t actical solutions - lehigh conference of...

FALL 2014

A JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL TACTICAL TRAINING ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONALS

actical Solutions

T

Alexandra Jones on Motorcycle Gangs and Extremism

Fred T. Leland on Mindset and Winning

Robert Trivino on The After Action Review

George Williams on Integrating Police and Fire/EMS

NDEXTactical Solutions

Tactical Solutions – FALL 2014

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

by R. Trivino

by G. Williams

DEPARTMENTS

I

From The Editorp.6

Integrating Police and Fire/EMS Within Active Shooter Responsep.18

by Dr. R. MartinelliTo Chase or Not to Chase?p.34

by F. T. LelandMindset and Winning is About Much More Than Words, Isn’t it?p.46

by L. Hayes

Leadership

The After Action Review—The Most Important Tool for Any Leaderp.7

by A. Jones

Transformers: Motorcycle Gangs and Extremismp.38

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

The End of SWAT as We Know It (But a Bright New Future)p.13

3

CONTENTS

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

Tactical Solutions

This journal is provided to members of the InternationalTactical Training Association-ITTA. The information presentedis from various sources from which there can be no warranty orresponsibility by the ITTA Corporation, or the publisher as tothe legality, completeness and accuracy. The informationdescribed and portrayed in this journal is based upon the per-sonal experience of the author. The author’s entire experiencemay not be reported or otherwise verified. Nothing in thisjournal should be construed as a substitute for a manufacturer’smanual or for professional training.

The ITTA does not, by the presentation of any advertisement,product evaluation, article or editorial, create any warranty,either expressed or implied. The opinions expressed in the edi-torial and articles are those of the authors, and do not necessari-ly express the opinions or positions of the Board of Directors ofthe ITTA or employees. The individual author represents tac-tics discussed in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS. This publicationshould in no way be considered an endorsement or recommen-dation by the ITTA Corporation.

All rights reserved. No portion of may be reproduced without prior written permission from theITTA Corporation.

Firearms SafetyAlways adhere to and obey firearms safety rules:

The individual manufacturer and retailer set the prices anddetails for items featured in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS. They are subject to change without notice.

Certain products featured in this journal may be subject to pro-hibitions, restrictions or special licensing for sale, possession orinterstate transport. Check with local and federal authoritiesregarding the legality of purchase, possession and transport.

Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to International Tactical Training Association ITTA,P.O. Box 59833, Chicago, Illinois 60659, United States of America

DISCLAI

MERS

4

FALL 2014

E D I T O R - I N - C H I E FLAWRENCE LUJAN •[email protected]

P R E S I D E N TAARON CUNNINGHAM •[email protected]

A D V A N C E D T A C T I C A L T R A I N I N G -L A W E N F O R C E M E N T D I V I S I O N

MARK STEPHENSON •[email protected]

S E C R E T A R YSUNG JOO LEE • [email protected]

G R A P H I C A R T I S TVANESSA M.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE isthe digital Journal of the InternationalTactical Training Association. Written

by and for special operators, policeoperators, and intelligence officers and

for all those in the mission againstcrime and terror worldwide.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINEis published in -December,

-March, -June, and -September

For inquiries regarding advertising inTACTICAL SOLUTIONS, please email

[email protected]

For inquiries regarding existing TACTICAL

SOLUTIONS editions, please emailTACTICAL SOLUTIONS at

[email protected]

Or Contact Us At:

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINEP.O. BOX 59833, CHICAGO, IL 60659 USA

Tel: 872-221-ITTA Fax: 872-221-5882

CONTRIBUTING PHOTOGRAPHERS

(Sgt. Craig Allen Hillsboro PD, Sgt. John Crosby US Army, LCpl Matt Myers USMC,

Msgt Scott Thompson USAF, )

ON THE COVER

Active Shooter Drill, Hillsboro Police Department, Oregon

CONTRIBUTING WRITERS

Alexandra Jones, Louis Hayes, Fred T. Leland, Dr. Ron Martinelli, Robert Trivino, George Williams

T

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

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GET A GREAT DEAL, JUST CONTACT US @ [email protected]

Autumn is upon us and the seasonal changes have begun. It’s time to break

out that cold weather gear and to get ready for cold weather operations.

Around the world we find a united coalition against the Islamic State (aka

ISIL or ISIS) as well as against the Khorasan group. There are currently 50

nations pledging support and to date, the United States and five Arab coun-

tries—Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—

have conducted military strikes.

Teamwork is the building block of all successful operations. Here we see it

at an international level and daily we see the fruits of it as we successfully

work with both our internal and external team members.

This month we discuss whether mindset and winning is about more than

just words. We present an excellent overview on outlaw motorcycle gangs

(OMG) and a change from the traditional to the extreme. Any operator

understands the importance of after action review (AAR) of operations—

they aid in our teams growth both at the individual and at the team level,

so we bring to you an in-depth look at the AAR. The values of specialist or

generalist operators are also discussed at length. Integration of the bomb

tech was presented in our last edition and we bring to you now the integra-

tion of the Fire/EMS to Active Shooter Response. And lastly we present to

you discussion on whether to get into that foot chase or not.

So get ready to now expand your knowledge and tactical toolbox, remain

that razors edge and to be ready to apply that skill when called upon.

Lawrence LujanEditor-in-ChiefTactical Solutions Magazine

Tactical SolutionsFALL 2014

6 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

LETTER

EDITOR

fromthe

All organizations whether military orcivilian conduct actions or executeplans in order to achieve an objective.Every plan of action has a desired out-come and many times we see theresult of hard work in a different light.That is, the outcome was differentthan what we envisioned or planned

for. Most leaders reflect on their per-formance or tasks to identify key areasthat were performed incorrectly andmost times leaders stop at this point.They consider it a success once theyhave identified the area(s) that needfixing and will try not to let thataction happen again.I have a military background andthose that have one similar to mine

understand that the military uses theAfter Action Review (AAR) as a toolto help their units identify problemsthat need fixing. The Army has apublication called, "The Leader'sGuide to The After-Action Reviews"which guides Army leaders to under-stand their purpose and how to devel-op and conduct an AAR. This guidedefines the purpose of the AAR as, "to

eadershipL

7TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

Written by Robert Trivino

The Most Important Tool for Any Leader

THE AFTERACTION REVIEW

eadershipLprovide feedback essential to correct-ing training deficiencies." As a formeroperational member and junior leaderin the Tier 1 Army unit, it is my opin-ion that my former unit has masteredall aspects of the AAR. This hasequated to the unit's many successes.It is due to my time assigned to thisunit and seeing firsthand how theAAR is utilized that I believe that thevast majority of all organizations, mili-tary and civilian, can improve theirAARs or develop an AAR format fortheir organization. First, I want to talk about how theAAR is viewed in my former unit.The AAR is a no holds barred, profes-sional discussion about a past event(real-world operation, small event,training, etc.). Everyone attendingone of our AARs understands severalimportant personal issues. First andforemost is the fact that the AAR isNOT a tool to embarrass, blame, com-pare, or judge another member or partof the organization. It is also veryimportant that everyone attending theAAR must have thick skin; all atten-

dees must check their egos at the AARdoorway. If this does not happen,your AAR will be askew with atten-dees looking to save face or to protecttheir insecurities, instead of focusingon identifying the critical areas thatwent wrong, and most importantly,how to fix them. Finally, and proba-bly from its inception, a unique cul-ture was created within the unit thatallows everyone serving in its ranks tospeak with candor about their actions.This very important concept is — it isok to make a mistake. Armed withthis concept, each member is comfort-able admitting when they made a baddecision, performed poorly, orscrewed something up. With this con-cept in mind, I must clarify one thing— if you continue to make the samemistake then you will be reprimand-ed, counseled, and if need be, eventu-ally fired. I would like to move on to a veryimportant concept that exits in the lawenforcement world and that is theconcept of zero tolerance (automaticpunishment for infractions of a stated

rule, with the intention of eliminatingundesirable conduct-OxfordDictionary). In my limited experienceworking with the LE community, thisconcept tends to permeate the workenvironment to the point that mostpolice officers can't afford to make a

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS8

“If you are a leader and yourpolice officers are afraid to

make mistakes in training orare not willing to participate

fully in fear of making a mistakethen you must change the workenvironment or the culture thatyour people operate in. Take alook at your organization and

make a change, for the better.”

9TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

mistake, even in training. Zero toler-ance should only be applied when anindividual violates the law, willinglybreaks organizational rules, andknowingly neglects the organization'sestablished legal, moral and ethicalstandards. If you are a leader and

your police officers are afraid to makemistakes in training or are not willingto participate fully in fear of making amistake then you must change thework environment or the culture thatyour people operate in. Take a look atyour organization and make a change,

for the better. I know based on my interaction intraining and working with the lawenforcement community, that my for-mer unit is an anomaly. Most organi-zations do not have the—it's ok tomake a mistake—concept as one of

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS10

implementing changes to tactics, orsomething as simple as ensuring allvehicles are tanked up at the end ofthe training day. Remember, in orderto see the full benefits of your AAR,ensure that you identify someone thathas the responsibility to follow up on

all the issues to theend. Also, leadersmust supervise andspot check to makesure it gets done. Here are some rec-ommended keys tosuccess for yourAARs. Remember,the AAR must havehonest, professionaldialogue and it mustfocus on the out-come or the resultsof your event. Youwant to focus onfour main areas:1. Identify thethings that wentwell and why.2. Identifythings that wentwrong and why.3. Collectivelydevelop a plan to fixthe problems thatoccurred. 4. Follow-through—superviseand spot check tomake sure it getsdone.

In order to accom-plish this leadersand subordinatesshould take notesprior to, during, andafter an event—thisis key. Try to con-duct your AAR witheveryone thatattended the event.

If everyone cannotattend you must have representativesfrom each of the organizations thatparticipated. If there are multipleagencies that took part in the eventyou must include those external agen-cies so that everyone can benefit fromthe process. For most LE deliberate

the mistakes of others and here is thekey—we follow through to ensure wedon't make the same mistake again.How do we do this? We attachresponsibility and give ownership tosolving the problem(s). For example,after an AAR, most times it will be the

senior non-commissioned officer thatis responsible for ensuring that allidentified issues are not just noted butthat identified solutions are also set inplace. This includes but is not limitedto changes to standard operating pro-cedures (SOPs), changes to policies,

the bricks in their organization's foun-dation. I've learned that most LE per-sonnel want to be correct and willdefend their position to protect theirimage. This is a zero tolerance atti-tude and your organization’s leader-ship enforces it. If you are the leaderyou must work tochange this, if you arethe "boss", then I recom-mend you change itimmediately. Leadersmust allow their peopleto make mistakes, espe-cially in training.Operationally, mistakeswill happen and it'simportant to capturethese mistakes, learnfrom them and sharethe information witheveryone. The AAR is the tool thatwe use to fix all of ourproblems in training,real world missions,deployment prepara-tion, and what haveyou. It is common prac-tice for teams to conductAARs after all trainingsessions. An AAR isdone after each andevery run through theshoot house, whether itwas a live fire scenarioor a dry run for teamtraining, no event is toosmall for an AAR. It isutilized at all levels andfor almost any event,any event that we wantto improve upon. Mostpeople understand thatthe Army's Tier 1 unitfunctions well and arehands down the best atwhat they do, so I wantto ask a question—Howdo you think we got tothat point? Well, I'll tellyou, we got here by making mistakes,conducting AARs to fix problems, andfollowing through with identifiedsolutions to ensure that we didn'tmake the same mistakes again. Thatis why we function so well. We'velearned from our own mistakes and

“We've learnedfrom our ownmistakes and

the mistakes ofothers and here

is the key - wefollow through toensure we don'tmake the samemistake again.”

eadershipL

ing the AAR may not always be ahappy camper. Remember to be hon-est with yourself, your people, and thetask at hand. Most AARs will focuson the negative aspects of an event.Remember, the overarching themeshould be to focus on bettering theorganization or the team. The follow-ing is an example AAR format for aLE preplanned mission or deliberateoperation.Conduct Roll Call

1. The leader reviews the situation andmission.2. Planning process

• Start from initial notification• Discuss leader actions• ID issues prior to issuing the plan• Allow each team to respond in order

3. Infiltration to Target Area • Begin at the start point• End at the Last Covered & Concealed Position (LCC)in order

4. Actions at (LCC)• Allow each team to respondin order

5. Actions on target• Starts when teams depart the LCC - cover each phase separately, this will help it flow, (Movement to breach, breach, assault, clear, back clear, all secure, post assault)• Ends when leader calls ‘Exfil’ • Allow each team to respondin order during each phaseof the process

6. Exfiltration from the target area • Starts at the command toExfil (Loading vehicles, PCmovement)• Allow each team to respond

operations, you must allow time foryour sub elements to conduct theirown small team AAR’s before comingtogether for the formal AAR. This isimportant and allows all team mem-bers (everyone on the ground) to voicetheir concerns and to provide inputbased on what they saw and did.Finally, I must say, do not air yourorganizations dirty laundry, unless itis of benefit to the entire group. Keepthese issues for your own internalAAR. If you do "call-out" someonedue to their performance, you musttry and use your organizations estab-lished performance standards togauge said performance. This willkeep the person that is called out frombecoming defensive. Once the poorperformance is identified try to linkthe poor performance to follow-ontraining. Below is a recommended format foryour AAR. Don't waste your time onantiquated methods such as askingeveryone in the room for one goodthing and one bad thing that they sawduring the event. This does nothingto help the process and will actuallyslow things and keep people fromthinking through the entire process.Leaders must be responsible for con-ducting the AAR and managing it. Donot let it get out of control and spininto a finger pointing session, remem-ber to focus on the outcome of theevents and try to identify solutions toproblems. Do not finish your AARwithout identifying solutions to prob-lems or establishing a second meetingafter some thought has been put todeveloping a solution. Finally, leadersmust understand that everyone leav- T

Robert Trivino is a Native American, Pueblo Indian, and a former United States Army Ranger

and a 1st SFOD-D (Delta) unit member. His military service ranged from tactical ground missions

to senior-level staff operations, including working at the highest levels within the Department of

Defense and the Pentagon. He is the owner and President of Evergreen Mountain LLC, a compa-

ny that specializes in providing cutting edge training in leadership, tactics and firearms.

About the Author

11TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

in order7. Post Assault

• Covers team actionsafter the mission• Allow each team torespond in order

8. Anything else that a team membersaw that needs to brought to every-one's attention. 9. Leader(s) determine who is respon-sible for following through on estab-lished solutions to identified prob-lems. Leaders must follow through,spot check and support this person.

If a team member identifies a prob-lem, collectively attempt to find asolution at that point. Do not bypassthe problem until a solution is identi-fied. If the group cannot find a solu-tion, take note and continue on, thencome back to this at the end. The AAR is a great tool, but you mustuse it to reap the benefits. Be honestand open-minded and you will startto see your organization improve ifyou implement the AAR process intoyour everyday work environment.Sometimes, the best ideas come fromthe newest person on the teambecause he or she brings a unique per-spective to the environment free ofsocial norms and the organization'sculture (which can sometimes hinderour thought process). This fresh per-spective coupled with the experienceand knowledge of seasoned membersof the organization is the key to posi-tive change. Eventually, the AAR will become second nature and yourorganization will change, for the better.

The days of the SWAT "bread truck"are left to 1970s television shows. Anydisparity between SWAT cops andpatrol officers continues to shrink. Thegap that separated revolver-carryingbeat cops and armor-clad SWAT oper-ators has narrowed, evidenced by thesuperior equipment being deployedby everyday (and every night!) neigh-borhood police cars. Less obvious tothe onlooker is the tactical trainingnow available to patrol officers.

I have been saying it for years.

Those who sepa-rate SWAT movements and strategiesfrom those of the rest of police unitshave fallen for the Specialist trap.Today's SWAT teams must train andprepare so their movements smoothlyintegrate into any police departmentunit, assignment, or division for anyproblem or incident. And this meansan end to the way we've come toknow SWAT.

The vision

The military uses a phrase ForceMultiplier. In civilian law enforce-ment, that term may not sit the best.Maybe a slight adjustment to Multiplier or Multiplier ismore palatable to Americans.Regardless of the phrasing, the futureof SWAT is:• Increase safe tactical options

along a spectrum of strategies.

eadershipL


Written by Louis Hayes

THE END OF SWATAS WE KNOW IT

(BUT A BRIGHT NEW FUTURE)


eadershipL• Act as strategic and tactical

leadership among other units.• Increase the effectiveness of

current manpower (patrol, K9,narcotics, gang, investigations, etc.)

• Deploy side-by-side with officers with less tactical experience, skills, and training.

• Using existing firstresponders as fellow tacticians in teams for the duration of incidents.

So instead of havingtwenty SWAT operatorsreplace the first respond-ing patrol officers at acritical incident scene, theoperators integrate them-selves into leadershippositions among firstresponders. These SWAToperators can positivelyaffect the response andactions of others, therebymultiplying their effec-tiveness. Instead of a fullcontingent of SWAT oper-ators serving high-riskwarrants, a smaller groupof tactical experts developthe strategy and tacticalplan...and deploy aheadof or alongside originat-ing units such as bomb,narcotics, fugitive, ordetectives. In cases ofactive killers or terrorism,ten SWAT operators areno longer just ten individ-uals on one team - theyare potentially the leadersfor TEN TEAMS!

