survival, coexistence, and autonomy: yezidi political identity after … and identity... · 2020....
TRANSCRIPT
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Survival,Coexistence,andAutonomy:
YezidiPoliticalIdentityafterGenocideGüneşMuratTezcür,ZeynepKaya,BayarMustafaSevdeen
Introduction
IncontemporaryYezididiscourse,violencehasacyclicalcharacter,incontrastto
interpretationsofhistorythatposittheprogressivelydecliningroleofviolenceinhuman
affairs.1AsenseofhistoricalvictimhoodiscentraltotheformationofYezidiscommunal
identitywhoseverysurvivalwasatstakeindifferenttimeperiods.Accordingly,theIS
attacksin2014wereperceivedasthelatestinaseriesofatrocitiesYezidisexperienced
sincethemedievaltimes.Theattacksarecalled“the74rdfirman”implyingcontinuitywith
previousepisodesofmassscaleviolencetargetingthecommunity.WhiletheISattacks
involvingmassexecutionsandenslavementshockedtheconscienceoftheinternational
community,forYezidis,thetragedyofAugust2014wasnotunprecedentedintermsofits
harm.InthewordsofaYezidileader,“[In1832],[t]heytookawayathousandofourgirls.A
thousandwasplenty.Ourpopulationwasmuchsmallerbythat…Younowseelotsof
[Sunni]Kurdsaround.TheirfourthorfifthgenerationancestorswereYezidis.”2Inhiseyes,
Yezidishavehistoricallybeentargetedbecauseoftheirreligiousbeliefsandsubjectto
sexualviolenceandforcedconversions.Themaindifferencebetweenthepastmassacres
andthecurrentonewasthewidespreadpublicitycharacterizingtheISviolencethat
triggeredaninternationalhumanitarianintervention,whichwasinfactunprecedented.
ThisprevailingdiscourseofvictimhoodimpliesthatYezidisweresubjecttoviolent
campaignsprimarilyduetotheirreligiousidentity.Infact,OrthodoxIslamicperspectives
defineYazidisaspolytheistsorunbelieversanddonottreatthemas“PeopleoftheBook,”
unlikeChristiansandJewswhoareentitledtocertainrightsandalimiteddegreeof
autonomyintheirinternalaffairs.Thisliminalstatus,similartotheexperienceofother
religiousgroupsthatemergedaftertheriseofIslamsuchasAlevis,Kakais,andBahais,put
Yezidisinaprecariouspositionandmorevulnerabletoviolencejustifiedonreligious
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groundsovercenturiesfromthefatwasoftheleadingOttomanjuristEbu's-suudinthe
16thcenturytotheISinthe21stcentury.Fromthisperspective,theveryexistenceof
Yezidisasanon-Islamicgrouphasbeenasourceofmajorsecurityconcernandreligious
challengetothepoliticalorderinMuslimsocieties.Whiletheriseofpoliticalsecularism
withtheformationoftheIraqinationalstateprovidedasemblanceofstabilityforYezidis,
thepost-2003periodwascharacterizedbythecollapseofthestateauthorityandviolent
sectarianismsignifiedthereturnofreligiousviolencetargetingYezidisquaYezidis.
ThischaptersuggeststhattheISattacksof2014,whichexhibitscertainsimilarities
withthepastviolence,hashaduniqueimplicationsforYezidis.Thecontemporaryformsof
Yezidiidentityexhibittwodistinctivecharacteristicsinthepost-genocidalera.First,
Yezidishavegainedunprecedentedrecognitionandinterestintheinternationalarena.
WhileYezidishadalonghistoryofcontactswithWesterndiplomats,scholars,and
travelersgoingbacktothefirsthalfofthe19thcentury,thecommunityasthevictimsof
religiousintoleranceandpersecutionbroughtthecommunityundergloballimelightinthe
post-2014period.Inparticular,captiveYezidiwomensubjecttoextremeformsofsexual
violencehavecometoembodytheexperienceofthecommunity.Thisgenderedexperience
facilitatedacontextforYezidiwomentoexpresstheirperspectivesandbecomevocal
voices,suchasNadiaMurad,tocommunicatetheexperiencesoftheYazidistothe
internationalcommunityandmakepoliticaldemands.Giventhelonghistoryofentrenched
patriarchalpracticesinthecommunity,theincreasedvisibilityofYazidiwomenandtheir
increasedengagementwithissuesthataffecttheircommunityrepresentsaparadoxical
outcomeoftheISviolence.
Next,themassivedisplacementsufferedbythecommunitycontributedtothe
fragmentednatureofYezidipolitics.Thisprocessoffragmentationhastakenplaceattwo
parallellevels.Ontheonehand,Yezidisaresubjecttotheauthorityofanincreasing
numberofpoliticalactorswithopposingagendas.ThefailureandinabilityoftheKurdish
militaryforcestoprotecttheSinjarareaagainsttheISonslaughtinearlyAugust2014
generatedsentimentsofdisillusionmentandresentmentamonglargesectionsoftheYezidi
community.ThisdevelopmentdrewawedgebetweentheYezidisandSunniKurdsdespite
theircommonlinguisticcharacteristics.EveniftheKurdistanRegionalGovernment(KRG)
pursuesapolicyofco-optationandsymbolicempowermenttowardstheYezidis,the
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debacleofAugust2014hashadastrongnegativeimpactoverthepopularappealofa
hyphenatedidentityof“Yezidi-Kurds.”Meanwhile,theriseofthePKKasasignificant
militaryforceintheSinjarareaandthecaptureofmostpartsoftheSinjarbytheIraqi
governmentandShiitemilitiasledtotheproliferationofpoliticalforces.Ontheotherhand,
therehasbeenanotableincreaseinthenumberofYezidiswhoclaimtospeakonbehalfof
thecommunityandpursuedifferentgoalsbothinIraqandWesterncountries.Ironically,
therelativedemographicandpoliticalweaknessoftheYezidicommunityhascontributed
toitspoliticalfragmentation,asdifferentYezidisseekthesupportofavarietyoflocaland
internationalentities.
ThechapterfirstoffersahistoricaloverviewoftheYezidis’interactionswithlocal
andimperialrulerssincetheriseofthecommunitywithitsdistinctivereligiousbelief
systembythe13thcentury.YezidisalwaysremainedoutsiderstotheOttomanmillet
systemofferinglimitedtoleranceandautonomytonon-IslamicgroupssuchasChristians
andJews.Atthesametime,large-scalemilitarycampaignstargetingYezidiswerenot
exclusivelyorprimarilyreligiouslymotivated.TheOttomanpashasledmanyexpeditions
againstMt.SinjarinhabitedbyseveralYeziditribesprimarilyinordertoprotectthe
caravanrouteslinkingnorthernSyriaandsoutheasternAnatoliawithMesopotamia.With
theadventofthe19thcentury,YezidisbecametargetsofOttomancentralizationefforts
aimingattaxcollectionandconscriptionthatcontinuedaftertheestablishmentoftheIraqi
stateinthe1920s.NextisanarrativeoftheviolenceexperiencedbytheYezidisinthepost-
2003era.ThegeneralatmosphereofsectarianinsecurityandriseofradicalIslamist
groupshavemadeYezidismoredependentontheKRGthatperceivedtheYezidi
communityasanimportantleverageinitsclaimsoverdisputedterritoriesintheprovince
ofNineveh.However,theISblitzkriegin2014underminedthisdependencyandexposed
thevulnerabilityofYezidislackingadefenseforceoftheirown.Theremainingsectionsof
thechapterfocusesontheriseofanethnoreligiousnationalidentityinintersectionwith
genderidentityamongYezidisamidpoliticalfragmentationinthepost-genocidalperiod.
