sustainable economic profits for a dynamic pap

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Sustainable Economic Profits for ADynamic Peoples Action Party?

April 2013


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Contents

Executive Summary

Chapter 1 Beginning of Transition and Evolution

Chapter 2 New Political Normal in Singapore

Chapter 3 Losing Economic Profits and MonopolyPosition

Chapter 4 Alignment and Sustainability Challenges

Chapter 5 No Dynamic PAP and No Competitive LifeCycle A Strange Combination

Chapter 6 PAP will continue its Integrated Strategies

Chapter 7 Reduced Economic Profits or NormalProfits

Appendixes


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Executive Summary

Introduction

Singapore Inc., as it is called internationally, is howSingapore as a country is run by Peoples Action Party(PAP). Business excellence and strategic tools arefrequently used in public administration and companiesto achieve Singapore Quality Class and Award.

Strategists toolkit is suitable and relevant to analyze the

PAP performance. A new normal political climate hasarrived and more competitions are expected. Thedevelopment will reduce the PAPs economic profits inthe coming elections.

Economic profits mean the PAP is getting moreparliament seats in proportion to the votes obtained in the

election.

Situations, Problems and Solutions

The PAP is a dominant political party and since 1959, ithas been in power and faces little challenges except in theearly years.

It usually controls more than 90% of the parliament seatsand so this is called a one-party state. Things havebegun to change and in the election in 2016, the PAP maylose its two-third majority in parliament. Or in the worstcase scenario though a remote chance, the party may losethe government in a freak election.

Economic profits are derived mainly from monopolypower, design capability and innovation dynamics. When


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From monopoly to open competitionThis is the message of Five Forces Analysis.

Threat of EntryThe PAP finds it hard to prevent oppositions fromcontesting the election. The high sunk cost, competitiveadvantage and retaliation are no more effective strategies.More open competition is expected and the threat ofentry is gone.

Threat of Substitutes

Many young voters express their willingness to change,however the switching cost is high, especially for the oldervoters. If Singaporeans change their government, aninexperience party will take over. This switching costconsideration can add value to the PAP.

Bargaining powers of buyers (voters)

This works against the PAP. The voters are moredemanding than before. There are common national issuesthat voters can come together to voice their concerns.There are also more good quality opposition candidates.The past divide and conquer tactics are not effective anymore.

Bargaining powers of suppliers (PAP associates)

The PAP has used up almost all the possible supports inthe past 50 years. Although suppliers follow instructions,their willingness and commitments are passive.Supporting organizations also complain about the inactionto their feedbacks.

Intensity of rivalry (oppositions)Since the PAP cannot stop the entry, more and moreopposition candidates are now standing for election. At


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the same time, the PAP finds it hard to find good qualitycandidates due to potential losses in election.

Alignment and Sustainability Challenges underCapability Analysis

The capability analysis shows that the PAP has alignmentand sustainability issues. In the capability value chain,there is little value created by real Design and Innovation.

Capability value chainThe usual value chain of Supplier - Manufacture Distribution Buyer can be described as follows:

Supply: The PAP has good supply bases from variousprivate and public bodies. For example, governmentfunded Peoples Association, trade union, election

department, chambers of commerce, business associations,racial and cultural groups, and even some NGOs etc.

Manufacture: Potential candidates will invite to tea partyand assign to grass roots for training, internal selection,background checks, promotion, etc.

Distribution: Detailed study of electoral districts based on

population and feedback including re-drawing ofconstituency boundary; election budget and deploymentof candidates etc.

Buyer: Voters have little time to know alternative policesand opposition candidates due to short campaign period.The main stream media on the other hand provides

publicity and coverage to PAP candidates.


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No Dynamic PAP, No Competitive Life Cycle and theenvironment is good for a monopoly.

There is hardly any Competitive Life Cycle in Singapore.There is no shakeout or disruption in the parliamentelection. As a result, the PAP only needs to focus onmanagement of changes (preventing entry, high cost forpolitical participation, game rules to its advantages, pressfreedom and detention without trial).

The three phases of Emergent (Annealing) Growth

(shakeout) Mature (disruption) have not happened. Theelection market remains a single brand industry withoutstrong alternative and competitor. Shakeout anddisruption only happen to the opposition parties.

In short,- Mature phase is long and dynamic change is

incremental (controllable and manageable).- Emergent phase is short and a dominant brand (PAP)

becomes the monopoly in the market.- Growth phase is short too and with just one general

election in 1959, a situation of winner takes alloccurs.

Hence, the overall development for this unique political

market is once the market leader is established, the firstmover advantage quickly moves in and the PAP becomesthe monopoly. After they have consolidated their politicalpositions, the market dynamism disappears leading to aslow evolving environment.

The PAP can hold the position for a long period and even

prolong the evolving process through monopoly-led andmanaged design and innovation.


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Recommendations:

Open competition will reduce the economic profits. More

than 90% parliament seats to the PAP are not sustainable.The PAP will fight to have two-third majority or evenmore, even though their averaged percentage votesobtained may fall below 60%.

In order to continue enjoying economic profits (e.g. 80%parliament seats); the following strategies should beadopted:

Integrated strategies:The PAP will go for low-cost leader and differentiation bycontesting all the seats. It is still an outstanding brandwith unique characters. Not to mention, it is the onlyparty capable to send candidates to all constituencies.

Switching cost:Voters do want changes but have to face the consequences.The passing of an experienced government is anopportunity cost. A proper marketing and emphasis ofswitching cost will have handsome returns to the PAP.

Real design and innovation:Electoral boundary and rule changes to benefit incumbent;

court and defamation lawsuits; and even media control etc.are not real design and innovation. The value chain needsnew real design and innovation to create value andmaintain economic profits. Learning from otherdemocracies, even neighboring Malaysia, will help toimprove this weak link.

Accept evolution and change:


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Singapore is a strange market as there is no CompetitiveLife Cycle. There is no shakeout or disruption in theelection industry. The PAP will have to face new normal

and open politics. This new challenge will change theculture, core value, missions and actions of the party(unchanged since 2003).

Accept smaller economic profits:With the success of WP strategies of focused low-cost andniche market, other opposition parties will follow. Somepossibilities of wildcat breakthroughs will happen by

other parties with their very outstanding candidates. ThePAP must psychologically prepare to lose more seats.

No freak election is expected in 2016. However, to have 90%parliament seats is equally a remote target. The opencompetition and normal politics will lead to morestrategies and dynamic changes. The changes of Yin and

Yang forces in both camps will decide the final outcome.


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[Chapter 1: Introduction]

Beginning of Transition and Evolution

The title of this report Sustainable Economic Profits forA Dynamic Peoples Action Party?may be misleading.For the future survival and prosperity of Singapore, thedynamism of Singapore as a country is certainly moreimportant than the PAP.

However, due to the unique political structure and thelack of competition, the PAP has been equaled toSingapore. Its success or failure is directly affectingSingapore. True or not true? It is a question Singaporevoters begin to ask and this leads to a talking of newnormal political development in Singapore.

Whatever the outcome, the PAP will need the economicprofits at sustainable level to continue running Singapore.This means the PAP will have to transform itself into aparty of dynamism. Otherwise, it will not be able to facethe challenges in transition and evolution.

Singapore politics is in transition and evolution.

A transition towards an open competitionenvironment from a monopoly and tightly controlledpolitical past.A transition from a party enjoying huge economicprofits to reduced economic profits or even normalprofits.An evolution showing real political design and

innovation capabilities leading to a non-monopolyinitiated dynamism.


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An evolution from a one-party control parliament toa two-party or multi-party parliament.

Singapore Inc., as it is called internationally, is howSingapore as a country is run by Peoples Action Party(PAP). Business excellence, total quality management andstrategic tools are frequently used in public administrationand government linked companies to achieve SingaporeQuality Class and Award. #1

Strategists toolkit is suitable and relevant to analyze the

PAP performance. A new normal#2 political climate hasarrived in Singapore and more competitions are expected.This development will reduce the PAPs economic profitsin the coming elections.