Making it happen

But in order for this tobecome a reality, two changes musttake place. The first is that there mustbe a change in the (tactical) trainingmethods for the general population ofpolice officers. The second change isthat SWAT must change the way theytrain and prepare.

What is wrong with non-SWAT tacti-cal training?

- as uttered by a fellowfirearms instructor. The attitude was

such that there was an impenetrablebarrier that defined the upper limits oftactical and weapons ability for patrolofficers. There is another shortcoming:that there are only two options forpatrol (or other non-SWAT) units...

1. Wait-for-SWAT2. Balls-to-the-Wall

Those two strategies don't allow for alot of "speeds" or options in between.Lastly, there is a certain amount of"dance rehearsal" in police trainingthat does not mesh well with evenminor changes in terrain, situation,manpower, or positioning. Recall yourlast felony car stop. Did it look like it

was "supposed to in training"?

What is wrong with SWAT training?In a nutshell, it's too damned inflexi-ble. The rigidity of formations or tac-tics requires a tremendous amount of

practice (or is it choreogra-phy?). That's the recipe

that makes SWATextremely good atwhat they do - butalso why they excludeothers, hopefully inad-vertently, from theirtactics. Because themovements are sorehearsed, they are notvery adaptable whentrying to bring in oth-ers without the samelevel or exact type oftraining. These opera-tors have paintedthemselves into a cor-ner, without the abilityto conform or adjustoutside their "team."This is most clearlyproven by the inabilityfor different SWATunits to work along-side each other - theirtactics aren't compati-ble. I've seen this notonly between twocompletely differentlocal teams....but alsowithin the SAMEdepartment's teamthat has broken intodifferent platoons.Imagine two groups ofoperators wearing thesame badge and patch,under the same com-

mander, which havemorphed into two dis-

tinct animals that cannot play witheach other!

Part of the answer is This means that

SWAT and non-SWAT units alike mustagree upon a

that guide their movements, for-mations, responses, and tactics. Theconcepts must be general or universalenough so that anyone can work andcommunicate with anyone. There

“Today's SWAT teamsmust train and

prepare so theirmovements smoothly

integrate into anypolice department

unit, assignment, ordivision for any

problem or incident.And this means an

end to the way we'vecome to know SWAT”

T

Louis Hayes is a systems thinker for The Virtus Group, Inc., a firm dedicated to

the development of public safety leadership. He is a co-developer of The Illinois

Model™ law enforcement operations system (LEOpSys) and moderates several

courses rooted in its theory and concepts. He is a 17-year police officer, currently

assigned to a multi-agency tactical unit in Chicagoland. He is a patrolman first,

then a tactical officer, then a SWAT operator, then a PointMan - in that order.

About the Author

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS16

LEOpSys for all law enforcement.That day should be sooner than later.It just takes a little courage to makethe change.

must be a highly-adaptable system soall the parts of the machine worktogether for the problem. Once spe-cialization or technique takes prece-dence over concept, there will beincompatibility and in-adaptability.

This doesn't mean that SWAT teamslower their standards. No, not at all,but the change to concept-based train-ing is a big one....especially for experi-enced teams with lots of time together.I am also not suggesting that teams ofpatrol officers led by SWAT operatorswill function as effectively or efficient-ly as a same-sized group of SWATteammates. But what I do claim is thatfive patrol teams each led by SWAToperators have a higher potential forsuccess than four pure patrol teamsand one pure SWAT team.

We are all on the same team. We musttrain and prepare like it.

The deployment of full 30-man SWATteams is becoming limited to hostagerescue and long-term standoffs.Otherwise, operators are being askedto compliment other units such aspatrol, K9, narcotics, gang, investiga-tion, and fugitive teams. And thecohesion sucks. We have poorlytrained our specialty units in waysthat make them over-specialized, per-haps, a case of unintended conse-quences. The above-described futureof tactical policing is on the horizon.We must acknowledge its arrival andmake some much needed changes toour training methods.

One day we will have an overriding

eadershipL

We are allon the same

team. Wemust train

and preparelike it

Active Shooter events will likelybe with us forever. If it is not thementally ill seeking a sense ofaggrandizement or revenge, itwill be the Salafist bent on theworld caliphate (and, unfortu-nately, our Mumbai and Beslanexperiences are coming) or someother form of terrorist act (or actof war). In the past, the responsehas been seen solely as a lawenforcement response. It waslaw enforcement’s job to get tothe scene as early as possible tostop the suspect from harmingany additional victims. After thescene was determined to be com-pletely safe—often taking moreone-hour—firefighters and/ortheir EMS counterparts werethen permitted access to the vic-

actics Techniques and ProceduresT

Written by George Williams

INTEGRATINGPOLICE ANDFIRE/EMSWITHIN THEACTIVESHOOTERRESPONSE



tims who had been bleeding anddying from the moment of beingshot.

Recognition is growing that theFire Service with its EmergencyMedical Services (EMS) capabili-ties brings life-saving skills thatare just as necessary to preservelife as that of stopping the sus-pect’s rampage. Active shooterincidents now become a “PublicSafety” response, integrating thepolice and fire/EMS services intoan efficient and highly effectivereply to any criminal mass casu-alty incident. How Public Safetyresponds to this high casualtyincident means the differencebetween life and death for notonly those victims who have notyet been shot or injured, but alsofor those who are wounded andfacing life-threatening injuries.

In any response method, timehas proven that the less complex-ity a method involves, the morelikely it will work. Simplicityequals reproducibility.Complexity creates friction, andfriction is the enemy of opera-tional success. Likewise, a sys-

TechniquesandProcedures

acticsT

tem of response that is highlyintuitive and requires personnelto operate within their existingskill and knowledge sets is morelikely to be successful. Aresponse method should beselected based upon its initialdegree of training difficulty andexpense, as well as the intensityand cost of sustainment trainingnecessary to maintain the capa-bility of personnel to effectivelyrespond.

Two PrimaryResponseMethodsThere are two primary methodsof integration being implement-ed across the country: The use ofa secure Internal CasualtyCollection Point (CCP) in a“warm zone” inside the struc-ture, or the use of Rescue Teams(RT, sometimes referred to as a“Rescue Task Force”) to bring thewounded out of the structure toa CCP in a cold zone.

This is a provenlife-saving option where thewounded are quickly moved to asecure area within the structurefor purposes of quickly assessingand categorizing (triage), rapidcontrol of bleeding or clearing ofair passages (treatment), anddelivering that person to a defin-itive medical care facility (emer-gency surgery in an operating

room) as quickly as possible(transport). Fire personnel,escorted by armed police assecurity, enter the secure CCPand implement their MassCasualty Incident (MCI) proto-cols to process and transport themost critically wounded asquickly as possible to life-savingcare.

The team consists of 2-4police officers and 2 paramedicswho are trained to move as ateam into a cleared hot zone(although proponents of the RTstate that the team operates in awarm zone, the requirement ofballistic armor and movingthrough cleared but unsecuredareas argue against that assess-ment). As the team encounterswounded individuals, the para-medics stabilize and then trans-port the injured person in a tacti-cal manner to a CCP that issecure, generally outside of thestructure. The team then re-enters the structure, tacticallyclearing its way to the next vic-tim where the team’s efforts arerepeated until the structure iscleared of wounded.

Time is the enemy of the ActiveShooter response. The more timethe suspect has privacy and cansafely hunt his victims, thegreater number of casualtiesthere will be. And the longer ittakes to get the wounded todefinitive medical care, the morewho will suffer a preventable

death. Both methods operateunder the same time constraints:some of the wounded will die nomatter what type of medicalintervention they receive. Mostof those who will inevitably diewill expire within minutes ofbeing shot. Others who are seri-ously injured may die fromuncontrolled blood loss eventhough they might be saved byearly surgical intervention (e.g.,the TSA agent who was mur-dered on November 1, 2013 atLos Angeles InternationalAirport). Others can toleratedelays of hours before theirinjuries are life-threatening. It isthis group of the seriouslyinjured who will benefit mostfrom life-saving represented bythe efficient and effective inte-grated police-fire response.

Internal CCP,or RapidResponse &TreatmentMethod (R2TM) Dual PrioritiesThe R2TM response employs anintegrated response of police andfire/EMS to achieve simultane-ous dual life-saving priorities:• The rapid response by police tomitigate the imminent threat tolife of the suspect(s).




• The mitigation of the woundedthrough the safe and rapid intro-duction of fire/EMS personnelinto the scene to begin earlyMass Casualty Incident (MCI)protocols resulting in the rapidtransport of the injured.

