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SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF FRIDAY, i sth OCTOBER, 1948

Registered as a newspaper

MONDAY, 18 OCTOBER, 1948

COASTAL FORCE ACTIONS.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty onthe i$th March, 1943, by Admiral SirHENRY H. HARWOOD, K.C.B., O.B.E.,Commander-in-Chief, Levant.

Levant,i$th March, 1943.

MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS 61, 77, 82, 307 AND 315—REPORT OP PROCEEDINGS i5TH/i6THFEBRUARY, 1943.

Forwarded for the information of Their Lord-ships, concurring generally-in the remarks ofthe Captain- Coastal Forces. This operationresulted in a torpedo hit on an enemy mer-chant ship and damage to other enemy shipsby gunfire.* Much valuable experience wasgained.

2. The remarks in paragraph 3 of the Cap-tain Coastal Forces' letter are fully concurredin. M.T.B.S 77 and 82 should have firedboth torpedoes at their targets.

3. The operation was carried out in the faceof strong opposition in a spirited and deter-mined mannei, which bodes well for futureoperations. The diversion by the M.G.B.,waswell planned and carried out.

4. The freedom from mechanical troubleduring the operation reflects credit on all con-cerned.

(Signed) H. H. HARWOOD,Admiral,

Commander-in-Chief.

Admiralty footnote:* The action took place in the vicinity'of Maritime

Island, off the western point of Sicily.

ENCLOSURE i TO C.-iN-C., LEVANT'S LETTER.FROM ... The Captain Coastal Forces,

Mediterranean.

DATE ... 2ist February, 1943.

To ... The Commander-in-Chief, Levant.

The attached report and diagram from theCommanding Officer, 7th Motor Torpedo BoatFlotilla are forwarded, with the followingremarks.

i. The composition of this strike was asfollows::—

M.T.B.s 61 ")77 (Flotilla Commanding I 7th Flotilla

Officer on board) f (Vospers)82 J

M.T.B.s 307315

\ioth Flotilla/ (Elcos).

As the loth Flotilla boats had been undockedonly the same day, it was impossible for themto be ready in time to sail in 'company withthe other boats. It was unfortunate that thetwo units were not able to join up, as in-tended; results would probably have been farmore effective had a laxger number of MotorTorpedo Boats been available to attack themain enemy convoy. The results of this attackwere that one merchant vessel of mediumsize was definitely damaged with an expendi-ture of two torpedoes. There is now no reasonto suppose that this ship was the same as thatsubsequently sunk by an aircraft.

2. It is considered that Motor Torpedo Boat77 was well handled 'by Lieutenant J. B.Sturgeon, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. His

5494 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 18 OCTOBER, 1948

attacks were pressed home to short range, re-sulting in a hit with the only torpedo fired,confirmed by Motor Torpedo Boat 82. It wasnot known to the Commanding Officer that hissecond torpedo had failed to fire until abouttwenty minutes later. • This misfire and thecasualty to the First Lieutenant when aboutto release a depth charge, were two misfor-tunes which combined to spoil a very spiritedattack during which Motor Torpedo Boat 77was subjected to intense enemy fire.

3. Motor Torpedo Boat 82 fired one torpedoonly, which missed. The conclusions (para-graph 13 (viii)) of the Flotilla CommandingOfficer are that both torpedoes should be firedwhenever a good target presents itself. Thisis considered, without doubt, to be the correctprocedure and has again been impressed onCommanding Officers.

4. Motor Torpedo Boat 61 (Lieutenant T. J.Bligh, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve),equipped as a gunboat, fought a prolongedand resolute action with the convoy escort,which was greatly superior in- fire power. Itis considered that this boat did particularly well;her wheel steering was out ot order through-out the action, during which she was steeredwith the tiller from att.

5. The conclusions of the Flotilla Command-ing Officer are considered sound, particularlyparagraph 13 (viii), referred to above. TheR.D.JK.* with which these M.T.B.s are fittedwas not used on this occasion, as the enemyconvoy appeared before it was expected.

.6. Motor Torpedo Boats 307 and 315, nothaving met the others at the rendezvous, weredeprived of their target at the last moment byits being sunk by a Wellington torpedo-bomber.The small fast enemy destroyer which hadbeen escorting the merchant ship was not asuitable torpedo target and these Motor TorpedoBoats are not sufficiently heavily armed withguns to engage such a target with a good chanceof success.

7. Mechanically, all the Motor Torpedo Boatsran well and without giving any trouble. Thisis a far more satisfactory state of affairs thanhas recently been the case with boats of thistype, and the improvement is largely due tothe skill and enthusiasm of Lieutenant (E)W. R. Coverdale, Royal. Navy, the CoastalForce Base Engineer Officer.

The conduct of officers and ships' companiesduring this operation is reported to have beenexcellent.

8. It is considered that this force of MotorTorpedo Boats was well led by LieutenantR. A. M. Hennessy, Royal Navy, the Com-manding Officer of the 7th Flotilla, who washampered by having only two Motor TorpedoBoats and one Motor Gun Boat, against theenemy escort of four destroyers and three E-boatsf and merchant ships which were them-selves armed. His small attacking force causedgreat' confusion among the convoy, enemyships firing on one another and some in theair. Under these conditions, a really adequateforce of Motor Torpedo Boats should have beenable to sink several enemy ships. In this case

Admiralty footnotes:* R.D.F.—radar,t E-boats—similar to' British M.T.B.s.

the main Motor Torpedo Boat striking forcehad been removed from Malta a few dayspreviously.

(Signed) M. C. GILES,Lieutenant, R.N.,

for Captain, Absent on Duty.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO C.-iN-C., LEVANT'S LETTER.FROM ... The Senior Officer, 7th M.T.B.

Flotilla.DATE ... i7th February, 1943.To ... The Captain Coastal Forces,

Mediterranean.Submitted:

M.T.B.S 77 (V.7* on board), 82 and 61sailed from Malta in accordance with previousinstructions, and passed the boom at 1500.Having reached the end of the swept channela course was set for a position 15 miles duesouth of Maritime Island. All three .boatswere carrying a thousand gallons of upper-deck fuel, and as this was the first time ofcarrying it a speed of i8£ knots was allowed forengine revolutions giving 20 knots under normalload. It was subsequently found that therewas no reduction in speed due to the extraload.

M.T.B.s 307 and 315 were due to sail atapproximately 1600, and catch us up en route,or failing that to rendezvous in position 15miles south of Maritime Isknd.

2. At 2140, an enemy report was received ofone merchant vessel and two destroyers, steer-ing 240 degrees towards Maritimo Island. Itwas thought that these ships would be ourtarget, and that they would -eventually altercourse to the southward, in which case burposition south of Maritimo Island would bevery suitable.

At 2320, M.T.B. 61 signalled that she hada defective dynamo and that it was necessaryfor her to stop. - Boats stopped at 2325 andcut engines. At that moment an- enemy reportof four merchant vessels and three destroyersto the northward of us was received, and beforeit could 'be plotted on the chart M.T.B. 61reported that she had sighted a large merchantvessel to starboard, about i| miles away.

3. All boats were ordered to start up oneengine, and M.T.B. 77 followed by M.T.B-. 82,proceeded on a north-easterly course with theobject of getting the target on the port bow".

On closing it was observed that there weretwo columns of ships, with a heavy escort ofdestroyers, and that we were steering on - acourse almost exactly opposite to the portenemy column. . • •

The starboard column was sighted to1 port,and consisted of a destroyer with two merchantvessels astern. As we were in an ideal posi-tion to attack the leading ship of this column,the signal " Attack with torpedoes " was made,and all three boats acted independently. from,then on.

4. M.T.B. 77 (Lieutenant J. B. Sturgeon;,R.N.V.R.) altered course to port to get on thefiring course to attack the leading merchantvessel of the starboard column. In order toavoid the'port column it was necessary to goon to all three engines and increase to 20 knots.

Admiralty footnote: ' . ' • '* V.7—the Commapding O|&cer of 7th' M.T.B.

Flotilla. • • v. • . . . ' . - • • • • ' . • ' •

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 18 OCTOBER, 1948 5495

M.T.B. 77 was now crossing the centre ofthe convoy and by some miracle remainedunobserved until the range of the target hadclosed to 400 yards, and the port torpedo wasfired. The torpedo was seen to run correctly,and we decided to alter course 100 degrees tostarboard to attack the rear ship of the portcolumn. The' columns were about 5 cablesapart. Having turned 100 degrees to star-board, fire commenced on M.T.B. 77, at firstfrom the second merchant vessel of the star-board column, but very soon every ship wasfiring with machine-guns varying from40-m.m. to .303-inch, and the destroyers werefiring 4-inch H.E. that burst about 50 feetin the air.

An explosion was felt. shortly after•M.T.B. 77 had altered round.

5. M.T.B. 77 got into position between 300and 400 yards on the starboard bow of thesecond merchant vessel of the port column andthe starboard torpedo firing lever was pulled.

Unfortunately the firing mechanism failed,and owing to the heat of the battle it wasnot noticed that the torpedo had not left thetube. At about this time a burst of about tenheavy calibre cannon shells aimed atM.T.B. 77 struck the bridge of the merchantvessel.

6. It was then decided to attack the lead-ing merchant vessel of the port column withdepth-charges before disengaging. Speed wasincreased to 27 knots and M.T.B. 77 steeredso as to pass close under the stem of thetarget, Lieutenant D. M. W. Napier, R.N.V.R.went aft to the port depth-charge to releaseit when in position, but was killed when abreastof it.

M.T.B. 77 passed right under the stem ofthe target, and a tray of twelve 2o-m.m. S.A.P.incendiary from the Breda gun was fired intothe merchant vessel hitting her just above thewater line.

We then decided to disengage to the south-ward as quickly as possible as the enemy gun-fire was intense and becoming very accurate;an attempt to lay smoke was unsuccessful asthe C.S.A. apparatus had been hit. Afterabout ten minutes, firing on M.T.B. 77 ceasedand course was set to the south-east, M.T.B. 82having joined us. The escort continued tofire, at times in the air, for some time afterour withdrawal.

7. M.T.B. 82 (Lieutenant P. R. A. Taylor,R.N.R.), when the order was received to pro-ceed on one. engine, followed close behindM.T.B. 77 and assumed by the course thatM.T.B. 77 was steering that she intended toattack the port column, and consequentlyaltered course to the westward to attack fromthe convoy's starboard bow.

