. Then*object was to close the principal escape routeswhich these Japanese forces must pass throughto get out of Burma.

88. Few factors sustain the -morale of fight-ing men more than the knowledge that suppliesof provisions and equipment are assured. Theisolated Japanese forces in Burma, however,as the result of disruption and disorganisationof their rear lines of communication, were ill-equipped, and certainly denied any possibilityof supply by air. They suffered considerablythrough shortages of food, also medical sup-plies, and took to eating attractive lookingbut dangerous fruits.

89. So long as these trapped Japaneseforces remained on Burmese soil, however,they required considerable effort from the airto watch their movement and to destroy themas opportunity arose.

The Competitive Spirit of Squadrons.90. The task of hunting and destroying these

isolatecL^pockets of Japanese forces, in co-operation with the Allied ground troops, felllargely upon the squadrons of No. 221 Group,since No. 224 Group, after its fine record ofachievement in Burma, was now in the pro-cess of pulling out for training and re-equip-ment in Southern India prior to the assault onMalaya.

91. The competitive spirit among squadronssoon produced keen offensive patrols in seek-ing out the enemy with Mosquitos, Beau-fighters, Hurricanes, Spitfires and Thunderboltscovering wide areas of country—in spite ofMonsoon weather—and succeeding in drivingparties of Japanese troops off the main escaperoutes and forcing them to seek the cover ofjungle or scrub.

92. In this offensive drive by the squadronsduring May and June, a total of 4,813 sortieswas flown by our aircraft in monsoon weatherto bomb and strafe the enemy.

93. It was during this period that a returnwas made to jungle warfare in Burma, as grimand fierce as anything experienced by the airand ground forces during (previous months.The air forces faced the considerable hazardsof monsoon flying conditions as they attackedenemy troop, concentrations attempting to re-group and reach appointed regrouping areas.

'94. The effectiveness of these R.A.F. junglestrikes was not only substantiated in apprecia-tive messages by the Army, but also byJapanese officer prisoners-of-war captured atthis period. Of the air forces operatingagainst them, a Japanese officer, a L/Cpl., anda Superior Private had said during interroga-tion:—

" Dawn found us 'heading towards a villageon the opposite shore. Later, we found thatit was near Mumbu. We cooked some riceand afterwards all went to sleep in a bambooclump on the 'bend of the river. Sleep, how-ever, was not so easy, for the enemy 'planeswere roaring overhead, and we would awakein a cold sweat in the midst of a horriblenightmare."95. There could be no doubt that the enemy

had a healthy respect for our British Air Forceand sought the cover of 'undergrowth whensurprised by our fighters, which strafed themincessantly. A Japanese Private of the 82ndAir Field Battalion, captured in Burma, whenshown a collection of silhouettes of Alliedaircraft, picked out the Spitfire as the aircraftmost feared by the Japanese.


Closing the Net around the Enemy in Burma96. By the end of June, the net was gradually

tightened around the isolated Japanese landforces holding out in the Pegu Yomas inCentral Burma. The monsoon continued. Theheavy rains made the movement of Alliedtroops and their supporting arms exceedinglydifficult on the fringes of the Pegu Yomas andalong the Mawchi Road east of Toungoo.

97. The Japanese, however, got no nearer toescape. Whenever weather permitted, thesquadrons of 221 Group were overheadendeavouring to locate the enemy in the mostdifficult of wooded country, and bombing onevery occasion whatever targets presentedthemselves. For days, aircraft continued tosearch for heavily laden animal transportswhich the enemy were pressing into service tocarry accoutrement of every description.. Evenlumber elephants, taken from their'work in thefamous Teak Forests of Burma, were employedin carrying light guns and other heavy equip-ment 1-pr the enemy. If the monsoon proveda handicap to the Allied Forces it was worsefor the Japanese, who were completely cut offfrom sources of supply. In the Pegu Yomas,the plight of the enemy, as a result of thevigilance of air power and the movement ofAllied ground troops, became desperate as theystruggled against malaria and starvation, orsuffered foot-rot and stomach and skin troubles.Some, indeed, were like skeletons whencaptured, while the remainder, still imbuedwith fanaticism of glory and death, ratherthan disgrace in surrender, struggled on.

98. In their jungle strikes and " hunting"expeditions, the squadrons obtained a largenumber of good results in spite of the diffi-culties of weather and thick ground cover. Ifthe enemy looked for a lull in operations as aresult of the monsoon, thus giving them anopportunity to regroup, they got none from theR.A.F. squadrons and ground forces.

99. In the Mokpalin area, where No. 20Squadron had damaged much enemy transport,a message sent by Headquarters, 4 Corps, afterthe strike, said: —

"Thanks for the magnificent effortsyesterday on the Mokpalin road."100. When Mosquitos of 47 Squadron went

out on a strike, they bombed a village northeast of Nyaunglobin, where it was reportedthat the Japanese, moving south, had takencover during the day. The Mosquitos dis-persed their bombs well among the bashas andon dumps of packing cases seen on either sideof the roadway, while many low flying attacksmade across the area did extensive damage.

101. An Army report which reached 221Group Headquarters stated that during an airattack in the Meprawse area, some 30 to 40bullock carts carrying food were accounted for,two petrol dumps destroyed and 50 to 70Japanese troops killed.

102. Up the Mawchi Road, Hurricanes wentafter a number of guns or tanks stated to bemoving in the district. Two attacks whichthey made on heavily camouflaged objects,revealed large guns with limbers or tractors.They left the targets in flames.

103. The plight of the enemy as a result ofthese jungle strikes worsened. A reportbrought in, following an air strike by No. 11

Squadron, said that "the villagers reportedthat they carried away 30 Japanese corpsesafter the strike."

104. Some time earlier, a strike by Nos. 79and 261 Squadrons brought the followingmessage from Headquarters, 20 Indian InfantryDivision: —

"One 75 mm gun, one 70 mm gun, one77 mm A/T gun, one 20 mm A/T rifle, sixpistols, six swords, approximately 100 rifles,three stacks of ammunition and muchartillery ammunition,"

were found by ground forces after a successfulair attack.

105. In the last week of June, the main con-centration of Japanese forces in Central Burma,was opposite Nyaunglobin, with protectiveforces north west of Pegu and south west ofPyu, which gave R.A.F. Thunderbolts oppor-tunities for attacks. During one raid, sixaircraft of 79 Squadron bombed the village ofThaingon. Some days later it was learned that170 Japanese and 40 mules had been killed.

106. On the Sittang river too, where move-ment by the enemy became more active, Spitfireaircraft undertook patrols down the river,damaging and sinking small river craft of everydescription almost daily, thus helping ourground forces to interrupt enemy efforts in thatarea to escape across the river.

"Force 136 " and Sittang River Air Patrol.107. There were other major difficulties

which stood in the way of the trapped Japaneseforces in escaping from Burma. The guerillatactics of " Force 136 ", which later played aconspicuous part in the slaughter of the enemyon the Sittang River, helped to seal this stretchof water against any large scale enemy crossing.

108. The forces of Burmese guerillas, whichbegan to assume considerable importance atthis time in Burma, had caused the utmostconcern to small parties of Japanese stragglers,who suffered severe losses at their hands.These guerillas had been operating with successduring the latter weeks of March, and through-out April, but they were even more activeduring June and July, as the Japanese casualtyfigures testified.

109. Organising the Burmese patriots wasthe work of the British Organisation in Burmaknown as " Force 136". It was an inde-pendent body which operated both with the AirForces and the Army. The Force consisted oftrained and specially picked officers who weredropped by parachute into enemy-occupiedareas to organise Burmese levies and to wagesurprise attacks against the Japanese. Thisguerilla warfare demanded the closest liaisonwith the Air Forces. Supplies, including armsand ammunition, were air dropped once theparties of levies had been organised.

110. It was through the machinery of " Force136" too, that much valuable informationon enemy dumps, troop movements, head-quarters, and concentrations of transport carry-ing food, stocks and equipment, was passedby W/T to Army Headquarters, and specialair-strikes quickly organised for the squadronsof 221 Group, R.A.F. These tasks were carriedout eagerly by pilots, and many profitableand successful strikes were made against the


enemy. The Japanese casualties showed asharp rise as a result of these sudden airattacks.

•111. The air patrol on the Sittang River,on the other hand, consisted of three standingpatrols daily—dawn, midday and dusk. Theduration of the patrols up and down the riverwas so varied that the Japanese could neverbe certain of escape.

112. During one such patrol in June, twoHurricanes of 28 Squadron came upon 50river craft of all types in the Suppanu Chaungand, after damaging them by strafing, went onto Letpan and 'there strafed several boatsdrawn up on the bank of the river near somevillages.

113. There could be no doubt that the vigi-lance maintained by aircrews engaged on offen-sive patrols over the Sittang River was acontributory factor to holding up any rivercrossing in strength, which .the Japanese mayhave contemplated during June.

Disaster overtakes the Japanese in Burma.114. Disaster overtook the Japanese during

July, when their final bid to break throughthe Allied net and escape from Burma endedin a debacle.

115. It was one of the blackest periods forthe enemy throughout their ill-fated campaign.More than 10,000 men were killed in themonth's operations. Those who succeeded ingetting away and joining the main Japaneseforces at Moulmein, took with them a pictureof the punishing they had faced from theBritish air forces, the warring guerillas, andthe newly-formed 12th Army under LieutenantGeneral Sir (Montague Stopford.

116. Operations by the air and ground forceshi this last major battle in Burma took on anentirely new character from the mobility andspeed which had so characterised the pursuitof the enemy down the central railway corri-dor during April and May. Instead, the lullperiod in June had given the squadrons andground forces a better opportunity to deployat strategic points in Southern Burma, so thatthe enemy break-through from the Pegu Yomas,when it ultimately took place, developed intoa wholesale killing. The monsoon forcedR.A.F. Squadrons to base themselves at air-strips other than they would have preferred,but, even so, the operations were maintained.

117. The squadrons of 221 Group, R.A.F.,accounted for at least 2,000 Japanese casualties.Throughout the campaign it was always diffi-cult to assess with accuracy the number ofactual casualties inflicted by the air forces andour own artillery.

118. Four separate phases characterised theJuly battle.

(a) There was a sudden flare-up of enemyactivity on the Sittang iBend at the openingof the month where the Japanese, firmlyestablished at Mokpalin, succeeded inmaking a bridgehead across the river and,after some grim fighting, succeeded in hold-ing on the right bank, an area of approxi-mately one square mile of country, encom-passing the villages of Nyaungkashe, Abya,and Myitkye.

(b) Up country, on the Sittang, taking inan area,-between Shwegyin and Kyaukkye,

parties of Japanese troops, as they en-deavoured to escape by crossing to the leftbank of the Sittang, continued to fall intothe hands of organised guerillas.

(c) Yet further to the north 19 IndianDivision and Patriot Burmese Forces in theworst of monsoon weather, were strugglingalong the Mawchi Road from Toungoo inan effort to reach Mawchi, and cut themain escape route of large Japanese forcesretreating southwards down the road fromLoikaw, and Kemapyu, on the SalweenRiver, and then south by valley tracks whichled to Papun and Kamamaung. FromPapun, one escape route continued south-west to Bilin with easy access toy road andrail to Moulmein. The second escape routefrom Papun went south-east to Kamamaung,thence by ferry down the Salween toShwegun, and there joined a track leadingthrough Pa-An to Moulmein.

(d) The final, and major phase, was thelarge scale attempted break-through acrossthe railway corridor from the Pegu Yomas,starting on July 21st, by Japanese troopswhose strength had now been estimated to beabout 18,000, of which about 1,000were left behind sick in the Yomasand could not take part in the breakoutoperations.119. Squadrons which played such a con-

spicuous part in these operations were deployedas follows:—

(a) When the sudden flare up at the Sittang(Bend began, No. 906 Wing with Nos. 273and 607 Squadrons; one detachment of night(Beaufighters, and the 'H.Q. and one flightof No. 28 Fighter Recce Squadron, werebased at Mingaladon, Rangoon, thus withineasy reach of this enemy force.

(b) Based at Kinmagon was No. 908Wing with Nos. 47 and 110 Mosquito Squad-rons, which were able, weather permitting,to afford valuable support to the parties ofguerillas in their successful attacks on theJapanese in the Sittang river area.

(c) No. 910 Wing was based at Meiktilawith four Thunderbolt squadrons, Nos. 34,42, 79 and 113, ready for action at the firstsign of the break-through from the PeguYomas.

(d) Assisting 19 Indian Infantry Divisionon the Mawchi road, was 909 Wing atToungoo, with No. 155 Spitfire Squadron,and later strengthened by No. 152 SpitfireSquadron which moved down to Thedawfor a short period, and, at other times, stagedthrough Toungoo.120. When the -break-through by the

Japanese from the Pegu Yomas started onJuly 21st, the whole of 'the air support wasswitched over -to this area and, for eight ornine days, the bewildered enemy wasstrenuously harassed by the squadrons sup-porting the 12th Army.

Battle of the Sittang Bend.121. In an attempt to create a large scale

diversion of the Allied ground forces, theJapanese, at the opening of July, launched anoffensive at the Sittang from the bridgeheadwhich they.tenaciously held on the right bankopposite Mokpalin.


122. It was flat, open, country with scatteredscrub, and some very fierce fighting took placehi appalling weather at Nyaungkashe, Abya,and Myikye. The village of Nyaungkashe, in-deed, changed hands several times.

123. Air support thrown in by 221 Group,included the Spitfire and Thunderboltsquadrons operating continuous patrols or"Cabranks" in the Nyaungkashe area. Theenemy took exceedingly heavy punishment.His determination to hold this area, at all costs,however, until the large Japanese forces to thenorth got down past Bilin, with the strategictown of Mokpalin on their right, safeguardedby the Sittang troops, was obvious.

124. Day after day, gun positions, troop con-centrations, and river craft of all descriptionswere subjected to intensive attacks by the airforces, bringing sincere thanks from the Army.On July 4th, No. 42 Squadron's Thunderboltshad a most successful day, when a 105mmgun was wrecked and two other guns silencedat Nyaungkashe.

125. It was at this time that some forcesof 7 Indian Infantry Division found themselvesin a precarious position as a result of thedetermined Japanese thrust, but, assisted by airattack, succeeded in extricating themselves.

126. "With the help of excellent air sup-port quickly given," wrote Lieutenant GeneralMesservy to Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier,A.O.C. 221 Group, " I have been able to extri-cate some four hundred men, including sixtywounded, from a difficult situation with goodknocks to the Japs at the same time."

127. It was noted throughout these ah*operations, and further substantiated by groundreports, that a considerable number of Japanesetroops were killed as a result of air attacks.

128. By July llth, the Japanese offensive atthe Sittang Bend had been contained, thoughthe enemy still retained their foothold on theright bank of .the Sittang, opposite Mokpalin.

Air Power Assists the Guerillas.129. As the month advanced, a notable

movement of enemy troops endeavouring tocross the Sittang River in parties at variouspoints between Shwegyin and Kyaukke, keptthe Spitfire squadrons on continuous patrolover the Sittang River exceedingly active.Thunderbolt squadrons, too, came down fromthe Meiktila area to attack forces of Japanesenumbering, in some instances, one thousandstrong, as they made then: way eastwards. Thelarge scale break-through from the PeguYomas had not yet started.

130. It was in this area of the Sittang, andalso in the east, on the right bank of theSalween, that the organised guerillas, whichhad been brought under the control of 12thArmy, ambushed hundreds of escapingJapanese troops moving down from Loikawto Papun, and literally massacred them. Noenemy party was safe from these guerillasunder Force 136 who, with portable W/T,kept base informed of the enemy's movementsand as a result provided the Mosquitos andSpitfires with definite targets, which theybombed and strafed untiringly.

131. The guerillas' flag was seen regularlyby pilots heading for their targets. They wereassisted by large indicator arrows on theground, and even cryptic messages which the

levies had conceived. On one occasion, pilots,correctly interpreting a message, "In M",located a Japanese force in a marsh.

132. Following a heavy raid on Pa-An, oneof the principal staging villages used by theJapanese while moving down the Salweenvalley, a message sent from our land forces to273 and 607 Squadrons on July 1st said: —

"More than five hundred Japs killed inlast heavy raid on Pa-An. Did not tell youbefore as awaiting confirmation. Congrats topilots."133. An earlier report had described this

whole area after the raids as covered in dustand smoke, with Japanese soldiers seen runningabout in panic and rushing for shelter as air-craft came down to strafe them. The Mos-quito Squadrons got equally effective resultsfor, during a strike at Kawludo, an enemystaging post in the Salween valley, north ofPapun, a ground report stated that over onehundred Japanese troops had been killed.

134. Thunderbolts and Spitfires carried outa very successful attack on July 15th and 16th,in the Shwegyin Chaung area of the Sittang,and a message from Kyadwin to 113 Squadronand '607 Squadron said:— "Tell R.A.F. strikegreat success."

135. North East of Kyadwin, at Paungzeik,Mosquitos of 47 Squadron, on July 16th,made a bombing and strafing attack in thePaungzeik valley and 51 dead Japanese werecounted after the attack. Yet another attackby aircraft on the 19th, at Shanywathit,resulted in two direct hits being made on ahouse which was full of Japanese troops, andover eighty are 'believed to have been killed.

136. The reports of successful air strikesagainst the escaping enemy were many andvaried. In .the credit for their success theguerillas of Force 136 must equally share.Their daring in approaching large enemyparties and making sudden furious assaults onthem with gunfire and grenades before retiringto their hideouts to plan further surprise raids,was outstanding in this final killing of theJapanese in Burma. The risks, too, which theyran, while blatantly guiding aircraft on toenemy concentrations, frequently involved themin hazardous escapes. Many escapes were onlymade possible indeed, by aircraft swooping inbetween the levies and the enemy, strafing theJapanese pursuers., If caught, guerillas weretortured cruelly by .the enemy.

Tribute to R.A.F. from Guerilla Leader.137. A tribute paid to -the Royal Air Force

in Burma came from the leader of one of thesecourageous parties operating in the Okpyatarea of the Sittang.

" Both I and every guerilla would like tomake it known to every pilot who took partin the battle of the Okpyat area just how,much all the brilliant offensive action of theR.A.F. fighter-bomber pilots was appre-ciated," wrote Captain J. Waller, BritishOfficer in charge of Force 136 Guerillas,Okpyat. " From our point of view on theground, we wished that we had more airground strips so that we could write in full—'Hats off to the R.A.F. pilots. You arekilling hundreds of Japs and your perfectco-ordination and patience in reading ourcrude signals is saving the lives of manythousands of defenceless civilians.'"


138. Whilst these exploits revealed the mag-nificent work of aircrews, they illustrated atthe same time the confidence and daring of theBritish-led irregular, for whom the pilots of221 Group squadrons felt most strongly thatit was a case of "Hats right off" to theguerillas.

139. "From Letpangon we were attackedby two hundred Japs at 23.30 hours. We onlykilled fifteen of them, but we kept them therefor you to attack next day when you put intwo good strikes. They cleared out after dark,and went on to Yindaikaein where you wereable to attack them again," said CaptainWaller.

140. The combined attacks on the Japaneseaircraft and guerilla parties constituted a warof attrition on the enemy. They could neverbe sure of safety in any village they passedthrough, and roads, planked with thick scrub,were a perpetual nightmare. The guerillaswere masters in the art of ambush. With theair forces to supply and assist them theyseemed to be everywhere, and to know theenemy's next move. This was evident from thecasualties they inflicted against the Japanese.

141. It was after an attack by air forces ona large concentration of Japanese troops atLetpangon, that the Okpyat Guerilla party,which had been pinning down the enemy untilthe aircraft arrived, went out in a most success-ful mopping-up task.

•142. Captain Waller reported to the R.A.F.,"We only killed 15 of .them but you killed105 in three cracking good air strikes. Youalso saved the lives of almost three thousandoccupants and evacuees in Okpyat who werecompletely cut off."

Japanese Break-through from Pegu YomasFails

143. The desperate and last bid by the 28thJapanese Army to,escape across the Sittangbegan on July 21st, when some 15,000 to 18,000enemy troops, sick and demoralised, moved outof the jungle and scrub shelter of the PeguYomas.

144. The moment for which the squadronsand Allied ground forces had been awaitinghad now come. The ground forces of 17Indian Infantry Division, ranged in groupsalong the 100 miles stretch of roadway betweenToungoo and Pegu, which formed part of therailway corridor, engaged the enemy, burstingover the road at several points simultaneously,and slaughtered them-,

145. The squadrons of 221 Group wereswitched over to this battle area in supportof 17 Division, and for almost nine days airassault was directed on the wretched Japaneseas they made desperate attempts to reach theSittang River.

146. From a captured enemy document itwas revealed that the main break-through fromthe Pegu Yomas had been delayed by theenemy to allow the move of the Japanese28th Army to co-ordinate. The greater partof the Mayazaki Group (Lt.-Gen. G.O.C. 54Division) had planned to attempt to cross theSittarig between Nyaungbentha and Pyu.Coinciding with this move, Koba Group(Major-General Koba) had planned anothermajor break out, and while the area of the

move was not determined, it was anticipatedthat it would take place north of Toungoo in19 Division area where .troops were deployingalong the Toungoo-Mawchi Road.

147. The enemy's plan was to form roadblocks at selected points and to pass throughthem assisted by " Jitter Squads" to creatediversions. All movements were to be madeby night and the keynote of the break-throughwas to be " speed " so that the maximum timewould be available for the collection of boatsand rafts from the Sittang river in order tocomplete the crossing before daylight. Theenemy had planned, on reaching the Sittang.to cross on a wide front using barges, rafts,logs, bamboo poles and even petrol tins toassist the buoyancy of escapees in the water.

148. It would be invidious to state .that onesquadron, more than another, inflicted thegreatest punishment on the escaping enemy.All squadrons thrown into the "Battle of theBreak-through," overcoming monsoon withlow clouds and heavy rain for long periods,did what was expected of them with credit.The keenness of squadron ground personnelwas equal to the occasion. They worked hardand ungrudgingly. All, indeed, in the air, aswell as on the ground, felt that somethingsubstantial was being accomplished in this lastshow-down with the Japanese in Burma.

149. The July killing lasted until the 29th.The Thunderbolt squadrons, carrying three500 lt>. bombs on each aircraft, played havocamong concentrations of moving Japanesetroops. The Spitfires too, carrying one 500 Ib.bomb on each aircraft, pursued the enemyrelentlessly, strafing them as they ran for cover.As many as 62 sorties were flown on July 23rdby Nos. 152 and 155 Squadrons.

150. The extent of the full air effort by theR.A.F. squadrons in this battle cannot beadequately measured in the many squadron re-ports which told of the effectiveness and killingsmade during their strikes. The confusion anddisruption caused among the Japanese forces,amounted to almost chaos. More convincing,perhaps, were the reports sent by 12th ArmyDivisional Commanders to 'H.Q. 221 Group,who were not slow to express their gratitudefor the support given to their troops.

151. After almost nine days of intense fight-ing, the attempted break out by the Japanesefrom the Pegu Yomas ended in utter and com-plete failure. More .than 10,000 men werekilled, as against only three hundred oddcasualties sustained by the Allied forces. Outof approximately 1,300 Japanese troops whosucceeded in crossing the Sittang betweenMeikthalin and Wegyi, it was estimated that500 of their number had been killed duringair strikes by Spitfires and Thunderbolts.

152. The whole Japanese plan for organisedescape petered out in the closing days of July,and the air and ground attacks were thentransferred once more to the Sittang Bend,where the other Japanese forces, to their credit,had held out bravely in their struggle to keepopen the last doorway leading out of Burma.In the July battle, R.A.F. squadrons had flowna total of 3,045 sorties—92 per cent, of whichwere offensive strikes in support of groundtroops, while a total weight of 1,490,000 Ib. ofbombs had been dropped.