Economic profits mean the PAP is getting moreparliament seats in proportion to the votes obtained in the

election. [Chapter 2: Table 1 and Chapter 6: Table 6.3]

#1http://www.spring.gov.sg/qualitystandards/be/pages/business-excellence-initiative.aspx#.UV_by5NTB0o

#2http://www.spring.gov.sg/NewsEvents/ITN/Pages/Singapore-must-achieve-more-with-less-20120314.aspx#.UV_cR5NTB0o
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[Chapter 2: Situational Analysis]

New Political Normal in Singapore

Mission, Actions and Core Values

The Peoples Action Party (PAP) refreshed its Missions,Actions and Core Values in a 2003 party convention.Since then, there is no update of them for this 1954

established political party.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Action_Party)

In the partys website, the stated missions, actions andcore values are as follows:

The Party's core values should remain constant. The PAP

reaffirms the founding ideals that enabled it tosuccessfully govern and transform Singapore into amodern miracle.

The mission of the PAP is to build a fair and just societywhere the benefits of progress are spread widely to all.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Action_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Action_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Action_Party


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http://www.pap.sg/about-pap/our-core-values


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The only ruling party in Singapore since 1959

The PAP has an unbroken record in government, ruling

Singapore since 1959. It has absolute control of parliament controlling more than 90% of parliament seats in everygeneral election in Singapore except 1959 and 1963. Therewas a split of the PAP in 1961 and it resulted to PAPpercentage votes dropped to below 50%. Even that it stillcontrolled 84.3% of the parliament seats.

Table 1.1: Result of General Elections and Distribution

of Votes and Parliament Seats

GeneralElection

year

% ofvotes

Totalparliamentseats

Seatswon bythe PAP

% of PAPseats inparliament

2011 60.14% 87 81 93.1%

2006 66.6% 84 82 97.6%

2001 75.3% 84 82 97.6%1997 65% 83 81 97.6%

1991 61% 81 77 95.1%

1988 63.2% 81 80 98.8%

1984 64.8% 79 77 97.5%

1980 77.7% 75 75 100%

1976 74.1% 69 69 100%

1972 70.4% 65 65 100%

1968 86.7% 58 58 100%

1963 46.9% 51 37 72.5%

1959 54.1% 51 43 84.3%Source: Singapore-elections.com


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Environment Analysis

In the General Election in 2011, the PAP had received the

lowest average percentage votes since Singaporeindependence in 1965. Although it still controls more than93% of the parliament seats, there are clear signs that thiseconomic profit cannot hold on for too long. In the nextelection due in 2016, more seats are expected to be won bythe oppositions. The question is by much.

From survey conducted by Institute of Policy Studies after

2011 General Election and other analysis #1, the magiceffect of the past political monopoly, monopoly-led designand innovation has gone. A new normal politicalenvironment will emerge and it means the economicprofits of the past will be significantly reduced. The partymonopoly status is challenged by the oppositions. Theusefulness of the re-designed election system has reached

its limit and the innovated Elected President system hasbecome a negative asset to the ruling party.

In short summary, there will have the followingconsequences:

Demographic trends: The young generation is bettereducated than the older generation and they are more

open to opposition politics. To offset this trend, PAP isbringing in more immigrant citizens.

Socio-cultural influence: With social media and internet,voters have an alternative communication channel otherthan the government-control media.

Technological development: The emergency of social mediaand internet has weakened the PAP monopoly in media.


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Voters can access social media and alternative news easilyand challenge and criticise government policies openly.

Macroeconomic impact: Housing, medical, cost of livingand rich-poor gap in Singapore are the concerns to middleclass and lower income voters.

Political-legal pressure: There are external developments,e.g. Jasmine revolution, strong oppositions in Malaysiaand Indonesia, political opening up in Myanmar, etc. haveaffected the thinking of the voters. In addition, lack of

press freedom, poor human rights record, InternalSecurity Act (detention without trial) etc. affects the moodof voters.


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SWOT Analysis

SWOT Analysis indicates there are more weaknesses and

threats than opportunities and strengths.

Strengths: PAP is still the most established andprofessional political party in Singapore. It has goodreputation locally and internationally.

Weakness: Support from grass roots level is weak. Notlistening to citizens concerns and demands, lack of

human touch, only concern about economic growth arethe complaints of the people.

Opportunities: There are no opportunities to grow, or evenmaintaining more than 90% of parliament seats in futureelection. Switching cost concern (change of government)or economic uncertainty may help to maintain status quo

or slow down the unpopular votes, but they are aseffective as before.

Threats: The challenges from oppositions are gettingstronger and stronger. Not only oppositions have goodquality candidates, they also have improved image,strategy, more grass root supports.

Political parties and competition

In 2011, there were 7 political parties contesting in thegeneral election. There was only one group constituencynot contested and resulted to a walkover. Walkoverwas very common in Singapore past parliament elections.

The winners were declared on the spot on nomination day


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by the returning officers because there were nocompetitions.This is not likely to happen in the next election.

The 7 participating parties in 2011 were:

1.Peoples Action Party PAP (www.pap.org.sg)2.The Workers Party of Singapore -WP (www.wp.sg)3.Singapore Democratic Party - SDP (www.yoursdp.sg)4.National Solidarity Party NSP (www.nsp.sg)5.Singapore Peoples Party SPP (www.spp.org.sg)6.Reform Party RP (www.reformparty.org)7.Singapore Democratic Alliance - SDA

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliance)

Their political ideologies are as follows:

Parties Political ideologies1 PAP Social conservatism, fiscal conservatism,

Third Way, Anti-communism

2 WP Social democracy

3 SDP Liberalism, liberal democracy

4 NSP Democratic socialism

5 SPP Liberalism, Social liberalism, liberaldemocracy

6 RP Liberal free market

7 SDA Liberal democracySource: wikipedia.org

According to Wikipedia, in the past 50 years the PAP hastransformed its political ideologies from a historicalperspective of anti-colonialism and democratic socialism to

the modern day of social conservatism, fiscal conservatism,Third-way and anti-communism. In short, the PAP political
http://www.pap.org.sg/http://www.pap.org.sg/http://www.pap.org.sg/http://www.wp.sg/http://www.wp.sg/http://www.yoursdp.sg/http://www.yoursdp.sg/http://www.nsp.sg/http://www.nsp.sg/http://www.spp.org.sg/http://www.spp.org.sg/http://www.reformparty.org/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://www.reformparty.org/http://www.spp.org.sg/http://www.nsp.sg/http://www.yoursdp.sg/http://www.wp.sg/http://www.pap.org.sg/


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position is moving from left to right or centre-right. Ashift of position also means its old position (left or centre-left) is taken up by other opposition parties.

A new political normal in fact will see the emergence ofcentre-left political forces in Singapore. The reduced PAPEconomic Profits or Normal Profits will be taken over bythese forces in the next elections.

#1

http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/events/post-election/PEF_report_080711.pdf

http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/events/pops/POPS%204_May11_report.pdf

http://yawningbread.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/ips-post-ge2011-survey-part-1/

http://yawningbread.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/ips-post-ge2011-survey-

part-2/

http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/events/p2012/sp_JD_SP2012_160112.pdf
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[Chapter 3: Five Forces Analysis]

PAP is losing Economic Profits and its MonopolyPosition

The Five Forces Analysis developed by Michael Porter isusually used for business strategy analysis. For themoney-minded PAP, it matches quite perfectly into theframework. Most importantly, as the competition movestowards a normal and perfect one, the economic profits or

rents enjoyed by the PAP in the past will be gone.

The PAP will have to face more competitions and losemore market shares in future. PAP monopoly status inSingapore politics is declining fast so do its past (enjoyed)economic profits.