On altering course to port to cross over tothe starboard column, M.T.B. 82 sighted thedestroyer ahead of the column and decided tosteer down between the lines and attack thefirst merchant vessel of the port column. Bythis time M.T.B. 77 was crossing between thecolumns and M.T.B. 82 decided to attack theleading ship of the starboard column.M.T.B. 82 then came under very heavy firefrom many directions, and fired one torpedoat the leading ship of the starboard column.

60583

M.T.B. 82 altered course to the southward,being engaged by a destroyer and an E-boat.

8. A cloud of black smoke was observedalongside the leading merchant vessel of thestarboard column, preceded by a flash. Thiswas certainly caused by M.T.B. 77's torpedohitting.

During her withdrawal, M.T.B. 82 engagedan E-boat that was keeping station on herstarboard beam; this action drew accurate firefrom the destroyer. M.T.B. 82 increased tomaximum speed and withdrew to the south-east, joining up with M.T.B. 77.

9. M.T.B. 61 (Gun Boat) (Lieutenant T. J.Bligh, R.N.V.R.) sighted the enemy at 2328,.and on receiving the order to proceed on oneengine decided to proceed to the stern of theconvoy to create a diversion in accordance withpre-arranged tactics.

On hearing M'.T.B. 77 start all three engines,M.T.B. 61 did likewise and passed down theport side of the convoy engaging the mer-chant ships with 20-m.m. gunfire. Havingobserved the two M.T.B.s disengaging, andM.T.B. 61 being apparently mistaken for anE-boat (or unobserved) she stopped abeam ofthe stern destroyer. Calcium flares were thendropped in an endeavour to draw off an E-boat,but although a destroyer opened fire on theflares, the E-boats did not leave the convoy.

10. M.T.B. 61 then proceeded to the star-board beam of the convoy and opened fire,with all bearing guns at a range of about2,000 yards. As the E-boats still declinedaction and the merchant vessels showed noinclination to straggle, M.T.B. 61 proceeded to'the port beam of the convoy and opened fire-on an E-boat at a range of 2,000 yards. Firewas returned by the convoy. M.T.B. 61 thenproceeded to the head of the convoy to investi-gate possibilities of a smoke screen, but asJhree dtestroyers were keeping close station,there, and the wind and sea were increasing,it was decided to discontinue the engagementat 0100/16.

A course of south 48 degrees east was steeredand M.T.B. 61 joined M.T.B.s 77 and 82 atthe rendezvous at 0210.

During the whole of the time that M.T.B. 61was in contact with the enemy she was on handsteering, which made manoeuvring very diffi-cult, and turning at high speed almostimpossible.

At 0220/16, M.T.B.s 77, 82 and 61 pro-ceeded on a course of south 48 degrees east forMalta, arriving at 0830/16.

11. It is considered that the following damagewas sustained by the convoy: —

One merchant vessel damaged and possiblysunk by torpedo from M.T.B. 77;

One merchant vessel damaged by gunfirefrom escort;

One merchant vessel damaged by gunfirefrom M.T.B. 77;

E-boats possibly damaged by our gunfire.12. Damage sustained by our own forces:

M.T.B. 77—shrapnel holes in engine-room,tank-space and crew space, slight damage ondeck;

M.T.B. 82—one cannon-shell hit on thestern;

M.T.B. 61—no damage.A 2


13. Conclusions—(i) Due to the fact that the convoy

appeared much sooner than we expected, andthat we found ourselves right in their track,there were two courses open to us.

(ii) The first was to haul out and returnio carry out a silent attack in the hope thatthe escort would not see us. This course wasnot adopted as it was considered that wewere already too close, and were bound tobe observed any moment.

(iii) The alternative was to deliver an attackat once, down the middle of the convoy, asit would not have been possible to get out-side the screen without using all engines andmaking a great deal of noise.

(iv) We adopted the second method, whichwas made much easier by the very indifferentlook-out that the convoy was keeping.

(v) They could not have been usingR.D.F. or keeping a listening watch.

(vi) In future, more use could be madeof a gunboat diversion astern of the convoyto leave the M.T.B.s a clear run from ahead.

(vii) For this method of attack more gun-boats are needed.

(viii) Both torpedoes should be fired at thesame target to make certain of sinking it.

(Signed) R. A. M. HENNESSY,Lieutenant, R.N.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty onthe i.2th October, 1943, by Vice-Admiral SirHENRY D. PRIDHAM-WIPPELL,K.C.B., C.V.O., Flag Officer Commanding,Dover.

Dover,T2th October, 1943.

SINKING OF ENEMY SUPPLY SHIP IN A STRONGLYESCORTED CONVOY EASTBOUND FROM LEHAVRE—NIGHT 26TH/27TH SEPTEMBER, 1943.Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the

attached reports of an action between threeM.T.B.s, supported by three M.'G.B.s, and astrongly escorted enemy convoy on passagefrom Le Havre to Boulogne during the nighta6th/27th September, 1943.

2. Aerial reconnaissance had reported thepresence in Le Havre of two enemy merchantvessels which were expected to attempt thepassage of the Dover Strait.

3. Accordingly, M.T.B.s 202 (LieutenantJ. L. Bommezyn, R.Neth.N.); LieutenantE. H. Larive, D.S.C., R.Neth.N., SeniorOfficer embarked,' 204 (Lieutenant H. C.Jorissen, R.Neth.N.), 231 (Lieutenant C. H.Vaneeghen, R.Neth.N.) with M.G.B.s 108(Lieutenant L. E. Thompson, R.N.V.R.), 118(Lieutenant M. O. Forsyth Grant, R.N.V.R.),117 (Sub-Lieutenant D. W. B. Woolven,R.N.V.R.), were, ordered to patrol the vicinityof Berck Buoy in accordance with my signaltimed 1545 on 25th September, copy of which isattached.

Albacore patrol between Boulogne andDieppe had to be withdrawn earlier owing toweather.

4. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the remarksof the Senior Officer, M.T.B.s are concurredin.

This well planned and skilfully executedattack reflects the greatest credit on LieutenantE. H. Larive and the officers and men underhis command.

It is probable that the enemy's misplacedfaith in his recently laid minefields, throughwhich a channel had been swept only two daysprior to the engagement, together with theimprobability of our Coastal Forces operatingin the prevailing weather conditions, con-tributed to an unusual element of surprise.

The likelihood of this event in no way be-littles the success of the M.G.B.s' diversion toseaward which, added to the advantage of thelight, no doubt accounted for the unprepared-ness of the enemy for a torpedo attack frominshore.

5. This action was fought outside the range of.shore-based radar and in consequence consider-able risk from enemy minefields to returningcraft doubtful of their position had to beaccepted, but had all craft been fitted withRotet,* valuable assistance could have beengiven in the later stages of their return.

(Signed) H. D. PRIDHAM-WIPPELL,Vice-Admiral.

ENCLOSURE i TO F.O.C. DOVER'S LETTER.FROM ... Senior Officer, H.M.M.T.B.s,

Dover.DATE ... 6th October, 1943.To ... Flag Officer Commanding, Dover.

I have the honour to submit the followingreport of proceedings of the night 26th/27thSeptember, 1943, from 'the Senior Officer, gthM.T.B. Flotilla.

2. The action was well planned and executedand led to the sinking of the main torpedotarget.

3. The handling of the force by the SeniorOfficer, gth M.T.B. Flotilla up to the momentof firing torpedoes was excellent and put theM.T.B.s into a perfect firing position. I feel,however, that he would have been better ad-vised to have had the M.T.B.s in StarboardQuarter line instead of Port Quarter line andthus avoided M.T.B.204 crossing the bows ofM.T.B.23I just before M.T.B.23I fired. Star-board Quarter line in this instance would havebeen the usual formation.

4. I consider M.T.B.231 was incorrect inshifting his point of aim to a coaster from themain torpedo target. All Commanding Officersshould realise that while tthe main torpedotarget remains afloat that target only should beattacked. Even if the main target has beenhit ibut has not yet sunk, any torpedoes remain-ing in the force should be used against thattarget.

5. It has long been the intention to attackfrom inshore in this area and it is most satis-factory that on this first occasion the attackwas successful. This is only possible betweenthe Berck Buoy and the southern limit of theCommand. The suggestion in para. 17 of theSenior Officer, gth M.T.B. Flotilla's report isagreed with and it is hoped to try it out at anearly opportunity.

(Signed) B. C. WARD,Lieutenant, R.N.

Admiralty footnote:* Rotet—a device to increase the range of shore'

based radar.


Enclosure 3 to C-in-C , Levant's Letter

COASTAL FORCE ACTIONin the vicinity of Maritime Island (Sicily)

Night IS^/IG?1 February, 1943Approximate movements ofM.T.Bs 61.77 &. 82 during action,with Enemy Convoy.

Tf

M.T.Bs 6l,77,82._232fl//5


ENCLOSURE 2 TO F.O.C. DOVER'S LETTER.

FROM ... Senior Officer, gth M.T.B. Flotilla.DATE ... 27th September, 1943.To ... Senior Officer, H.M.M.T.B.s,

Dover.

I have the honour to submit the followingreport of the action on the night of 26th/27thSeptember off Point du Haut Bane between acombined Motor Torpedo Boat and Motor GunBoat force and an escorted enemy convoy.

Own Forces.2. Force A, M.T.B.s 202 (S.O.), 204 and

231, and Force B, M.G.B.s 108 (S.O.), 118and 117. S.O. Force A was in command ofthe combined forces.

Object.3. To intercept and destroy northbound con-

voy which was expected to be on passage fromLe Havre.

Weather Conditions.4. Visibility moderate to westward, poor to

eastward, due to clouds and land giving nohorizon; sea moderate; swell short; wind N.W.force 4*; squally.

Narrative.5. Forces A and B slipped at 2325/26th and

proceeded in accordance with Vice-Admiral,Dover's signal timed 1545 on 25th September(copy attached). AA buoy was passed at 0046and course was set through swept channel untilPoint du Haut Bane was bearing east, whencourse was altered to east. When forces were9 miles east of Point du Haut Bane, radar wasswitched on and M.T.B.s came in single star-board cruising line. M.G.B.s were in single portcruising line. This formation is always usedwhen approaching patrol line as no signallingis allowed by me unless in emergency, andspeed can be reduced or increased withoutdanger of collision.