ThechapterconcludeswithabriefreflectiononthefutureevolutionofYezidipolitics.
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ALiminalExistence:YezidisundertheOttomans
Yezidism,primarilyasetofbeliefsandpracticestransmittedorallyacrossgenerations,has
aninherenttendencytodefyorthodoxyassociatedwithreligionswithahistoryof
extensiverecords.AseloquentlyarticulatedbyPhilipKreyenbroek,nodogmaticand
officialformofthefaithexists.ThepursuitofdefiningYezidismaccordinganauthoritative
andcanonicaltextualsourceoverlooksoraltraditionscentraltoitslivedexperience.3
UnlikeMandeanswhoclaimedtohavesacredbooksoftheirown,probablytoescape
persecutioninthehandsofpowerfulMuslimrulers,Yezidiwenttolenghtstohidetheir
purportedbooksfromoutsiders.4Nonetheless,theattempttoidentifythetextualoriginsof
YezidismhasbeenamajoroccupationofbothWesternandMuslimtravelers,scholars,and
intellectualswhooftenperceivedthecommunityasanexoticgroupwithstrangeand
arcanecustomsforanextendedperiodtime.5Inparticular,thewidespreadusageofthe
epithetof“devil-worshippers,”whichconflatesthesacredstatusofPeacockAngelfor
YezidisasanaffronttotheMuslimGod,suggeststhatthecommunityremainedillegiblefor
outsideobserversforcenturies.6
TheYezidisremainedanillegiblecommunityintheeyesofOttomanrulerswho
establishedtheirdominanceoverterritoriesinhabitedbyYazidisintheearly16thcentury.
Atthesametimefarfrombeingdefenselessandhelplesssubjects,Yezidiswere
autonomouspoliticalactorswithsignificantcapacityforcoalition-building,negotiation,
andresistance.TherearenumerousrecordsofYeziditribalchiefsbeingappointedaslocal
OttomanrulersandengaginginallianceswithoragainstSunnitribalchiefs.7The
communitypresentedtwooverlappingbutdistinctchallengestotheOttomanorder.First,
OttomanrulersperceivedMt.Sinjar,anaridandnarrowmountainrangewithcommanding
viewsofthetraderoutesbetweenBaghdadandMosul,inthesoutheast,andAleppo,
Diyarbakir,Mardininthenorthwest,asabastionofinsecurityandbanditry.8They
organizedaseriesofpunitiveexpeditionsagainstYeziditribeswhoengagedinraids
targetingcaravans.Forinstance,EvliyaÇelebi,therenownedOttomantraveler,wasan
observerinsuchanexpeditionin1655.HedescribedYezidisofSinjaras“wildsavages,
rebellious,ghoulfaced,hairyinfidels”whoworshipedablackdog.9Healsonarratesa
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previousexpeditionbytherulerofDiyarbakirin1640resultedinmassacresand
enslavementofthousandsofYezidis.10
EvliyaÇelebi’sdehumanizationofYezidiswasnotuntypicalandpointedouttoa
seconddynamiccharacterizingtheOttoman-Yezidirelations.Yezidiswiththeir
“illegitimate”beliefsystemremainedoutsideoftheOttomanmoralorder.Evenifthe
campaignsagainstMt.Sinjarwereoftenmotivatedbysecurityconcerns(i.e.,securingthe
caravanroutesandrecoveringstolengoods),largescaleandindiscriminateviolence
againstYezidiswerejustifiedonreligiousgrounds.11Inthisregard,itispossibletodraw
parallelsbetweentheOttomanstate’perceptionofSinjarandtheOttomanandlater
Turkishstate’sperceptionsofDersimineasternAnatolia.12Usingtheconceptdeveloped
byJamesScott,thesetwomountainrangeswiththeirnaturaldefensesagainstinvading
forcescanbedescribedasstatelesszoneswithalonghistoryofindigenouspeopleresisting
orfleeingstateauthorities,YezidisinSinjarandZazakispeakingAlevisinDersim.13Inboth
cases,thestateauthoritiesperceivedastheseregionsasastatelesszoneinhabitedbya
groupwhose“deviant”religiousbeliefsfosterdisloyaltyandmakethempotentially
rebellious.14
ThehistoryofOttoman-YezidiinteractionsduringthelastcenturyoftheEmpire
demonstratesseveraltendenciesshapingtheimperialpoliciesandpriorities.Theadvent
Ottomanmodernizationofthe19thcenturyinvolvedtheimpositionofconscription,
improvementsintaxcollection,andprojectionofcentralstateauthorityintoremote
cornersoftheempire.Meanwhile,theRusso-Turkishwars,especiallytheconflictin1877,
resultedinthousandsofYezidibeingsubjectsoftheRussianEmpire.15The1830sand
1840ssawaseriesofcampaignsagainstSinjarthatremainedageopoliticallyimportant
areacontrollingthelineofcommunicationbetweenDiyarbakirandMosul.16Apermanent
TurkishgarrisoninthemoreaccessiblesouthernSinjarwasestablishedonlyafter1849.17
Atthesametime,theOttomanswerelesssuccessfulinconscriptingYezidis.18Afterthe
powerfulBritishAmbassadorintheOttomancapitalintervenedontheirbehalf,Yezidisof
SheikhanandSinjarwereabletoobtainanexemptionin1850.19Inapetitionsubmittedto
theOttomanauthoritiesandrepresentativesofEuropeanpowers,Yezidileadersdemanded
exemptionfromobligatorymilitaryserviceonreligiousgrounds.Thiswasthefirsttime
Yezidispresentedastylizedversionoftheirbeliefsystemstotheoutsideworldinawritten
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document.EveniftheOttomanstatecontinuedtotreatYezidisasaliminalminoritynot
qualifiedtobeincludedinthemilletsystem,italsoshowedflexibilityandacceptedthat
YezidismadeapaymentinlieuofservingintheOttomanarmy.