A company can enjoy economic profits when it hasmonopoly power (prevent entry), or imitation power ordesign (prevent copying) or dynamic capability (preventinnovation).

The current PAP leadership and organisation has lost allthese powers:

1.Monopoly: it can no more prevent or discouragepeople joining and supporting oppositions. Thisperhaps is the most important setback as voters havemore options as compared to the past.

2.Design/Imitation: Oppositions are able to learn frompast mistakes, project better image and learn to

present good policy options like the PAP. The PAPdoes not have real design capability.


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3.Innovation/Capability: Oppositions are able to come

out with innovative campaigns, more dynamic

personalities and higher fighting spirit. Again, thePAP does not real innovation strength.

PM Lee Hsien Loong in his recent interview with TheWashington Post has indirectly admitted the losing ofmonopoly control and the competition has gone tonormal.

["It's a different generation, a different society, and thepolitics will be different," said Mr Lee.

"We have to work in a more open way. We have to acceptmore of the untidiness and the to-ing and fro-ing, which ispart of normal politics," he added.]http://www.singapolitics.sg/news/govt-must-work-more-openly-and-accept-more-untidiness-pm

Different politics, more untidiness and normal politicsare the normal political competition environment inSingapore. This also means that the huge economicprofits (in parliament) the PAP has enjoyed in the past isnow a history.

If there are only normal profits in general elections, the situationof 60% votes controlling more than 90% parliament seats willalso become a history. Normal profits mean normaldistribution of parliament seats. Singaporeans have to beprepared for this outcome in future elections.


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Porter Five Forces Analysis Wikipedia.org

Five Forces Analysis for the PAP

Here is a short summary of the analysis.

Threat of Entry

Environment Monopoly PAP(in the past)

Normal PAP(in future)

1.1 High sunk cost Yes. Oppositionshave to pay highprice to enterpolitics.

No. It is difficultto use court caseor other means toprevent peoplejoiningoppositions.

1.2 Competitive

advantage

Yes. GRC,

boundary re-drawand hugeorganizationsupport.

No. Diminishing

return begins toappear.

1.3 Retaliation Yes. MSM andother means todiscreditoppositions.

No. Social mediacan counterattack. It is hardto use old practice

anymore.


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Threat of Substitutes

Environment Monopoly PAP Normal PAP

2.1 Cross-priceelasticity ofdemand

High. PAP canuse economicgrowth as asubstitute for lessfreedom, lessopen, less checkand balance.

Low.Singaporeansdemand fairerdistribution ofwealth and moreparticipation andinvolvement.

2.2 Switching cost Yes. The cost of

changinggovernment ishigh.

Yes. It remains so

but more willingto give it a try.

Bargaining powers of buyers (voters)


3.1 buyers notconcentrated

Yes. Voters can beseparated intorace, educationand incomebackground.

No. Singaporecitizen coreappears.

3.2 buyers havefew options

Yes. Fewoppositions andlow quality.

No. Moreoppositioncandidates withgood quality.

3.3 buyers aresegmented

Yes. Chinese orEnglish educated.Lower or higherincome groups.HDB or privateresidences.

No. There arecommon issuesfor differentsegments ofcitizens. E.g.education,

transport,


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population etc.

Bargaining powers of suppliers (PAP associates)


4.1 Sellers are notconcentrated

Yes. NTUC, PA,business groups,associations,MSM and NGOs.

No. Because ofNS, commonissues, consensuscan be formedacross differentgroups.

4.2 Firms havemany alternatives

Yes. PAP can evenuse governmentagencies, opinionsurveys to help incampaigning.

No. It is harderand harder to findalternativesupports.

4.3 Sellers do nottreat segment

differentlye.g. informationnot available.

Yes. Even withoutfull information,

all supportingorganizationsknow their ruleand commontarget.

No. There areunhappy and

confusions ingrass roots. Morecriticisms fromelites.

Intensity of rivalry (oppositions)


5.1 small numberof competitors

Yes. Fewoppositioncandidates.Walkovers.

No. Moreoppositioncandidates. Notlikely to havewalkovers.

5.2 incentive

(political

Yes for

oppositions,

Yes for PAP. PAP

finds harder and


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ambition) to fightare low,

especially in1970s, 1980s oreven 1990s.

There are so manyobstacles, ISA,defamations,MSM etc.

harder to findsuitablecandidates. Will

the (threat of) lossof power makePAP fight harder?

3.3 coordination isfeasible, e.g.boundary fixing,tacit coordination

Yes. PAPencouraged lowquality oppositioncandidates to

contest in GE. Badmouth goodoppositioncandidatesthrough MSM.

No. It is difficultfor low qualityoppositioncandidates to

contest, especialindependent.Voters recognizeand build partyloyalty.


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[Chapter 4: Capability Analysis]

PAP is facing Alignment and SustainabilityChallenges

Using the strategy tool of capability analysis, the PAP isfacing challenges in alignment and sustainability. In thecapability value chain, there is little value created byDesign and Innovation. The PAP has lost its monopoly

status in the election market. An open competitionenvironment will threaten the economic profits that thePAP has been enjoying in the past 50 years.

Capability value chain

Political parties do have value chain. This is very true for

the PAP as it runs the government likes a businesscorporation. Singapore government agencies anddepartments are required to achieve business excellencefor their performance.(http://www.spring.gov.sg/qualitystandards/be/pages/business-excellence-initiative.aspx#.UVT1qhxTB0o )

For the case of politics, the only different is that the PAPwants to gain more votes (rather than money) from thequality performance of its public administration. Hence,the usual value chain of Supplier - Manufacture Distribution Buyer can be described as follows:

Supply:PAP associates and grass roots organizations are playing

the support and supply role. The directly involvedorganizations are Peoples Association (www.pa.gov.sg),
http://www.pa.gov.sg/http://www.pa.gov.sg/


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NTUC (trade union, ntuc.org.sg), election department(www.eld.gov.sg), etc. And the indirect supporting bodiesinclude chambers of commerce, business associations,

racial and cultural groups, and even some NGOs etc.

ManufacturePolitical parties need candidates to stand for election.People with potential will be invited to attend tea sessionsfor their suitability. Potential candidates will be assignedto grass roots for training and understudy under currentmembers of parliament. Candidates will also undergo

internal selection, background checks, interviews,promotion, training, etc.

DistributionBefore a general election is called, there are manydistribution works including media coverage for thepotential candidates; detailed study of electoral districts

based on population and feedback (sometimes evenexternal survey); re-drawing of constituency boundary togain economic profits; election budget to please voters;moods of voters; key issues; finalize list of candidates andgroup them into different teams, etc.

BuyerParliament is dissolved and a new general election is

called. It is time to convince voters to buy the PAPcandidates. The new or re-drawn constituencies (singleand group) will be announced in short notice which willgive oppositions little time to prepare for election (anothereconomic profits possibility). The government controlmedia will then give friendly and co-operative coveragefor the PAP candidates, development plans in their

contested seats, and team leaders for the group
http://www.eld.gov.sg/http://www.eld.gov.sg/http://www.eld.gov.sg/


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constituency (GRCs). The campaign period is short and isonly lasted for 9 days plus 1 more cooling-off day.

Capabilities and Economic Profits

If we use the 3 economic profits elements for thecapability analysis of the PAP, besides monopoly, thedesign and innovation elements need urgentimprovement.

Table below shows the relationship of the various

capabilities.

Capabilities Supply Manufacture Distribution Buyer

Process

People

Systems

Alignment

Sustainability

The value chain

It is either lack of Design or Innovation that lead to lessvalue (economic profits) being created. The PAP can stilluse the (less effective) monopoly power to control thevalue chain of Supply Manufacturer Distribution Buyer. But there are alignment problems and sustainable

issues.

These alignments and sustainable issues are appearing inprimary and secondary activities.