The R2TM program operatesunder the concept of a time-lim-ited response. Upon notificationof a criminal mass casualty inci-dent in-progress, on-duty officersimmediately respond and makeentry, swarming the structurethrough multiple ingress points.These officers, singly and insmall teams of two or three (asofficers begin arriving simultane-ously) quickly move towardthreat indicators (shots, victimsfleeing, etc.), generally to the lastreported position of the suspect.The intent is to mitigate thethreat of the suspect, to controlcorridors and key architecturalaccess points, and limit themobility of the suspect(s), deny-ing access to additional victims.

Fire personnel simultaneouslystage nearby. Two crews mergeinto one apparatus with theirMCI trauma gear. The first arriv-ing apparatus delivers two firelieutenants and six to eight fire-fighter/EMTs/paramedics.Depending upon the initial intel-ligence as to the number injured,this can expand to another—oreven several—apparatus withcombined crews. What is at firsta very limited number of

responding officers who aremoving toward the indicators ofthreat or the last reported posi-tion of the suspect(s) typicallybecomes a wave of officers whoare responding from more dis-tant beats and nearby jurisdic-tions. This typically occurs with-in 5-7 minutes of the first officerentry. This late-arriving wave ofofficers transitions from suspectmitigation to victim life-savingtasks. • A police supervisor takes andsecures a Forward OperatingBase (FOB) within the structure.Security is established by up tothree officers. The FOB permitsbetter utilization of interiorresources prior to the establish-ment of the Unified Command(UC). The FOB supervisor coor-dinates responding officers,directing responding officers toeither make entry or, when thereare sufficient numbers of officersinvolved in suspect mitigationefforts, to respond to FireStaging. It is likely the FOB willtransition into the CasualtyCollection Point (CCP).• Responding officers notalready involved in suspect miti-gation efforts now report to firestaging to act as “Fire SecurityTeams.” These security teamswill provide security duringingress of fire personnel into theCCP.• A hasty Unified Command iscreated by the linking up of aBattalion Chief and WatchCommander or shift supervisor.This occurs at the Fire

Stage location.As the location of the suspect isnarrowed down, some officerspursuing mitigation efforts willbecome redundant. These aswell as additional officers enter-ing at this point transition theirfocus of efforts to life-savingefforts for the wounded. Assoon as the location of the CCP isdeclared by the FOB/CCP super-visor, they begin moving thewounded to the secured CCP inthe warm zone. If there isuncontrolled bleeding, the offi-cers may tourniquet the woundbefore dragging or carrying thepatient to the CCP.Firefighters, escorted by armedofficers, make entry into the CCP,ideally within 10-15 minutes ofthe first officer’s entry.Ambulances are brought forwardeven as suspect mitigation effortscontinue, protected by the offi-cers on the security teams. Fireimplements its Mass CasualtyIncident (MCI) Protocols, aprocess they are expert in andrequire no additional training toperform well.

The CCP concept is a functionaloption for many practical reasons:•

There is very littlecross-training required. Initialtraining focuses on a slight para-digm shift for officers. While tra-ditional police Active Shooterresponse training has solelyfocused on locating and stopping

the threat, police are quicklytrained on requirements forestablishing an effective CCP forfire/EMS to conduct their MCI.Other than this nod to extra-police duties, the disciplines—and their training—remainintact. Police mitigate the sus-pect’s threat (verify he is downby suicide or third-party action,shoot him, verify he has barri-caded or has fled). Police con-duct security efforts to protectfire personnel as they transitioninside to the warm zone/CCPand as they conduct their MCIprotocols. As we’ve seen in inci-dent after incident, officers carryand drag the wounded whenEMS is delayed—the CCP con-cept formalizes this naturallyoccurring behavior, requiringarmed officers to transition thewounded to the CCP. While sus-pect mitigation efforts are on-going, firefighters enter thewarm zone (without the need ofballistic protection) and conducttheir MCI. Protected by policesecurity teams, ambulances pullup to the CCP entrance to receivethe wounded ready for transportand are transported to a defini-tive care facility. • Once the con-cept is explained to line, supervi-sory, management, and com-mand personnel, the conceptbecomes intuitive, lessening thedegree of training perishabilitythat is inherent in any responsemethod. As solutions become

more complicated, perishabilityincreases, creating a greater needfor recurring training and greaterbudget expenditures. There areno formations to learn and forgetfor either the police or fire.• The early establishment of theCCP is a proven concept in mili-tary combat operations and per-mits rapid triage, treatment, andtransport for the wounded. If18-year olds in combat canunderstand and function withthis concept, police officers willeasily function and make itwork. The 2011 shooting ofCongresswoman GabrielGiffords along with the six deadand 12 additional wounded is anexample. A married doctor andnurse already on-scene immedi-ately set up triage, and becausethe location was in a parking lot,fire personnel and ambulanceshad immediate access to thewounded. CongresswomanGiffords was operated on within53 minutes of being shot, savingher life. The early establishmentof the hasty UC is likely. UnifiedCommand between police andfire is facilitated and establishedas early as the two field com-mand elements can respond tothe Fire Stage location. This is anestablished priority for thisresponse method.•

While UnifiedCommand is vital to the successof the overall response, it is notrequired for suspect mitigationefforts, the formation of FireSecurity Teams, establishing aFire Stage (where two fire com-panies merge with all of theirMCI gear into one apparatus), orestablishing a secure CCP. TheUC is not critical to initial policelife-saving efforts until therelease point where fire is per-mitted to make entry into theCCP while protected by the secu-rity teams. The UC gives firepermission to make entry, com-plying with fire protocols withinthe Incident Command System(ICS).•

Initialresponding officers make inde-pendent entry into the structuresingly or in twos or threes. Asadditional officers arrive therebecomes an obvious point whereadditional personnel are not nec-essary to suspect mitigationefforts. Some who are inside thestructure will turn to patienttransfer to the CCP. Othersarriving at this point will becomepart of the Fire Security Teams.Fire personnel have alreadystaged and completed their inte-gration of crews and equipmentinto the primary response appa-ratus. It is only now that the ICScatches up with the incident and




the need for command and con-trol is exercised in releasing thesecurity teams and fire personnelto make entry into the CCP. Bynow the hasty UC, consisting ofa Battalion Chief and a policesupervisor or WatchCommander, is up and suffi-ciently oriented to make the call.

Where problems are experiencedwithin the R2TM/Internal CCPmethod is primarily due to train-ing scars from prior responsemethods requiring the thoroughsearching of every nook andcranny of a structure before con-cluding that is clear and "safe."Training must stress to officersthat their job is to create a rea-sonably secure "warm zone"rather than a safe "cold zone."

How RescueTeamsFunctionThe Rescue Team (RT) functionsunder the concept of a time-lim-ited response. Officers makeentry, either through rapidresponse (one or more officersinterdicting the suspect(s)) or byformation. Officers then locatethe wounded and twice sweep acorridor leading to a CCP on theexterior of the structure, search-ing and clearing each room andaccess to the corridor. TheUnified Command Post (UCP) isnotified that the corridor is clearand ready for patient extraction.

Officers and trained andequipped firefighters/EMSreport to the UCP. Teams of twofirefighters who are speciallytrained in small unit movementand equipped with ballistic pro-tection (helmets and vest) areassigned to a team of two to fourofficers. Multiple teams are des-ignated and prepare for entry.As soon as the UCP is notified

the corridor has been twice-cleared (now considered a“warm zone”), the RTs move tothe structure and make entry.Each RT moves as a team utiliz-ing specific trained formationsthat change given the architec-tural layout, possible threat area,or some kind of obstacle.

RTs encounter patients and treat

Time is the enemy

of the Active Shooter

response.

The more time the

suspect has privacy

and can safely hunt his

victims, the greater

number of casualties

there will be. And the

longer it takes to get

the wounded to

definitive medical

care, the more who

will suffer

a preventable death.

them in place, stabilizing them,and then drag or carry themwhile guarded by their lawenforcement counterparts. Aftermoving the patient to the exteri-or CCP, the RT returns, movingin formation, to the next patient.At the CCP, firefighters/EMSperform their Mass CasualtyIncident protocols the patientsare transported in order of theseverity of their injuries.

While Rescue Teams may func-tion once they are finally estab-lished and begin operating, how-ever, there are a great deal ofunanswered questions and prob-lems surrounding this conceptthat has been tried and failed inthe past:•

For apatient who is bleeding severelyfrom multiple gunshot wounds(GSW), having two paramedics,each having an MCI backpackfilled with medical equipment, issurpassed only by the patientalready having arrived at thetrauma center. However, MassCasualty Incident protocols weredeveloped to efficiently processmultiple trauma patients into thedefinitive care system as quicklyas possible. Delaying transportto a trauma center by two para-medics “staying and playing”causes other patients to bedenied these EMS professionals’help. The critically wounded arebest served in this instance byminimal EMS intervention andrapid transport to a trauma oper-

ating room.

