t2 b11 analysis strategy fdr- plan to assess intel analysis leading up to 9-11

8/14/2019 T2 B11 Analysis Strategy Fdr- Plan to Assess Intel Analysis Leading Up to 9-11

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PLAN TO ASSESS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS LEADINGUP TO THESEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST

ATTACKS

OVERVIEW

The primary objective is to write a chronological n arrative of theIC's efforts to analyzethe Al Qaeda threat between1991 and 2001. The narrative willbe followed by a sectiondiscussing the major factors thatthe determined the effectivenessof these efforts.

To do this, we propose thefollowing approach:

We will iden tify, obtain,and review the major analytic products pertainingto AlQaeda and related activities that were produced du ring this period. W e w ill alsoreview a sample of the day-to-day reporting. W e w ill arrange these produc ts inchronological order, and identify the conclusions that were reached at differentpoints in time.

To understandhow these produc ts were developedand put them in contextwewill identify and interview personnel who participated in these analyses. W e willalso interview intelligence consumers,after coordinating thiseffort with thePolicy Team.

To understandhow these analyses reflectedthe state of 1C analysis and its abilityto respond to the terrorist threat, we w ill collect docu mentation layingforth thedevelopment of policies, plans, and instructions that guided1C analyticoperations.

We will also interview analysis managerswho were responsible for the planning,review, and coordination of these products.

Using all these data,we will then identify the main factors that shaped1C analysisfor Al Qaeda and terrorism, and the effectiveness of this analysis.These factorswill be documented, discussed, and used to develop"lessons learned" andproposals for recommendations.

APPROACH

Establish Backg round:

1. Identify the players:

A. Consu mers: Wh o tasked and received analysis, and wh at were the resulting terms

of reference? How did this change over time? (Coordinate this section with Policy Team )

B. Producers: W ho were the relevant individualsand organizations in the analyticcommunitynominally responsible for analyzing the Al Q aeda threat? Responsibilitiesaside, who was actually conducting analysis,and what were their skills, specialization,and functions?How did this change over time?


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2. Assess state of und erstanding of theAl Qaeda threat prior to9-11

A. Open literature and med ia reports: Wh at was the state of understand ing Al Qaedaoutside the1C in respect to its size,capabilities, financial support, objectives, andorganization?Identify and review books, monographs;identify the leading experts andtheir conclusions. Com pile this as a time line to show ho w it evolved.

B. Intelligence co mm unity products: Address above qu estions in respect to the 1C.Identify majorproducts in respects to conclusionsand evolutionof understanding overtime: NIEs, SEIB items, and briefings. Identifyand document flow of information whoproduced the products, who received the produc ts. Docum ent response and satisfaction ofrecipients with the analysis they received and how this feedbackaffected later analysis.

Assess Issues:

1. Develop overviewof general stateof 1C analysisof the terrorist threat du ringtheperiod in review

A. Efforts to adapt andfocus analysis methods and management to the new threat.Identify and review efforts by CIA, NSA,DOD and other 1C agencies to update theiranalytic organizations for the terrorist threat and other post-Cold War issues.

B. Docum ent analytic production plans.How did AlQaeda fit into the over analyticstrategy of the CIA, NS A, DOD andother 1C organizationsduring the period in review?What was thelevel of effort?

2. Assess 1C analytic capabilities, m ethods,and resources

A. Personnel. Assess number and types of analytic personnel assigned to terrorism,and, in particular,Al Qaeda. Develop time lines, documen t decision pointsin allocationof personnel. Specialeffort will be made to correlate these allocations to ma nagem entdecisions. This effort will be coordinated with Commission teams and staff examiningintelligence resources.

B. Data. Identify data gaps revealed and discussed in the analysis. Assess how thisaffected collection taskingfrom analystsand how collectors responded. Assessho wanalystsdealt with data gaps (e.g., estimating uncertainty , analytic workaround s)

C. Tools and m ethodologies.Identify and describe tools and methodologies used in

tracking Al Qaeda (e.g., netwo rk analysis; toolsfor sorting dataand identifying linkages;translation;link analy sis; etc.

2. Evaluate1C managem ent and operation of the analyticprocess

A. Tasking and M onitoring.Describe procedures for assigning tasks to analysts,monitoringresponse, and review of output.


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B. Coordination and Com mu nication. DescribeIT and procedures usedby analyticorganizations

Requiredresources for the workplan

1. Publicationsand documents

The Team 2 workplan identifiesthe materials that willbe required for the analysis.Special em phasis w ill be placed on:

All National Intelligence CouncilNIEs, SNIEs,and other major productsmaterials on the terrorist threat

All CIA Directorate of IntelligenceIMs, LAs,typescripts, SEIBand PDB itemspertaining toA l Qaeda and the terrorist threat

All DCI Counterterrorism Center reports Access to all NS Areports an d supporting data pertainingto A lQaeda (thesewill

be examined selectively because of the volum e of m aterial)

In addition to these analytic products,the workplan willalso require access to documentslaying forth the policies, plans,and procedures that guided CIA , NIC,and NSA analyticefforts. These include:

Allmajor planning an d strategy documentsby (or directing)th e DI, th e analyticcomponentsof N S A ,and DOD intelligence organizations

The portions of DCI plans and directives pertaining the intelligence analysis The results of commissions and similar groups tasked during this timeto examine

the intelligence comm unity's analysis and analytic capabilities

2. Interviews

The Team 2 workp lan lists the persons w ho need to be interview ed to assess theperformance the intelligence c om mu nity prior to9-11. This sub-plan requires essentiallythe same access,with special emph asis on those persons holding thefollowing positionsduring theperiod in question:

Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Directorof Central Intelligence CIA Deputy D irectorfor Intelligence Chairman, N ationalIntelligence Council National IntelligenceOfficer (Warning) Heads of the DCI Counterterrorism Center,InformationOperations Center,and

UBL Task Force Director of the National Security A gency Deputy Directorof the National Security A gency


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Director of NSA sub-components responsible for the analysis of SIGINTpertainingto terrorism

Schedule and Products

The schedule for this effort is highly dependenton when we can begin serious work,and

this depends mainly on the CJA recognizing m y clearances. Assum ing we can begin byJuly 1, we expect to complete the review of existing materials by the end ofAugust. Mostinterviews will be conductedfrom September through November.

W e will havea draft of the main product,a monograph suitablefo r publicationandrelease to the public as an unclassified docum ent by the end of December.

t2 b11 analysis strategy fdr- plan to assess intel analysis leading up to 9-11

Documents