ReligiousconsiderationsbecamemorecentraltohowtheOttomanstatedealtwith
theYezidisduringthereignofAbdülhamidII.Theprojectofmakingloyalsubjectsoutof
Yezidisinvolvedsystematicattemptsattheirconversionatatimewhenincreasing
presenceofforeignrepresentationsandmissionariesintheeasternprovincesaggravated
thethreatperceptionoftheOttomanstate.TheconscriptionofYezidiswouldfacilitate
theirIslamization,andmakethemimmunetotheappealofforeigninfluences,andensure
theirloyaltytotheOttomanorder.AnOttomanPashaentrustedwiththetaskofdealing
withthe“Yezidiquestion”whoarrivedinMosulin1892engagedinacampaignofterror
anddestructionthatultimatelybackfired.HundredsofYezidiswerekilled,theLalish,the
spiritualcenterofYezidis,wasconvertedtoamadrasa,sacredreligiousobjectswere
confiscated,mosqueswerebuiltinYezidivillages,leadingfiguresofthecommunitywere
forcedtoconvert.20WhenthewordofthesecoercivepracticesreachedtheOttoman
capital,thepashawasdismissed.Apparently,theOttomanstatedidnotapprovepasha’s
brutalmethodsthatsowdisorderandinsecurityintheregionandrecognizedthelimitsof
violenceinachievingmassconversion.21TheremainingdecadesoftheOttomaneradidnot
seeanylargeanti-YezidiviolenceexceptforbriefexpeditionsagainstSinjarduringWorld
WarI.Overall,thishistoricaloverviewoffersanuancedpictureofYezidivictimhoodunder
theOttomans.WhilereligiousviolenceagainstYezidis,aheterodoxgroupexcludedfrom
thelegitimateOttomanintercommunalsystem,becamesalientincertaintimeperiods,the
communitydevelopedastrongsenseofpoliticalautonomyandoftenachievedsignificant
concessionsviaresistanceornegotiations.
IntheCrossfire:TheFormationofYezidiPoliticalIdentityinPost-2003Iraq
DuringtheMosuldisputebetweenthenascentTurkishRepublicandtheBritishcontrolled
Iraq,mostYezidileaderspreferredIraqunderaEuropeanmandateoveraTurkishorArab
government.22Nonetheless,YezidisremainedonthemarginsofthenewlyestablishedIraqi
state.Conscriptioncontinuedtobeamajorconcernforthecommunityandtriggeredsmall
scaleactsofrebellioninSinjar,whichgainedanewgeopoliticalimportanceasaborder
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zonebetweenSyriaandIraq.23Ironically,themarginalpoliticalinfluenceofYezidiscould
beamajorreasonfortheabsenceoflarge-scaleviolencetargetingthecommunityinIraq
duringthe20thcentury.24Nonetheless,therisingappealofKurdishnationalismamong
Yezidisstartingwiththeearly1960sledtorepressivepoliciesbytheBaghdad
governments.25TherulingBa’thregimeinitiatedasystematiccampaignofresettlement
andArabizationtargetingtheSinjarregion.26Yezidisofthemountainvillageswereforced
torelocateto11collectivesettlementssurroundedbyArabvillagesreceivingpreferential
treatment.27Inthe1980s,asignificantnumberofYezidisservedintheIraqiarmyandlost
theirlivesinthewarwithIran.Intheearly1990s,theestablishmentofaninternationally
enforcedno-flyzoneandtheformationofdefactoKurdishautonomysawthepartitionof
YezidilandsbetweenBaghdadandErbil.WhiletheSinjarareaandsouthernSheikhan
remainedundertheIraqirule,YezidicommunitiesinDohuk,otherpartsofSheikhan
district,andtheLalishtemplefallundertheKurdishcontrol.
Inthepost-2003order,YezidisbecameacrucialdemographicbloctoKRG’sclaims
overdisputedterritoriesanditspowerpoliticsintheNinevehprovince,oneofthemost
contestedareasintheentirecountry.Inthe2005referendumonthenewIraqi
constitution,around55percentofthevoterssaidnointheNinevehprovincethatalso
includesSinjar.Thiswasstillshortofthetwo-thirdsofthevotethatwouldresultinthe
defeatofthenewconstitution.28SincetheKurdswerethemainbeneficiariesofthenew
constitutionalorder,obtainingtheYezidisupportinNinevehwasessentialtotheirpolitical
goals.Article2oftheconstitutiondraftedin2006andpassedintheKRGparliamentin
2009includedSinjaraspartofIraqiKurdistan.Yezidis,whoweresubjecttoArabization
policiesduringtheSaddamera,alsobenefitedfromtheKurdishpatronage.Forthefirst
time,SinjardistricthadaYezidigovernor.SomeYezidisjoinedtheIraqiarmyor
PeshmergaandworkedastranslatorsfortheUSarmy.OtherYezidisfoundemployment
opportunitiesinDohukandErbilandbenefitedfromtheKurdisheconomicboomthat
lasteduntil2014.29ThesedevelopmentsgeneratedsomeresentmentamongtheSunni
ArabsandTurkomansintheareawholosttheirprivilegedpositionsandincreasingly
perceivedtheYezidisasbeingpartoftheKurdishpowerstructure.30Atthesametime,a
significantnumberofYezidiswereuncomfortablewiththerisingethnictensionsand
KurdishexclusionandrepressionofYezidispoliticalactivismespousinganindependent
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communalidentity.Theywerefearfulthattheircommunitywasbecomingpawnsinthe
Kurdish-ArabterritorialstruggleandcharacterizedtheKRGpoliciesas“Kurdification”of
Sinjar.31
LikeotherreligiousminoritiesinIraq,thefalloftheSaddamregimein2003
generatedanatmospherethatwashighlydangerousforYezidis.Asearlyas2004,targeted
killingsofYezidisbecauseoftheirreligiousidentitystartedtoproliferate.32Itbecame
increasinglydangerousforYezidistogetservices,workorstudyatMosul,whichemerged
asahotbedofSunnimilitantgroups.33Theself-proclaimedIslamicStateofIraq(ISI)
imposedasiegeonthedeliveryoffood,fuel,andconstructionmaterialstoSinjarasit
consideredYezidisunbelievers.34AfteraYezidigirlwasstonedtodeathherrelativesand
communityforallegedlyhavinganaffairwithaSunnimaninApril2007,theISIurgedits
followerstokillYezidiswherevertheyfindthem.Twoweekslater,armedmenstoppeda
bus,checkedpassengers’identificationdocuments,andorderednon-Yezidisoffthebus.
ThentheydrovethehijackedbustoMosulandexecuted23Yezidisthere.35Themostlethal
terroristattackinpost-2003Iraq,suicidebombingsinAl-Qahtaniya(Girzerik)andAl-
Jazeera(SibaSheikhXidir)collectivetownsinhabitedbyYezidis,killedseveralhundredsof
peopleonAugust14,2007.36
ThesedevelopmentsmadeYezidisofSinjarmoredependentontheKurdish
authoritiesfortheirsecuritywhoincreasedtheircontroloftheareaespeciallyafterthe
2007bombings.Between2005and2009,Kurdishpartiesincreasedtheirvoteshareatthe
expenseofautonomousYezidipartiesinSinjar.WhiletheKurdishAlliancereceived44,224
votes(approximately60percentofthevalidvotes),theYezidiMovementforReformand
Progressreceived17,055votes(app.22percent)intheSinjardistrictandQahtaniya
subdistrictintheDecember2005parliamentaryelections.37Incomparison,theKurdish
alliancereceived101,606votes(app.78percent)whiletwoautonomousYezidiparties
receivedonly7,787votes(app.6percent)intheJanuary2009provincialelections.38By
thattime,theYezidisupportfortheKurdishpoliticalgoalsinNinevehbecameevenmore
importantastheSunniArabsnowstartedtoactivelyparticipateintheelectoralpolitics.