153. As the last few hundreds of exhaustedJapanese were making their escape to Moul-mein with bitter recollections of the ordeal theyhad passed through, Lieutenant-General SirMontague Stopford, G.O.C. 12th Army, whenrecalling the severity of the weather, its flood-ing, rains and cloud, showed his appreciationof the RA.F. in these words :—

"Grateful if you would accept and passon to all ranks under your command mymost grateful thanks for the admirable sup-port given during break-out battle and mycongratulations on splendid results achieved.Flying conditions must have been most diffi-cult but on all sides I hear nothing butpraise of the keenness and determination ofpilots to get through. You have all playeda great part in the Twelfth Army's first bigoperation."154. Over and above the R.A.F. contribu-

tion, our victory was won by our superiorityover the Japanese in training, fighting abilityand weapons; the accurate intelligence whichwas obtained before the battle began; the finework of the guerillas, and above all the highmorale and fighting efficiency of the troops.

STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS.A Well Sustained Offensive against Enemy

Supply and Communications.155. With the capture of Rangoon and the

disbandment of the integrated Anglo-AmericanStrategic Air Force on June 1st, the R.A.F.•heavy bombers of 231 Group were left to carryout the next phase of the battle against theenemy's' communications leading to Singapore,and on other important targets.

156. The partnership which had been forgedbetween heavy bomber units of No. 231 Group,R.A.F., and the 7th Bombardment Group,U.S.A.A.F. had, over a period, produced astriking force so effective that it (brought abouta serious disruption to Japanese strategic com-munications in this Theatre, with a criticaldecline in the quantity of supplies intended fortheir ground forces in Burma.

157. The departure of the 7th BombardmentGroup had one important significance. TheGroup had operated twelve aircraft fitted with" Azon " equipment, consisting of a radio trans-mitter in the aircraft and a radio receiver onthe bomb which, once released, could be guidedin such a way that [line errors could Ibeeliminated. Throughout the series of " bridge-busting " missions on the (Burma-Siam railway,which, on account of anti-aircraft defencescould not ,be (attacked from low level byLiberators, the Azon equipment was used withgreat success.

158. The destruction of bridges in Burmaand Siam, notably on the Bangkok-Pegu rail-way, which was one of the principal tasks ofthe Strategic Air Force, was a vital factor incrippling the enemy's land communications.

159. In a six-month period between De-cember 1944 and May 1945, there was photo-graphic confirmation of (bridge destruction asshown hereunder:—

Destroyed DamagedRail 96 36Road 13 4

Total 109 40

160. Feverish efforts made by the Japaneseengineers, who worked with great energy re-pairing and rebuilding bridges, failed to keepopen many of the vital communications uponwhich the Japanese in Southern Burmadepended.

Greater Distances Flown to Target Areas.161. On the Allied occupation of Rangoon,

R.A.F. Liberators carried the heavy bomberoffensive much further afield into the enemy-occupied territories of South East Asia, in-volving frequent flights of over 1,000 milesradius from then* Indian bases in Bengal. Thiswas inevitable, as the newly occupied airfieldsin Southern Burma, after the capture of Ran-goon, were not yet big enough to take heavybombers. The long distance flights undertakenby these aircraft across the Bay of Bengal indifficult monsoon, weather were mosthazardous.

162. From Moulmein, at the mouth of theSalween River, to Victoria Point, the southern-most tip in Burma, is nearly 500 miles. Thiscoastal tip, known as the Tenasserim, togetherwith Japanese bases in the Andaman Islands,came in for attention by the heavy bombersafter our entry into Rangoon. ' Nearly 1,000tons of bombs were dropped by the R.A.F.squadrons during May, which reflected thedetermination of the crews to carry on theirheavy bombing work in the disruption of theenemy's communication system. Indeed, whatwas to have been a V.E.-Day celebration inMay, was spent by crews of the squadronsstanding by for an attack on shipping in theAndamans. This cultimated in a bombing raidon May 17th against the most westerly Japanesebase in the Bay of Bengal—Port Blair. Thebombing force on this occasion concentratedon important harbour installations, includingmarine workshops at Phoenix Bay, whilebuildings at Hope Town, the main coalingpoint, were destroyed. A large orange redexplosion, with flames rising up to 1,500 feet,was seen by the crews after they had hit theirtarget. The enemy had fortified the whole areaof Port Blair with shore batteries and A.A.guns, which succeeded in shooting down oneof our aircraft.

163. But the main battle against the enemy'scommunications—notably those affecting Singa-pore—was now on. The same air strategywhich had disrupted the Japanese supply linebetween Bangkok and Rangoon was applied inthe succeeding months with equal effectiveness 'to the line linking Bangkok with Singapore.

164. Communications on this mountainouspeninsula, embracing territory of three States—Burma, Siam and Malaya—had, for the mostpart, been seaborne, though, as the Japaneseadvance in 1941 showed, Singapore still hada backdoor by means of the rail route to thenorth.

165. With the sea lanes in the Strait ofMalacca made more and more hazardous forJapanese shipping through the effectiveness ofour mine-laying from the ah- and the vigilanceshown by R.N. submarines, the enemy wasforced to fall back steadily on the use of theBangkok-Singapore railway for the movementof supplies. This line snaked for a thousandmiles up the narrow neck of land between theGulf of Siam and the Andaman Sea.


166. Not all the stretch of railroad waswithin range of the R.A.F. Liberators. Withpersistence, however, they succeeded in gettingas far south from their bases in India as theBay of Bandon at the Isthmus of Kra, toinflict heavy damage on the important railwayjunction of Jumbhorn at the narrowest partof the Isthmus.

Enemy's concern over Systematic Damage167. I must express most sincere admiration

for the aircrews who flew these Liberators suchabnormally long distances, frequently throughatrocious monsoon weather, to bomb theirtargets in Siam and Malaya.

168. Crews of Bomber Command in Europeflew 1,200 mile round trips to Berlin whenattacking targets hi the capital of the Reich, butthe R.A.F. Liberators in South East Asia flewfrom their bases in India round trips well over2,000 miles to bomb objectives at Bangkok,and other targets on the Isthmus of Kra. Thisis equal to a flight from London to Naples orwell to the east of Warsaw—flights, it shouldbe noted, which the R.A.F Liberators in myCommand carried out regularly against theJapanese.. 169. The concern of the enemy over thesystematic damage to, and destruction of, theirlines of communication in Siam and Malayawas revealed in a document which came intoour hands entitled " Protection of Communica-tions ". This document called upon JapaneseUnit Commanders to overhaul then* A.A.defence methods as "enemy aircraft arecarrying out continuous and unceasing attackson our rear communications and planning tocut our rear lines altogether. We must perfectour counter-measures."

170. The enemy's increased vigilance, how-ever, appeared to make no material differenceto the preservation of their rail bridges, dumps,water towers, locomotives, rolling stock andshipping.

171. On June 5th, seven Liberators attackedrailyards at Surasdhani on the Bangkok-Singapore line. Surasdhani was an importantsupply post for the Japanese and, to reach it,our bomber crews flew for 17 hours, mostlyacross the Bay of Bengal, and through someof the worst weather which the monsoonduring 1945 had produced. This flight of 2,400miles was one of the longest undertaken, upto that time, on a heavy bombing mission inthis Theatre. The bombing was well concen-trated, and the results were good. Subsequentreconnaissance confirmed all claims made bythe crews.

Liberators sink 10,000-ton Japanese Tanker.172. A shipping strike in Siamese waters on

June 15th, when a 10,000-ton Japanese tankerwas set on fire and left sinking by the stern,was one of the most noteworthy operations ofits kind during the closing stages of the waragainst Japan in South East Asia.

173. To effect this strike, aircraft had tomake a round trip of approximately 2,500miles to the expected anchorage, the routebeing almost entirely over the Bay of Bengaland the Andaman Sea.

174. The tanker was the largest enemy vesselreported in Siamese waters for many months,and was believed to be one of the last of its

size remaining to the Japanese in the SouthernArea. It was sighted by a Sunderland aircraftof 222 Group when it was apparently trying tomake a northbound run through the Gulf ofSiam and along the east coast of the MalayPeninsula. The tanker had an escort.

175. The Air Forces at the disposal of 231Group for this strike were four heavy bombersquadrons—Nos. 99, 159, 355 and 356,equipped with Liberator Mark V aircraft. Adetachment of six aircraft from No. 159Squadron, based in India, moved downtemporarily to Akyab, on the Arakan, for theoperation. This enabled the aircraft of thedetachment to load up during the night andto take off at 0900 hours on the day of thestrike. They were, therefore, the last squadronin to attack.

176. Due to exceedingly bad weatherencountered by all aircraft on the route to thetarget, a number of the aircraft were forced toabandon the operation and returned to base.The master bomber and deputy master bomberwere, unfortunately, included in this number.The remaining aircraft, which pressed on, cameupon their target in the early afternoon as thetanker was moving past Samui Island. Anescort was some distance away.

. 177. Three aircraft of 99 Squadron attackedthe tanker at low level but did not succeed irisecuring hits. All three aircraft were damagedby A.A. fire from the escort vessel and thetanker itself. One aircraft had a fin shot off.After delivering its attack, it eventually reachedMingaladon Airfield, Rangoon, where itcrash-landed. The second aircraft, alsodamaged, by A.A. fire, crash-landed atAkyab.

178. The battle against the tanker was con-tinued later with three aircraft of 356 Squadronattacking at low level, and a direct hit pro-duced fire and a series of explosions. Thetanker still fought back fiercely, and all threeaircraft were damaged by A.A. fire, one ofwhich crashed when landing at Salbani in Ben-gal. The fight continued with the arrival ofthree further aircraft from 159 Squadron whichpressed home the attack, claiming four andpossibly six hits. With smoke billowing to7,000 feet, the tanker was left burning fromstem to stern and sinking. The tanker's escortsucceeded in making its escape.

179. Subsequent reconnaissance showed thatthe tanker was sunk, the funnel and mast wereseen showing above the sea.

1180. Loss of so vital a supply vessel as anoil tanker of 10,000 tons, particularly at a tunewhen supply meant everything to the enemyin South East Asia, added further to the em-barrassment of the Japanese.

181. For this outstanding success I sent amessage of congratulation to Major-GeneralJ. T. Durrant, S.A.A.F., who, on June 15th,had assumed Command of 231 Group, viceAir Commodore F. J. W. Mellersh, C.B.E.,A.F.C., repatriated to the United Kingdom.

182. The attack on the Japanese tankerended a month of most successful shippingstrikes by the air forces of 231 Group duringJune, for, on June 1st, Liberators had surprisedenemy vessels at Satahib in the Gulf of Siam,when a 335-foot submarine depot ship—" Angthong "—was sunk.


183. The stranglehold on the Japanese sup-ply and communications system was furthertightened on June 24th, when Liberators des-troyed two important bridges at Kanchanaburi,eighty miles west of Bangkok. The raid onthese bridges across the Meklong River atKanchanaburi was a disruption of serious con-sequence on the Burma—Siam railway. Theultimate result of this attack was that threespans were demolished and one span displaced.

184. Strategic bombing by the air forces ofthis Command drastically cut down the u&e ofthe enemy's railroads, compelling the transfer

-of more and more supplies to road and seatransport, which inevitably slowed up theenemy's war supply machine.

185. When the A.C.S.E.A. Commandformed in December, 1943, our heavy bombereffort was only 449 tons dropped by Libera-tor aircraft. In 1944 the figure had risen to3,846 tons, and by August, 1945, it had againrisen to a total of 9,441 tons.

186. Behind these tonnages is evidence ofthe contribution by the heavy bomber aircraftof this Command to the overall strategy of theSupreme Allied Commander, South EastAsia, in bringing about the disruption ofJapanese supply and road, rail and sea com-munications.

AIR SUPPLYA Testing Period for Squadron?

During Monsoon187. Although the capture of Rangoon

brought an end to the more intensive Army-Air co-operation in Burma, the day by dayair supply for ground troops concentrated inSouthern Burma, and still engaging largeisolated forces of the enemy, was still main-tained.

188. There was no alternative. Air supply, itwas realised, would have to meet the Army'sdemands until seaborne supplies 'began to func-tion, and road and rail communication inlandfrom Rangoon were re-established.

189. Much was being done to hurry forwardrehabilitation in Rangoon generally and to getport facilities working, but this was no easytask. Looting of property and bomb damageto those essential services which are .the main-spring of a busy commercial port were exten-sive. Entry of larger ships into the harbourwas also delayed until dredging of the riverchannel was completed, while there was theadditional task of repairing docks, wharves, andbadly disrupted road and rail communications.All these were vital factors which indirectlyaffected supply to a vast Allied ground forcewhich had pushed its way into Rangoon.

4190. The period May to August, 1945—covering the re-entry of the Allied forces intoRangoon, and later the surrender of Japan—cannot be termed spectacular in air supplyoperations, when reckoned against such effortsas persisted during the Allied advance downthrough Burma earlier in the year, and thesupply tonnage record was broken in April,1945, with 2,900 tons on one day. But itwas, nevertheless, an exacting period for squad-rons and personnel alike, for the followingreasons: —

(a) The period of the monsoon had setin, making flying exceedingly hazardous inso mountainous a country as Burma.

1(6) With the disintegration of the Britishand American Air Forces after 1st June,1945, American Transports were withdrawn,leaving R.A.F. squadrons of No. 232 Groupto continue air supply operations unaided.

i(c) Supply demands made by H.Q. AlliedLand Farces were not immediately reduced:after entry into Rangoon. On the contrary,the Army persisted in a continuance of airisupply on a scale which it was not alwayspracticable to meet in face of atrociousweather and fewer available aircraft.191. The departure of the American trans-

port squadrons towards the end of May, 1945,resulted in a corresponding reduction in airsupply to the ground forces. With hostilitiesin Burma virtually over, this was only to beexpected. What air supply did not anticipatewas the enormous concentration of Alliedground forces which had pushed into Ran-goon at the last minute to ensure its speedycapture. These troops had still to be fed andsupplied, as had the Allied ground forces en-gaging the remnants of the Japanese mainArmy trapped in the Pegu Yomas of SouthernBurma as the result of the rapid Allied driveto Rangoon.

192. Throughout the campaign in Burma ithad been the practice to pool the air resourcesfor the mutual benefit of the British andAmerican elements of Eastern Air Command.The result had been a -building up of abalanced organisation known as Combat CargoTask Force, capable of operating at an in-tensive rate of air supply.

193. The operational achievement of CombatCargo Task Force, covering the period October,1944 (the date of its inception) to the end ofMay, 1945, when disintegration took place, isbest indicated toy the following figures:—

Total hours flown 386,283Supplies carried (short tons) 332,136Number of .persons carried 339,137Number of casualties carried 94,243Total tonnage carried, in-

cluding weight of personsand casualties 379,707

Forecast for Air Lift after Rangoon.194. From the examination of results

achieved during the advance through Burma,and the lessons learned, it was possible, inthe middle of May, to agree that each transportsquadron's effort as from 1st June, 1945 to31st July, could be 125 hours per aircraftfor the month. This demanded an effort of156 hours per aircraft on the squadron strength.

195. A better flow of reinforcement aircraftwas expected, which would thus greatly helptowards making the new transport effort pos-sible, also a stepping-up and increase in effi-ciency of maintenance organisation, with con-sequent increased monthly output and quickerturn-round of aircraft undergoing repair, wastaking place.

196. On the assumption that two R.A.F.squadrons were made available for airbornetraining by 1st June, that internal airlines re-quirements were met, and that U.SA.A.F.transport squadrons were all out of the Theatrefrom 10th June, it was calculated that the


following transport aircraft would be avail-able :—

1-10 June—8 R.A.F. Squadrons—240 C-474th C.C. Group—100 C-46

11 June-31 July—8 R.A.F. Squadrons—240 C-47

197. On such a basis, the capacity for thedaily lift on long tons of squadrons wasestimated as under:—

1-10 June—1,474 long tons

11 June-31 July—800 long tons

198. This capacity measured against the.Army's requirements of 14th May, 1945,showed the following situation in tons:—

ALFSEA Capacity toPeriod requirement Deliver

tons tons1— 8 June 1,310 1,4749—10 „ 1,070 1,474

11—18 „ 1,070 88019 June—8 July 840 8809—31 July 600 880

199. On calculation, therefore, a total sur-plus capacity of 2,120 tons existed from 1-10June, and a deficiency of 1,520 tons from 11-18June, giving a surplus airlift. The surplus air-lift from 1-10 June, it was calculated, couldbe stock-piled to offset the deficiency from11-18 June. From these calculations, there-fore, it was considered that the transfer of theU.S.A.A.F. squadrons could be accepted with-out detriment to any foreseen operations. Un-fortunately, a variety of factors militatedagainst this target which had been so carefullyplanned.

Some Difficulties with the Army over Supply.200. On llth June, Advanced H.Q.

A.L.F.S.E.A. signalled direct to the SupremeAllied Commander that the short fall in airtransport for the first nine days in June totalled955 long tons, and asked, therefore, for theretention of No. 238 Squadron already overdueto go to the Pacific.

201. I proceeded to Rangoon to discuss thismatter more fully with Lieutenant General SirOliver Leese, C.-in-C, A.L.F.S.E.A. andMajor^General OBastyan (JMajor-General Ad-ministration), A.L.F.S.E.A.

202. The Army had come fully briefed, andit was obvious that any detailed discussionin Rangoon without a full knowledge of allfactors would place the Air Force at a dis-advantage. Accordingly, I signalled Air Com-mand to take all possible measures to lessenthe short fall and, for this purpose, to allocate22 additional Dakotas at once. Upon my re-turn to Command, at Kandy, J held a fulldiscussion on the problem.

203. The varied aspects of the problem areworth detailing since they illustrate the manylinks upon which air transport depended atthe time, and also the strong disinclination ofthe Army to accept responsibility for break-downs in air supply. Factors which had upsetthe ah* supply target planned in the middle ofMay included the following:—

(a) The reinforcement flow had not beensufficient to equip the squadron up to a

Unit Equipment of 24 plus 6 as planned and,in consequence, aircraft strength was 12 percent, deficient.

(6) Ramree airfield, which had been builtby the Army for the express purpose ofmonsoon air supply operations, was oftenso waterlogged that aircraft could not getoff.

(c) There had been an epidemic of mainbearing failures in Dakota aircraft engineswhich had caused an appreciable drop inserviceability; one squadron needed 26 newengines.

(d) Although we had' a margin of surpluslift available in May, the Army could nottake advantage of it in June, • owing toshortage of transport.

(e) Army demands remained high becausethey could not withdraw sufficient troopsthrough Rangoon due to shipping and com-munication difficulties.

204. It was decided to take the followingsteps:—

(i) Inform B.A.F.S.E.A. that the allot-ment of 24 aircraft to each squadron wasof the greatest urgency.

(ii) Press the Army for better drainage ofRamree airfield.

(iii) Transfer as soon as possible one ortwo transport squadrons from Ramree toAkyab.

(iv) Give the squadrons a target of 100short tons per day. This was desirable, forit provided a goal that could be reached,and prevented the frustration that had sooften been felt in the past at being given atarget impossible of achievement. Anymargin above the stated figure would be inthe nature of a bonus and have a stimulatingmoral .effect.

•(v) Withdraw one of the two squadronsengaged from airborne training and employit on transport. This would give a totalof 810 long tons a day against the Armyrequirements of 880. The difference was sosmall that it could surely be made up byinland water transport or other means andwould certainly entail no drastic cut inrations or amenities.205. Even then, air transport problems were

not solved. There were still in Burma tacticalsquadrons whose speedy withdrawal for refitand training in preparation for " Zipper/Mail-fist" Operation could not be effected throughthe overloaded land and sea lines of communi-cation. The only method of withdrawingthese units in sufficient time was to fly themout. I decided, therefore, that such a taskheld priority over the airborne training 96Squadron was accomplishing at that time, andaccordingly I received the Supreme AlliedCommander's agreement to 96 Squadron'stemporary withdrawal to enable air lift to beprovided for R.A.F. personnel and equipmentof the units already mentioned.

Transport Preparations for " Zipper I Mail-fist".

206. An important step was taken hi Julywhen I directed that Air Force representationshould be made available for Army planningbodies in order to prevent the Army supplyauthorities from budgeting for airlift which


could not .possibly be met. By means of closerliaison it was hoped that the Army wouldmake bids for air transport which would bepracticable, so that there would be no needfor the Air Forces to overwork their squadronsin order to make good the backlog. In addi-tion, it was possible, in planning, to leave someairlift for domestic requirements such as thecarriage of A.O.G. spares, etc.

207. For the coming months air transportcommitments could be divided into thefollowing categories:—

(i) The requirements of " Zipper/Mail-fist " Operation.

(ii) The supply of 12th Army fighting inBurma.

(iii) The maintenance and expansion ofinternal airlines.

(iv) The continuance at a higher rate thanhitherto of airborne training.208. In order to meet requirement (i) it had

been anticipated that there would be a sharpdiminution in the supply of 12th Army inBurma as the port of Rangoon became cleared.It became apparent in the first week of July,however, that the requirements of the Armyin Burma were going to be very considerablyin excess of the figures that had been esti-mated at the time when aircraft had beenallocated for " Zipper/Mailfist."

209. A complete review of air transportplans was thus once again necessary. TheArmy suggestions for meeting the new situa-tion were given in a signal from H.Q.,A.L.F.S.E.A., which, however, could not beagreed. The Army was accordingly asked toawait recommendations which would be avail-able with all data at the next meeting of theSupreme Allied Commander, when the wholequestion of air transport requirements wouldbe reviewed and priorities adjusted.

Hazards of Weather in Monsoon.210. Weather was the one dominant factor

which affected air supply operations through-out Burma after the breaking of the monsoon.It is no exaggeration to state that the transportaircraft, probably more than any other air-craft employed in the Burma Theatre, had towage a day to day battle against the elements.

211. During the crucial months, while theAllied advance down through Central Burmawas in progress, transport aircraft had beenable to fly long hours, often in good weather,which greatly contributed to the successfulcompletion of their commitment.

212. The proposition, however, was differentin May, after the arrival of the monsoon. Notonly did weather make flying hazardous anddifficult, but it was frequently impossible formeteorological staffs to determine in advancewhat weather the transport aircraft were likelyto encounter en route to their destination.

213. The monsoon in Burma is at its worstduring June and July, when cumulo nimbuscloud, the greatest enemy of aircraft flyingover Burma, builds up frequently from lowlevel to above aircraft ceiling.

214. Comparing aircraft effectiveness in themonsoon months of June and July with thatof February and March, 1945, it appearedthat the effectiveness dropped to 70 per cent.

(68742)

As the average length of trip was less duringJune and July, however, the cargo tonnagecarried per aircraft dropped only to 76.5 percent, of the fine weather standard.

215. An indication of the monsoon's toll onaircraft and crews may be seen from the studyof figures of losses for the month of June,1945. During this .period No. 232 Group lost12 aircraft due to bad weather; casualties tocrews and passengers inclusive of those killed,injured and missing totalling 72. This was ahigh price paid in men and material for thecontinued success of air supply hi Burma./

216. It is on record that one Dakota aircraftflying over Burma actually found itself turnedupside down in a storm, and it was only theskill and presence of mind of the pilot whichaverted disaster,

217. Yet another example of the hazardswhich faced transport supply crews in Burmaduring that monsoon was the experience ofa pilot who found himself completely closedin with cumulo nimbus cloud during a returnjourney from Meiktila to Akyab. After threeattempts, a break in the cloud was found whichbrought the aircraft out on to the coast oppositeRamree Island. The aircraft descended to 300feet but cumulo nimbus again closed in behind,and the pilot, after making several unsuccessfulattempts to climb out of the cloud, was even-tually forced down to sea level. For almostan hour the aircraft circled around until thepilot finally succeeded in climbing to 7,000 feetwhere more cumulo nimbus was encounteredand the radio compass was rendered unser-viceable. The aircraft then turned on a re-ciprocal course and found a small gap in thecloud which again closed in. In the face ofthis predicament, .the pilot decided there was noalternative but to descend and to risk a blindforced landing. The pilot succeeded in bring-ing the aircraft to a standstill in a paddy fieldwithout injury to any of the crew.