•

Anumber of agencies boast theyhave at least one, and sometimestwo qualified RT firefighters onevery shift in their city. Thosepersonnel, first, must respondcity or county-wide to the inci-dent. If there 20 patients, 8immediate and 12 delayed, howlong before all 20 are triagedwith one or possibly two teamsoperating in the incident? Triagecannot efficiently occur ifpatients are being encounteredindividually by EMS first respon-ders. The question should be,“How can we efficiently transi-tion patients into the MCIprocess?” The only answer is toget them quickly into the CCPfor MCI processing into theTrauma Center.

•

Otherthan the control of arterial bleed-ing (which officers are capable ofcontrolling with tourniquets),patients are best served by theirrapid transfer to the CCP andinto the MCI process. Studiesdemonstrate that any delay inthe arrival of a patient to defini-tive medical care results in alower survival expectation.Patient survival depends upon asystematic triaging and transport

based on medical need ratherthan individual diagnosis ofwounds and stabilization at thelocation of wounding. Officersare already operating in the hotzone within the building.Officers, singly or in pairs, canmore easily and quickly transferpatients to the CCP than can aslow moving tactical formation.This natural police behaviorrequires no direction by higherauthority as evidenced in manyincidents where officers take theinitiative to move patients toEMS personnel rather than waitfor fire and EMS to be releasedinto the scene. Every minutewaiting for command direction isanother minute the victims arebleeding out.

• . In many RT

scenarios, the team members arealready in kit and linked up, andappear at the ingress point of abuilding. Where did the eightteams of four officers and twoparamedics each find each other,get assigned into teams, and whoassigned them to make entrywithin minutes of the first offi-cers entering? In the midst ofthe chaos and urgency of anactual event, escort officers andRT firefighters must respondfrom their respective locations(their stations, the field, fromhome), have a rally point (theCommand Post once it is set up),receive assignments, stage untilthe CP is informed that a particu-lar corridor or area has been


twice swept, and then makeentry when released by com-mand. This is unlikely to hap-pen in the early response stages.

•

Howlong does it take in the realworld before the average CP isestablished and, importantly,functioning? The CP not onlymust be established, but the per-sonnel manning the CP mustquickly get up to speed and ori-ent to an overwhelming amountof information, enabling them tothen process detailed intelligencefrom interior officers. Someonein the CP must then divert theirattention from gathering andanalyzing the information toattend to forming and releasingthe RT to respond. This takestime the wounded do not have.Without a functioning CP, the RTcannot come into existence andcannot be dispatched.•

The RT modelassumes RT personnel will beon-scene and linked up early inthe incident response. It alsoassumes that communicationswith interior units and the CPwill be established early and willbe clear regarding the status ofthe operating area in which theRTs will operate. An RT will notget the go-ahead to proceedwithout clear communicationsregarding where they are needed

and their route of travel. If com-munications are confused or theradio repeaters shut down due tocall volume (a common occur-rence), insertion of the RT mustbe delayed. The RT’s depend-ence upon early and clear com-munication from interior units isa major vulnerability to this con-cept. Hinging this much on sucha fragile variable is not tacticallynor strategically wise.

•

These incidents typicallyput a heavy demand on availableradio frequencies. It is notunusual that radio repeaters shutdown during the midst of sus-pect search operations for manyseconds or even minutes.Sometimes the structures them-selves block radio communica-tions and hamper operationaltempo and coordination—espe-cially in top-down managementenvironments. RTs require strictcoordination from the CP whilethese incidents by their verynature subvert clear communica-tions.

•

RT modelspermit teams to enter a section ofa building only after the corri-dor(s) and adjacent rooms havebeen twice-swept. Given the

mass confusion as well as thecontradictory reports and misin-formation over the radio (“Allunits, reports of a second sus-pect, description to follow.”), aswell as the information over-whelm that will initially be pre-sented to the Command Post,how will the CP: 1) Be estab-lished in time to be a factor inthe wounded’s survival? 2)How will the CP assign teammembers to teams in a timelymanner? 3) How will the CPdetermine what is a warm zoneand what is not with any degreeof accuracy? In the interior ofmany buildings it is easy—andcommon—to become disorientedto the cardinal directions. Howwill the officer be certain that the“west corridor” is properly iden-tified?

•

From the moment the indi-vidual is wounded, he or she hasbeen bleeding out. Some ofthese people are running out oftime. They have no luxury forthe time it takes to sweep andclear an entire hallway and eachroom leading to it, the samenumber of officers could havesecured the hallway and transi-tioned all of the wounded to theCCP.

• RTs are resource heavy. Eventhe leanest RTs require twopolice officers and two RT-quali-fied EMTs/paramedics. In an


incident where five teams areneeded due to the number ofwounded, where will the tenequipped and trained firefighterscome from? How long will ittake for them to report to thescene when off-duty? It must beremembered that within 20 min-utes of the first responding offi-cer, it is not unusual for publicsafety traffic jams to lock upevery surface street for blocks—late arriving firefighters/EMSmay have to walk for blocks tothe get to the UCP before beingassigned—after they respond totheir station for their turn-outgear.

•

This PPE represents alarge budgetary expense: mini-mally ballistic vests (sized toeach individual), ballistic hel-mets, and ballistic eye protection.Some teams are each being kittedout with TEMS backpacks.Maintenance and storage issuessoon arise. Where on the truck isthis PPE carried year round(especially when each vest andhelmet is fit to an individual)?Who maintains it? Who tracksthe expiration dates of the PPEfor replacement? Due to the lackof incidence, this PPE may becarted around for the duration ofthat firefighter’s career andnever be used. As promotions,injuries, and retirements occur,additional ballistic PPE will berequired for the new RT firemembers.

•

As inHazMat responses, the hot zonerequires special PPE for the tech-nicians to perform inside theaffected area, while support per-sonnel in the “warm zone” donot because they are not present-ly endangered by the environ-ment. The need for ballistic PPEfor the firefighters in the RTargues against the classificationof “warm zone.”

• Fire

personnel are not trained inpolice tactics and small unitmovement. This is a new skillinvolving very low-frequency,high-personal threat activitieswhere the likelihood of an indi-vidual actually being called uponto perform these tactics is far lessthan the chance of any individ-ual officer getting into a shootingon a particular shift. Nothing inthe firefighters’ daily work taskswill reinforce this training. Assuch, it will require intensive ini-tial training. The perishability ofthis training is high and teammembers must maintain this skillfor the duration of their careerwith frequent—and expensive—sustainment training.Additionally, as interest wanes orpromotions, injuries, and retire-ments occur, new team membersare required to be trained andequipped.

•

Transitioningpatients to the CCP for MCI pro-cessing is time-critical. The morepeople needed to respond to asingle location for assignment, begranted permission to enter atwice cleared area, move to thelocation of a wounded individ-ual, stabilize that individual, andthen move back to transfer thatperson to an external CCP, themore friction there will be, ham-pering rescue operations. Four(or six) individuals moving inrigid formations and collectingone patient at a time to transitionto a distant CCP is not only inef-ficient but is time consumingwhile people are bleeding unat-tended and in need of a surgeon.

Time mattersAs Sgt. Craig Allen said, "US lawenforcement wasted more than adecade training officers torespond to an Active Shooter information and have nothing toshow for it. It's time we move inthe direction of life-saving andabandon formations." Thisincludes formations in any form. The concept of early interdictionof the suspect combined with theearly establishment of the CCPand transitioning patientsthrough the MCI protocols intodefinitive medical care as rapidlyas is safely possible is a less com-plex, more intuitive method ofresponse. It is fast enough tomitigate the most common inci-dent: the lone gunman in a gun-


free zone with complete access tovictims. It is also flexible enoughto respond to the threat of multi-ple suspects acting in multiplelocations. And it requires far lessrecurrent training because thereis little cross-training—officerand firefighters are asked to per-form their everyday tasks withinthe model:• Police: Respond to a man witha gun/shots being fired call. • Police: Provide securityagainst assault.• Fire/EMS: Respond to a med-ical call with multiple traumavictims.

• Police and Fire/EMS: Helppeople who have been victim-ized and injured.• Police/SWAT: Perform a finalclearing of the structure.• Police: Evacuate and reunifica-tion.• Police: Investigate thecrime(s).Rather than recreate a failed tac-tic and instituting a complicatedmethod requiring expensiveequipment that might never beused as well demanding exten-sive recurrent sustainment train-ing as well, success is more likelywhen employing a less-complex,

more intuitive method. The inte-gration of police and fire is a life-saving concept that should beadopted and made as simple andas intuitive as possible. This isbest achieved when the policeare tasked with police duties andfire with fire duties, and the twodisciplines work together toachieve the overall goal of thePublic Safety response: life-saving.