Atthesametime,theKRGauthoritiesdonotrecognizeYezidisasadistinct
ethnoreligiousgroupbutasethnicKurdswithdistinctreligiousbeliefs.IntheeyesofKRG
leaders,Yezidismisthe“originalKurdishreligion”thatsetKurdshistoricallyapartfrom
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Arabs,Persians,andTurks,theirMuslimneighborsMuslimpopulations.Inthisregard,
YezidismwasincorporatedintotheKurdishnationalistdiscourse.39Article6ofthedraft
KRGconstitutionexplicitlymentionsonlyTurkomans,Chaldeans,Assyrians,Armenians,
andArabsasdistinctnationalgroups.Article7statesthattheIslamiclawisoneofthe
sourcesoflegislationwhileindicatingtherightsandfreedomsofChristiansandYezidisand
otherreligionsaretobeprotected.40TheKRGparliamenthas111seatswith11ofthese
seatsreservedforChaldeans,Assyrians,Armenians,andTurkomansandnoneforYezidis.41
Insummary,thefalloftheSaddamregimehadamixedblessingfortheYezidis.On
theonehand,therewasanimprovementinthematerialwell-beingoftheYezidisinthe
post-2003era.SomeYezidis,especiallytheonesservingintheIraqiarmyorworkingfor
theU.S.army,improvedtheireconomicsituation,builtthemselveshousesandpurchased
cars.42Moreover,YezidisaffiliatedwiththeKDP,thedominantpartyintheKRG,gained
accesstogreaterpoliticalpatronageandresources.Ontheotherhand,theriseofsectarian
extremismmadethesituationofYezidis,ahistoricallymarginalizedcommunity,evenmore
precarious.Theyweredisproportionatelytargetedbyextremistgroupsandbecame
increasinglydependentontheKurdishPeshmergafortheirverysurvival.Besides,the
KRG’sattemptstoreconstructYezidiidentitybyemphasizingitscommonlinkageswith
KurdishnessgeneratedsomebacklashamongYezidisofSinjarwhowerefearfulthat
increasingethnicconflictoverdisputedterritoriesinNinevehwouldresultintheir
scapegoating.
AnEthnoreligiousNationalIdentity?
IntheearlyhoursofAugust3,2014,theso-calledIslamicState(IS),whichalready
capturedMosulandthesurroundingareasinlessthantwomonthsago,stageda
coordinatedattackagainsttheSinjarregion.AstheKurdishforceswithdrewinpanic,theIS
quicklyoverrunanyfeebledefenseshowninYezidicollectivetowns.Duringthiscampaign,
atleast1,500Yazidiswereexecutedwhilealmost1,500diedonMt.Sinjarfrom
dehydrationorstarvation.43Around6,400Yazidis,mostlywomenandchildren,were
kidnapped.Manyofthemweresubsequentlysoldas“slaves”byIS.44Womenwereraped
repeatedly;childrenwereforcedtoconvertandbrainwashedtoserveassoldiersfortheIS.
AlthoughotherreligiousminoritygroupsinnorthernIraqwerealsotargetedbyIS,the
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scaleofanti-Yazidiviolencewasunparalleled.Testimoniesbysurvivorssuggestthatmany
localMuslims,includingformerfriends,“bloodbrothers,”andgodfathersofYezidichildren,
tookanactivepartinthekillingsandkidnappings.Accordingly,mostkillingsand
kidnappingstookplaceintownssuchasSibaSheikXidir,Girzerik,andKochothatwere
closetoArabsettlements.45Yezidisinthenorthernpartofthemountainhadmoretimeto
takerefugeinMt.Sinjar.46TheIScontroloftheSinjarcitycenterendedinNovember2015;
theentireSinjardistrictwasliberatedbyspring2017.Yetthescopeofdestruction,
poisonedintercommunalrelations,andprevailingpoliticalinstabilityhaveprevented
reconstructionefforts.Fiveyearsaftertheattacks,mostYezidisofSinjareitherstayedin
IDPcampsinIraqiKurdistanorsoughtrefugeinWesterncountries.47
ThiscatastrophicdevelopmenthadamonumentalimpactonYezidipoliticalidentity
andhadthreespecificconsequences.First,forthefirsttimeintheirhistory,Yezidis
emergedasapoliticalcommunityattractingsignificantinternationalinterestandconcern.
TheObamaAdministration’sdecisiontoauthorizeairstrikesagainsttheISwastriggered
bythehumantragedyexperiencedbytheYezidisstrandedonMt.Sinjar.48International
organizationsincludingtheUnitedNationsdescribedtheanti-Yezidiattacksasgenocide.49
AYezidisurvivorwoman,NadiaMurad,becametheco-recipientoftheNobelPeacePrizein
2018forherglobalactivismagainstsexualviolenceinwar.TheGermanfederalstateof
BadenWürttemberginitiatedahumanitarianadmissionprogramspecificallyforYezidi
womensurvivorsandtheirchildren(butnotnecessarilyadultmalemembersoftheir
family).50Whileitwouldtakesomeyearstofullyassessitseffects,thisglobalspreadofthe
communityledtothediversificationandinternationalizationofYezidiactivismwiththe
formationofvariousassociationsbyYezidisbasedinWesterncountries.51Withsupport
fromvariousinternationalactors,theseassociationshavemadetwocoredemands
influencedbypoliticalliberalismandtransitionaljusticediscourses:(a)therecognitionof
theISattacksagainstYezidisasgenocideand(b)theformationofinternationaltribuneto
tryandconvictindividualswhoparticipatedintheseattacks.ThefactthattheInternational
CriminalCourt(ICC)doesnothaveautomaticjurisdictionoverIraqandSyria,whichare
notpartoftheRometreatyof2002thatcreatedtheICC,complicatedtheseefforts.52The
capturedISmilitantsweretriedinIraqicourtswheremanyofwhomfoundguiltyand
sentencedtodeath.ThousandsofISfightersfrommanydifferentcountriesweredetained
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byPYDforcesinnorthernSyriaaftertheliberationofthelastpieceoflandheldbytheISin
March2019.YetnotasingleISmemberwasputontrialforcrimesspecificallycommitted
againstYezidipeople.53
AnotherimportantconsequenceoftheISattacksonYezidipoliticalidentityisthe
strainedlinksbetweenYezidisandtheKRG.Asindicatedbefore,theKRGestablished
politicalandmilitarycontroloverYezidiinhabitedterritoriesandextensivepatronage
networksincorporatingalargenumberofYezidisbetween2003and2014.Howeverthe
panickedwithdrawaloftheKurdishforcesfromSinjarinAugust2014wasamajor
disappointment.WhilesomeYezidisarguedthattheKurdishforceslackedthecapacityto
resistagainsttheISonslaught,manyothersportrayedthewithdrawalasanactofbetrayal
demonstratingthedispensabilityofYezidisfortheKurdishleadership.54Inresponse,the
KRGauthoritiesundertookseveralinitiativesincludingtheestablishmentofanoffice
responsibleforrescuingYezidiskidnappedbytheISanddiplomaticeffortsaimingtohave
theanti-Yezidiattacksrecognizedasgenocide.55Thetermgenocideevokesastrong
emotionalandpoliticalmeaningsforIraqiKurdsgiventhelegacyofSaddamHussein’s
Anfalcampaigninvolvingchemicalweaponsattacks,massacres,sexualviolence,andmass
deportationagainstKurdishpeopleinthelate1980s.ThedescriptionofAnfalasgenocide
hasbeencentraltothelegitimacyofKurdishpursuitofstatehoodandindependencefrom
Iraq.56BylabellingtheISviolenceagainsttheYezidisasanothergenocidevictimizing
ethnicKurds,theKurdishauthoritiessoughtinternationalsupportfortheformationofan
independentKurdistanwherereligiousminoritieswouldbesafefromextremistviolence.