Stocking Rear Airfields with Supplies.218. Most of the supplies carried by the

R.A.3F. Transport Squadrons in Burma afterthe departure of .the American units were forthe purpose of stocking rear airfields, where theArmy organisations distributed the supply tovarious Army and R.A.F. units. Civil commit-ments also continued to be fulfilled in NorthernBurma.

219. With the experience gained in June re-garding the consumption of petrol required byC-47 aircraft for each trip during average mon-soon flying conditions, squadrons located atRamree, Akyab, and Chittagong wereinstructed to increase their load from 5,500 Ib.to 6,000 Ib.

220. In preparation for the final showdownwith the trapped Japanese forces in Burma,during July, special instructions for supplydropping in the Toungoo area were issued.Weather, however, was again the big handicap,and as dropping operations were frequentlyimpossible in this area, arrangements had to bemade to land loads in Central Burma so asto form a stock-pile near the source of groundoperations and later take advantage of periodsof fine weather in which to deliver the back-log. This system made it unnecessary for air-craft to carry undropped supplies back to base,with a consequent increase in the number of

B


hours required to deliver them. In the eventof abortive trips producing a back log atToungoo, aircrews were briefed to proceed tothat area on supply dropping operations, afterwhich the aircraft landed at Toungoo or Magweand carried out second and possibly third tripsbefore returning to base.

221. During the flare up in ground opera-tions in the third week in July, when (thebreak-through from the Pegu Yomas by thetrapped Japanese forces began, air supply tothe Allied ground forces engaging the Japaneseassumed considerable importance until thebattle had ended. Rainfall was widespreadover the whole area of operations, and diffi-culties under which aircraft had to operatewere acute. With exceedingly bitter fightingtaking place, and thousands of Japanese troopspressing forward in .their anxiety to escape, thestate of the ground situation was ever fluid,and made the accurate dropping of supplies noeasy task. Many of the dropping zones used,indeed, were less than 100 yards from localenemy forces and there were occasions whena dropping zone was surrounded by Japanesetroops and some of the containers overshot themark and fell into enemy hands. It speaks wellfor the aircrews trained in dropping suppliesthat more containers did not fall into the handsof the Japanese, whose desperate plight duringthe previous two months was due to lack ofair supply and to the fact that the enemy werecut off from their Headquarters and bases inSouthern Burma and Siam by our land forces.Even in this last and major battle with theJapanese in Burma it was significant that airsupply—of which .the enemy had none—wasone of .the cardinal factors in assuring triumphfor the Allied ground forces and disaster forthe enemy. Air supply in Burma madehistory which outdistanced in merit andachievement the more publicised air supplyoperations of the war in Europe such as thatof Arnhem, or the food dropping to the Dutchin Holland. These, without doubt, were im-portant and commendable efforts hi themselves,but they bore no comparison to the enormousand sustained efforts of transport aircrewswho faced the hazards of monsoon weather.

End of the War Affects Air Supply Operations.222. With the Japanese surrender hi South

East Asia in August, air supply operations tothe Allied ground forces in Burma took on anew aspect in keeping with the new situation,

. 223. This did not mean that the commitmentof the air supply squadrons would cease, orindeed, that fighting in Burma was entirelyover. On the contrary, it was expected that incertain respects air supply commitments wouldincrease. There could be no doubt, however,that the nature and the location of loads whichwould be carried, would greatly change.Evacuation of prisoners-of-war and internees,the " fly-in " of Allied ground forces to occupylarge and vast territories held by the Japanese,were all commitments which faced the trans-port squadrons in South East Asia on the cessa-tion of hostilities. Materiel of war, on the otherhand—so important a cargo throughout thecampaign in Burma—ceased to have a firstpriority. Movement of personnel, carriage ofrations -and civilian supplies replaced the trans-port of military supplies.

224. Operations of the transport squadronsduring August fell into two distinct categories.The first half of the month, when Japan wasstill at war, supply operations continued muchthe same as on previous months. After 15thAugust, when surrender was announced, thesituation became somewhat confused.

225. The supply tasks by aircraft during thefirst half of August were confined principally tothe carrying of ammunition and petrol for thetwo most active areas of fighting in Burma—the Mawchi Road and the lower Sittang—where the remnants of the Japanese forces whohad survived the July "Killing" were stillholding out. There were, of course, othernumerous and important supply tasks, 'thebiggest of which was the stocking of airfieldsin Southern and Central Burma in preparationfor the sustained effort which would be requiredonce the assault on Malaya, under operation" Zipper ", began.

226. One squadron during the first half ofAugust had the sole task of taking food suppliesto the civilian population of Northern Burma.This was an important commitment owing tothe lack of other means of transport.

Operations to relieve Allied Prisoners of War.227. With the Japanese surrender in the

second half of August, there came orders forthe move of six R.A.F. Transport squadronsto the Rangoon area to transport stores, andto evacuate Ps.O.W. from Siam, French Indo-China, Malaya and the Netherlands EastIndies. As the result of these squadron moves,and the military situation at the time, thenumber of normal transport operations fellaway very considerably. The majority of thetrips, indeed, were concerned with moves bysquadrons and the stocking up of the Rangoonairfields with provisions for the liberatedterritories and the P.O.W. Camps.

228. August 28th—the historic date on whichOperation "Mastiff" was launched to bringrelief to the thousands of Allied Ps.O.W. inthe prison camps throughout the vast terri-tories of South East Asia—saw the transportsquadrons, as well as other aircraft of the-Command, including those of the R.A.A.F.,take part in what was described as " one ofthe greatest mercy missions of the war."

229. Many of the flights undertaken in theseoperations were equivalent to a Transatlanticflight, and yet 75 per cent, of the crewssucceeded in reaching their targets anddropping their messages as well as parachuting,medical supplies, Red Cross parcels and teamsof medical and signalling personnel providedmainly by airborne formations. Later, manythousands of Ps.O.W. and internees wereevacuated from these territories by air.

230. It is not difficult to visualise the plight,in which our Allied Ps.O.W. would certainlyhave found themselves after the officialJapanese surrender, had not all resources,including Air Power, been used, and organisedquickly, to bring relief, comfort and sustenanceto these unfortunate men, many of them topweak to stand on their own legs. Only AirPower could have penetrated these vast terri-tories throughout South East Asia with thespeed required to initiate that essential relief.The pin-pointing of many Japanese P.O.W.camps, in addition to the great distances flown.


by aircraft and the hazards of weatherencountered in these tropical regions, speaksmagnificently for the navigational and flyingskill of our aircrews.

231. The period, May to August, 1945—covering the re-entry of the Allied Forces intoRangoon and later the surrender of Japan—cannot be termed spectacular in air supplyoperations when reckoned against such effortsduring the Allied advance down throughBurma earlier in the year, when the mobilityof Fourteenth Army was almost entirely pro-vided by the Allied Air Forces whose record

supply tonnage averaged 2,900 tons per day inApril, 1945.

232. The period, May to August, was notonly the monsoon period but the period, withthe exception of the July battle in Burma,during which the Allied Forces on ground, seaand in the air were building up their organisa-tion and strength to deliver the next blowwhich would have fallen upon the Japanese inMalaya in early September. Nevertheless, theR.A.F. Transport supply squadrons met thedemands required of them, and the supplyeffort for that period may be summarised asfollows: —

Tactical TripsPersonnel CarriedCasualties EvacuatedSupplies Delivered (Short Tons)Estimated Total (Short Tons)

May7,9987,7953,899

23,17223,951

June7,2112,3212,515

19,97820,210

July8,2583,0172,044

22,17022,472

August3,7794,6511,5149,4189,883

Total27,24617,7849,972

74,73876,516

CASUALTY EVACUATIONA Prominent Lesson which Emerged from the

Campaign in Burma.233. The great saving of lives and raising of

morale due to air casualty evacuation was oneof the main lessons which emerged from theCampaign in Burma.

234. This service was easily one of the bestmorale builders among Allied front-line troops.It inspired the fighting man's confidence andallayed any fears he may have had about beingwounded, with the possibility of falling intothe hands of the Japanese as a prisoner.

235. Air casualty evacuation, once it becameknown ^s the recognised -method for dealingwith serious cases by flying them out of theforward areas in Burma, was a triumph bothfor the Allied medical staffs and the aircrewsalike. The Japanese had no ah* organisationfor similar evacuation of their troops, and thelow condition in which many enemy prisonerswere found as a result of #cute sickness in thejungle areas was, in itself, a contributory factorto their defeat.

236. The general policy was for supply air-craft to deliver supplies and take back fromforward airfields on their return trips loads ofcasualties to the base hospitals, and the specialcentres established at Comilla, but whenadverse landing conditions compelled supplyby dropping, there were temporary difficultiesin clearing casualties from Corps and Armymedical centres. Austers and L.5 aircraft(Sentinels) were used in the Theatre with con-spicuous success in the forward areas.

237. For the purpose of handling casualtiesfrom forward medical units and forward trans-port landing grounds, R.A.F. Casualty AirEvacuation Units were set up. These unitswere situated on the transport air strip coveringa particular area. • Emplaning of the casualtieson to the aircraft was effected according to theirdegree of urgency for base hospital medicaltreatment. The average strength of a CasualtyAir Evacuation Unit was 40 British otherranks, with a varied number of Indian per-sonnel. Approximately 100 wounded could bestaged at these C.A.E.U.S. for as long as wasnecessary. As many seriously wounded andsick personnel required medical attentionwhilst travelling in aircraft to base, an air

(68742)

ambulance orderly pool was established at base.This was composed of specially trained nursingorderlies who flew in all aircraft. It is note-worthy to record that these nursing orderliesflew as much as 200 hours a month. Theycarried with them complete first-aid equip-ment, including oxygen-giving apparatus. Inthe Burma Theatre, due to the mountainousnature of the country, portable oxygen equip-ment proved to be essential in air casualtyevacuation work, and its employment actuallysaved many lives.

238. The Casualty Air Evacuation Units inthe forward areas were also responsible for theoff-loading, treatment and conveyance ofcasualties received direct from the battle linein light aircraft such as the L.5. These aircraftproved invaluable in evacuating casualtiesfrom jungle clearances and small strips in theforward areas.

239. Air evacuation of casualties began inBurma in the opening months of 1944, whenthe Allied ground forces found themselves^encircled in the Arakan, and later during theperiod of the Siege of Imphal. By .Septemberof that year, some 48,789 casualties had beenevacuated by air, and as the months passed,and the campaign developed in intensity, thecasualty evacuation figures steadily increased.

240. By the end of April, 1945—three daysbefore the fall of Rangoon—the totalcasualties evacuated by British and Americanaircraft in Burma was 110,761, of which50,285 were evacuated by R.A.F. aircraft.

241. In the period May to August, 1945, theclosing stages of the war against the Japanese,R.A.F. aircraft evacuated a total of 9,972casualties.

242. That air casualty evacuation proved!itself a triumph both from the point of viewof morale and the lives saved, is undisputed.Perhaps more convincing is the fact that,throughout the campaign, only one death inthe air among ground personnel evacuated wasrecorded, and only one aircraft, carrying 24casualties, was lost due to weather.

243. H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A. stated that airevacuation reduced mortality of wounded by60 per cent.

B2

2J46 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951

American Experience in Casualty Evacuation.244. Since American aircraft operated as

part of the Allied Air Forces in the Theatreuntil integration in the Command ceased on1st June, 1945, it is not inappropriate to men-tion something of the interesting experience ofAmerican L.5. aircraft employed in Burma incasualty evacuation and in other secondary im-portant tasks associated with supply to theground forces.

245. A special research report on evacua-tion of casualties from the forward areas inBurma which was produced in July, 1945 byAir/12G (Research) Headquarters, AlliedLand Forces, South East Asia, described thework of two American squadrons operatingL.5. aircraft with Fourteenth Army in thecampaign.

The purpose of the report was: —(a) To consider the best method of using

L.5. aircraft for casualty evacuation in thelight of the American experience.

(6) To estimate the number of aircraft re-quired to -evacuate the casualties from aCorps in action with varying degrees ofbattle activity.246. Throughout the period considered in

the report—November, 1944 to April, 1945—the squadrons worked with 4 Corps and 33Corps from a rear strip close to the CasualtyClearing Station. The squadrons of light air-craft were allotted on the basis of one for eachCorps of three Divisions. The C.C.S. was sitedat the edge of. the strip. Forward strips weremade by the troops, and the location of thestrips was signalled to the squadrons. A re-connaissance plane would fly over the site inthe early morning and photograph the strip.If it was considered satisfactory for landingand take-off, the required number of aircraftflew out immediately.

247. During the Meiktila-Rangoon ad-vance of 4 Corps, the number of strips con-structed was greater than that during acorresponding period at any other time, yetnone of the strips was refused by the squadrons.When the strips could be built more than 500yards long, it was possible to evacuate twositting cases in one sortie, but there were fewopportunities for this.

248. All the squadron commanders under-stood their primary role to be casualty evacua-tion. But important secondary tasks were alsoperformed. Except in the case of the fly-in ofimportant medical supplies, these secondarytasks were never allowed to interfere with theevacuation of casualties.

249. The secondary tasks undertakenwere: —

(a) The emergency flying-in of medicalsupplies, especially whole blood.

(6) Flying-in reinforcements, mail, food,ammunition and items of personal kit. Thesetrips were always part of an evacuationsortie.

(c) Transporting V.I.P.s. within the Corpsarea.

(d) Spotting for artillery.(e) Dropping and picking up messages.(f) Reconnaissance flights.

250. The importance of the evacuation ofcasualties relative to other duties was, indeed,

interesting. The total trips by one squadronover a given period of one month, whenactivity was intense, was 12,017 of which 9,238were casualty evacuation flights, or 77 percent, of the total, as against 2,779 secondarymissions.

251. In an analysis of the secondary tasksundertaken by these aircraft, the flying-in ofreinforcements proved exceedingly valuable,since these missions could be combined readilywith 'the collection of a casualty, while mostof the other missions could not. In variousten-day periods, for example, the total numberof casualties evacuated was 7,705 as against3,345 reinforcements flown in. The per-centage of evacuated casualties which werereplaced by reinforcements was therefore 43.

Evacuating Casualties from a Corps in Action.252. For the .peak period March, 1945, a

squadron of 32 American light aircraftoperated under 33 Corps.

253. During this period, all the cases re-quired to be evacuated were taken out by air.No cases were evacuated by road or rail. Theaircraft were based at Shwebo during the firsthalf of the month and flew as far as Ondaw,35 miles away. In the second 'half of themonth, the aircraft were based at Ondaw andflew as far as Wundwin, 65 miles away. Thenumbers of ground forces evacuated and thehours flown in three ten-day periods were asfollows: —

Date1—11 March

11—22 March21—31 March

Total ...

NumberEvacuated

1,7931,4641,362

4,619

HoursFlown1,6041,4311,688

4,723

Maximum distance between base and forwardstrip (miles') 65

Minimum distance between base and forwardstrip (miles) 35

Average per cent, aircraft in commission daily 96-7Average number of aircraft in commission daily 30 • 6Average number of hours flown per plane per

day 5-2Average number of hours flown per plane per' month 153

Average number of cases evacuated per planeper day 5

Average number of hours flown per day ... 157Average number of cases evacuated per day ... 154Maximum number of flying hours a pilot a day 9

254. The above achievement by thissquadron was a record for the Americansquadrons in the Group. The effort was be-lieved to be near the maximum which anysquadron could reach in similar circumstances.

255. During the period some of the pilotsflew for nine hours a day for five consecutivedays, and made up seven sorties in one dayon several occasions. This intensification ofactivity for short periods could not have beenachieved without the very high level of main-tenance attained, nor could it have 'been ex-ceeded without putting too great a strain onthe pilots or replacing some of .the aircraft.Three of the pilots had to be replaced beforethe end of the operation owing to exhaustion,and 14 aircraft had to be replaced when thesquadron came out. The deterioration of theengines, -however, cannot be ascribed simplyto this operation, as the aircraft had had threemonths of operations before operating with


33 Corps. The Squadron Commander, it wasinteresting to note, considered that the factorlimiting the monthly carrying capacity of asquadron was the ability of the pilots, ratherthan that of aircraft, to withstand the strainof intense activity. Few of the pilots in ques-tion could have remained efficient if thesquadron had attempted to carry on for longerthan six weeks at the same level of activity.

Maximum Monthly Carrying Capacity of L.5Aircraft.

256. While the average daily number of casesevacuated per aircraft was 5, some of the air-craft actually exceeded this number, whilesome failed to reach it. On the other hand,had all aircraft been used to the same extentas those which flew more than the average forthe whole squadron, the average daily numberevacuated would have been six, or 180 for thesquadron of 30 aircraft. This figure wasagreed upon by the Squadron Commander,who estimated that the maximum daily carry-ing capacity of a single squadron of light air-craft was 180 and the maximum monthly capa-city 6,000. This, of course, was based on themaximum distance of 65 miles between therear and forward strips.

257. The situation was somewhat altered inthe instance of 4 Corps' advance down theMeiktila-Rangoon road in April, 1945, whenan American light aircraft squadron wasevacuating cases from Toungoo to Meiktilafor a short period. The distance involvedwas 330 miles for a whole sortie, and the flightlasting approximately four and a half hours.This meant that it was not possible to evacuatemore than two cases per plane per day formore than .a total of 60 casualties per day forthe whole squadron. It was interesting tonote in this connection, however, that 4 Corps'rate of advance in April was approximately14 miles iper day. While the .distances flownby light aircraft engaged on casualty evacua-tion were correspondingly great, the squadronwas nevertheless well able to handle afi cases,because ground casualties were very light.

258. Altogether the data derived as a resultof the operational experience of these light air-craft in Burma suggests that one squadron of32 L.5 aircraft is sufficient to evacuate all thecases • requiring evacuation from the forwardareas of a Corps of three Divisions, providedthe average daily number of cases does not ex-ceed 180 and the average distance flown isnot greater than 60 miles per trip (120 milesper round sortie). One other important pro-viso, of course, is that we have air superiorityand that there is no prolonged heavy fightingwith an exceedingly high sickness rate.

GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE.

A Period of Great Versatility for G.R. Aircraft.259. When the period under review opened,

offensive general reconnaissance had becomeeffectively established as the primary opera-tional function of air-sea power in this Theatre.The opening weeks of 1945 had incontestablyindicated an entire absence of enemy U-boatsthroughout the vast expanses of the IndianOcean, and pointed to the urgent need foralternative employment. Thus evolved theplan for an intensive anti-shipping campaign

to disrupt the enemy's sea transport in andaround the waters of the Andaman Sea. Fourmonths of vigorous anti-shipping strikes andcarefully planned air-sea mining operationsrevealed that these tactics were greatly,harass-ing the enemy, and an intensification of offen-.sive general reconnaissance was rightly con-sidered a remunerative policy to pursue.

260. Although the primary operational roleof 222 Group in May 1945 was that of sinkingand immobilising the enemy's shipping, itmust be borne in mind that there were con-'tinued and increasing commitments in thespheres of photographic reconnaissance,meteorological flights and air-sea rescue. Ihad, in fact, delegated the responsibility for theorganisation and control of air-sea rescueoperations and units to Air Marshal Com-manding 222 Group as from 1st April, 1945,for the whole of South East Asia Command.Moreover, there was always the possibility thatthe enemy might recommence his U-boat war-fare with renewed vigour, and the G.R. forcesunder my control had always to be preparedfor such a contingency.

Developing the Anti-Shipping Campaign.261. With the re-occupation of Rangoon on

May 3rd, 1945, it became possible to estab-lish a new and invaluable base from whichto develop the anti-shipping campaign in moreeasterly waters. Sunderland aircraft of 230Squadron (relieved in July by a detachmentof 209 Squadron, similarly equipped) operat-ing from the depot ship S.S. " Manela " underthe operational control of 346 Wing were ableto spread their tentacles over the areas of theTenasserim Coast, Kra Isthmus, Gulf of Siamand South China Seas, adding confusion andperplexity to the enemy with their constantarmed reconnaissance and timely attackswherever suitable targets presented themselves.

262. As a counterpart to this newly estab-lished base of Rangoon in the north, the de-velopment of Cocos Island in the south con-stituted an equally important strategic basefor similar operations off the west coast ofSumatra, the south coast of Java and theSunda Straits. No. 321 Squadron, equippedwith Liberators (Mark VI), commencedoperating a detachment of six aircraft fromCocos Island on July 22nd, 1945.

263. No. 354 Liberator Squadron, whichhad initiated the offensive anti-shipping strikeaspect of the campaign in early February,disbanded on 15th May, 1945. No. 203Liberator Squadron, however, which had com-menced strike operations on 20th .March,1945, continued its programme of incessant andforceful attack over the Andaman Sea, Straitsof Malacca, Gulf of Siam, Java Sea, BangkaStrait and off the west coast of Sumatra untilthe cessation of hostilities. This squadronwas based at Kankesanturai (North Ceylon)but frequently operated detachments fromAkyab, Ramree and Cocos Island underadverse conditions.

264. The paramount problem of the ship-ping strike operations was the lack of forwardbases. Liberator aircraft had been operatingfrom bases far removed from this scene ofoperations, and the period of patrol in theoperational area was inevitably curtailed, thus


detracting from the efficacy of the sorties.Furthermore, flying-boat facilities at Rangoonwere inadequate, and prevented the Sunder-lands from being used to the fullest operationalcapacity. For example, there were no slipwayor beaching facilities, so that it was impossiblefor flying-boats to undertake operations likelyto cause severe damage to their hulls. Neitherthe Sunderland nor the Liberator aircraft isideal for low-level shipping attacks, but thenature of the operation and existing conditionsdemanded long-range aircraft and these werethe only types available*

265. It is interesting to note that Liberatoraircraft of Nos. 203 and 354 Squadrons carriedout a series of long-range sea reconnaissancepatrols during May 13th-19th which provedinvaluable in the location and eventual destruc-tion on May 16th of the Japanese heavy cruiser'"HAGURO" in the Straits of Malacca by:H.M. Naval forces. (26th' Destroyer Flotilla-Captain M. L. Power, C.B.E., D.S.O., inM.M.S. "SAUMAREZ".)

266. Having regard to the many and variedcomplexities of conducting strike operationswithin this vast theatre of operations, such asthe unfortunate paucity of air bases, theirremediable problem of distance and the un-suitability of aircraft, my GJR. Air Forcesachieved results both impressive and commend-able. The enemy's shipping sustained consider-able blows at a time when every ship in hispossession was of vital importance. When thewar came to an abrupt conclusion, offensive.general reconnaissance was getting into itsstride. Had hostilities continued, past experi-ence permits an optimistic speculation in con-nection with the heavy toll general reconnais-sance would have taken of Japanese sea trans-port, particularly on the shipping routesbetween Batavia and Singapore.

Air-Sea Mining as Part of the Campaign.267. Mine-laying operations were planned as

an essential part of the anti-shipping campaign,to toe executed concurrently with the moredirectly offensive anti-shipping strikes pro-gramme. Initially, it was planned to lay minesduring the hours of darkness in the shippinglanes of Northern Sumatra and NorthernMalaya, and 160 Squadron (Liberators Mk.V.)underwent an intensive period of training inlong range flying and the technique of mine-laying to implement these plans. They com-menced these operations on 21st January, 1945and continued until 24th May—a period of124 days during which 196 sorties were flown.After operational experience had been gained,the mining commitments were increased toinclude drops in the areas of Sonchkla, Chum-born, Port Swettenham and Singapore.Mine-laying operations were discontinued after24th May, 1945, because the stage was thenbeing finally set for Operation " Zipper ", andto have continued mine-laying beyond that datemight have had serious repercussions whenAllied landings took place on the west coastof Malaya.