6. Forces stopped in position Point du HautBane 5 miles at 0202 and engines were cut.Position was checked with bearings fromEtaples and Point du Ha-ut Ba'nc lights andconstant radar watch was kept. As the horizonto the westward was far better than to the east-ward and it was suspected that northboundconvoys used the inshore route, I decided at0245 to move i£ miles more inshore, whereforces stopped and cut engines at 0251.Although the weather was too bad for properuse of hydrophone, watch was kept as well aswith radar. A faint " ping " noise was heardin the hydrophone and at 0307 a faint pro-peller effect was obtained through the inter-ference. By this time the radar as well wasgiving echoes and " hydrophone up" wasordered. The ship was rolling too much to usethe radar echoes for plotting the enemy move-ments accurately.

7. Enemy was sighted at 0308 when clear ofa low dark cloud obscuring the horizon. Imme-diately after the first radar echoes wereobtained fast signalling with a blue light wasseen on the same bearing as given by radarand hydrophone, being south 20 degs. west,thus confirming by visual contact the

technical ones. As it could be seen thatunder uthe present circumstances the enemywould be passing too close to the seaward ofus, I ordered both forces to start up at 0309,and proceeded on course north-east to get moreinshore. I steered north-east and not eastso as to prevent showing more silhouette thanwas necessary. Speed at first 12 knots andlater increased to 20 knots for reasons of wash.The enemy was expected to do 9 knots. Enemywas kept in radar touch all the time.

8. At 0317 forces were stopped in position290 degs. Point du Haut Bane 1.8 miles andthe ships' heads kept pointing in the direc-tion of the enemy to keep the silhouette small.

At 0319 the enemy was sighted again in theform of several 3till, small, dark shapes.

9. At 0320 several starshells exploded deadabove us. Immediately afterwards a mostviolent battle started in the direction of theenemy. Radar gave a range of 2,000 yardsto the enemy. I ordered the forces to startup and proceeded on course north-west, speed36 knots, in order to get to the seaward of theenemy forces and the shore batteries. Anattack under these circumstances was out ofthe question. It could not be observed wherethe starshells were coming from. No small armsfire was directed at us except some straybullets'. Shell fire, however, was experienced.At 0323 speed was reduced to 22 knots so asnot to damage the engines. Boats were bump-ing heavily against the swell.

10. In the light of the starshells the bowsand bow waves of nine E or R-boats* forming ascreen ahead of the convoy could be seen inline abreast, six of which seemed to be point-ing in our direction, giving the impressionof being in pursuit of us. No fire from theseships however seemed to be directed at us.The whole situation was rather puzzling.

11. When the enemy convoy was south ofus1 the gunboats on our starboard quarter swunginto attack to create a diversion, passing asternof the M.T.B.s to the south-west, in accord-ance with plans discussed previously. Whenthe M.T.B.s had cleared the light arc of thestarshells and I considered that the gunboatshad attracted the attention of the enemy effec-tively, course was1 altered to the north andlater to the north-east, speed 30 knots, and eastat 0328. Speed varied between 30 knots and18 knots as convenient. Radar touch was keptall the time. Force was stopped at 0337 inposition 350 degs. Point du Haut Bane 4.2miles, when range was 4,500 yards and M.T.B.swere well inshore of the enemy route.

12. When the inshore position was reached,Force B was' ordered to attack from the sea-ward. By the time, however, Force A attacked,no diversion from seaward took place. Whenthe enemy came up north the M.T.B.s slowlyclosed in, keeping well out ,of sight of thescreen ahead. The enemy, however, sil-houetted against a fairly light horizon, couldbe observed with ease from about 1,800 yards.As soon as the screen ahead of the convoypassed, the M.T.B.s increased speed to between8 and 12 knots, closing in to about 1,400yards.

Admiralty footnote:* Wind force 4—moderate breeze (11-1-5 m.p.h.).

Admiralty footnote:* R-boats—motor launches.


13. Having been unable to plot the enemymovements with the radar echoes, I alteredcourse to parallel with the enemy, speed 10knots, thus comparing our speeds and in themeantime picking out the main target, whichwas rather difficult as the longest silhouettethat could be seen was rather low and I wasexpecting something higher for that size ofship. After close scrutiny it was decided thatthe silhouette mentioned was the main target,but heavily laden, a three island ship. Atapproximately 0400 course was altered to port.Orders to attack the main target were shoutedto M.T.B.s 204 and 231, who were in advancedsingle port cruising line, and the estimatedspeed of the enemy passed—9 knots.

14. The enemy convoy consisted of a bigmerchant vessel, 6 to 9 E or R-boats ahead,two coaster type vessels on the starboard quar-ter of the main target, and astern were 6 ormore other trawler size vessels. The screen onthe port side, being of no interest to us, wasnot observed properly. No outer screen was1

present on the starboard side. At 0403,' Iobserved a bright flash' and a dark smokecloud just abaft the funnel of the main targetand a distinct shock was1 felt in M.T.B. 202.Immediately afterwards a siren was heard.

15. The Commanding Officer of M.T.B. 202had just fired his starboard torpedo and turnedto port to disengage according to his instruc-tions'. Speed was increased—when very heavygun and machine gun-fire was opened on us.Starshell was again used with great accuracy;apart from the usual starshell the enemy usedfloating luminous flares coming down ahead ofus, and several grape-shots exploded fairlyclose ahead and to starboard. Although nohits were received enemy fire was extremelyheavy and accurate, causing numerous nearmisses. Quite a lot of fire went just over.

16. At 0426 M.T.B. 202 was stopped andan investigation was carried out as to the causeof a misfire at the port torpedo tube. When thiswas cleared I ordered M.T.B. 202 at 0443 to closesome lights and an occasional small searchlightwhich had been observed in the bearing wherethe action had taken place, to fire her secondtorpedo. After having closed in at varyingspeeds for reasons of wash I ordered M.T.B.202 to stop at 0451, when radar range was1,200 yards to the centre of activity, wherethree ships were lying stopped. I consideredit unnecessary to reduce the range more asthe targets were lying stopped and an outerscreen of E or R-boats were circling slowlyaround them, only 700 yards away, and theattack might have been spoiled if sighted.After two disappointing attempts to fire theport torpedo I ordered M.T.B.202 to return toharbour as it was obvious that the firing systemwas defective.

Conclusions.17. Attack from inshore has been proved to

be possible at this point of the enemy convoyroute. Close co-operation with gunboats tocreate a diversion, strongly enough armed tofight off a pursuing enemy, again proved itsvalue, particularly under ciccumistances likethese where an attack from the inshore sidecan be made. The diversion created by thegunboats is of great value, partly because ofthe starshells fired at them silhouetting 'theenemy for the inshore attack. Against such a

heavy escort, however, it is too risky to do sofor a long time. To get the same result asfrom starshell it would be of great value if theM.G.B.s could drop floating luminous flares toseaward in a case like this, not just abreast ofthe enemy, but starting from a mile or half amile ahead; this making a line of flares whichthe enemy has to pass, giving the M.T.B.s afair chance to attack. The possibility that theenemy expects an attack from inshore in thiscase is acceptable as they probably have notime in the confusion to divert their escorts totheir inshore side.

(Signed) E. H. LARIVE,Lieutenant, R. Neth. N.

ENCLOSURE 3 TO F.O.C. DOVER'S LETTER.FROM ... Senior Officer, M.G.B.s.DATE ... 2Qth September, 1943.To ... Flag Officer Commanding, Dover.

I have the honour to submit the followingreport on the action on the night 26th /27thSeptember by a combined Motor Torpedo Boatand Motor Gun Boat force on an escortedenemy convoy.,

General Narrative.2. Combined forces were stopped in posi-

tion 090° Berck Buoy i mile at 0203. Owingto low visibility to shoreward and good visi-bility to seaward, forces moved i£ miles in-shore, stopping in position 100° Berck Buoy2£ miles at 0250. Engines were cut, andM.G.B.H7 set radar watch, while M.T.B.skept hydrophone watch.

3. At 0306, some flashing from a blue lightwas observed, bearing south-west, and imme-diately afterwards one large vessel and severalsmaller could be seen. S.O. Force A wasinformed. At 0310, combined forces pro-ceeded north-east at 12 knots, gradually in-creasing speed. At 0314, starshell were firedover the forces. It could not be seen whetherthey were fired by the convoy or from ashore,but it is probable that the convoy sighted ourwakes.

4. The combined forces altered course north-west and increased speed. Force B alteredcourse to port at 30 knots and engaged theleading enemy escort on opposite courses, open-ing fire at 0317. The enemy fire was believedto be from 4-inch and all calibres below. Itwas intense and mainly accurate, especiallyfrom the larger calibre guns. Many near misseswere observed by all boats. The enemy star-shell also were intense, but promiscuouslyplaced. The blinding effect of the starshelland enemy tracer made it difficult to distin-guish targets. M.G.6.117 observed the nearestescort to be almost stopped with a small fireaft, and her guns temporarily silenced. TheCommanding Officer of M.G.6.117 assumed•that this had been caused by the fire ofM.G.B.ioS. M.G.B.H7 engaged this targetat a range of 300 yards, arid observed severalhits with Oerlikon shells.

5. At 0330, a 4-inch (?) shell missedM.G.B.ioS's port quarter by two yards, andthe starboard engine stopped. M.G.B.s, whowere in line ahead, disengaged to north-westand stopped at 0335 to investigate damage andcasualties. The after Oerlikon gunner ofM.G.B.ioS was wounded and his place wastaken by the radar operator. The other boats


were not damaged, but M.G.B.ii7's pom-pomcould not be laid owing to the failure of theelevating ram. Force B was still being illu-minated by starshell, but was not being activelyengaged. It was decided to withdraw to thenorth and signal the Force A to find out if theyhad attacked with torpedoes. Accordingly at0342, Force B proceeded north at 22 knots,and stopped at 0353, where signals were ma'deto Force A, firstly asking if they were all right,and secondly asking if they had completed theattack. At 0357, a message from Force A wasreceived, ordering Force B to attack from sea-ward.