My thanks to Jeff Gurske andRoberto DiGiulio for their con-tributing to the content of thisarticle.


Mr. George Williams is a Police Training Specialist and the Director of Training for CUTTING

EDGE TRAINING, LLC, in Bellingham, Washington. He has been a trainer of police overall since

1981 and a full-time trainer since 1987.He is responsible for the development and presentation of

unique and varied training programs to SWAT, patrol, K9, and Police Administrators, as well as

certifying instructors in Defensive Tactics, impact weapons, and shooting. His experience in train-

ing law enforcement ranges from police academies, through municipal and county agencies to

the state and federal government level. A SWAT tactics and weapons trainer, he has been a con-

sultant to several dozen teams in the Western United States over two decades. Mr. Williams is a

California P.O.S.T.-certified Police Master Instructor. As a Police Training Specialist, he has person-

ally trained officers from all 50 States and several U.S. Territories, as well officers from 14 foreign

countries. He continues to serve as a police expert witness in federal and state courts throughout

the US since 1991, and has authored two books and over 200 articles.

About the Author

T

An officer detains an active paroleegang member for questioning andduring the detention the suspect sud-denly runs. The officer chases the sus-pect for two blocks, observes the sus-pect to be grabbing into his shortspocket. The suspect yells out to theofficer that he is armed and will shootthe officer. The officer tackles the sus-pect, there is a violent struggle for theweapon and the officer shoots andkills the suspect.An officer attempts to affect anenforcement stop on a motorist for ahit and run accident. The driver failsto yield and stop at the first availableopportunity, drives to a park and thensuddenly foot bails into the park. Thelone officer chases after the suspectinto the park where the officer is sub-sequently ambushed, shot and killed.The situations described above aresimilar circumstances each resulting inopposite tragic and deadly conse-quences. Why does this continue tohappen?Foot pursuits by their very nature arehighly emotionally charged and dan-gerous events that occur frequently inpolice work. So far this year 50 officershave been killed by gunfire – a 32%increase from the same time last year

– and at least 19 of those officers or38% were victims of ambush or sur-prise attacks according to the mostrecent statistics gathered by the FBI.The significant increase in officerdeaths by gunfire is a disturbing trendthat has steadily risen since 1994 whenonly 10% of officers killed were as aresult of ambush attacks. More oftenthan not, officers become emotionallycaptured in a pursuit event and havean instinctive reaction, rather than astudied and planned response toresistance and chase without consider-ing the inevitability of suspect cap-ture. In other words, they chase thesuspect until the suspect catches them.Officers should remind themselvesthat what they often do not knowabout the people they are chasing andthe environment the foot pursuit takesplace can seriously hurt or kill the offi-cer.What officers may not know about thesuspect they are chasing include: • What if anything they may be want-ed for;• If they are armed;• What the suspect's martial arts orfighting skills are;• If the suspect is in better physicalshape than the officer is;

• If the suspect is psychotic;• If the suspect is under the influenceof drugs - such as powerful stimu-lants, or PCP;• Where the suspect may be takingthe officer to - such as an area ofambush;• If there are other suspects the officer is not aware of who can aid the suspect.

Officers need to remember that at thesame time that they are catching up tothe suspect, they are also reducing the"reactionary gap" between themselvesand the suspect. Reactionary gap isthe distance between the officer andsuspect, compared to the officer’s abil-ity to defensively react to somethingthe suspect might do to them. Shortenthe distance and the officer shortenshis/her reaction time. This is almostalways dangerous for the officer.The public sees so many foot pursuitson live television that they, and unfor-tunately the officers themselves, fail torealize just how inherently dangerousthese foot pursuits really are. The situ-ation for the officer and suspect canliterally and irrevocably change in theblink of an eye and can have fatal con-sequences for each.


Written by Dr. Ron Martinelli

TOCHASE



OR NOTTO

CHASE?

OR NOTTO

CHASE?In reviewing circumstances similar tothe incident involving a Riversidepolice officer who was murdered fol-lowing a foot pursuit on the eveningof November 7, 2010, 2006 FBI statis-tics on officers killed in the line ofduty indicate that 38% of all officerskilled in the U.S. occurred during acrime in progress where the officerwas affecting an arrest and that 60% ofall officers killed under such circum-stances were acting alone. Sixty-eightpercent (68%) of those officers werekilled at night. Seventy percent (70%)of officers are killed by handgunsfrom distances of fifteen feet or lessand suspects are able to hit an officertarget 68% of the time compared toofficers striking the suspect only 14%of the time. Other statistics show thatin a physical confrontation with a sus-pect, the officer ends up on theground 86% of the time where 25% areseriously injured and 12% are killedwith their own weapons such ashandguns and batons when the sus-pect is somehow able to disarm theofficer. These are certainly not favor-able survival statistics for the officer.Psychophysiologically, a pursuingofficer immediately may fall victim to

their body’s own survival mechanismsduring the chase. While running, anofficer’s brain involuntarily “dumps”powerful internal chemical stimulantssuch as adrenalin and epinephrine;and pain-blockers such as endorphinsand euphoric dopamine into theirbody. While the stimulants can makean officer stronger, they also createvisual distortions such as perceptualnarrowing (tunnel vision) and the lossof near vision (inability of seeing thefront sights of a handgun). As thebody automatically pools blood andfluids towards its core to preventblood loss in the event of traumaticinjury; officers also lose control oftheir fine and complex motor skills(ability to manipulate and graspobjects such as OC, ECWs andbatons); and most experience a dimin-ished or a complete loss of hearing.Worse case scenarios I have personallyinvestigated have found officers toreach a state of complete “hypervigi-lance” upon encountering their sus-pects, where the pursuing officerbecomes confused, panics, freezes, orhave resorted to extreme and unneces-sary uses of force. All of these symp-toms can prove deadly to the officer

or the fleeing suspect. So what should the officer do when asuspect runs from them? Here are afew officer safety enhancing tips:• Do not wait! Get on the radio imme-diately and call for assistance;• Put out a good description of thesuspect and their direction of travel;• SLOW DOWN and carry on a mov-ing surveillance of the fleeing suspectfrom a distance that allows for a lot ofreactionary gap time;• If you lose sight of the suspect, stop,find cover/concealment, arm yourselfand set up a perimeter while waitingfor back-up;• Check in with yourself and get backinto forebrain cognitive processing.Get centered; reduce your breathingand heart rate. Work on getting out oftunnel vision and diminished hearing.Make a plan or review your plan andthen engage it;• Let the suspect tire out from run-ning; let them experience the reducedvision and hearing instead of you;• Call for a K-9 unit and or a helicop-ter if available to search for the sus-pect;• Remember that it is usually not amatter of if you will catch the suspect;


Dr. Ron Martinelli, Ph.D., BCFT, CFA, CLS is a former police officer and detective with over 22

years of street experience primarily with the San Jose Police Department. Dr. Martinelli is a for-

mer director of a POST police academy, and a multi-certified use of force instructor who also is a

CSI forensic criminologist and police practices expert specializing in officer-involved shootings

and major uses of force. He is NCCM Board Certified in Forensic Trauma, a Diplomat with the

Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, a Certified Force Analyst with the Force Science Center

and a recognized member of the American College of Forensic Experts Institute. Dr. Martinelli is

nationally recognized for his research on the subject of psychophysiology and stress-induced

responses. He can be reached at (951) 719-1450 and at [email protected].

About the Author

Officers becomeemotionally captured in

a pursuit event and have aninstinctive reaction, rather thana studied and planned responseto resistance and chase withoutconsidering the inevitability ofsuspect capture. In other words,they chase the suspect until the

suspect catches them.

just when you will catch them.

Suspects most usually go to ground and hide soon after an officer loses sight of them. Setting up a perimeter and using aK-9 and air support to find the suspect has historically proven to be the most successful method of capture.While an officer’s desire to protect the public and affect the arrest of a fleeing suspect is a selfless and courageous act,there is rarely a good reason for an officer to get injured or killed during a foot pursuit. Officers killed in the line of dutyduring foot pursuits should be a constant reminder to the public that police officers introduce themselves into dangeroussituations on a daily basis. Unfortunately, this risk has become an all too frequent occurrence in our industry.If officers can just remember a few of these important tips, they will make it home safe and alive.