268. It is difficult, if not impossible, to assessaccurately and fully, the damage and incon-venience caused to the enemy by these par-ticular operations. The strategy employed wasto mine a .number of different and well-separated targets at frequent intervals so as

to cause the enemy the greatest possible incon-venience in constantly deploying his inadequateforce of mine sweeping craft over a large area.It is reasonable to assume that many thousandsof tons of enemy shipping were immobilised ata time when they could ill be spared, and thetask of constant mine-sweeping must have beenheart-breaking if not overwhelming. What-ever the material achievements of these opera-tions, it must be added that the programmewas extremely well-conceived and wellexecuted.

Employment of General Reconnaissance Air-craft on Special Duty Operations.

269. The year of final and complete victoryin South East Asia Command was a periodof strenuous re-orientation for G.R. Air Forces.With the Indian Ocean no longer a hunting-ground for enemy U-boats, the days of vigilantdefensive warfare had passed, and it becameessential to re-model the defensive Air Forcesinto a strong and penetrating arm of offencewith which to sever the enemy's sea communi-cations. (The broad strategy of general re-connaissance in the Indian Ocean had alwaysbeen concerned with the passive protection ofshipping rather than the hunting of U-boats—a strategy rendered inevitable 'by the enor-mous expanse of water to be reconnoitered andthe inadequate number of aircraft and fewadvance bases at our disposal.)

270. Unfortunately, it was impossible todevote our entire G.R. resources to the execu-tion of this offensive plan, for there were moreurgent operational demands to be satisfied, andgeneral reconnaissance aircraft could bequickly and satisfactorily diverted to the rescue.When mine-laying operations ceased, it wasenvisaged that 160 Squadron, together withNos. 8 and 356 Squadrons, would reinforcethe shipping strike campaign, but the growingrequirements of the S.D. organisation absorbedthese squadrons to the detriment of offensivegeneral reconnaissance. The effort of G.R. air-craft operating in the S.D. role does not pro-perly belong to this chapter, but rather to thatof S.D. operations as a whole. Suffice it isto say here that these squadrons acquitted them-selves in a creditable fashion, and manifestedonce again the comparative ease with whichAir Power can be moulded into different formsor styles to meet the changing requirements.

271. Towards the end of the war, No. 222Group had become responsible for the opera-tional control of some six squadrons engagedon S.D. operations, with the result that thefunctional and administrative experience gainedtherefrom provided the Command with a com-petent and well-versed organisation for thevital and intricate operations immediatelyfollowing the end of the war. No. 222 Groupalso played a large and important part inOperations " Birdcage " and " Mastiff ", for therequirements of these operations were in manyways similar to those of S.D.

272. The achievements of general recon-naissance aircraft engaged upon the relief andliberation of Allied prisoners-of-war, arerecorded in the appropriate chapter. It was asatisfying conclusion to the history of generalreconnaissance in the Indian Ocean—a historyof dexterous and highly competent adaptationto the many and varied exigencies of animmense and complicated theatre of war.


SPECIAL DUTY OPERATIONS.An Integral Part in the War Strategy of

South East Asia.273. Operations by S.D. aircraft of my Com-

mand contributed very materially to the successof the highly organised guerilla forces of thisTheatre which, themselves, were an integralpart of the strategy of the Supreme AlliedCommander, South East Asia.

274. In the initial stages, S.D. operationswere primarily hi support of our own forcesoperating in the enemy-occupied territories, con-cerning which our Intelligence from groundsources was exceedingly scarce. In the closingstages of the war, however, operations by air-craft hi introducing personnel to the Japanese-occupied areas of Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Malaya, Sumatra and Singapore Island,and supplying them as well as the guerilla for-mations under their control, grew to propor-tions which called for the maximum effort ofaircraft and crews engaged on this special work.Indeed the true picture was that our Liberatorposition in the Command was exceedinglytight, since the S.D. effort was carried outlargely by this type of aircraft.

275. By May, 1945, gueriDa organisations inthe Theatre had become firmly established, somuch so, that the Burmese Guerillas playeda prominent part with our Air and GroundForces in the killing of ten thousand Japanesetroops during an attempted mass escape fromthe Pegu Yomas in July.

276. A brief account of their activities in co-operation with the Tactical Air Forces iscovered in another chapter.

Control of the Guerilla Organisations.277. The control of the Guerilla Organisa-

tions in this Theatre was vested in the SupremeAllied Commander, South East Asia, with abranch, known as "P" Division, which dele-gated part of its functions to special staff officersat various lower formations.

278. Guerilla operations in South East Asiatook on an entirely different character fromthe work of the underground forces in Europe,where patriots speedily organised themselvesas a resistance movement. In South East Asiathe sympathies of Asiatics had first to be wonover to our cause by special agents and leaders,and parties of guerillas organised among thelocal inhabitants and often fanatical hill tribes-men. Aircraft made flights of 2,000 and 3,000miles -regularly on these expeditions for on air-craft almost entirely did the build-up of thesesecret forces depend.

279. Briefly, the Guerilla Organisationsoperating in the Theatre were as follows: —

(a) Force 136. This was a British Organi-sation mainly responsible for raising, train-ing, arming and controlling guerilla jforcesand sabotage teams. It also had a tacticalintelligence role and operational control of"Z" Force which had a more limited butsimilar function.

(b) OSS. The American Officers ofStrategic Services had a similar object to thatof Force 136, and also collected and distri-buted strategic intelligence.

<c) I.S.L.D. The Inter-Service Liaison De-partment was a British Organisation and was

concerned mainly with the collection and dis-tribution of strategic intelligence from manysources.280. In addition to the above, there were also

miscellaneous organisations which hadguerilla functions, and sometimes called uponSpecial Duty aircraft to assist them.

Allied Air Force Units Involved.281. Liberators, Dakotas, Catalinas,

Lysanders and L.5 (Sentinels) were used for theS.D. operations. The principal units employedwere: —

(i) No. 357 Squadron. This squadron wasthe one permanent complete S.D. squadronin this Theatre. It consisted of 10 Libera-tors, 10 Dakotas and a detached flight ofup to 10 Lysanders. The role of theLysanders was the infiltration and with-drawal of men and mail by landing in enemyterritory. The Dakotas were also availablefor similar landings, as well as for parachuteoperations.

(ii) No. 240 Squadron. This G.R. Cata-lina squadron included three Catalinas forSpecial Duty Operations in alighting in enemywaters. These Catalinas were also capableof minor parachute operations.

(iii) No. 358 Squadron. This heavybomber squadron was transferred indefinitelyfrom 231 Group to the S.D. role, and con-sisted of 16 Liberators which were modifiedto S.D. standards.

(iv) lOtfi U.S.A.A.F. Until the withdrawalby the American Army Air Forces from theCommand on 1st June, 1945, a proportionof the effort of the ,10th U.S.A.A.F., by'arrangement with the O.S.S., was allocatedto S.D. operations.

(v) Tactical Groups. By local arrange-ments between the Guerilla Organisations andNo. 221 Group, Tactical squadrons some-times carried out S.D. operations authorisedby the Group Headquarters.

(vi) S.D. Air/Sea Rescue Operations.Special Duty Ah-/Sea. Rescue operations werecarried out from time to time by A.S.R. Cata-linas under the control of No. 222 Group.These operations were concerned with instal-ling dumps of foodstuffs and equipment formissing aircrews on coasts in enemy waters,and were arranged by " E " Group.282. As the S.D. squadrons during the closing

stages of the war in South East Asia wereoperating regularly at an intensive rate of efforton these missions, other units were also broughtin to supplement the S.D. work.

Planning of S.D. Air Operations.283. The training of aircrews and army per-

sonnel to the R.A.F. standards took as highpriority as the operations themselves. Wherepracticable, and when the Guerilla Organisa-tions agreed, the training of army personneland aircrews was combined. This was par-ticularly essential during training for nightlanding operations on enemy territory, andfor ground-to-air special radar and signalsequipment.

284. It was estimated that a sustained rateof five successful sorties per aircraft permonth could be maintained by an S.D.squadron of twelve aircraft, giving a total of


sixty sorties per month. Generally, planningdid not exceed -more than fifty sorties permonth, in view of the maintenance difficulties,the extremely long sorties which had to beflown, and the fact that the Guerilla Organi-sations might not have continuous operationsin hand. While it was possible to carry outthe majority of the operations over Malayawith safety during daytime, or under last lightconditions, it was not considered wise to makethese flights in daylight hi the immediatevicinity of Singapore.

285. The three principal home bases for theS.D. operations were at Jessore in Bengal,Minneriya. in Ceylon, and later the CocosIslands. The operations from the Cocos didnot begin until mid-July, when sorties wereflown to all parts of Malaya. From Bengal,the S.D. operations were principally overBurma and French Indo-China, but flightswere also made deep into Malaya, one air-craft logging twenty hours thirty-nine minutesfor one of its sorties.

Operations Increased for Malaya.286. The strategic plan for the assault on

Malaya called for an even greater effort by•the S.D. squadrons based in Ceylon. By July,the underground forces had been so organisedby our personnel, and supplied with arms andequipment to such proportions, that they con-stituted a very real threat to isolated garrisonsof Japanese troops. The time was consideredopportune to foster and galvanise these organi-sations into a formidable, fighting force toharass the enemy at the time of our own land-ings in Malaya. For this purpose, therefore,it was decided to use heavy bomber aircraft,based on the Cocos Islands, to supplement theS.D. operations into Southern Malaya, and toemploy these aircraft on -the first ten nightsof the July and August moon periods. Theseoperations were controlled by Headquarters,No. 222 Group. Aircraft airborne from theCocos Islands were routed in daylight throughthe gap hi the Sumatra mountain range between1° North and 2° North, and carrying a pay-load of 5,000 Ibs. In this way, approximately75 per cent, of the Malayan dropping zoneswas covered.

287. In order to carry out very long rangeS.D. operations within the Command withworthwhile payloads, Liberators at one tunewere operating with an all-up-weight (a.u.w.)of 66,000 Ibs. This had paid a great dividendin establishing links with the undergroundforces in Malaya.

288. To keep the a.u.w. within the marginof safety, however, and at the same time carrythe maximum payloads, it was necessary, onoccasion, to cut the amount of extra petrolcarried to the irreducible minimum; to stripaircraft of non-essential equipment, and tocarry only essential crews.

289. In the weeks immediately preceding.the Allied landings on Malaya, a considerableweight of weapons, ammunition and concen-trated food was dropped to thousands oforganised guerillas, together with trainedguerilla leaders.

290. The operational records of the aircraftengaged on S.D. operations in the Commandshow that aircraft °of No. 222 Group aloneflew nearly 11,000 hours between May and

September, 1945. The Cocos squadrons,although not altogether fully experienced inS.D. work, speedily established an enviablereputation for accurate dropping. When itis realised, too, that the sorties carried outby Catalina aircraft entailed, for the mostpart, night landings on enemy waters in vary-ing conditions of sea, without benefit of flare-path, some idea is gained of the high skillrequired from these R.A.F. pilots.

291. The sudden end of the war hi SouthEast Asia did not conclude the tasks of theS.D. squadrons, but brought instead a newseries of commitments under Operation"Mastiff" for the relief and liberation ofAllied prisoners-of-war, an aspect which isdealt with in a later chapter of this despatch:

Outstanding Operations by Lysander Aircraft:292. Any report or narrative on S.D. opera-

tions would be far short of completeness with-out mention of the magnificent work done bylight aircraft, notably Lysanders. The untiringefforts of Lysander pilots, indeed, greatlyassisted Force 136 to carry on their activitiesbehind the enemy lines during the drive throughBurma, and I feel justified in singling them outfor especial mention.

293. Particularly outstanding work was doneby the Lysander Flight of 357 Squadron. Notonly were personnel infiltrated, but seriouslywounded personnel were evacuated from thefield. In addition to the urgent operationalstores flown in, commitments had includedtransport of Staff Officers to Party Commandershi 'the field, and the evacuation of enemyprisoners-of-war and documents.

294. The versatility of the flight had in-creased with each operation. Sorties oftennecessitated flying in foul monsoon -weatherand landing on very small strips. On one occa-sion a landing was attempted at Ntilawathihta,near the Papun-Momaung Road, on a veryshort strip and on wet and slippery grass. Theaircraft slid into a deep ditch at the end of thestrip, but escaped with negligible damage. Inattempts to extricate the aircraft, lumberelephants would not go near, but the com-bined efforts of fifty local inhabitants even-tually succeeded in hauling the plane back onto the strip; the pilot then flew back to base.

295. On many occasions Lysander sortiescame near to failure owing to the presence ofJapanese troops hi the area. Force 136 nearlyalways had to cover the landing area for fearof surprise by Japanese patrols.

296. On another occasion, a pilot was in-volved in a skirmish between Japanese troopsand Force 136 Guerillas at Lipyekhi, whenhis aircraft failed to start for the return journeyto Rangoon. Firing took place across thestrip, but the aircraft escaped damage. Itwas rendered serviceable next day by a rescuesortie, and was able to return to base.

297. Another escapade was accomplishedwhen Squadron Leader Turner, Flight Com-mander, damaged his Lysander in an attemptto pick up personnel at Ngapyawdaw, nearKinmun. Shortly after he had landed, the"neighbourhood was compromised by Japaneseforces and repair of the aircraft was impos-sible. Attempts to rescue" Squadron LeaderTurner were abortive until ten days later,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951 2151.

when a rescue aircraft made a well-timedevacuation. In the meantime, the Flight Com-mander stayed with Force 136 Guerillas.

The Advantages of the Lysander Aircraft.298. The advantages of the Lysander for the

unique type of work it was called upon tocarry out were as follows:—

(i) Weight lifting capacity.(ii) Automatic flap action, meeting all the

conditions of flight, e.g. a sudden loss of liftin a sudden violent turn or in conditions ofturbulence over the hills.

(iii) Capability of cruising at low speed inconditions of bad visibility.

(iv) High rate of turn, of great value inconfined spaces.

(v) Fixed undercarriage, strong and ableto stand the shocks of heavy landings.

(vi) High engine power and light wingloading, facilitating quick take-off fromwaterlogged strips, and an immediate highrate of climb.

(vii) Reasonable flying endurance of air-craft, the pilot never being embarrassed in adifficult operation by shortage of fuel.299. But even with these advantages, the

technique required of the Lysander pilots wasone of skill, particularly when landing on verysmall strips. On such occasions the normalapproach speed of 85 m.p.h. had to be re-duced to 70 m.p.h., and a precision touch-down at the very beginning of the strip, withthrottle promptly closed, had to be accom-plished.

300. From May, 1945, to October, 1945,357 Squadron Lysanders flew no less than1,310 hours. 405 sorties were attempted and363 of these were successful. Personnel in-filtrated had numbered 214, and evacuations,330. In addition, some 104,580 Ibs. of storeswere landed behind the enemy lines.

301. A fitting tribute to the Lysander opera-tions was paid by Headquarters, Group "A"of Force 136 on 23rd June, 1945.

PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCEA Record of Achievement Built on

Perseverance of Crews.302. Photographic reconnaissance has come

out of the South East Asia Theatre with arecord of achievement built upon the perse-verance of its air crews to master the diffi-culties of climate and terrain. A flight of2,600 miles in nine hours five minutes was oneof the longest flights ever done in P.R.

303. The radius of P.R. cover in Decem-ber, 1943, when the Command was formed,was not more than 680 miles, since long rangereconnaissance by Mosquitos was only in pro-cess of being attempted in the coverage ofthe Andaman Islands from Comilla and, alittle later, of Bangkok in Siam. When thewar with Japan ended in August, 1945, therange of P.R. aircraft in South East AsiaCommand was such that .coverage .of theAndaman and Nicobar Islands from Ceylon,flights deep into Siam and French Indo Chinafrom Rangoon, and a detailed coverage oftargets in Sumatra, Southern Malaya, Singa-pore and Java by aircraft based on the CocosIslands; had become normal routine.

304. The Mosquito indeed made amendsfor the structural defect which had curtailedits use in this Command, for it set up tworecords in 1945. Firstly, a Mosquito XVIbroke the long distance record on March 22for this type of aircraft in any theatre of war,with a flight of 2,493 miles in eight hoursforty-five minutes, covering the Bangkok—Singapore railway to a point south of theMalayan frontier. This performance, however,was eclipsed by a Mosquito XXXIV based onthe Cocos Islands, which on 20th August,1945, flew 1,240 miles to Penang Island andthen went on to cover Taiping town and air-field at 17,000 feet. On the return home asurvey run was made on the K8/12-inchcamera. This was the longest P.R. flight to bemade in the Command, and covered a total of2,600 miles in nine hours five minutes.

Photographic Survey of Burma.305. Possibly the two most outstanding con-

tributions by photographic reconnaissance tothe war in South East Asia were its surveyphotography of Burma at the beginning of1944, and its detailed coverage of enemyoccupied territories after the fall of Rangoonin May, 1945, in preparation for the largescale assault on Malaya.

306. The survey photography of Burmafulfilled a long-felt want by supplying accurateand up-to-date maps of Burma which werepractically non-existent up to this time—theAir Force and Army having to use 1914-15ground surveys which, as photographic recon-naissance proved, showed major errors. Thenew survey of Burma was one of the bestexamples of R.A.F. assistance to the Army inthis Theatre.

307. Faced with the urgent and extensiveprogramme of photographic reconnaissance inMalaya and Sumatra for Operation " Zipper ".a detachment of 684 Squadron (Alipore) com-menced operations from the Cocos Islands inJuly, 1945, with four Mk. XXXIV Mosquitoswhich had just been released for service usehi temperate and tropical climates. The P.R.programme for "Zipper" went steadily for-ward and, by the end of July, was 60 percent, completed. A second detachment of684 Squadron Mosquitos was operating at thistime from China Bay, Ceylon, for the cover-age of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

P.R. organisation after fall of Rangoon.308. At the time of Rangoon's capture in

May, 1945, the Photographic ReconnaissanceForce was commanded by Colonel Minton W.Kaye, United States Army Ah* Force, withGroup Captain S. G. Wise, D.F.C., as AssistantAir Commander:

309. The Force controlled two R.A.F.Squadrons, No. 681 (Spitfires) and No. 684(Mosquitos), while the Americans had a P.38(F.5) Squadron, a P.40, and a B.24 MappingSquadron. The American Units, however, hadcompleted their task as a P.R. integrated forcein the Command and, after carrying out afew P.R. sorties at the beginning of May, 'theythen retired to prepare for withdrawal toChina with the remainder of the American AirForces in the Theatre. The two R.A.F.squadrons, therefore, were left to operate ontheir own.


310. It became apparent, after ttie fall ofRangoon, that Photographic Reconnaissancein the Command would have to be endowedwith a mobility wliich would allow it tomove forward with the tide of battle. Accord-ingly, No. 347 P.R. Wing, which was formedin April, became effective as a formation inMay, 1945. The new Wing Headquartersabsorbed all of the R.A.F. element of thePhotographic Reconnaissance Force and certainsections of the Station Headquarters at Aliporeand Bally (India), where the two R.A.F.Squadrons of Spitfires and Mosquitos werebased.

311. In May, No. 684 Squadron continuedto be based at Alipore, but No. 681 Squadronmoved to Mingaladon, Rangoon and flew mostof their sorties in support of the TwelfthArmy's mopping up operations along theMawchi Road, the Sittang Bend and the roadand river communications between Pegu andMoulmein.

312. On 9th June, 1945, the Wing passed tothe Command of Group Captain C. E. St. J.Beamish, D.F.C

Working against the Monsoon in OperationalAreas.

313. Bad weather was the enemy whichphotographic reconnaissance had to combatalmost continuously. Only by dint of sheerperseverance were many of the most importantcovers accomplished.

314. With the arrival of the Monsoon inMay over the operational areas in SouthernBurma and Slain, coverage from a photo-graphic point of view became extremely diffi-cult and flying more hazardous.. 315. The inter-tropical front appeared at theIsthmus of Kra and moved as far north asMergui, 'but generally it kept more to thesouth. By the end of May, weatherdeteriorated considerably and the Monsoonentered into its own for the season.

316. While Spitfires, based in SouthernBurma, were able to take advantage of localweather conditions for short P.R. sorties insupport of the Army, the task was moredifficult, long range Mosquitos undertakingmany flights of more than 2,000 miles for eachsortie. More than one aircraft on occasionsreturned to base with torn fabric and otherevidence of severe climatic conditions.

317. In August, with the weeks drawingnear for the assault on Malaya, No. 2 MosquitoDetachment of 684 Squadron (based on theCocos Islands), succeeded an flying 282operational hours with only four crews. Someof the beach targets necessary for operation"Zipper" were exceedingly exacting, sincephotography had to be done at low tide inorder to secure a full picture of the stateand condition of 'beaches in preparation forthe landings.

318. Intimation of Japan's surrender was thesignal for P.R. to work at greater pressurethan ever. The " Zipper " programme, whichwas all but complete, was cancelled, and a newprogramme substituted entailing cover, threetimes a fortnight, by P.R. aircraft of all im-portant targets ranging from Penang Island toSourabaja in Java. It is worth noting thatP.R. aircraft, during this period of uncertaintyamong Japanese units regarding their country's

surrender, met with more opposition than atany other time. At Palembang, pilots re-ported that enemy A.A. fire was intense.

319. Probably the most outstanding P.R.sortie from a general and humane interest atthis time was that undertaken by a pilot of681 Squadron (Spitfires) when coveringprisoner-of-war camps in the Kanchana Buriarea of Siam, ten days after the declarationof Japan's surrender. Prisoners at one of thecamps were crowded together and swarmingover the watch towers, waving and cheeringto the pilot of the aircraft. Signs were alsolaid on the ground, including a giant UnionJack to indicate to the pilot that the prisonersalso knew of events which had caused excite-ment in the world outside.

PART III.THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN.

THEATRE BOUNDARIES AND DEPLOYMENT OFAIR FORCES DECIDED AT MANILACONFERENCE.

320. August, 1945 saw the war againstJapan move with over-whelming speed towardsits culmination.

321. Throughout the war, research inBritain, America and Germany had pursuedthe possibility of harnessing to war the poten-tialities of atomic energy, and the first atomicbombs were dropped with devastating effect onmetropolitan Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasakion 5th and 9.th August, 1945, respectively.Adding further to the plight of Japan was thedeclaration of war by Russia on 8th August,followed by Soviet Forces crossing the Man-churian and Korean borders.

322. From these momentous events, andfaced with certain Allied invasion of the home-land, for which air power had paved the way,Japan could see no escape. The end came inthe form of surrender, which was broadcastfrom Tokip on 10th August, and the acceptanceof the Allied terms on 14th August.

323. As the result of the Japanese intimationthat they were prepared to discuss and toreceive surrender terms, the Supreme AlliedCommander, South East Asia, directed that aMission representing himself and his threeCommanders-in-Chief should be despatched toManila in the Philippines. The primary.object of this Mission was to discuss the termsof surrender with General MacArthur and hisstaff, with a view to co-ordinating measures tobe adopted to implement the terms of surrenderboth in the South West Pacific area and inSouth East Asia.

324. As my representative on this Mission,I selected Air Commodore W. A. D. Brook,C.B.E., Deputy Senior Air Staff Officer. Othermembers of the Mission which left Kandy byYork on 16th August, refuelling at Calcuttaen route, and continuing the flight 'by nightover enemy occupied territory, were:—

Major-General Penney, S.A.C.'s represen-tative. Head of 'the Mission," and also repre-senting C.-in-C, A.L.F.S.E.A.