6. Accordingly, Force B proceeded at 26knots steering north-east, and at 0406 wereagain illuminated by starshell. At 0407, ForceB engaged the enemy screen on a similarcourse. Enemy fire was still heavy, especiallyfrom larger calibre guns, but was not so in-tense as during the first attack. Starshell againmade it difficult to see the enemy at all clearly,and no results of own gunfire were observed.At 0408 the signal " Attack completed " wasreceived from Force A. At 0410, Force B dis-engaged to the north-west and stopped at 0413,when the signal " Withdraw " was receivedfrom Dover.

7. As however it was obvious that the enemywere by now in a confused state and werefiring at each other, it was decided to make abrief attack in order to keep the kettle boiling.Accordingly Force B proceeded at 0415, steer-ing east at 10 knots in single line abreast toport, and at 0418, opened fire. Two T.L.C.*type craft were observed, and several E or R-boats in a formed state were observed by thelight of the enemy starshell. A considerableamount of enemy fire was observed, but notvery much in our direction, and it appearedas if the kettle was boiling nicely. At 0420,Force B turned 180° and disengaged undersmoke. Course was set west at 28 knots andthen to Dover by the swept channel.

General Conclusions.8. It had previously been arranged between

the S.O.s of the forces that if possible, M.G.B.sshould make diversionary attacks from sea-ward, in order to draw the attention and fireof the enemy, while M.T.B.s made an un-observed attack on the main target from in-shore. In the event, this was carried out suc-cessfully, although the M.T.B.s did not attackwhile the M.G.B.s were carrying out -the firstdiversion.

9. It is estimated that the enemy escort con-sisted of at least two gun coasters or T.L.C.sand three or more groups of E or R-boats, eachgroup consisting of at least 4 boats. The groupswere mainly on the seaward side of the con-voy, and were also ahead and astern of themain target. From the intensity of largercalibre fire, there may have been more largersized escorts, as it was too accurately placedto have been fired from the shore.

10. It was interesting and heartening toobserve during the first attack that althoughthe enemy fire was intense, and it appearedimpossible for boats to live through it, neglig-ible damage was actually sustained.

(Signed) R. B. ROOFER,Lieutenant, R.N.

Admiralty foot-note:* T.L.C.—Tank Landing Craft.

ENCLOSURE 4 TO F.O.C. DOVER'S LETTER.SIGNAL.

FROM ... V.A. Dover.Tonight Saturday Force A, M.T.B.s 202

(S.O.), 204, 231, and Force B, M.G.B.s 114(S.O.), 108, 116, are to be sailed in companyto pass AA buoy at 0045, thence via sweptchannel to Berck Buoy where patrol is to beassumed in vicinity.

Object to intercept and destroy northboundconvoy which may be expected to be on pas-sage from Le Havre.

Albacores of 841 Squadron may be patrollingconvoy route to Dieppe with freedom to bombsurface craft south of latitude 50° 20' North.

Unless in action and in absence of otherorders, forces are to leave patrol area at 0500and return by same route at best speed untilA A buoy is passed thence to harbour.

I545/25tl1 September.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty onthe i.Sth November, 1943, by Admiral of theFleet Sir JOHN C. TOVEY, K.B.E.,DIS.O., Commander-in-Chiej', The Nore.

The Nore,i8th November, 1943.

/•

DESTROYER AND COASTAL FORCE ACTION WITHE-BOATS ON NIGHT OF 24TH/25TH OCTOBER,1943-Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the

following report on E-boat operations on thenight of 24th/25th October, 1943. The forcesemployed were:—

Destroyers patrolling convoy route:EGLINTON, WORCESTER, MACKAY,

and CAMPBELL.With F.N. Convoy:

PYTCHLEY.Coastal Force Units:

Unit P. M.T.B.s 693, 689.Unit O. M.G.B.s 86, 85.Unit C. M.L.s 112, 114.Unit Y. M.G.B.S 607, 603.•Unit L. M.T.B.s 444, 445.Unit V. M.G.B.S 313, 327.Unit R. M.G.B.S 609, 610.Unit S. R.M.L.s* 250, 517.Unit E. M.T.B.s 438, 443, 440.$Unit J. M.T.B.s 442, 4394

J At Lowestoft until receipt of first enemyreport.

PART I—NARRATIVE.The Coastal Force dispositions for this night

had been made with an eye to a. possible attacknorth of Yarmouth. The dispositions north,of Yarmouth'are shown in Appendix A. Otherpatrols and Coastal Force Units operated southof the area shown in the diagram.

2. Soon after 2200A several reports frombombers who had been out " gardening "fwere received. These indicated the possibilityof small craft -in the vicinity of 52° 50' N.Admiralty footnotes:

* R.M.L.s—Rescue Motor Launches.I " Gardening "—laying parachute sea-mines.


Enclosure 5 to F.O.C. DoverTs Letter

I 1 '*' I I I I '"»' I I I I fr' I I

COASTAL FORCE ACTIONof¥" the French coast

Night 26^/27*^ September, 1943.Scale of Sea Miles

Q I 2 3

3O'

0400

50e

2S7"

2O'

Light-tHouset

M.T.Bs attackO400

M.T.Bs•0337 :: '

Brtfr'''Jj3uoy 0316A:

O3IO0306 louse':

'edu HcuitBanc

20'

£;S'6 MME-B.AY--\\

1 I is7' Longitude IJ2O' East from Graenwich 25' I i I I I I 3*5'

Based on Admiralty Chart, N?26I2


3° 35' E. steering 300° at about 1940. Theinference was made that if these were in factE-iboats they were using a route direct fromIjmuiden north of-the Ower Bank thence tothe convoy route either in the Humber orCromer area. It was also considered probablethat they would use the same route for theirretirement. When the action started coastalforces were redisposed accordingly.

3. At about 2318 H.M.S. PYTCHLEY whowas .guarding the seaward flank of the F.N.convoy* obtained a radar contact of E-boats.The E-boat warning was at once sent out. At2318 H.M.S. PYTCHLEY went into actionwith 5 or 6 E-boats 4 miles north of 566 ibuoyfand drove them off to the north-east, severelydamaging one. This timely and well foughtaction undoubtedly saved ithe convoy frombeing accurately located. It appears probablethat the E-boats intercepted by Unit Y at 0206(see paragraph 22) were some of ithis groupescorting the damaged boat back to its base.

4. On receipt of H.M.S. PYTCHLEY'senemy report at 2318 coastal force units wereredisposed as follows:—

(a) Units R and V (positions Z$6 andZ55J) were fleeted § 300 °, 20 miles.

(b) Units L and Y (positions Zi8 andZi6) were fleeted 020°, 20 miles, to coverthe inferred line of retirement to Ijmuiden.

(c) Units C, O and P (positions Zi4, Zi2and Zio) were fleeted 015°, 18 miles to closethe gap left by (b).

(d) Two fast units of M.T.B.s (E and J)were ordered out from Lowestoft to positionsZio and Zi2. These were later ordered tothe northern end of Brown Ridge, againcovering the inferred line of retirement toIjmuiden.It is most creditable that all these signals

were correctly received and acted upon withpromptitude.

5. The shore radar stations now began to getunidentified plots in dangerous proximity tothe F.N. convoy—H.M.S. EGLINTON onpatrol 3 was therefore ordered to remain withthe convoy until further orders, H.M. ShipsWORCESTER, MACKAY and CAMPBELL'(patrols 4, 5 and 6) being fleeted north to 3,4 and 5 respectively at 0002.

6. It soon became clear that the E-boats hadsplit into numerous groups which were ap-proaching the outer war channel at a numberof points east of 57F buoy. It was remark-ably fortunate that all these groups came inastern of the convoy which was in fact neversighted. This convoy happened to be 2 hoursahead of timetable. In addition to the convoythe trawler WILLIAM STEPHEN was a sourceof anxiety as she had straggled some milesastern of the convoy.

7. The situation at 0002 on 25th October onthe convoy route was as follows:—

The rear of the F.N. convoy approximately

Admiralty 'footnotes:* F.N. convoys were northbound coastal convoys.t For positions of numbered buoys, see Appendix

A.J For numbered positions Z$6 etc., see Appendix

A.§ " Fleet " was a code-word used in signals when

re-disposing units on patrol; in this context," fleeted " means merely " moved ".

at 57C buoy—H.M.S. WORCESTER on pat-rol 4 had by that time reached the eastern endof her patrol, 57 buoy. There was thus tem-porarily a stretch of 25 miles that was com-pletely open to attack since H.M.S. EGLIN-TON (patrol 3) had been ordered to remainwith the convoy. Radar stations showed un-identified plots close north of 556 buoy andapproaching 566. Another track appearedabout 3 miles north-east of 57C moving slowlytowards 57F. Shortly after this time yetanother track appeared a mile or so north of56 buoy. At 0002 H.M.T. WILLIAMSTEPHEN was near 56 buoy.

8. Between 0015 and 0115 there weregroups of E-boats at 56, 566 and at 57F -buoyafter the convoy had passed. Positions of thesegroups obtained by shore radar were signalledby Commander-in-Cihief, The Nore, althoughno immediate action could ibe taken to dealwith them. These groups were in addition tothose engaged by H.M.S. PYTCHLEY at2318, H.M.S. WORCESTER at 0027, H.M.S.MACKAY at 0045 and 0136, and Unit R at0140.

Destroyer Actions.g. HM.S. PYTCHLEY (with F.N. 60).—

Already described in paragraph 3.10. H.M.S. 'WORCESTER (patrol 4).—At

0027 when 3 miles east of 556 buoy, H.M.S.WORCESTER engaged 4 E-boats, scoringOerlikon hits on second boat in the line. TheE-boats retired on a course of 030°. A castround after contact had been lost did not locatethe possibly damaged boat.

n. H.M.S. WORCESTER passed 56 buoyabout oioo, at which time shore radar placedthe group that had bee.n near that .buoy about3 miles north, of it. By now the large numberof plots made identification and following ofunits extremely difficult and a clear pictureof the situation in this area could not beobtained.

12. At 0117 H.M.S. WORCESTER engaged3 E-'boats i£ miles north of 566 buoy. OneE-boat was 'hit by a 4.7-inch shell and closerange weapons and was seen to blow up, burn-ing wreckage being passed during the chaseto the northward. At 0151 on return to thechannel, H.M.S. WORCESTER sighted andengaged 3 E-boats on the scene of the actionat 0117. These were "stopped when sighted.They were engaged and driven off.