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TRANSFORMERS: Written by Alexandra Jones

Motorcycle Gangs and Extremism


The past decade Europe has seen an explosive growth in the number of motorcycle gangs (MCs), many of

which are listed as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs[1] (OMGs), sometimes referred to as ‘One Percenters’. The One

Percenters are more narrowly defined by ATF as (among other things) any group of motorcyclists whose

activities bring them and their club into repeated and serious conflict with society and the law. These defini-

tions assume that such clubs are bands of motorcyclists. In Europe, this is often no longer the case. They are

at best hybrid gangs, and often – like the Black Jackets MC – glorified street gangs that are cloaked in the


colours of an MC, because the MC

is a proven successful business

model.

It’s allabout themoney –The FBI defines OMGs as organi-

zations whose members use their

motorcycle clubs as conduits for

criminal enterprises. The purpose

of an enterprise is to make money,

and any company set up with an

eye to maximizing profits and

minimizing risks will seek an

organizational model so as best to

enable and support its aims. The

OMG offers bands of criminals a

successful business model that will

do just that outside and sometimes

inside of regular societal frame-

works for conducting business.

Or is it? Where the rapid expansion of the

motorcycle gangs is in itself cause

for concern, the situation has been

aggravated by the emergence of

gangs that either had a political

agenda from the start or that have

become politically sensitized.

Consisting mainly of young men

from ethnic minorities and socially

marginalized groups such as

Travellers, these MC-look-a-likes

have evolved from goon squads

into serious transnational criminal

networks.

, John

Hagedorn states that gangs have

become institutionalized in social

environments, are globalized and

can be found in increasingly glob-

alized urban spaces. Crucially in

the context of the developments in

the European MC-scene, according

to Hagedorn, gangs are ‘social

actors’ whose identities are formed

by (perceived) identity-based

repression, participation in the

underground economy, and con-

structions of gender [2]. Where the

goon squads were basically first

generation street gangs – and

some OMG puppet clubs still are –

the new MCs are at least second

generation gangs, and some of

them have grown into third gener-

ation ganghood. The issue with

these new style European MCs is

that some of those which may still

be characterized as second genera-

tion gangs, have a political edge to

them. Such motorcycle gangs

transform into true outlaw motor-

cycle gangs: gangs that incorpo-

rate resistance to mainstream soci-

ety and become social actors out-

side society’s legal framework.

Although the rapid expansion of

MCs is seen throughout Europe,

the expansion in Eastern Europe

appears to differ from the situation

in North-Western Europe (mainly

The Netherlands, Germany and

Scandinavia, especially Denmark).

The MC-look-alikes in the North-

West, an area that could also be

described as the Meuse-Rhine-Elbe

delta, stand out from their sur-

roundings in that they are com-

posed of young men who are eth-

nically and often religiously differ-

ent from mainstream society. This

appears not to be the case in

Eastern Europe simply because

there aren’t nearly as many immi-

grants there, and none of the

Eastern European countries has a

colonial past. To the best of my

knowledge Southern Europe does-

n’t suffer from such an increase in

motorcycle gang activity. It is true

that a number of MC chapters


have been established in Spain in

the past decade, but these seem to

have been predominantly estab-

lished and ‘staffed’ by MCs from

e.g. Germany and The

Netherlands. Gangs that are exem-

plary for this new breed of not-

really-MCs: Dutch Satudarah MC

with its core of Moluccans, the

three Dutch MCs that unite

Travellers and Romani, the

Kurdish Median Empire MC, the

Black Jackets MC and the

Kamikaze Riders MC. At least

two, and possibly three of these

MCs can be linked to terrorist

groups: the Kamikaze Riders MC

in Belgium are closely associated

with jihadists currently active in

Syria and Iraq, one of the Dutch

Travellers MCs has an interesting

association with Northern Ireland

(Ulster), and with some consider-

able caution Median Empire MC

in Germany might be linked to the

Kurdish PKK [3]. All the OMGs

mentioned above are very present

on the internet, especially on

YouTube.

Whereangelsfear totread Where angels fear to tread

The very notion of gang is treach-

erous terrain, an academic mine-

field subject to political and police

opportunism, discussion of which

is beyond the scope of this post. In

Europe there lies a conceptual no

man’s land between Thrasher’s

traditional ‘wild peer group’ of

unruly adolescents and the offi-

cially labelled ‘organized crime

group’ (OCG) consisting of adult

males whose joint criminal activi-

ties are structured, persistent and

mainly driven by prospects of

financial gain. The outlaw motor-

cycle gangs are commonly ana-

lyzed and tackled as if they were

like most OCGs, i.e. exclusively

economic enterprises. The new

OMGs, however, combine the eco-

nomic ambitions of the organized

crime groups with the drive for

territory of the street gangs and

the quest for identity of the adoles-

cent peer groups. They become

socio-political actors.

The nexus between organized

crime and terrorism isn’t a new

phenomenon; Sullivan and Elkus

have explored the matter exten-

sively in Global cities – global

gangs, and Red Teaming Criminal

Insurgency (2009). This post will

explore relations between some of

the most notable new OMGs and

terrorism.

No Surrender MC. The Travellers

community in The Netherlands

has spawned three major OMGs in

the past five years, one of which is

No Surrender MC. It has quickly

become an MC of mixed ethnic

and social composition. One of its

chapters is in The Hague. Last

year the website of this particular

chapter had its home page show-

ing its own logo next to the sym-

In spite of being calledan MC, they do not ride

bikes. He says that if theyjust were to ride around

on bikes wearing cutsand colours, they wouldbe a ‘carnival society’

(Karnevalsverein)

bol and colours of the local foot-

ball club and interestingly, graffiti

style red fist adjacent to the text:

Loyalists/still/under siege/NO

SURRENDER.

This is a clear reference to the out-

lawed Red Hand Defenders, a loy-

alist (i.e. Protestants loyal to the

United Kingdom) paramilitary

group that is now officially classi-

fied as a terrorist group and as

such has been banned. The RDH

rejects the Good Friday Agreement

and is held responsible for multi-

ple killings. It is unclear why an

OMG chapter from The Hague

would associate itself with the

RDH or flag its affinity with it.

The website no longer shows this

particular picture.

Median Empire MC, Germany. A

number of years ago leading

members of a notorious Kurdish

crime family in Germany estab-

lished several chapters of Mongols

MC Germany after they had been

turned down by the Hells Angels.

A young Kurd called ‘Erhan’ or

‘Azad’, originally from Iran, joined

the Kurdish Mongols MC in

Germany but found them very

much lacking in the brotherhood

they so advertised. So he founded

his own Kurdish MC, Median

Empire MC. The name Median

Empire refers to the ancient

empire that occupied the lands

many Kurds consider ancestral

Kurdish territory and which they

strive to unite once more into a

Kurdish homeland. One of the

support clubs is called ‘The

Immortals’, referring to the elite

soldiers of the kings of Persia. One

of the clips posted on YouTube

shows the frontman abroad,

apparently in Kurdistan. He is

armed with an AK-47. In an inter-

view with the respectable

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in

2012 headman ‘Azad’ isn’t shy

about the nature of Median

Empire MC. In spite of being

called an MC, they do not ride

bikes. He says that if they just

were to ride around on bikes

wearing cuts and colours, they

would be a ‘carnival society’

(Karnevalsverein). ‘Azad’ also says

that he ‘used to be’ an active mem-

ber of the PKK, the outlawed

Kurdish organization classified as

a terrorist organization. The PKK

and its affiliates are well known

for the sophistication of their

organization. They are a pervasive

presence in Kurdish communities

in Europe. Extortion and protec-

tion are important sources of rev-

enue for the PKK as well as for

OMGs. It is doubtful whether a

young man once in the PKK could

successfully leave the organization

and establish his own gang which

in some fields would compete

with the PKK.

In Antwerp and Brussels young

men and boys of often Moroccan

descent have ganged up together

in a small MC which they call

Kamikaze Riders MC. The name of

which refers both to their reckless

bike riding and to the Japanese

suicide pilots of WW2. In this case


the word ‘streetgang’ is probably

too strong; the group as an MC

doesn’t seem particularly evolved

but motorcycles actually do fea-

ture: Japanese motorcycles of

course, not American ones. The

bikers engage in street races. The

MC was begun by Said Saouti, a

Salafist preacher who names

Anwar Al Awlaki, among others,

as his teacher. Saouti teamed up

with a good friend of his,

Abdelouafi Elouassaki to found

Kamikaze Riders MC. Abdelouafi,

who died in a motorcycle accident

in May 2013, had two brothers.

Those two brothers, Houssien and

Hakim, were both suspected of

being involved with terrorist activ-

Sharia4Belgium, an extremist

Muslim organization which was

disbanded in October 2012. Other

members of Kamikaze Riders MC

on Facebook openly support jihad.

Founding father Said Saouti can be

found on social media as Said

Deltabox III, or Said Kamikaze or

Kawaz:

Belgian websites dedicated to

monitoring links between Belgian

jihadists and the war in Syria [4]

have no qualms about the nature

of the Kamikaze Riders MC: they

call the gang a dangerous jihadist

motorcycle gang. Said Saouti may

be a preacher, he is also a felon

convicted for burglary and fire

arms offences.