Vice-Admiral C. Moody, representingC.-in-C, E.I.F.

Colonel /Mitford-Slade, representingJ.P.S., S.A.C.S.E.A.

Colonel Bull, representing J.P.L.C-S.A.C.S.E.A.


Lieut.-Colonel Maugham, representingIntelligence Branch, S.A.C.S.E.A.

Lieut-Commander Galley, R.N., FlagLieutenant to Admiral Moody.

2nd Officer Price, W.R.N.S., Secretary tothe Mission J325. The Mission arrived at Manila shortly

after dawn on 17th August. The returnjourney, following the same route, was. com-pleted on 21st August, crossing occupied terri-tory once again by night.

Political Situation at Time of Surrender.326. At the time of the S.A.C.S.E.A.

Mission's arrival at Manila, the visit of theJapanese Mission to obtain the surrender termswas still awaited. It was thought that somedelay might have occurred arising out of thepolitical confusion in Japan and the lack ofcommunication facilities generally as the resultof continuous and heavy bombing.

327. The general opinion in the South WestPacific Area appeared to be that the SouthEast Asia Command Theatre was being fartoo precipitate in implementing the surrenderterms which had not yet been agreed by thecontracting parties. Furthermore, GeneralMacArthur was adamant -that any implementa-tion of the surrender terms could only takeplace after the surrender terms had been form-ally agreed and signed by the Japanese Govern-ment either at Tokio or on board a ship inadjacent waters. This, it was calculated, wouldbe at least a week after the presentation of theAllied terms to 'be collected by the JapaneseMission to Manila, to whom" certain pointswould need clarification.

328. The Japanese Mission consisting ofsome eight Japanese officers arrived at Manilaon -the evening of August 19th, having flownin two Betty Bombers from Japan to Okinawawhere they had transferred to a C.54. TheMission was led (by. Lt.-Gen. KawabaTakashiro, Vice Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff. Altogether, the representatives were adejected looking gathering of very small men,clad in shabby and ill-fitting uniforms. Theywere treated with respect and allowed to weartheir swords throughout their visit—an un-comfortable privilege, as each member wascarrying a sword nearly as tall as himself.The members of the Mission were housed inthe same building as the SA.C.S.E.A. Mission'•—a partially repaired building in which theywere granted the hospitality of the top floor,the least repaired of all. After a brief mealon arrival they were summoned to a confer-ence at G.H.Q. where they were presented withthe terms of surrender for explanation andtransmission to their Government. On theirpart, they provided full details of their Orderof Battle, strength of garrisons and the neces-sary information regarding Prisoner-of-Warcamps in various Theatres.

329. The Japanese Mission returned toOkinawa from Manila at midday on 20thAugust. No untoward events occurred duringtheir visit to the Philippines, but such was themixture of feeling within .their own countryat that time regarding the peace terms thatthey were shot at by their own fighters whenleaving Japan for Okinawa. A similar recep-tion was contemplated on their return to Japan,and, in consequence, they took the precautionof approaching Japanese territory in the dark.

330. There is little doubt in my mind thatthe Japanese Government, at the time of sur-render, was up against some very strong oppo-sition from certain fanatical factions. It wasstated that in Singapore, before our occupationin September, a group of young Japaneseofficers had planned to fly to Tokio and thereweed out whatt .they considered to be the" corrupt elements " around the Throne, wheredefeatist policies, they held, had greatlyinfluenced the Emperor.

331. The conference at Manila revealed anexceedingly interesting feature. Opinion in theSouth West Pacific Area apparently attributeda far higher value to the enemy's fighting quali-ties than was attributed to those Japanesewhom we fought and defeated in Burma. Itappeared that the morale and determination ofthe enemy forces in the metropolitan area wason a far higher level than that experienced inthe outer regions of Japanese conquest, whereforces had been virtually isolated for monthsand, in any case, were not directly involved inthe defence of their homeland. For thisreason, G.H.Q. Manila expected considerableopposition to their occupying forces in Japanproper, in the form of sabotage and other sub-versive activities by fanatical elements.

332. At this time, the American airbornedivision was standing by at Okinawa to flyinto Japan. The ultimate figure for the build-up of U.S. Army Forces for occupation wasput at some 18 Divisions together with thewhole of the 5th Air Force, although it wasnot thought that this would include V.H.B.aircraft owing to the lack of suitable runwaysin Japan.

333. I think it is important to note theAmerican attitude at that time towards theparticipation of Air Forces, other thanAmerican, in the initial occupation of Japan.General Kenney, Commanding General, FarEastern Air Forces, was not disposed to dis-cuss the occupation of Japan by Allied AirForces, which he apparently regarded as un-necessary representation in a country whereairfield facilities were limited. Furthermore,it seemed that any inclusion of British AirForces in Japan would inevitably raise thequestion of Russian Air Forces in a similarrole, to which the Americans were stronglyaverse in every way. On the other hand, theAmericans favourably accepted the occupa-tion of Hong Kong and elsewhere by our AirForces, since they did not regard Hong Kongas their own problem. The fact that the British" Tiger Force" project for Okinawa was nolonger contemplated, as the result of Japan'ssudden surrender, also produced for theAmericans a general feeling of relief, mainlyon logistical grounds. The British airfieldengineers, who were already in transit for"Tiger Force" constructional requirements,were delayed at the island of Quajalin in thePacific, pending further instructions to pro-ceed, and it was suggested to us that we mightlike to divert these forces for our own airfieldrequirements in Malaya and elsewhere.

334. Australia, however, let it be known thatthey had every intention of being representedin the forces of occupation of Japan. GeneralMacArthur was informed, through GeneralBlarney, that the Commonwealth proposed toprovide a representative garrison for Japan,includins three tactical squadrons of the Royal


Australian Air Force. It is interesting to notethat this was the first official intimation whichhad been received by Headquarters, SouthWest Pacific Area regarding the representationof Allied Air Forces in Japan.

335. With Japan's surrender, H.Q. SouthWest Pacific Area were not unnaturallyanxious that we should accept full responsi-bility, as soon as possible, within the newTheatre boundaries originally discussed at ameeting between Admiral Mountbatten andGeneral MacArthur, which had taken place atManila during July.

336. In the division of responsibility forimplementing the surrender terms, South EastAsia Command was allotted the following:—

{a) Andamans. Nicobars.Burma. Thailand.F.I.C. (South of Malaya.

16° N.). Java.Sumatra. Lombok.Bah'.

Australia accepted responsibility for:—British New

Guinea.Bismarck IslandsFlores.Soemba.Boeros.Kai Aroe.

Borneo..Solomons.Timor.Ceram.Amboina.Tanimbar.

Islands in the Arafura Sea.

337. This division, however, left a gapcomprising the Celebes, Halmahora Islandsand Dutch New Guinea, for which no forceswere available to implement the surrenderterms unless the Dutch did so—a commitmentwhich would obviously have introduced a ship-ping problem to transfer the necessary forcesfrom Europe. The Australians, too, wereanxious to hand over Borneo to us as soon aspossible.

THE SURRENDER IN SOUTH EAST ASIA.Ceremonies at Rangoon and Singapore.

338. In accordance with the orders of theSupreme Allied Commander, South East Asia,Japanese envoys, headed by Lieutenant GeneralTakazo Numata, Chief of Staff to Field MarshalCount Terauchi, Japanese Expeditionary Force,Southern Regions, arrived at Rangoon by airon August 26th to be given their instructionsfor the implementation of the local surrenderterms. Thus, after inflicting on the Japaneseone of the greatest defeats of the war in theFar East, in a campaign which had lasted forover three years and in which the enemy's lossesamounted to 100,000 men, it was at Rangoonthat the Japanese Generals arrived to lake theirorders from the Allied Forces in South EastAsia.

339. The meetings in Rangoon with theJapanese plenipotentiaries were, in no sense,negotiations. There was no question of dis-cussion of terms. The Japanese were there toaccept Unconditional Surrender. It was in-tended also that a binding act of surrendershould be signed at Rangoon and that theofficial ceremony of surrender would be carriedout at Singapore after the Supreme Allied Com-mander's instructions had been completed atthe Rangoon meetings.

340. The conditions insisted upon by theSupreme Allied Commander, South East Asia,included immediate relief to prisoners-of-warand internees ; Allied aircraft to begin day andnight reconnaissance flights over South EastAsia; Allied vessels to begin mine-sweepingoperations in hitherto Japanese-controlledwaters, and also for Allied vessels to enter portsin Malaya and elsewhere with full facilitiesprovided.

,341. The meetings with the Japanese pleni-potentiaries, which were resumed at Rangoonin the opening days of September, brought toJight many positive facts concerning the plightof the Japanese Army in Burma from the timeof the enemy's disastrous retreat at Imphal inJune, 1944. It was apparent from one im-portant statement read by Major GeneralIchida, at Rangoon on September llth, thatthe Japanese in Burma had not reckoned withtwo important and vital factors which upsettheir calculations and placed -their forces atdisastrous disadvantages: —

(a) Allied air supply, which permittedground forces in Burma to consolidate theirpositions without being forced to retreat, andthus rendered the enemy's infiltration andencircling tactics abortive. ,

(6) Allied air superiority, which so dis-rupted Japanese supply lines, both in Burmaand further afield, that starvation and illnessovertook thousands of Japanese troops facingFourteenth Army, and also denied them theessential supplies of fuel, equipment andmaterial with which to fight a superiorequipped, and better supplied, Allied Force.342. With the disruption of the enemy's lines

of communication, and the systematic attackson their rear supply bases, it was not surprising •that Major General Ichida should declare:—

" From the time of the Imphal operation,last year, our Army in Burma carried onits operations continuously for a period ofa year with its main force, and during thatperiod the army hardly ever received anyreinforcements in its manpower—none sinceDecember last year—the replenishment 'ofmilitary stores also being very meagre."343. The situation of the Allied ground

forces, ranged against -them, presented . ahappier picture. Thanks mainly to Allied airsuperiority, and resulting air supply, they hadwithstood the siege of Imphal, and, on thesiege being raised, had taken the offensivedown through Burma with .the knowledge thatfuel, rations, ammunitions and miscellaneousequipment would be air-dropped or air-landedto them, throughout the advance, while casual-ties inflicted by the enemy would be takencare of and evacuated safdy to base.

The Ceremony at Singapore.344. With the Supreme Allied Commander,

and other Commanders-in-Chief, it affordedconsiderable satisfaction to witness GeneralItagaki sign, for his defeated compatriots,Admiral Mountbatten's terms for UnconditionalSurrender in the South East Asia Theatre atSingapore, on 12th September, 1945.

345. There was not displayed at that cere-mony any deliberate'outward show of pridein Allied military achievement. It was more,I consider, an atmosphere of confident achieve-ment which reflected the mood of the three


services in South East Asia that no matterhow long the struggle against the Japanesemight have taken, victory would be with usin the end. In Sou/th East Asia we hadgood reason to remember that unequal con-test during the dark days of 1941 and 1942,when the enemy, powerful and well pre-pared, swept through Malaya, occupied Singa-pore and later Burma. But their ultimate anddecisive defeat—when the tide turned againstthem, must surely have caused them to re-member the sting of our air forces which, indue course, swept clear the skies over Burma,and disorganised the land communications ofthe Japanese army as the ground troops rolledthe enemy back through Burma during theadvance from Imphal to Rangoon.

346. The Instrument of Surrender was drawnup in English—the only authentic version.In case of doubt as to the intention of ourmeaning in that Instrument of Surrender, thedecision of the Supreme Allied Commanderwas unequivocal and final.

347. Under the terms of surrender, allJapanese Army, Navy and Air Forces in SouthEast Asia passed to the control of the SupremeAllied .Commander.

348. I was much impressed by one notice-able characteristic on the part of OUT enemieswhich was in striking contrast to their pre-vious behaviour in this Theatre—some of itan exhibition of unmitigated barbarism. Afterthe surrender there was a widespread attitudeof subservient willingness by the Japanese toobey our orders. In Singapore, as in otherparts of the Command, I observed that theJapanese, officers and men alike, conductedthemselves with strict discipline in our presence.They were super-punctilious too, when payingrespects to members of our forces. While thiswas no doubt correct, it did appear somewhatunreal.

349. If, at Singapore, the Japanese myth ofinvincibility still lurked in the midst of themore fanatical Japanese elements, the SupremeAllied Commander must have corrected s'harplyany such belief which was held, in so faras it concerned the campaign in South EastAsia. Admiral Mountbatten made it clearand emphatic to Itagaki during the surrenderceremony that it was not a negotiated sur-render, but complete capitulation by theJapanese, after total military defeat. Heinformed Itagaki that not only did he possess•superior naval, military and air forces at Singa-pore, .but, in addition, he had a large fleetanchored off Port Swettenham and PortDickson where, three days previously, onSeptember 9-th, considerable forces had starteddisembarking at daylight. On the 10th, the.•strength of. that force was 100,000 men ashore.Indeed, at .the very time of the Japanesesigning the Instrument of Surrender at Singa-pore, R.A.F. units were firmly established atstrategic points throughout the vast territoriesof this Theatre which, a few weeks beforehand,lad been held by the Japanese.

350. It was also emphasised at the Singapore-ceremony that the invasion of Malaya wouldhave taken place on September 9th whetherthe Japanese had resisted or not, and it wasstressed for the particular benefit of GeneralItagaki, 'therefore, that the Japanese were sur-rendering to a superior AMed force in Malaya.

PART IV.THE RE-OCCUPATION OF JAPANESE

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON SUR-RENDER.

OPERATIONS "TBDERACE" AND "ZIPPER".351. South East Asia Command's assault

on Malaya, planned for 9th September, 1945,was forestalled by Japanese surrender, thusbringing about a last minute change in planinvolving more than 500 aircraft of theStrategic, Tactical and General Reconnaissanceunits of the R.A.F. which had been assembledin India, Burma, Ceylon and the Cocos Islandsfor the attack.

352. While Operation " Zipper" went for-ward on 9th September as arranged, it did soon a much modified scale, having quicklytransferred a proportion of its original strengthto 'Operation "Tiderace" and leaving itselfmore in the nature of a display to show the

353. The sudden capitulation of Japan onAugust 14th had brought with it the gigantictask of effecting rapid occupation of the prin-cipal key points throughout the 'Japaneseoccupied territories in South East Asia andfurther afield.

354. South East Asia, in this respect, boreno comparison to the situation in Europewhere, on the eve of Germany's capitulation,the armed might of the Allied forces couldroll along the roads of the Reich to Berlin,and the Air Forces sweep over Germany atwill from their bases behind the victorioustroops. In South East Asia, the Japaneseoccupied territories were vast. They coveredSiam, French Indo-China, the TenasserimCoast of Southern Burma, Malaya, SingaporeIsland, Sumatra, Java and Borneo. Even faroff Hong Kong became a commitment.

355., Headquarters, Air Command, SouthEast Asia, based at Kandy, Ceylon, was 1,500miles distant across the Bay of Bengal fromits principal air bases in Burma. Yet, suchwas the flexibility of air power, and despitethe many and intricate formalities with whichthe Command was confronted hi implementingthe surrender terms on the eve of the plannedinvasion of Malaya, that air formations occu-pied bases at Penang on September 5th, Singa-pore on the 6th, Bangkok on the 5th andSaigon and Hong Kong on September 12th.

356. More vital still was the fact that theair forces of my Command had also launchedupon one of the greatest" 'missions of mercyof the war—the relief and liberation ofthousands of Allied prisoners-of-war from themisery and privations of their prison camps,and assisting in their transportation westwards.

The Advent of " Tiderace " for Occupation ofSingapore.357. Capitulation by Japan naturally

rendered planning and preparations for theassault on Malaya somewhat abortive. Butthis was only on a limited scale.

358. At the end of July, the mounting curveof Allied air assaults on Japan was such thatit did seem reasonable to presume that anearly collapse was a distinct possibility. Accord-ingly, emergency planning was put in pre-paration for the rapid occupation of Singapore


at an early date should the enemy agree toaccept the terms of the Potsdam declarationof July 26th.

359. The wisdom of this planning made itselfapparent early in August when the first atomicbomb was dropped on the Japanese homelandand Russia entered the war.

360. It was the possibility of Japanesetreachery, however, which decided 'the coursethat planning would take, and the initial occu-pation of Singapore, known as Operation" Tiderace" was, therefore, mounted fromresources other than those earmarked forOperation "Zipper". In this way, it waspossible to counter any Japanese opposition to" Tiderace " which may have taken place, bycontinuing to mount the strong fighting" Zipper " operation as originally planned.

361. Although the first objective in the re-occupation plan was Singapore, a necessary stepin order to establish an advanced air and navalbase to clear the Straits of Malacca for ship-ping, it became clear that Bangkok in Siam,and Saigon in French Indo-China, would alsohave to be occupied soon after the Japanesesurrender.

362. Operations known as " Bibber ", whichinvolved the occupation of the Bangkok area,and " Masterdom ", involving the re-entry intoFrench Indo-China to gain control over theforces of Field Marshal Count Terauchi, whoseSouthern Army Headquarters were at Saigon,had therefore to be worked out in detail. More-over, it had been indicated by the British Chiefsof Staff that the former British port of HongKong must also be occupied at an early date.

363. To meet these exigencies, therefore, itwas found necessary to modify to some extentthe air effort for Operation *' Tiderace " so thatthe Dakota Squadrons, based in Rangoon, couldbe utilised for essential trooping and air liftduring the occupation of Bangkok and subse-quently of Saigon. This was exceedingly im-portant, since a long voyage with troops fromexisting Allied bases to Siam and French Indo-China would almost certainly have prohibitedthe speedy occupation of these territories hadnot the ground forces been lifted by air.

364. That 14,000 Army and Air Force per-sonnel for the garrison at Bangkok and Saigonwere carried in by our Air Forces without lossafter the Japanese surrender, was evidence ofthe additional role which the Air Forces of myCommand were called upon to play on thecessation of hostilities, at a time when it wasimperative to establish ground troops at keypoints within the scattered enemy-occupiedterritories in the quickest possible time.

Original " Zipper " Plan Forestalled.365. The Surrender by Japan cut right across

the ambitious air plan for Operation " Zipper "which had been so carefully conceived to sup-port the landings by ground troops on theSouthern region of the Malay Peninsula.

366. Landings on the beaches at PortsSwettenham and Dickson on D-Day, September9th, were to have been made under air coverprovided by carrier-borne aircraft of the RoyalNavy, whose task would have included attackson the enemy's lines of communication andtroop concentrations until the fly-in of R.A.F.fighters was accomplished. Two aircraft

carriers, H.M.S. SMITER and H.M.S,TRUMPETER, carrying short-range Spitfiresand Sentinels and Austers for casualty evacua-tion, were to carry these aircraft to a point offshore for pilots to fly them from off the carriersand land them on the newly-occupied aero-dromes.

367. The planned effort of the naval carrier-borne fighters was 190 sorties a day from themoment of their arrival in the areas of thebridgeheads for about a week. This wouldbe further augmented, within six days, by amadditional 72 sorties a day from the first land-based squadrons of R.A.F. Spitfires, arid sixsorties- per night from :the night fighterMosquitos. From the outset, therefore, airsuperiority was assured. The enemy was notexpected to produce any serious air threat whichcould not be dealt with adequately by ourfighters-

368. As more than a thousand milesseparated the existing R.A.F. bases in Rangoonand the Cocos Islands from the landingbeaches, and almost 1,500 miles in respect ofother R.A.F. bases in Ceylon and RamreeIsland, it was impossible for L'ght bomber,fighter and fighter bomber squadrons to operatein immediate support of the bridgehead groundforces until the position ashore was consoli-dated, an airfield captured, repairs effected andrunways made serviceable.

369. Basing its time-table on the speed of TheArmy's advance and the rapidity by which con-structional engineers could repair damaged run-ways and taxi-tracks, it was estimated thatstrips could be brought into operation at therate of approximately one per week. Oncethe newly-occupied airfields had been estab-lished, the long-range Thunderbolts, Mosquitosand Dakotas, flying a thousand miles fromRangoon, would then make the flight south toMalaya, being guided on the way by threenavigational aid ships at specified positions offthe Tenasserim Coast and Malayan Peninsula.

370. The first strip —Kelanang—was calcu-lated to be operational by D plus 6; PortSwettenham by D plus 12 and Kuala Lumpur•by D plus 20. It was possible that a fourthstrip might be established at Batu Pahat, orMalacca, in order to accommodate a light Mos-quito bomber and rocket-firing Beaufighter air-craft by D plus 40.

371. The value of the Cocos Islands prior toand during Operation "Zipper" would havebeen considerable. The Strategic and G.R.squadrons were to have taken part in large-scalepre-D-Day operations directed against radarinstallations covering the approaches to theassault area, and also to cutting the Bangkok-Singapore railway north of Kuala Lumpur.Other tasks included the neutralising of theJapanese Air Force, estimated at a little morethan 170 aircraft in Malaya and Sumatra, alsoattacking enemy shipping employed hi carryingsupplies or reinforcements to Malaya to opposeour landing. The aerodromes at Kelanang, PortSwettenham and Kuala Lumpur were not to bebombed, since they were the first objectives onestablishing the bridgehead.

372. Five R.A.F. Wings were detailed tooperate in the tactical forces contained withinAir Vice Marshal Bandon's 224 Group, whoseadvanced Headquarters were to be established


ashore on D-Day to set up control communi-cations and radar screens, as an early occupa-tion of Kelanang air strip in a serviceablecondition would allow Spitfires to be flown inthe following day and made ready for action.

373. The R.A.F. Wings made available forthe operation were Nos. 901 Wing, to be firstlocated at Kuala Lumpur; 902 Wing atKelanang; 904 Wing at an air strip to be sitedand constructed ; 905 Wing at Port Swetten-ham and 907 Wing at Batu Pahat or analternative.

374. A prominent 'role in the "Zipper"operation was also allocated to the R.A.F.Regiment. Five Wings of nearly 2,500 officersand men, made up of nine Field Squadronsand five Light Anti-Aircraft Squadrons were tocapture and hold the aerodromes and also toprotect radar sites. The majority of the menhad been on active service in India andBurma.

Other Operational Aspects of " Zipper ".375. Air operations in " Zipper ", once our

position ashore had been consolidated and air-fields established, would have followed closelyto plan thus:—

(a) Eight squadrons of Thunderboltswould have supported the drive on Singa-pore.

(ft) Fighter Reconnaissance cover wouldhave been provided by Spitfire F/R Mk.XIV's. and, as in Burma, they would haveflown protective patrols over the traffic lanesof the supply dropping Dakotas.

(c) Two squadrons of Transport Com-mand supply freighters were allocated to thetask of carrying supplies from the beach headair strip at Port Swettenham to the forwardtroops. A start would first be made with atarget of 150 tons per day from D plus 23.

(d) With the possibility of an airborneassault force deep behind enemy lines afterthe third or fourth week of the operation,six squadrons of Dakotas would have beenflown in from Rangoon and out againimmediately afterwards for this purpose.

(e) Mosquitos were to be employed aslight bombers, night fighters and photo-graphic reconnaissance aircraft.

(/) Air evacuation of casualties was toihave been the task of Sentinel and Auster air-craft. As in Burma, they were to operatefrom a main strip flying as required to 400yard clearings in the flight zone to pick upwounded and to carry them back to theDakotas. The more seriously woundedwere to have been ferried by Dakotas toRangoon.

(g) Three D.D.T. spraying Dakotas oper-ating from Kelanang were to spray mosquitoinfested zones over a wide area.

(Ji) To answer emergency calls from Dplus 4, three Sunderland aircraft were to beavailable for air-sea rescue while three high-speed launches were also to be deck-carriedto the beach head.

(0 Rocket firing Beaufighters were to beemployed from about D plus 43 in attackson shipping, enemy rolling stock, targets onSingapore Island and also in assisting in thebombardment plan for the crossing of theJohore Strait for the final assault on Singa-pore itself.