13. H.M.S. MACKAY (patrol 5).—At 0005when " fleet north" signal was receivedH.M.S. MACKAY was at southern end ofpatrol 5. At 0036 when at 57 buoy radardetected 3 targets 4 miles to the northward.At 0040 5 E-iboats were engaged at 1,700 yardsrange. These retired to north-eastward, mak-ing smoke and dropping delayed action depthcharges which were easily avoided. M.G.B.Unit L fleeted 020°, 20 miles from Zi8 ob-tained H.E. from this group at 0137 but couldnot intercept. At 0107 H.M.S. MACKAY,then some 14 miles north-east of 57 buoy,shaped course for 54D -buoy.

14. At 0136 when 6 miles north of 57 buoy,H.M.S. MACKAY obtained suspicious radarcontact 4 miles to the west. At 0148 at least2 E-boats were engaged and straddled with thetwin 6-pdr. The E-boats retired to the north-eastward, dropping depth charges as they went.


At 0205 H.M.S. MACKAY in the vicinity ofZ23 broke off the engagement and returned topatrol 4.

Loss of H.M.T. WILLIAM STEPHEN.15. This trawler did not maintain her station

in the convoy though she should have hadsufficient speed and had dropped some fivemiles astern. As soon as ithe E-boat activitydeveloped it was seen that this unfortunatetrawler had E-boats both ahead and asternof her and she ran into the group at 56B buoy,being sunk by (torpedo a few minutes beforeoioo. I regret now that I did order her tosteer inshore, but at the time the E-iboat situa-tion was not so clear as it became subsequently.The explosion was felt -by Unit V to the nortii-ward. A 'German broadcast on the followingday mentioned the picking up of survivors.

Coastal Force Engagements.16. Unit S—M.L. 250 and RM.L. 517

(position Z22) sighted H.M.S. MACKAY'sfirst action but was not able to intercept theE-boats, the speed of the unit being reducedto 12 knots due to engine failure in M.L. 250.At 0156 a momentary action was fought withthe two E-boats driven off by H.'M.S. MACKAYin her second action.

17. Unit V—M.G.B.s 315 and 327 (position£55) started to fleet 300°, 20 miles at 2345.The first actions of H.M. Ships WORCESTERand MACKAY were seen in the distance to thesouthward. An underwater explosion was feltabout oioo which confirms the time of thetorpedoing of trawler WILLIAM STEPHEN.H.M.S. WORCESTER'S second action (para-graph 14) was also seen and at 0120 radarcontact was made with these E-boats. Threeboats were heavily engaged from 0138 until0144, hits being observed on two of them. Thelast boat in the line may have been considerablydamaged. At 0230 three more E-boats weresighted on a north-easterly course at high speedabout six miles north erf 556 buoy. Owingto their large turning circle Unit V was unableto turn quickly enough to engage the fastmoving enemy.

18. Unit R—M.G.B.S 609 and 610 (positionZ$6) started to fleet 300 °, 20 miles at 2341.Two unidentified plots were signalled to theunit at 0035 and 0040 some ten miles E.N.E.of Sheringham buoy but Unit R had alreadyinvestigated radar contacts in this area by thetime the signals were received.

19. At oioo Commander-in-Chief signalledposition of Unit R and an enemy plot—Unit Rhad already obtained hydrophone contact andat 0102 obtained contact by radar. From thistime until 0141 Unit R stalked the enemy,keeping between him and the convoy. As soonas the enemy showed signs of closing theconvoy, Unit R attacked, twice forcing him towithdraw to the eastward, the second time forgood. The second boat in the line on whichUnit R concentrated their fire was undoubtedlyhit hard and forced to leave the line.

20. This group of E-boats was the only oneto operate north of 57iF buoy.

21. Unit Y—M.G.B.s 607 and 603 (positionZi6) together with Unit L (position Zi8) wasfleeted 020°, 20 miles at 2340 as mentioned inparagraph 4. H.M.S. WOiRGESTER's first

engagement at 0027 and those of H.M.S!MACKAY were observed to the westward.H.M.S. MACKAY's track chart and that ofUnit Y indicate that the E-boats engaged byH.M.S. MACKAY at 0148 could riot be thesame as those engaged by Unit Y as suggestedby Senior Officer of Unit Y. From statementsby prisoners of war and other sources it isconsidered that Unit Y's group were proceedingback to their base possibly escorting one E-boatthat had been damaged by H.M.S. PYTCHLEYat 2318. The fact that they reached Unit Yapproximately at the end of H.M.S. MACKAY'saction appears to have been pure coincidence.

22. At 0206 Unit Y engaged a group of E-boats steering an easterly course about 22 milesnorth-east of Smiths Knoll buoy. The unitpressed home its attack with great vigour andset two E-boats on fire. These E-boats wereseen to blow up. M.G.B. 607 (LieutenantR. M. Marshall, R.-N.V.R.) also rammed andsank a third E-boat.

23. At 0400 M.G.IB. 603 with 607 in towobtained radar contact to the northward. Towwas slipped and at 0418 M.G.B. 603 went intoaction with six E-boats at a range of under800 yards. As the result of being the first toopen fire M.G.B. 603 obtained many hits onone boat and probably damaged it severely.After a running fight the enemy made off athigh speed at about 0445. M.G.B. 603 thenrejoined M.G.B. 607.

24. Unit J—M.T.B.s 442 and 439. Units Eand J which had been ordered out from Lowes-toft to positions Zio and Zi2 when E-boatactivity started, were ordered to the northernend of Brown Ridge (position RB27 and tenmiles north of position, "RB27 /respectively)where they arrived at 0300. At 0406 unit wentinto action with three E-boats and a high speedrunning fight ensued in which both M.T.B.sscored a number of hits. They also suffereddamage and casualties, a hit on the bridge of442 killing the First Lieutenant. At 0415M.T.B. 439 lost contact with 442 owing to thefailure of the rudder to turn the boat, althoughhard over—439 continued to engage the enemy,however, until 0445 when it became necessaryto attend to action damage and to wounded.At 0450 M.T.QS. 442 also disengaged due toaction damage and stoppage of 2-pdr. It isconsidered probable that considerable damagewas inflicted on the enemy in these engage-ments.

25. At 0545 in position 52° 50' N. 3° 04' E.,M.T.B. 439 sighted four'E-boats steering E.S.E.As by this time 439 was in no fit state foraction, avoiding action was taken. The presenceof 439 appears to have confused the enemysufficiently to induce them to open fire onone of their own boats which was straggling(from the line.

26. At 0605,'some 12 miles further west, 439sighted another group of eastbound E-boats whoopened fire. This group was also avoided. Iconsider this avoiding action was justified.

27. Most unfortunately fog at the aerodromesprevented any aircraft of Fighter or CoastalCommands taking advantage of this uniqueopportunity of attacking E-boats in daylight.A number of these did not reach their basebefore noon.


PART II—REMARKS.28. This was probably .the most difficult

night yet experienced from the radar point ofview. The E^boats split up into many smallgroups thus making identification most difficult.

29. As late as 0540 there were indicationsthat some E-boats were still not far from _ thecoast, almost certainly north of Ower Bank sincethe area south of it was covered by CoastalForces. From previous experience it can beinferred that they were looking for missingboats. It is always a sign that our counter-measures have achieved some success. Analysisof the action reports points to the E-boatshaving come hi north of the Ower Bank andthen fanned out to the southward hi probablythree main groups (A, B and C) which in turnsplit up into smaller groups.

30. Group A operated between 57F buoy and566 buoy and appears to have been a verylarge group. Units of it were engaged byH.M. Ships PYTOHUEY and WORCESTER(second action). Group A also provided theunit which remained at 57F buoy (between 0050and 0212. Another unit of this group wentnorth of 5?F buoy in search of the convoy andwas only prevented from finding it by the welljudged action of -Unit R. It was probablysome of group A that sank iH.M.T. WILLIAMSTEPHEN.

31. Group C was the most easterly of thethree. Units of it were engaged by H.M.S.WORCESTER at 0027 and HJM.S. MACKAYat 0045 and 0148.

32. Group iB appears to have been between566 and 55B buoys. Shore radar showed E-boats near 56 buoy and Unit V's second sight-ing was probably boats of this group. Itappears to have merged with group A at timesand may have had a hand in the sinking ofH.M.T. WILLIAM STEPHEN and thereforein H.M.S. WORCESTER'S second action.

33. From the number of callsigns heard (30)and the number of boats accounted for byradar plots and ships' action reports (seeparagraph 8) it is considered that at least 30E-boats were present on this occasion, a strengthof attack that has to be expected with the largenumber of E-boats known to be based "on Dutchports.

Shore Radar.34. Shore radar stations did much good

work in detecting E-boat units in or near theswept channel. It was their first experience ofaction conditions and it is considered that greatcredit is due to them hi view of the very largenumber of both enemy and friendly vesselsinvolved.

Remarks on Ships' Actions and Reports.35. H.M.S. PYTCHLEY (Lieutenant-Com-

mander R. H. Hbdgkinson, R.N.).—Thistimely and well fought action had considerablebearing on the general success of the night'soperations in that it prevented itine enemyaccurately locating the convoy. Throughoutthe Commanding Officer acted with soundjudgment.

36. H.M.S. WORCESTER (LieutenantJ. A. ,H. Hamer, R.N.).—The CommandingOfficer's decision at 0130 to break off the chaseof E-boats when five miles north of the sweptchannel and return to his patrol was correct,

especially as the range was such that hitscould scarcely be expected. The definitedestruction of an IE-boat is a most satisfactoryindication of the efficiency of the ship. TheCommanding Officer -handled his ship withdetermination and sound judgment.

37. H.M.S. MACKAY (Lieutenant-Com-mander J. H. Eaden, D.S.C., R.N.).—Although it is undesirable to lay down anyhard and fast rule as to how far from his patrola destroyer should chase E-boats, in this caseH.M.S. MACKAY's patrol was left completelyopen for a very long time. The object of thesepatrols is the prevention of minelaying in thechannel and on this occasion the enemy wouldhave been able to lay mines at his leisureduring a period of two hours.

