survey of routing attack

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    Seminar On

    A Survey of Routing Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

    By

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    Introduction

    Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) are group of

    mobile devices which have no predefined

    infrastructure and the packets are transferred from

    one node to another node through different routes.

    Mobile ad-hoc networks have unique characteristics,

    such as dynamic network topology, limited

    bandwidth, and limited battery Power.

    So routing in a MANET is a particularly challenging

    task compared to a Conventional network.

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    MANET routing protocols can be classified into two categories:

    1. reactive routing protocols

    2. proactive routing protocols.

    In reactive routing protocols, such as the Ad hoc On Demand Distance

    Vector (AODV) protocol, nodes find routes only when required.

    In proactive routing protocols, such as the Optimized Link State Routing(OLSR) protocol nodes obtain routes by periodic exchange of topologyinformation.

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    Routing Methodologies

    Reactive Routing Protocol

    Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector AODV

    S wants to send a packet to D

    S does not have a route to D

    S sends a routing request RREQ to all its neighbors

    They either return a fresh path to D or forward the RREQ to their

    neighbors.

    Once the RREQ reaches D it returns a route reply RREP

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    Routing Methodologies

    Proactive Routing Protocols Optimized Link State Routing OLSR

    Two types of messages:

    Hello message to all neighbors, contains the nodes address and a listof all its one hop neighbors

    The hello message gives each node a complete two-hop topology Second type of message Topology Control TC messages

    Only sent out by MPR nodes and contains the list of the senders MPRselector

    Allows each node to learn the partial network topology and they canbuild a route to any node

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    History

    Mobile Ad Hoc networks are improved

    version of conventional networks which

    overcome the backlogs of conventionalnetworks like lack of mobility,high cost.

    And they implement dynamic network

    toplogy and can have the routes

    dyanamically which is not seen in the caseof conventional networks

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    Advantages:Mobility

    Lowcast

    No need for existing infrastructure

    No centralized administration

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    Disadvantages: limited bandwidth

    limited battery Power

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    APPLICATIONS:

    Disaster relief

    Emergency operations

    Military service

    Maritime communications

    Vehicle networks

    Campus networks

    Robot networks

    Etc

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Flooding Attack

    Objective: exhaust network resources, overall bandwidth, and

    individual nodes resources of computational and battery power.

    In AODV attacking node A sends out a large number of RREQs

    for a route to a non-existent node.

    Countermeasures

    Calculate rate of neighbors RREQs, block if they exceed threshold

    Can not stop flooding below threshold and could block valid node if

    A is spoofing real nodes.

    Use statistical analysis to detect varying rates of flooding

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    Example of a Blackhole attack on AODV

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Link Withholding Attack

    Obj: Attacker does not advertise a link to a specific

    node or group of nodes.

    Countermeasures: Nodes listen for the TC message from the MPR

    node they selected, if they do not hear one then

    that MPR node is rated suspicious and additional

    MPR nodes are selected.

    Again the countermeasure can be defeated by

    collusion if A2 drops the TC message created by

    A1

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Link Spoofing Attack

    Obj: A attacking link advertises links to non-

    neighbors, by faking links to the two-hop neighbors of

    S, A can become one of its MPR nodes, and thenmanipulate traffic.

    Countermeasures:

    Equip nodes with GPS and calculate whether two

    nodes could really have a link.

    Another solution is to include the 2-hop neighbors

    in the Hello message, this gives every node a 3-

    hop topology of the network, less expensive than

    special hardware, but is defeated by spoofing

    outside of 3-hops

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Replay Attack

    Obj: Attacker records another nodes control

    messages and resends them later. Can be used to

    spoof another node or just disrupt routing. Countermeasures:

    Add time stamp and asymmetric key to messages

    Reject old messages as suspicious

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Wormhole Attack

    Obj: Two colluding attackers have a high speed link

    between them. Any RREQs that pass through the

    colluding nodes A1 and A2 will appear to cross the

    shortest path because of the high-speed link. Thiswill cause S to send all messages to D through the

    compromised links A1 and A2.

    Countermeasures:

    Packet leashes, temporal and geographical. These prevent a packet from moving too far too

    fast.

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    Example of a Wormhole attack on reactive routing

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    Attacks and Countermeasures

    Colluding Misrelay Attacks

    Obj: Two colluding attackers modify or drop packets

    Countermeasures:

    An acknowledgment system could detect this butwill increase overhead.

    Another solution is to increase transmission power

    twice to detect the colluding attackers. However

    even if we increase the transmission power Ktimes, K+1 attackers can drop packets.

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    Example of a colluding misrelay attack

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    Future scope

    Construct a network which can offer more

    security and overcome the problems faced

    by present (MANET) like the constrained

    bandwidth, processing power and battery

    power.

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    conclusion

    The advantages of the MANET are allowing

    them to be deployed much rapidly at low cost in

    a variety of applications.

    Security is often necessary, and the weaknessesof a MANET need to be considered. The major

    weaknesses are the constrained bandwidth,

    processing power and battery power.

    The article presented a survey of the various

    attacks currently considered against MANETs

    and summarized defenses that have been

    developed.

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