Primary activities:The PAP still uses the same design and innovative processand procedures in the primary activities. From logistics

(organization of visits, rally), production (selection of


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candidates), marketing and sales (through main streammedia, endorsement), to services (rally gifts, campaignwalks and slogan), there is no different from the past

practice.

Secondary activities:As for secondary activities, there are also no new designand innovations for value creation. From Infrastructure(organization structure), HR (deployment of candidates,PR assistance), R&D (use of new media, peopleengagement), to procurement (new assistance or

additional resources), design and innovation have failedto create new or even maintain the economic profits.

Since there is no control of entry, oppositions can nowcompete and participate in the elections with less fearfactors. The use of monopoly (state) control throughtangible and intangible means has failed and it can no

longer protect the economic profits or keep all theeconomic profits under PAP pocket. Due to the ineffectiveentry control, the hope is on design and innovation tomaintain the level of economic profits. However, it is achallenge for the PAP to come out with useful andworkable design and innovation solutions.

Alignment

Design and Innovation do not help in maintaining anefficient alignment for the PAP. Internal and externalalignments do not paint an economic profit capabilitypicture.

Internal:

The PAP is using a top-down approach for electioncampaign. The party central committee decides the


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direction, action plans and rules to follow. PAP associatesand organizations will follow the instructions. Grass rootsare not happy about this arrangement and they have

voiced out their concerns but their views are not beingtaken seriously.

Supporting organizations are rather passive and wait forinstruction. Some may not even be willing to co-operatebut they just have to do it for fear of offending the PAP.

This Process, People and System alignment problems

make the reinforcement and building up the PAPcapability unsustainable.

External:If we consider VRIN (Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-Substitutable), there are problems in value alignment. ThePAP value proposition is weak. It cannot offer or propose

Valuable future to convince voters. It is no more a Rareoption for Singaporeans. It is easy to be copied andInimitable is not on the PAP side. Finally, the PAP iscertainly not a Non-substitutable product. Voters arewilling to buy alternative products and options.

Sustainability

The past practices of winning elections easily with out ofproportion economic profits are no more sustainable.Other political parties can copy the same tactics orimprove the old practices to attract more voters.Imitability is no more a problem for competitors. On theother hand, the PAP is facing durability problems. Someold practices or past success models are at the stage of

degrade and obsolete. They cannot hold the economicprofits as before.


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ImitabilityYes. Alternative parties and oppositions can easily do thesame. They have better turnout for their political rallies,

more positive responses during house visits, more votersare willing to take picture together with the oppositions orshowing opposition flags etc. VRIN is on the oppositionside, especially in the social media.

DurabilitySustainability means the PAP has to maintain itscapabilities in the value chain. But there are out of date

practices, or some are already degraded and obsoleted.For example, Peoples Association, as a front line supportorganization, does not bring in valuable feedbacks. Votersare suspicious about the open support given by union,chambers of commerce or associations. They even dislikethe good education background and outstandingcredential of the PAP candidates.

Building capabilities:

The PAP is facing great challenges in building up itscapabilities. For a business organization, it can acquire therequired technology or other capabilities through mergerand acquisitions or develop the capabilities internallyovertime by own investment and R & D.

It is not possible for the PAP to do so, for instance, buyingover opposition parties or merger with them. The best thePAP can do is to promote less creditable oppositions,painting bad pictures of oppositions or even plantingmoles into the oppositions.

The PAP is less successful in developing capabilitiesinternally. Overtime, it has proved that the quality of


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their candidates, the commitment of party members, thealignment between PAP and support organizations, theprocess-people-system alignment relationship and even

the media support have deteriorated. Internal capabilitybuilding is less effective as before not to mention itsculture and value upbringing internally.


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[Chapter 5: Competitive Life Cycle Analysis]

No Dynamic PAP and No Competitive Life Cycle A Strange Combination

There is hardly any Competitive Life Cycle in Singaporepolitics. There is no shakeout or disruption in theparliament election and so is there a need for the PAP tobe dynamic? As a result, its dynamism is mainly focused

on management of changes (changes in preventing entry,high cost for political participation, game rules to itsadvantages, press freedom).

The capability analysis of the PAP clearly shows that itsdesign and innovation capability is weak and does notadd value to the value chain. Competitive dynamic in fact

is referring to innovation-led economic profits.Dynamism can add temporary advantages to anorganization and help to maintain (or even enlarged) theenjoyed economic profits. The PAP does not have adynamic advantage but a monopoly-led and -manageddynamism. However, it still enjoys economic profits. Why?

There is also no Competitive Life Cycle in the electionmarket as the PAP has an unbroken absolute majority inthe parliament for more than 50 years. Why?

Competitive life cycle

In Singapore politics, there is no CLC in the electionindustry. The three phases of Emergent (Annealing)

Growth (shakeout) Mature (disruption) have nothappened in Singapore parliament election. The election


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market remains a single brand industry without strongalternative and competitor.

There is no shakeout and also no disruption. Shakeoutand disruption only happen to the opposition parties. Forexample, Barisan Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialis,Singapore Democratic Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Party, and Singapore Democratic Alliance.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_All

iance.

The PAP is the only party enjoying economic profits,cumulative revenues and huge margins in modern-daySingapore politics.

Competitive Life Cycle Analysis

Phase Timing Severity

Disruption How long is the maturephase?

Radical or incremental?

Annealling How long is theemergent phase?

Dominant design ormultiple designs

Shakeout How long is the growthphase?

Winner takes all,duopoly or contested?

Overall Slowly evolving orhyper-dynamic

First mover advantage?

The PAP was established in 1954. From 1954 to 1959, therewere intense competitions in the market. However, in1959, the PAP was elected to run Singapore. In 1961, therewas a split in the PAP. Even that the PAP managed towin the election with reduced majority and in 1966 whenthe oppositions walked out of the parliament, there waszero opposition in Singapore parliament.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Alliancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Democratic_Partyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barisan_Sosialis


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Table 5.1: No Competitive Life Cycle in Singaporepolitics?

GeneralElection

year

% ofvotes Totalparliamentseats

Seatswon bythe PAP

% of PAPseats inparliament

2011 60.14% 87 81 93.1%

2006 66.6% 84 82 97.6%

2001 75.3% 84 82 97.6%

1997 65% 83 81 97.6%

1991 61% 81 77 95.1%

1988 63.2% 81 80 98.8%

1984 64.8% 79 77 97.5%

1980 77.7% 75 75 100%

1976 74.1% 69 69 100%

1972 70.4% 65 65 100%1968 86.7% 58 58 100%

1963 46.9% 51 37 72.5%

1959 54.1% 51 43 84.3%Source: Singapore-elections.com

Perhaps, the one CLC faced by the PAP is in the earlyyears (1950s and 1960s) and after that the PAP has full orabsolute control of Singapore politics in the past 54 years(since 1959). Using the CLC analysis, we can concludethat

- Mature phase is long and dynamic change isincremental (controllable and manageable).

- Emergent phase is short and very quickly a dominantbrand (PAP) becomes the monopoly in the market(with no alternative).

- Growth phase is short too and with just one generalelection in 1959, a situation of winner takes all

occurs.


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Hence, the overall development for this unique politicalmarket is once the market leader is established, the first

mover advantage quickly moves in and the PAP becomesthe only master (sole monopoly) in Singapore politics.After they have consolidated their political positions, themarket dynamism slows down. As a result, the marketbecomes a slow evolving environment.

As the mature phase is so long, there are some problemsand issues the incumbent will have to face:

- No better position or no change in position at alleven the market environment changes (e.g. newtechnology, social media, young voters)

- Complacency problems: bad news about PAPmembers or associates, drop in efficiency etc.

- Degrading party culture, values, and cohesiveness.How long can the PAP hold their monopoly position andstop the CLC from moving or evolving again?

Since the PAP has absolute control (>90%) in theparliament, any moving or evolving of the CLC will be adisadvantage to the PAP. Jasmine revolution, politicaltsunami or political changes (ISA detention without trial)are not the friendly words in the PAP dictionary.