38. Unit V (M.G.B.s 315 and 327) (SeniorOfficer, Lieutenant J. A. Caulfield, R.N.V.R.).—The shore control had great difficulty inidentifying Unit V among the many radar plotsthat appeared in the area concerned, conse-quently it was not possible to give this unitmuch help. It is most satisfactory that theunit was able to get into action with goodeffect so soon after H.M.S. WORCESTER'Sengagement and probably with the same boats.The continual harrying of the E-boats is boundto have a discouraging effect. The resultsobtained by the new type of hydrophone aremost satisfactory but the standard of radarperformance in M.G.B. 315 leaves somethingto be desired. Had the second enemy unitbeen picked up by radar the unit might havebeen able to turn to a similar course to thatof the enemy before sighting and thus have gotinto action.

39. Unit R (M.G.B.s 609 and 610).—TheSenior Officer of this unit, Lieutenant P. Edge,R.N.V.R., showed a quick and sound apprecia-tion of the Commander-in-Chief's object infleeting the unit, i.e., the defence of the north-bound convoy, and throughout handled hisunit with tactical ability of a high order.Skilful use of radar gave him. an exact pictureof the enemy's movements and enabled himto go into action at a moment of his ownchoosing. The moment he chose was entirelycorrect and there is no doubt that this wellfought action saved the convoy from beinglocated and attacked. The unit was unfor-tunate in not obtaining a kill especially as aprobable one had to be sacrificed in achievingthe object.

40. It is not possible to lay down any hardand fast rule as to how far destroyers shouldbe from the convoy route and it is inevitablethat they should illuminate any craft approach-ing them that they cannot identify as friendly.The onus of establishing identity must remainwith the coastal forces.

41. Unit Y (M.G.B.s 607 and 603)Lieutenants Marshall and Lightoller showedadmirable judgment and a magnificent fightingspirit in this, the most successful action of thenight. It is considered that the claim to havedestroyed 3 E-boats is substantiated. Onceagain the value of 2-pdr. starshell both asilluminants and as incendiary ammunition wasdemonstrated.

42. This action also shows the devastatingeffect of the gunpower of the- D classM.G.B.s in an attack which is pressed well


home. The results obtained give clear proofof the very high fighting efficiency of these twoboats.

43. The gallant action fought single-handedby M.G.B. 603 against six E-boats not onlyshowed determination to Jose no chance ofengaging the enemy but may well have savedM.G.B. 607 from destruction.

44. Unit J (M.T.B.s 442 and 439) (SeniorOfficer, Lieutenant C. A. Burk, R.C.N.V.R.).—Here again good use was made of radarduring the action. Considerable damage wasundoubtedly done to the enemy and but foraction damage a kill might well have resulted.

General.45. This action gives general proof of a great

improvement in the efficiency of the CoastalForces particularly as regards communicationsand the use of radar. The small number ofmaterial breakdowns- also indicates a higherstandard of interest and handling by the Com-manding Officers and crews of boats andreflects great credit on the maintenance officersand staffs of the bases. Furthermore, it clearlydemonstrates the value and essential need ofconstant training and practice.

46. The dispositions and movements of forceswere controlled by Commander H. A. Taylor,R.N., and the success of the operations was inlarge part due to his skill and extremely cleverand prompt anticipation of enemy movements.

47. In addition to the successful defence ofthe convoy, it is considered permissible to feela modicum of satisfaction in the number oftimes the E-boats were engaged. They wereroughly handled six times in or near the convoyroute (H.M. Ships WORCESTER andMACKAY' twice, H.M.S. PYTCHLEY andUnit R once each), once by Unit V whenretiring from H.M.S. WORCESTER'S secondaction, and by Units Y and J on their home-ward passage when they probably felt theywere clear of our forces. Had the R.A.F.been able to attack them after daylight it wouldhave been a strong deterrent to E-boats leavingtheir return to their bases till so late.

(Signed) JACK C. TOVEY,Admiral of the Fleet,.Commander-in-Chief.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty onthe gth December, 1944, by Admiral SirJOHN H. D. CUNNINGHAM, K.C.B.,M.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, MediterraneanStation-

Mediterranean,gth December, 1944.

ACTION REPORT—H.M. M.G.B: 662, H.M.M.T.B.S 634, 637, 638 ON THE NIGHT OFIITH/MTH OCTOBER, 1944.

Forwarded for the information of Their Lord-ships, strongly concurring in paragraph 2 ofthe remarks of the Captain Coastal Forces,Mediterranean.

(Signed) 'J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM,Admiral,Commander-in-Chief.

ENCLOSURE i TO C.-iN-C., MEDITERRANEANSTATION'S LETTER.

FROM ... The Captain Coastal Forces,Mediterranean.

DATE ... i8th November, 1944.To ... The Commander - in - Chief,

Mediterranean Station.The remarks of the Commander Coastal

Forces, Western Mediterranean, are fully con-curred in.

2. The Senior Officer, 57th M.T.B. Flotillahas written such an excellent report and soably summed up this prolonged action hi hisparagraphs 39 and 40, that little remains tobe said. To the factors which made victorypossible (vide paragraph 39 of the ActionReport) must unquestionably be added brilliantand inspiring leadership, as the CommanderCoastal Forces, Western Mediterranean has in-deed already remarked. I have on severalprevious occasions remarked on Lieutenant-Commander T. J. Bligh's splendid leadershipof his flotilla in action. On this occasion heset a seal on his previous performances.

3. In my letter dated 3rd October, 1944, Iremarked on the brilliant success of three boatsof the 56th M.T.B. Flotilla in a prolonged nightaction. It is a matter of great personal satis-faction to me, knowing all the officers of bothflotillas and having watched the happy mixtureof close co-operation and friendly rivalry exist-ing between them, that the 57th Flotilla hasnow crowned its career with an equally, andpossibly even more brilliant success.

(Signed) J. F. STEVENS,Captain, R.N.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO C.-iN-C., MEDITERRANEANSTATION'S LETTER.

FROM ... The Commander Coastal Forces,Western Mediterranean.

DATE ... 23rd October, 1944.To ... The Captain Coastal Forces,

Mediterranean.Submitted:Forwarded:

2. This highly successful action wascharacterised in its initial stages by skilfulanticipation of enemy movements; and later,by the manner in which prevailing conditionsand available resources were turned to suchgood account in securing maximum oppor-tunity for attack, but for which our boatswould have undoubtedly incurred greaterdamage and casualties. Throughout, theengagement was carried out with skill anddetermination under brilliant leadership, in theface of heavy enemy fire.

(Signed) A. D. MC!LWRAITH,Commander, R.N.V.R.

ENCLOSURE 3 TO C.-iN-C., MEDITERRANEANSTATION'S LETTER.

FROM ... The Senior Officer, 57th M.T.B.Flotilla.

DATE ... i5th October, 1944.'To ... The Commander Coastal Forces,

Western Mediterranean.The following report of the attack on enemy

F-lighter* convoys in the Adriatic on the nightof nth/i2th October, 1944, is submitted.Admiralty footnote:—

* F-lighter—comparable to an armed tank landingcraft.


Own Force.2. His Majesty's M.G.B. 662 (Senior Officer),

His Majesty's M.T.B. 634 (Lieutenant W. E. A.Blount, D.S.C., R.N.V.R.), His Majesty'sM.T.B. 637 (Lieutenant R. C. Davidson,D.S.C., R.N.V.R.) and His Majesty'sM.T.B. 638 (Lieutenant D. Lummis,R.N.V.R.).

Duty on which Force was employed.3. On patrol, North of Zara, in accordance

with instructions from the British Senior NavalOfficer, Vis.

4. Weather—tfine: Wind force and direc-tion—north-east, force 1-2*: Sea and swell—nil: Moon—moonrise 0114: Visibility—1,000yards until moonrise: Phosphorescence—slight.

General Narrative.5. It was arranged that the unit proceed on

patrol, north of Zara, on D - i day, lie up at1st on D day, patrol on the night of D dayand either return to Vis on D + i, or wait at1st for a further night, patrolling on D + 2and returning to Vis on D + 3 day.

Accordingly, the unit left Komiza at 1300on loth October, 1944, proceeding northwardsat seventeen knots in arrowhead formation.H.M.M.T.B. 634, who had been to 1st before,was sent ahead at nineteen knots to contact theL.R.D.G.f Officer and the Partisan navalauthorities and obtain the latest naval intelli-gence. At 1845, the unit arrived at the rendez-vous position just south of 1st harbour, but asH.M.M.T.B. 634 was not there'H.M.M.G.B. 662entered the bay to find her and go alongside.

6. Lieutenant W. E. A. Blount, D.S.C.,R.N.V.R., reported that the intelligence he hadbeen given was as follows. A northboundconvoy of some four or five ships (mostlyF-Boats) had been seen by L.R.D.G. to enterZara some three or four days ago and it was(to be expected that they would endeavour toproceed northwards as soon as possible.Further, no shipping had been seen either north-bound or southbound for three days and therewas a certainty of somethdng passing near VirIsland during the night. In addition, threePartisan "tigers "J were patrolling the MaonChannel to the northwards (where they hadrecently sunk one and captured another enemyschooner), and a Ju.88 had machine-gunned asmall ship in 1st Bay at dawn two dayspreviously.

7. Accordingly the unit was led between 1stand Mulat (a very narrow but deep channel)at 1945 and course was set to close "Vir Islandon silent engines, the three " tigers " beingsighted on the port beam, forming up into.their cruising formation as the leading boait leftthe channel.

8. At 2040 the unit closed the coast of Vir,and lay stopped, in wait for the promised north-bound convoy.

Admiralty footnotes:* Wind force 1-2—light air to light breeze (1-6

m.p.h.).t L.R.D..G.—Long Range Desert Group.% Tigers—any minor partisan craft employed on

reconnaissance or patrol duties.

The weather was very dark and thundery,with vivdd flashes of lightning to the south-wards, but apart from two panics caused bythe spire of Zara Church, all was quiet.

9. At 2245, three white flares were seen overMulat.

At 2347, much tracer was seen coming from1st, in what appeared .to be a land battle, butthe L.R.D.G. representatives on board H.M,M.T.B.634 considered that a low flying airattack was being made on the harbour. Imyself thought this unlikely, and was of theopdnion that an E-boat was firing irresponsiblyfor some obscure reason known only to theenemy. (I had seen this happen before, in thesame place, on -the night of 26th June, thisyear.) The firing then ceased, but ten minuteslater broke out further south, near Mulat. Thistime there were some flares (or starshell) beingused, and some large flashes were seen on theland, and the aircraft theory seemed possible:however, some 88-m.m. tracer was identifiedfrom the eastern side of Mulat and it wasobvious that there was somethdng taking place.