Modified Operation " Zipper " Goes Forward.376. In the closing days of August, before

even the " Zipper " convoys had left India forMalaya, the emergency operation "Tiderace"was ordered, since it was essential 'that air unitsshould fly into Penang and Singapore withoutfurther delay. This brought No. 185 Wing,controlling Dakotas, Spitfires and Mosquitosfrom Burma to Penang, and No. 903 Wingfrom Akyab to Singapore, together with Nos.152 and 155 Spitfire Squadrons flyingZayatkwin (Rangoon)—Penang—Singapore(Tengah), and 110 Squadron from Hmawbi(Burma)—Penang—Singapore (Seletar). No.903 Wing elements reached Singapore on 6thSeptember, some three days before the first"Zipper" elements arrived off the west coastof Malaya on September 9th.

377. With " Tiderace " operation completed,and air, ground and sea forces occupyingSingapore, the modified "Zipper" operationwent forward on September 9th with convoysstanding off the beaches at Ports Swettenhamand Dickson. The naval air support pro-gramme, however, had been called off.

378. The ah* effort for the original"Zipper" was considerably reduced and ofthe five R.A.F. Wings scheduled to take partin the operation, the following wings did notenter Malaya and were phased out:—No. 901 Wing. No. 904 Wing. No. 907 Wing.

This left the Wing Order of Battle for" Zipper " as under:—

No. 902 Wing. No. 905 Wing.Tengah. Kuala Lumpur.

No. 185 Wing. No. 903 Wing.Penang. Kallang.

S.S. "Manela" Sunderland H.Q. Ship—Seletar.

379. The following squadrons were alsophased out: —

Spitfires Squadrons No. 132and 615

Thunderbolts ... Squadrons No. 530and 261.

Dakotas Squadrons No. 96 and62.

Beaufighters ... Squadrons No. 22,217 and 45.

Mosquitos ... Squadrons No. 82 and211. .

leaving the undernoted squadrons of theoriginal plan:—

Spitfires Squadrons No. 11, 17and 681.

Thunderbolts ... Squadrons No. 131,258, 81 and 60.

Mosquitos ... Squadrons No. 89,684 and 84.

Austers Squadron No. 656.Sunderland Det. ... Squadron No. 205.

The " Zipper " Landings which took place.i380. On D-Day, September 9th, the first of

the "Zipper" landings under the modifiedplan took place, with ground forces and R.A.F.parties leaving the anchored convoys and goingpeacefully ashore in the Port Swettenham andDickson areas.

381. This was the start of the large scalelanding in Malaya—and under very differentcircumstances from what had been envisagedwhen the operation was first planned.


382. Included in the convoy was Head-quarters ship H.M.S. BULOLO which carriedAir Vice-Marshal Bandon and his advanceH.Q. 224 Group staff who moved ashore toKelanang airfield on September 10th; TelokDatok on September 14th; Kuala Lumpur onSeptember 18th and Singapore on September22nd.

383. The landing at Port Dickson, some fiftymiles south of Swettenham, went forward asplanned and without untoward incident.

384. On the eve of the llth September, theD-plus-3 convoy dropped anchor among thegreat concentration of shipping already lyingoff Morib Beach. The scene, with every vesseltwinkling lights, resembled more a Cowesregatta than one of the largest amphibiousoperations of the campaign.

385. The landings at Morib cannot bedescribed as attaining the same degree ofsuccess as those experienced at Ports Swetten-ham and Dickson—-due principally to the diffi-culties encountered on the water-coveredbeaches which, at that part of the coast, arenothing more than mud brought down by theKlang River. Morib is some 20 miles southof Port Swettenham and 30 miles north ofPort Dickson. iWhile there was much to com-mend Port Swettenham and Port Dickson forlandings by a fighting force, this unfortunately,could not be said of Morib. A number ofM.T. vehicles which were driven off the landingcraft by their Army drivers into what wasconsidered axle-deep water, later plunged intoslime and mud while negotiating the shore andremained fast. There were several casualties.

386. These are important factors whichmight well have produced serious consequenceshad " Zipper " been mounted against opposingforces on dry land at this part of the coast.,

SOME ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION OF SIAM,FJjC. AND HONG KONG.

387. On the occupation of Siam, the DonMuang airfield at Bangkok provided two im-portant functions. It enabled released Alliedprisoners-of-war to be evacuated by our aircraft10 Rangoon and Singapore, while it alsoformed a valuable staging post to Saigon inFrench Indo-China as well as a refuelling pointfor aircraft lifting there.

388. In Bangkok, the Siamese Air Force wasfound to be extraordinarily co-operative andmarkedly pro-R.A.F., since many of them Ijad,in fact, been trained in England.

389. An unusual document, giving an out-line of the activities and organisation of theSiamese Air Force, and also emphasising itsattitude of passive resistance to the Japanesethroughout the enemy's occupation of Siam,was handed over by the Siamese Air Force toR.A.F. Intelligence,

390. History must judge this document foritself. Whatever may have been happeningpolitically behind the scenes in the Far East,in these dark days of December, 1941, thereseems to be no doubt .that units of the SiameseAir Force, on December 8th, took the air toresist the Japanese invader, only to be out-numbered and overwhelmed by units of themore superior Japanese Air Force. While thiscommendable spirit of resistance by theSiamese Air Force may have been evident, they

were to learn sadly, the same day, .that theSiamese Government in Bangkok was actuallynegotiating with the Japanese Ambassador.

•391. "From outer appearances we playedup to mislead the Japanese ", is one commentin the Siamese document when discussing thedefence of Siam during the period of Japaneseoccupation. In their participation in thedefence of Don Muang airfield and Bangkokagainst Allied aircraft, it was maintained bythe Siamese Air Force that " we just did it ina formal fashion. The United Nations aircraftwould fly one way and our aircraft the otherway, or at different heights. If by rare chancewe had to meet we carried on just for appear-ances sake."

392. Such are some of the statements by theSiamese Air Force. But it is on fact, ratherthan on professions of loyalty, that any finalassessment must be made. In this respect,there is one incontrovertible fact concerningAllied prisoners-of-war, which does reveal thesilent co-operation rendered by the SiameseAir Force from the time of their first prisoner-of-war-^William MacClurry, an Americanpilot from the American Volunteer Group(Tiger Squadron), who bailed out at CheingMai at the onset of .the war in the Far East,and whose custody by the Japanese wasvigorously contested by the Siamese Air Force,until they finally confined him themselves toensure his better treatment and safety.

393. It must also be marked to the creditof .the Siamese Air Force that they did, to ourknowledge, assist in furthering liaison andcommunication work within Siam, whichincluded the conveyance of passengers in andout of the country; rendering assistance to,and providing safeguard for Allied personnelsent into Siam to gather information, and alsoindicating for our benefit, precise targets inthe hands of the Japanese. Such acts of co-operation were fraught with grave risk, and itis not surprising that the Japanese ultimatelyadopted an attitude of suspicion.

The occupation of Saigon..394. The outward welcome accorded to the

Allied Forces from both the French andAnnamese alike on our entry into French Indo-China was decidely embarrassing. Our Forcesobviously found themselves in a divided house.

395. The main R.A.F. party flew into Saigonfrom Burma on September 12th, and was givena demonstrative reception by the French. Atthe same time, there were banners throughoutSaigon's streets erected by the Annamesewhich welcomed the Allies but bore causticanti-French slogans.

396. R.A.F. reconnaissance parties who in-spected Japanese Air Force installations atThan Son Nhut and Saigon, found them mostdisappointing. Comparatively few aircraftwere discovered, and none, indeed, wereserviceable. It appeared that all serviceableaircraft had either been withdrawn for thedefence of Japan or flown to Phu My aero-drome, twenty miles east of Saigon, after thecessation of hostilities. The majority ofJapanese Air Force personnel previously atSaigon had also been withdrawn.

397. The Saigon-Than Son Nhut area wasthe maintenance and repair unit base for theJapanese in French Indo-China, but, since only

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE. 19 APRIL. 1951 2159

two engine test benches were found, the normalcapacity for engine repairs must have beenvery low. No sign of any centralised produc-tion line was apparent.

398. Of characteristic orderliness in Japanesestorage equipment there was none. All kindsof equipment were found mixed together ineach warehouse apparently without rhyme orreason, and there appeared to be little attemptto keep any detailed record of stock and issues.It is surprising how any items were found whenrequired, or further commitments even calcu-lated.

399. Arms discovered tallied with the listprovided by the Japanese, but there was noth-ing to show that this list was, in fact, definite.Judging" by the aggressive attitude of the-Annamese towards the French at this period,it may well have been that considerable stocksof Japanese arms had not been declared.

The occupation of Hong Kong.400. On August 29th a strong naval force

under Rear Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt, C.B.,C.B.E. (Flag in H.M.S. SWIFTSURE)arrived off Hong Kong and landed a force onAugust 30th, being joined by Rear AdmiralC. S. Daniel, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C. (Flag inH.M.S. ANSON). The formal surrender ofthe Japanese at Hong Kong took place onSeptember 16th. An air headquarters wasestablished on September 12th.

.401. One Spitfire squadron was conveyed inan aircraft carrier and the remainder of theair units, which included a Mosquito L.B.squadron, another Spitfire squadron, a Sunder-land squadron, and one Dakota squadron, wereflown in to Kaitak Airfield at Kowloon, on themainland.

402. Air defence of Hong Kong, and theprovision of air support for any operationswhich might be necessary by the ground forcesinvolving security of the ibase, were theprimary duties of the air forces as planned.In addition, however, Hong Kong provided alink in the chain of air communications for,and reinforcement of the British and DominionAir Forces which would garrison Japan.

403. The "Shield" convoy, which was atsea at the conclusion of the Japanese war and,accordingly, was diverted while proceeding toOkinawa in connection with the Pacific " TigerForce" operation, arrived in Hong Kong onSeptember 4th with 3,400 officers and men ofvarious R.A.F. units. A large percentage of"Shield" Force was composed of personnelof No. 5,358 Airfield Construction Wing, whoseoriginal task had been rendered redundant.

404. The variety of rehabiliitation tasksundertaken by R.A.F. personnel on the occupa-tion of Hong Kong and Kowloon on ,themainland, and accomplished without any pre-vious experience, showed that tine Royal AirForce, apart from its qualities as a fightingservice, could be extremely versatile in otherspheres. It was gratifying to observe at HongKong how aircrew personnel, mainly fighterpilots, could apply themselves to ground dutiesvarying from prison supervision to billetingand requisitioning, whereas those with greatertechnical knowledge, such as R.A.F. AirfieldConstruction Personnel, were largely respon-sible for the initiation and maintenance of thepublic services; power, light, transport, etc.

(68742)

405. In the first few days of occupation,some 18,000 Japanese forces, including manysenior officers, were rounded up, disarmed,and concentrated in Shamshui Po prison, pre-viously a concentration camp on the main-land.

406. The first commandant of what, underBritish occupation, became a Japanese con-centration camp, was a R.A.F. squadronleader whose previous experience had beenlimited to operational flying. He proved him-self a competent prison governor during hisshort term of office before handing over hisduties to an Army officer.

R.A.F. undertake many public services.407. The total neglect of civic administra-

tion by 'the Japanese in Hong Kong andKowloon, except in so far as it affected them-selves, was all too apparent. Transport didnot exist; electric power was unreliable andthe supply severely limited; public healthservices had been totally ignored, and thestreets stank with accumulated rubbish andfilth. There was, too, large scale looting bythe Chinese who, until checked, literallystripped every house they entered of all furni-ture, fittings and every piece of wood includ-ing floor iboards and window and door frames.Wood for fuel purposes, indeed, was at apremium in Hong Kong due to the absenceof coal.

408. The problems of occupation whichfaced our forces on arrival were so numerousand varied that it was difficult to know whereto make a start. Yet, at this time, whenthe R.A.F. personnel were busily engaged inestablishing an occupation force, many im-portant public services were undertaken withwillingness.

409. To overcome the transport difficulties,every motor car available was requisitioned.This in itself involved considerable labour forR.A.F. personnel in rehabilitating and main-taining decrepit and /mechanically unsoundvehicles which had been left behind by theJapanese. In particular, restoration of thedock area to >a standard capable of unload-ing the freight ships of " Shield " convoy pre-sented big difficulties. The wharves werebroken in many instances and covered withdebris and dilapidated equipment. Sunkenvessels in the bases were also hazards tonavigation.

410. The power station at Kowloon wasmanned by a R.A.F. supervisory staff. Whilethe plant did not work to full capacity, prin-cipally on account of fuel shortage, it was,nevertheless, made to function and -supply allthe requirements of light and power in Kow-loon and the docks area. This work includedthe reconditioning of furnaces, boilers, andthe repair of certain tuiibine power units.

411. In their search for wood as fuel, anR.A.F. reconnaissance party of ground per-sonnel penetrated into the New Territorieswhich "vere still occupied by the Japanese.Large stocks of wood were discovered at Taipoand Fanling, .twenty and fifteen miles respec-tively. An incidental on this trip was that achit was given to the Chinese Communist ArmyTroops which allowed the party to cross overthe border to collect a number of abandoned

C

2160 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 195tl

railway trucks. A fuel supply for the Kow-loon jroweir station was thus assured, butthe margin was so close that on one occasionthe power house was within 15 minutes ofclosing down completely.

412. Railway workshops were also under theinitial supervision of a R.A.F. staff, whichwas later augmented by suitable personnelthrough arrangements with Civil Affairs.Under R.A.F. supervision these workshopscompleted repair to three locomotives, sometwenty goods wagons, and three passengercoaches. As a result, the rolling stockaugmented by this output from the railwayworkshops was sufficient to meet the require-ments of the railway within the colony.

413. Even Hong Kong's municipal watersupply included an element of R.A.F. super-visory staff, though in this -respect the watersupply as a whole had suffered little duringenemy occupation and therefore met existingrequirements.

414. The morale of our Air Forces in theexecution of these extraordinarily varied taskswas wonderfully high, and once the initialexcitement and novelty associated with theirmisemployment in the role of shock troops,guards, policemen and municipal authoritieshad worn off, R.A.F. units took stock of thesituation and turned their attention to thetasks of resuming their normal service duties.

THE LIBERATION OF ALLIEDPRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES

Operations "Birdcage" and "Mastiff"415. The relief and liberation of almost

100,000 Allied prisoners-of-war and interneesconfined in Japanese prison camps throughoutthe vast territories of South East Asia, is anepisode in -the Far Eastern War which reliedalmost entirely upon Air Power for its successin the initial but vital stages of its operation.

{416. It would be inaccurate to record thatthe Air Forces alone were responsible for theultimate rescue and liberation of these thou-sands of prisoners, but the Air Forces of thisCommand carried out vital tasks as follows: —

id) Spread the news of Japanese surrenderin millions of leaflets dropped over the prin-cipal towns and known sites of Japanese{prison camps scattered throughout SouthEast Asia.

(b) Warned Allied prisoners-of-war andinternees of their impending liberation.

(c) Dropped medical supplies, medicalteams, administrative personnel and W/Tioperators to make first contact with prisonersand to signal back vital information regard-ing numbers imprisoned and supplies re-quired.

(d) Air dropped, or air landed, quantitiesof food, clothing and other necessities torelieve the privations suffered at prisoncamps.

<«) Evacuated by air hundreds ofprisoners from Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China, Sumatra and Java, including cases<of very serious illness.417. In a message to all formations of Air

Command which took part in the inaugurationof this task on August 28th. 1945, the opera-tion was described as " the greatest mercy mis-sion of the war ".

418. It was a mission of paramount import-ance to thousands of families in Britain, theDominions and, indeed, in Holland, whoeagerly .awaited information about relativesinterned and captured during the Japaneseconquest of Malaya in 1942.

419. In Singapore alone, about 35,000prisoners were held in the various Japaneseprison camps throughout Singapore Island^the most notorious of which was the ChangiGaol. The inmates of these camps had beensubjected to coarse indignities and even torture;

420. The feeling in Britain found expressionin a message from the British Foreign Secretaryto the Supreme Allied Commander, South EastAsia, in which he drew Admiral Mountbatten'sattention to the numerous enquiries which theGovernment had received since the publicationof atrocity stories from Singapore and else-where, and saying that there was grave concernin respect of Sumatra, since deaths actually re-ported by the Japanese through the Inter-national Red Cross were much higher in pro-portion to numbers anywhere else in the FarEast.

[421. It can be seen, therefore, how wellsuited was Air Power to perform this vitallyimportant task involving great distances acrossgreat tracts of land—a task also in which speedwas essential for its success.

Operation " Birdcage " launched.422. As soon as the Japanese surrender had

been universally accepted and confirmed, actionwas taken to issue instructions contained inspecially prepared leaflets to: —

(a) Japanese Prison Guards.(6) Allied Prisoners-of-war.(c) Local Japanese forces.((d) The local native population.

423. The operation to implement this actionwas allotted the code name of "Birdcage,"and was launched by the Air Forces of AirCommand on August 28th, operating frombases in Ceylon, Cocos Islands, Bengal andBurma.

424. Thereafter, Operation "Mastiff", wasplanned to ensure that medical aid, comforts,food, clothing, R.A.P.W.I. Control Staffs wherenecessary, and any other essential preliminaryneeds were introduced into the camps as earlyas possible.

{425. Operation "Birdcage" was completedby August 31st. In the space of four days,leaflets had been dropped over 236 localitiesand 90 prisoner-of-war camps throughoutBurma, Siam, French Indo-China, Malaya andSumatra. Where sorties were at first renderedabortive by weather and by difficulty in locat-ing targets or by mechanical trouble, 'theywere persisted with on the following days. Veryfew priority targets remained uncovered. Onegroup of towns in the hinterland of Malayawas successfully covered only at the thirdattempt.

426. In addition to Liberator sorties flownfrom bases in Ceylon, Cocos Islands andBengal, Thunderbolts operating from Burmadropped one million leaflets on thirteen locali-ties in Southern Burma extending as far southas the Kra Isthmus. No target was left un-covered. One Thunderbolt was lost duringthese operations—the aircraft crashing inflames at Kraburi.


427.1 think it is worthy of note that Opera-,tion " Birdcage " was carried out in very in-different conditions. Even more important stillwas the fact that an all round trip of manyof the sorties was equivalent to a trans-Atlanticflight. Nevertheless, 75 per cent, of the crewsireached their targets, which included towns andcamps as far east as Hanoi, Tourane andSaigon.

Success of Leaflet Dropping.428. The news of Japanese surrender con-

tained in the millions of leaflets dropped metwith great enthusiasm throughout the scatteredterritories of South East Asia. They werepicked up on the streets of towns and readeagerly by the civilian population. The mes-sages also dropped to the Allied prisoners-of-war stated, " We want to get you back homequickly, safe and sound ".

429. Many of the prisoners had beenJapanese forced labour for the building of thenotorious Bangkok-Moulmein railway—a slavetask which will take its place among the listof incredible efforts carried out by captive men.

430. August, 1945, saw the greatest effort inleaflet dropping attempted by aircraft of theCommand.

431. Prior to the surrender, and immediatelyafter, some 33,00 ,̂000 leaflets were droppedover the enemy-occupied territories in SouthEast Asia. This form of psychological warfarehad been stepped up very considerably afterthe defeat of the Japanese in Burma, and inJuly the total dropped toy aircraft of the Com-mand reached 22,000,000.

432. One particular form of leaflet, droppedover the trapped Japanese forces in the PeguYomas of Southern Burma during July, notonly called upon the enemy to surrender aftertelling them of the hopeless position of theirhomeland, but, on the reverse side offeredthem a safe conduct through the Allied lineswith the added assurance that they would begiven food, medical attention and honourabletreatment.

Launching of Operation "Mastiff".433. The saturating of towns and prison

camps with leaflets announcing the Japanesesurrender was, in itself, a laudable effort, butthe main task which awaited the Air Forceswas unquestionably that of Operation"Mastiff" in bringing practical relief andcomfort to those who needed them most.

434. -Hundreds of these prisoners wereemaciated, gaunt and pitiful beings—some, in-deed, were too weak to stand upon theirlegs. The majority of prisoners were deficientof proper clothing. There were instances; too,where some were completely naked.

435. The need of medical supplies was per-haps the greatest, for the Japanese had shownlittle ability or willingness to appreciate theneeds of prisoners-of-war in many cases. Theimmediate requirements in drugs, therefore,could only be taken to sufferers by air, and,as a large percentage of prisoners and internees,particularly in Singapore, were affected bymalaria, it was estimated that 1.250,000 tabletsof Atabrine, or substitute, were essential fordelivery each week.

(68742)

436. The "Mastiff" operation in the earlystages was carried out by ten Liberator squad-rons (including one R.A.A.F. squadron) andone Dakota squadron. Three .Liberator squad-rons operated from bases in Bengal—Jessore,Salbani and Digri—covering targets chiefly inSiam and French Indo-China. From bases inCeylon another three Liberator squadronsoperated over Malaya and Sumatra, while areasin Malaya and Java were supplied by threeLiberator squadrons based in the CocosIslands, though these were chiefly employedon targets in Sumatra.

437. The Dakota squadron operated fromRangoon over Siam and the Tenasserim CoastalArea of Southern Burma. The tasks under-taken by this Dakota squadron must not beconfused with the all-out effort made by fiveDakota squadrons of No. 232 Group, R.A.F.,based on Rangoon, which were employed onthe air-lift to Bangkok, where the Don MuangAirfield was quickly in use. The operationsof these Dakota squadrons in the air landingof supplies and in the evacuation of prisoners-of-war was one of the outstanding features ofthe air operations associated with "Mastiff".

438. From 1st to 5th September, approxi-mately 200 Dakota sorties were flown fromRangoon, and some 400 tons of stores weredropped or landed. The same aircraft carriedback 4,000 prisoners-of-war and internees. Onthe following week the Dakotas carried outa further 360 sorties, and dropped or landed600 tons of stores. On their return trips theycarried back some 3,700 prisoners-of-war. Itwas a tribute to the enthusiasm shown by theDakota aircrews at this time that 12th Army,by September 10th, was able to report thatapproximately 9,000 prisoners-of-war had beencarried back to Rangoon from Bangkok. Earlyin the month, practically all the U.S. prisoners-of-war had been evacuated from the Bangkokarea, the figure being approximately 162. Thisevacuation was carried out chiefly by U.S.airlift, which was also responsible for bringingout a number of British and Allied sick.

Use of Thunderbolts and R.A.A.F. Liberators.439. Though not actually engaged upon

Operation " Mastiff ", a number of Thunderboltaircraft flew from their bases in Burma andassisted in the problem of locating camps anddetermining their circumstances. Many ofthese Thunderbolt sorties were rendered abor-tive by weather, but other sorties resulted inthe -bringing back of valuable information. Itwas noted, for example, that several of theprison camps on the Burma-Siam railway, inthe area stretching N.W. from Kanchanaburi,were deserted and empty, while prisoners-of-war in other scattered camps greeted theappearance of the Thunderbolts with under-standable enthusiasm expressed by franticcheering and waving.

440. The inclusion of a series of sorties byLiberators of the R.A.A.F. which took offfrom bases in North Western Australia to dropsupplies over Magelang Airfield, in Java, alsogreatly assisted in the success of operations inthe opening weeks. These aircraft landed inthe Cocos Islands, loaded up with fresh sup-plies, and repeated the drop on Java en routeback to Australia. The R.A.A.F. Liberatorscompleted 21 sorties, all of which were success-ful. Other sorties of a similar nature were


flown by these aircraft. At this time too, thepresence in Singapore of Dakotas belongingto 31 Squadron, which operated over Sumatra,assisted materially in bringing out of Sumatrasome of the first prisoners-of-war.