As discussed in the capability analysis, the PAP is weak inDesign and Innovation (the 2 factors can add value andcreate temporary advantages for making economic profits).So, they cannot depend on these 2 factors to stop themoving of the cycle. Hence, it is quite obviously that thePAP can only rely on one factor, monopoly which is the

only source that can contribute to the PAPs economicprofits. But it is getting more and more difficult to stop


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oppositions to enter the market. The past obstacles ofpolitical entry have become obsoleted and sometimesbecome the PAP liabilities for a free and true democracy

development in Singapore.

If the PAP cannot protect its monopoly position, e.g.preventing others to join in, their market share andeconomic profits will have to be reduced. The question isby how much.

New Economic Profits

The next general election in Singapore will be due in 2016or 2017. To remain absolute control of the parliament, thePAP will need to have two-third majority in theparliament. The parliament currently has 87 memberswith full voting rights.

Table 5.2: Possible PAP majority and seats in theparliament

PAPMajority

Totalseats

PAP MPs PAPMPs %

OppositionsMPs

2011 87 81 93% 6

Two-third 87 58 66.7% 29

70% 87 61 70% 26

75% 87 66 75% 2180% 87 70 80% 17

85% 87 74 85% 13

# assuming there are no change in total seats

The PAP only obtained 60% votes in the last generalelection in 2011. By proportional standard, the PAP is

enjoying economic profits (more parliament seats than


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votes obtained). Even the PAP is allocated two-thirdparliament seats; it is still a bonus to them (60% votes with67% seats). The fact is the PAP is having huge margin and

economic profits, a lot more than the two-third seats (58against 81). From the PAP viewpoint, the economicprofits at two-third majority level are too low anduncomfortable especially compared to the past. Quitelikely, they are aiming to have more than 80% or 85%majority (70-74 seats). However, from the point of view ofthe oppositions, they, of course, hope to reduce the PAPsmajority to below two-third.

Let consider the timing and severity. Will there be acompetitive re-ordering occurring, a new dominantdesign (brand, technology) appearing and the old firmdisappearing? This is very unlikely. Or, we call it a freakelection that will bring a new political party or a coalitionin power. There is a remote possibility that it will happen.

In the past, the PAP can hold the position for a longperiod and even prolong the evolving process, why cantthey continue to do so and enjoy economic profits likebefore?

The PAP of course wants to maintain the economic profitsas high as 2011, i.e. 93%. But the oppositions wants to

reduce the majority to two-third, i.e. 67%. So, the new(political normal) economic profits of the PAP will be 80%,if we take the mid-point.


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[Chapter 6: Generic Competitive Position Analysis]

PAP will continue its Integrated Strategies

In order to enjoy economic profits and absolute control inthe parliament, the PAP has to continue its integratedstrategies. The party has to position itself as a cost leaderand at the same time, to be different from other politicalparties in Singapore. It will continue to contest all the

parliament seats and most likely it is the only party to doso in the next election.

In 2011 General Election, except one group (5 members)constituency, all other parliament seats were contested.There were 6 opposition parties participated in theelection. The number of seats each party contested

ranging from 7 to 24. No single party, besides the PAP,has contested more than one-third (27) of the seats.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_election

The risks of PAP Integrated Strategies are oppositionparties will concentrate on the low-cost focused marketand niche (focus differentiation) segment. The dilemma of

stuck in the middle is real. This had happened in 2011when the main opposition party, The Workers Party (WP),made a breakthrough in one of the group constituencies.No opposition party has ever won a group representationconstituency since its establishment in the 1980s.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_electionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_electionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_electionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_electionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Singapore#2011_general_election


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Table 6.1: Generic Competitive Position

http://www2.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/dstools/gif/genstra.gif

Source of competitive advantageThe PAP is a dominant party. To maintain a one-partystate for so long itself is already a very unique situation. Ithas resources and candidates contesting all the seats.They have experience, expertise, first mover advantage,

brand, suppliers support and advertising (media controland promotion) at their sides.

Competitive scope within industryThe PAP is aiming to be the government so it has to bebroad base and representing all Singaporeans. Itscompetitive strengths cannot only be in a niche market(e.g. professionals, foreign-born citizens) or focused onlow cost (e.g. lower income voters, certain racial orreligious groups).

Integrated StrategiesIt is like Toyota, aiming to be the cost leader as well as tocontinue differentiating from other car manufacturers. ThePAP is even in a better position than Toyota. There are no

strong alternatives or competitors; heavy investment on


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R&D (regulations and boundary changes, think tanks) andhuman resources (scholarships to potential candidates)can be sponsored by the government funding; free

advertising are carried out by the main stream media, etc.

As a result, the PAP is able to market itself with very littlecost. Their logo is known to everyone at all marketsegments from young to old, from different race orlanguage or education background. At the same, they alsohave die-hard supporters who are willing to pay higherprice (even the party makes mistakes) to vote for the PAP.

They have also free access to niche markets like grassroots organization, religion bodies, chambers of commerce,clan associations etc.

Challenges are from focus on low cost and niche market

Since there is no broad base opposition party with strong

differentiation characters, the only breakthrough that analternative party can achieve is to focus on certain areas(to save costs and reach economy of scale) and nichemarket (traditional opposition strongholds).

WP is able to make the breakthrough by concentrating inthe eastern part of Singapore. They have concentrated alltheir resources in certain constituencies in the east and

maintain constant contacts and communications withbuyers.


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Table 6.2 Performance of PAP and selected oppositionparties in GE2011 (% of valid votes in contested wards)

GElection PAP WP NSP SDPGE2011 60.14% 46.6% 39.3% 36.8%

GE2006 66.6% 38.4% - 23.2%Source: Singapore-election.com

Table 6.3 Credibility of Selected Political Parties (IPSPost-GE Survey)

Mean PAP WP NSP SDP2006 4.1 3.6 - 2.3

2011 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.9Source: Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore

Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show that the main challenge forthe PAP is WP. The average percentage votes that WPreceived in their contested wards in 2011 were quite close

(46.6%) to the PAP and it is well ahead of other oppositionparties. In term of credibility, WP is also catching up (3.6against 3.9 for the PAP). Again, WPs credibility is alsoahead of other opposition parties.

WPs weakness is it is a regional party. It has yet to reachout to the whole of Singapore. It only contested 23 seats in

the parliament in 2011. By 2016 or 2017, it is very unlikelythey will contest all the (87) parliament seats. The partyhas clearly stated that they are not ready to take over thegovernment and wants to concentrate on building theirpower base in the eastern part of Singapore. WP seems toadmit they have yet to realize the full benefits of learningcurve.


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The generic competitive position for WP, strategicallyspeaking, will be continued to be in focused low-cost andniche markets in 2016.

As a strategy consideration, as they dont want to form thegovernment, they will most likely not contesting morethan 51% of the seats, i.e. 44 seat under the current 87- seatparliament. In 2016, WP will certainly contest more wardsthan 2011 but may purposely choose to contest less than50% of the seats.

The two recent by-elections (http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/andhttp://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/) in 2012 and 2013 were wonby WP. This clearly shows the popularity of the party inthe eastern side of Singapore. The 2013 by-electionshowed a swing of 10% towards WP making the partycapturing one more parliament seat.

Besides WP, the other opposition parties will need to catchup in average percentage votes obtained, credibility andpopularity. There is a wider gap between the PAP andthese opposition parties. They may have some wildcatbreakthroughs but the impact will be limited. This is whyfreak election result may not happen in the next election.

The political strategic maps in Singapore in the nextelection in 2016 will look like the followings:(Assuming the x- and y-axis as average percentage votes andcredibility, and the third factor is number of seats contested)

PAP is the only big circle contesting all the seats, withhigh average percentage votes and credibility. They are

adopting integrated strategies and want to maintain costleader and differentiation competitive position.
http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/


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WP is the only mid-size circle contesting less than half ofthe seats, coming closer and matching the PAP in averagepercentage votes and credibility. But their competitive

position will be different from the PAP. They will look forniche market and low-cost focused segment.