TheKRGauthoritiesorganizedpollingstationsinIDPcampsandstronglyurgedYezidis
displacedfromSinjartovoteinthereferendum.57Inthisregard,therecognitionofYezidi
victimhoodhasbeenmadecentraltoKurdishvictimhoodandpursuitofindependence.At
thesametime,thefailureofKurdishforcestoprotectYezidisfostereddemandsforthe
formationofanautonomousregionforreligiousminoritiesinNinevehunderinternational
supervision.Forinstance,Yazda,oneofthemostwell-knownYezidihumanitarianand
lobbyingorganizations,explicitlycallsforsuchautonomy.58Similardemandswerealsoput
forwardbyvariousChristiangroups.59
AfinaltransformationfollowingtheISattacksconcernstheendoftheKRGcontrol
overSinjar.WhiletheKRGforcesgainedbackpartsofSinjarfromtheIS,theywithdrew
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completelyfromtheareainthefaceoftheIraqiandShiitemilitiaadvancesinOctober
2017.Asaresult,forthefirsttime,aShiitepoliticalforceassertedmilitarysupremacyover
YezidislandsandaimedtocultivateitsownpatronagenetworksamongYezidisbytaking
advantageofintra-Yezididivisions.60Besides,thePKK,aKurdishnationalistforcewitha
historyofrivalrywiththeKDP,madesignificantinroadsamongYezidisinthepost-2014
period.61Duringtheattacks,thePKKmilitantsplayedahighlyvisibleroleinopeningupa
humanitariancorridorbetweenMt.SinjarandtheSyrianbordercontrolledbythePYD,a
PKKaffiliate.ThiscorridorenableddesperateYezidiswhotookrefugeinMt.Sinjartoreach
safety.ThePKKestablishedapermanentpresenceintheareaandsuccessfullyrecruiteda
significantnumberofYezidimenandwomen,whoweredisenchantedwiththeKDP,toits
militia.62LiketheKDP,thePKKalsoemphasizesKurdishnessofYezidis,butoffersadistinct
ideologicalalternative.Inparticular,thePKKwithitssecular,equalitarian,andgender
progressiveplatformspresenteditselfasavehicleofempowermentforYezidiwomen
subjecttoextremelevelsofsexualviolenceandpatriarchalpractices.63Moreover,thePYD
forcesrescuedmanykidnappedYezidiwomenandchildrenfromtheIScaptivityin
northeasternSyria.Buildingonablueprintthatwasimplementedsuccessfullyinnorthern
Syria(andunsuccessfullyinKurdishareasofTurkey),thePKKdeclared“democratic
autonomy”forSinjarandsoughtinternationalsupport.TheriseofthePKKasaviableforce
vyingforsupportamongYezidiscontributestofurtherfragmentationofYezidipolitical
identityandcomplicatestheformationofaunifiedstanceamongYezidiswhoaremore
spreadoutthaneverbefore.
Gender&PoliticsamongtheYezidis
IS’sattacksagainsttheYezidisrevealedonceagainthecentralityofgenderinpolitical
violence.Indeed,sexualviolencehasbeenusedasadeliberateandsystematictoolto
commitgenocideandethniccleansingagainstreligiousandethniccommunitiesinmany
othercontextsinrecentdecadesaswell,suchasinBosnia,Kosovo,Rwanda,Sudan,Uganda
andtheDRC.64GroupssuchasISusespecific,typicallypatriarchal,gendernormsin
intersectionwithidentityperceptionstowardsreligiousorethnicgroupstojustify
violence.65TheprecariouspositionoftheYazidiminorityinIraq,asexplainedearlierinthe
chapter,playedanimportantroleinIS’stargetingofthiscommunity.Thelawlessnessand
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insecuritycreatedbysectarianviolenceinIraqfurtherexacerbatedexistingdiscriminatory
attitudestowardstheYezidis,aswellasotherminoritycommunities.66
ISexplicitlyjustifieditsgenderedviolenceagainsttheYezidisthroughits
interpretationofcertainIslamicrulesandpractices.ItdefinedtheYezidisasa“pagan”
minorityandnon-believersandtreatedthemdifferentlyfrommembersofotherreligions
suchasChristians.AccordingtoISideology,ChristiansandJewsareconsideredasthe
“PeopleoftheBook”whocanbetreatedasimmunefromcertainpracticesduringwar,such
asabductingandrapingfemalemembersofthesecommunities.67ISbelievedthatitwas
allowedtokillmalemembersoftheYezidicommunityiftheydonotconverttoIslam,and
toabduct,rapeandselltheYezidiwomenandgirls,andforcethemtodohouselabor.68
Aftertheircapture,theYezidiwomenandchildrenweresharedamongstISfightersthat
participatedintheoccupationofSinjarandafterthatonefifthofthecaptives,inIS
terminology‘slaves’,weretransferredtotheISauthoritiestobedividedas‘profit’.69
CapturedYezidiwomenandgirlslivedundercircumstancesinwhichtheyhadnocontrol,
andtheywereentirelystrippedofftheirabilitytocontroltheirlife,bodyanddignity.