10. In view of the intelligence reports receivedearlier in ithe evening, I was averse to leavingthe patrol area—in fact the firing may havebeen a diversion to draw our craft away fromthe eastern side of the channel—but it did seempossible (that there was at least one F-ldghteror siebel ferry* over on that side, so at 0039H.M.M.T.B.634 was detached to go to 1st tocontact the L.R.D.G. or Partisans and find outwhat was happening, whilst the remainder ofthe unit stayed in the patrol area.

11. At 0223, H.M.M.T.B.634 made R/Tfcontact with H.M.M.T.B.637 and reported thatthere had been two destroyers in position 206°4£ miles Veli Rat Light, having previously sent,a W/T signal to me to the effect that itherewas heavy firing to seaward, and broadcastingan enemy report. H.M.M.T.B.634 also re-ported that an F-lighter had been seen by thePartisans in amongst the islands, but was south-bound.

The unit at once proceeded to Kok Pointito rendezvous H.M.M.T.B.634, torpedoes wereset to 3 and 5 feet, radar switched on and acourse set to pass between Skarda and 1st, tocarry out a sweep outside the islands to tryand find the two destroyers. Search was aban-doned at 0345, as there was a rising wind andsea, and unit returned to 1st.

12. It seemed probable that the destroyershad proceeded northwards at high speed, directlyafter the bombardment and the chance of catch-ing them was remote.

My opinion is that I was justified in stayingoff Vir and not leaving my area, but that Ishould have detached H.M.M.T.B.634 earlier,when I might have been able to have contactedthe enemy.

13. At 0900, a Partisan reported a large war-ship wdth two funnels in a cove on the eastcoast of Mulat, a moderately alarming reportto receive at any time, but .this dwindled to-an F-lighter by 1000, an E-boat by iioo and a" trick of the light " by 1200.

Admiralty footnotes:* Siebel ferry—a type of German landing craft,f R/T—radio-telephony.


14. At 1730, a conference was held with thelocal authorities and it was decided to repeatthe previous night's patrol, with the addi-tional proviso that if any shipping at all wassighted near 1st, a pre-arranged pyrotechnicsignal would be made from ,the Partisan look-out post.

Having thus secured the rear, the unit pro-ceeded to Vir at 1825.

15. It had been decided that the ibig demon-stration put up by the enemy the previousnight (which included torpedoes fired byE-boats at Mulat breakwater) was aimed ateliminating some "tigers" and/or M.G.B.sand that it was probable he would try andrun a big convoy north this night. Hence theunit closed Vir Island1 and was disposed alongthe coast to meet a northbound convoy.

16. Some flares were seen to the southwards,and there were lights and flickerings in the skyover Nin—all appeared to be set. At 2215 somevertical tracer was seen off Zara.

At about 2220 H.M.M.T.B.634*3 starboardouter engine pushed a conrod through the crankcase and most of the engine-room crew wereovercome by fumes.

At about 2245 all the boats started rolling, asif a lot of ships had passed by to seawards, soat 2300 the unit proceeded northwards, a guessthat eventually proved correct.

17. The visibility was now very low, due towidely scattered low cloud, but I was not pre-pared for the shock of suddenly seeing enemyships on the port bow, at about four hundredyards' range.

The unit was at once stopped and the boatsheaded into the shore just north of Vir light.The targets were now seen to be fourF-lighters, of which one was altering coursetowards us: he appeared to be higher out ofthe water than the others and was possibly anescorting flak lighter: he had probably sightedone or more of the unit and was closing todrive us off.

18. H.M.M.T.B.634 was ordered to try andcarry out a snap torpedo attack on this target,whilst H.M.M.G.B.662 ordered " single lineahead, speed 8 knots ", and went ahead inorder to engage the remainder ,by gunfire.

The flak boat opened fire on H.M.M.G.B.662at 2306, at once killing one of the pom-pomloading numbers. Fire was- returned from allguns and H.M.M.T.B.638 illuminated withstarshell.

19. It is scarcely possible to describe the nextten minutes. The visibility was such that theleading boat in the line had a completely dif-ferent picture from the fourth boat, and theslight offshore breeze was blowing the smokefrom H.M.M.G.B.662's gunfire across the lineof sight of our ships and the enemy convoy,which was, of course, much more of an advan-tage to us than them as we had the inshoreposition and knew where to expect them, whilethe only ship that they could see wasH.M.M.G.B.662. But it will, in fact, beeasier to give the impressions of each boatduring this phase of the action and try to paintthe picture that each one saw, than to give acoherent account of what the unit did.

H.M.M.G.B.6fa's Narrative.

20. H.M.M.G.B.662 had drawn ahead ofH.M.M.T.B,634, who had manoeuvred for atorpedo attack, and was engaging many tar-gets on the port side, including F-lighters,Pi-L Boats* and E-boats. Very heavy 88-m.m.and 2O-m.m. was coming our way, ah" high,from a variety of enemy vessels and this firehad a strong blinding effect on my bridge.Nevertheless, I saw a Pi-L Boat hit by the6-pounder and blow up, starting a petrol fireon the surface of the water.

In the light of H.M.M.T.B.638*5 starshellahead, I saw F-lighters being hit by my pom-pom and Oerlikon. I saw an E-boat in thelight of the petrol fire hit, set alight and blowup—a victory achieved by the bridge .303-inchVickers, and on the port quarter I witnessedan inspiring display of 6-pounder gunnery.An F-lighter, at about four hundred yards, wassteering away from us, unilluminated andalmost invisible, even through binoculars, yetthe 6-pounder fired nearly thirty rounds thatscored hits in about a minute. The 6-pounderalso hit and sank a Pi-L Boat with an inertcargo.

Meanwhile, H.M.M.G.B.662 had crossed thenorthern end of the convoys and was lyingstopped, waiting for the other boats to rejoin,and trying to* ensure that no enemy got away.

It had been intended to work round to thewest of the enemy immediately and engagethem against the fires of their burning vessels,but this was not possible until all the boatshad come round.

Everywhere on the port side there wereburning ships and explosions. There werevisible many more ships than the original fourF-lighters. The sight was fantastic.

H.M.M.T.B.634*8 Narrative.

21. H.M.M.T.B.634 says—" The SeniorOfficer signalled single line ahead speed 8 knotsand opened fire on the enemy, which nowappeared clearly as four F-lighters, three ofwhich were stopped or proceeding slowly north-wards in single port cruising line. One wasclosing. I prepared to attack the flak-lighterwith torpedoes, but the range had closed toone hundred yards by the time the sight wason and I decided that it was too close, so Ialtered back to starboard, and opened up withall guns on the flak-lighter who was firing atH.M.M.G.B.662. As I turned, less than fiftyyards from the flak-lighter, H.M.M.T.B.634was hit in the port pom-pom ready use lockerwhich exploded and went up in flames. Thefire was promptly extinguished. All our gunscontinued to pour an intense fire into the flak-lighter which burst into flames from stem tostern, by the light of which every detail of hercould be discerned. She appeared to have an88-m.m. amidships, a quadruple 20-m.m. aftand many 2O-m.m. in sponsons down the star-board side. Her bridge collapsed and sheappeared to be breaking in two. I steeredparallel to the enemy who was turning slowlyto port, at less than forty yards. Then anotherF-lighter, followed by two more, appeared veryclose to seaward of the burning flak-lighter.

Admiralty footnote:* Pi-L boats—Pioneer Landing Craft.


They were well lit up by the flames and steer-ing southwards in single line ahead. All myguns fired on the middle one and then the lastone, and fires were started on both. All threewere seen to be engaged by H.M.M.T.B.s 637and 638. Astern of the southgoing F-lighters,what looked like an E-boat, bows on to us,appeared. This was engaged by the port.5-inch turret and was seen by me to explodeand disappear.

Un rejoining, the flak-lighter of the north-bound group was seen to sink in a cloud ofsmoke and steam, half-a-mile to seaward of theengagement and all the remaining F-lightersappear to have been driven south byH.M.M.G.B.662."

HM.M.T.B.b3j's Narrative.22. H.M.M.T.B.637 says—" At 2306, the

enemy opened fire and H.M.M.T.B.634 alteredcourse to port to attack with torpedoes. TheSenior Officer and H.M.M.T.B.634 wer« en-gaging targets unseen by us, but fires.could beseen breaking out. My pom-pom gunner wasengaging a northbound F-lighter, but asH.M.M.T.B.638 was on the port beam, noother guns could fire. (This was due to thefact that I was manoeuvring to keep stationon H.M.M.T.B.634/3 gun flashes.) However,in a few seconds I opened fire with all gunson a target which was headed northwards. Itwas bows on to another burning F-lighter. Therange of the target was about seventy-five yardsand every detail of the vessel was discerned.At this range none of our guns could miss.She immediately caught fire. The after super-structure of this vessel resembled WembleyStadium on a dark night, except for the Naziflag. The gunners reduced it to a blazingwreck, and another large target seen abeam ofthis blaze was being engaged byH.M.M.T.B.638 with accurate fire.

At 2317 two large objects were observed onthe port beam and turned out to be upturnedvessels."

H.M.M.T.B.638's Narrative.

23. H.M.M.T.B.638 says—" At 2305 theSenior Officer signalled enemy ahead. Theywere invisible to us at this moment. The boatsahead opened fire. My pom-pom illuminatedwith starshell as previously arranged. AnF-lighter was set on fire, fine on my port bowand this illuminated two F-lighters, a Pi-L Boatand an E-boat on my port beam, steeringsouthwards. We sank the Pi-L Boat withOerlikon and concentrated on an F-lighter attwo hundred yards. Shells could be seen rip-ping open her side. This target was left burn-ing fiercely, and fire was directed on anotherF-lighter which was hit with all guns and seton fire. An E-boat appeared on the starboardquarter, and was bit with Oerlikon. We sus-tained one 20-m.m. hit in this engagement."

24. At 2314 the situation was resolving itselfand a sweep was carried out round to the westand south to discourage any of the enemy fromreturning to Zara. An active F-lighter couldbe seen to seaward of the scene of the action,steering south, but he turned inshore, and Iwas confident that we* would easily find himagain: I somehow felt that none of the enemywould try and push any further north, andwas mostly concerned with the southern flank.