Other opposition parties will form different small circleswith weaker positions in average percentage votes andcredibility. Some may contest as many seats as WP and asa result, the election may see more multi-cornercompetitions.

One thing to note, Singapore parliament election is first passthe post system. There is only one winner in the contestedconstituency. Candidates backed by parties with loweraverage percentage votes and credibility will havedisadvantages in winning a contest, no matter how manycandidates they are sponsoring in the election.

Assuming WP only contests in 40 seats in the next electionand they manage to improve their average percentagevotes to 50% in their contested seats, this will give WP 20seats in the parliament. In addition to some wildcatbreakthroughs by other opposition parties, the total seatslost to the oppositions may be 26.

The PAPs average percent votes will reduce to below 60%,say 55%. A 55% popular votes has 70% seats in theparliament, the PAP is still enjoying economic profits. IfWP contests fewer seats than 40 or bring in low qualitycandidates, then the seats lost to WP will be less. The PAPwill regain more economic profits, with less than 60%popular votes but enjoying 80% of the parliament seats.


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Table 6.4: Possible PAP majority and seats in theparliament

PAPMajority Totalseats PAP MPs PAPMPs % OppositionsMPs

2011 87 81 93% 6

Two-third 87 58 66.7% 29

70% 87 61 70% 26

75% 87 66 75% 21

80% 87 70 80% 17

85% 87 74 85% 13

# assuming there are no change in total seats in 2016

A win-win situation may be the PAP having economicprofits at 75%-80% level of parliament seats with slightlyfew than 60% popular votes. The PAP still has the two-third majority and the oppositions start to gain substantialseats in the parliament.

The evolving process for Singapore politics is incrementaland it is marching towards normality but yet to achievefull open competition and normal profits in 2016.


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[Chapter 7: Conclusions]

Reduced Economic Profits or Normal Profits

It is not sure how long the transition and evolution periodwill be. It is unlikely a freak election will happen in thenext election in 2016. After 2016, it is everyone guesses.

If there is no freak election, there will be no normal profits.The PAP will take the economic profits and the

oppositions, negative economic profits. How big will thereduction in economic profits (parliament seats) be willvery much depend on the strategies that the PAP and theoppositions adopt. WPs strategies are important to thePAP as the PAP wants to contain and restrict the growthof WP in the east of Singapore.

The economic profits of having more than 90% parliamentseats will be reduced due to open competition. Thecurrent 60% popular support level may even reduce tofurther. However, it will not result to normal profits if thePAP makes big changes and be more (and real) dynamic.The PAP will fight to have two-third majority or evenmore, even though averaged percentage votes obtainedmay fall below 60%.

In order to continue enjoy high economic profits (e.g. 80%parliament seats), the following strategies should beadopted:

Integrated strategies:The PAP will go for low-cost leader and differentiation by

contesting all the seats. It has an outstanding brand namewhich carries its unique characters, quality, and credibility.


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Not to mention, it is the only party capable to sendcandidates to all constituencies. (Chapter 6: GenericCompetitive Position Analysis)

Switching cost:Voters do want changes but they will also have toconsider the consequences. To many people, inside andoutside Singapore, the PAP is a very successful businessmodel. The passing of an experienced government maymean nothing to a corrupt and poor economy. It means alot to Singaporeans who are now one of the richest people

in the world. A proper emphasis of switching cost at theright time and place will have handsome returns to thePAP. (Chapter 4: Five Forces Analysis)

Real design and innovation:Electoral boundary changes; rule changes to benefitincumbent; court and defamation lawsuits; and even

detention without trial etc. are not real design andinnovation. The PAP needs real dynamism, not a designand innovation capability derived from its monopolyadvantages. The value chain of an open market needs newreal design and innovation to bring in value and maintaineconomic profits. Learning from other democracies, evenneighboring Malaysia, will help to improve this weak link.[Chapter 3: Capability Analysis]

Accept evolution and change:Singapore is a strange market and there is no CompetitiveLife Cycle. There is no shakeout or disruption in theelection industry. The new normal and open politicshave begun. There is no alternative to evolution andchange, the PAP has to accept the evolving changes. This

is a new challenge that will change the culture, core value,missions and actions of the party which has not been


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updated since 2003. [Chapter 5: Competitive CycleAnalysis]

Accept smaller economic profits:With the success of WP strategies of focused low-cost andniche market, other opposition parties will follow. Thereare always the possibilities of wildcat breakthroughs,especially candidates with very outstanding quality andpopularity. The PAP must psychologically prepare to losemore seats.

A freak election will not to happen in 2016 general election.However, to have 90% parliament seats is equally aremote target. As the competition is open up and it istowards normality, it is now a change game. The changesof Yin and Yang forces in both camps will decide theoutcome.

Whether reduced economic profits (the wish of the PAP)or normal profits (the wish of the oppositions) will takeplace in Singapore politics, is it too early to tell. The PAPis trying very hard by having direct and indirectconversation with the people. They are engaging in somechanges. The oppositions are also expanding and havebecome more aggressive.

It will be an interesting to see the outcome in 2016.


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Appendixes

1 Will PM Lee do a Chiang Ching-kuo inSingapore?

2 The efficient but ineffective PAP3 A divided Singapore is looking for a

unifying heart and voice as President

4 Sustainable Singapore or SustainablePopulation, does it matter under IPATmodel?

5 Press freedom and publication bias go handin hand in Singapore

Note:All the above materials can be found in

pijitailai.blogspot.com


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Appendix 1

Will PM Lee do a Chiang Ching-kuo in Singapore?

After May 7 election, PM Lee made some changes thatseem to be big changes in Singapore. Some observerseven said he had re-discovered himself and been fully incharge of the government by his own judgment (less theinfluence of Lee Kuan Yew).

It is too early to tell whether PM Lees commitment tochange and listen to the people will go deeper and becomea permanent change in Singapore politics.

However, comparing to Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan inthe 1980s, PM Lee is still far behind. Firstly, Chianginitiated political change without the pressure from voters.

Secondly, the changes that Chiang made have far greaterimpact and meaning than the changes announced recentlyby PM Lee.

Key changes made by PM Lee

The followings are the key changes introduced by PM Lee:

* Announcing a younger cabinet without MM, SM andother not so popular ministers;* Reviewing the ministerial pay and senior civil servants;* Reducing the demand on foreign workers;* Improving the public housing programme; and* Improving the public transport system.

If you compare these changes to Chiang Ching-kuo, may Iuse the famous quote? It is just a peanut.


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Chiang lifted martial law and media control

Let see what Chiang Ching-kuo did in Taiwan then wecan have a better understand of the meaning of change.He created a democratic system in which the people couldchoose their ruler. He lifted martial law and the ban onpolitical parties and non-official media.

These changes or contribution to Taiwan democracy areboth recognized by the Kuomintang and the Democratic

Progressive Party. This is something strange in Taiwanpolitics that these 2 parties rarely agree on one commonagenda.

PM Lee never touches on the ISA, the media, a fairerpolitical competition and system, even the role of electedPresident is confusing as many people are not clear about

its function after more than 20 years. The law ministerand a former senior minister need to come out to clarifythe appointment and function of the Elected President.

PM Lee recently announced changes may result to futureacknowledgement of the PAP and the oppositions but it isreally a bit too far from any impacting or influencingchange in Singapore politics.

Political elites attitudes towards democracy

Ching-fen Hu is his paper Taiwans Geopolitics andChiang Ching-Kuos Decision to Democratize Taiwanpointed out that political leadership can change thedemocratic process.