TheYezidicommunity’sowngendernorms,especiallytheembodimentofmen’s
andfamilies’‘honor’inwomen’sbodies,madetheseattacksparticularlyunsettlingforthe
community.Yezidis’gendernormswereusedasatoolbyIStodiscourageabductedYezidi
womennottoescape.Yezidisurvivorswerereportedtosaythattheircaptivestoldthem
thatiftheyreturnedtotheircommunities,theywouldbekilled,referringtothepracticeof
‘honor’killing,orwouldnotbeacceptedbackhome.70TheYezidis,includingYezidileaders,
considerthesexualviolenceperpetratedbyISagainstYezidiwomenandgirlsasanattack
againstthewholeofthecommunity.AsMîrTehsînSeîdBeg,thehereditaryleaderofthe
YezidisstatedtheYezidiscouldhavemaybereconciledandwentbacktolivingwiththeir
Arabneighborsevenafterkillings;butIS’treatmentofthousandsofYezidiwomenand
girlswouldmakeitveryhardtoreconcile.71TheexperiencesoftheYezidisleftlastingscars
forthecommunityandledtoextremelevelsofpost-wartraumaandPTSD.72
SexualandotherformsofviolenceexperiencedbytheYezidiscannotbetreatedas
simplyanoutcomeofIS’sextrememethodsortheresultofconflict.Thereisawider
contextofinequalityandstructuresinplacethatmadesuchviolencethinkableand
feasible.InterviewswithmembersoftheYezidicommunitysuggestthatthecommunityis
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14
awareofthesewidercircumstances.Theyassociatetheirexperiencesofviolenceand
sexualviolencetothelong-termdisadvantagesofbeingaminoritygroupinthedisputed
territoriesinIraqandthehistoricalprejudicesagainsttheircommunity.Likemanyother
minoritycommunitiesinIraq,alargesectionoftheYezidicommunityislocatedin
disputedterritories(betweentheKurdishregionalgovernmentandtheIraqigovernment),
Beinginthislocationputstheminaprecariouspositionbecausetheseareasaretypically
neglectedintermsofinfrastructure,economicinvestmentandprovisionofsecurityand
protection.Moreover,thehistoryofreligiousprejudiceagainstthecommunityandthe
distrustbetweenYezidisandIraqiandKurdishhaveexacerbatedtheprecariousnessof
theirposition.Gendernormsalsoplayedakeyroleintheseoutcomes.Theideathat
womencanbeboughtandsoughtforsexualpurposeslikeacommodityandthattheycan
beentirelystrippedofftheiragencyisaclearexampleofthis.Thisextremeformof
discriminationandviolencepracticedagainstYezidiwomencanbeseenaspartofa
continuumofwiderdiscriminativepracticesandviolencesperpetratedagainstwomenin
Iraqingeneral.73
Yet,alongsidethis,thecommunity’sexperienceofgenderedviolencebyIShashada
transformativeimpactonthepoliticalandsociallifeamongtheYezidicommunity.These
impactscanbeanalyzedinthreeinterrelatedaspects.First,IS’sattacksanditsviolence
againstYezidiwomenhadsignificanteffectonYezidiattitudesaboutsurvivorsofsexual
violence.FemalesurvivorswhowereheldcaptivebyISandexposedtosexualandother
formsofviolencewereinitiallyhesitantaboutreturningtotheirfamiliesandcommunities.
Theyfearedtheywouldberejectedorkilledfor“tainting”the“honor”ofthefamily.74With
theFebruary2015DeclarationbytheYazidireligiousauthorities,survivorwomenaswell
aswomenandmenwhowereforcedtoconverttoIslamwerere-acceptedtothe
community.Afterthisdeclaration,numberofwomenandgirlsreturningtotheir
communityincreased.However,thisdoesnotmeanstigmaaroundbeingsexuallyassaulted
havedisappearedandlifeafterreturnhasbeeneasyforreturnees.Moreover,manyof
thesewomenandgirlscontinuetolivewithuntreatedtraumaandindifficultconditionsof
displacementawayfromtheirhomes.SomeofthesewomenhavemigratedtoEuropean
countriesandexperiencingotherdifficultiessuchasbeingawayfromhomeandfamily,and
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15
adjustingtolifeinadifferentculture.75Finally,thesituationofchildrenborntoYezidi
womenrapedbytheirIScaptorsisaparticularlychallengingissue.76
AnothersignificantimpactofsexualviolenceagainstYezidiwomenandgirlsisthat
taboosaroundtalkingaboutsexualviolenceintheYezidicommunityhasweakenedafter
thisexperience.Generally,sexualviolenceisconsideredasadifficultissuetomakepublic
andacknowledgeinmostsocieties,aspreviouscasesofsexualviolenceinarmedconflicts
acrosstheworldshowed.77Therehasbeenapublicsilenceabouttheexperiencesof
KurdishwomensexuallyassaultedduringtheAnfalcampaign.78Insharpcontrast,sexual
violencehasbecomepartofthepublicdiscourseandYezidisintegrateditintotheir
communicationwithoutsidersandIraqiandKurdishauthoritiestoexplaintheirsituation,
requestsupportandexpresstheirneedsanddemands.Malecommunityleaders,and
brothers,fathersandhusbandsofsurvivorsofsexualviolencehaveopenlydiscussedthe
issue.Thisisaninterestingdevelopmentbecauseratherthanshyingawayfromit,Yezidis
areopenlytalkingaboutsexualviolenceinnationalandinternationalplatforms.Nadia
Murad,aYezidisexualviolencesurvivorherself,isseenasaspokespersonfor
communicatingYezidis’experiencesandneeds,anddemandjusticeandprotectionforher
community.ThesenoveldevelopmentsareunprecedentedinthehistoryoftheYezidi
community.
Finally,thereareindicatorsofchangingperceptionsaboutwomen’sroleand
positioninsocietyamongtheYezidicommunity.Thisisfortworeasons.First,the
experienceofgenocideandsexualviolencemadethecommunityonceagainrealizethat
theirpositionasacommunityinIraqisprecarious.Theydonothavethenecessarysupport
politicalandeconomicstructuresandprotectionmechanisms.Therefore,someofthe
communitymembersbelievethatempoweringgirlsthroughenablingthemtoaccessto
educationandjobscanprovidethemsomeformofprotection.Anumberofinterviewees
saidthatiftheirpeopleinSinjarweremoreeducatedandmoreawareoftheirlifeoutside
theircommunities,thegenocideagainsttheircommunitywouldnothavehappened.79The
secondfactorthatcontributedtochangingperceptionsaboutwomen’spositionis
displacement.DisplacedSinjariYezidisinSheikhanandDuhokwereabletomeetwith
YezidislivingintheseareasandinteractwithmembersoftheYezididiaspora.Yezidisin
Sinjarhavegenerallymoreconservativenormsaboutwomen’spositioninsociety
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16
comparedtoYezidisintheDuhokregionthathavebeenunderKurdishrule.Afterthe
attacks,severaleducatedandexperiencedlocalYezidiwomeninDuhokandSheikhan
begantoworkwithwomen’srightsorganizationsandhumanitarianorganizationsto
providesupportforsurvivinganddisplacedSinjariYezidisandmetandworkedwiththem.
OneoftheinterviewedhumanitarianNGOworkers,whoisaYezidiherself,said“the
Shingali80womenwereinitiallyreluctantbutthenstartedtoparticipateintrainingand
evenstartedworking.”Sheattributedthispartlytotheexpositionofthemoreconservative
SinjariYezidicommunitiestothemoreopenlifeoftheYezidisinDuhok:“theShingali
communitybecamemoreopentowardswomenbecausetheysawotherYazidiwomen,like
thosefromSharia.Theysawthattheirwomenareopen,theygotowork,theygotoschool,
sotheythoughttobealittlebitmoreopenwiththeirwomenaswell.”81
Conclusion
Thegeneralfeelingofinsecuritycharacterizingpost-SaddamIraq,theriseofSunni
extremism,theconflictbetweentheKRGandIraqicentralgovernmentinvolvingYezidi
lands,andthefurtherfragmentationofthecommunityviamigrationsandforced
displacementshavemadeitincreasinglydifficult,ifnotimpossible,forYezidistoseek
politicalaccommodationasanon-assertiveminoritygroup.Thegenocidalattacksin2014
hasstronglyreinforcedthistrendandcontributedaproliferationofvoicesandplatforms
aboutdistinctiveYezidiidentityatlocal,national,andinternationallevels.Inthisregard,
Yezidisarelatecomerstotheglobalpoliticsofrecognitionchallengingallegedlydifference-
blindpoliciesanddemandingdignityforparticulargroupidentities.82
TheYezidipoliticsofrecognitionrepresentsamajorchangeinthecommunity’sself-
identificationandrepresentationgiventhelonghistoryofYezidisasaliminalcommunity
lackingofficialrecognitionduringtheOttomantimesandwidespreadprejudicesabout
theirbeliefsystemspersistinguntilnow.Itentailsastrongemphasisonthedistinctive
natureofYezidiidentityandhistory,andarequestforaccountabilityofthecrimes
committedagainstYezidisinformedbydiscoursesoftransitionaljusticeandfeminism.This
requestforrecognitionalsoentailsastronggenderdimension.Thetraumaticexperienceof
systematicsexualviolencepushedthecommunitytoquestiongender-relatedtaboosand
normsandwomen’spositioninprivateandpubliclife,andtoinitiatesomechanges.In
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17
theirdemandsforprotectionandrecognition,Yezidiadvocacygroupsandactivistshave
explicitlyincorporatedYezidiwomen,genderdimensionandsexualviolence.Allthese
haveledtosignificantsymbolicgainsthatelevatedYezidisfromanobscureminorityinto
aninternationallyrecognizedreligiousminoritysufferingfromcrimesagainsthumanity
anddeservingrespectandprotection.