441. For purposes of comparison, the under-noted table shows the air effort over differenttarget areas of 'South East Asia for the firstthree weeks during which Operation " Mastiff "was in progress, and which covers the particularperiod of my Despatch.

TargetArea

Siam ...F.I.C. ...Malaya...SumatraJava

August— September

Week 30th— 5th

Successful

42132223

100

Abortive

8122

13

Missing

1

1

2

September

Week 6th— 12th

Successful

491110292

101

Abortive

21

3

Missing

—

—

September

Week 13th— 19th

Successful

49116

3822

126

Abortive

31

41

9

Missing

2

2

Working of RAPWI and the S.D. Squadrons.442. The evacuation of prisoners-of-war and

internees required the maximum cooperationbetween Naval, Land and Air Forces.

443. An Inter-Services Inlter-Allied Com-mittee was therefore established at the Head-quarters of the Supreme Allied Commander,at Kandy, Ceylon, for planning and co-ordina-tion of control. This Committee acted as theclearing house for information, and declaredthe decisions of the Supreme Allied Com-mander on policy, priorities, and allocation ofresponsibility.

444. The working organisation was knownas RAPWI (Release Repatriation of AlliedPrisoners-of-war and Internees), which had aCentral Control for aid by air at Kandy, withArmy and Air Force Officers, and Sub-Con-trols at Calteutita,, Rangoon, Colombo andCocos. As the necessity for air droppingdecreased, these Controls were incorporated inthe RAPWI Control Organisations with Naval,Army, Air and Allied representation. Sub-sequently a Control was opened at Singapore.

445. The RAPWI Controls were responsiblefor co-ordination of executive action in allmatters of supplies for RAPWI, and theevacuation of personnel by aircraft and whiteand red ensign ships.

446. For the prodigious effort put up bythe Cocos based squadrons engaged on opera-tion "Mastiff", Red Cross and other storesfor RAPWI were packed at Sigiriya, Ceylon,and handed over to the R.A.F. for deliveryto the Cocos Islands. This demanded a veryheavy ferrying commitment to the Cocosas two-thirds of the prison camps weresupplied by the Cocos based squadrons. Everyavailable Liberator and Sunderland aircraftwas used during the inauguration of"Mastiff".

447. This extra effort by the S.D. Liberatorsbased on the Cocos was due to the large loadswhich had to be carried to the prison campsat Singapore and Southern Sumatra—loadswhich averaged from 3,500 to 4,000 Ibs.

448. No praise could 'be too high for theair and ground crew personnel of these Cocosbased squadrons. Despite the severe shortageof experienced crews and, indeed, aircraft, adaily average of seven sorties, and sometimesnine, was maintained. One squadron flew to

widely differing diropping zones throughoutMalaya, Sumatra and Java. Ninety-five per-sonnel were dropped on these sorties, of which65 were doctors or medical orderlies, and allarrived safely despite the short notice at whichmost of the sorties were laid on. On the firstday of the "Mastiff" operations, indeed, oneof the aircraft dropped a medical team onChangi Airfield at dawn on August 29th,making a round trip of 3,400 miles.

449. The great distances covered and theadverse weather conditions encountered weredifficulties which were not overcome lightly andwithout danger. A Liberator on a supplydropping mission to ithe prison camps atPalemlbang was seen to spin whilst executinga steep turn and all nine crew members werekilled.

450. It became obvious that Operation"Mastiff" would continue for some consider-able time until the last prisoner of war and in-ternee had been evacuated from all areas byair and sea. As September advanced thenumbers brought out mounted steadily. Therehas been praise on all sides for our squadronsco-operating with the other Services in thisrescue of men and women who have endureduntold hardships, indignities and, in some casesbarbarous cruelties—comments of praise which1 have confirmed myself during talks withrepatriated prisoners of war flown out of theprison camp areas.

THE JAPANESE PLANNED COUNTER MEASURESTO INVASION OF MALAYA.

451. The the Allies' powerful "Zipper"operation for the landing in Malaya wouldhave succeeded, and that mastery of the aircovering the landing would have been securedalmost from the start, seems a justifiable claimafter careful examination of evidence madeavailable through interrogation of Japaneseofficers following the surrender in South EastAsia

452. It was evident that the Japanese, intheir defence of Malaya, were unable to con-form to one of the first principles of modernwarfare—that air superiority must be gained,and that the battle in the air must first bewon, before ground forces can wage theiroperations with any likelihood of success. -

453. The Japanese counter invasion planwas based on the fact that very few opera-,tional aircraft were available since it had been


decided to concentrate all forces for thedefence of the homeland. The aircraft avail-able, therefore, were mainly trainers whichwere not easy to send back to Japan. In all,the enemy had, for the defence of Malaya,Sumatra and Java, approximately 800 service-able aircraft all of which, in the last resort,were to be used as Tokkoki (special attackersuicide aircraft).

454. On D-Day, the enemy planned thatthere should be no daylight sorties whateverowing to the difficulty in providing sufficientfighter cover to break through the Britishfighter defences. About 50 to 60 suicide sortieswere to be made at twilight with a fighterescort of 30 to 40 aircraft. The suicides wereto fly in flights of about 5 aircraft and allattacks were to be concentrated on shipping.Even if balloons were used by the Allied con-voys no other method of attack than that ofsuicide attack was considered feasible. Groundtargets were also to be ignored and no fighterdefence put up against R.A.F. bomberattacks. Once the Japanese fighters had ful-filled their escort tasks to the suicide aircraftthey, in turn, were to be used as suicide air-craft themselves since there were not enoughaircraft to use for both purposes.

455. One Japanese source of information, asthe result of interrogation, was extremelyrevealing. This source declared that the wholeof the aircraft available to the Japanese for thedefence of Malaya against the Allied invasionwould, as the result of the mass suicide attackpolicy, "have been knocked out in about aweek *'.

Direct attack on Mainland not Expected.456. Following upon the Allied victory in

Burma, and the capture of Rangoon in May,the Japanese expected attacks by the Allieson the Andamans, Nicobars, Mergui andPuket in August or September, with the mainattack on Malaya coming at the end ofOctober or nearly in November.

457. As soon as the airfields around Ran-goon had been made serviceable by the Allies,the Japanese expected there would be a pro-gramme of softening-up attacks on Japanesebases by R.A.F. aircraft, with some 200bomber sorties and 200 escorting fighter sortiesdaily. The enemy intended to put up littleopposition on air attacks against Mergui, theNicobars or Andamans, while no defensivefighter sorties were to be flown against theR.A.F. softening-up attacks unless Singaporeitself were attacked.

458. A direct landing on the mainland ofMalaya was not anticipated at the outset.Instead it was expected that the Allies wouldwork gradually south, during which time therewould be consolidation and the systematicbuilding up of bases. In this connection, it isinteresting to note that the Japanese consideredany landing in the Puket area (an operationwhich we had earlier planned and then aban-doned after the fall of Rangoon) would haveproved exceedingly dangerous for them, asthe short range of the available Japanese fighteraircraft would have made it most difficult tooppose a landing there. The area of PortSwettenham on the Peninsula, it was believed,would not be reached until the end of 1945.

459. As " Zipper '* was planned for Septem-ber, and would undoubtedly have taken place

on that date but for the cessation of hostilities,it is evident that the dispositions by the Japan-ese for counteracting the Allied invasion wouldhave been lamentably behind schedule.

Japanese Build up of Suicide Aircraft.460. Taking into account the enemy's limited

aircraft resources, the Japanese air strategy, onpaper, was quite logically prepared.

461. In February, a little more than sixmonths before surrender came, the JapaneseSouthern Area Army in South East Asia wasinformed by Tokio that there must be a changein air strategy in the Southern Area. The HighCommand had visualised that, before long, theSouthern Area (French Indo-China, Siam,Malaya, Burma and Netherland East Indies)would be almost entirely cut off from theEmpire and would have to develop their ownair defence from an already diminishing airforce in that area.

462. Training was accordingly speeded up,and all training aircraft and some operationaland second line aircraft were ultimately modi-fied to carry bombs.

463. As far back as February, 1945, theJapanese had already had some experience inthe use of suicide attacks in the Philippinescampaign and had seen how effective thesesuicide attacks could be against concentrationsof shipping and, in particular, against largebattleships and carriers.

464. It was the eventual plan of the Japan-ese, once the Allied invasion of Malaya hadstarted, to use all their aircraft (first line, train-ing and transport) as suicide aircraft againstAllied shipping and then continue to fight onthe land without an air force.

465. In the Southern Area, all Japanese air-craft were widely dispersed over the vast areasof Malaya, Sumatra and Java, while airfieldswere, in many instances, poor in condition. Toeffect this concentration of aircraft in Malaya,Sumatra and Java in preparation for the Alliedinvasion of Malaya, the Japanese had left Siamand French Indo-China almost bare of aircraft,except for some trainers, and it had not beenthought possible to transfer to Malaya.

No Shortage of Suicide Pilots.466. It seemed that there was no shortage

of pilots in the Southern Area to man Japanesesuicide aircraft, and that Major-GeneralKitagawa, G.O.C., 55th Air Training Divisioncould, on his own admission, have called on2,000 pilots for the 8/900 suicide aircraft athis disposal. On the other hand, few had anyoperational experience and consisted of traininginstructors and student pilots with little morethan 100 hours flying. It was from these thatonly the best were selected as suicide pilots.Here, however, an exceedingly interesting and;important factor must be noted. This specialattack corps of suicide pilots was made up ofardent volunteers. They had determination toproceed to their doom elated in the thoughtthat they were dying for their Emperor.

Major Factors Overlooked by Japanese.467. The Japanese considered .that they

would have been able to defeat the Allies' firstattempt at landing in Malaya by the use oftheir suicide aircraft, but considered that whenthe second attempt at landing was made by the:


Allies, .they would have no more aircraft leftand. the. second landing would therefore havebeen easy. .

468. I refute the Japanese contention thatthe first attempt at landing by the Allies wouldhave met with reverse. On impartial examina-tion of the facts made available by the Japaneseafter surrender, there were several major factorswhich the Japanese most decidedly over-looked. Briefly these factors were: —

(i)- No attacks were to have been made byJapanese suicide aicraft until dusk on D-Day,ithus giving our air forces taking part in thelarge scale invasion of Malaya at least twelvehours to neutralise, as they would have done,Japanese aircraft in the Penang/NorthSumatra area.

(ii) R.A.F. Intelligence had estimated that175 Japanese first line aircraft would beimmediately available in Malaya andSumatra. Of this number, only 20 werethought to be bombers, and 120 fighters—the remainder being reconnaissance andfloatplanes.

The general preparation of all the trainerunits in these areas for suicide attacks waswell known to the R.AJF., and the estimatednumber available in Malaya and Sumatrawas 245 in Malaya and 20 in Sumatra. Theestimated number of trainer aircraft in Javawas 346.

By early September, the intended move ofthe Japanese trainer^aircraft in Java to air-fields in North Sumatra and Central Malaya

•--had only just got under way, so that it seemsfairly certain that many of these trainer air-craft would never have been able to leaveJava, as the Japanese had quite overlookedthe Allied .threat by our air forces establishedin -the Cocos Islands which had started opera-

. tions in August.(iii) It was unlikely that any reinforce-

ments of aircraft could have been withdrawnfrom French Indo-China and Siam. In anyevent, the numbers and types of aircraftavailable from that source were negligible—

=• a fact borne out on the entry of the R.A.F.into French Indo-China during the course ofoccupation after the surrender.

(iv) Without exception the Japaneseofficers interrogated after surrender were wellaware of the fact that their communicationswere so unreliable that no High Command

. -such as 3rd Air Army could have hoped tocontrol operations once " Zipper" hadstarted. Decisions, it should be noted, were

• to have been left to subordinate commanders.' and even to unit, commanding officers. This

undoubtedly would have meant a great dealof wasted effort.

(v) The Japanese had planned to rely onair reconnaissance for advance informationon " Zipper " and the location of targets forsuicide attacks in the preliminary stages ofthe invasion. They were so short of aircraftfor this essential commitment, however, thatit would have been exceedingly difficult forthem to spot and hold any of the AlliedForces. Indeed, it is more likely that com-plete surprise would have been achieved on

:- D-Day by the RA.F. units taking part in"Zipper" and that large numbers ofJapanese aircraft would most certainly have

. been-destroyed on the ground.

. <yi) Lastly, the Japanese Air Force hadanticipated a breathing space between theair attacks on the Penang area and theattacks on Singapore. It is doubtful, how-.ever, if they could have withdrawn and re-deployed many of their aircraft from thatarea as well as from Sumatra without ourknowledge (through superior photographicreconnaissance.

MAINTENANCE.Meeting the needs of overhaul in face of

advancing front469. The Maintenance Organisation in South

East Asia was faced with two major issuesduring the period May to September, 1945,following upon the re-occupation of Rangoonand, later, the sudden termination of hostilitiesin August.

470. The influencing factors were: —\(a) The need for a re-orientation of the?

Maintenance Organisation as the result ofthe battle front having moved further awayfrom the static repair and overhaul bases*which had been built up in India.

(b) The termination of Lend/Lease bj<America to the United Nations followingupon the surrender of Japan, this causinglacute difficulties in providing replacementsand spares for American types of aircraftan operational use within the Command.

471. On the one hand, the re-organisation ofmaintenance to meet the needs of the advanc-ing front was not an insuperable task and soon,righted itself once necessary changes had beeneffected, but the denial of spares, on the cessa-tion of Lend /Lease, was distinctly serious asthere were some 1,600 American aircraft andgliders in India and South East Asia for whichspares were absolutely essential.

472. With the arrival in Southern Burma ofthe victorious Air Forces in May, it was con-sidered that a reversion from the existing cen-tralised system of maintenance in the Theatre-should be initiated. The six months rapid ad-vance down through Burma had been a testingtime for every branch of maintenance. Burma!could not be compared to the great flat desertstretches of the Middle East. Transport of?the mobile units negotiated appalling roaddafter an equally difficult journey from India. Atone time, indeed, it was doubtful if transportwould last until Rangoon was reached.

473. These difficulties must be emphasisedbecause it was to this mobile ground organisa-tion, embracing Repair and Salvage Units. AirStores Parks, Motor Transport, MaintenanceUnits and Motor Transport Light Repair*Units, that the Air Forces in Burma were tiedand were fully depndent upon for their servic-ing if not their very existence during opera-tions.

474. The re-organisation of Maintenancewhich took place after pur arrival in SouthernBurma can be summarised as follows:—

/(fl) The Forward Repair Depots in theoperational areas were abolished and Sal-vage units built up.

|(fe) Group Commanders were invested•with the responsibility of repair and overhaulof their squadron's aircraft


<c) Squadrons were given their full U.E.of aircraft instead of retaining a proportionof them in the Maintenance organisation as'hitherto.

{d) Each Repair and Salvage Unit and AirStores Park worked for a wing and special-ised in the types of aircraft operated by thewing.

475. Re-organisation was necessary for yetanother important reason. The great distancewhich, at that time, obtained between opera-tional areas in Burma and bases in India,precluded the return of short range aircraft toMaintenance Units for major inspections andengine changes. Thus, it became necessary totransfer the responsibility for this maintenance-work to the squadrons and other flying units.-Owing to the different problems, includingbeaching facilities, involved in carrying out-major inspections on flying boats, this mainten-ance continued to be centralised at Koggala in-Ceylon.

476. Hitherto, all repair and salvage unitsin the Command were controlled by Head-quarters, Base Air Forces through Nos. 222,226 and 230 Groups on a regional basis. In there-organisation no change in policy, however,was effected in the case of units under 222Group, Ceylon, and 226 Group, whose areaextended, throughout India, but excludedBengal and Assam. The R. & S.U.s. on theother hand, had, of necessity, to be fully mobileand to move with the units they supported.

,477. When the re-organisation was put intoeffect the establishments of flying units wereincreased by 25 per cent, in order to cover air-craft undergoing major inspections at units.This increase was effected by feeding in addi-tional aircraft from the R. & S.U.s. as and whenthe squadron or unit became due for a majorinspection.

;478. The base at Rangoon carried heavy res-ponsibilities—not only for the continuance ofoperations during the mopping up period inBurma, but in preparing its organisation tomeet the coming operations against Malaya.

479. A Forward Equipment Unit and a For-ward Repair Unit were maintained in Ran-goon to support the Air Forces in SouthernBurma and to act as backing, if necessary, forthe "Zipper" forces which would deploythrough Southern Burma bases. The pressureon maintenance at this crucial period is illus-trated by the amount of work tackled. Duringthe months from May to August, the Repairand Salvage Units returned to service 830 air-craft and dismantled a further 420 which hadbeen written off. The heaviest month f wasMay, after the entry into Rangoon, when 300aircraft were repaired—an indication of thestrenuous use to which they had been sub-jected during the last stage of the lightningadvance to Rangoon.

480. It was thought that the Repair andSalvage Unit in Rangoon would build up afairly extensive repair depot, but with thecapitulation of the Japanese in August thiswas no longer necessary, and personnel wereswitched to Singapore to re-occupy and buildup the original Repair Depot at Seletar onSingapore Island.

(68742)

Difficulties arising from Lend (Lease termin-ation.

481. President Truman's announcement ofthe Surrender of Japan brought with it the de-claration that Lend/Lease to Allied Govern-ments was at an end except for assistance toforces engaged against Japanese who had notsurrendered.

482. The repercussions in Air Command,South East Asia were serious. There was aworld-wide shortage of Dakota spares. TheU.S.A.A.F., however, as a result of the termin-ation of Lend/Lease had cancelled the pro-duction of spares for their earlier Marks I, IIand III and there were 200 Dakotas included inthis range within South East Asia Command.

483. To ascertain the position as it affectedAir Command, investigation revealed that, ex-cluding Dakotas, Expediters, Thunderbolts andCornells, there were some 1,600 American air-craft and gliders in India and South East Asiawhich would gradually become unserviceablethrough lack of spares.

484. The Command's most urgent attentionat the beginning of September, therefore, wasdirected with the utmost speed to securingalternative arrangements for supply of neces-sary spares. In some respects, but by nomeans all, the situation was partially alleviatedby the arrangement reached at Washington thatthe U.S.A.A.F. would meet, on a cash basis,limited demands in respect of Liberator,Dakota and Skymaster aircraft only. No stockdemands, however, were permitted. The literalinterpretation of this ruling was that a demandcould not be raised until an aircraft wasactually grounded or until repair was held up.A period of from eight to ten weeks also mustelapse before the necessary parts could beobtained from America.

485. What became quite certain was thatno demand whatsoever would be met in othertypes of aircraft, which included Jhe follow-ing:—

Thunderbolt. Cornell.Sentinel. Vengeance.Argus. Catalina.Expeditor. Harvard.

486. It was clear, therefore, that as stocksfor any particular item became exhausted, soalso -would the repair of aircraft, their engines,and associated equipment automatically cease.Cannibalisation, or robbing another aircraft,was of very limited value as the bulk of thespares required were rendered necessary bywear and tear or by climatic deterioration.

487. In a signal to the Air Member forSupply and Organisation, I stated that if wedid not get the essential parts, I could foreseeus falling down badly on our agreed commit-ments, and urged that dollars should be madeavailable for purchase of our essential require-ments for replacement arising from wear andtear.

488. But the difficulties in England over thetermination of Lend/Lease were greater thanit was at first realised. There were dollarquotas to be considered, and in this connectionit was learned that demands on availabledollars were extremely heavy, especially forfoodstuffs. The situation in respect of air-craft spares and replacements, therefore, was

E

2166 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE; 19 APRIL, 195jl

not cheerful. As regards a British replacementfor the Dakotas, we could no longer demandthe highest priority for labour in Britain, nowthat the war had ended, thus making progressautomatically slow in production.

R.A.F. REGIMENT OPERATIONS.A record of achievements in the South East

Asia Command.489. In the various campaign stages of the

war in South East Asia I have been leftin no doubt whatsoever about the usefulness,efficiency and fine example of that most juniorof all our forces—the R.A.F. Regiment.

490. The R.A.F. Regiment adequatelycarried out the task of close defence of air-fields in Burma and in other operational areasin South-East Asia.

491. I have it on record from one of myGroup Commanders who moved withFourteenth Army all the way through Burma,that he considered it probable that the Groupcould not have occupied air strips as far for-ward as they did—with consequently betterair support for the Army—had he not beenconfident that the R.A.F. Regiment could havemaintained the necessary security.

492. In South East Asia the R.A.F. Regi-ment proved itself a force capable of carryingout more than the tasks which its originatorsclaimed the Regiment could accomplish. Itwas not a force of men dressed up as guardsand picqueted around some airfield or supplydump with guns propped in their hands. Thesemen were so trained in the art and strategyof ground defence and of jungle warfare, thatthey were able to undertake with successcounter measures against Japanese infiltrationparties who might set themselves up near theperimeter of some airfield and constitute amenace until hunted down and destroyed.

493. When the advance through Burmabegan in January, 1945, there were ten FieldSquadrons, seven A.A. Squadrons and sevenRegiment Wing Headquarters working withthe Tactical Air Forces. On the capture ofRangoon in May, 1945, these had been in-creased to fourteen Field Squadrons, nine A.A.Squadrons and eight Wing Headquarters.

494. For the D-Day operations planned forthe assault on Malaya, the Regiment was alsoscheduled to play a prominent part. FiveRegimental Wings of nearly 2,500 officers andmen, made up of nine Field Squadrons and fiveA.A. Squadrons were available. . One A.A.Squadron had been brought out of the CocosIslands, where its twenty millimetre Hispanocannons had given protection to the heavybomber and transport airfield there.Defence of Airfields and Mopping Up.

495. When it is considered that fewJapanese were ever taken prisoner in Burma,electing to face death rather than capture,and that the principal task of the R.A.F. Regi-ment was to protect our air strips rather thanto make enemy captives, the effort of theRegiment between January and May, 1945, inall forms of service was exceedingly high.While operating at seven strips during thatperiod, the A.A. Squadrons succeeded indestroying one enemy aircraft and registeringhits on three others out of a total of nineenemy aircraft attacking these particularstrips.

496. The most outstanding episode of theR.A.F. Regiment's service in this theatre wasthe assistance they gave in the defence ofMeiktila airfield. It was essential to comb theairfield and its environs each morning forsnipers before permitting aircraft ta land.Every gully, fox-hole or other feasible hidingplace of a sniper had to be examined. Thepatrols started just after daybreak and tookalmost two hours to complete. It was thoroughand effective, but the only sure method ofclearing the area of the enemy, to ensure thesafety of our aircraft.

497. In mopping up isolated parties ofJapanese in Burmese villages at the time ofthe advance on Rangoon, certain units ofthe R.A.F. Regiment gave considerable assist-ance to Civil Affairs Officers and also helpedin the clearing and disposal of mortar bombs,booby-traps, mines and anti-tank traps. Ex-tensive searches, including patrols up rivers,were also carried out by the Regiment in theirefforts to arrest wanted and known collabora-tors and to enforce the surrendering of illegallyheld arms and ammunition. The river patrolson these occasions were necessary owing tothe difficulties of communication and the natureof the country. During March and April, forexample, one Field Squadron covered an areaof 2,600 square miles, visited or "raided"250 villages, arrested 100 Japanese collabora-tors and recovered 26 rifles. Large quantitiesof ammunition of British and Japanese makewere also recovered, together with clothing,equipment, parachutes and rations.

The Occupation of Singapore.498. In the protection of newly captured

airfields and the guarding of vital radar sitesonce the assault on Malaya had begun, theR.A.F. Regiment would have been.indispen-sable to the Air Force and could have beenrelied upon to fulfil its task thoroughly andwell. Even in the peaceful occupation ofSingapore, units of the Regiment, within 24hours, were maintaining the security of Kal-lang, Changi, Seletar and Tengah airfields—one of which had three hundred police inpeacetime.