(http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china2.pdf)
http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china2.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china2.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china2.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china2.pdf


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Hu said: Taiwans successful transition from authoritarianregime to democracy suggests that neither a Leninist party

structure nor a Confucian cultural heritage is a bar todemocratization. Taiwans experience also clearlyillustrates that democracy can be achieved throughpolitical leadership, a mode of democratic transition thathas been emphasized in recent scholarship by SamuelHuntington, Bruce Dickson, and Steven Hood, thelattermost of whom argues that democratic transitions arebrought about by political elites who have changed their

attitudes about democracy.

Political learning and democracy

In the paper, Hu also stressed the importance of politicallearning that I am not sure whether it is equal to the PAPsstress of listening to the people.

Hu said this process has been described by NancyBermeo as political learning, meaning the process bywhich authoritarians come to realize the benefits, or insome cases their only option for survival, is to movetowards a democratic solution.

The paper further explained As the paramount leader of

the Kuomintang (KMT), the decision to move forwardwith Taiwans democratization in 1986 ultimatelybelonged to Chiang Chingkuo (CCK). Although CCKinitially supported the status quo, he eventually came torealize that a democratic solution would benefit the KMT,and that failure to liberalize the system could result inviolent conflict.


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We will have to wait and see the changes in attitude ofSingapore political elites and their political leaning aboutdemocracy from GE2011 and the coming Presidential

election.


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Appendix 2

The efficient but ineffective PAP

At the Deyi Nomination Centre, you could see theorganization efficiency of the PAP and the inefficiency ofthe oppositions. However, when came to effectiveness, itseemed to be the reverse.

Peter F. Drucker, a 20th century Austrian social scientist

and author of many books on organizational managementsaid that businesses should strive for effectiveness incontrast to mere efficiency. A quote from Drucker's book,The Effective Executive, says that "Efficiency is doingthings right, effectiveness is doing the right things."

Doing things right

The PAP has an excellent grassroots support and is able tosend many people to the nomination centres on thenomination day. They did it in an efficient way, dividinginto different GRC, SMC teams and arranging differenttime for them to march into the nomination centres. Daysbefore the nomination day, the PAP already did theplanning asking supports from the PAP branches, NTUC

and even RCs or CCCs. LKY even said that PA was alsopart of the PAP.

These people (I dont like to use the word supporters as Ibelieve some may not vote for the PAP eventually) weregiven some incentives to attend the nomination day event.Transport and food were provided as the PAP could get

sponsors easily.


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Due to efficient management, these people weredisciplined and obedience. Some could not take the heatand ambulance had to be called. And most of them are not

working like housewives, retired persons. Of course, therewere some die-hard supporters who took leave.

Doing right things

On the other side, you could see supporters of theoppositions coming in alone, 2 or 3 or in a group 5 or 6.Although some supporters came in blue, however, most of

them wore different colours.

They could only form part of the school field at DeyiSecondary School. However, when came to shouting forsupports. The opposition supporters were united andcheered for RP, SPP and WP candidates. If you look at theYouTube video, you will know what I mean.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsJtBeQLvgE

Almost all the PAP candidates only looked at their ownsupporters when they made their speeches. That includedPM Lee. Sometimes, the shouting was so loud that youcould not hear the speeches of the PAP candidates.

While there were many PAP people there, but they were

speechless, soundless; there were no cheer leaders; andthey did not even look like a united force even though allwore white.

2 examples of efficiency and effectiveness

You can find many descriptions and examples in modern

management books and publications about efficiency andeffectiveness. Here are 2 examples:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsJtBeQLvgEhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsJtBeQLvgEhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsJtBeQLvgE


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The buggy whips (like the PAP people) were delivered onor ahead of schedule at the lowest possible cost. (It mightbe no cost at all as they are many willing sponsors). This

company (like the PAP) was very efficient.

However, the company (like the PAP) and its strategistswere not very effective. The company (like the PAP) wasdoing the wrong things efficiently. If they (the PAP) hadbeen effective, they would have anticipated theimpending changes (expectation, desires of Singaporevoters) and gotten into a different market.

Example 2

Someone else (like the PAP CEC) marks the right knee(wrong strategies) for surgery. However skilled thissurgeon is (the powerful PAP), however fast he performs(getting people to nomination centres) the surgery (i.e.,

however efficient he is), this process will not be effective.When the patient awakens from the surgery, he will notbe a happy camper. (When the Singapore voters awake,they are very angry)

Why rally turnouts were so different?

The first example is about manufacturing - hardware and

the second is talking about care software (hearts).

There is a limit to the PAPs efficiency. When you need aparticipation of 10,000, 20,000 or 100,000 people, you needeffectiveness. There are common values or meanings forpeople to participate in a mass rally. Just like a footballmatch, you could see the difference between Singapore

lion vs. Malaysia tiger and the S-league matches. Why theformer could get a big turnout?


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There was no problem for the PAP to get 1,000, 2,000 oreven 5,000 to their rallies. But there is a limit on hardware

(sponsored logistics) and software (willingness to come).

If you consider Jasmine revolution, people who stoodagainst the authority were equipped with poor weaponsor no weapons at all. But how come an inefficient groupof people could become an effective force to overthrow theestablishments?


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Appendix 3

A divided Singapore is looking for a unifying

heart and voice as President.

When we enter the polling stations on 27 August, onething for sure is we are NOT electing the governmentwhich has already been formed in May. In fact, it is astrong government controlling 81 out of the 87 seats in theParliament.

The result of the Presidential election will NOT collapsethe government. On the contrary, the Parliament canoverthrow the veto decision of the President with two-third majority.

No danger of weak government

There is no danger of a weak government or an ineffectivegovernment. Hence, Dr Tony Tan believes that with theright leadership, there's no need for Singaporeans to fearthe future.

Indeed, the government is too strong, for example, therecently case of Aljuned GRC, and it needs a caringPresident to heal the differences between the governmentand the people.

We must have confidence on ourselves and our country.Dr Tony Tans confidence for the future is different fromus. His future is a pair of old spectacles. We need a futurewith new changes.


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The PAP government is running the country now and willcontinuing to do so until the next general election whichwill not only take place 5 years later.

There should be no fear and worry to vote for a candidateother than Dr Tony Tan. Voting is compulsory and secret.

Government can work with whoever is elected

Speaking on the eve of Nomination Day, PM Lee stressedthat it is important for Singapore to have a good President,

and for the President to work closely with the government.

He added that his government will work with the man chosen byvoters, whoever he is.

So, if you think Tan Jee Say is a good President, then youshould vote for him. The definition of good President is

defined by you, the voters, not the government. Thegovernment must respect the choice of the people andwork closely with the President.

The Presidential Elections Committee, in assessing thesuitability of each hopeful, was satisfied that Mr Tan KinLian, Dr Tony Tan, Dr Tan Cheng Bock and Mr Tan JeeSay are all men of integrity, good character and reputation.

All candidates have integrity, good character andreputation. You have a choice not to veto for Dr Tony Tan.

What we do need now is a President different from thepast. We need a President with a heart to voice out theconcerns of the people. He has to be different from the

PAP government otherwise there will have groupthinking from top to bottom.


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King in the losing kingdom

The Aljunied incident is another case that peoples voiceand choice are not respected by the government and if wecontinue to elect Dr Tony Tan as President, then thesituation will not change, the PAP will continue to usetheir government machinery (HDB, PA, etc) to bully thepeople.

Speaking to reporters before his Meet the People Session

yesterday, a visibly worked-up Mr Low Thia Khiang said:"The way I look at it is ... it seems to me to be the case thatsome Residents' Committees behave like the king in theirown kingdom ... They expect to be treated (with) priority."

He added: "Now they want to cut out - after they lostAljunied GRC - part of the common property, to be their

own kingdom ... (and) to impose conditions on peoplewho want to use the premises." (Today, 25 Aug)

The President as an independent mind and non-politicalperson can remind the government to be neutral on thismatter.

If allegations are false, Dr Tony Tan should sue

Throughout the campaign, there are several rumoursregarding to Dr. Tony Tans family. Even all his threesons issued statement to clarify the matter, the voters stillhave doubt.