Ironically,thisriseofautonomousYezidipoliticsisaccompaniedwithanincreasing
communalfragmentationanddispersionand,aninvolvementofanevengreaternumberof
externalactorsinYezidiaffairs.Thepost-warconditionsinSinjarremainprohibitivefor
therevitalizationoftheYezidilifethere;geopoliticalrivalriesinvolvingmultiplelocaland
regionalforcesmaketheformationofanautonomouszoneforYezidishighlyimplausible.
Underthesecircumstances,onecanexpectthatYezididiasporawouldincreasinglyplaya
moreimportantroleinsustainingYezidicollectiveidentity,shapingitsglobalimage,and
transformingrelationswithinthecommunity.
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1Pinker2011.2HeisreferringtotheatrocitiescommittedbyalocalKurdishruler,MirMohammadofSoran.InterviewedconductedinSheikhaninSeptember2017.3Kreyenbroek1995.4Khenchelaoui1999,23-5.5Allison2008.6Aslateas1935,TheNewYorkTimesdescribedYezidisas“devil-worshippers”inanarticleaboutapunitiveIraqiexpeditiontoMt.Sinjar.“RebelliousYezidisaresubduedinIraq,”TheNewYorkTimes,October26,1935.7MirMohammadofSoran,whoseviolentcampaignleftastronglegacyinYezidioraltraditions,attackedYezidisbecausetheywerealliedwithhisrival,theBehdinanEmirate.Layard1850,276-7;Longrigg1925,28;Guest1993,67-9.8InYezidihistoriography,thesecampaignsmakeapluralityoffirmanstargetingthecommunity.CindîReşo2014.9Çelebi2013,50.Kreyenbroek(1995,36)observesthattheviolenteventsbetweenthe14thcenturyandthecampaignofMirMohammadofSoranin1832leftlittletraceincollectivememoryoftheYezidis.10Ibid,51-4.HewritesthatthiscampaigntooktherevengeofKarbala(54).Infact,thereisawidespreadassociationbetweenYezidisandCaliphYazidwhosesoldiersmassacredthegrandsonofProphetMohammadandhisfollowersinKarbalain680.ThismonumentaleventgraduallyledtotheschismbetweenSunniandShiiteMuslims.ForadetailedandnuanceddiscussionofthereverenceshowntoYazidinYeziditradition,seeKreyenbroek,37.11Gölbaşı2013,3-4.12Dersimwasthesceneofstate-ledmassacresin1937and1938.FortheOttoman/TurkishperceptionofDersimanditspeople,seeGoner2017,chp1.13Scott(2009,13)callsthegreatmountainouszoneinSoutheastAsia,Zomia,as“oneofthelargestremainingnonstatespacesintheworld,ifnotthelargest.”14ThisinterpretationdisagreeswithGülsoy(2002)whoarguesthatreligiousdifferencesneverhadprimaryinfluenceontheOttomantreatmentofYezidis.HearguesthatOttomanstargetedYezidisonlywhentheythreatenedthepublicorder(134-5).15ForYezidisincontemporaryTranscaucasia,especiallyArmenia,seeNicolausandYuce2019.16ABritishofficervisitedSinjarduringthisperiod(Forbes1839).17Fuccaro1999,4.18Gölbaşı(2009)providesahighlyinformativenarrativeoftheOttoman-Yezidirelationsregardingconscription.19Guest,104;Gölbaşı2009,95.20Erdem(1996,46,59-60)writesthatthepost-1856TanzimaterabroughtanendtotheOttomanpracticetoenslavementofdisobedientpopulations.Atthesametime,Parry(1895)observesthatthisfindesiècle
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campaignentailedthekidnappingsofYezidiwomenandgirlsandtheirforcedmarriagetotheOttomansoldiers.21Deringil1999,71-5.TheOttomanstateeventuallyreturnedthepossessionoftheLalishtempleandsacredobjectstotheYezidireligiousleadership.22LeagueofNations1925.23Fuccaro1997.24TherewaslittlemodernpoliticalparticipationamongYezidis.Forinstance,theCommunistPartyofIraqthatattractedmarginalizedethnicandreligiousgroupssuchasChristians,Kurds,andShiiteArabshadverylittleYezidirepresentation.Batatu1978,1190.25Ali2019.26ItalsoaimedtogenerateahistoriographylinkingYezidistotheUmayyadcaliphateandarguingfortheirArabicroots.SeeMajidAliHassanchapterinthisvolume.27Savelsberg,Hajo,andDulz2010.28Heavymajorities(morethantwo-thirds)inAnbarandSalahuddinvotedno.HadthenovoteinNinevehalsoreachedthetwo-thirds,theconstitutionwouldberejected.BBC2005.29AYezidipoliticianaffiliatedwithaKurdishpartyresembledDinjartoDarfurregionofSudangivenitsunderdevelopment.InterviewwithXXX,May2018-XXX.30InterviewwithKhidirDomle,May2019.-XXX.31UNAMI2009(WethankPeterBartuforsharingthisdocumentwithus);HRW2009.AUSdiplomaticcablefrom2008publishedbyWikileaksnotesthatMirTahsinSaidBeg,theforemostYezidileader,wasworriedwithforcefultransferofYezidipropertytoKurdishownershipinSheikhanwiththegoalofincreasingthenumberofKurdsinthedisputedterritoriesofNineveh.Availableathttps://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD3776_a.html. 32UNHCR2005.33UNAMI200934UNAMI2009.AccordingtoUNHABITAT(2015),theSinjarregionhadapopulationof339,000beforetheAugust2014attacks.Yezidismadearound74percentofthispopulation.35HRW2009.36SomeYezidislabeltheseattacksas“the73rdfirman.”37ThisYezidipartywontheparliamentaryseatallocatedforYezidisinthe2005Iraqielections.38UNAMI2009;USIP2011.TherewasasignificantincreaseinthenumberofvotersinSinjarbetween2005and2009leadingtotheallegationsofvotingfraud.39Spät(2018,426)observesthisideaoffusionbetweenKurdishandYezidiidentitiesfoundalessreceptiveaudienceamongtheYezidisofSinjarthantheYezidislivingeastoftheTigris,whohavealongerandmoreintensehistoryofcontactwiththeKurds.40ThisdraftconstitutionalsotalksaboutreligiousfreedomofYezidisinArticles65and124.Forananalysisofandtextofthedraft,seeKelly2010.41TherewasasingleYezidipoliticianaffiliatedwiththeKDP,SheikhShamo,intheKRGparliamentelectedin2013.TwoYezidisonefromKDPandanotherfromPUK,gainedseatsintheSeptember2018parliamentaryelections.TheinabilityofYezidisfromSinjar,manyofwhomlivedincampsintheDuhokprovince,significantlyundermineselectoralpowersoftheYezidisintheKRGelections.Ironically,thesedisplacedYezidiswereallowedtovoteintheKurdishindependencereferenduminSeptember2017.42Dinç2017.43Cetorellietal.,2017.44AsofAugust2019,3,509ofthesecaptiveswereliberated,mostlythroughransompayments,accordingtothestatisticsannouncedbytheKRG.45Kocho,wheretheworstatrocitiestookplace,remainedundersiegeuntilAugust15whentheISmilitantsraidedthetown,executedadultmalesingroups,andenslavedwomenandchildren.Accordingtosurvivortestimonies,ISmilitantsincludedArabsfromneighboringvillages.46TheexceptiontothispatternisthetownofHerdan,locatedinthenorthwesternpartofMt.Sinjar,whichwasattackedbytheneighboringSunniTurkomans.47AsofFebruary2017,therewerearound36,000familiesinIDPcampsintheDohukprovinceoftheKRG.Around77percentofthesefamilieswereYezidis(BRHA2017,18).