499. Up country in Malaya, during the earlydays of occupation by our forces, a squadronof the R.A.F. Regiment sent out a patrolinto one of the thickly wooded areas and suc-ceeded in recovering 600 gallons of petrolfrom a party of Malays and Chinese.

500. On September 10th, two days beforethe official surrender ceremony at Singapore,No. 1329 Wing R.A.F. Regiment, with fourField Squadrons, arrived at Penang and tookover the entire garrison duties from the RoyalMarines. On the day following it was decidedthat the Regiment should also occupy PortButterworth and Prai area, Province Wellesley,as part of the Penang commitment.

501. If the R.A.F. Regiment in South EastAsia had done nothing more than providevital protection for our airfields, the recordof its achievements would still read with com-mendable credit. That it was able to performfurther additional services and maintain asmartness and discipline which called forthpraise from Army and Navy' alike, demon-strates the value of the Regiment as an ad-junct to the Royal Air Force. In my many


tours and inspections throughout this Theatre would have to be accepted. It became evident,I have noted the almost " jealous-like " pride therefore, that the basis for planning was notwhich the Regiment Squadrons have in their what the Command was entitled to expect, butown service. what was actually available.

PART V.ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER

ASPECTS.THE REPERCUSSIONS FELT BY Am COMMAND

AFTER DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND JAPAN.. 502. The period May to September, 1945,witnessed a series of important changesassociated with the administrative developmentof Air Command, South East Asia, and therecasting of plans already made to meet thechanged conditions after the defeat of Germanyand, later still, defeat of Japan.

503. The Command felt the full effects ofthe global shipping and manpower shortages;of pre-election uncertainties in England; ofthe change in emphasis of attacks on Japan'soutlying conquests to the Japanese homeland;of the vastness of the task involved in buildingup the Southern Burma net of all-weather air-fields in preparation for coming operations;of the monsoon; the sharp contraction in ah*supply resources consequent upon the with-drawal of the American squadrons, and finally,the task of re-occupying liberated territories.

504. Following the reconquest of Burma inMay, the future trend of the Command'sadministrative development was largely influ-enced by the following factors:—

(i) Disbandment of the integrated EasternAir Command Headquarters on 1st June,1945 and the withdrawal of the United StatesArmy Air Forces from the Command.

(ii) Reorganisation of Headquarters,R.A.F., Burma, on the assumption of fulloperational and administrative control of theAir Forces in Burma.

(iii) Administrative planning in anticipa-tion of the forthcoming operations in SouthEast Asia associated principally with there-conquest of Malaya and the build-up ofthe strategic base of Singapore.)

(iv) Planning for the reorganisation of theCommand, subsequent to the re-occupationof Singapore.

.505. It was not unnatural, on the defeatof Germany, that attention should be focussedsuddenly upon the impressive array of airpower promised for South East Asia in PhaseII of the war. Not only was the number ofsquadrons expected to be increased, but moremodern and more powerfully armed aircraftwere envisaged. There were expectations too,of -plentiful supplies of spares and ancillaryequipment calculated to abrogate, for theduration of the Far Eastern war,, the parsimonyof indigenous industrial resources. South East

506. In spite of these difficulties—and theyhad been many in South East Asia—it wasnecessary to cut the administrative cloth tosuit the operational coat. A target of 87squadrons which, it was reckoned, would have

.to meet the air effort, both for " Zipper " and" Mailfist" and other commitments, was there-fore accepted.

507. Although these factors did not seriouslyaffect Operation "Zipper", the enforcedeconomy would have had some bearing uponthe final assault on Singapore itself and uponoperations contemplated early in 1946 intoSiam, had the war with Japan continued. Othertasks too, included action on the developmentof the air base in Southern Burma and theCocos Islands, both closely associated with" Zipper " and the redeployment of the strategicforces, once heavy bomber bases further eastand south east became available.

Important Changes After Fall of Rangoon.508. The ease with which Rangoon fell

caused future administrative planning to pro-ceed along more ambitious lines. Beforefurther operations could be undertaken, how-ever, it was necessary to have a reshuffle ofoffensive and defensive units; introduce a re-vised maintenance policy and new equipmentto meet conditions of the Malay Peninsula;to withdraw many air forces from Burma forrest, refit and concentration for "Zipper".

509. The most important change in Com-mand organisation at this time was the de-parture of the American Air Forces whichwere withdrawn from the Theatre as from 1stJune, 1945. The disintegration of the Britishand American Air Forces in Burma involvedthe disbandment of Headquarters, Eastern AirCommand, and the transfer of the Air Stafffrom that Headquarters to H.Q. R.A.F.,Burma, which then became an independentR.A.F. Command under H.Q. Air Command,South East Asia.

510. A series of other changes wasbrought about as a result of the revised respon-sibilities of Headquarters, R.A.F. Burma,upon disbandment of Eastern Air Command.Operational control of all R.A.F. formationsand units, formerly under Eastern Air Com-mand, was taken over by H.Q. R.A.F., Burma.

511. The title of "Strategic Air Force",which had included British and Americansquadrons, ceased to be used with effect from1st June, 1945, and No. 231 Group, R.A.F.,continued strategic operations alone. In thesame way the disintegration of Combat CargoTask Force was carried out and, on the de-parture of the American squadrons, No. 232Asia, it was confidently hoped, would achieve Parture <*me AmfI(?° squadrons, JNO. *«

a-hieher olace in the list of nrinrities as frnm Group took over the full operational controla higher place in the list of priorities as fromVE-Day. But this illusion was soon shattered.At the beginning of June it was officially re-vealed tfiat the Pacific'Tiger Force and post-war-events in Europe would take priority overSouth East Asia's demands. The decision wasoccasioned not" so much- by the shortage - ofequipment as by- the global deficiencies in ship-ping-and manpower which implied that drasticouts in the Phase II Target of 116 squadrons

of all - R.A.F. transport units in theA.L.F.S.E.A. area.

• 51-2. Yet another important change at thistime was the reorganisation of the ILA.F.Element of H.Q. Photographic ReconnaissanceForce as a- Wing (No. 347 Wing), after the with-drawal of the American Forces. Included inthe wing's establishment was No.. -1 Plioto-graphic Interpretation Detachment 'The object


of tine change was to give the former R.A.F.Element of Photographic ReconnaissanceForce more mobility as a wing which couldbe moved forward as required for operationalpurposes.

513. Throughout the campaign in Burma,Headquarters 230 Group 'had 'been chargedwith the control of all maintenance and stor-age -units in the area of Headquarters, R.A.F.,Burma, tout the Group itself was under thedirect control of the C.M.O., Headquarters,Base Air Forces. This arrangement was un-satisfactory because it meant that the R.A.F.operational commander in Burma did nothave complete control of his maintenanceorganisation. It was therefore decided to dis-band No. 230 Group and to absorb the Main-tenance Staff of the Group into Headquarters,R.A.F., Burma, with effect from 15tih May,1945. The units under No. 230 Group were,at the same time, placed directly under theoperational groups they served, and the staffsof these groups were increased to cope withthis commitment by the addition of some ofthe posts thrown up from the disbandmentof No. 230 Group.

Withdrawal of 224 Group in Preparation for"Zipper".514. The main assault on Malaya, scheduled

for early September, made necessary the with-drawal of No. 224 Group and units from theArakan and Burma.

515. This was started earlyin May. Thewithdrawal was handled directly between Head-quarters, R.A.F., Burma, and Headquarters,Base Air Forces. As from 1st June, 1945,H.Q. 224 Group was placed directly under thecontrol of H.Q. Base Air Forces for the pur-pose of mounting operation "Zipper", butthe A.O.C. 224 Group and his staff retainedthe right to visit all units during mountingand to advise on all matters concerning thetraining of units for their various tasks. Head-quarters 224 Group undertook the responsi-bility for force planning.

516. It was decidedly unfortunate, if notserious, that owing to the acute shortage ofshipping, the withdrawal of units from Burmadid not go off as smoothly as might havebeen expected. Many of the units, indeed,came out of the Arakan with no equipmentor M.T., while the equipment and M.T. ofother units which arrived in India lay onthe docks awaiting the arrival of the unitsfor many weeks. When units ultimately reachedIndia they were deployed on airfields whichhad been prepared for them, but owing to thenon-arrival of equipment or personnel, thecommencement of training was badly delayed.

Re-organisation of Air Command in 1945-46.517. In view of the extension of the respon-

sibilities of Air Command, South East Asia,towards Singapore and beyond, Ithe futureorganisation of formations- in the Commandrequired consideration.

518. The principal factors which necessi-tated reorganisation were as follows:—

(a) Mopping up operations of the enemyin Burma would continue for some time,but, so far as the Air Forces were concerned,these could be undertaken by one compositegroup (No. 221).

\(b) Since No. 224 Group had been with-drawn from Burma for participation inOperation " Zipper ", the Group would comedirectly under the operational control ofHeadquarters, Air Command, during thenext stage of the Campaign.

(c) The Heavy Bomber Group (No. 231)was no longer suitably located in Burma. Itwould be based at the Cocos Islands for"Zipper" support.

(d) Photographic Reconnaissance, SpecialDuties and Air Supply Operations wouldno longer be concentrated on Burma, butwould be required in widely separatedareas. This called for direct control fromthe Headquarters of the Air Command ofthe groups engaged in these duties.

(e) The above factors reduced the respon-sibilities of H.Q. R.A.F. Burma, which hadhitherto controlled several functionalgroups.

(/) The altered military situation had alsocalled for the move of Headquarters, AlliediLand Forces to Kandy, while Headquarters.Supreme Allied Command, together with theHeadquarters of the three Commanders-in-Chief, would move to Singapore at theearliest practicable date.

(g) The 10th U.S.A.A.F. had been movedto China and. Eastern Air Command dis-solved. At the same time the R.A.F. TargetForce for South East Asia in Phase II wasnot to be as large as originally planned.519. These factors, it was considered, re-

quired revision of previous operational plans,and would enable a considerable reduction ofplanned overheads to be effected in Head-quarters and Administrative Services.

520. On the fall of Singapore the followingmoves were scheduled to take place: —

(a) Headquarters, Air Command wouldmove there in company with Headquarters,Supreme Allied Commander, H.Q. AlliedLand Forces and part of the E.I.F. H.Q.

(b) Headquarters, No. 222 Group wouldmove from Ceylon to Singapore and under-take responsibilities in that area similar tothose undertaken by Mediterranean AlliedCoastal Forces or Air "Defences, EasternMediterranean.

(c) Headquarters, No. 231 Group wouldmove to Singapore and be possibly em-ployed either as a heavy Bomber GroupHeadquarters, the Headquarters of a TaskForce, or be disbanded.

(d) Headquarters, No. 224 Group wouldalso move to Singapore area and remaina composite group, being modelled as neces-sary to undertake further operations for the•reconquest of Sumatra, Java and Borneo,521. A small Headquarters, R.A.F. Ceylon,

was also planned to take over area respon-sibilities for: —

(a) Ceylon.(&) Island Flying-boat, Emergency Land-

ing Grounds and Met. Stations to the south,(c) Cocos for administrative services.

522. Although the future .strategy for SouthEast Asia Command was not yet determined,making it impossible to forecast reliably forthe future deployment of forces, it was con-sidered that the reorganisation as plannedwould meet' all the probable requkements"


THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN(SOUTH EAST ASIA

523. The energetic stepping up of operationsin the Pacific directly against Japan, broughtabout a wide variety of circumstances whichcombined to deny Air Command, South EastAsia that priority in personnel which theCommand had expected would be forthcoming.

524. Demands in Europe and the Pacific forshipping; the sudden announcement, preced-ing the General Election, to reduce the Over-seas Tour for Army personnel by approxi-mately 10 per cent; the operation of the Re-lease Scheme, and the priority accorded to thePacific "Tiger Force", all adversely reactedupon Air Command, South East Asia.

525. In May, 1945, the establishment andstrength of the Command for British personnelwere as follows:—

Surplus/Estab. Strength Deficiencies

Ground Officers 8,103 . 7,573 — 530Other Ranks ... 105,470 110,459 4,989 —

526. The 6£ per cent, deficiency in groundofficers affected principally the branches inAdministration, Code and Cypher, Tech. (E)and Catering. On the other hand, the positionas regards airmen was that the technical tradescarried a surplus of 7,100, whilst the trade ofClerk G.D. was deficient by not less than 36per cent., equipment assistants by 20 per cent,and cooks by 28 per cent.

527. By September, 1945, the position hadso deteriorated that an overall deficiency wasshown, although certain trades continued tocarry a surplus. The strength of personnelwas as follows: —

Surplus/Strength Deficiencies

7,525 — 591114,419 — 9,047

Estab.Ground Officers 8,116Other Ranks ... 123,466

528. The 7 per cent, deficiency in groundofficers was spread over a great many branches.Physical Fitness carried a deficiency of 36 percent, and Code and Cypher a deficiency of22 per cent.

529. The overall 8 per cent, deficiency inother ranks, however, clouded the very largedeficiencies carried in the following trades: —

(Per cent.deficiency.

•Clerks G.D 43Clerks Acctg. 36Cooks 32Driver M.T 18Equip. Asst 36

. 530. The Command had clearly to takemeasures to rectify this weakness if it was tofunction administratively, and compulsory mis-employment of surplus tradesmen and aircrewwas therefore introduced. It was fortunatethat, on- the defeat of Japan, an opportunitywas offered for a large scale reduction of estab-lishments and disbandments to begin.

531. The Release Scheme, coming so soonafter the cessation of the European War, re-acted very materially against the Command.It brought further grave losses in the difficulttrades at a time when the efficient administrationof the Command was essential for the prose-cution of the war against Japan.

532. An even greater disadvantage was thefact that it withdrew from the Command themore senior and experienced personnel. _ Con-sequently, while the position in a branch ortrade as far as actual personnel were con-cerned, may have appeared satisfactory ornpaper, it was not always so in actual perform-ance of work, and efficiency thereby suffered.

Reduction in overseas tour for personnel.(533. On 6th June, 1945, the War Office

suddenly announced a reduction in the overseastour of Army personnel. This factor had everypromise of producing serious repercussions inSouth East Asia, in which either coming opera-tions, or morale, or both, might well have beenaffected. The fulfilment of the War Officeannouncement was rendered virtually impos-sible by the lack of homeward personnel ship-ping and the congestion in transit camps inIndia.

534. To avoid a parallel situation with regardto the Air Force in this Command, I signalledthe Chief of Staff emphasising that anyannouncement of a reduction in overseas tourfor the Air Force would be premature and im-practicable at this juncture.

535. At the same time, I strongly recom-mended that shipping and air transport shouldbe found in order to bring into effect, by 1stDecember, 1945, a reduction of tour from fourto three and a half years, for all single officersand airmen. This reduction was agreed uponin August in principle, but was not fullyimplemented until December.

536. Between May and September, 1945,some 559 officers and 2,263 airmen left theCommand under the Release Scheme. Duringthe same period 2,201 officers and 12,932 air-men were repatriated in addition to those des-patched on release.

537. The celebration of V.E.-Day in theCommand was a sincere enough occasion foreveryone, though it was only natural that itdid not hold the same high spirit of enthusiasmfor those in the East still fighting the last ofthe remaining Axis powers. The announce-ment that the Burma Star had been inauguratedgave general satisfaction to personnel servingin Burma—an award well merited—but person-nel in India and Ceylon felt that the burdenof their overseas service was not sufficientlyrecognised by the award of the Defence Medal.

538. The postal voting scheme for theGeneral Election in July, 1945, was put intooperation successfully during May and June,and ballot papers for personnel in South EastAsia were flown out from England by trans-port aircraft. The papers were given priorityover all other mails handled by R.A.F. PostStaffs. The total number of completed applica-tion forms for postal voting received by 25thJune at R.A.F. Post Karachi was 33,500. A lastminute supply of forms to the Cocos Islands,whose original consignment was 'mislaid intransit, produced satisfactory results.

539. Altogether, a total of 30,013 ballotpapers was finally forwarded by air to the UJK.from the Command. .


PART VI.CONCLUSIONS

Japan's defeat.540. Japan, in her disastrous war against the

Allied Powers, was defeated largely by her ownmisjudgment—embarking upon a policy ofexpansion which lengthened too far her linesof communication without providing adequ-ately armed forces for their protection andmaintenance.

541. Expansion brought the Japanese, intheir initial flush of success, to the very thres-hold of India at a time when the Allies wereleast prepared to resist her westward march.

542. Defeat for the Japanese in South EastAsia, I consider, had its begnning in the airbattles over the Arakan in late 1943 and theopening months of 1944, when Allied airsuperiority was obtained.

543* It is my opinion that the cardinal weak-ness in Japan's war of aggression was un-doubtedly a badly balanced war machine, whichshowed too heavy a bias in favour of landforces, and a much too weak air force, alsoair potential

544. Without air support, the JapaneseArmy in South East Asia fought a losing battleafter Allied ah* superiority had been won. Thenumbers actually killed during their campaignin Burma were enormous, whilst the numberthat perished in the jungle will never beknown. This Japanese Army provided a grimreminder to any Army that embarks uponoperations without adequate air support.

Close Support operations.545. According to the Japanese, it is im-

possible to state definitely which of our Alliedfighters had the greatest effect morally upontheir ground forces in South East Asia, as eachfighter had its own characteristics. The effectdiffered according to the nature of the targetattacked and the time of the attack, whetherby day or by night. On an assessment of theAllied fighter aircraft individually, however, itappears that the enemy considered the Spitfire,the Thunderbolt and the Mustang surpassedall others.

Tighter, and fighter /bomber offensive opera-tions.

546. The. effect of the Beaufighter andMosquito attacks on Japanese shipping in theGulf bf Martaban during the early months of1945-was such that the enemy stopped move-ment of shipping by day, and did movementsonly at night. In this way enemy shipping wasconserved.

547. On the other hand, the harassing attacksthese aircraft carried out on the enemy's road,rail and river transport areas was exceedinglyeffective. While it cost them few casualtiesto- men, the air, attacks, according to theJapanese, made troop as well as supply move-ments virtually impossible. Materials and food,they stated, became difficult to move, and thishad a b'ad effect upon the civilian population.

548. Our policy of surprise raids on theenemy's rear airfields was most effective. Jnthis respect the American fighter attacks, onthese airfields were notonly effective, -butgreatly, helped' to • reduce the - operationalstrength of the Japanese Army Air Force.

Heavy Bomber Operations.549. The heavy bomber attacks which our

aircraft carried out on Rangoon, and on supplydumps in the" vicinity, cannot be compared, ineffectiveness, to the heavy air attacks made on

'bridges, railway tracks, marshalling yards andimportant installations in other enemy occupiedareas. The dumps in .the Rangoon area whichwere targets of attack were," according to theenemy, destroyed to some extent, but they didnot greatly affect Japanese morale. The bomb-ing of Rangoon itself, however, which wascontinued for almost a month before theenemy's evacuation, had a marked effect upontheir morale. The effect of the bombings.onthe civilian population appeared to be smallbecause only military targets were bombed.

550. Bombing raids on military installationsin the rear areas were admitted 'by theJapanese to be most effective,, and many targets,some highly important to the Japanese wareffort, were destroyed. The attacks, it appears,could have been even more effective had ourbombers struck at the targets over a widetarea, as enemy installations were immediatelydivided up into sections and scattered once atarget area was hit.Air Mining Operations Affect Supply.

551. I consider it exceedingly gratifying, andindeed, interesting, to have it confirmed bythe Japanese themselves that the isolation oflarge sea transports, as the result of our airmining operations, seriously affected theJapanese supply situation. The mines werelaid by our aircraft in the Rangoon River and •off the Tenasserim and Malayan coasts. Thesowing of these mines, the Japanese stated,was directly responsible for' the sinking ofimportant supply ships.

552. Our air mining programme, which'began on 21st January, 1945, and was discon-tinued on 24th May, 1945, since the stage wasthen being set finally Ifor the assault on Malaya,resulted in a total of 925 mines being droppedin the spepified areas. The minelaying opera-tions were 86.9 successful—only 29 mines beingdropped fou'l, and 80 being brought back byaircraft to base.

553. From a tactical point of view, I wasinterested to learn that, .of all the weaponswhich we used against the Japanese in Burma—rockets, machine-guns, cannon, bombs andNapalm—the machine-guns thad the most effect,both morally and physically, upon their groundforces. . . «

|554. During the advance of our groundtroops, the feints and dummy -attacks by oursupporting aircraft proved very effective inkeeping the "Japanese under'cover—a highlyimportant factor when troops .are stormingstrongly-held positions. , -

555. Close support by the Japanese ArmyAir Force was negligible. Its developmentwas dependent -upon adequate ah- strength, andas the Japanese Army Air Force graduallydwindled away to nothing, close support fortheir ground forces was therefore impracticable.

556. .While the Japanese also., used VisualControl Posts to indicate'targets'.to their, air*crafit, shortage of wireless equipment'."greatlyhindered^them in putting, through, demands-.forair support. This is in striking contrast.to ourown use of'V.CJ*.s., which we exploited to thefull with excellent-results..- .. .._. .-... : •. .'


Air supply.557. Burma proved how an Anny could

march for a thousand miles through some ofthe worst country in the world so long as airsupply was guaranteed by pur retaining airsuperiority and having adequate-air transport.

558. There is no doubt that the Japanesefully appreciated how vitally important Alliedair supply was to the success of our operations.They confessed that all means possible wereused to interfere with Allied air supply, but,due to the small size of their Air Force, theyfailed in their efforts.

559. Burma, I consider, has given us theclassic example of an Army' in the field existingon air supply, and the technique evolved fromthese air supply operations must surely com-mand serious attention,

Lessons which emerged in South East Asia.560. The war in South East Asia, has

immeasurably enriched bur experience in airoperations in the East; quickened our percep-tion to the dangers of a purely static defencesystem for these Empire territories, and shown,how essential is air power for future defence.

The need for greater squadron mobility.561. One of the most noticeable features of

our operations in South East Asia was theclumsy and inadequate method which we hadbeen forced to employ to maintain .the mobilityof our squadrons, their personnel andequipment.

562. This implies no reflection on thfc groundstaff and maintenance organisation, whosucceeded in achieving good results with theequipment and facilities available when movingthe squadrons forward, month after month,through a country devoid of proper communi-cations and faced with flooding during themonsoon, when roads turned into quagmires.

563. But a squadron working hi support offront-line troops must have greater mobility

to enable its ground organisation to move toits next base, and not find itself on some narrowinadequate road, choked for miles ahead withslow moving army transport.

564. It is on record that during April, 1945,when over 80 RA.F. units moved forward inBurma to new bases in keeping with the over-all plan of advance, one R.A.F. wing, havinginsufficient road transport, had to use bullockcarts. Against this, there is the more logicalinstance of another R.A.F. wing which movedfrom Akyab to Rangoon by air, taking withit all its equipment and personnel and leavingbehind only M.T., since it was picking up anew allotment of vehicles at its destination.

565. With so many moves by squadrons inthe forward areas—many going ahead with thebare minimum of staff to keep aircraft opera"-tional pending the arrival of the remainderof their ground personnel bringing up essentialequipment—squadrons often found themselvesseparated from a proportion of their servicingechelons for' several days due to lack of trans-port. Until the full staff of the echelonsarrived, an enormous amount of work wasthrown upon ground crew, since aircraft at thetime were being pressed into service in supportof the advance and had to be loaded withbombs and with ammunition. . They alsoneeded daily servicing.

566. This, I consider, is one of the mostimportant lessons which emerged from opera-tions in South East Asia. Experience hasshown that Air Power, in the movement of itsground organisations, must have infinitelygreater mobility in future, and be air-lifted byits own transports. " ' i

K. R. PARK,Air Chief Marshal, [

Allied Air Commander.in Chief,South East Asia.

August, 1946,

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