Dr Tony Tan should sue whoever spreads the rumours

and not just felt that he was 'deeply disappointed' by


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these online allegations. Disappointment will not kill theallegations.

Dr Tony Tan is close to the PAP and he is not Ong TengCheong. In all his interviews, discussions and talks, hewants to continue to be a pro-PAP President. If you like itthis way, then you vote for him.

Otherwise, look for a heart, or a high-5. A dividedSingapore urgently needs a caring President with a heartand voice out their concerns.


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Appendix 4

Sustainable Singapore or Sustainable Population,

does it matter under IPAT model?

During the parliament debate on Population White Paper, boththe PAP government and WP used sustainability to arguetheir cases. One used it for Singapore (WP) and the other usedit for Population (PAP). Really, does it make any difference?

The PAP governments white paper wants to achieve ASustainable Population for A Dynamic Singapore.However, WP argues for A Dynamic Population for aSustainable Singapore. Which argument will give us abetter living environment and quality of life?

A.Using population to achieve a dynamic Singapore orB.Using Singapore to achieve a dynamic population.

IPAT equationIPAT equation is commonly used for environment impactanalysis and as we know the environment will affect thequality of life of Singapore core.

I = PAT is the lettering of a formula put forward to

describe the impact of human activity on the environment.

I = P A TIn words:Human Impact (I) on the environment equals the productof P= Population, A= Affluence, T= Technology. Thisdescribes how our growing population, affluence, and

technology contribute toward our environmental impact.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environment_(biophysical)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environment_(biophysical)


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The equation can aid in understanding some of the factorsaffecting human impacts on the environment.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_%3D_PAT)

Singapore is an immigrant country and sinceindependence in 1965, Singapore has increased itspopulation as well as its economy rapidly. So much sothat we have to think of sustainability in terms of manyaspects: land, environment, population, economy, socialdevelopment etc.

A country is made up of its people, especially its citizens.In the recent Parliament debate, the life quality of citizencore was the key points of argument.

Table

http://www.thwink.org/sustain/articles/011_IPAT_Equ

ation/index.htm

However, Singapores case is unique as this is differentfrom the IPAT equation for developed countries and looksmore towards an IPAT model for developing countries.

IPAT for developed countriesTo reduce the human impacts on environment, the model

for developed countries will look like this:

P stable (population stable or reducing)A down (high GNP, need to cut down consumption)T down (using technology more environmental friendlyproduction)

A developed economy will try to make changes to reduceconsumption and improved technology to reduce the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_impacts_on_the_environmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_impacts_on_the_environment


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environment impacts. A better environment or healthyenvironment will improve the quality of life. This is whywe talk about Swiss standard of living many years ago.

The challenges or options for change are A and T: to cutdown the consumption per person (due to affluence) andto bring down the environmental damage per unit ofconsumption (help by technology).

IPAT for developing countriesTo reduce the human impacts on environment, the

developing countries will do the followings:

P up (e.g. population reduction through birth control,education, jobs for women)A up (becoming affluence, GNP per capita increasing,consumptions up, to reduce consumption for less stress onenvironment)

T down (using latest technology for production)

A developing country will try to make changes to reducepopulation and consumption; and improved technologyused to reduce the environment impacts. A betterenvironment or healthy environment will improve thequality of life (e.g. longer life span, better education andhealth care). This is the early days of Singapore from 1965

to maybe 1980s.

The challenges or options for change are P, A and T. Thereare big population size and continuing growing;increasing affluence leading to higher consumption perperson and technology/ways to bring down theenvironmental damage per unit of consumption.

The case of Singapore


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Singapores case is unique that we are a developedcountry but facing the challenges like a developingcountry, especially from the arguments of the government

published (parliament endorsed) Population White Paper.

P Up (Singapore wants to increase population size bybringing in more immigrants)A Up (emphasis on economic growth and to increaseincome further so consumption will go up)

T down (in basically 2 approaches: using advanced and

latest technology for manufacturing activities and littleagricultural activities. Also Singapore is a service industryeconomy. It is able to cut down environmental impacts ordamage by improving technology in manufacturing andservice industry as well as transferring someenvironmental damages to other countries, especially inprimary and agricultural industries)

Sustainable Population or Sustainable Singapore?The PAP government white paper wants to have ASustainable Population for A Dynamic Singapore. Theysuggest:

P up (increase population to a possible worst case scenarioof 6.9 million)

A up (3-4% per year 2013-2020, 2-3% per year 2020-2030)T down

However, the opposition Worker Party (WP) wants tohave A Dynamic Population for a Sustainable Singapore.In this case,

P stable (cap at 5.9 million)


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A stable (slower growth rate, 2.5%-3.5% 2013-2020, 1.5%-2.5% 2020-2030)T down

WP arguments for less population increased are:

http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/

Is Singapore a developed country?

In many ways, the PAP is denying our achievement andsuccess. It still considers Singapore as a developingcountry (and there are many advantages in theinternational world for being a developing country).

A developing country uses population (P) to grow

economy, and increase consumption due to affluence andimproved income (I).

The PAP government is using the IPAT equation fordeveloping countries to deny citizen core to have a betterstandard of living and quality of life.

It is not surprise that the low income workers do not havereal income increase for more than 10 years. Despite
http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/http://wp.sg/2013/02/a-dynamic-population-for-a-sustainable-singapore-reclaiming-back-singapore-mp-sylvia-lim/


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affluence we still have housing, education, transportproblems.

After all, in the eyes of the PAP leaders, Singapore is still adeveloping country and the PAP wants to keep the statusquo for as long as they are in power!


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Appendix 5

Press freedom and publication bias go hand in

hand in Singapore

Singapore was placed 149th in the World Press FreedomIndex 2013, a further drop of 14 places. This is contrary toSingapore income position in the world#2. So, Singaporecan achieve economic development without pressfreedom.

No wonder the ruling Peoples Action Party dismissed thelow press ranking#3. In fact, all mainstream media arecontrolled by the government. The Singapore PressHoldings#4 and Mediacorp#5 are the only authorizedpublisher and broadcaster.

The 149th poor ranking wasnt mentioned in local media.Surprisingly, even Singapore based yahoo.sg also darednot provide the details#6. The website gave a publicationbias #6 headline: Watchdog launches global press freedom'indicator'.

Just imagine international news sites like yahoo, alsoexercises self-control. So, when reading article likeMedical Journal Cites Misleading Research#7, one willfind many similar examples of publication bias inSingapore.

Perhaps, this is the prize for economic achievement.

More about publication bias:


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Publication bias is a bias with regard to what is likely tobe published, among what is available to be published.

Not all bias is inherently problematic for instance, a biasagainst publishing lies is often a desirable bias but oneproblematic and much-discussed bias is the tendencyofresearchers, editors, and pharmaceutical companies tohandle the reporting of experimental results thatarepositive (i.e. showing asignificantfinding) differentlyfrom results that arenegative(i.e. supporting thenullhypothesis) or inconclusive, leading to a misleading bias

in the overall published literature.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publication_bias

#1Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontires, orRSF) has just released its annual press freedom ranking

World Press Freedom Index 2013 last month.

Singapores ranking dropped 14 positions from 135th lastyear to current 149th. It appears that Singapores rankinghas been getting worse over the years:

2009 133rd2010 136th

2011/12 135th2013 149thAt 149th, Singapores ranking is even worse thancountries like Cambodia (143rd), Congo (142nd), Ethiopia(137th), Zimbabwe (133rd), Libya (131st), Angola (130th),Algeria (125th).

Singapore is only slightly better than Myanmar (151st).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Researchhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Researchhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Researchhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significancehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_resulthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_resulthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_resulthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_hypothesishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_hypothesishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_hypothesishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_hypothesishttp://en.w

sustainable economic profits for a dynamic pap

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