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48“ObamaallowslimitedairstrikesonISIS,”TheNewYorkTimes,August7,2014.Availableathttps://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-military-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html. 49OHCHR2016.50McGee2018.51Themostwell-knownoftheseassociationsareYazdaandFreeYezidiFoundation.52TheICChasjurisdictionovercrimescommittedbyISmilitantswhoarecitizensofthecountriesthataremembersofthecourt.ItisalsopossiblefortheUNSecurityCounciltoreferacasetotheICC,asithappenedwithatrocitiesinDarfurin2005.Becauseofthisreferral,theICCProsecutorissuedanindictmentofthenSudanesePresidentOmaral-Bashirandaccusedhimcommittingthecrimeofgenocide.YettheTrumpadministration,whichisopenlyhostiletotheICC,wasnotwillingtoreferthecaseofISatrocitiestotheinternationalcourt.53HRW2017.54InterviewsinDohuk,May2018.55InastatementdeliveredonthefourthanniversaryoftheISattacks,then-KRGPrimeMinisterNechirwanBarzanidescribedtheevents“asoneofthemostbarbaricgenocidesofthe21stcentury.”Rudaw,August3,2018.Availableathttps://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/030820182. 56BaserandToivanen2017.57WhilemanyYezidiswereagnosticabouttheKurdishreferendumin2017,MirTahsinSaidBeg,whodiedinJanuary2019,askedYezidistosupportKurdishindependence.“JiMîreÊzidiyênCîhanêbangareferandûmê”Rudaw,September23,2017.Availableathttps://www.rudaw.net/kurmanci/kurdistan/230920175.58YazdaPressRelease,May15,2016.Availableathttps://www.facebook.com/yazda.organization/posts/yazda-press-releasea-statement-about-recent-political-developments-in-shingal-si/484781928398425/. 59DemandsforautonomyhavealonghistoryamongtheAssyriansgoingbacktotheformativeyearsofIraq.Joseph1961,chp8.60ICG2018.ShiiteviewsofYezidisarecomplicatedbythewidespreadperceptionthatYezidisarefollowersofCaliphYazid,themosthatedfigureintheShiitehistoriography.Atthesametime,thereisnohistoryofYezidi-Shiiteintercommunalconflictinrecenthistorygiventheirlimitedgeographicalcontact.Infact,YezidisandShiitesofSinjarwereparticipatinginsimilarritualsandveneratingthesameshrineinthepost-2003period.Dirasat2016,95.Moreover,ShiiteauthoritiesstronglycondemnedtheIScrueltyagainstYezidisandAyatollahAliSistanimetwithaYezididelegation.Ibid,404-5.61ForanoverviewofKDP-PKKtensionsoverSinjar,seeYılmaz2018.62ThePKKpresenceinSinjaraggravatedthreatperceptionoftheTurkishstatethatconductedairstrikesintheareainnumeroustimes.63ForthemotivesofwomenjoiningthePKKanditsgenderpolitics,seeTezcür2019.64Jefferson2014.65DaviesandTrue2015,505.66Maisel2008;Oehring2017.Shi’iiteTurkmenwomenandgirls,albeitatasignificantlylowerscale,werealsoamongminoritiesinIraqthatwereexposedtosexualviolencebyIS.Bor2019.67Inpractice,thisdistinctionwasnotalwayskept.ISmembersdidalsokidnapped,raped,andenslavedChristianwomen.“ChristianwomenkidnappedbyISreunitedwithfatherafterfouryears,”Kurdistan24,April5,2018.Availableathttps://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/987a77c3-56c3-44b7-a8f9-e6a8d63d0e00.68Dabiq2014,Issue4,pp.14-15.69Dabiq2014,Issue4,p.15.70InterviewswithmembersofYezidicommunity,May2018,Duhok.71InterviewwithPrinceHassan,May2018,Prince’sHouseinSheikhan.72Erdener2017;Kizilhan2018.73GenevaInternationalCentreforJustice2015,pp.18-22.74InterviewwithtwoYezidisexualviolencesurvivors,Sharyacamp,Duhok,May2018.75McGee2018.76AccordingtothreedifferentNGOsources,thenumberofmotherswithchildrenfromISISwasaround200asofMay2018.SomewomengavetheirchildrentothePKKandsomeofthemreturnedandtookshelterwiththeirchildunderthePKK.Yazidisurvivorswithchildrensometimesfinddifferentstrategiestonavigatein
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thissituation.Someclaimtotheirfamiliesthattheymetahusband(usuallydeadormissing)atsomepointandthechildwashis.Eventhoughthisisnottrue,andthefamilyknowsthis,theyacceptit.Somemotherswanttokeepthechild;somedonot.InterviewsinDuhokandSheikhan,May2018.ThetopicremainshighlycontroversialamongYezidis.OnApril24,2019,YezidiSupremeSpiritualCouncilissuedadeclarationacceptingthesechildrentothecommunitybeforereversingitthreedayslater.77Jefferson2014;Turshen2001,p.66.78Moradi2016.79InterviewswithYezidicommunitymembers,December2017andMay2018,Duhok.80ShingalisthelocalnameforSinjar.81InterviewwithaYezidifemalehumanitarianNGOstaff,May2018,Duhok.82Fromthisperspective,thelackofrecognitionofmisrecognitioncanbeaformofoppressionTaylor1994.