Badge of The Immortals – 135 support crew (of Median Empire MC)

Median Empire MC, probably chapter Dark City (= Cologne, Germany). Not a motorcycle in sight.

ities. Houssien was apparently

planning to commit a terrorist

attack in Brussels. Hakim and

Houssien went to Syria to join the

fight, in the course of which

Houssien was killed and Hakim

was grievously wounded.

Houssien Elouassaki was also one

of the frontmen of

Alexandra Jones has been a strategic crime analyst with the police in The Hague, The

Netherlands for the past eight years. Her main interest is in criminal street gangs, network analy-

sis, and threat assessments. Currently mainly charged with research and development assign-

ments, she has also worked organized crime, homicide, and political extremism.

About the Author


[1]For the sake of brevity, no distinction is made between OMGs, One Percenter OMGs and their puppet clubs[2] John M. Hagedorn (ed.) (2007). Gangs in the Global City. Alternatives to Traditional Criminology. Urbana and Chicago,University of Illinois Press.[3]All information in this post is OSINT.[4]http://mediawerkgroepsyrie.wordpress.com and http://emmejihad.wordpress.com

This article is reprinted with permission from Foreign Intrigue . (Posted 28 August 2014)

Conclusion: Leaders of radicalized Muslims and leaders of gangs in European cities are fishing for the same

fish in the same ponds. They groom alienated boys and young men, generally from marginalized communi-

ties such as ethnic or religious minorities, who are looking for pride, fulfillment of a particular sort of mas-

culinity and generally somewhere to belong. Especially vulnerable are those who are (considered) social fail-

ures, with a propensity to violence and no allegiance to mainstream society. Those gangs that succeed in com-

bining the successful organizational model of the outlaw motorcycle gang with a cultural narrative create a

robust and flexible framework through which to do business, which may not always be financial, viz the

Kamikaze Riders. The diaspora of a great array of peoples through Europe’s cities lends these gangs an easy

reach outwards to fellow communities elsewhere while at the same time importing into these cities the con-

flicts from their homelands. These new MCs are organized on the basis of a shared heritage and a shared

rejection of the society that surrounds them. As it is the nature of street gangs and jihadists to strive for con-

trol over territory, they look to control not just hearts and minds but actual neighborhoods on which they will

impose their own rules and where they can stave off fiscal and judicial intervention.

ntelligence, Surveillance & ReconnaissanceI

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J u s t c o n t a c t u s @ L L u j a n @ I T TA c o r p . o r g


Written by Fred T. Leland, Jr.


“It’s about mind over matter. I

don’t mind and you don’t mat-

ter.” ~Marine Corps Drill

Instructor, Parris Island 1980

Mind over matter are words I

heard chanted in my ear over

and over again as I made

efforts to push out hundreds of

pushups, sit-ups, jumping

jacks, complete obstacle courses

and various challenges while

attending Marine Corps Boot

Camp some 32 years ago. Mind

over matter is a concept I have

believed in for much of my

adult life since. It helped me in

all my efforts to persevere in

both my personal and profes-

sional lives. It embellished the

can or will do attitude. I have

uttered to myself and out loud;

I am, and I can accomplish

what I think about. As a cop the

mind over matter concept often

came to surface over the years

in the performance of my

duties; “I will win, and I will

run faster and further than the

other guy. When I see the

“PERP” running away, I will

run him down and stop him.

When he zigs I will zag. I will

physically beat my opponent.

When the “PERP” does not

comply and wants to fight or

kill me I will outmaneuver, out-

fight and outdraw and out

Mindset

Republic of Korea Marines and U.S. Marines participated in a 400-kilometer hike for the first time duringKMEP as part of the annual cold weather training the ROK Marines train in. 1st ROK Special

Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st ROK Division, Company A, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd MarineDivision, III Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by LCpl Matt Myers)


and Winning is About Much More than Words, Isn't It?

Every situation is winnable, not becausethey will it to be so, but instead becausethey possess both the will and skill to win


shoot my opponent. I will win

every encounter and go home to

my family at the end of my

shift!” Really I will! I mean it! I

just said it, didn’t I, so it will be

so? Or is there something more

to mind over matter? What hap-

pens when the adversary you

face does mind and suddenly

you do matter? Isn’t there more

substance to the winning mind-

set than mere words and does

not mind have to connect with

matter, the stuff you know

(ideas, innovative and adaptive

tactics, techniques and proce-

dures) and are capable of apply-

ing if you are to win on the

street?

Now before you get crazy on me

and start going off on how

important the winning mindset

and positive self-talk is, to us

winning on the street let me say

this, I WHOLEHEARTIDLY

AGREE! But it’s also about

knowledge and skills. More

importantly it’s about taking that

same knowledge and skills and

applying it to the street and the

situation we find ourselves in.

This takes conditioning the

mind, subconscious mind and

physical skills so they work in

unison.

I have come to the conclusion

that what we say, the words we

use or think about often do not

match our actions. In other

words, we do not walk the self-

talk and practice what we preach

or tell ourselves. In order for

mindset to work we must live

and breathe it. We must take

ownership enthusiastically and

create and nurture the winning

mindset so that it takes hold

mentally in our decision making

and transitions to the physical in

our actions. Mindset has to syn-

ergistically connect to the physi-

cal and be part of us always. The

winning mindset is not some-

thing you just turn on when

things go bad. Mindset is always

in the on position. This is why

training must be realistic and

constant.

Law enforcement officers who

possess a winning mindset know

that the only purpose for han-

dling dynamic encounters is to

win. Now we must keep in mind

that winning as numerous defi-

nitions in the law enforcement

world. We need to navigate

ambiguous, uncertain and com-

plex situations while exploiting

opportunities and hence out-

comes we seek often change. We

may seek a resolution through

negotiation and win voluntary

compliance. We may win

through physical force when

negotiation efforts fail. We in a

worst case scenario may win

through the use of deadly force.

Winning in any of these exam-

ples takes mindset, knowledge,

skills and sound tactics.

Cops have to possess the win-

ning mindset but they must also

possess confidence in their skills

and abilities and how they can

apply them under the pressure

of real time real world condi-

tions. They must be committed

and dedicated to their mission,

and must be physically and men-

tally prepared to do whatever is

reasonable and necessary to

accomplish that objective. Their

training allows them to under-

stand that every situation is

winnable, not because they will

it to be so, but instead because


they possess both the will and skill to win.

There is much misunderstanding at least in my mind about the true warrior spirit within law enforce-

ment. There are many who think that the winning mindset is about machismo, about bravado. They

think the winning mindset is about rushing pedal to the metal, to all the calls, or puffing up their chest,

starting fights to show others how tough or how much of a man they are. They take rash actions and

uncalculated risks. Professionals, however, do not need to start fights to show others how tough they are.

They are confident in their skills and tactics, because they understand the connection and importance of

mindset applied with skill. They understand that they must shape and reshape events with skill opera-

tionally and that there is a time to fight and a time to talk. They know when wait for reinforcements or

when they must go it alone. When they have to fight, they fight to win. They fight with stubbornness

and intensity combined with skill they have created and nurtured through training and learning from

every experience. When it’s over they walk away with their heads held high with integrity and honor

knowing they used tactical methods they decided on. A decision they were able to make because they

understood that it’s the mindset and physical connection (will and skill) that had them ready and pre-

pared. Mind (will) and matter (skill) make the difference, don’t you think?

Fred T. Leland, Jr. is the Founder and Principal Trainer of LESC: Law Enforcement & Security

Consulting (www.lesc.net). He is the author of “Adaptive Leadership Handbook: Innovative

Ways to Teach and Develop Your People", written for police and security professionals, pub-

lished in January 2014, and is available on Amazon. In addition to his work with LESC, Fred

Leland is an active Lieutenant with the Walpole (MA) Police Department. He previously worked

as a deputy with the Charlotte County (FL) Sheriff’s Department and before that spent six years

with the United States Marines including as a squad leader in Beirut, Lebanon. Leland is an

accomplished trainer with more than 28 years’ experience teaching law enforcement, military

and security professionals. His programs of instruction include handling dynamic encounters;

threat assessment; nonverbal communications; decision making under pressure; evolving

threats; violence prevention; firearms; use of force; officer created jeopardy and adaptive lead-

ership. He is also a 2004 graduate of the FBI National Academy Class 216, and a current instruc-

tor for the Massachusetts Municipal Police Training Committee. Outcomes based training and

education (OBTE) is his approach to creating and nurturing decision makers to observe, orient,

decide and act while considering consequences.

About the Author


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