25. At 2346, when about one mile from Virlight, an F-lighter was seen close inshore; itturned over and submerged, and was thoughtvto be the one that had been damaged byH.M.M.G.B.662's six-pounder. There wasanother possible small target here also, but Iwas looking for the other F-lighters and decidednot to investigate. It was probably a wreckanyhow.

26. At 2353, targets were sighted at Green20°,* and H.M.M.T.B.637 was ordered toilluminate with starshell. This was done well,and H.M.M.G.B.662 opened fire with all gunson an F-lighter and a Pi-L Boat or E-boat lyingclose inshore, near Vir Point. The F-lighter wasseen to sink; the smaller craft was also hit.The enemy now opened heavy fire from a posi-tion abaft the beam, almost certainly one ormore F-lighters lying very close to the beach,well north of Vir light and completely invisible.All boats returned fire at the flashes, and somedamage may have been inflicted, as the enemycraft ceased fire until we were going away tothe northward, when they fired vigorously atnothing to -the south-west.

27. It^ was thus decided to go away and lieoff until 'the moon got up, and the light im-proved, and then come back and torpedo theremaining enemy. This entailed some risk oflosing the enemy if he crept close to the coast,but I decided to place complete confidence andreliance in my radar set and its experiencedoperator, and to lie off, stopped at about fourthousand yards. I felt certain that we shouldbe able to pick up any F-lighters that tried tomove, but had to admit that if a Pi-L Boatwanted to get away—well then it could; but Idid not want to risk losing any boats by takingthem into a dark coast with a belligerent groupof well-armed vessels lying on the beach, whenthere was a big improvement of visibility duein two hours' time.

Various echoes were plotted during the nexttwo hours but they turned out to be ghost oraircraft echoes in the centre of the channel.

28. It was now planned to approach the coastjust north of Vir light in very broad single lineabreast to starboard, on a north-easterly coursewith torpedoes ready for immediate firing.H.M.M.G.B.662 was to illuminate the coastline with starshell, and the first M.T.B. to sightan F-lighter was to fire torpedoes and say soat once on 'the inter-communication; no otherM.T.B. was to fire torpedoes until the resultof the first attack was observed. By spreadingout the unit, danger from enemy fire was re-duced and perfect inter-communication ensuredthat good control could be maintained.

It is at this point worth noting that duringthe waiting period there were several little ex-plosions from two positions on the coast betweenVir Point and Vir light.

29. At 0151 the moon was giving moderatelight and it was decided to carry out the thirdattack of the night. All went according to planuntil 0221 when H.M.M.G.B.662 opened firewith starshell. Then the first hitch occurred,in that under the light of the shells that did

Admiralty footnote:* Green 20°—20 degrees from right ahead on the

starboard side.


60583


illuminate, nothing of any size could be seen.After twenty minutes searching with starshell byboth H.M.M.G.B.662 and H.M.M.T.B.634, andsome pom-pom fire from all boats, at the twosmall objects north of Vir libht that had beenseen, and nothing having happened from thebeach, it was decided to close very near thecoast and run down to -the southwards.

30. At 0251, when about fifty yards off thecoast line the unit was brought round to south-west and set off down the coast in single lineahead at eight knots.

At 0254, a very large F-lighter was sighteddead ahead, -at^about four hundred and fiftyyards, with bows 'into the beach, a perfecttorpedo target. H.M.M.G.B.662 at once alteredround to starboard, ordering H.M.M.T.B.634to sink the target with torpedoes, and lay offready to engage with covering gunfire.H.M.M.T.B.634 fired at 0256, scoring hits withboth torpedoes, and the unit, in loose forma-tion, was stopped to the eastwards of the smok-ing wreckage.

31. At 0310, H.M.M.G.B.662 decided to closethe small piece of F-lighter still visible to tryand identify it. Smoke was being carried awayfrom the shore by a light breeze andH.M.M.G.B.662 went through this " screen "to the southwards at 0314. At that moment Ifound myself only 50 yards from a beachedconvoy of two F-Hghters and some small craft.Fire was at once opened with all guns and theunit called up to close me with despatch. Thesebeached craft were heavily damaged by gunfirefrom all boats, and the one F-lighter that wasnot burning was sunk by a torpedo fromH.M.M.T.B.637 at 0337.

During the whole of this third attack theenemy could not have fired more than twentyrounds in all.

. 32. It was now decided to withdraw. Twoof. these last F-lighters had been torpedoed, 'hit,and the third was well ablaze. Any smallcraft that were alongside the lighters had beensunk. There seemed no object in staying and itwas desired to get out of the channel beforethe Royal Air Force came over: accordingly at0355 the unit proceeded to 1st. All the wayacross the burning F-lighter was seen to beblowing up continuously.

33. We informed the L.R.D.G. and Partisanauthorities of what had occurred and then pro-ceeded to Komiza in two units, H.M.M.G.B.662and H.M.M.T.B.637 at twenty-two knots, andH.M.M.T.B.s 634 (who had a defective engine)and 638 at fourteen knots.

34. As regards assessing the actual damagesuffered by the enemy, great difficulty has beenexperienced. The natural desire to claim whatone believes to have been sunk has been curbedby the almost too satisfactory nature of the bestpossible results. Conservative and consideredestimates are: —

First attack:

i F-lighter heavily hit by M.T.B.634 an<*seen to sink by all boats.

i F-lighter heavily damaged byH.M.M.G.B.662 and seen to sink later byall boats.

1 F-lighter heavily damaged byH.M.M.T.B.637, probably sunk.

2 F-lighters set on fire by H.M.M.T.B.s637 and 638.

(i F-lighter seen to be undamaged andgoing to the beach).

2 Pi-L Boats fired and sunk byH.M.M.G.B.662 and H.M.M.T.B.638.

i Pi-L Boat sunk by H.M.M.G.B.662.i E-boat sunk by H.M.M.G.B.662.i E-boat damaged by H.M.M.T.B.638.i E-boat damaged by H.M.M.T.B.634.

Second attack:- i F-lighter sunk by H.M.M.G.B.662 andH.M.M.T.B.634.

I F-lighter damaged by all boats.1 Pi-L Boat damaged by H.M.M.T.B.637.

Third attack:2 F-lighters sunk by torpedoes.i F-lighter beached and completely on fire.i Pi-L Boat- sunk by gunfire from

H.M.M.G.B.662.i possible E-boat sunk by gunfire from

H.M.M.T.B.637. 'or in brief,

6 F-lighters sunk.i F-lighter probably .sunk.4 Pi-L Boats sunk.i E-boat sunk.1 E-boat possibly sfimk.2 E-boats damaged by gunfire.

It- is felt certain by all our boats that noF-lighters got away, although it is possible thatone or more may have beached in a more orless invisible manner.

The Pi-L Boats were the larger type of smallGerman lighter, with a silhouette like anR.C.L.*, but the high bow and stern made itimpossible to distinguish them from anF-lighter, except in fairly full side view.

Casualties and Damage to Own Force.35. On the other hand our force suffered

only superficial damage and the followingcasualties:—

One A.B. killed, and two seriously and oneslightly wounded.

Items of interest.36. The enemy used no light signals, but one

ship fired a three white star cartridge duringthe latter part of the first attack. Except forthe flak-lighter the enemy displayed a lack ofvigilance, courage, initiative, and resource. Itis possible that the unit was fortunate enoughto contact the enemy at the crossing place oftwo convoys, the one coming up from Sibenikand Zara and the other coming down from thenorth. This would account for the fact thatsome of the enemy vessels never at any timeopened fire, due to their not knowing whichship was which, the northbound convoy beingsighted first.

37. The enemy vessels' armament was thenormal one for F-lighters and other craft, exceptthat more than one F-lighter had the 88-m.m.,quadruple 2o-m.m., twin 20-m.m. and single

Admiralty footnote:* R.C.L.—Ramped Cargo Lighter.


2o-m.m. that is normally associated with flak-lighters. The flak-lighter had more armamentthan this and may have been the onebombarding Mulat the previous night.

38. Partisans on 1st reported four beachedvessels the following morning. L.R.D.G. onRivanj reported three. Royal Air Force recon-naissance on the morning of the I3th, reportedthree aground, two still burning. Also,Partisans reported a northbound convoy goingthrough the Pasman Channel earlier on theevening of the nth.

Most of the enemy vessels were laden, at leastone with petrol, and one F-lighter withammunition.

A report just received indicates that therewas a southbound convoy that night going fromTrieste to Split and it was probable that this wasone of the convoys attacked.

Strategic or Tactical Conclusions.39. This was the first really decisive victory

of D-boats* over the old enemy, F-lighters, andwas made possible due to low visibility, landbackground, uncertainty of identification,absurdly close ranges, excellent gunnery andadmirable coolness on the part of the threefollowing Commanding Officers. In factD-boats are not suited to a " snap " torpedoattack and the fact that H.M.M.T.B.634 washaving to manoeuvre on inner engines made herslower on the turn than usual. This kept the

Admiralty footnote:* D-boat—a " Fainnile

M.G.B.type of M.T.B. and

three M.T.B.s well behind the Senior Officer.As it turned out, no tactic could have been moresuccessful. H.M.M.G.B.662 drew all theenemy's fire and attention away from the bodyof the unit, and the smoke from the guns driftedacross the line of sight of the enemy so thatthey were able to get into within one hundredyards without ever being fired on. The firstthat the enemy knew of there being any shipsthere other than H.M.M.G.B.662 was the fullbroadsides of three " Ds " from under onthundred yards away. This contributedmaterially to the success of an action which inits results surpasses anything this flotilla has yetdone, for the cost of very few casualties andvery slight damage.

There is little to say about the second andthird attacks, as intuition is incapable ofanalysis.

40. I would not, on the strength of thisaction, recommend that units of D-boats cantake on units of F-lighters, unless the actioncan, as it were, be fought on a site of theD-boats' choosing. On this particular occasionthe enemy was firing at us with very muchheavier armament than we possess, and if thevisibility had been a hundred yards or so betterI cannot but feel that we would have lost atleast one boat. What is certain, though, is thatonce the action is joined, and both sides arefiring, the enemy will be the first to becomeerratic.

(Signed) T. J. BLIGH,Lieutenant-Commander, R.N.V.R.

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